This document outlines a strategy to recover secrets from a vault by dividing the problem into independent subproblems that can each be solved using power analysis techniques. Specifically, it proposes using differential power analysis to recover the secrets K, OPc, and c1 through c5 one at a time, and correlation power analysis to recover the secrets r1 through r5 individually. The overall goal is to break into the vault by recovering its independent secret components separately.
This document outlines a strategy to recover secrets from a vault by dividing the problem into independent subproblems that can each be solved using power analysis techniques. Specifically, it proposes using differential power analysis to recover the secrets K, OPc, and c1 through c5 one at a time, and correlation power analysis to recover the secrets r1 through r5 individually. The overall goal is to break into the vault by recovering its independent secret components separately.
This document outlines a strategy to recover secrets from a vault by dividing the problem into independent subproblems that can each be solved using power analysis techniques. Specifically, it proposes using differential power analysis to recover the secrets K, OPc, and c1 through c5 one at a time, and correlation power analysis to recover the secrets r1 through r5 individually. The overall goal is to break into the vault by recovering its independent secret components separately.
This document outlines a strategy to recover secrets from a vault by dividing the problem into independent subproblems that can each be solved using power analysis techniques. Specifically, it proposes using differential power analysis to recover the secrets K, OPc, and c1 through c5 one at a time, and correlation power analysis to recover the secrets r1 through r5 individually. The overall goal is to break into the vault by recovering its independent secret components separately.
• Our job: recover the secrets K, OPc, r1,c1, …, r5, c5 one at a
time using power analysis. for secret ∈{K, O𝑃c, c1, c2, …, c5 } do a Differential Power Analysis (DPA) for secret ∈{r1, r2, …, r5 } do a (non-standard) Correlation Power Analysis (CPA)