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3oo The Foreign Threat: Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

1) The shogunate council reluctantly agreed to open the ports of Hyogo and Osaka to foreign trade after initially hesitating over the difficulties it could cause Kyoto. 2) Satsuma opposed the decision in order to prevent the shogunate from gaining dominance over the imperial court, which would strengthen its position against the daimyo lords. 3) Faced with a deadlock, the shogun offered to resign in favor of Keiki and proposed adopting Western military techniques like building ships and guns to strengthen Japan against foreign threats.

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60 views1 page

3oo The Foreign Threat: Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

1) The shogunate council reluctantly agreed to open the ports of Hyogo and Osaka to foreign trade after initially hesitating over the difficulties it could cause Kyoto. 2) Satsuma opposed the decision in order to prevent the shogunate from gaining dominance over the imperial court, which would strengthen its position against the daimyo lords. 3) Faced with a deadlock, the shogun offered to resign in favor of Keiki and proposed adopting Western military techniques like building ships and guns to strengthen Japan against foreign threats.

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3OO THE FOREIGN THREAT

politics. The bakufu council, having demurred, briefly and ineffec-


tively, over the opening of Hyogo and Osaka, because of the difficul-
ties this might cause to Kyoto, accepted the terms on November 13,
only to find Hitotsubashi Keiki insisting that for the bakufu again to
act without the court's approval in a matter of such sensitivity would
be politically disastrous. The council reluctantly agreed. Keiki se-
cured a promise from the foreign representatives of an extra ten days
to accomplish the task, then set out to win imperial consent. Hostility
from remaining antiforeign groups in the palace was something he
expected and could confidently ignore, given the support of senior
court officials, most of whom owed their appointment to the shogun's
favor. More alarming was the stubborn opposition he encountered
from Satsuma. It was not so much that Satsuma objected to the foreign
proposals in themselves. Rather, it was that Okubo Toshimichi,
Satsuma's key political figure in Kyoto, was determined that the
bakufu must not be allowed to use the crisis to establish a position of
dominance at court that would strengthen it against the great lords.
Consequently, to Keiki's insistence on consulting the court he added a
demand for consultation of the daimyo, notwithstanding the time it
would take. He even offered to approach the foreigners directly, or
through the court, to secure their consent to the delay.
One factor in resolving the resulting deadlock was Parkes's impa-
tience. On November 21 he wrote a letter to the shogun threatening all
kinds of evil consequences if the matter were not settled: "[Disunion
must bring upon your country the most grave disorders, as our Govern-
ments are firmly resolved to insist upon the faithful and complete
observance by all parties, whether our enemies or our friends, of every
condition of the Treaties. . . ."& More immediately significant, how-
ever, was a remarkable closing of the ranks within the bakufu itself.
On November 18 the shogun, Iemochi, offered to resign in favor of
Keiki. He accompanied this gesture with a memorandum that not only
recommended acceptance of the demands presently being made by the
foreign envoys but also urged an entirely new line of approach to the
West,, that of borrowing Western techniques to build up Japanese
strength. Japan, he argued, must "follow the example of the foreigners
in using the profits from trade to construct many ships and guns,
adopting the strategy of using the barbarian to subdue the barbar-
ian."1*8 The idea was not new, for many Japanese had been advocating
something of the kind in the years since Perry, but never before had

47 Ibid., pp. 299-300. 48 Ibid., pp. 297-9.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

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