DaVeFeAm18 Iot PLC
DaVeFeAm18 Iot PLC
net/publication/327389471
CITATIONS READS
2 902
4 authors, including:
Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:
All content following this page was uploaded by Luca Davoli on 20 September 2018.
Abstract The giant information exchange enabled by the Internet of Things (IoT)
paradigm, i.e., by a “network of networks” of smart and connected devices, will
likely exploit electrical lines as a ready-to-use infrastructure. Power Line Commu-
nications (PLC) have received a significant attention in the last decade, as electri-
cal lines are not used as simple energy supply media, but as information carriers.
Among the different aspects of PLC-based architectures, an interesting and im-
portant analysis have to be reserved to security aspects that should be adopted in
similar infrastructures, having that they are crucial to deliver trustworthy and reli-
able systems and, hence, to support users relying on available services, especially
in case in which they should be inherently secure at the physical level (e.g.,
against unauthorized signal removal/interruption and eavesdropping, since they
are difficult and dangerous). Motivated by the relevant impact of PLC on IoT, in
this chapter we investigate experimentally the performance of IoT systems on
PLC in indoor environments, considering a vendor-provided application tool and a
self-developed Java library. The experimental tests are carried out on both cold
and hot electrical lines, evaluating both fixed-size and variable-length power lines.
Our results show that IoT-oriented PLC can reach a throughput of 8 kbps on a 300
m cold line and of 6 kbps on a 300 m hot line. Further experimental efforts will be
oriented to performance analyses in presence of the adoption of security measures.
§
Corresponding Author
1
Department of Engineering and Architecture, University of Parma, Parco Area delle Scienze,
181/A, 43124, Parma, Italy (IT), [email protected]
2
Department of Engineering and Architecture, University of Parma, Parco Area delle Scienze,
181/A, 43124, Parma, Italy (IT), [email protected]
3
Department of Engineering and Architecture, University of Parma, Parco Area delle Scienze,
181/A, 43124, Parma, Italy (IT), [email protected]
4
Tesmec Automation srl, Via Emilia Ovest, 61 – Frazione Rimale, 43036, Fidenza, Italy (IT),
[email protected]
2
Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Xiaolin Lu, Wonsoo Kim, Ariton Xhafa,
and Andrew Soukup (Texas Instruments Research Center, Dallas, TX, USA) for the fundamental
support and useful discussions.
References
[74] A. Pittolo and A.M. Tonello, “Physical Layer Security in Power Line Com-
munication Networks: An Emerging Scenario, Other Than Wireless,” IET
Communications, vol. 8, no. 8, pp. 1239-1247, May 2014. DOI 10.1049/iet-
com.2013.0472
[75] M. Esmalifalak et al., “Bad Data Injection Attack and Defense in Electricity
Market Using Game Theory Study,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol.
4, no. 1, pp. 160–169, 2013. DOI 10.1109/TSG.2012.2224391
[76] S. Dudek, “HomePlugAV PLC: practical attacks and backdooring,” 2014.
URL https://goo.gl/FgTBQJ (accessed January 19, 2018)
[77] W. Ahn et al., “Development of Cyber-Attack Scenarios for Nuclear Power
Plants Using Scenario Graphs,” International Journal of Distributed Sensor
Networks, vol. 11, no. 9, 2015. DOI 10.1155/2015/836258
[78] J.R. Lindsay, “Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare,” Security Studies,
vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 365-404, 2013. DOI 10.1080/09636412.2013.816122
[79] J. Loeb, “Researchers warn of biggest cyber threat to power grids since
Stuxnet,” 2017. URL https://goo.gl/FyVhz2 (accessed January 18, 2018)
[80] Texas Instruments - TMDSPLCKIT-V3 - C2000 Power Line Modem Devel-
oper’s Kit, 2017. URL https://goo.gl/9J8H4u (accessed January 18, 2018)
[81] Texas Instruments - Developing robust power line communications (PLC)
with G3, 2017. URL https://goo.gl/EkygT1 (accessed January 18, 2018)
[82] A. Sokolov, “Java Simple Serial Connector (JSSC),” 2017. URL
https://goo.gl/uATJqS (accessed January 18, 2018)
[83] Texas Instruments - TMDSDC3359 - Data Concentrator Evaluation Module,
2017. URL https://goo.gl/skCeRp (accessed January 18, 2018)