682 Supreme Court Reports Annotated: Gempesaw vs. Court of Appeals

1/22/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 218
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gempesaw vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 92244. February 9, 1993.
NATIVIDAD GEMPESAW, petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE
BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.
Negotiable Instruments Law; Checks; Forged Indorsements;

Effect of drawer's negligence.—As a matter of practical
significance, problems arising from forged indorsements of checks
may generally be broken into two types of cases: (1) where forgery
was accomplished by a person not associated with the drawer—for
example a mail robbery; and (2) where the indorsement was
forged by an agent of the drawer. This difference in situations
would determine the effect of the drawer's negligence with respect
to forged indorsements. While there is no duty resting on the
depositor to look for forged indorsements on his cancelled checks
in contrast to a duty imposed upon him to look for forgeries of his
own name, a depositor is under a duty to set up an accounting
system and a business procedure as are reasonably calculated to
prevent or render difficult the forgery of indorsements,
particularly by the depositor's own employees. And if the drawer
(depositor) learns that a check drawn by him has been paid under
a forged indorsement, the drawer is under duty promptly to report
such fact to the drawee bank. For his negligence or failure either
to discover or to report promptly the fact of such forgery to the
drawee, the drawer loses his right against the drawee who has
debited his account under the forged indorsement. In other words,
he is precluded from using forgery as a basis for his claim for
recrediting of his account.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—As a rule, a drawee bank who
has paid a check on which an indorsement has been forged cannot
charge the drawer's account for the amount of said check. An
exception to this rule is where the drawer is guilty of such
negligence which causes the bank to honor such a check or checks.
If a check is stolen from the payee, it is quite obvious that the
drawer cannot possibly discover the forged indorsement by mere
examination of his cancelled check. This accounts for the rule that
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016875fb71b70c4aacc7003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/18
although a depositor owes a duty to his drawee bank to examine

his cancelled checks for forgery of his own signature, he has no
similar duty as to forged indorsements. A different situation
arises where the indorsement was forged by an
___________
* SECOND DIVISION.
683
VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 9, 1993 683
employee or a ent of the drawer, or done with the active

participation of the latter. Most of the cases involving forgery by
an agent or employee deal with the payee's indorsement. The
drawer and the payee oftentimes have business relations of long
standing. The continued occurrence of business transactions of
the same nature provides the opportunity for the agent/employee
to commit the fraud after having developed familiarity with the
signatures of the parties. However, sooner or later, some leak will
show on the drawer's books. It will then be just a question of time
until the fraud is discovered. This is specially true when the agent
perpetrates a series of forgeries as in the case at bar. The
negligence of a depositor which will prevent recovery of an
unauthorized payment is based on failure of the depositor to act
as a prudent businessman would under the circumstances.
Same; Same; No legal obligation on drawee not to honor
crossed checks.—Petitioner argues that respondent drawee Bank
should not have honored the checks because they were crossed
checks. Issuing a crossed check imposes no legal obligation on the
drawee not to honor such a check. It is more of a warning to the
holder that the check cannot be presented to the drawee bank for
payment in cash. Instead, the check can only be deposited with
the payee's bank which in turn must present it for payment
against the drawee bank in the course of normal banking
transactions between banks. The crossed check cannot be
presented for payment but it can only be deposited and the
drawee bank may only pay to another bank in the payee's or
indorser's account.
Banks and Banking; Contractual relation between depositor
as obligee and drawee bank as obligor; Violation of rule on non-
acceptance of second indorsements without approval of branch
manager.—There is no question that there is a contractual

relation between petitioner as depositor (obligee) and the
respondents drawee bank as the obligor. In the performance of its
obligation, the drawee bank is bound by its internal banking rules
and regulations which form part of any contract it enters into
with any of its depositors. When it violated its internal rules that
second endorsements are not to be accepted without the approval
of its branch managers and it did accept the same upon the mere
approval of Boon, a chief accountant, it contravened the tenor of
its obligation at the very least, if it were not actually guilty of
fraud or negligence. Furthermore, the fact that the respondent
drawee Bank did not discover the irregularity with respect to the
acceptance of checks with second indorsement for deposit even
without the approval of the branch manager despite
684
periodic inspection conducted by a team of auditors from the main

office constitutes negligence on the part of the bank in carrying
out its obligations to its depositors. Article 1173 provides—"The
fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
correspondents with the circumstance of the persons, of the time
and of the place. x x x." We hold that banking business is so
impressed with public interest where the trust and confidence of
the public in general is of paramount importance such that the
appropriate standard of diligence must be a high degree of
diligence, if not the utmost diligence. Surely, respondent drawee
Bank cannot claim it exercised such a degree of diligence that is
required of it. There is no way We can allow it now to escape
liability for such negligence. Its liability as obligor is not merely
vicarious but primary wherein the defense of exercise of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees is of no
moment.
PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
L.B. Camins for petitioner.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private
respondent.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:

**
**
From the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-
G.R. CV No. 16447), petitioner, Natividad Gempesaw,
appealed to this Court in a Petition for Review, on the issue
of the right of the drawer to recover from the drawee bank
who pays a check with a forged indorsement of the payee,
debiting the same against the drawer's account.
The records show that on January 23, 1985, petitioner
filed a Complaint against the private respondent Philippine
Bank of Communications (respondent drawee Bank) for
recovery of the money value of eighty-two (82) checks
charged against the petitioner's account with respondent
drawee Bank on the ground
____________
** Penned by Associate' Justice Celso L. Magsino, Associate Justices

Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr. and Cezar D. Francisco, concurring.
685
VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 9, 1993 685

that the payees' indorsements were forgeries. The Regional

Trial Court, Branch CXXVIII of Caloocan City, which tried
the case, rendered a decision on November 17, 1987
dismissing the complaint as well as the respondent drawee
Bank's counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals in a
decision rendered on February 22,1990, affirmed the
decision of the RTC on two grounds, namely (1) that the
plaintiffs (petitioner herein) gross negligence in issuing the
checks was the proximate cause of the loss and (2)
assuming that the bank was also negligent, the loss must
nevertheless be borne by the party whose negligence was
the proximate cause of the loss. On March 5, 1990, the
petitioner filed this petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court setting forth1 the following as the alleged errors of the
respondent Court. :
"I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING

THAT THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DRAWER IS THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE RESULTING INJURY TO THE
DRAWEE BANK, AND THE DRAWER IS PRECLUDED FROM
SETTING UP THE FORGERY OR WANT OF AUTHORITY.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ALSO ERRED IN

NOT FINDING AND RULING THAT IT IS THE GROSS AND
INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE AND FRAUDULENT ACTS OF
THE OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE RESPONDENT
BANK IN FORGING THE SIGNATURE OF THE PAYEES AND
THE WRONG AND/ OR ILLEGAL PAYMENTS MADE TO
PERSONS, OTHER THAN TO THE INTENDED PAYEES
SPECIFIED IN THE CHECKS, IS THE DIRECT AND
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE TO PETITIONER
WHOSE SAVING (SIC) ACCOUNT WAS DEBITED.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ALSO ERRED IN

NOT ORDERING THE RESPONDENT BANK TO RESTORE OR
RECREDIT THE CHECKING ACCOUNT OF PETITIONER IN
THE
___________
1 Rollo, p. 11.
686

CALOOCAN CITY BRANCH BY THE VALUE OF THE EIGHTY

TWO (82) CHECKS WHICH IS IN THE AMOUNT OF
P1,208,606.89 WITH LEGAL INTEREST."
From the records, the relevant facts are as follows:

Petitioner Natividad O. Gempesaw (petitioner) owns and
operates four grocery stores located at Rizal Avenue
Extension and at Second Avenue, both in Caloocan City.
Among these groceries are D.G. Shopper's Mart and D.G.
Whole Sale Mart. Petitioner maintains a checking account
numbered 13-00038-1 with the Caloocan City Branch of the
respondent drawee Bank. To facilitate payment of debts to
her suppliers, petitioner draws checks against her checking
account with the respondent bank as drawee. Her
customary practice of issuing checks in payment of her
suppliers was as follows: The checks were prepared and
filled up as to all material particulars by her trusted
bookkeeper, Alicia Galang, an employee for more than
eight (8) years. After the bookkeeper prepared the checks,
the completed checks were submitted to the petitioner for
her signature, together with the corresponding invoice
receipts which indicate the correct obligations due and
payable to her suppliers. Petitioner signed each and every

check without bothering to verify the accuracy of the checks
against the corresponding invoices because she reposed full
and implicit trust and confidence on her bookkeeper. The
issuance and delivery of the checks to the payees named
therein were left to the bookkeeper. Petitioner admitted
that she did not make any verification as to whether or not
the checks were actually delivered to their respective
payees. Although the respondent drawee Bank notified her
of all checks presented to and paid by the bank, petitioner
did not verify the correctness of the returned checks, much
less check if the payees actually received the checks in
payment for the supplies she received. In the course of her
business operations covering a period of two years,
petitioner issued, following her usual practice stated above,
a total of eighty-two (82) checks in favor of several
suppliers. These checks were all presented by the indorsees
as holders thereof to, and honored by, the respondent
drawee Bank. Respondent drawee Bank correspondingly
debited the amounts thereof against petitioner's checking
account num-
687
VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 9, 1993 687

bered 30-00038-1. Most of .the aforementioned checks were

for amounts in excess of her actual obligations to the
various payees as shown in their corresponding invoices. To
mention a few:
"x x x (1) in Check No. 621127, dated June 27, 1984 in the amount
of P11,895.23 in favor of Kawsek Inc. (Exh. A-60), appellant's
actual obligation to said payee was only P895.33 (Exh. A-83); (2)
in Check No. 652282 issued on September 18, 1984 in favor of
Senson Enterprises in the amount of P1 1,041.20 (Exh. A-67)
appellant's actual obligation to said payee was only P1,041.20
(Exh. 7); (3) in Check No. 589092 dated April 7, 1984 for the
amount of P11,672.47 in favor of Marchem, (Exh. A-61)
appellant's obligation was only P 1,672.47 (Exh. B); (4) in Check
No. 620450 dated May 10, 1984 in favor of Knotberry for
P11,677.10 (Exh. A-31) her actual obligation was only P677.10
(Exhs. C and C-1); (5) in Check No. 651862 dated August 9, 1984
in favor of Malinta Exchange Mart for P11,107,16 (Exh. A-62), her
obligation was only P1,107.16 (Exh. D-2); (6) in Check No. 651863
dated August 11,1984 in favor of Grocer's International Food
Corp. in the amount of P1 1,335.60 (Exh. A-66), her obligation
was only P1,335.60 (Exh. E and E-1); (7) in Check No. 589019
dated March 17, 1984 in favor of Sophy Products in the amount of
P11,648.00 (Exh. A-78), her obligation was only P648.00 (Exh. G);
(8) in Check No. 589028 dated March 10, 1984 for the amount of
P11,520.00 in favor of the Yakult Philippines (Exh. A-73), the
latter's invoice was only P520.00 (Exh. H-2); (9) in Check No.
62033 dated May 24, 1984 in the amount of P11,504.00 in favor of
Monde Denmark Biscuit (Exh. 2
A-34), her obligation was only
P504.00 (Exhs. 1-1 and I-2)."
Practically, all the checks issued and honored

3
by the
respondent drawee Bank were crossed checks. Aside from
the daily
_____________
2 Rollo, pp. 20-21; CA Decision, pp. 2-3. See Notes 2-6 thereof.
3 A crossed check is defined as a check crossed with two (2) lines,
between which are either the name of a bank or the words "and company,"
in full or abbreviated. In the former case, the banker on whom it is drawn
must not pay the money for the check to any other than the banker
named; in the latter case, he must not pay it to any other than a banker.
Black's Law Dictionary 301 (4th Ed.), citing 2 Steph. Comm. 118, note C; 7
Exch. 389; [1903] A.C. 240; Farmers' Bank v. Johnson, King & Co., 134
Ga. 486, 68 S.E. 85, 30 L.R.A., N.S. 697.
688

notice given to the petitioner by the respondent drawee

Bank, the latter also furnished her with a monthly
statement of her bank transactions, attaching thereto all
the cancelled checks she had issued and which were
debited against her current account. It was only after the
lapse of more than two (2) years that petitioner found out
about the fraudulent manipulations of her bookkeeper.
All the eighty-two (82) checks with forged signatures of
the payees were brought to Ernest L. Boon, Chief
Accountant of respondent drawee Bank at the Buendia
branch, who, without authority therefor, accepted them all
for deposit at the Buendia branch to the credit and/or in
the accounts of Alfredo Y. Romero and Benito Lam. Ernest
L. Boon was a very close friend of Alfredo Y. Romero, Sixty-
three (63) out of the eighty-two (82) checks were deposited
in Savings Account No. 00844-5 of Alfredo Y. Romero at the
respondent drawee Bank's Buendia branch, and four (4)
checks in his Savings Account No. 32-81-9 at its Ongpin

branch. The rest of the checks were deposited in Account
No. 0443-4, under the name of Benito Lam at the Elcano
branch of the respondent drawee Bank.
About thirty (30) of the payees whose names were
specifically written on the checks testified that they did not
receive nor even see the subject checks and that the
indorsements appearing at the back of the checks were not
theirs.
The team of auditors from the main office of the
respondent drawee Bank which conducted periodical
inspection of the branches' operations failed to discover,
check or stop the unauthorized acts of Ernest L. Boon.
Under the rules of the respondent drawee Bank, only a
Branch Manager, and no other official of the respondent
drawee Bank, may accept a second indorsement on a check
for deposit. In the case at bar, all the deposit slips of the
eighty-two (82) checks in question were initialed and/or
approved for deposit by Ernest L. Boon. The Branch
Managers of the Ongpin and Elcano branches accepted the
deposits made in the Buendia branch and credited the
accounts of Alfredo Y. Romero and Benito Lam in their
respective branches.
On November 7, 1984, petitioner made a written
demand on respondent drawee Bank to credit her account
with the money value of the eighty-two (82) checks
totalling P 1,208,606.89 for
689
VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 9, 1993 689

having been wrongfully charged against her account.

Respondent drawee Bank refused to grant petitioner's
demand. On January 23, 1985, petitioner filed the
complaint with the Regional Trial Court.
This is not a suit by the party whose signature was
forged on a check drawn against the drawee bank. The
payees are not parties to the case. Rather, it is the drawer,
whose signature is genuine, who instituted this action to
recover from the drawee bank the money value of eighty-
two (82) checks paid out by the drawee bank to holders of
those checks where the indorsements of the payees were
forged. How and by whom the forgeries were committed are
not established on the record, but the respective payees
admitted that they did not receive those checks and
therefore never indorsed the same. The applicable law is
4
4
the Negotiable Instruments Law (heretofore referred to as
the NIL). Section 23 of the NIL provides:
"When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the

person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative,
and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge
therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto,
can be acquired through or under such signature, unless the party
against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from
setting up the forgery or want of authority."
Under the aforecited provision, forgery is a real or absolute

defense by the party whose signature is forged. A party
whose signature to an instrument was forged was never a
party and never gave his consent to the contract which
gave rise to the instrument. Since his signature does not
appear in the instrument, he cannot be held liable thereon
by anyone, not even by a holder in due course. Thus, if a
person's signature is forged as a maker of a promissory
note, he cannot be made to pay because he never made the
promise to pay. Or where a person's signature as a drawer
of a check is forged, the drawee bank cannot charge the
amount thereof against the drawer's account because he
never gave the bank the order to pay. And said section does
not refer only to the forged signature of the maker of a
___________
4 Act No. 2031, enacted on February 3, 1911.
690

promissory note and of the drawer of a check. It covers also

a forged indorsement, i.e., the forged signature of the payee
or indorsee of a note or check. Since under said provision a
forged signature is "wholly inoperative", no one can gain
title to the instrument through such forged indorsement.
Such an indorsement prevents any subsequent party from
acquiring any right as against any party whose name
appears prior to the forgery. Although rights may exist
between and among parties subsequent to the forged
indorsement, not one of them can acquire rights against
parties prior to the forgery. Such forged indorsement cuts
off the rights of all subsequent parties as against parties
prior to the forgery. However, the law makes an exception
to these rules where a party is precluded from setting up

forgery as a defense.
As a matter of practical significance, problems arising
from forged indorsements of checks may generally be
broken into two types of cases: (1) where forgery was
accomplished by a person not associated with the drawer—
for example a mail robbery; and (2) where the indorsement
was forged by an agent of the drawer. This difference in
situations would determine the effect of the drawer's
negligence with respect to forged indorsements. While
there is no duty resting on the depositor to look for forged
indorsements on his cancelled checks in contrast to a duty
imposed upon him to look for forgeries of his own name, a
depositor is under a duty to set up an accounting system
and a business procedure as are reasonably calculated to
prevent or render difficult the forgery of indorsements,
particularly by the depositor's own employees. And if the
drawer (depositor) learns that a check drawn by him has
been paid under a forged indorsement, the drawer is under
5
duty promptly to report such fact to the drawer bank. For
his negligence or failure either to discover or to report
promptly the fact of such forgery to the drawee, the drawer
loses his right against the drawee who 6
has debited his
account under the forged indorsement. In other words, he
is precluded from
____________
5 Britton, Bills and Notes, Sec. 143, pp. 663-664.

6 City of New York vs. Bronx County Trust Co., 261 N.Y. 64,184 N.E.
495 (1933); Detroit Piston Ring Co. vs. Wayne County & Home
691
VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 9, 1993 691

using forgery as a basis for his claim for recrediting of his

account.
In the case at bar, petitioner admitted that the checks
were filled up and completed by her trusted employee,
Alicia Galang, and were later given to her for her
signature. Her signing the checks made the negotiable
instrument complete. Prior to signing the checks, there was
no valid contract yet.
Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete
and revocable until delivery of the instrument
7
to the payee
for the purpose of giving effect thereto. The first delivery of
the instrument, complete in form, to the payee who8

takes it
as a holder, is called issuance of the instrument. Without
the initial delivery of the instrument from the drawer of
the check to the payee, there can be no valid and binding
contract and no liability on the instrument.
Petitioner completed the checks by signing them as
drawer and thereafter authorized her employee Alicia
Galang to deliver the eighty-two (82) checks to their
respective payees. Instead of issuing the checks to the
payees as named in the checks, Alicia Galang delivered
them to the Chief Accountant of the Buendia branch of the
respondent drawee Bank, a certain Ernest L. Boon. It was
established that the signatures of the payees as first
indorsers were forged. The record fails to show the identity
of the party who made the forged signatures. The checks
were then indorsed for the second time with the names of
Alfredo Y. Romero and Benito Lam, and were deposited in
the latter's accounts as earlier noted. The second
indorsements were all genuine signatures of the alleged
holders. All the eighty-two (82) checks bearing the forged
indorsements of the payees and the genuine second
indorsements of Alfredo Y. Romero and Benito Lam were
accepted for deposit at the Buendia branch of respondent
drawee Bank to the credit of their respective savings
accounts in the Buendia, Ongpin and Elcano branches of
the same bank. The total amount of Savings Bank, 252
Mich. 163, 233 N.W. 185 (1930); C.E. Erickson Co. vs. lowa
Nat. Bank, 211 lowa 495, 230 N.W. 342 (1930).
___________
7 NIL, Sec, 16.

8 Ibid., Sec. 191, par. 10.
692

P1,208,606.89, represented by eighty-two (82) checks, were

credited and paid out by respondent drawee Bank to
Alfredo Y. Romero and Benito Lam, and debited against
petitioner's checking account No. 13-00038-1, Caloocan
branch.
As a rule, a drawee bank who has paid a check on which
an indorsement has been forged cannot charge the drawer's
account for the amount of said check. An exception to this
rule is where the drawer is guilty of such negligence which
causes the bank to honor such a check or checks. If a check

is stolen from the payee, it is quite obvious that the drawer
cannot possibly discover the forged indorsement by mere
examination of his cancelled check. This accounts for the
rule that although a depositor owes a duty to his drawee
bank to examine his cancelled checks for forgery of his own
signature, he has no similar duty as to forged
indorsements. A different situation arises where the
indorsement was forged by an employee or agent of the
drawer, or done with the active participation of the latter.
Most of the cases involving forgery by an agent or employee
deal with the payee's indorsement. The drawer and the
payee oftentimes have business relations of long standing.
The continued occurrence of business transactions of the
same nature provides the opportunity for the
agent/employee to commit the fraud after having developed
familiarity with the signatures of the parties. However,
sooner or later, some leak will show on the drawer's books.
It will then be just a question of time until the fraud is
discovered. This is specially true when the agent
perpetrates a series of forgeries as in the case at bar.
The negligence of a depositor which will prevent
recovery of an unauthorized payment is based on failure of
the depositor to act as a prudent businessman would under
the circumstances. In the case at bar, the petitioner relied
implicitly upon the honesty and loyalty of her bookkeeper,
and did not even verify the accuracy of the amounts of the
checks she signed against the invoices attached thereto.
Furthermore, although she regularly received her bank
statements, she apparently did not carefully examine the
same nor the check stubs and the returned checks, and did
not compare them with the sales invoices. Otherwise, she
could have easily discovered the discrepancies between the
checks and the documents serving as bases for the checks.
With such discovery, the subsequent forgeries
693
VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 9, 1993 693

would not have been accomplished. It was not until two

years after the bookkeeper commenced her fraudulent
scheme that petitioner discovered that eighty-two (82)
checks were wrongfully charged to her account, at which
time she notified the respondent drawee bank.
It is highly improbable that in a period of two years, not
one of petitioner's suppliers complained of non-payment.
Assuming that even one single complaint had been made,

petitioner would have been duty-bound, as far as the
respondent drawee Bank was concerned, to make an
adequate investigation on the matter. Had this been done,
the discrepancies would have been discovered, sooner or
later. Petitioner's failure to make such adequate inquiry
constituted negligence which resulted in the bank's
honoring of the subsequent checks with forged
indorsements. On the other hand, since the record
mentions nothing about such a complaint, the possibility
exists that the checks in question covered inexistent sales.
But even in such a case, considering the length of a period
of two (2) years, it is hard to believe that petitioner did not
know or realize that she was paying much more than she
should for the supplies she was actually getting. A
depositor may not sit idly by, after knowledge has come to
her that her funds seem to be disappearing or that there
may be a leak in her business, and refrain from taking the
steps that a careful and prudent businessman would take
in such circumstances and if taken, would result in
stopping the continuance of the fraudulent scheme. If she
fails to take such steps, the facts may establish her
negligence and in that event,
9
she would be estopped from
recovering from the bank.
One thing is clear from the records—that the petitioner
failed to examine her records with reasonable diligence
whether before she signed the checks or after receiving her
bank statements. Had the petitioner examined her records
more carefully, particularly the invoice receipts, cancelled
checks, check book stubs, and had she compared the sums
written as amounts payable in the eighty-two (82) checks
with the perti-
____________
9 Detroit Piston Ring Co. vs. Wayne County & Home Savings Bank,
supra, note 3.
694

nent sales invoices, she would have easily discovered that

in some checks, the amounts did not tally with those
appearing in the sales invoices. Had she noticed these
discrepancies, she should not have signed those checks, and
should have conducted an inquiry as to the reason for the
irregular entries. Likewise, had petitioner been more

vigilant in going over her current account by taking careful
note of the daily reports made by respondent drawee Bank
on her issued checks, or at least made random scrutiny of
her cancelled checks returned by respondent drawee Bank
at the close of each month, she could have easily discovered
the fraud being perpetrated by Alicia Galang, and could
have reported the matter to the respondent drawee Bank.
The respondent drawee Bank then could have taken
immediate steps to prevent further commission of such
fraud. Thus, petitioner's negligence was the proximate
cause of her loss. And since it was her negligence which
caused the respondent drawee Bank to honor the forged
checks or prevented it from recovering the amount it had
already paid on the checks, petitioner cannot now complain
should the bank refuse10 to recredit her account with the
amount of such checks. Under Section 23 of the NIL, she
is now precluded from using the forgery to prevent the
bank's debiting on her account.
The doctrine in the case of Great Eastern
11
Life Insurance
Co. us. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank is not applicable to
the case at bar because in said case, the check was
fraudulently taken and the signature of the payee was
forged not by an agent or employee of the drawer. The
drawer was not found to be negligent in the handling of its
business affairs and the theft of the check by a total
stranger was not attributable to negligence of the drawer;
neither was the forging of the payee's indorsement due to
the drawer's negligence. Since the drawer was not
negligent, the drawee was duty-bound to restore to the
drawer's account the amount theretofore paid under the
check with
____________
10 Defiance Lumber Co. vs. Bank of California, N.A., 180 Wash. 533, 41
P. 2d 135 (1935); National Surety Co. vs. President and Directors of
Manhattan Co., et al, 252 N.Y. 247, 169 N.E. 372 (1929); Erickson Co. vs.
lowa National Bank, supra, note 3
11 43 Phil. 678 (1922).
695
VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 9, 1993 695

a forged payee's indorsement because the drawee did not

pay as ordered by the drawer.
Petitioner argues that respondent drawee Bank should

not have honored the checks because they were crossed
checks. Issuing a crossed check imposes no legal obligation
on the drawee not to honor such a check. It is more of a
warning to the holder that the check cannot be presented to
the drawee bank for payment in cash. Instead, the check
can only be deposited with the payee's bank which in turn
must present it for payment against the drawee bank in
the course of normal banking transactions between banks.
The crossed check cannot be presented for payment but it
can only be deposited and the drawee bank may only pay to
another bank in the payee's or indorser's account.
Petitioner likewise contends that banking rules prohibit
the drawee bank from having checks with more than one
indorsement. The banking rule banning acceptance of
checks for deposit or cash payment with more than one
indorsement unless cleared by some bank officials does not
invalidate the instrument; neither does it invalidate the
negotiation or transfer of the said check. In effect this rule
destroys the negotiability of bills/checks by limiting their
negotiation by indorsement of only the payee. Under the
NIL, the only kind of indorsement which stops the further
negotiation of an instrument is a restrictive indorsement
which prohibits the further negotiation thereof.
"Sec. 36. When indorsement restrictive.—An indorsement is

restrictive which either
(a) Prohibits further negotiation of the instrument; or X X x."
In this kind of restrictive indorsement, the prohibition to

transfer or negotiate must be written in express words at
the back of the instrument, so that any subsequent party
may be forewarned that it ceases to be negotiable.
However, the restrictive indorsee acquires the right to
receive payment and bring any action thereon as any
indorser, but he can no longer transfer his rights as such
indorsee where the form of the
696

12
indorsement does not authorize him to do so.
Although the holder of a check cannot compel a drawee
bank to honor it because there is no privity between them,
as far as the drawer-depositor is concerned, such bank may
not legally refuse to honor a negotiable bill of exchange or a
check drawn against it with more than one indorsement if

there is nothing irregular with the bill or check and the
drawer has sufficient funds. The drawee cannot be
compelled to accept or pay the check by the drawer or any
holder because as a drawee, he incurs no liability on the
check unless he accepts it. But the drawee will make itself
liable to a suit for damages at the instance of the drawer
for wrongful dishonor of the bill or check.
Thus, it is clear that under the NIL, petitioner is
precluded from raising the defense of forgery by reason of
her gross negligence. But under Section 196 of the NIL, any
case not provided for in the Act shall be governed by the
provisions of existing legislation. Under the laws of quasi-
delict, she cannot point to the negligence of the respondent
drawee Bank in the selection and supervision of its
employees as being the cause of the loss because her
negligence is the proximate cause thereof and under Article
2179 of the Civil Code, she may not be awarded damages.
However, under Article 1170 of the same Code the
respondent drawee Bank may be held liable for damages.
The article provides—
"Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of

fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages."
There is no question that there is a contractual relation

between petitioner as depositor (obligee) and the
respondent drawee bank as the obligor. In the performance
of its obligation, the drawee bank is bound by its internal
banking rules and regulations which form part of any
contract it enters into with any of its depositors. When it
violated its internal rules that second endorsements are
not to be accepted without the
____________
12 NIL, Sec. 37.
697
VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 9, 1993 697

approval of its branch managers and it did accept the same

upon the mere approval of Boon, a chief accountant, it
contravened the tenor of its obligation at the very least, if it
were not actually guilty of fraud or negligence.
Furthermore, the fact that the respondent drawee Bank

did not discover the irregularity with respect to the
acceptance of checks with second indorsement for deposit
even without the approval of the branch manager despite
periodic inspection conducted by a team of auditors from
the main office constitutes negligence on the part of the
bank in carrying out its obligations to its depositors. Article
1173 provides—
"The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of

that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponds with the circumstance of the persons, of the time
and of the place. x x x."
We hold that banking business is so impressed with public

interest where the trust and confidence of the public in
general is of paramount importance such that the
appropriate standard of diligence must be a high degree of
diligence, if not the utmost diligence. Surely, respondent
drawee Bank cannot claim it exercised such a degree of
diligence that is required of it. There is no way We can
allow it now to escape liability for such negligence. Its
liability as obligor is not merely vicarious but primary
wherein the defense of exercise of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees is of no moment.
Premises considered, respondent drawee Bank is
adjudged liable to share the loss with the petitioner on a
fifty-fifty ratio in accordance with Article 1172 which
provides:
"Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of

every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may
be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances."
With the foregoing provisions of the Civil Code being relied

upon, it is being made clear that the decision to hold the
drawee bank liable is based on law and substantial justice
and not on mere equity. And although the case was brought
before the court not on breach of contractual obligations,
the courts are not precluded from applying to the
circumstances of the case
698

the laws pertinent thereto. Thus, the fact that petitioner's

negligence was found to be the proximate cause of her loss
does not preclude her from recovering damages. The reason

why the decision dealt on a discussion on proximate cause
is due to the error pointed out by petitioner as allegedly
committed by the respondent court. And in breaches of
contract under Article 1173, due diligence on the part of
the defendant is not a defense.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the case is hereby ordered
REMANDED to the trial court for the reception of evidence
to determine the exact amount of loss suffered by the
petitioner, considering that she partly benefited from the
issuance of the questioned checks since the obligation for
which she issued them were apparently extinguished, such
that only the excess amount over and above the total of
these actual obligations must be considered as loss of which
one half must be paid by respondent drawee bank to herein
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Feliciano, Regalado and

Nocon, JJ., concur.
Case remanded to trial court for reception of evidence.
Note.—Respondent bank is not guilty of negligence for

it had no way of ascertaining the authenticity of the
endorsements in the checks, and because it caused the
checks to pass through the clearing house, before allowing
withdrawal of the proceeds thereof (Manila Lighter
Transportation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 251).
—o0o—
699
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1/22/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 218

682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

NATIVIDAD GEMPESAW, petitioner, vs. THE

Negotiable Instruments Law; Checks; Forged Indorsements;

although a depositor owes a duty to his drawee bank to examine

VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 9, 1993 683

Gempesaw vs. Court of Appeals

employee or a ent of the drawer, or done with the active

manager.—There is no question that there is a contractual

684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gempesaw vs. Court of Appeals

periodic inspection conducted by a team of auditors from the main

PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

** Penned by Associate' Justice Celso L. Magsino, Associate Justices

VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 9, 1993 685

that the payees' indorsements were forgeries. The Regional

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ALSO ERRED IN

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ALSO ERRED IN

686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

CALOOCAN CITY BRANCH BY THE VALUE OF THE EIGHTY

From the records, the relevant facts are as follows:

payable to her suppliers. Petitioner signed each and every

VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 9, 1993 687

bered 30-00038-1. Most of .the aforementioned checks were

Practically, all the checks issued and honored

688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

notice given to the petitioner by the respondent drawee

checks in his Savings Account No. 32-81-9 at its Ongpin

VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 9, 1993 689

having been wrongfully charged against her account.

"When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the

Under the aforecited provision, forgery is a real or absolute

4 Act No. 2031, enacted on February 3, 1911.

690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

promissory note and of the drawer of a check. It covers also

to these rules where a party is precluded from setting up

5 Britton, Bills and Notes, Sec. 143, pp. 663-664.

VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 9, 1993 691

using forgery as a basis for his claim for recrediting of his

the instrument, complete in form, to the payee who8

7 NIL, Sec, 16.

692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

P1,208,606.89, represented by eighty-two (82) checks, were

causes the bank to honor such a check or checks. If a check

VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 9, 1993 693

would not have been accomplished. It was not until two

Assuming that even one single complaint had been made,

694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

nent sales invoices, she would have easily discovered that

irregular entries. Likewise, had petitioner been more

VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 9, 1993 695

a forged payee's indorsement because the drawee did not

Petitioner argues that respondent drawee Bank should

"Sec. 36. When indorsement restrictive.—An indorsement is

In this kind of restrictive indorsement, the prohibition to

696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

check drawn against it with more than one indorsement if