Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal

Author(s): Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart

Source: Comparative Politics , Jul., 1997, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Jul., 1997), pp. 449-471
Published by: Comparative Politics, Ph.D. Programs in Political Science, City University
of New York

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 Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy

A Critical Appraisal

Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart

Since the 1960s Juan J. Linz has been one of the world's foremost contributors to
our understanding of democracy, authoritarianism, and totalitarianism. Although
many of his contributions have had a significant impact, few have been as far-
reaching as his essay "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a
Difference?," originally written in 1985. The essay argued that presidentialism is
less likely than parliamentarism to sustain stable democratic regimes. It became a
classic even in unpublished form. Among both policymakers and scholars it
spawned a broad debate about the merits and especially the liabilities of presidential
government. Now that the definitive version of the essay has appeared, we believe
that a critical appraisal is timely. This task is especially important because Linz's
arguments against presidentialism have gained widespread currency.
This article critically assesses Linz's arguments about the perils of presidential-
ism. Although we agree with several of Linz's criticisms of presidentialism, we dis-
agree that presidentialism is particularly oriented towards winner-takes-all results.'
We argue that the superior record of parliamentary systems has rested partly on
where parliamentary government has been implemented, and we claim that presi-
dentialism has some advantages that partially offset its drawbacks. These advantages
can be maximized by paying careful attention to differences among presidential sys-
tems. Other things being equal, presidentialism tends to function better where pres-
idencies have weak legislative powers, parties are at least moderately disciplined,
and party systems are not highly fragmented. Finally, we argue that switching from
presidentialism to parliamentarism could exacerbate problems of governability in
countries with undisciplined parties. Even if parliamentary government is more con-
ducive to stable democracy, much rests on what kind of parliamentarism and presi-
dentialism is implemented.2
By presidentialism we mean a regime in which, first, the president is always the
chief executive and is elected by popular vote or, as in the U.S., by an electoral col-
lege with essentially no autonomy with respect to popular preferences and, second,
the terms of office for the president and the assembly are fixed. Under pure presi-
dentialism the president has the right to retain ministers of his or her choosing
regardless of the composition of the congress.

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Comparative Politics July 1997

The Perils of Presidentialism: Linz's Argument

Linz bases his argument about the superiority of parliamentary systems partially on
the observation that few long established democracies have presidential systems. He
maintains that the superior historical performance of parliamentary democracies
stems from intrinsic defects of presidentialism. He analyzes several problems of
presidential systems. We briefly summarize the five most important issues.
First, in presidential systems the president and assembly have competing claims
to legitimacy. Both are popularly elected, and the origin and survival of each are
independent from the other.3 Since both the president and legislature "derive their
power from the vote of the people in a free competition among well-defined alter-
natives, a conflict is always latent and sometimes likely to erupt dramatically; there
is no democratic principle to resolve it."4 Linz argues that parliamentarism obviates
this problem because the executive is not independent of the assembly. If the major-
ity of the assembly favors a change in policy direction, it can replace the government
by exercising its no confidence vote.
Second, the fixed term of the president's office introduces a rigidity that is less
favorable to democracy than the flexibility offered by parliamentary systems, where
governments depend on the ongoing confidence of the assembly. Presidentialism
"entails a rigidity . .. that makes adjustment to changing situations extremely diffi-
cult; a leader who has lost the confidence of his own party or the parties that ac-
quiesced [in] his election cannot be replaced."' By virtue of their greater ability to
promote changes in the cabinet and government, parliamentary systems afford
greater opportunities to resolve disputes. Such a safety valve may enhance regime
stability.
Third, presidentialism "introduces a strong element of zero-sum game into demo-
cratic politics with rules that tend toward a 'winner-take-all' outcome." In contrast,
in parliamentary systems "power-sharing and coalition-forming are fairly common,
and incumbents are accordingly attentive to the demands and interests of even the
smaller parties." In presidential systems direct popular election is likely to imbue
presidents with a feeling that they need not undertake the tedious process of con-
structing coalitions and making concessions to the opposition.6
Fourth, the style of presidential politics is less propitious for democracy than the
style of parliamentary politics. The sense of being the representative of the entire
nation may lead the president to be intolerant of the opposition. "The feeling of hav-
ing independent power, a mandate from the people ... is likely to give a president
a sense of power and mission that might be out of proportion to the limited plurality
that elected him. This in turn might make resistances he encounters ... more frus-
trating, demoralizing, or irritating than resistances usually are for a prime minister.7
The absence in presidential systems of a monarch or a "president of the republic"
deprives them of an authority who can exercise restraining power.

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 Scott Mainwaring and Matthew J. Shugart

Finally, political outsiders are more likely to win the chief executive office in
presidential systems, with potentially destabilizing effects. Individuals elected by
direct popular vote are less dependent on and less beholden to political parties. Such
individuals are more likely to govern in a populist, antiinstitutionalist fashion.

A Critique of Linz's Argument

We agree with the main thrust of four of Linz's five basic criticisms of presidential-
ism. We concur that the issue of dual legitimacy is nettlesome in presidential sys-
tems, but we believe that his contrast between presidential and parliamentary sys-
tems is too stark. To a lesser degree than in presidential systems, conflicting claims
to legitimacy also exist in parliamentary systems. Conflicts sometimes arise between
the lower and upper houses of a bicameral legislature, each claiming to exercise
legitimate power. If both houses have the power of confidence over the cabinet, the
most likely outcome when the houses are controlled by different majorities is a com-
promise coalition cabinet. In this case dual legitimacy exists, not between executive
and assembly, but between the two chambers of the assembly. This arrangement
could be troublesome if the two chambers were controlled by opposed parties or
blocs. In a few parliamentary systems, including Canada, Germany, and Japan,
upper houses have significant powers over legislation but can not exercise a vote of
no confidence against the government. In some the upper house can not be dissolved
by the government. Then, there is a genuine dual legitimacy between the executive
and part of the legislature. Thus, dual democratic legitimacy is not exclusively a
problem of presidentialism, though it is more pronounced with it. A unicameral par-
liament would avoid the potential of dual legitimacy under parliamentarism, but it
sacrifices the advantages of bicameralism, especially for large, federal, and plural
countries.8
Another overlooked potential source of conflicting legitimacy in parliamentary
republics is the role of the head of state, who is usually called "president" but tends
to be elected by parliament. The constitutions of parliamentary republics usually
give the president several powers that are - or may be, subject to constitutional
interpretation - more than ceremonial. Examples include the president's exclusive
discretion to dissolve parliament (Italy), the requirement of countersignatures of
cabinet decrees (Italy), suspensory veto over legislation (Czech Republic, Slovakia),
the power to decree new laws (Greece for some time after 1975), and appointments
to high offices, sometimes (as in the Czech Republic and Slovakia) including min-
istries. Linz argues that the president in such systems "can play the role of adviser
or arbiter by bringing party leaders together and facilitating the flow of information
among them." He also notes that "no one in a presidential system is institutionally
entitled to such a role." He is quite right that political systems often face moments

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Comparative Politics July 1997

when they need a "neutral" arbiter. However, for the position of head of state to be
more than feckless it is necessary to make it "institutionally entitled" to other tasks
as well. Linz correctly notes that, "if presidents in pure parliamentary republics were
irrelevant, it would not make sense for politicians to put so much effort into electing
their preferred candidate to the office."'
Paradoxically, the more authority the head of state is given, the greater is the
potential for conflict, especially in newer democracies where roles have not yet been
clearly defined by precedent. Hungary and especially Slovakia have had several con-
stitutional crises involving the head of state, and in some Third World parliamentary
republics such crises have at times been regime-threatening, as in Somalia
(1961-68) and Pakistan. Politicians indeed care who holds the office, precisely
because it has potential for applying brakes to the parliamentary majority. The office
of the presidency may not be democratically legitimated via popular election, but it
typically has a fixed term of office and a longer term than the parliament's By prais-
ing the potential of the office in serving as arbiter, Linz implicitly acknowledges the
Madisonian point that placing unchecked power in the hands of the assembly major-
ity is not necessarily good. Again, the key is careful attention to the distribution of
powers among the different political players who are involved in initiating or block-
ing policy.
We also agree that the rigidity of presidentialism, created by the fixed term of
office, can be a liability, sometimes a serious one. With the fixed term it is difficult
to get rid of unpopular or inept presidents without the system's breaking down, and
it is constitutionally barred in many countries to reelect a good president. However,
there is no reason why a presidential system must prohibit reelection. Provisions
against reelection have been introduced primarily to reduce the president's incen-
tives to abuse executive powers to secure reelection. Despite the potential for abuse,
reelection can be permitted, and we believe it should be in countries where reliable
institutions safeguard elections from egregious manipulation by incumbents.
Even if reelection is permitted, we are still left with the rigidity of fixed term
lengths. One way of mitigating this problem is to shorten the presidential term so
that if presidents lose support dramatically, they will not be in office for as long a
time. Therefore, we believe that a four year term is usually preferable to the longer
mandates that are common in Latin America.
The argument about the flexibility of replacing cabinets in parliamentary systems
is two-edged. In a parliamentary system the prime minister's party can replace its
leader or a coalition partner can withdraw its support and usher in a change of gov-
ernment short of the coup that might be the only way to remove a president who
lacks support. We agree with Linz that cabinet instability need not lead to regime
instability and can offer a safety valve. Yet crises in many failed parliamentary sys-
tems, including Somalia and Thailand, have come about precisely because of the dif-
ficulty of sustaining viable cabinets. Presidentialism raises the threshold for remov-

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 Scott Mainwaring and Matthew J. Shugart

ing an executive; opponents must either wait out the term or else countenance
undemocratic rule. There may be cases when this higher threshold for government
change is desirable, as it could provide more predictability and stability to the poli-
cymaking process than the frequent dismantling and reconstructing of cabinets that
afflict some parliamentary systems.
Theoretically, the problem of fixed terms could be remedied without adopting
parliamentarism by permitting under certain conditions the calling of early elections.
One way is to allow either the head of government or the assembly majority to
demand early elections for both branches, as is the case under newly adopted Israeli
rules. Such provisions represent a deviation from presidentialism, which is defined
by its fixed terms. Nevertheless, as long as one branch can not dismiss the other
without standing for reelection itself, the principle of separation of powers is still
retained to an extent not present in any variant of parliamentarism.
We take issue with Linz's assertion that presidentialism induces more of a winner-
takes-all approach to politics than does parliamentarism. As we see it, parliamentary
systems do not afford an advantage on this point. The degree to which democracies
promote winner-take-all rules depends mostly on the electoral and party system and
on the federal or unitary nature of the system. Parliamentary systems with disci-
plined parties and a majority party offer the fewest checks on executive power, and
hence promote a winner-takes-all approach more than presidential systems.'0 In
Great Britain, for example, in the last two decades a party has often won a decisive
majority of parliamentary seats despite winning well under 50 percent of the votes.
Notwithstanding its lack of a decisive margin in popular votes, the party can control
the entire executive and the legislature for a protracted period of time. It can even
use its dissolution power strategically to renew its mandate for another five years by
calling a new election before its current term ends.
Because of the combination of disciplined parties, single member plurality elec-
toral districts, and the prime minister's ability to dissolve the parliament,
Westminster systems provide a very weak legislative check on the premier. In prin-
ciple, the MPs of the governing party control the cabinet, but in practice they usual-
ly support their own party's legislative initiatives regardless of the merits of partic-
ular proposals because their electoral fates are closely tied with that of the party
leadership. As a norm, a disciplined majority party leaves the executive virtually
unconstrained between elections." Here, more than in any presidential system, the
winner takes all. Given the majority of a single party in parliament, it is unlikely that
a no confidence vote would prevail, so there is little or no opposition to check the
government. Early elections occur not as a flexible mechanism to rid the country of
an ineffective government, but at the discretion of a ruling majority using its disso-
lution power strategically to renew its mandate for another five years by calling a
new election before its current term ends.12
Presidentialism is predicated upon a system of checks and balances. Such checks

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Comparative Politics July 1997

and balances usually inhibit winner-takes-all tendencies; indeed, they are designed
precisely to limit the possibility that the winner would take all. If it loses the presi-
dency, a party or coalition may still control congress, allowing it to block some pres-
idential initiatives. If the president's own legislative powers are reactive only (a
veto, but no decree powers), an opposition-controlled congress can be the prime
mover in legislating, as it is in the United States and Costa Rica, the two longest
standing presidential democracies. Controlling congress is not the biggest prize, and
it usually does not enable a party or coalition to dictate policy, but it allows the party
or coalition to establish parameters within which policy is made. It can be a big prize
in its own right if the presidency has relatively weak legislative powers.
Moreover, compared to Westminster parliamentary systems, most presidential
democracies offer greater prospects of dividing the cabinet among several parties.
This practice, which is essentially unknown among the Westminster parliamentary
democracies, is common in multiparty presidential systems. To get elected, presi-
dents need to assemble a broad interparty coalition, either for the first round (if a
plurality format obtains) or for the second (if a two round, absolute majority format
obtains). Generally, presidents allocate cabinet seats to parties other than their own
in order to attract the support of these parties or, after elections, to reward them for
such support. Dividing the cabinet in this manner allows losers in the presidential
contest a piece of the pie. The norm in multiparty presidential systems is similar to
that in multiparty parliamentary systems: a coalition governs, cabinet positions are
divided among several parties, and the president typically must retain the support of
these parties to govern effectively.
Thus, most parliamentary systems with single member district electoral systems
have stronger winner-takes-all mechanisms than presidential systems. The combi-
nation of parliamentarism and a majority party specifically produces winner-takes-
all results. This situation of extreme majoritarianism under parliamentarism is not
uncommon; it is found throughout the Caribbean and some parts of the Third World.
In fact, outside western Europe all parliamentary systems that have been continu-
ously democratic from 1972 to 1994 have been based on the Westminster model (see
Table 1). Thus, Linz is not right when he states that an absolute majority of seats for
one party does not occur often in parliamentary systems.'3 In presidential systems
with single member plurality districts, the party that does not win the presidency can
control congress, thereby providing an important check on executive power.
Linz's fourth argument, that the style of presidential politics is less favorable to
democracy than the style of parliamentary politics, rests in part on his view that pres-
identialism induces a winner-takes-all logic. We have already expressed our skepti-
cism about this claim. We agree that the predominant style of politics differs some-
what between presidential and parliamentary systems, but we would place greater
emphasis on differences of style that stem from constitutional design and the nature
of the party system.

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 Scott Mainwaring and Matthew J. Shugart

Table 1 Independent Countries That Were Continuously Democratic, 1972-1994

Inc. level Pop. size Parliamentary Presidential Other

Low/lower- Micro
middle
Small Jamaica Costa Rica
Mauritius

Medium/ Colombia
Large Dominican Republic

Upper- Micro Nauru

middle Barbados
Malta

Small Botswana

Trinidad and Tobago

Medium/ Venezuela
Large

Upper Micro Luxembourg Iceland

Small Ireland Cyprus

New Zealand
Norway

Medium/ Australia United States Austria

Large Belgium Finland
Canada France
Denmark Switzerland
Germany
Israel

Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Sweden
United Kingdom

All regimes in the "other" column are premier-presidential, except for Switzerland.

Countries that have become independent from Britain or a British Commonwealth state since
1945: Jamaica, Mauritius, Nauru, Barbados, Malta, Botswana, Trinidad and Tobago, Cyprus,
Israel

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Comparative Politics July 1997

Finally, we agree with Linz that presidentialism is more conducive than parlia-
mentarism to the election of a political outsider as head of government and that this
process can entail serious problems. But in presidential democracies that have more
institutionalized party systems the election of political outsiders is the exception.
Costa Rica, Uruguay, Colombia, and Venezuela have not elected an outsider presi-
dent in recent decades, unless one counts Rafael Caldera of Venezuela in his latest
incarnation (1993). Argentina last elected an outsider president in 1945, when Per6n
had not yet built a party. In Chile political outsiders won the presidential campaigns
of 1952 and 1958, but they were exceptions rather than the norm. The most notable
recent cases of elections of political outsiders, Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil
(1989) and Alberto Fujimori in Peru (1990), owe much to the unraveling of the party
systems in both countries and in Fujimori's case also to the majority run-off system
that encouraged widespread party system fragmentation in the first round.

Assessing the Record of Presidentialism

Linz correctly states that most long established democracies have parliamentary sys-
tems. Presidentialism is poorly represented among long established democracies.
This fact is apparent in Table 1, which lists countries that have a long, continuous
democratic record according to the criteria of Freedom House.
Freedom House has been rating countries on a scale of 1 to 7 (with 1 being best)
on political rights and civil rights since 1972. Table 1 lists all thirty-three countries
that were continuously democratic from 1972 to 1994. We considered a country con-
tinuously democratic if it had an average score of 3 or better on political rights
throughout this period.14 Additionally, the scores for both political and civil rights
needed to be 4 or better in every annual Freedom House survey for a country to be
considered continuously democratic.
Of the thirty-three long established democracies, only six are presidential despite
the prevalence of presidentialism in many parts of the globe. Twenty-two are par-
liamentary, and five fall into the "other" category. However, the superior record of
parliamentarism is in part an artifact of where it has been implemented.
Table 1 provides information on three other issues that may play a role in a so-
ciety's likelihood of sustaining democracy: income level, population size, and
British colonial heritage. It is widely recognized that a relatively high income level
is an important background condition for democracy.'" In classifying countries by
income levels, we followed the guidelines of the World Bank's World Development
Report 1993: low is under $635 per capita GNP; lower middle is $636 to $2,555;
upper middle is $2,556 to $7,,910; and upper is above $7,911. We collapsed the
bottom two categories. Table 2 summarizes the income categories of countries in
Table 1.

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 Scott Mainwaring and Matthew J. Shugart

Table 2 Income Levels of Continuous Democracies, 1972-1994 (number of countries in each

category)

Per Capita GNP in US $ Parliamentary Presidential Other

0-2555 2 3 0
2556-7910 5 1 0
over 7911 15 2 5
total 22 6 5

Most of th
upper midd
countries t
tems. Fifte
income cou
would have
stitutions.
because of
of the wor
with parliam
Very small
typically h
ticterms,
countries a
medium to
thirty-thre
tary system
lished dem
The strong
widely reco
bilities men
ernmental
mentarism)

Table 3 Pop
each category)

Population Parliamentary Presidential Other

Under 500,000 4 0 1
500,000 to 5,000,000 7 2 0
Over 5,000,000 11 4 5
total 22 6 5

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Comparative Politics July 1997

the colonial state.16 Nine of the thirty-three long established democracies had British
colonial experience. Among them, eight are parliamentary and one is presidential.
Here, too, background conditions have been more favorable to parliamentary systems.
It is not our purpose here to analyze the contributions of these factors to democ-
racy; rather, we wanted to see if these factors correlated with regime type. If a back-

Table 4 Independent Countries That Were Democratic for at Least Ten Years (But Less Than
Twenty-three) as of 1994

Inc. level Pop. size Parliamentary Presidential Other

Low/lower- Micro Belize (1981)

middle Dominica (1978)
Kiribati (1979)
St. Lucia (1979)
St. Vincent (1979)
Solomons (1978)
Tuvalu (1978)
Vanuatu (1980)
Small Papua New Guinea
(1975)
Medium/ India (1979) Bolivia (1982)
Large Brazil (1985)
Ecuador (1979)
El Salvador (1985)
Honduras (1980)
Middle Micro Antigua and Barbuda
(1981)
Grenada (1985)
St. Kitts-Nevis

(1983)
Small

Medium/ Greece (1974) Argentina (1983) Portugal' (1976)

Large Uruguary (1985)
Upper Micro Bahamas (1973)
Small

Medium/ Spain (1977)

Large

Numbers in parentheses give the date when the transition to democracy took place or the date
of independence for former colonies that were not independent as of 1972.

Note: 1. Portugal has a premier-presidential system

Countries that have become independent from Britain or a British Commonwealth state since
1945: Belize, Dominica, Kiribati, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Solomons, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Papua
New Guinea, India, Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis, Bahamas

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 Scott Mainwaring and Matthew J. Shugart

ground condition that is conducive to democracy is correlated with parliamentarism,

then the superior record of parliamentarism may be more a product of the back-
ground condition than the regime type.
Table 4 shows twenty-four additional countries that had been continuously demo-
cratic by the same criteria used in Table 1, only for a shorter time period (at least ten
years). Together, Tables 1 and 4 give us a complete look at contemporary democra-
cies that have lasted at least ten years.
There are three striking facts about the additional countries in Table 4. First, they
include a large number of microstates that became independent from Britain in the
1970s and 1980s, and all of them are parliamentary. All seven presidential democ-
racies but only three of the sixteen parliamentary democracies are in medium to
large countries (see Table 5). All sixteen of the democracies listed in Tables 1 and 4
with populations under one-half million (mostly island nations) are parliamentary,
as are eight of ten democracies with populations between one-half and five million.
In contrast, no presidential systems are in microstates, and many are in exception-
ally large countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, and the United States.
Second, with Table 4 the number of presidential democracies increases substan-
tially. Most are in the lower and lower middle income categories, and all are in Latin
America. Table 6 summarizes the income status of the newer democracies listed in

Table 4. Clearly, not all of parliamentarism's advantage stems from the advanced
industrial states. Even in the lower to upper middle income categories, there are
more parliamentary systems (twenty-one if we combine Tables 1 and 4, compared
to eleven presidential systems). However, every one of the parliamentary democra-
cies outside of the high income category is a former British colony. The only other
democracies in these income categories are presidential, and all but Cyprus are in
Latin America.

Thus, if the obstacles of lower income (or other factors not considered here) in
Latin America continue to cause problems for the consolidation of democracy, the
number of presidential breakdowns could be large once again in the future. More
optimistically, if Latin American democracies achieve greater success in consoli-
dating themselves this time around, the number of long established presidential
democracies will grow substantially in the future.

Table 5 Population Size of Continuous Democracies, 1985-1994 (number of countries in

each category)

Population Parliamentary Presidential Other

Under 500,000 12 0 0
500,000 to 5,000,000 1 0 0
Over 5,000,000 3 7 1
total 16 7 1

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Comparative Politics July 1997

Table 6 Income Levels of Continuous Democracies, 1985-1994 (number of countries in each

category)

Per Capita GNP in US$ Parliamentary Presidential Other

0-2555 10 0 0
2556-7910 4 5 1
Over 7911 2 2 0
total 16 7 1

Similarly, if
democracy, p
ized many sm
ment, always
aspects of L
regions) are
vantage.
In sum, presidentialism is more likely to be adopted in Latin America and in
Africa than in other parts of the world, and these parts of the world have had more
formidable obstacles to democracy regardless of the form of government. In con-
trast, parliamentarism has been the regime form of choice in most of Europe and in
former British colonies (a large percentage of which are microstates), where condi-
tions for democracy have generally been more favorable. Thus, the correlation
between parliamentarism and democratic success is in part a product of where it has
been implemented.

Advantages of Presidential Systems

Presidential systems afford some attractive features that can be maximized through
careful attention to constitutional design. These advantages partially offset the lia-
bilities of presidentialism.

Greater Choice for Voters Competing claims to legitimacy are the flipside of one
advantage. The direct election of the chief executive gives the voters two electoral
choices instead of one - assuming unicameralism, for the sake of simplicity of
argument. Having both executive and legislative elections gives voters a freer range
of choices. Voters can support one party or candidate at the legislative level but
another for the head of government.

Electoral Accountability and Identification Presidentialism affords some

advantages for accountability and identifiability. Electoral accountability describes

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 Scott Mainwaring and Matthew J. Shugart

the degree and means by which elected policymakers are electorally responsible to
citizens, while identifiability refers to voters' ability to make an informed choice
prior to elections based on their ability to assess the likely range of postelection
governments.
The more straightforward the connection between the choices made by the elec-
torate at the ballot box and the expectations to which policymakers are held can be
made, the greater electoral accountability is. For maximizing direct accountability
between voters and elected officials, presidentialism is superior to parliamentarism
in multiparty contexts because the chief executive is directly chosen by popular vote.
Presidents (if eligible for reelection) or their parties can be judged by voters in sub-
sequent elections. Having both an executive and an assembly allows the presidential
election to be structured so as to maximize accountability and the assembly election
so as to permit broad representation.
One objection to presidentialism's claim to superior electoral accountability is
that in most presidential systems presidents may not be reelected immediately, if at
all. The electoral incentive for the president to remain responsive to voters is
weakened in these countries, and electoral accountability suffers. Bans on reelection
are deficiencies of most presidential systems, but not of presidentialism as a regime
type. Direct accountability to the electorate exists in some presidential systems, and
it is always possible under presidential government. If, as is often the case, the con-
stitution bans immediate reelection but allows subsequent reelection, presidents who
aspire to regain their office have a strong incentive to be responsive to voters and
thereby face a mechanism of electoral accountability. Only if presidents can never
be reelected and will become secondary (or non) players in national and party poli-
tics after their terms are incentives for accountability via popular election dramati-
cally weakened. Even where immediate reelection is banned, voters can still directly
hold the president's party accountable.
Under parliamentarism, with a deeply fragmented party system the lack of direct
elections for the executive inevitably weakens electoral accountability, for a citizen
can not be sure how to vote for or against a particular potential head of government.
In multiparty parliamentary systems, even if a citizen has a clear notion of which
parties should be held responsible for the shortcomings of a government, it is often
not clear whether voting for a certain party will increase the likelihood of excluding
a party from the governing coalition. Governments often change between elections,
and even after an election parties that lose seats are frequently invited to join gov-
erning coalitions.
Strom used the term "identifiability" to denote the degree to which the possible
alternative executive-controlling coalitions were discernible to voters before an elec-
tion.'8 Identifiability is high when voters can assess the competitors for control of the
executive and can make a straightforward logical connection between their preferred
candidate or party and their optimal vote. Identifiability is low when voters can not

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Comparative Politics July 1997

predict easily what the effect of their vote will be in terms of the composition of the
executive, either because postelection negotiations will determine the nature of the
executive, as occurs in multiparty parliamentary systems, or because a large field of
contenders for a single office makes it difficult to discern where a vote may be
"wasted" and whether voting for a "lesser-of-evils" might be an optimal strategy.
Strom's indicator of "identifiability" runs from O to 1, with 1 indicating that in
100 percent of a given nation's post-World War II elections the resulting government
was identifiable as a likely result of the election at the time voters went to the polls.
The average of the sample of parliamentary nations in Western Europe from 1945
until 1987 is .39, that is, most of the time voters could not know for which govern-
ment they were voting. Yet under a parliamentary regime voting for an MP or a party
list is the only way voters can influence the choice of executive. In some parlia-
mentary systems, such as Belgium (.10), Israel (.14), nd Italy (.12), a voter could
rarely predict the impact of a vote in parliamentary elections on the formation of the
executive. The formation of the executive is the result of parliamentary negotiations
among many participants. Therefore, it is virtually impossible for the voter, to fore-
see how best to support a particular executive.
In presidential systems with a plurality one round format, identifiability is likely
to approach 1.00 in most cases because voters cast ballots for the executive and the
number of significant competitors is likely to be small. Systems in which majority
run-off is used to elect the president are different, as three or more candidates may
be regarded prior to the first round as serious contenders. When plurality is used to
elect the president and when congressional and presidential elections are held con-
currently, the norm is for "serious" competition to be restricted to two candidates
even when there is multiparty competition in congressional elections. Especially
when the electoral method is not majority run-off, presidentialism tends to encour-
age coalition building before elections, thus clarifying the basic policy options being
presented to voters in executive elections and simplifying the voting calculus.
Linz has responded to the argument that presidentialism engenders greater identi-
fiability by arguing that voters in most parliamentary systems can indeed identify the
likely prime ministers and cabinet ministers."9 By the time individuals approach
leadership status, they are well known to voters. While his rejoinder is valid on its
face, Linz is using the term "identifiability" in a different manner from Strom or us.
He is speaking of voters' ability to identify personnel rather than government teams,
which, as we have noted, may not be at all identifiable.

Congressional Independence in Legislative Matters Because representatives in

a presidential system can act on legislation without worrying about immediate con-
sequences for the survival of the government, issues can be considered on their
merits rather than as matters of "confidence" in the leadership of the ruling party or
coalition. In this specific sense, assembly members exercise independent judgment

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 Scott Mainwaring and Matthew J. Shugart

on legislative matters. Of course, this independence of the assembly from the exec-
utive can generate the problem of immobilism. This legislative independence is par-
ticularly problematic with highly fragmented multiparty systems, where presidents'
parties typically are in the minority and legislative deadlock more easily ensues.
However, where presidents enjoy substantial assembly support, congressional oppo-
sition to executive initiatives can promote consensus building and can avoid the pas-
sage of ill-considered legislation simply to prevent a crisis of confidence. The immo-
bilism feared by presidentialism's detractors is the flip side of the checks and bal-
ances desired by the United States' founding fathers.
Congressional independence can encourage broad coalition building because even
a majority president is not guaranteed the unreserved support of partisans in
congress. In contrast, when a prime minister's party enjoys a majority, parliamen-
tary systems exhibit highly majoritarian characteristics. Even a party with less than
a majority of votes can rule almost unchecked if the electoral system "manufactures"
a majority of seats for the party. The incentive not to jeopardize the survival of the
government pressures members of parliament whose parties hold executive office
not to buck cabinet directives. Thus, presidentialism is arguably better able than par-
liamentarism to combine the independence of legislators with an accountable and
identifiable executive. If one desires the consensual and often painstaking task of
coalition building to be undertaken on each major legislative initiative, rather than
only on the formation of a government, then presidentialism has an advantage.

Variations among Presidential Systems

Linz's critique is based mostly on a generic category of presidential systems. He

does not sufficiently differentiate among kinds of presidentialism. As Linz acknowl-
edges, the simple dichotomy, presidentialism versus parliamentarism, while useful
as a starting point, is not sufficient to assess the relative merits of different constitu-
tional designs.
Presidentialism encompasses a range of systems of government, and variations
within presidentialism are important. Presidential systems vary and their dynamics
change considerably according to the constitutional powers of the president, the
degree of party discipline, and the fragmentation of the party system.

Presidential Powers The dynamics of presidential systems vary according to

presidents' formal powers. Some constitutions make it easier for the president to
dominate the political process, while others make it more difficult.
One way to think of presidential legislative powers is in terms of the relationship
of the exercise of power to the legislative status quo.20 Powers that allow the presi-
dent to attempt to establish a new status quo may be termed proactive. The best

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Comparative Politics July 1997

example is decree power. Those that allow the president to defend the status quo
against attempts by the legislative majority to change it may be termed reactive
powers.
The veto is a reactive legislative power that allows the president to defend the sta-
tus quo by reacting to the legislature's attempt to alter it, but it does not enable the
president to alter the status quo. Provisions for overriding presidential vetoes vary
from a simple majority, in which case the veto is very weak, to the almost absolute
veto of Ecuador, where no bill other than the budget can become law without pres-
idential assent (but congress can demand a referendum on a vetoed bill).
In a few constitutions the president may veto specific provisions within a bill. In
a true partial veto, also known as an item veto, presidents may promulgate the items
or articles of the bill with which they agree, while vetoing and returning to congress
for reconsideration only the vetoed portions. A partial veto strengthens presidents
vis-ai-vis congress by allowing them to block the parts of a bill they oppose while
passing those parts they favor; the presidents need not make a difficult choice of
whether to accept a whole bill in order to win approval for those parts they favor.
Several presidents have the right of exclusive introduction of legislative proposals
in certain policy areas. Often this exclusive power extends to some critical matters,
most notably budgets, but also military policy, the creation of new bureaucratic
offices, and laws concerning tariff and credit policies. This power is also reactive. If
presidents prefer the status quo to outcomes likely to win the support of a veto-proof
majority in congress, they can prevent changes simply by not initiating a bill.
A proactive power lets presidents establish a new status quo. If presidents can sign
a decree that becomes law the moment it is signed, they have effectively established
a new status quo. Relatively few democratic constitutions allow presidents to estab-
lish new legislation without first having been delegated explicit authority to do so.
Those that confer this authority potentially allow presidents to be very powerful.
Decree power alone does not let presidents dominate the legislative process. They
can not emit just any decree, confident that it will survive in congress. But it lets
them shape legislation and obtain laws that congress on its own would not have
passed. Even though a congressional majority can usually rescind decrees, presi-
dents can still play a major role in shaping legislation for three reasons: unlike a bill
passed by congress, a presidential decree is already law, not a mere proposal, before
the other branch has an opportunity to react to it; presidents can overwhelm the
congressional agenda with a flood of decrees, making it difficult for congress to
consider measures before their effects may be difficult to reverse; and presidents can
use the decree power strategically, at a point in the policy space where a congres-
sional majority is indifferent between the status quo and the decree:
A case can be made that presidential systems generally function better if the pres-
ident has relatively limited powers over legislation. When the congress is powerful
relative to the president, situations in which the president is short of a majority in the

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 Scott Mainwaring and Matthew J. Shugart

congress need not be crisis-ridden. If the president has great legislative powers, the
ability of the congress to debate, logroll, and offer compromises on conflictual issues
is constrained. The presidency takes on enormous legislative importance, and the
incumbent has formidable weapons with which to fine tune legislation and limit con-
sensus building in the assembly. It is probably no accident that some of the most
obvious failures among presidential democracies have been systems with strong
presidential powers.

Presidentialism and Party Discipline Linz properly argues that parliamentary

systems function better with disciplined parties. We believe that some measure of
party discipline also facilitates the functioning of presidential systems. Parties in
presidential systems need not be extremely disciplined, but indiscipline makes it
more difficult to establish stable relationships among the government, the parties,
and the legislature. Presidents must be able to work with legislatures, for otherwise
they are likely to face inordinate difficulties in governing effectively. Moderate
party discipline makes it easier for presidents to work out stable deals with congress.
Where discipline is weak, party leaders can negotiate some deal, only to have the
party's legislative members back out of it. Presidents may not even be able to count
on the support of their own party. Under these conditions, presidents are sometimes
forced to rely on ad hoc bases of support, frequently needing to work out deals with
individual legislators and faction leaders rather than negotiating primarily with party
leaders who deliver the votes of their copartisans. This situation can be difficult for
presidents, and it encourages the widespread use of patronage to secure the support
of individual legislators.
With more disciplined parties, presidents can negotiate primarily with party
leaders, which reduces the number of actors involved in negotiations and hence
simplifies the process. Party leaders can usually deliver the votes of most of their
members, so there is greater predictability in the political process.

Party Systems and Presidentialism Linz notes that the problems of presidential-
ism are compounded in nations with deep political cleavages and numerous political
parties. This argument could be taken further: the perils of presidentialism pertain
largely to countries with deep political cleavages and/or numerous political parties.
In countries where political cleavages are less profound and where the party system
is not particularly fragmented, the problems of presidentialism are attenuated. Many
presidential democracies either have deep political cleavages or many parties; hence
Linz's arguments about the problems of presidentialism are often pertinent. But
some presidential systems have less indelibly engraved cleavages and less party sys-
tem fragmentation. In these cases, presidentialism often functions reasonably well,
as the United States, Costa Rica, and Venezuela suggest. One way of easing the
strains on presidential systems is to take steps to avoid high party system fragmen-
tation.21

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Comparative Politics July 1997

Significant party system fragmentation can be a problem for presidentialism

because it increases the likelihood of executive-legislative deadlock. With extreme
multipartism, the president's party will not have anything close to a majority of seats
in congress, so the president will be forced to rely on a coalition. Interparty coali-
tions, however, tend to be more fragile in presidential systems than with parliamen-
tarism.22

Whereas in parliamentary systems party coalitions generally are formed after the
election and are binding for individual legislators, in presidential systems they often
are formed before the election and are not binding past election day. The parties are
not corresponsible for governing, even though members of several parties often par-
ticipate in cabinets. Governing coalitions in presidential systems can differ marked-
ly from electoral coalitions, whereas in parliamentary systems the same coalition
responsible for creating the government is also responsible for governing. Parties'
support during the electoral campaign does not ensure their support once the presi-
dent assumes office. Even though members of several parties often participate in
cabinets, the parties are not responsible for the government. Parties or individual leg-
islators can join the opposition without bringing down the government, so a presi-
dent can end his or her term with little support in congress.
Second, in presidential systems the commitment of individual legislators to sup-
port an agreement negotiated by the party leadership is often less secure than in most
parliamentary systems. The extension of a cabinet portfolio does not necessarily
imply party support for the president, as it usually does in a parliamentary system.
In contrast, in most parliamentary systems individual legislators are more or less
bound to support the government unless their party decides to drop out of the
governmental alliance. MPs risk bringing down a government and losing their seats
in new elections if they fail to support the government.23
The problems in constructing stable interparty coalitions make the combination of
extreme multipartism and presidentialism problematic and help explain the paucity
of long established multiparty presidential democracies. At present, Ecuador, which
has had a democracy only since 1979, and a troubled one at that, is the world's old-
est presidential democracy with more than 4.0 effective parties. Only one country
with this institutional combination, Chile from 1932 to 1973, sustained democracy
for at least twenty-five consecutive years. This combination is manageable, but not
optimal.
Where party system fragmentation is moderate (under 4.0 effective parties),
building and maintaining interparty coalitions are easier.24 The president's party is
certain to be a major one that controls a significant share of the seats. This situation
mitigates the problem of competing claims to legitimacy because many legislators
are likely to be the president's copartisans. Conflicts between the legislature and the
executive tend to be less grave than when the overwhelming majority of legislators
is pitted against the president.

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 Scott Mainwaring and Matthew J. Shugart

The problems of the fixed term of office are also mitigated by limited party sys-
tem fragmentation. The fixed term of office is particularly pernicious when the pres-
ident can not get legislation passed. This problem is more likely when the presi-
dent's party is in a distinct minority. It is no coincidence that the oldest and most
established presidential democracies - the U.S., Costa Rica, and Venezuela (from
1973 to 1993) - have two or two-and-one-half party systems. Six of the seven pres-
idential democracies that have lasted at least twenty-five consecutive years (Uru-
guay, Colombia, and the Philippines, in addition to the three already mentioned
cases) have had under three effective parties. Chile is the sole exception. Extreme
multipartism does not doom presidential democracies, but it does make their func-
tioning more difficult.

Electoral Rules for Presidentialism Other things being equal, presidential sys-
tems function better with electoral rules or sequences that avoid extreme multi-
partism, though it is best to avoid draconian steps that might exclude politically
important groups, for such an exclusion could undermine legitimacy.25 Party system
fragmentation can be limited even with proportional representation by either of two
factors: most important, by having concurrent presidential and legislative elections
and a single round plurality format for electing the president, and by establishing a
relatively low district magnitude or a relatively high threshold for congressional
elections.
Holding assembly elections concurrently with the presidential election results in
a strong tendency for two major parties to be the most important even if a very pro-
portional electoral system is used, as long as the president is not elected by majority
run-off.26 The presidential election is so important that it tends to divide voters into
two camps, and voters are more likely to choose the same party in legislative elec-
tions than when presidential and legislative elections are nonconcurrent.
If assembly elections are held at different times from presidential elections, frag-
mentation of the assembly party system becomes more likely. In some cases the
party systems for congress and president diverge considerably, and presidents'
parties have a small minority of legislators. Therefore, with presidentialism con-
current elections are preferable.
The increasingly common majority run-off method for electing presidents has the
advantage of avoiding the election of a president who wins a narrow plurality but
who would easily lose to another candidate in a face to face election. Majority run-
off is appealing because it requires that the eventual winner obtain the backing of
more than 50 percent of the voters. However, the run-off system also encourages
fragmentation of the field of competitors for both presidency and assembly. Many
candidates enter the first round with the aim of either finishing second and upsetting
the front runner in the run-off or else "blackmailing" the two leading candidates into
making deals between rounds. The plurality rule, in contrast, encourages only two

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Comparative Politics July 1997

"serious" contenders for the presidency in most cases. Other mechanisms besides
straight plurality can guard against the unusual but potentially dangerous case of a
winner's earning less than 40 percent of the vote. Such mechanisms include requir-
ing 40 percent for the front-runner or a minimum gap between the top two finishers
instead of requiring an absolute majority to avoid a run-off and employing an elec-
toral college in which electors are constitutionally bound to choose one of the top
two popular vote winners.
If the president is elected so as to maximize the possibility of two candidate races
and a majority (or nearly so) for the winner, the assembly can be chosen so as to
allow the representation of partisan diversity. Extreme fragmentation need not result
if only a moderately proportional system is used and especially if the assembly is
elected at the same time as the president and the president is not elected by majority
run-off. Proportional representation can permit the representation of some important
minor parties without leading to extreme fragmentation.

Switching from Presidential to Parliamentary Government: A Caution

Convinced that parliamentary systems are more likely to sustain stable democracy,
Linz implicitly advocates switching to parliamentary government. We are less than
sanguine about the results of shifting to parliamentary government in countries with
undisciplined parties. Undisciplined parties create daunting problems in parliamen-
tary systems.27 In countries with undisciplined parties, switching to parliamentary
government could exacerbate problems of governability and instability unless party
and electoral legislation was simultaneously changed to promote greater discipline.
In parliamentary systems, the government depends on the ongoing confidence of
the assembly. Where individual assembly members act as free agents, unfettered by
party ties, the governmental majorities that were carefully crafted in postelection
negotiations easily dissipate. Free to vote as they please, individual legislators
abandon the government when it is politically expedient to do so. Under these con-
ditions, the classic Achilles heel of some parliamentary systems, frequent cabinet
changes, is likely to be a problem.
Linz counterargues that presidentialism has contributed to party weakness in
some Latin American countries, so that switching to parliamentary government
should strengthen parties by removing one of the causes of party weakness.
Moreover, analysts might expect that the mechanism of confidence votes would
itself promote party discipline, since remaining in office would hinge upon party dis-
cipline. We do not dismiss these claims, but in the short term switching to parlia-
mentary government without effecting parallel changes to encourage greater party
discipline could prove problematic.
Any switch to parliamentary government, therefore, would need to carefully

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 Scott Mainwaring and Matthew J. Shugart

design a panoply of institutions to increase the likelihood that it would function well.
In presidential and parliamentary systems alike, institutional combinations are of
paramount importance.28

Conclusion

While we greatly admire Linz's seminal contribution and agree with parts of it, w
believe that he understated the importance of differences among constitutional an
institutional designs within the broad category of presidential systems and in doin
so overstated the extent to which presidentialism is inherently flawed, regardless
constitutional and institutional arrangements. Presidential systems can be designed
to function more effectively than they usually have. We have argued that providin
the president with limited legislative power, encouraging the formation of parties
that are reasonably disciplined in the legislature, and preventing extreme fragment
tion of the party system enhance the viability of presidentialism. Linz clearly reco
nizes that not any kind of parliamentarism will do. We make the same point about
presidentialism.
Under some conditions the perils of presidentialism can be attenuated, a point th
Linz underplays. It is important to pay attention to factors that can mitigate the prob
lems of presidentialism because it may be politically more feasible to modify pres
dential systems than to switch to parliamentary government.
We have also argued that presidentialism, particularly if it is carefully designed
has some advantages over parliamentarism. In our view, Linz does not sufficient
consider this point. Moreover, on one key issue - the alleged winner-takes-a
nature of presidentialism - we question Linz's argument. The sum effect of our
arguments is to call more attention to institutional combinations and constitution
designs and to suggest that the advantages of parliamentarism may not be as pr
nounced as Linz argued. Nevertheless, we share the consensus that his pathbreakin
article was one of the most important scholarly contributions of the past decade an
deserves the ample attention among scholars and policymakers that it has alread
received.

NOTES

We are grateful to Michael Coppedge, Steve Levitsky, Arend Lijphart, Timothy Scul
anonymous reviewers for helpful criticisms of earlier drafts of this article.
1. We follow Lijphart's understanding of a Westminster (British) style democracy. Ar
Democracies.: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Cou
Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), esp. pp. 1-20. For our purposes, the most important

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Comparative Politics July 1997

Westminster democracy are single party majority cabinets, disciplined parties, something approaching a
two party system in the legislature, and plurality single member electoral districts.
2. See Adam Przeworski et al., "What Makes Democracies Endure?," Journal of Democracy, 7
(January 1996), 39-55.
3. Matthew Shugart and John Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral
Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), ch. 2.
4. Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?," in Juan J.
Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Crisis of Presidential Democracy: The Latin American Evidence
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 7; Juan J. Linz, "The Perils of Presidential-
ism," Journal of Democracy, 1 (Winter 1990).
5. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
6. Ibid., p. 18.
7. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy," p. 19.
8. Lijphart, ch. 6.
9. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy," pp. 47, 46.
10. Donald L. Horowitz, "Comparing Democratic Systems," Journal of Democracy, 1 (Fall 1990),
73-79; and George Tsebelis, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism,
Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995),
289-325.

11. Assuming that the party remains united. If it does not, it may oust its leader and change the prim
minister, as happened to Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Brian Mulroney in Canada. However, su
intraparty leadership crises are the exception in majoritarian (Westminster) parliamentary systems.
12. A possible exception in Westminster systems is occasional minority government, which is mo
common than coalition government in such systems. Even then, the government is as likely to call ear
elections to attempt to convert its plurality into a majority as it is in response to a vote of no confiden
13. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy," p. 15.
14. Using an average of 3 on both measures would have eliminated three countries (India and Colom
bia in Table 1 and Vanuatu in Table 3) that we consider basically democratic but that have had problem
with protecting civil rights, partly because of a fight against violent groups.
15. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Pre
1973), pp. 62-80; Kenneth Bollen, "Political Democracy and the Timing of Development," America
Sociological Review, 44 (August 1979), 572-87; Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democ
racy Reconsidered," in Gary Marks and Larry Diamond, eds., Reexamining Democracy: Essays in Honor
of Seymour Martin Lipset (Newbury Park: SAGE, 1992), pp. 93-139; Seymour Martin Lipset et al.,
Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy," International Social Science Journal,
(May 1993), 155-75.
16. Larry Diamond, "Introduction: Persistence, Erosion, Breakdown, and Renewal," in Larr
Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: As
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989); Myron Weiner, "Empirical Democratic Theory," in Myron Weiner a
Ergun Ozbudun, eds., Competitive Elections in Developing Countries (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute, 1987); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephen
Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
17 Some British colonies later adopted presidential systems and did not become (or remain) dem
cratic. However, in many cases democracy was ended (if it ever got underway) by a coup carried out b
the prime minister and his associates. Not presidential democracies, but parliamentary proto-democrac
broke down. Typical was the Seychelles. The failure of most of these countries to evolve back in
democracy can not be attributed to presidentialism.
18. Kaare Strom, Minority Government and Majority Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pre
1990).

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 Scott Mainwaring and Matthew J. Shugart

19. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy," pp. 10-14.

20. Matthew Shugart, "Strength of Parties and Strength of Presidents: An Inverse Relationship" (forth-
coming).
21. Przeworski, et al., "What Makes Democracies Endure?," found that the combination of presiden-
tialism and a high degree of party system fragmentation was unfavorable to stable democracy.
22. Arend Lijphart, "Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy: Theoretical Observations," in Linz
and Valenzuela, eds.
23. The key issue here is whether or not parties are disciplined, and nothing guarantees that they are
in parliamentary systems. Nevertheless, the need to support the government serves as an incentive to
party discipline in parliamentary systems that is absent in presidential systems. See Leon Epstein, "A
Comparative Study of Canadian Parties," American Political Science Review, 58 (March 1964), 46-59.
24. The number of effective parties is calculated by squaring each party's fractional share of the vote
(or seats), calculating the sum of all of the squares, and dividing this number into one.
25. Arturo Valenzuela, "Party Politics and the Crisis of Presidentialism in Chile: A Proposal for a
Parliamentary Form of Government," in Linz and Valenzuela, eds., pp. 91-150.
26. Shugart and Carey; Mark P. Jones, Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracy
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995).
27. Giovanni Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism nor Parliamentarism,"' in Linz and Valenzuela, eds.,
28. James W. Ceaser, "In Defense of Separation of Powers," in Robert A. Goldwin and Art Kaufman,
eds., Separation ofPowers: Does It Still Work? (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1986),
pp. 168-93.

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