Risk Matrix Model For Rotating Equipment
Risk Matrix Model For Rotating Equipment
Risk Matrix Model For Rotating Equipment
Abstract. Different industries have various residual risk levels for their rotating
equipment. Accordingly the occurrence rate of the failures and associated failure
consequences categories are different. Thus, a generalized risk matrix model is developed
in this study which can fit various available risk matrix standards. This generalized risk
matrix will be helpful to develop new risk matrix, to fit the required risk assessment
scenario for rotating equipment. Power generation system was taken as case study. It was
observed that eight subsystems were under risk. Only vibration monitor system was under
high risk category, while remaining seven subsystems were under serious and medium
risk categories.
1 Introduction
To define risk of a typical rotating equipment is quite difficult, because of broad range of rotating
equipment present having various features like speeds, sizes, use etc [1]. Besides, there is wide variety
of rotating equipment. In general any rotating equipment has three major components, which are rotor,
bearings and supporting structure known as foundation. Rotating equipment are critical for many
industries. Failure of rotating equipment could result to risk related issues [2].
The risk assessment matrix is a classical technique of system or component risk analysis [3]. This
technique can provide the benefit to identify risk of rotating equipment as a combination of two
parameters; consequences and probability of failure or failure rate. These parameters can be estimated
using statistical method and calculations or by engineering judgment [3]. Risk assessment matrix
gives both, objective and the subjective evaluation of risk and identifies risk acceptability for system
[4]. Implementation of quantified scales to the risk assessment matrix axes has become an accepted
practice and is supported by certain standards, which improved the decision making.
Variety of risk assessment matrix are available from various standards like Risk Management
Standards : AS/NZS 4360:2004 and MIL-STD-882 [5]. Risk assessment matrix, while staying factual
to the Occupational Health and Safety authorities, can be frequently customized to fit a specific work
circumstances. Risk assessment can be performed by three approaches, namely; quantitative,
qualitative and semi-quantitative approach [5].
The categorization of the failure consequences and probability depends on the type of activity risk
involved, in this case rotating equipment. Generally, according to MIL-STD-882D standard a failure
probability is categorized into five categories and failure consequences severity into four categories.
There may be used 3 by 3 cells matrix or 5 by 5 cells matrix especially for simple risk assessments
a
Rano Khan Wassan : [email protected]
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[6]. For larger structure like process plants 7 by 4 cells matrix is used for risk assessment [7]. It shows
variable categories for failure probability and failure consequences of risk. Similarly for wide range of
rotating equipment, there is a need of generalized risk matrix model which can fit different rotating
equipment risk assessment situations. Therefore, in this study generalized risk matrix is developed.
Variables are suggested for failure probability or failure rate and failure consequences ranges of
rotating equipment to select required number of categories for effective risk assessment.
2 Methodology
To develop the generalized risk assessment matrix model, some basic rules were followed [4].
Generalized consequences and probability of failure categories scale were developed. These scales are
discussed in next sections.
The suggested consequence scales are general and can fit any risk matrix standard like MIL-STD,
ASME standard etc. These are depicted in the Table 1. Variable “y” is suggested, which demonstrates
the consequences failure range. This variable can be given any suitable numerical value and variable
can be extended from y1….yn for nth category. This depends on how many categories are selected for
the failure consequences. In the Table 1, C represents the consequences categories C 1 …Cn, severity
of the consequences decreases from C1 to Cn. In Table 1, descriptive terms are used to set qualitative
assumptions if numeric numbers are not available for the consequence categories. Qualitatively
consequences can be named as catastrophic, critical, marginal and negligible. These category levels
are examples, but can be customized further.
C1 ≥ y1 C1 Catastrophic P1 ≥ x1 P1 Frequent
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In the risk assessment matrix in Table 3, each cell has been given risk parameters (failure rate ×
failure consequences) categories. These parameters help to categorize the failures risk in such
particular cells. The Table 4 shows the different ranges of cell values to categorize failures based on
combined effect of failure rate and its consequence. In proposed risk assessment matrix, cell C1P1
show the high risk and it is assumed that this risk for the system is unacceptable. Similarly ranges are
set for remaining cells and different categories are shown in Table 4. Further, this categorization for
the risk depends on residual risk value of any organization.
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Number of failures 3
Downtime (Hours)
140
120
2 100
80
1 60
40
20
0 0
Figure 2 shows the gas turbine subsystem’s downtime per failure. The downtime occurred due to the
vibration monitor system was 116.5 hours. Generator, fuel gas block and compressor, combustion
chamber and turbine have 44.4, 29.8 and 23.8 downing hours respectively. While load gear, fire
protection, control system and lube oil block have 0.5, 0.9, 40 and 13 hours downtime respectively. In
terms of downtime, higher consequences were due to the vibration monitor subsystem failures.
Generator subsystem has second high consequences when it failed.
Different failures of gas turbines subsystems may have similar or different consequences severity
impact. To categorize the consequences severity of the failures, downtime ranges were suggested. The
ranges assumed for failure consequences are shown in Table 5. Four categories of consequences in
terms of the downtime hours due to failure were assumed.
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4 Conclusions
It was observed that total eight subsystems of power generation were under risk. Vibration monitoring
was having high risk, five subsystems were under serious risk and two under medium risk categories
based on the risk matrix ranking. This study can be further extended for maintenance planning of
subsystems based on their associated risk.
Acknowledgement
Author would like to thank Department of Mechanical Engineering, Universiti Teknologi
PETRONAS for supporting this research study.
References
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