Hindawi Publishing Corporation

International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

Volume 2012, Article ID 492819, 8 pages
doi:10.1155/2012/492819

Review Article
Wireless Sensor Network Applications in Smart Grid:
Recent Trends and Challenges

Yide Liu
Faculty of Management and Administration, Macau University of Science and Technology, Taipa, Macau

Correspondence should be addressed to Yide Liu, [email protected]

Received 28 April 2012; Revised 11 July 2012; Accepted 16 July 2012

Academic Editor: An Liu

Copyright © 2012 Yide Liu. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Smart grid revolutionizes the current electric power infrastructure by integrating with communication and information
technologies. With wireless sensor network, smart grid enables both utilities and customers to transfer, monitor, predict, and
manage energy usage effectively and costly. However, the increased application of wireless sensor network also introduce new
security challenges, especially related to privacy, connectivity, and security management, causing unpredicted expenditure and
disaster to both utilities and consumers. In order to build a reliable wireless sensor network for smart grid, an application review
and taxonomy of relevant cyber security and privacy issues is presented in this paper. A unified framework for identification of
applications and challenge issues of wireless sensor network in smart grid is developed. Future research directions are discussed at
the end of this paper.

1. Introduction However, wireless sensor network also brings cyber secu-

rity and privacy challenges to smart grid—many security,
Smart grid can provide efficient, reliable, and safe energy privacy and reliability issues appear during electric power
automation service with two-way communication and elec- delivery. For example, cascading-failure-induced disasters
tricity flows. Through wireless sensor network, it can capture might appear if attackers disrupt the grid at a later date from
and analyze data related to power usage, delivery, and a remote location; smart grid customers’ privacy information
generation efficiently. According to the analysis results, smart might be accessed illegally through wireless sensing network;
grid can provide predictive power information (e.g., meter the adversary might also compromise selected nodes in
reading data, monthly charge, and power usage recommen- a tactical delay-tolerant network and thus fail the critical
dation) to both utilities and consumers. It can also diagnose mission of the supervisory control and data acquisition
power disturbances and outages to avoid the effect of equip- (SCADA) systems [1, 2]. Any of these forms of attack can be
ments failure and natural accidents. Wireless senor network highly dangerous to the grid—millions of homes might be
is adopted by utility companies and suppliers for substation left without electric power and businesses could be closed.
automation management, and it is also widely applied in Besides, power grids are a major resource to the national
wireless automatic meter reading (WAMR) system. Based defense. Therefore, a secure wireless ad hoc and sensor net-
on wireless sensor network, energy usage and management work communication with high capacity must be addressed
information, including the energy usage frequency, phase to ensure a reliable and efficient smart grid.
angle and the values of voltage, can be read real time from However, some of current guidelines for electric power
remote devices. Therefore, utility companies can manage system were designed for connectivity, without consideration
electricity demand efficiently. They can reduce operational of wireless risks [3], and some of electric power system secu-
costs by eliminating the need for human readers and provide rity standards do not cover threats through wireless sensor
an automatic pricing system for customers. Customers can network communication. It may lead to an unsatisfied
enjoy highly reliable, flexible, readily accessible and cost- result to simply transplant wireless sensor network security
effective energy services. techniques into the smart grid. An understanding of system
2 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

HAN

Nonrenewable

BAN

Renewable AMI
Substation
LAN
Bulk Transmission Distribution Customers
generation

Operations

Service providers
Markets
Electrical flows
Secure communication flows

Figure 1: NIST reference model for the smart grid [5].

components with wireless sensor network and associated and multifunctional sensor nodes which can be of benefit to
cyber vulnerabilities is therefore necessary for the smart grid electric system automation applications, especially in urban
deployments and is the motivation of this paper. areas [4]. These sensor nodes take advantage of demo-
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec- graphic, action, communication, situation, or other data
tion two reviews the application of wireless sensor network in (physical environment, location data, distance, temperature,
smart grid, including WirelessHART, International Society of sound, air pressure, time, lighting levels, people nearby,
Automation (ISA) 100.11a, and ZigBee. In Sections three and customer preferences and even customer emotional state,
four, related cyber security and privacy issues in the smart etc.). They can also map the physical characteristics of the
grid are discussed and classified. Section five provides several environment to quantitative measurements [4].
potential research fields. The collaborative and context-awareness nature of WSN
brings several advantages over traditional sensing including
2. Wireless Sensor Network Applications in greater fault tolerance, improved accuracy, larger coverage
Smart Grid area, and extraction of localized features. Sensor nodes can
monitor the overall network and to communicate with the
For distributing energy power from power plants to end control center in the power utility (e.g., a substation), in
customers, smart grid contains three major processes: power order to help operators decide the appropriate actions. The
generation, power delivery, and power utilization, wherein sensor node can communicate with the task manager via
seven specific domains are going on: power plant domain, Internet or satellite. As shown in Figure 2, for developing a
substation domain, distribution domain, market domain, wireless sensor network for smart grid, there are three alter-
operation domain, service provider domain, and customer natives based on the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol: ZigBee, Wire-
domain (as show in Figure 1). Recently, WSN has been lessHART, and ISA100.11a. For example, ZigBee is a choice
widely recognized as a vital component of the electric power for smart grid system networking within home. Wireless-
system, different from wireless ad hoc networks, wireless sen- HART or ISA100.11a can be used in substation or a gen-
sor network contains a large number of low cost, low power, eration plant. In this section, the wireless sensor network
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 3

Markets Operations Service providers

Retailer/ RTO/ISO Ops Transmission Ops Distribution Ops Utility provider Third-party
wholesaler provider
EMS Demand Asset CIS
EMS response Mgmt Retail
energy CIS
WAMS Billing
Aggregator provider Billing
MDMS DMS
Home/building
Enterprise Enterprise manager
Energy market bus Enterprise
clearinghouse bus bus Aggregator
Metering Others
ISO/RTO RTO Transmission system
participant SCADA SCADA Distribution
SCADA Internet/
e-business

Internet/
e-business
Wide area Energy Electric
Market services Field area services vehicle
networks networks
interface Data interface
collector Distributed
Plant control Meter generators
system Substation Substation
LANs controller Field device Internet/ Electric
Generators e-business storage
Bulk generation Customer
equipment Applications
Substation
device Distributed
generators Customer Thermostat
Electric EMS
Domain storage
Network Distribution
Actor Transmission Customer
Comms path
Domain gateway actor
Comms path changes owner/domain

Figure 2: NIST Smart Grid Framework 1.0, September 2009 [6].

application for smart grid will be discussed separately in

the context of power generation, power delivery, and power HW
utilization.

2.1. Power Utilization. Wireless sensor network can be used Power

in home area networks (HANs). As mentioned, ZigBee is router
a suitable choice for HANs. It provides the reliable wide-
area coverage and predictable latencies that are expected
for smart grid. A typical application of WSN for smart Load
grid is wireless automatic meter reading (WAMR) systems, signature
moderator
which can determine real-time energy consumption of the (LSM)
customers as customers can download their archives and take Smart
HAN meter
it to meter reading through a mobile device. WAMR can also
improve business performance and technical reliability for Figure 3: Home area networks (HANs) example [7].
power utility operations, as utility companies can identify
more valuable customers by comparing the data between the
distributed generation sources and overall power consump-
tion [4]. WAMR system can remotely control light, heat, air shown in Figure 3. This network could connect to the utility
conditioning, and other appliances of different customers. network via a smart meter. The smart meter serves as an
Smart grid system needs to provide benefits to both interface for a variety of operational signals so that both
the customer and the utility, and the smart meter within metering and operational data are carried on the wireless
HANs perform as an interface that translates, summarizes, sensor network. For example, a utility can implement the
and aggregates data of power usage and presents it to the “demand response” function within a home through a price-
power utility [9]. Inside home, a wireless sensor network can based incentive signal, and the smart meter infrastructure
link the various equipments and a central power router as carry the signal [9]. Specifically, in areas of high population
4 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

density, the smart meter must be able to different smart grid directed interference or jamming, and eavesdropping or
nodes (SGNs) that belong to each customer by collecting unauthorized modification of the communications if not
usage information through SGNs [9]. The smart meter may protected by authentication and encryption [9]. Customers’
also assert an incentive signal to cause the SGNs to switch metering information must also be secure. In this section,
to a power-saving profile when the amount of information we detail challenges found in the research literature and map
exchanged is not large [9]. them onto the CERT taxonomy [8].
CERT taxonomy provides a useful framework and uni-
2.2. Power Delivery. Wireless sensor networks can also be form terminology to security researchers (see Figure 4).
used in electric power system operations and substation
automation. For example, sensors could be installed to mon- 3.1. Security Requirements. Secrecy, integrity, and availability
itor the delivery systems and power use in the system, and are three fundamental security requirements, and previous
sensors can be further classified according to their location. research has provided several basic goals for establishing
Substations could also be monitored as circuit currents, secure smart grid over the wireless sensor network [1–3, 11–
power usage and station apparatus are checked here [9]. 14].
WSNs can also provide a feasible and cost-effective sensing
and communication solution for remote system monitoring 3.1.1. Secrecy. The target of secrecy is to prevent passive
systems. The conditions of different smart grid operation attacks and unauthorized access to sensitive data, that is,
process, (e.g., generation units, transformers, transmission power usage and billing information. In a wireless sensor
lines, and motors), can be monitored by the large-scale network, the issue of confidentiality should address the
deployment of smart sensor nodes in a remote, and these following requirements [15–17]: (i) a sensor node should
nodes can be installed on the critical equipment of smart not allow its neighbors to read its readings unless they
grid. Therefore, a single system contingency in the power are authorized, (ii) key distribution mechanism should be
grid can be detected and isolated before it causes cascading robust, and (iii) public information (e.g., sensor identities
effects [10]. Besides, measuring voltages and currents asso- and public keys of the nodes) should be encrypted to protect
ciated with transformers, circuit breakers, and switches in a against traffic analysis attacks. Early detection method could
substation or a distribution station, power quality sensors, be used for preventing unwarranted communication delays,
transformer temperature sensors, and breaker position any manipulation of information must be detected as early
indicators may also be monitored [9]. as possible. Early detection can also eliminate or reduce
false alarms. Besides, privacy is also a critical issue and can
2.3. Power Generation. A bulk generation plant may contain be attacked easily, especially in context such as submitting
several generation units, and several hundred actuators may service request for emergency and checking energy usage
control fuel, air, and water flows to optimize heat rate from smart meters. However, it is not easy to describe the
(efficiency of the generator) control emissions, and adjust scope of privacy issues for smart grid, as privacy problems
generator output within each unit [9]. Wireless sensors could can exit not only in personal communications, but also
be installed to monitor the generation systems in power in business transaction among power plant, substations
plants, and WirelessHART or ISA100.11a could be used to and customers. Unfortunately, there has not been a well-
deploy sensors here. established standard for smart grid privacy issues. Standard-
Sensors that use IEEE 802.15.4-based radio transceivers based privacy protection schemes could be a solution. For
can function for several years in harsh environments without example, EG2 made a suggestion to separate the smart
requiring any external power (e.g., WirelessHART can route metering data into low-frequency attributable data (e.g., data
around not only single but also multiple node failures) [9]. used for billing) and high-frequency anonymous technical
Besides, sensors can be easily relocated and supplementary data (e.g., data used for demand side management) aiming
sensors can be deployed within a few hours. Therefore, each to protect privacy [18].
generation unit may measure parameters such as steam tem-
perature and air, water, or fuel flow rates based on sensors. 3.1.2. Integrity. The target of integrity is to ensure that the
This information is fed into the data acquisition system in transmitted data is not illegally modified (e.g., changing,
the power plant [9]. deleting, creating, delaying, or replaying data) from the
sender to the recipient, and the identity and content of the
3. Challenges of Wireless Sensor Network in received data must be verified to be the same as the original
Smart Grid source. An authentication method could be developed for
ensuring that the origin and destination of information
Although the wireless sensor networks have been facilitating is correctly identified, the injection of corrupted data by
different smart grid operation processes, the characteristics unauthorized entities must be prevented.
of different WSNs applications are vastly different in features,
data rate, and related standards. Therefore, different chal- 3.1.3. Availability. The target of availability is to ensure the
lenges might appear in different application contexts, which wireless sensor network services to be available to authorized
increase the risk of smart grid operation and maintenance. users on time, even in presence of an internal or external
Common challenges associated with wireless sensor attack (e.g., denial of service attack). To reach this target,
networks are probabilistic channel behavior, accidental and both additional communication among nodes and a central
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 5

Incident
Attack(s)

Event
Unauthorized
Attackers Tool Vulnerability Action Target result Objectives

Physical Increased Challenge,

Hackers Design Probe Account access
attack status, thrill
Information Implementation Scan Disclosure of
Spies Process Political gain
exchange information
User Flood Corruption of Financial
Terrorists Configuration Data information gain
command
Corporate Script or Authenticate Denial of Damage
program Component service
raiders
Autonomous Theft of
Profesional Bypass Computer resource
criminals agent

Vandals Toolkit Spoof Network

Distributed Read
Voyeurs tool Internetwork

Data tap Copy

Steal

Modify

Delete

Figure 4: Attack taxonomy by CERT Coordination Center [8].

access control system may be adopted for successful delivery Table 1: Attackers and objectives of wireless sensor network in
of every message to its recipient [15, 19]. A solution is to smart grid.
make sure all actions performed on any information must
Attacker Objective
be logged for a time period.
Damage or steal smart grid devices like
Professional criminals
smart meters and home appliances
3.2. Attacks Taxonomy. CERT taxonomy focuses on inci-
Terrorists Cause harm
dents, and an incident within CERT taxonomy means that
an attacker executes one or more attacks to achieve specific Vandals Crack
objectives. Additionally, based on the target each incident, Hackers Crack
different tools are used to exploit vulnerabilities to produce Voyeurs
Gain access to related devices and related
an unauthorized result. Table 1 listed the main attackers and data
objectives.

3.2.1. Device Issues. Devices related with wireless sensor financial gain. Therefore, the location of smart meters should
network include smart meter and AMI devices. These devices not be easy to touch. Hackers may gain access to related
bring significant advantages for users and create challenge devices and related data (e.g., metering database, meters
issues at the same time because date and signals transmitted battery change, removal, and modification information)
by these devices contain the information about presence of for challenging themselves [20, 21]. Voyeurs may remote
people at their residence and what appliances are in use. connect/disconnect meters and outage reporting [20, 22].
Depuru et al. listed certain sections of people who might be Therefore, it needs high security to protect customer infor-
interested in collecting and analyzing the data transmitted mation and devices. Possible solutions include ensuring the
through wireless network, including revengeful exspouses, integrity of meter data, detecting unauthorized changes on
civil litigant, illegal consumers of energy, extortionists, meter, and authorizing all accesses to/from AMI networks
terrorists, political leaders with vested interests, thieves, and [23]. In fact, challenges are not only from deliberate attacks,
so forth [4]. For example, professional criminals may damage but also include other possible human errors and system
smart grid devices and steal costly device components for vulnerabilities, such as weak smart grid user authentication
6 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

Table 2: Attacks of wireless sensor network in smart grid.

Target Vulnerability Actions Unauthorized result Tool

Steal, destroy, or replace
Device Design/implementation Meter storage tampering Thieves tools
devices
Inadequate physical tamper
Sensor data Jamming attacks Service or data lost Jamming
protections
Network failures/crypto or Jamming Communication
Communication ability Script or program
protocol issues attacks/spoof/scan interception
Account/data No firmware integrity protections Spoof/scan/read Password extraction Malicious software

control, weak communication protocol, and improper com- humidity levels, vibrations, dirt and dust, or other condi-
munication management. tions; furthermore, the topology and wireless connectivity
of the network may vary [10]. The harsh environmental
3.2.2. Networking Issues. Routing information in wireless conditions may disturb a portion of sensor nodes in
sensor networks can be changed, and this challenge can result information delivery process.
in unauthorized control of the communication network. For When wireless sensor communicating across power
example, an intruder can take over vulnerable equipments utilities and customers, the power plants are in charge of
and mislead the data presented to smart grid operators. exchanging data (e.g., peer transmission and distribution
Jamming attacks could be seen as the most well-known system operation) or regional transmission organization
attacks that compromise availability of wireless sensor (e.g., substations, end users, or other power plants), and
networks. The possibility of jamming may appear with any substations are in charge of exchanging important informa-
radio-based medium, and the sensor nodes may be deployed tion (e.g., protection data among substations) and alarms.
in hostile or insecure environments where an attacker has the In short, power plants provide operation services such as
physical access. Jamming is a type of attack which interferes switching operation, changing setups, recommendation of
with the radio frequencies that the sensor nodes use for optimized operations, starting emergency procedure and
communication [15, 19, 24]. A jamming source may be performing system restorations [3], and substations always
powerful enough to disrupt the entire network. Even an take the responsibility of power system protection, load
intermittent jamming may cause negative effect as the shedding, recovery from load shedding, shunt control and
message communication in a WSN may be extremely time- compensation control [3]. Therefore, the wide variety of
sensitive [15, 25]. Besides, the integration of other com- applications of WSNs in smart grid will have different
munication systems might result in arduous challenges of requirements on quality-of-service (QoS), reliability, latency,
protecting smart grid, especially when integrating smart gird network throughput, and so forth [10]. In addition, sensor
with existing public network [3]. AES (advanced encryption data are typically time sensitive [10].
standard) encryption [26, 27] could be a possible solution for In WSNs, the bandwidth of each wireless link depends
protecting sensor network. on the interference level of the receiver, and high bit error
WSNs’ vulnerabilities include design and implementa- rates (BER = 10−2 − 10−6 ) are required in communi-
tion of wireless sensor networks for smart grid. The design cation [10]. Deliberate attacks which can overwhelm the
and implementation of WSNs are constrained by three types forwarding capability of nodes, and they can also consume
of resources: (i) energy, (ii) memory, and (iii) processing sparsely available bandwidth. These challenges can result
[23]. During different communication processes, the lack of in a denial of service to advanced metering infrastructure
sensor battery may lead to the failure of smart grid. Sensor (AMI) applications based on WSNs. In addition, wireless
nodes have limited battery energy supply [28], but in smart links perform varying characteristics over time and space
grid, the batteries of the sensors can be charged by the due to obstructions and harsh environment in smart grid.
energy supplies [23]. The collaborative effort of sensor nodes Therefore, it may be difficult for wireless links to meet QoS
can handle the problems of limited memory and processing requirements due to the bandwidth and communication
capabilities of the sensor nodes [23]. Table 2 described the latency at each wireless link are location-dependent and can
wireless sensor networks attacks. vary continuously [10]. Figure 5 is a modified version of
CERT taxonomy based on what we discussed, and it can
be seen as a unified framework for identification challenge
3.2.3. Other Technical Challenges. Other technical challenges issues of wireless sensor network in smart grid.
for wireless sensor network in smart grid include harsh
environmental conditions, reliability and latency require- 4. Conclusion
ments, and packet errors and variable link capacity [10]. In
smart grid environment, sensors may also be subject to RF The number of applications of smart grid over wireless
interference, highly caustic or corrosive environments, high sensor networks has been steadily increasing, such as wireless
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 7

Unauthorized Objectives
Attackers Tool Vulnerability Action Target result
Physical Increased Challenge,
Professional Design Probe Account access
attack status, thrill
criminals
Information Disclosure of Financial
Implementation Scan Process gain
Terrorists exchange information
Script or Configuration Jamming Data Corruption of Damage
Vandals program information
Autonomous Authenticate Denial of
Hackers agent Component service
Spoof Theft of
Toolkit Network resources
Voyeurs
Distributed Read
tool

Figure 5: Modified attack taxonomy.

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