DIVISION

[ GR No. L-36409, Oct 26, 1973 ]

PEOPLE v. LORETA GOZO

DECISION
153 Phil. 216

FERNANDO, J.:
Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales,
convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a
permit from the municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well
as any modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She questions its validity,
[1]
or at the very least, its applicability to her, by invoking due process, a contention
[2]
she would premise on what for her is the teaching of People v. Fajardo. If such a
ground were far from being impressed with solidity, she stands on quicksand when
she would deny the applicability of the ordinance to her, on the pretext that her house
was constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces. While
yielding to the well-settled doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be Philippine
territory, she would, in effect, seek to emasculate our sovereign rights by the assertion
that we cannot exercise therein administrative jurisdiction. To state the proposition is
to make patent how much it is tinged with unorthodoxy. Clearly then, the lower court
decision must be affirmed with the sole modification that she is given thirty days from
the finality of a judgment to obtain a permit, failing which, she is required to demolish
the same.

The facts are undisputed. As set forth in the decision of the lower court: "The accused
bought a house and lot located inside the United States Naval Reservation within the
territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the house and built another
one in its place, without a building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City,
because she was told by one Ernesto Evalle, an assistant in the City Mayor's office, as
well as by her neighbors in the area, that such building permit was not necessary for
the construction of the house. On December 29, 1966, Juan Malones, a building and
lot inspector of the City Engineer's Office, Olongapo City, together with Patrolman
Ramon Macahilas of the Olongapo City police force apprehended four carpenters
working on the house of the accused and they brought the carpenters to the Olongapo
City police headquarters for interrogation. * * * After due investigation, Loreta Gozo
was charged with violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, S. of 1964 with the City
Fiscal's Office."[3] The City Court of Olongapo City found her guilty of violating
Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1964 and sentenced her to an imprisonment of
one month as well as to pay the costs. The Court of First Instance of Zambales, on
appeal, found her guilty on the above facts of violating such municipal ordinance but
would sentence her merely to pay a fine of P200.00 and to demolish the house thus
erected. She elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but in her brief, she would put
in issue the validity of such an ordinance on constitutional ground or at the very least
its applicability to her in view of the location of her dwelling within the naval base.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, in a resolution of January 29, 1973, noting the
constitutional questions raised, certified the case to this Court.

There is, as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this petition, no support in law for
the stand taken by appellant.
1. It would be fruitless for her to assert that local government units are devoid
of authority to require building permits. This Court, from Switzer v.
[4]
Municipality of Cebu, decided in 1911, has sanctioned the validity of such
measures. It is much too late in the day to contend that such a requirement
cannot be validly imposed. Even appellant, justifiably concerned about the
unfavorable impression that could be created if she were to deny that such
competence is vested in municipal corporations and chartered cities, had to
concede in her brief: "If, at all, the questioned ordinance may be predicated
[5]
under the general welfare clause * * *." Its scope is wide, well-nigh all
embracing, covering every aspect of public health, public morals, public
[6]
safety, and the well-being and good order of the community.

It goes without saying that such a power is subject to limitations. Certainly, if its
exercise is violative of any constitutional right, then its validity could be impugned, or
at the very least, its applicability to the person adversely affected could be questioned.
So much is settled law. Apparently, appellant has adopted the view that a due process
question may indeed be raised in view of what for her is its oppressive character. She
is led to such a conclusion, relying on People v. Fajardo.[7] A more careful scrutiny of
such a decision would not have led her astray, for that case is easily distinguishable.
The facts as set forth in the opinion follow: "It appears that on August 15, 1950, during
the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality
of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in question
providing as follows: '* * * 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a
building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the
Municipal Mayor. * * * 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each
building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued. * * * 3. [Penalty] - Any
violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make the violator liable
to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than
12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said building
destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be
removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house. * * *." Four years later,
after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son-in-law,
appellant Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a
permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land
registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from
the public plaza by a creek * * *. On January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the
reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of
the public plaza * * *. On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their request for a
building permit * * *, but again the request was turned down by the mayor.
Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a
permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house
having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased
property."[8]

Clearly then, the application of such an ordinance to Fajardo was oppressive. A

conviction therefore for a violation thereof both in the justice of the peace court of
Baao, Camarines Sur as well as in the Court of First Instance could not be sustained.
In this case, on the contrary, appellant never bothered to comply with the ordinance.
Perhaps aware of such a crucial distinction, she would assert in her brief: "The
evidence showed that even if the accused were to secure a permit from the Mayor, the
same would not have been granted. To require the accused to obtain a permit before
constructing her house would be an exercise in futility. The law will not require
anyone to perform an impossibility, neither in law or in fact: * * *."[9] It would be
from her own version, at the very least then, premature to anticipate such an adverse
result, and thus to condemn an ordinance which certainly lends itself to an
interpretation that is neither oppressive, unfair, or unreasonable. That kind of
interpretation suffices to remove any possible question of its validity, as was expressly
announced in Primicias v. Fugoso.[10] So it appears from this portion of the opinion
of Justice Feria, speaking for the Court: "Said provision is susceptible of two
constructions: one is that the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated
discretion to grant or refuse to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or
meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of
Manila; and the other is that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be
granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latter's reasonable discretion to determine
or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, with a view to
prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public
places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of
disorder. After a mature deliberation, we have arrived at the conclusion that we must
adopt the second construction, that is, construe the provisions of the said ordinance to
mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit,
but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or
public places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held."
[11] If, in a case affecting such a preferred freedom as the right to assembly, this Court
could construe an ordinance of the City of Manila so as to avoid offending against a
constitutional provision, there is nothing to preclude it from a similar mode of
approach in order to show the lack of merit of an attack against an ordinance
requiring a permit. Appellant cannot therefore take comfort from any broad statement
in the Fajardo opinion, which incidentally is taken out of context, considering the
admitted oppressive application of the challenged measure in that litigation. So much
then for the contention that she could not have been validly convicted for a violation
of such ordinance. Nor should it be forgotten that she did suffer the same fate twice,
once from the City Court and thereafter from the Court of First Instance. The reason is
obvious. Such ordinance applies to her.
2. Much less is a reversal indicated because of the alleged absence of the rather
novel concept of administrative jurisdiction on the part of Olongapo City.
Nor is novelty the only thing that may be said against it. Far worse is the
assumption at war with controlling and authoritative doctrines that the
mere existence of military or naval bases of a foreign country cuts deeply
into the power to govern. Two leading cases may be cited to show how
offensive is such thinking to the juristic concept of sovereignty, People v.
[12] [13]
Acierto, and Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. As was
so emphatically set forth by Justice Tuason in Acierto: "By the Agreement, it
should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the
United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given
purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine
Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the
Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States
Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such
offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights
not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military
authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first
proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases;
[14]
the second from the express provisions of the treaty." There was a
reiteration of such a view in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled than
that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be
exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond
its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands
paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must
submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and
personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus,
[15]
there is a diminution of its sovereignty." Then came this paragraph
dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: "It is to be admitted that any
state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a
power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-
limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, 'is the property of a
state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-
determination and self-restriction.' A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain
[16]
from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence." The
 opinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there is at the most
diminution of jurisdictional rights, not its disappearance. The words
employed follow: "Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory
no longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from
allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right
over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that
such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their
status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction
may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under
lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases
agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory."[17]

Can there be anything clearer, therefore, than that only a turnabout, unwarranted and
unjustified, from what is settled and orthodox law can lend the slightest degree of
plausibility to the contention of absence of administrative jurisdiction. If it were
otherwise, what was aptly referred to by Justice Tuason "as a matter of comity,
courtesy, or expediency" becomes one of obeisance and submission. If on a concern
purely domestic in its implications, devoid of any connection with national security,
the Military-Bases Agreement could be thus interpreted, then sovereignty indeed
becomes a mockery and an illusion. Nor does appellant's thesis rest on less shaky
foundation by the mere fact that Acierto and Reagan dealt with the competence of the
national government, while what is sought to be emasculated in this case is the so-
called administrative jurisdiction of a municipal corporation. Within the limits of its
territory, whatever statutory powers are vested upon it may be validly exercised. Any
residual authority not therein conferred, whether expressly or impliedly, belongs to
the national government, not to an alien country. What is even more to be deplored in
this stand of appellant is that no such claim is made by the American naval
authorities, not that it would do them any good if it were so asserted. To quote from
Acierto anew: "The carrying out of the provisions of the Bases Agreement is the
concern of the contracting parties alone. Whether, therefore, a given case which by the
treaty comes within the United States jurisdiction should be transferred to the
Philippine authorities is a matter about which the accused has nothing to do or say. In
other words, the rights granted to the United States by the treaty insure solely to that
[18]
country and can not be raised by the offender." If an accused would suffer from
such disability, even if the American armed forces were the beneficiary of a treaty
privilege, what is there for appellant to take hold of when there is absolutely no
showing of any alleged grant of what is quaintly referred to as administrative
jurisdiction? That is all, and it is more than enough, to make manifest the futility of
seeking a reversal.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is affirmed insofar as it

found the accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of
Municipal Ordinance No. 14, series of 1964 and sentencing her to pay a fine of
P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and modified insofar as
she is required to demolish the house that is the subject matter of the case, she being
given a period of thirty days from the finality of this decision within which to obtain
the required permit. Only upon her failure to do so will that portion of the appealed
decision requiring demolition be enforced. Costs against the accused.

Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio, and

Esguerra, JJ., concur.

[1] According to Article III, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Constitution: "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws."

[2] 104 Phil. 443 (1958).

[3] Decision, Appendix A to the Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 1A-1B.

[4] 20 Phil. 111. Cf. People v. Cruz, 54 Phil. 25 (1929); Tan Chat v. Municipality of
Iloilo, 60 Phil. 465 (1934); Hipolito v. City of Manila, 87 Phil. 180 (1950); Uy Matiao
and Co. v. The City of Cebu, 93 Phil. 300 (1953); University of the East v. City of
Manila, 96 Phil. 316 (1954); Verzosa v. City of Baguio, 109 Phil. 571 (1960); Lopera v.
Vicente, L-18102, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 549; People v. Soria, L-18982, January 31,
1963, 7 SCRA 242.

[5] Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 10. She would cite Sec. 2238 of the Revised
Administrative Code, but strict accuracy would demand that she should refer to the
specific provision in the Olongapo city charter.

[6] Cf. United States v. Alexander, 8 Phil. 29 (1907); Punzalan v. Ferriols, 19 Phil. 214
(1911); United States v. Espiritusanto, 23 Phil. 610 (1912); United States v. Ten Yu, 24
Phil. 1 (1912); United States v. Abundan, 24 Phil. 165 (1913); Case v. Board of Health,
24 Phil. 250 (1913); United States v. Hilario, 24 Phil. 392 (1913); United States v.
Chan Tienco, 25 Phil. 89 (1913); United States v. Joson, 26 Phil. 1 (1913); Rivera v.
Campbell, 34 Phil. 348 (1916); United States v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 103 (1918); Kwong
Sing v. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 103 (1920); Vinco v. Municipality of Hinigaran, 41 Phil.
790 (1917); People v. Cruz, 54 Phil. 24 (1929); Tan Chat v. Municipality of Iloilo, 60
Phil. 465 (1934); People v. Lardizabal, 61 Phil. 360 (1935); Malabon Sugar Co. v.
Municipality of Malabon, 61 Phil. 717 (1935); People v. Chan, 65 Phil. 611 (1938);
People v. Sabarre, 65 Phil. 684 (1938); People v. Esguerra, 81 Phil. 33 (1948); Eboña
v. Municipality of Daet, 85 Phil. 369 (1950); Manila Race Horse Trainers Asso. v. De
la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60 (1951); Vega v. Municipal Board of the City of Iloilo, 94 Phil.
949 (1954); Co Kiam v. City of Manila, 96 Phil. 649 (1955); Physical Therapy Org. of
the Phil. v. Municipal Board of Manila, 101 Phil. 1142 (1957); Uy Ha v. City Mayor, 108
Phil. 400 (1960); Gaerlan v. Baguio City Council, 109 Phil. 1100 (1960); Gerena v. City
of Manila, 110 Phil. 958 (1961).

[7] 104 Phil. 443 (1958).

[8] Ibid, 444-445.

[9] Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 11.

[10] 80 Phil. 71 (1948).

[11] Ibid, 77.

[12] 92 Phil. 534 (1953).

[13] L-26379, Dec. 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 968.

[14] 92 Phil. 534, 542.

[15] 30 SCRA 968, 973.

[16] Ibid.

[1 ]
[17] Ibid, 973-974.

[18] 92 Phil. 534, 542.