Vollenhoven Reader

Draft D JHK Translation Page 27
Calvinism and the Reformation of Phi osophy

[/33a18}
CHAPTERI
WHAT IS CALVINISM?
Is Calvinism anything like a noncritical admiration of everything

Calvin has done, or a verbatim repetition of what he has taught? And does
one have the right, then, to deny the name of "Calvinist" to anyone who
thinks little differently on one point or anotherthan did the great reformer
?
People often act as if they have that right. There are a number of people
who, without being true to Calvin in every detail themselves, are anxious
to
sow seeds ofdifference among Calvinists in this way. Forinstance, a theory
about the relationship of church and state that has been thought through
more deeply than did Calvin, as found for example in the sixteenth century
teachings of Marnix of St. Aldegonde and in the nineteenth century work of
Abraharn Kuyper, is simply labelled uncalvinian. But the truth is that both
these Calvinists were in a position to submit their better solutions because
they lived after Calvin did and were his loyal students.
If we feel that the opinion expressed above does us an injustice, we
will naturally be careful not to make a similar mistake. But then we must
also clearly distinguish between what follows directly from Calvin's
principles, and what had only to do with the needs of his time and of his
life,
In ordertoillustrate this difference, let's return to the example referred
to above. Calvin confessed divine election: according to him, belief
in
[/33a19} Christ is a gift that God does not grant to all. That standpoint,
of
course, implies that no government in any land has the right to require that
all its subjects be believers in Christ and members of some instituted church,
There's a good reason, however, why Calvin did not apply this simple con-
Sequence of his confession while in Geneva: he had madethat city
an asy-
lum for those poorexiles who were not safe anywhere else, neither in the
Spain of the Hapsburgs, nor in the France of the Guises and the Medicis,
nor in the England of Bloody Mary. Andit was worthy of Calvin's best ef-
forts, when the storm of the counter-reformation broke loose, to
keep
Geneva as the bulwark of the reformation. This solution to a concrete
problem must be seen in connection with the evil times that created the
problem. When people forget the context for Calvin's heroic Vigilance
and
want once and forall to derive from his actions the principle that is
to gov-
erm the juridic relationship, in this land or another, between the institute
d
Calvinisin and the Reformation of Philosophy
churches on the one hand—usually the singular is used here, which shows
howblind people still are to reality—and the respective state on the other
hand, then they arrive at a hopeless dilemma. Weeither have to give up on
acknowledging divine election as the core of the concept “church,” thus de-
grading churches to popular [vo/ks] institutions, or hang on to election and,
equating our countrymen with the church, instruct the present government,
here as well as elsewhere, to banish unbelievers from the realm. In either
case, the choice made will conflict with one of the basic thoughts of the re-
formation.
This illustration is connected with the exigencies of Calvin's era. In
other instances we must notice the demands of his life. His time was short
and the task weighed heavily upon him. Besides this, he was a child of a
generation that, howeverit excelled, did not knowits history very well. For
even a strong sense of the past cannotreplace a lack of well equipped scien-
tific knowledge. That's whyit [/33a20] doesn't take much to point out here
and there that Calvin never quite rid himself of scholasticism. Anyone who
wishes to provethis will often find many available quotations. But they for-
get that although Calvin may have been the last of the great reformers, he
never desired this honor for himself. His adage, ecclesia semper refor-
manda quia reformata, in other words, “right after reformation the church
must be open to new reformation,” leaves us with a different impression.
Remembering the needs of Calvin's times as well as of his life, we
simply ask what Calvin's principia_were, by which we understand only
thosethoughts that do not contradict each other and that together bear the
edifice
ofhis life's work.
And then—without any danger of being conteste¢—we mention as
foremost theacknowledgement of Holy Scripture as the word of God. Ev-
erywhere for Calvin, in his /nstitutes and church-order, in polemics and
commentaries, in sermons and correspondence, the appeal to Holy Scripture
put an end to all dispute.
Even today this "formal principle of the reformation" holds for all who
call themselves issu de Calvin,
Nowthis principle is of great significance for the reformation of phi-
losophy. For it says that we do notstand critically over against the word of
God and in awe of traditional philosophy, as does current philosophy, but,
on the contrary, unconditionally bowing to the authority of Holy Scripture,
want to further investigate in a frank way all the rest—also our own
work—as to its truth content. If we do this seriously, then the problem
posed almost always changes, and with that also the answer.
This will become clear in what follows.
Yet this “formal principle of the reformation" will be oflittle value to
those who understand Scripture hardly or notat all.
Calvinism and the Reformation of Philosophy
Forit all depends uponthis understanding. (/33a21]

The formal acknowledgement of Holy Scripture as word of God first
acquires content when thequestion is answered, "What does Scripture say?"
Now then,the calvinian answerto this question can be briefly summaz-
rized as follows:
a. Holy Scripture teaches the direct sovereignty of God, who has re-
vealed himself in his word, over all things, no matter in what area and in
what connection, and, in like manner, clearly distinguishes between God as
Sovereign and that which he has created.
b. Holy Scripture views religion as a covenant (unio foederalis) made
known to humankind, also before the fall, by means of word revelation.
c, Scripture preaches, concerning thesituation after the fall:
1. the total depravity of man,
2. death as punishmentfor sin, and
3. the revelation of the grace of the sovereign God in the Mediator.
Draft b JHK Translation Page 30
(33a22]
CHAPTERII
THE BASIC THEMES

OF SCRIPTURAL PHILOSOPHY
ave
ee
‘A
! understand by scriptural philosophy a philosophic basic conception orp
that continually reckons with Holy Scripture.
This is not to say that advocates of scriptural philosophy may content
themselves with studying the Bible. They too will have to depend on much
more than just Scripture. For example, those who want to devote them-
selves to christian political activity ought to know the contemporary political
situation, nationally and internationally. This knowledge cannot be derived
exclusively from Holy Scripture. And even those who want to know what
the situation is as far as the church is concerned, neglect the study of books,
magazines, and newspapers only to their own detriment. The term “scrip-
tural" only means to say that the philosophy that values this predicate con-
tinually reckons seriously with Holy Scripture, yes, does this to such an ex-
tent that it relies on Scripture, in other words, is in line with Scripture.
Whensetting forth its basic themes, then, this philosophy can also duly
link up with the calvinian answer to the question as to the main content of
Holy Scripture.
However, in order to exclude any misunderstanding—ambiguous ter-
minclogy should above all be avoided—I will include a few comments still
on the chosen formulation. Generally speaking they can be brief, except for
the first remarks which require some more depth. [/33a23]
A.
Scripturalphilosophy teaches the direct sovereignty of God, who has
revealed himself in his word, over all things, no matter in what area and in
what connection, and, in like manner, clearlydistinguishes between Godas
Sovereign and that which he has created.
1. The qualification who has revealed himself in his word is far from
superfluous. There is no word that philosophy has tossed about and played
with more than the word "god." Sometimes it's been used to indicate a cer-
tain primeval unity, at other times, God was said to be identical with pure
form. Especially in the Middle Ages, when many Christians set themselves
to the task of combining heathen and scriptural thought, sin abounded on
Draft ® JHK Translation Page 31
this score. That is why I state with emphasis: if people think they have to
endorse a conception about God in their philosophy, other than what Scrip-
ture teaches us, then this “god” is not the God of Scripture, and their philos-
ophy is not calvinian.
2. On the basis of this word revelation scriptural philosophy accepts
that God created heaven and earth and since then bears them by the word of
his power. Hence, following Scripture, it honors only him as the jinn basis
of everything and sharply distinguishes him from the things invisible and
visible in heaven and on earth that rest uponthis “basis.”
3. In the third place: What is sovereignty? The answerto this ques-
tion can be clarified by referring to the [/33a24) relationship of an absolute
monarch to his subjects. This relationship is to be rejected when it occurs
among men; rooted as it is in a conception that deifies the monarch, either
because he is looked upon as the creator of the state or as the son of the na-
tional deity. Such a human sovereign formulates a law and considers him-
self to be elevated above the law, But God indeed created the entire cosmos
and indeed placed it under his commands.
This is also why we can indicate the [grens] demarcation or line be-
tween God and cosmos.
It could very well be that the word “line” at first does not seem very
appropriate. This term can call to mind something spatial: e.g. in the sense
that a circle divides a plane into two parts, its circumference being the
boundary between thepart that is enclosed and that which is not. In the pre-
sent context, the words "limit" or “line” when used in this spatial sense are
obviously contraband. For the line between God and cosmos cannot, of
course, be spatial. That which is spatial itself belongs to that which is cre-
ated and a spatial boundary can therefore only mark off something in the
cosmos from somethingelse in the same cosmos, such that thelatter lies our-
side the former. But whoever thinks that God stood outside the cosmos
could notdo justice to the confession of his immanence.
Yet the term “grens" can most certainly be used here. This word has
another meaning as well. Used in that sense, it denotes the "x" that makes a
clear distinction possible, without suggesting anything spatial. We can
speak ofa line or limit in this second sense when,of the two wedistinguish,
the one lies entirely on this side and the other entirely on that side of the
said limit. The only thing to watch out for is this: that when determining
the line we reckon with the nature of the two that we want to distinguish.
Well, that happens also when we say: “The line between God and cosmosis
the law." For everything that stands above the law for the cosmos is
Sovereign over the cosmos, and this honor is due only to the God of
Draft D JHK Translaion Page 32
Scripture. And everything that belongs to the cosmos(/33a25) stands under

the law of God, is subject to this law, in other words, is subject to God.?
4. The words over all things almost need no additional comment.
Whoever uses them leaves plenty of room for acknowledging the difference
between the one thing and the other thing. At the sametime, with this "all"
we want lo deny anyone's appeal to this difference [of individuality] in order
to say: "This particular thing is not subject to God." When, for instance,
some Calvinists fought against the monarchian saying princeps legibus so-
durus est, i.e, “the regent stands above the law," which was the cry of the
Renaissance, they did it on the basis of their confession that Deus legibus
solutus est, i.e. "God stands above the law." Everyone who knowstheir
history and remembers how sharply Calvin distinguished between reforma-
tion and revolution knows that the Calvinists were not of the opinion that
rulers had no authority. But the authority of rulers is not sovereign, so that
nothing in this confession hinders the Calvinist from acknowledging the
earthly powers that are placed over him, so long as they do not hinder the
Christian from serving God in obedience to his word.
5. The phrase no matter in what area deserves a longer look. The
cosmos knowsotherdiversities, completely different from the individual dif-
a ference just mentioned between "the one thing" and "the other thing.” One
ofthese differences is the diversity of areas in which one and the same thing
Junctions, Paganistic philosophy has often attempted to force this rich di-
versity into the schema of one or two differences that the respective thinker
had discerned. Calvin's attitude was completely different. The world is the
handiwork of God and, because of that, creation is far richer than we hu-
mans can ever take in. Godis in principle completely above all these human
constructs that lead to nothing but crooked contrasts. (/33a26] He not only re-
jects the Roman Catholic distinction between the realm of nature and the
kingdom of grace, but alongside of the family, the state, and the church,
which Luther had already distinguished, he gives economic life its own
place. But however much his conception, based as it was in believing
Scripture, stood open to acknowledging the multitudinous variety in cre-
ation, there was one thing that everything had in common: it all standsas
the life of things created by God under the law of God.
2 "Being-subject-to-God” is naturally something very different from “subjectivity” in

the sense of whim [willeXeur]. It is not even its opposite. Acknowledging our
being subject to the laws of God makes us humble, which is not exactly what
those currently preaching "subjectivity" have in mind.
3 It follows from the historical background ofthis antagonism thattheir “solutus est"
did not mean to suggest that God in his relationship to the creature will not be
faithful to his laws, but that God, other than his creatures, did not himself stand
underthe law....
This is why anythingthat has toddo with revolution is foreign to the

Calvinists’ concept offreedom; whichis, al atthe same
same time,sOveryrich.
In the first place,there is the Christian's freedom. Christian‘freedom
is to be free from the sinthat hinders us in every realm from serving
God
according to hisword.
Distinct but not separated from this freedom is the other freedom of
which we boast when we speak of "free churches,” “free state,” “free soci-
ety," and "free university." Support for this second freedom is rooted in the
insight that the lives set free by Christ from the power of sin may not
blindly ignore the rich diversity in the work of God. For even in a country
whose inhabitants would all be christian men and women, the authority of
government leaders should be distinguishable from that of the council in the
instituted church. If people do not take these differences into consideration,
the office-bearer of one institution will step in to regulate matters in a sphere
over which he has no authority. His rules will only keep disrupting things.
Because this diversity in authority is the work of God, one way Calvinists
can experience their liberation through Christ is in recognizing this richness
as _well as in strugglingagainst all myopia which, because it's blind to this
diversity, results in office-bearers from one sphere oflife tyrannizing some
other sphere,
That's the meaning of Abraham Kuyper's battle for sphere sovereignty
[literally translated: "the sovereignty in one's own sphere oflife"). In this
Struggle he asserted two things: first, the responsibility of the office-bearers
in_a specific sphere of life to formulate the laws that are to hold (/33a27) for
that [societal] connection; and, second, the limitation of this responsibility,
such that all other institutions are free with respect to decisions made else-
where.
Of late some peoplein ourcircles tend to feel that these distinctions are
really not so important, at least when it comes to the work done onchristian
turf. “Church, school, christian social and political action,” they say,
“they're all expressions of the one life." "And besides that, isn't the number
of people who volunteer for this work rather small, so that you constantly
meet the same people at meetings that are held for these different causes?"
Especially those with many such assignments tend to agree with the argu-
ment. To be sure, there is some truth in this. We do have a few too many
societies and associations. But, this being granted, the suggested solution is
both excessive and dangerous. Excessive, because it generalizes too much.
There are many workers who specialize in only onefield of christian service
and who, though interested in other endeavors, do not belong to that same
group seen at every meeting. Besides, a further division of functions among
a larger number of people will gradually solve this objection. But the sug-
gestion to do away with these distinctions is also dangerous. All
Allauthority is
rooted in ordinances of God, but in each case these ordinances hold for a
specified area, and in so doingalso limitthe competence ofthis authority.
Nothing undermines the esteem for sanctioned authority, also in christian
circles, more than when those who bear this responsibility presume duties
and rights they don't have. That's why wesee little merit in any kind of re-
action againstKuyper’swork. Rather, his basic point deserves resolute af-
firmation.
But even this is not sufficient. In addition, it will need to be thought
through more thoroughly and applied where that hasn't happened yet.
First, as far as thinking through sphere sovereignty again, difficulties
have arisen, and continue to do so, {/33a28) because the term “sphere” has a
double meaning,* The first meaning has more to do with the difference be-
tween “the one” and "the other." The extent [grenzen] of this kind of sphere
can for the most part be defined spatially, in the sense that different munici-
palities, local churches, and the like, are found next to each other. This
criterion sometimes presented problems when people focused on the
[physical] extent or reach of the operation, but these problems usually can be
resolved by asking, "Where's the center?” Different departments of a mu-
nicipality ail work the same territory. But their headquarters differ. Even
though close cooperation will save a good deal of time and effort, people
also understand that, in cities of any size, the one workman will only obey
the instructions of this bureau and another only the work orders coming
from thatoffice.
When we're looking at the demarcation between different functions,
each of which is tied to different laws and hence lies in different law
spheres, things are completely different. The line between the two functions
of a man whois both father and foreman is not marked by the threshold
between his house and the firm. He's still husband and father when he takes V
his wife and children to see the company's new line of products. And when
the brief case is open on the dining room table and he's bent over his books,
he is obviously busy as foreman.
Those who remember the difficulties that arose around the discussion
of the “bakers' law" will readily agree that the answer to the question "What
is a sphere?" does become clearer when people keep this difference between
kinds of spheres in mind. It's a distinction that can have very practical con-
sequences.
What can we say about applying this thought to relatively new terri-
tory? People don't have to go to college to know the things I've been dis-
cussing. Abraham Kuyper often found listening ear for the distinctions he
* This is an elaboration of the same point 1 made already in my Logos en ratio

(Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1926) 65.
Draft P JHK Translation Page 35
was making among people who nevertasted the luxury of continuing their
formal education. These men and women supported him warmly because
the significance of what he was saying was clear to them from everydaylife.
(/33a29) They didn't need to be told that a mle imposed by an unsanctioned
authority will always disrupt life. So they were ripe for the insight that life
comprises many arenas all of which are subject to God's laws and that these
arenas readily conform to the formulation of these laws by sanctioned au-
thorities who carry out their difficult work with love and know-how, but
also resist conformingassoon as a rule that doesnotthe
that arena is arbitrarily imposed uponit,
Whatis interesting is that something similar was happening in the spe-
cial sciences. For example, as long as mathematicians did not distinguish
the domain of numbers from that of space, and tried to arrangethelatter un-
der the former, space remained defiant, challenging scientists in the twenti-
eth century with the same antinomies with which Zeno from Elea had caught
the Pythagoreans. But when people distinguish the arithmetic and the spatial
and abandonall attempts to subsume the one underthe other, the antinomies
have hadit.
Everyday life as well as science run stuck as long as people do not as-
sume that antinomies in the cosmos are out of the question. Thisprinciple
(principium exclusae antinomiae) is nothingotherthan a corollary or anin-
ference to confessing God's sovereignty overall things, in whatever area.
Because when these areas are subjected to the laws of God that hold for them
in particular, then it is clear that none of them are subjected to another law
and that every human attempt to subject them to a law that does not belong
to that area is doomedto failure. So that when it comes right down to it, the
campaign against accepting antinomies, which was launched among us at the
scientific level in recent years, is really only continuing the enduring battle
against the pseudo-sovereignty of reason which has been valiantly fought in
other areas for so long.
All the same, the confrontation here will not be any more petty than
elsewhere. Paganistic thinking has from antiquity always accepted anti-
nomies.
They had no choice. [/33a30]
They had themselves called them into being. Because they did not see
the cosmos to be an ordered work of God, they thought they were dealing
with a chaos that was awaiting the regulating hand of man. The simpler the
ruling, the better, Wasn't it Hans Driesch5 who, until recently, very openly
pushed the monistic paradigm to the foreground, only to admit of late that it
3H. Driesch, Wissen und Denken, ein Prolegomenon zu aller Philosophie (Leipzig:
E. Reinicke, 1919) 16-18.
was not going to work? And even when people have te acknowledge some
kind of functional diversity, that old audacity keeps coming back. They do
not expect any more surprises. Should they happen upon a set of distinct
functions, they right away try to arrange this diversity within the categories
they already have. In Babylon we find the astrologer distinguishing the spa-
tial field and movement; a vitalist swears by the difference between the me-
chanical and the organic; others see only that emotional life is totaliy differ-
ent from organic life, which is a difference the Marburgers in turn misun-
derstand, such that they just as emphatically point to the fact that analysis
cannot be reduced to the emotions. This attitude naturally brings with it the |
problem that functions wrongly grouped under one of the two functions peo-
ple had correctly discerned were not distinguished clearly, the one from the
other. I have already referred to compressing the arithmetic with the spatial.
But it is also common knowledge that the Greek conception of logos was a
conflation of analysis and the lingual function, of thought and the statement,
from which analytics (“logic”) and linguistics are still reeling.
What must we think of this struggle? These tactics are sound to the
extent they have indeed discerned a difference in function. Movement can-
noi be subsumed under space nor can the organic be included under move-
ment. Emotional life is truly something other than organic life, just as the
analytic differs from the emotional. The creation is like a book written by
God, and all such domains are distinguished as so many chapters in this
book. But precisely because each of these thinkers is correct to the extent
each of them found difference that can't be denied, all are also wrong the
moment[/33a31] each of them wants to force the wealth of diversity in its en-
lirety into the scheme of the one difference that, after falling into oblivion
during an earlier period, they fortunately found again, but at the same time
quite wrongly overestimate.
This is why, with an eye to the history of science, we claim for now to
be able to distinguish the following functions: the arithmetic, the spatial,
the physical (= energetic, this includes kinetic energy, to which classical
mechanics had limited itself}, the organic, the emotional or psychic, the an-
alytic or logical, the historic, the linguistic, the social, the economic, the
aesthetic, the juridic, the ethical, and the pistic function, All of these func-
tions, in the order given, are, as functions of things very closely connected
to one another, subjected to the laws of God that hold for them.
From the above we see that we have to distinguish law and order.
There is an order fo laws, just as there is an order to the functions. If we
equate order and law, we raise the possibility on all kinds of confusion.
Somewill conclude from the fact that onlyone order exists, that there is also
no more than one functional Jaw and that there is therefore no good reason
to distinguish the laws for the different functions. Others, proceeding from
the diversity of functional laws, will conclude that there is a diversity of or-
dinances and will easily lose sight of the order of these laws. Still others
will equate one of the many laws with the one order and then cometo the
conclusion that outside the domain for which this law holds there is no or-
der.
Now that we have distinguished these functions, morelight falls on the
functional difference between things from different realms. Numbers, for
example, have only one subject function, the arithmetic; circles have two,
the arithmetic and the spatial; physical things are subject to three of these
laws, the arithmetic, the spatial, and the physical. A plant has one subject
function more than physical things, namely, the organic; an animal, one
more than a plant, namely the psychic; a human being, many more than an
animal, namely, the analytic, historic, linguistic, social, [/33a32] economic,
juridic, ethical, and pistic. Given their highest actual function, we can call a
stone a physical thing, a plant an organic thing or organism, and an animal a
psychic thing. I will talk about human beings in a moment.
6. The connections in the cosmos are no less important than the do-
mains that we haveto distinguish.
There are connections in one and the same thing (intra-individual) as
well as between different things (inter-individual}, These two kinds of con-
nection need to be clearly distinguished. That is why I will first deal with
them separately and then show how a thing can move from the one to the
other.
a, J] will take the intraindividual connection first and distinguish two
sorts: a connection between the successive states of one and the same thing
and a connection between a thing'sdifferent functionsinoneandthe same
State.
Let's begin with the second kind ofintraindividual connection. That a
connection exists between the functions of a thing in one and the same mo-
ment is news to no one. Just think of the connection between an organic in-
flammation and the pain that accompanies it in the emotional, or, reversing
things, the psychic pressures that coincide with economic instability. As
long as people know they are dealing here with one and the same thing, no
one is struck by these connections.
Difficulties first arise when people buy into the tendency of current
philosophy and consider the one thing to be the result of two pseudo-things.
I am obviously not criticizing the technical analysis of the chemist, for ex-
ample, who is able to resolve things composed of two or more other things
into their factors. The elements the chemist ends up with in this manner are
quite rightly called "things." They are both chemical elements and hence
belong to the same realm. They likewise have similar functions, namely, an
arithmetic, a spatial, and a physical function. Thesituation is completely
Draft © JHK Translation Page aT
Calvinism and the Reformation ofPhi geAT 3S"
with economic instability. As long as people know they are dealing

here with one and the same thing, no oneis struck by these connec-
tions.
Difficulties first arise when people buy into the tendency of cur-
rent philosophy and consider the one thing to be the result of two
pseudo-things. 1 am obviously notcriticizing the technical analysis of
the chemist, for example, whois able to resolve things composed of
two or more other things into their factors. The elements the chemist
ends up with in this mannerare quite rightly called “things.” They are
both chemical elements and hence belong to the same realm. They
likewise have similar functions, namely, an arjthmetic, a spatial, and a
physical function. The situation is completely different when it comes
to the so-called “things” many philosophers are left with when the
split the one thing into two groups of [/33a33] functions. Democritus
[460-362 BC], e.g., split physical things into a spatial thing and move-
ment; others view a plant as a stone + “life,” an animal as an organism
+ something psychic, a human being as an animal + something else.
However, those who gothat route misconstrue the connection between
the different functions.
Itis precisely because of this connection that the less complicated
functions of a human being are morerichly developed than those of a
plant or animal. The lower functions in the case of a human being are
disposed toward being_present together with the higher functions in
for example, neces organs, but lack the sense organs, which they also
don’t need because they have no senses. In other words, we see in the
sense organs that the organic functioning of humans and animals is
adapted to their supra-organic existence, with this lower “anticipating”
the higher. On the otherside, the more complicated functions not only
rest on the less complex functions, but also always point back to these
as well, displaying what wecall “retrocipations."
Anticipations and retrocipations exist then by virtue of the verti-
cal connection of different functions in the same thing. This connection
must be clearly distinguishedfrom the horizontal interrelation be-
tween similar functions of different things. Butthen [giventhis verti-
cal connection] it is not permissible to split the plant into a stone and
an organic function, or the animal into an organism and a psychic
function, nor a human beingirintoananimalandasupra-animal part.
Draft © JHK Translation PapeAz
37
For functions are function”of things andpeople may not present a
group¢of these thing functions as though it were a thing. This is not to
deny the difference between body and soul, to which 1 will return’ op
Ao
ht
When people use the words "body" and "soul" scripturally, they are re-
ferring to a difference laid in human life by God. But this has nothing
to do with groups of functions that humansarbitrarily elevate into so-
called things, with the result that they then are stumpedto find the an-
swerto the obviously unsolvable puzzle of how it can be that two of
these pseudo-things nevertheless seem to be one! [/33a34]
Besides the connection we havejust discussed between the func-
tions of one thing, thereisanother connection that is also in-
traindividual: a thing, in allits functions, foes trough‘different states.
stand isolated from each other. If we from the present look back to-
ward the past, we discern that what comeslater lay,‘enclosed in what be lies/?
was earlier and came/from that. And yet the present couldn't have M2 comia/ 7
been predicted from the past,just as the future can't be predicted given
the present. This points to a unique connection between what's earlier
and what'slater. What'searlier apparently includes a myriad ofpossi-
® To forget this is the mistake of all functionalistic dichotomism. So-called

“parallelism” is not the only guilty party here. “Interaction theory,” whenit
takes this position,is just as guilty. Both views differ only in their answer to
the question whether a connection exists between the two pseudo-things
they are assuming. Parallelism says no, while the interactionigt'sansweriin
the affirmative. But don't let this difference blind people to what these two
agree about concerning these hypothetical pseudo-things! Dichotomism is
not going to solve these difficulties; it only makes them bigger! Besides,
these groups of functions can each be cut in two again: Why couldn't the
higher half be split into faith and reason, for example, and the lowerinto
soul and body; subsequently, splitting reason into practical and theoretical,
and bodyintolife force and corpus, this corpus into a movement and stere-
ometric figure, and that in turn into space and number? The only reason
people don't see this is that in making the first division into two, other
themes are working, like the distinction "heavnjand earth” and the opposi-
tion “spirit and flesh,” etc. The equation of these twofold differences with |
groups of functions is based on a mixing of scriptural and unscriptural
themes and always led/heresy. On top of that, it is not clear what the ad- | Vntemas. be/
vantage is, philosophically, to take what is not identical and call them that
anyway.
7 See pages 51ff. and the footnotes there
Draft © JHK Translation Page 43x YO
Calvinism and the Reformation of Phi osophy
bilities that are missing in what's later, even thoughit in turn contai
ns
all kinds of possibilities that are excluded in what comesstill later.
These two intraindividual connections, between the functions and
between the moments of one thing, are obviously not identic
al. It is
notthe case that the one function stands to the other as Possibi
lity does
to reality. Whatrelates as possibility to reality is what's
earlier to
what's later, and this relationship is present in all the functions.
This is enough for now about the connections within things.
(Ac-
tually,|the only reason I discussed these connections first was
because
it fit in well with what came before. In everydaylife these connec
tions
do not stand in the foreground, nor do they do so in Holy
Scripture.
However, both life and Scripture do have an eye for the
weighty place
occupied by connections between different things in the
cosm v
something that many today, under the influence of indivi
dualism,
have forgotten.
b. With that I come to a discussion of interindividual connec
tions.
Here too, God's handiwork displays a richness so diverse that
we will
never find out the ends of it. For that reason, as well, I will have
to /
limit myself to dealing with what can't be misse given what follow
s
[in the untranslated historical section]. So just a few words about
the
interindividual connection, first between subjects and subjects
and
then between subjects and objects. [/33235]
First the interindividual connection between subject and subject
.
Mutually different individual things that belong to the same "realm
,"
like two plants or two people, are similar in that they posses
s subject
functions in the same law spheres. These functions do notlie
isolated
next to each other, but stand with each otherin interrelations
that nat-
urally also display the law sphere's character. Twocircles can
inter-
sect, in physical interrelations the one energy can be changed
into an-
other, and my neighbor can suggest to me a hunch at the analytic level.
_
When languageplays a role these interrelations take on the
character |
of cooperation. In supralinguistic areas cooperation givesrise to
inter- |
human connections like association, business, state, family, and
cultic
community. These connections differ from each other in that the
mis-
sion of each does notlie in the same law sphere. Because I haveal-
ready mentioned the need to distinguish these connections clearly and
the struggle waged by Calvinists in that regard, I will move on to a
discussion of otherinterrelations, namely, those between subject and
object.
Draft © JHK Translation Page f/
osop
Calvinism and the Reformation of Philos
People often deal with the interrelation between subject and ob-
ject only in their theory about knowledge. Butthat's not right. Even if
they avoid the mistake positivism makes and don't conceive the exis-
lence of objects as depending upon investigation, more than likely,
when objects have a place only in their theory of knowledge, they are
not distinguishing clearly enough between object and field of investig-
ation. That itself has dire consequences for science. The most impor- |
tant place in the field of investigation does not go to objects, but to the
subjects! Hence, people making this mistake run the risk of missing
what is most important in what they wantto investigate.
Whatis even worse, if that's possible, is what this mistake does to
objects. Nothing can become field of investigation without someone
to do the investigating, but whether something is an object does not
“ =
depend on whether or notit is being investigated.” It celebrates its of-
tenglorious existence as object completely independent of the question
of whether anyoneattends to it or not. For there are objects every-
~
where where[/3336] a lower function repeats itself in a higher one.
For example, points in space are the repetition of the discontinuous
nature of numbersin the spatial, which is itself continuous; there are
paths in the physical that thernselves do not move,but are “traced” by
moving things; so too, space, which is itself not euclidean, takes its cue
in the physical as perceptual space, which is euclidean; and the biotic
prickling of light repeats itself in the psychic as color. More examples:
a rose is an organic thing that neither thinks, enjoys, nor worries—as
Scripture says so tellingly of the lilies of the field, "they do not labor or
spin"—andit is distinguishable, andit can be appreciated aesthetically
and “priced" economically by a human being, also when there is no
one there to distinguish it from others, to enjoy its play of colors, or to
estimate its value.
c. Finally still, something regarding the transition of a thing from
an interindividual into an intraindividual connection and its converse.
Wefind thefirst transition both within the samerealm,e.g., when
connecting two chemicals into one, and between things from different
realms, e.g., the nourishment of plants with minerals, also of animals
with plants, and of human beings with all of these.
* (compare with Kalsbeek, p. 121 “None of these aspects can exist apart from
man who sees, analyzes, forms, appreciates, and causes justice to be done....
for when a thing is considered apart from the horizon of human experience
with its divesity of aspects, nothingis left of that thing.”]
Draft © JHK Translation Page 45 Y2a
There are, at the same time,also transitions that go in the reverse
direction. These we find, for example, in genetic connections, by
which J mean the evolving of the one thing out of one or more pre-ex-
isting things in the same realm.It should be obviousthat this evolving
is totally other than what the followers of the functionalistic evolution
theory taught, according to whom things with more functions could
arise outof things with fewer functions. The studyof the evolvingthat
actually takes place, stays far away from these speculations and only
examines whatit finds in the cosmos. Andthatis, as we said, only the
rise of one thing from another within the same realm. 1 will try to
clarify this evolving with a simple example: an electron that is emitted
from an atom [/33a37] to which it belonged earlier. We see that this
electron, which earlier stood in an intraindividual interrelation with
the other constituents of that atom, is now only connected interindi-
vidually. Things get a bit more complicated when the thing emitted
takes on an intraindividual interrelation with another thing with which
it previously was connected interindividually. This happens, for ex-
ample, with sexual reproduction in plants, animals, and human beings.
Only when people actually study the evolving that goes on, and
that's fortunately happening again, will it be possible to build up a de-
cent conceptof "kind." What goes by that nametodayis little more
than recorded similarities in the "form" [or morphology] of things.
This leaves peoplestill to argue over whether such a universal "form"
actually exists and can be used as a standard to decide when things
participate more or less in this form, or whether this universal form is 0
simply a product of the abstracting activity of our thinking. When
people apply thefirst option to the human race, they elevate their own
idealto the level of norm for others and then look down on those who
don't meet that norm. With the second option they end up with cos-
mopolitanism. How very different the conception of Holy Scripture,
which knows no “ideas"? and does not point in the direction of cos-
mopolitanism. Scripture teaches that all human beings are “of one
blood" (Acts 17:26) and, when it talks about the souls of the descen-
9 W.Bauer, Griechisch Deutsches Worterbuch zu de Schriften des Neuen Testaments

und der tibrigen urchristlischen Literatur, {Geissen A. Topelmann, 1928) under
the words eidea, eldos, and idea. As for eidos, only in one place, 1 Thess. 5:22,
does Bauer wantto think of "kind"; the King James translation uses “appear-
ance.” As far as idea is concerned, the word does not once appear in Holy
Scripture,
mopolitanism. Scripture teaches that all human beings are “of one blood”
(Acts 17:26) and, when it talks about the souls of the descendents who are
"in the loins” or "in the hip” of the forefathers," understands evolving very
concretely. This is why Scripture values all those genealogies and, whenit
follows this line back to the beginning, ends with Adam, whois the only
human being, except Jesus, not born from an intimate union. Thefirst hu-
man came into being through creation. It was a special act of creation,
through which God revealed his love in this, that he wanted to be his Father
in heaven; which is also why Adam is called "son of God" (Luke 3:38), a
child that was to be the image of his God and reflect the glory of his Fa-
ther.!! [/33a38]
B.
Scriptural philosophy views religion as a covenant (unio foederalis)
. Made known to humankind, also before the fall, by means of word revela-
tion.
1. With this proposition calvinian philosophy directs itself first of all
against the suggestion that religion is a matter of people being "taken up,”
whether substantially or functionally, "into God." That's also why we are
discussing religion separately. There would be no reason to do so if we
could somehow agree with the conceptions that are current. Religion would
then have been included in the previous section.
Why must we be so insistent that religion not be confused with any
human subject functions, also not with their pistic functioning?
~The answerwill become clear as we take a look at what the pistic func-
tion is.
As function, that is, as believing, it is nothing more than the ac-
ceptance of God's word revelation or the acceptance of what one takes to be
word revelation. That last part is important because nonchristians have a
pistic function too."? If we keep this in mind and, at the same time, despite
“appearance.” As far as idea is concerned, the word does not once appear in
Holy Scripture.
Genesis 35:11, 46:26; Exodus 1:5; Judges 8:30; 1 Kings 8:19; 2 Chronicles 6:9;
Acts 2:30; Hebrews 7:5 and 10. Note that except for where reference is made to
the Mediator (Acts 2:30) this evolving is limited to the flesh, that is, to that which
is created.
2 Corinthians 3:18. The original text does not have "beholding” (King James,
e.g.], but “reflecting” (NIV, e.g.]. See also, Exodus 34:35.
2 Dr A. Kuyper, E Voto Dordraceno (Amsterdam; Hoveker en Wormser, 1905)
Til, pg. 536: “...alsof zulk een man nu duiten alle peloof stond. Neen, elke
moderne en elk dusgenaamd ongelovige is tegel¥k een afgodendienaar en heefi
een vals geloof,..."
mt
that, equate living in covenant with God with any of the human functions,
then the inevitable result, whether intended or not, is universalism. Faith,
spiritual life, conscience, or whatever they call it today, become rays of the
divine being, crystallizations of the Logos, or some such. But with every-
one exhibiting all these functions, the universalist is no longer able to see
leads to relativizing this difference. (/33239]

If people don't want to gloss over the difference betweenbeliefand
unbelief, then maintaining the proposition that religion is a human function
implies that they cannot attribute this function to everyone. Believing then
becomes a donum superadditum that obviously stands separate from most, if
not all of the functions; a line of reasoning that leads to the very question-
able severance of the connection between thinking and believing.
Rome followed a slightly different course. It rejected the division of
faith and learning, but universalism as well: after all, not everyone lives
with God. But in answering the question where the difference lies, Rome
mistakenly looked for it in the relationship in which people stood regarding
the authority of the office bearers of the instituted church. Forthis relation-
ship, too, though notitself a function, lies on the functional plane. It is the
relation between those who pay respect and the office bearers in the pistic
arena. Butthat raises the old question: Can an analogyofthis relationship
also be found among nonchristians, or do they lack any trace of anything
similar to institutionally conceived religion? The study of nonchristian reli-
gions excludes the last option. It would seem that the difference between
belief and unbelief cannot be made clear in this manner.
In addition, all these conceptions deny the possibility of serving God
directly in a nonpistic or noninstitutional context. As a result, wherever
these conceptions hold sway, this “lower” life, contrary to Scripture, begins
to "secularize"itself, at first inconspicuously, but slowly on moreexplicitly.
Once we see that equating religion with a function neither achievesits
goal nor deserves to be called scriptural, we ought to ask whether there's
another way to understand religion. And indeed there is. It is clear from
Scripture that we must reject universalism and neither isolate religion from
life nor equate it with the relationship of “laity” [/33a40)to office-bearers.
But Scripture also points us in theright direction byvery simply speakingof
the “heart,” from which flow "the issues oflife" (Proverbs 4:23).
These_words refer to the connection between the heart and the func-
tions. Functions are the channels through which the heart of man comesto
expression. But what holds for all the functions, holds likewise for the pis-
tic function: what people believe, ultimately depends on the heart they
have. That is the reason why, earlier, 1] held back fromtalking abouthu-
man being as a "pistic thing."
~*®
Draft D JHK Translation Pape 44

That this distinction of heart and faith finds oe from Scripture is

obvious to all who know Scripture (see, e.g., Acts 16:14). The
sameview
lies at the root ofthe old distinction between "making alive"regene
and repenera-
tion, on the one hand, and conversion, including conversionin faith life, on
theother.!3
Properly understood, faith as function is present with allpeople. But
whilethebelieving of Christians respects the word of God,the
believingof al
nonchristians directs itself to a Surrogate astheystand in unbelief over ah
against God's word. Their ill-informed opinions about what Christians

know from God's word have actually arisen as presumed revelation, recently
or not, from a human heart. It is in this sense that unbelievers ultimately
live and die by a product of their own culture.
Iis the Spirit of God that turns our lives about, redirecting the arrow
oflife. In so doing, we are brought to obey his word (Romans 6:17), and
life develops this word continues to grow in significance. It is also from
that word that we derive the definition of what religion really is. Holy
Scripture refers to it as a "walking with God," "a holding and keeping of the
covenant.""
Now this “covenant”is certainly not a connection that we are going to
find within the cosmos. For the covenant is a relationship in which God sets
himself before humankind and therewith humankind before himself. Hence,
this relationship is one between God who does not belong to the cosmos
{/33a41} and man who does. It does notlie, then, within the cosmos, but, be-
cause the cosmos1s taken up in this relationship, points beyond the latter. If
we keep this in mind, we will also easily recognize that the covenant is
something other than the genetic connection.
"9 Canons of Dordt, I-IV, 12. As such there is no objection if people in this re-
gard want to call this making alive “unconscious,” as long as they intend to say
with this term that this act of God precedes our knowing it. Assuming also that
this “preceding” is not understood functionally, that is, that it is not used in the
sense of “sub-conscious." Compare my “Tweeérlei wetenschap: Haitjema's
critiek op Kuyper's conceptie getoetst en afgewezen” in De Standaard
(November 9, 1931}. Nor ought people to take regeneration to be a seed that de-
velops itself. It is an act of God to which being born again corresponds and
which reveals itself as the years pass in the need for reinforcement in the strife
from the word of God. Some object to this view by pointing out that Scripture
says that faith is “a gift of God.“ But takenin its context the place they appealto
(Ephesians 2:8) refers not only to faith, but certainly also to being made alive
(5,6). Besides, don't forget that an Apostle, writing to Christians about faith, is
not holding forth about a function without direction, but about the christian faith,
' Genesis 5:22 and 24; Exodus 19:5; Deuteronomy 33:9; Psalm 25:10, 103:18,
132:12; Isaiah 56:4 and 6; Daniel 9:4,
=<
2. Butit is also the case, as | move to the second half of my propo-

sition, that
this
hisgenetic connection is included in the covenant. God's word
did not come randomly, first here then there; or go now to this "individual"
and then to that one. No, it was proclaimed to the human race. First to
Adam, then to both our forbears before and after the fall, then in the holy
lineage, subsequently to Noah, andfinally to the patriarches and Israel. The
habit of parents repeating God's word to the next generation gets incorpo-
rated (Psalm 78:3,4), and their duty in this regard is impressed upon them
(Deuteronomy 4:9, 6:7).
That is also why the word that comes later does not always haveto re-
peat again what was proclaimed earlier, but joins in with it, Even the fall
doesnotpresenta breakon this score. Certainly,after the fall the wordbe-
comes the word ofgrace for thefirsttime. But theSavior, whosearrival it
proclaims, was himself, as God, alsocreatorof
the‘worldand, regarding the
flesh, seed of David. As far as his work is concerned, by pouring out his
Spiriton all flesh Joel 2:28, Acts2:17), he saves it, thewayitwaswhen he
createdit; thus also in its genetic connection {Isaiah 44:3, Ezekiel 39:29).
With human‘life. sanctified by that
ai_spirit, |‘faithin the word of Godonce
again begins to increase, including faith in his promises for the faithful and
their seed. That's whylifeflourishes like nowhereelse where people take
God at his word. And so wesee in the new Israel, already before the end of
the first century, three generations again, after and next to each other (1
John 2:13), who believe that God was manifested in the flesh (1 Timothy
3:16) and that the Hives of those who are flesh are sanctified because of that
and for that reason, notjust later, but already in their youth, are called upon
to loathe the desires of the flesh as being “of the world" (1 John 2:16),
[/33a42] which is to say, to detest the human life that trusts in itself.
This should be enough to show that religion, according to Scripture, is
individual, like everything else that has to do with Creatures,bu
butthatit is in
no Way a matter of individuals. ~Consequently, it may notttbe that for a
scriptural philosophy either.
C. r
Conceming the situation after the fall, scriptural philosophy accepts:
1. the total depravity of man,
2. death as punishmentfor sin, and
3. the revelation of the grace of the sovereign God in the Mediator.
1. Those who followed the above understand that scriptural phi-
losophy also accepts God's word when it communicates hard truths. All
told, much more will be gained by doing that than by refusing to look reality
in the face. Here, too, philosophy cannot change anything. It has simply to
try to grasp God's word clearly.
Draft p JHK Translation Page 46
Calvinismand the Reformation of Philosophy
In the first place there is the message of Holy Scripture that the human
race is corrupted by sin. Death, then, affects not only Adam, but also all
who were included in him (1 Corinthians 15:21). And those who know
what they are saying can't say this without their words crying out like Paul's
did: “For all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God" (Romans
3:23). This holds, then, for every individual member of the human race and
does not touch just a partof their lives, buttheir entire being. Fortheir
hearts are untrustworthy(Proverbs28:26) and (/33a43] from their heart, out
of which are the springs of life, come evil thoughts and all kinds of abomi-
nations that defile them (Matthew 15:18-19).
Hence, when God's grace comes between both, a struggle ensues in
that heart between callous and compliance, between the old hate and the new
love, between “flesh” in its bad sense and “spirit.” This opposition, clearly,
does not correspond with the distinction of “intent and actuality" [geest en
leven] derived by recent philosophy from the age-old one that occurs not
only in the lives of Christians, but in the lives of everyone.”
2. In light of the preceding, what scriptural thinking understands by
“death” also becomesclear.
We know that Holy Scripture distinguishes here between the first and
the second death (see 2 Corinthians 5:3-8). A hasty comparison seems to
suggest the same distinction among the ancients. But a closer look proves
that what here seemed to be "the same" is really totally different. Ancient
philosophy tookits starting point and goal in man, and more specifically, at
least to the extent they wanted to bereligious, in his functions. That's why
they saw death at the functional level as a desirable division. They took the
first death to be a division between the body that was moved and the soul,
its mover. The second death was when the highest part of the soul that had
escaped the prison of the body left the lower part of the soul behind on the
moon, in order to completeits return to the sun.'®
Obviously, the basic thought of Holy Scripture is completely different.
It is not man that is trustworthy, but God. And the very best that can hap-
pen to people is to walk in covenant with God; to enjoy the wonderful sweet
life as only children of the heavenly Father can. To die then, according to
Scripture, is in no way something to be [/33a44] desired. On the contrary,
death comes to man from God as punishment for serious transgression.”
That holds for the first death as well as the second. The difference between
these two is primarily that the first death comes to all who were included in
* [The Germantranslation (35454) has here: “und auch gar nicht antithetisch ist."]
~ 18 Revelation 20:14,21 compared to Revelation 2:11 and 20:6.
~ 17 Yeberweg-Pracchier, Die Philosophie des Altertums (Berlin: S. Mittler & Sohn,
1926) 538.
Draft D JHK Transtation Page 47
Catvinism and the Reformation of Philosophy
Adam,and the second, in contrast, coincides with the eternal punishment

that comes tothose whoarenot saved by Christ."© Thistruly religious char-
acterization of death and this distinction between the first and second death
have nothing to do with the pseudo-religious speculations of someone like
Plutarch [46-120 AD]. Likewise, regarding the specifics, Scripture strikes a
completely different note than this philosopher. Here too itis not function-
alistic.
Without a doubt, death is separation. But what stands in the fore-
ground is the severance of the connection in which
theperson as "living
soul,” that is to say, the person as he was living (aschild
a of God or not),
stood to his surroundings (1 Corinthians 15:21 and Revelation 21:8). The
realization that laying aside the body is a secondary element here, is sup-
ported by the fact that it happens only here. At the second death, the heart
or soul has already been reunited with the body (Job 14:10-21). Also, “the
body" does not refer to “the animal in man," which Scripture knows nothing
of, but to the functions as a whole, which Paul compares to a cloak
(Revelation 20:13).
This all supports the proposition that Holy Scripture sees death as pun-
ishment. A man like Paul still dreaded (the first) death: rather that Christ
returned than have to undergo death, so that the way to the grave, that only
a few believers are spared, would be replaced by a sudden change-over he
needed too. But two prospects comfort Christians who die early. The first
is that the punishment, which comes over them as over all children of Adam,
is accompanied by a blessing. For while the interrelation with their sur-
roundings as well as the unity of life is broken for them too, it's also true
that the struggle between "spirit" and “flesh" which consumed their life on
both fronts has also come to an end. Their soul now lives with their Lord,
purified of the evil desires that arose in their hearts too, while on earth (2
Corinthians 5:8). In addition [/33a45], their body, here a “body of death”
{Romans 7:24) will also follow. Their body, though perishable and weak
and buried in dishonor as a “natural body,"will, like their soul, not fall
prey to death! This seed, because it stands in connection with the Holy
8 Gen 2:17, as well as the texts in the second note back.

1} 1 Corinthians 15:44. The Greek reads psychikos and is rightly translated as
“natural,” in the sense of “fallen in Adam." This “natural” {body], of course,
also refers to the entire cloak of functions. Psychikos should certainly not be
iranslated by “psychic" or “psycho-somatic"; as is evident from: 1 Corinthians
2:14, “the natural man does not understand the things of the Spirit of God";
James 3:15, "[the wisdom that does not come from above] is earthly, natural,
demonic"; Jude 19, "[the mockers who separate themselves are] natural men,
having not the Spirit."
Spirit, will be raised as a "spiritual body."*° We see that the words "body"
and “spiritual” are used here in such a way that there is nothing con-
tradictory in their connection as long as we understand the terms as Scripture
uses them and do not, living in a world of thought completely foreign to it,
read that world into these words.
3. I could not help but mention grace already in the previous points.
But it would still be good to focus on it for a moment.
a. First a few terminological questions.
What is grace? Whatis its relationship to "nature" and to “sin”? Is it
good toconnect this word with "realm" and talk about “realm(s) of grace"?
Here too, let's bepin with the positive elaboration. “Grace” means first
of all "mark of favor”; in the relationship of God to sinners, “forfeited mark
of favor." Grace,inthisrelation, always proceeds from God. Its opposite
is neither nature nor sin, but "God's wrath."
The answerto the question about the relationship of grace to nature, or
the natural state, depends of course on the sense in which the word "nature"
% | Corinthians 15:44. The Greek reads pneumarikos and is rightly translated as a

“spiritual,” in the sense of “dominated by the spirit of Christ." This is why there -
is nothing contradictory about the phrase “spiritual body” or the “spiritual food”
Pau] uses in | Corinthians 10:3 to refer to the manna Israel received as a chosen
people. “Spiritual” in this sense should certainly not be taken as refering to
something functional. Those who do so and think the distinction “natural / spiri-
tual" goes together or “corresponds with current philosophy's distinction between
‘life’ and ‘spirit'" does not understand Scripture and comes to conclusions like:
the phrase “spiritual body" contains a "fundamental contradiction.” But the
fundamental contradiction is not present in Scripture, but in the thinking of those
who read it that way. Years ago Prof. L. Lindeboom made the same point in his
brochure De aanslagen der medisch-theologische kwakzalverij tegen de Heilige
Schrifi, en bijzonder tegen de leer van de opstanding der doden, I Cor. XV, on-
derzocht bij het licht van geloof en wetenschap (Leiden; D. Donner, 1882).
Holy Scripture also speaks clear language concerning "immortality." The word
means "not subject to the power of death [in the scriptural sense of this term).”
Thatts whyimmortality ii s attributed only to God (1 Timothy 6:16) and to wise
whothrough him triumphoverdeath, so first of alltoChrist(Romans6:
then to those who belong to him inhis future (1 Corinthians 15:33 and 34). Re
lated to this is that Scripture: (1}never speaksabout immortality for humans be-
fore the first death, (2) never talksabout humanshavingan immortal part about
them {the
(1 phrases “immortal soul" and "immortal spirit” are foreign to Scripture),
(3)speaksof immortality for human
beings after their death only forthosewho
are of Christ. This last point does not play into the doctrine of constitutional im-
mortality. On the one hand, “being immortal” implies much more than |
“continued existence” and, on the other hand, “be subjected to death" excludes
"becoming annihilated.” See Lindeboom again (page 46), where he writes: “‘im-
mortality’ is something compietely different from ‘unable to be destroyed,’ which
is what is meant, although I find the expression less correct."
is used. Sometimes it denotes the makeup. Weuseit in this sense, e.g.,

when we talk about the Mediator in his divine and human “nature.” In other
cases, however, the word means “original.” Then it can denote what people
are in Adam. The human race is fallen; hence, “human nature" became a
"depraved nature” and stays that way to the extent God's saving Spirit does
not step in between these two. It is in that connection that we should under-
stand Paul's words: "the natural man (/33a46] does not accept the things of
the Spirit of God."*! Happily, this is not the way it stays. The people of
God, born again by the Spirit, do understand the things that come from the
Spirit, and it's to them that Paul says,” also with respect to the relationship
between what they are and have in Adam, on the one hand, and, on the
other, what they also have and are in Christ: "But it is not the spiritual
which is first, but that which is natural; and afterward that which is spiri-
tual.” In this sense, nature does stand over against grace, which drives it
back. This is not to say that there is no great danger of misconstruing things
here. Just think of Rome's use of the terms “nature” and "grace" in which
“grace” is equated with the "means of prace." Or of the way Leibnitz plays
around with words, equating grace with the human functions that animals
muss.
The life of language with respect to “sin” is less complicated than that
of “nature.” Originally in Scripture, it meant "missing the mark” by trans-
gressing God's commandments, whilestil! remaining under the law. Grace
in relation to sin, then, means “forgiveness.” And just as on God's side
grace is the contrary of wrath, sc also, on the side of man, forgiven sin
stands over against the sins that still cling to us, that is, the sins that remain
imputed to us.
Finally, the question whether the meaning of "grace" allows us to talk
about “realms of grace." As such, there is no objection against doing so, as
long as people remember that this realm, if not further defined, is always the
Same as that of creation and is only called “the realm of grace” because and
to the extent that God looks in pleasure upon it. This realm is much broader
than the Church as body of Christ and, all the more, greater than the life of
this Church as ecclesiastical institution. Even in the remotest regions God
still today often grants rich gifts to particular people to rule the lives of folk
and family. Calvinists have always seen this, and express it in their talk of
“common grace." The realm of special grace, then, stands to that of com-
21-1 Corinthians 2:14. This text [about “the natural man”) should not be used to
support the claim that someone in physics cannot prove the existence of God.
Such a proof is impossible, but the text is not about the natural sciences, but
about a dead sinner. See the note on page 47.
2 1 Corinthians 15:46. See the notes on pages 47 and 48; also K. Schilder, War is
de hei? Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1932) 54ff. and 89ff,
mongrace—to the extent Godin his favor looks down uponhis creature—as
the life in the cosmos that is reconciled to God stands to that which is not so
reconciled. [/33a47] We can conclude that the distinction between "common"
and “special” grace, and their respective realms, is completely legitimate.
People are looking for trouble, however, when they divide a person's life in
two somehow andthen lay this distinction on top of that division. The trou-
ble being that they then return to” the Roman Catholic view of nature and
grace, while depriving themselves of the possibility to realize this by using
calvinian terms that mean totally something else. Because this peril is so
conceivable, it isprobably better, in the spirit of Scripture, to speak of
"objects"ofgrace rather than "realms."
b. Obviously more important than the matter of terms is the question
of how grace comes to man.
We could answer, “through the Word." But the question is then, what
we understand this to mean. If we equate it with the word that is preached,
we end up equating life making grace with a kind of ministerial magic. So
we haveto distinguish, on the one side, the creating and hence divine Word,
who preached, sent his prophets, finally appeared himself, and also now lets
his word be preached and, on the other side, the preached gospel word
which, being meant for people, spoke and speaks of him in human lan-
guage. In other words, behind the word as communicated knowledge
—
stands’ the Word that, in a completely unique manner, covenanted with him
who, received of the Holy Spirit and born of the virgin Mary, is the second
Adam. In spite of his ties to fallen human nature, and through his unbreak-
able connection with God and anointment by the Holy Spirit, he leads every-
* The Germantranslation adds “der gnostischen oder auch” (35f56).

** Compare Romans 9:23. Whether it would not be safer to designate a part of the
area of “common grace” as the realm of “God's goodness” (namely, to the extent
it is not directly connected with preparing and sustaining the life of special grace)
is a question that, however important, need not be addressed here because in this
context it is only of secondary importance.
This question, too, I cannot pursue at the moment. Reformed theology correctly
spoke of God's incomprehensibility, without denying his knowability. For
Scripture says, on the one hand, that God's thoughts are higher than ours (saiah
55:9) and, on the other, it does so in human language, whichis to say, so that we
can know that. As for “translating” God's thoughts into human language, he
takes care of that (see Romans 10:6-8).
* The remainder of this sentence was retracted at the request of the Curators ofthe
Free University: “...after further reflection J am not happy with the way it is
worded and must admit that, contrary to my intention, it does give rise to the ob-
jection of conflicting with the Cannons of Dor. I openly declare that 1 whole-
heartedly subscribe to that confession and in no way wish to deviate from it”
(40479).
Draft B JHK Translation Page 51
thing from Adam's lost progeny that is His, through all opposition, to its
eternal destiny.
Naturally, muchof this is known to my readers. But it would not do to

omit the summary of the main content of Scripture here, for there is such a
danger that we forget these basic thoughts (/33a48) when directing our atten-
tion to the confusing variety of philosophic theories. And many who were
Calvinists in their dogmatics went awry in philosophicis. They then con-
fessed that human nature was corrupt, but no longer saw thatthis referred to
humanity included in the first head of the covenant; and so, without noticing
it, exchanged this meaning of the word “nature” for another one, according
to which "nature" is equated, for example, either with the sum of the lower
functions or with a neoplatonic intermediary situated somewhere between the
pseudodivine “original one" and its “particularizations." In a similar way
another person, influenced by vitalism, would use the adjective “dead,”
which then no longer had anything to do with the wrath of God againstsin,
as denoting the functions lower than the organic function. And a third
found himself well on the way to identifying spirit with those actual
functions of human beings that the animal lacks.
And the sad result ofall this was that in times of need, when matters in
our circles were tense, many in the sciences held back, so that the decision
was lefi to an intuition that, although it often proved to be very sound,
really missed the help of erudition.
Whyis it that this pattern repeated itself time and apain?
For a large part it was because people trusted current philosophy too
much and did not see the deep chasm which by virtue of principle and his-
tory divides it from a child-like faith.
Drafi D JHK Translation Page 52
[/33a49]
CHAPTERIII
THE BASIC THEMES OF

UNSCRIPTURAL PHILOSOPHY
INTRODUCTION
If this is to change in the future, we mustfirst of all realize that we
lack _a classification, befitting our view, of the “basic themes"of non-
scriptural philosophy. How often don't peoplepresentdeism andpantheism,
for example, as sharp contrasts, only to label their own Standpoint as
"theism"! Now in the first place, even when we see that this way of doing
things brings us no further, we need to remain fair. There was a time when
Calvinists had to defend themselves on these two fronts, and we can only be
thankful that it happened. In the second place, we need to remember that
the terminology often had to be devised in haste; in fact, it usually relied
upon that of others, for the simple reason that it was the issues that were
primary. I too originallyspoke of Calvinism in the sphere of philosophy as
being "theistic"; until a passage in Kuyper's E Vote, where he explicitly
discusses the use of this word—which he uses elsewhere without
question-and senses something wrong in its use, *4lso made me skeptical
aboutits suitability.
Meanwhile, skepticism itself yields little. What we need are positive
results.
Which method oughtto be followed in order to obtain these? [/33250)
METHOD
It is not surprising that people who attempt such a survey initially think
they have to proceed on the basis of how the various authors characterized
themselves. But it doesn’t take long before they find out that this approach
leads nowhere. First of all, many of these brilliant thinkers left behind very
little in the way of decent terminological characterizations of their system.
27 A. Kuyper, E Voto Dordraceno (Amsterdam: Héveker and Wormser, 1905)1,

178: “And this sparring with the equally Greek, philosophic concept of‘theistic’
will disappearall by itself with this ‘teaching concerning God.' ‘Theism’ says
nothing: at most, it implies a denial of deism and polytheism; it does nothing to
hamper pantheism; and the Unitarians, whe reject the holy Trinity on principle,
have a predilection for the term.”
Calvinism and the Reformation af Philosophy
Besides, to the extent others did do so, it really doesn't help much. The one
uses terminology that the next one contests. And combining the collected
results would, even on the main points—just think of what people associate
with the word “god"—lead to the strangest contradictions. This would ob-
viously hinder insight sooner than sharpen it, as is abundantly clear from
many survey texts.
Consequently, there is no other way than to classify the different sys-
temsaccording to the answers they give to precisely formulatedandwell ar-
ranged questions.
People might very well object that the results to which this method
leads will bear all to much the stampof the person posing the questions.
However, two things can be said in response. First of all, this ob-
jection is not as large as one thinks: a clear survey from a specific attitude is
better than an enumeration of problems and solutions without perspective.
And secondly, one should keep in mind that not every position is of equal,
be it more or less, value, as the relativists claim: when the classificatory
questionsare fruits of a scriptural thinking,the classification obtained on the
basis of answers given to these questions also offers the needed guarantee of
being objectively grounded. Hence, I indulge the hope that the result to je
which I came may also prove useful to others than those who are my part- |
ners in principle..... {33a50//]
epiphenomenal thinkers,’ among cosmists between subjectivism and objec-

tivism.? Finally we found, as the result of crossing these themes with oth-
ers, the opposition of nominalism and realism."
With these distinctions, whose articulation naturally presupposed some
knowledge of philosophy's past, we wentto the past and followed this oppo-
sition over a period of more than twenty centuries. We found that scriptural
and unscriptural themesfirst stood next to each other unmixed, were then
connected, and subsequently parted ways again. Philosophy's past proved to
be such a gigantic struggle between flesh and spirit that finally at the begin-
ning of the modern era, after pursuing all kinds of syntheses for centuries,
people came to see that the desired unity was no more than a patchwork and
its allurement began to wane.
] am certainly aware that many will initially find much of this rather
strange.
People on theleft as well as on the right claim that Holy Scripture says
about the same thing as one or another ancient school of philosophy; this in
spite ofall the light that has been shed here from very different corners. In
addition, the theme allows for so much variation: Philo is certain that
Plato's Academy teaches what Moses did and Zwingli thinks the Stoics and
Christendom are really very close.
In ali seriousness, 1 would first want to ask how it can be that ac-
cording to one, Scripture supports realism and that the well respected opin-
ion of another says, Scripture really comes to the aid of the nominalists,
while a little deeper investigation of the past teaches that these two parties
were continually at each other's throats.
But it's not my intention to “lock in on” any of my readers: all that
does is make [/332307} the victim antsy. To “help” is to do something else.
Nor do I want to play the nominalists and realists out against each other.
They have had to endure enough confrontations. All I wantto ask is this:
* In the apriori line of thought, whatis "higher" is considered secure, with what is
"lower" depending on what is higher. Emanation, as in tight or logos from
above, is a preferred analogy. An emphasis on being and absolutes are typical,
Epiphenomenalism presumes that what is “higher” rests on “the lower.” There is
a sirong preference for “growth” metaphors (and becoming, relativiry) that em-
phasize physis, e.g., the fruitfulness of the land, stream, and mother-earth.
@ Subjectivism and objectivism have an incorrect view of object functions and sub-
ject functions, respectively.
* Nominalism denies the existence of logical object functions: once the sense per-
ceptions are in, it's all mental from there on in; “truth” is found within the indi-
vidual. Realism overestimates the significance of logical object functions for
thinking; “truth” is not only within, but primarily outside the individual,
Y Yay S4 is en
Prerwadic of pase 26
“Doesn't a bird's-eye view of an importantpart of philosophy's past provide

some insight into the standings of main and subgroups and into the course
that things have been taking?"
When people consider this question carefully and take note of how the
past itself speaks of continual confrontation and that the parties, time and
again, take up precisely those positions sketched in part two [The Historical
Part], it may be that they are not used to this view right away. Butthat will
happen with time and, as I have found for myself, this way of looking at
things beginsto liberate.
What falls away first is the foolish prejudice that the entire history of
philosophy is a rift between rationalism and empiricism that was brought to
an end in the Peace of Konigsberg in 1781. Those who construct the past
this way are indeed captives of nominalism.
The vista is broader for those whoare able to see beyond these narrow
confines. Realism becomes an option, and they get very interested in the
contest realists had to wage with a variety of nominalists. For indeed, this
conflict is more significant than the one we just mentioned and dominates
what's happening also in the past, even more so than people usually sup-
pose. I hope that | have shown notonly that it instigated for the Greeks the
confrontation of the Academy against the Sophists and Stoics and surfaced
again, now as a purely logical question in the twelfth century, but that since
Socrates it also has been a defining factor in the mind wrenchingtension ofa
nigh uninterrupted dispute spanningat least 20 centuries.
Meanwhile, the significance of this opposition should not be over-
estimated either. It was unknown priorto the time of Socrates and [/33a308]
presently people are doing what they can to escapeits clutches by pulling
back, either with cosmists to positions of subjectivism and objectivism, or
with correlativistic theists to positions of apriorism (Husserl) and epiphe-
nomenalism (Heidegger).
But that doesn’t mean that they are where they haveto be, at least if
they want a view of the whole. Actually, two dangers threaten. When peo-
ple discover that modern philosophy, however muchit is involved with very
detailed questions, in fact goes back to the problems posed by the "pre-so-
cratics," then one of two attitudes are possible: one either tends to the
opinion that each of these theories has as muchright as the next and becomes
a relativist, or one doubts this right to equal rights [her recht van alle
tegelijk] and ends in skepticism.
Naturally, we can try to avoid this dilemma by taking sides and choose
for one ofthese positions, simply because people cannotlive without taking
a stand. But that's pretty difficult after first ascertaining the naivité of any-
one who actually holds to one ofthese theories.
Calvinism and the Reformation ofPhilosophy
with the result that the opponents can pride themselves in having made us
rich, we will certainly not be a blessing to them. But those who carefully
continue to work, always investigating by the light of God's word what the
Creator has made,will in the long run find more than those who scorn this
word and may perhapspresently be a blessing to those others. (33a319//}
2.
BELIEVING
FAITH
The science of psychology appeared on the academic horizon around

the dawn of the twentieth century. At the Free University the theologian
Herman Bavinck (1854-1921) was the pioneerin the field. He was followed
by Jan Waterink (1890-1966) in empirical psychology and Vollenhoven,
who until deep into the 1950s was responsible for the area of theoretical psy-
chology. All three realized that work in this area required a well-defined
view of man. Theyalso all agreed that a religiously neutral psychology was
neither what they wanted nor within the realm of possibilities; even our per-
ception is informed by basic concepts of what countas things and ofthe na-
ture of being, becoming, change, and causes. As far as they were con-
cerned, this meantthat the christian faith was also to inspire and spirit the
science called psychology. Disagreement arose, however, as to the correct
definition of man and likewise the field psychology has to study, Another
result was, as we read in the previous chapter, the more traditional view of
man (anthropology) began to totter (62). In fact, one of the subtexts of
Calvinism and the Reformation of Philosophy (1933) was an exposé of a
questionable (partial theistic) view of man that was still very much accepted
within reformed circles and an initial articulation of an anthropology that
was more in line with Scripture (see e.g. 39, 43, 47).
The next piece, published in 1950, dates from June 1949 and is a paper
Vollenhoven gave at a Roman Catholic student sponsored conference dealing
with faith and leaming. Though a very common themetoday in christian
academic circles, Vollenhoven, following in the line of Bayinck and Abra-
ham Kuyper, does not advocate the integration of faith and learning.
Learning always comes with "values" added and faith is not some superad-
ditive that is going to make one's research christian. What he advocates in-
Stead is an inner/outer distinction between the human heart and the many
human ways of being in the world,
Our heart within gives religious direction to our social life, our eco-
nomic life, our faith life, each of which are part of our outer cloak of func-
tions. Functions are the channels through which the issues of the human
heart come to expression. But what holds for all the functions, holds like-
wise for the pistic function (of faith): what people believe, ultimately de-
pends on the heart they have. Faith is a function all people have; there are
no nonbelievers. But while the believing of Christians respects the word of
God, the believing of nonchristians directs itself to a surrogate, and is called
“unbelief.” Vollenhoven describes the individual human heart, which is ei-
ther open or closed to God's word, as “pre-functional" and, as such, not ac-
cessible to another person's analysis or judgment. Rather, the obedience or
disobedience that lives in another person's heart only comes within our
purview through the various modesof earthly existence, in human activities
and their results, all of which, in one way or another, can be object for hu-
man analysis. In other words, faith so conceived is a behavioral aspect of
our lives, while it is from out of the heart that religion radically and totally
determines and dominates human living.
Vollenhoven’s claims with respect to the pervasive influenceof reli-
gious direction are prescriptive. He would bethelast to deny that a lack of
integrity prevails, also among Christians, between peoples’ religion and
their lives. As we'll see in this essay, obedient and disobedient living in one
person'slife are not like water and oil (74).
Bavinck had made a different but somewhatrelated distinction between
faith as a personal attitude and view of life and dogmatics as a formulated
system of religious belief statements or theology. This distinction was im-
portant for Bavinck for a number of reasons. On the one hand,it left room
for empirica} psychology as a science distinct from theology. Waterink, in
contrast, who denied the distinction, preferred to order psychology under
christian dogmatics. He made dogmatic theology the leading principle from
which the basic framework for psychology should be derived. This implied
that the better articulated one's theology was, the more christian was one's
perspective on psychology. For Bavinck, a vibrant christian faith life did
not take away the need for psychology. As heput it: Just because people
believe Christ doesn't mean that they have arrived theoretically; so also be-
ing an unbeliever does not make you demented ora liar.
Although they differed on the relationship of faith and learning and,
hence, theology and psychology, Waterink and Bavinck had a very similar
anthropology. A human beingis a unity of body, soul and spirit, whereby a
person's soul and spirit, the personality, are two sides of a single
incorporeal substance. The spirit side, which is the core of man,ties him to
whatis invisible and divine, while the soul side is tied to the body and what
is visible. In his psychology, Waterink assumed that someone's inherited
traits could be explained with reference to human ature, namely, to soul
and body, but that the immortal, “spirit” part of everyone, the ] or ego, was
created de novo by God at conception. Bavinck also emphasized the

importance ofa biblical understanding of the heart. As he saw it, the heart
moved mind and matter. It was the starting point for physical life as well
as psychic life: “While the spirit is the principle oflife and the soul is the
subject of life, the heart forms its central organ. Just as in the body the
blood flows out from the heart to all the members, so also in an analogous
and spiritual sense the entire life of the soul comes forth from the heart: Out
of the heart are the issues of life (Proverbs 4:23)" (Bijbelse en religieuze
Psychologie [1920] 61). Bavinck also distinguished two “faculties” of the
soul: intellect and will; distinguishing within the intellect between reason
(discursive thinking) and understanding (possessing the knowledge that the
truth makes known).
In the paperthat follows, Vollenhoven is echoing Bavinck when he re-
jects a natural/supernatural division (stereo)typical of Roman Catholics. He
is also in step with Bavinck's emphasis on sin and grace as a morebiblical
alternative to nature and grace. But Vollenhoven is also implicitly dis-
agreeing with Bavinck and Waterink's understanding of the soul as
(immortal) substance. The psuché is not a substance and psychology does
not study the whole of man, but (just) one of the ways in which living hu-
man beings function (see e.g., 224). Faith, Vollenhoven explains, is the
“highest” or "most complex" of these human functions.
Each of these functions (see 36, 192) is under a God-ordained
“functional law,” some of which are "norms." As we will read below, a
norm is a law for creaturely being that, if it is to be obeyed, demandsa lis-
tening ear (74, 151). In Vollenhoven's conception the functional law/norm
for true faith life is nothing other than Scripture (334227; 40p5). Scripture
is the modal norm forfaith life and reveals among other things the religious
norm for life within the context of the covenant. In other words, this in-
scripturated word revelation is the functional/modal law forthepistic aspect
of creaturely living and, as such, also reveals (but is not itself} the religious
norm for life: the great commandment oflovethat is to rule the hearts and
hencethelives of everyone.
Bavinck's distinction between faith and dogmatics is also echoed in
Vollenhoven's discussion. The knowing inherent to believing, to faith
knowledge, is not scientific or theoretic in nature. Scripture directs itself
first of all to practical everyday life in a concrete way. God's word revela-
tion, Vollenhoven claims, always speaks, about God, about his relationship
to creatures, and abouttheir relationship to him, “in the language of every-
day perception” (26a26). One need not be a theologian to read and under-
stand the Bible.
Wewill find that Vollenhoven has more to say about faith and religious
beliefs. Unfortunately, any discussion of the nature and task of iheology,
beyond generalities applicable to any of the other special sciences, is practi-

cally nonexistent. Although Vollenhovenhas little to say about any of the
special sciences, except psychology, the lack of more explicit reflection is
disappointing because of his own negative critique of others’ conception of
this discipline. These include the following: he rejects the notion that the-
ology is the queen ofthe sciences, that theologyis all-inclusive or has an in-
side track on the truth. Noris christian philosophy a matter of integrating
theological knowledge into the philosophic endeavor. So, while exposing
significant aberrations and tracing devastating historical consequences of
misconceiving this discipline, his comments about theology remain by and
large negative.
One thing that does come through loud and clear is the nature of theo-
retic reflection as a normed human activity that proceeds from and must re-
tum to the knowing of everyday. Science does not groundfaith, but the re-
verse is true. Scientific analysis, for all the details it may discover along the
way of resolution and composition, remains a "detour" embedded in every-
day knowledge and, ultimately, in the fullness of reality. According to
Vollenhoven, scientific knowing never stands alone, butis “continually un-
dergirded and propelled” by the everyday, nonscientific knowing that pre-
cedes it (34al; 42h4). (Nonscientific) knowledge of oneself, one's needs
and wants, of other people, of spouse and children and of what they expect
of us, of what one takes to be importantin life, etc., constitutes what we
could call the factual or existential starting point for all scientific activity,
This point of departure, which is left unquestioned, at least for the moment,
does not dissipate and remains presumed when oneturns to theoretic mat-
ters.
Vollenhoven is convinced that when someonelistens to the word of the
Lord, he comes to know something about God: that he created the world;
about the cosmos: that the whole world is created by God; about his
covenanting relation to the cosmos. Healso learns about the world in reta-
tion to God: that human beings, though unchanged structurally, radically
changed direction at the time of the fall; and about God's wrath and grace
with respect to the sinner. These are all "major matters" [hoofdzaken), pri-
mary givens having to do with “creation, fall, salvation through Christ, and
life in restored communion with God, hence with the magnalia Dei in cre-
ation and re-creation” (5018). Vollenhoven repeatedly emphasizes that the
knowledge ofthese things, implied in believing, not only presupposes some
(analytic) distinguishing on the part of the believer, but also bears a
nonscientific, pretheoretic character.
Although he nowhere explains in great detail the nonscientific character
of faith knowledge, Vollenhoven's most enlightening comments about it
have to do with the all-inclusive [fotalitair] (49c), circumscriptive
(nonscientific) concepts [omramingsbegrippen] of the knowing inherent to

believing. It is these circumscriptive concepts that help define the frame-
work within which a person lives and moves and understands her being
there. Although faith knowledge constitutes only one part of her nonscien-
tific knowledge, the claim is that because the pistic is the highest human
function, this faith knowledge is onc of the most decisive factors in defining
the parameters of that person's world and her sense of living here and now
and towards the future.
Wewill see below that the effort or activity of coming to know, as well
as its results, is characterized by the modaily qualified context in which it
takes place (267). For example, the knowing involved in the respect of
children for their parents is said to have a different character than the
knowing involved in the respect of citizens for their government (421114),
Atthe sametime, irrespective of the mode of being that qualifies it, all non-
scientific knowing displays this similarity: that which is discerned
“determines” the person doing the discerning. Wewill see in this essay that
this (nonscientific) discerning activity always has to do with things as a
whole (75).
Vollenhoven assumes throughout that a person's attitude toward life
and the world as well as the beliefs and circumscriptive concepts it includes
are all nonscientific in character. They are also pre-scientific, both in the
sense of had prior to (and not dissipating during) scientific investigation, but
also in the sense of determining the basic contours of the pre-supposed foun-
dation from which the scientist proceeds and to which she returns.
Vollenhoven was averse to an intellectualistic understanding of the
christian faith. Walking with God was much more important than being able
to talk theology or earn a Ph.D. But he was also secure in his insistence that
those who could should study.
“Believing in” and “studying about,” howeverdifferent they are, are definitely
not at odds with each other, Calvinists will not, given this difference, first of
all evaluate the people around them according to logical and noetic standards.
At the same time, they will resolutely require that people with clear demon-
strations and a lucid intuition will see all of this as outcome of the primary
(special) and secondary (general) influence of God's Spirit, and will exercise
obedience in their logical activity out of their love for him. (29644)
You don't need a college degree to love the Lord. And those who can better
handle abstract theories and hypothetical deductions must love their God no
less.
[/50d7 1]
Faith:
Its Nature, Structure,
and Significance for Science
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen: I was eager to comply with the
invitation to contribute to this conference. That comes not only because of
my pleasant memories of the Utrecht study conference in 1946, but also, and
especially, because it is important to improve our contact. AsI see it, Ro-
man Catholics and Calvinists in The Netherlands are becoming alienated
from each other, to the detriment of our country. If this situation is going to
change, then wearefirst of all going to have to understand each other well.
Conferences tike these are a most appropriate meansto that end.
The themeof the conference is “Faith and Science," and today we are
to approach it from the angle of faith. With that in mind, I asked myself:
Whatis the nature of faith? What part does knowing play when it comes to
faith? And, what value does faith knowledge havefor science?
The Nature
of Faith
Taking faith in the sense of religious faith or belief, and primarily in

the active sense of believing, what is the nature of faith?
A. I would describe faith in the sense of believing as the highest func-
tion in the life of the individual person. Whether this person is a Christian
or a pagan, to mention only the extremes, is of course terribly important,
but incidental to our definition. Everyone possesses faith. This is so be-
cause believing belongsto the structure of human life, which, in spite of im-
portant differences in how it unfolds, is the same forall.
Within this structure [of human life] we can also distinguish the [/50d72)
"inner" and the “outer,” or if you prefer, the center and the periphery, the
heart and the cloak of functions.
When call faith the highest function in human existence, I imply two
things: on the one hand,that believing is only a function; and on the other
hand, that believing is the most importantin the series of functions.
First: believing is only functional. That is to say; faith is not identical
with heart, but is determined by the heart in its direction towards good or
Faith: Nature, Structure, and Significance
evil, i.e., in obedience to the law of love or not. In other words, the whole
man is religious, and his life is a walk before the face of God in obedience
or disobedience.
But in the framework of functional existence faith also occupies the
most important place. This function is the highest, which implies that all
the others [e.g. the aesthetic, economic, social, lingual, and analytic] are
lower [functions] and together form the substrate of faith. Because ofthis,
faith refers back to all those other functions and these, in turn, point forward
to (anticipate) faith. Faith, then, is part of the functional “cloak” and, as
such, is part of the structure of man. it is not something that was Jost and
that was returned later as a donum superadditum, a super-added gift (of
grace).
B. So far I have considered faith in individual existence. But a person
never lives this way: he comes out of community and into many com-
munities. There are many such societal relationships. Think, for instance,
of clubs, associations, business enterprises, the state, and the family. These
societal relationships all have cultural-historical formation as their basis; in
addition, they ali imply the use of language, the observation of social cour-
tesy and interaction, while their highest function indicates the purpose.
The community of faith is also a societal structure. It, too, is inherent
to human life. A community of faith is not something only Christians
know; pagans knowit as well. In christian circles people call this commu-
nity "church."
Hence, the church, like the societal relationships we just noted, bears a
functional character. One should distinguish "church" from the “corpus
christianum,” the people of the Lord, whichis the prefunctional community,
rooted in Christ.
Ecclesiastic offices, therefore, are also functional and should be distin-
guished from the prefunctional office in which the representative of hu-
mankind acts in matters that are to be done for humanity before God. [/50473)
C. With this, we come to the genetic. Human life is not simply some-
thing of today. It also has a past.
This past plays a role in the nurturing that prepares the individual per-
son to stand at a later age within the societal relationships in the community.
But the past is also important for communities. They have their history as
well. Here too the direction of that which is functional is determined by the
heart and, as such, byreligion, i.e., by the relation to God. That is why the
history of religion is dominated by the falt of the first Adam. Adam did not
lose [the capacity for] faith, but directed it differently. He no longer be-
lieved God, but Satan. But he did lose his prefunctional office, that there-
after was entrusted to Christ as the second Adam.
Thus it can be understood that faith, although always a function of an

individual human being, is not only embedded in the totality of that exis-
tence, but also in the life of humankind, whether in Christ or not—no matter
how often actual life exhibits a mixed striving in both directions at once.
The Structure
of Faith
A. Being functional, faith is subjected to a functional law. In this re-

spect it is again similar to all other functions.
Now law and functions never coincide; not in the pre-analytic [i.e.,
sensitive, biotic, physical, kinematic, spatial, and arithmetic] functions, ei-
ther. But in the case of the analytic (also called the logical) function we
meet with something peculiar. Its nature is to analyze, to distinguish. But
distinguishing is nothing other than noting a diversity that exists independent
of this distinguishing activity. So, analytic [functioning] is also able to note
the diversity of law and function; not only when it comes to other law
spheres, but also in the case of the analytic itself. That is why the analytic
function can distinguish itself from the law that holds for it. Where this
[distinguishing of the function from the law] is possible we call the law
"norm." In other words, we do not dualistically set law and norm over
against each other, but distinguish between the lawsthat are not norms and
laws that are norms.
On the basis of the connection between the functions themselves there
are no postanalytic functions without self-distinguishing. The lawsfor all
these functions accordingly are norms. That is why we speak of norms for
the analytic, [/50d74] historical-technical, lingual, social, economic [modes of
being], etc.
So also the life of faith stands under a law that is a norm. This norm is
the word of Godinits faith-side, or, in paganism, what men take to be such.
This norm requires recognition, that is to say, requires that we ourselves
listen, not that it says something particular to us.
Thefaith function, however, is not only normed bythe law thatis cor-
relate to this function. In being subjected to this law, it also stands in con-
nection with everything else that is subjected to this law. This multiplicity
is in part object, in part subject,
Objects in the sphere of faith are all those things that Jack faith as a
subject function. They play a part in thelife of faith as well. Namely, as a
Christian I believe, on the basis of revelation, that all other creatures are cre-
ated by God. The sacraments occupy a special place. They remain what
they are, but at the same time serve the proclamation as sign and seal, that
is, to clarify and to confirm.
B. Faith also stands in connection with its substrate [i.e., with the
other, less complex functions]. Not only does faith rest on it; it forms a
whole with it. Faith refers to this substrate through traits that are inherent
to faith. The joy and sorrow of faith refer to the sensitive [mode of being].
Its thinking and knowledge to the analytic [mode of being]. The offering
refers to the economic [mode of being) and trust [as brothers and sisters in
Christ] to the ethical. These retrocipations are not elements in the sense that
one could say that faith consists of joy plus sacrifice plus trust. Faith is
something unique, sui generis. One cannot define it other than by saying
that it is the highest function. These traits are implicit to faith, but they do
not qualify faith. The debate over whether faith is emotional, cognitive, or
volitional is therefore meaningless.
C. Consequently, the knowing implicit in faith is no more important
than, for instance, trust, But in connection with our topicof the significance
of faith for sciencethis trait does merit special attention here.
Wenote in the first place that this thinking and knowing bears a non-
scientific character. It may definitely not be confused with the science about
faith which is part of theology. Taken Scripturally, faith (believing) is
knowing Godin the face of Jesus Christ. [/50d75}
The Significance of Faith Knowledge

for Science
A. Theoretic thinking and knowing is completely different from non-

theoretic thinking and knowing. The latter always has to do with things in
their totality, as for instance, when I perceive things around me. But theo-
retic (scientific) thinking proceeds methodically. Each of the special sci-
ences[like physics, psychology, and sociology) investigate one aspectof the
whole. Their method is not only determined by our thinking, but also by
the field of investigation, which, in addition to objects, contains—in fact
contains primarily-subjects.
B. Nontheoretic and theoretic thinking cannot be reduced to one an-
other. The former is not less important than the latter, but different. The
man and woman ofpractical life are not inferior to the man and woman of
science; in fact, their insight is often more penetrating. Whoever imposes
the criteria of science upon nontheoretic thinking and knowing violates
practical life; actually, violates his own life, because in the life of the sci-
entist nontheoretic knowledgealso retains an importantplace.
Although nontheoretic and theoretic knowledge cannot be reduced one
to the other, this does not mean that they are at odds with each other. Actu-
ally, there is a positive connection between these two. For knowing begins
with nontheoretic knowing and then, sometimes, proceeds to the differenti-
ated knowing found in the special sciences: and subsequently turns back, on
this detour, deepened and enriched, in philosophy to the knowledge of the
whole,
C. In all this the nontheoretic knowledge peculiar to faith occupies a
special place. For, while faith as a function remains a human function,
nevertheless, when one hears and listens to the Word revelation, which is
reliable in itself, and therefore needs no witness to back it up, he not only
learms something about the cosmos, but also about God andhis relation to
the cosmos. Whoever believes Genesis 1:1, for example, knows something
about God, namely, that he created the world, and something about the cos-
mos, namely, that all the world is created by God. And this knowledge has
to do with the main issues; if you will, with the circumscriptive concepts.
Once I have this knowledge, on the negative side, it leaves no room for
idolizing anything that is created, while on the positive side, it helps in ar-
riving at the common [/50d76) denominatorofall creation—namely, thatit is
subjected to the law of God and, by that, to God Himself.
The same holds with respect to faith knowledge concerning history.
Those who accept the fall into sin understand that in the fall humankind,
though unchangedin structure, radically changed in direction, As long as
no new turn-around (conversic) occurs, we live no longer to the right but to
the left.
Nontheoretic knowledge also includes what we know about the wrath
and grace of God. Both revelations are the disposition of God towards sin
and the sinner. That is why grace never, in any way, stands in opposition to
nature, but always over against wrath. As far as the relationship of grace to
(fallen) nature is concerned: the effect of grace can best be seen as a calling
to life and as healing. For grace brings forth gifts of grace, and the greatest
of these is the conversion, the regeneration of the heart. So this is no extra
dimension received as donum superadditum, but the influence of grace
through which we again begin, out of love, to live in obedience, not only in
a “religious sphere,” but as men and womenin integral wholeness.
The concepts of nontheoretic faith knowledge are accordingly all total-
ity concepts. They cannot replace the concepts of scientific investigation,
but they circumscribe them. WhateverI find by way ofscientific investiga-
tion is there before the investigation begins and sooner orlater fits within
that framework,
Faith, whether Christian or pagan, may not be considered “beyond” in-
vestigation. But such theoretic work is always a special science about faith,
that as field of investigation is there before that investigation can begin, and
therefore is not constructed or founded by science.
Conclusion
If we see the relationships in this way two things are understood. (a) A
theoretic basis for christian faith is impossible. (b) But, in contrast, a chris-
tian foundation for science is certainly possible. It is indeed a primary re-
quirement. For a science that does not have this foundation lacks the
framework in which also scientific knowledge ought to be placed.
These things are also of great importance for the investigator during his
work. They embed his efforis in the great struggle for truth and nurture a
sense of responsibility [/50d77): Theoretic work is part of our life, which in
its totality stands in service of God. Thus science becomes part of our
walking before his face. Further, they sharpen our insight, not only for that
which is present in what we investigate, but also into whatis lacking by rea-
son of sin. Forinstance, a historian will not only describe what he finds in
a pagan author such as Plato, but he will also see what Plato could not have
known.
In other words, being a Christian is infinitely more than being a stu-
dent. Being a student is being allowed to study; thus it is more than not be-
ing a student.
And being a student is infinitely more than to study as a nonchristian.
For the christian studentall of life, including also its theoretic side, includ-
ing activity and results, is safe with Christ in God. (50¢77/]
3.
SOCIAL SPHERES
AND LAW SPHERES
The 1950 text translated in this chapter records a critical appropriation

of Kuyper's theory of "sphere sovereignty.” What Vollenhoven says two
yearslater in general about the legacy of Kuyperholds in principle, I would
claim, for everyone to whom Vollenhoven was indebted: take time toseri-
ously consider and be ready to give account for what you accept and what
you reject:
[It] follows for us, Kuyper's students, that we, too, may not accept his legacy,
let alone pass it on to others, without testing it, For even thoughit is obvi-
ously improper to insert one's own thoughts into the description of Kuyper's
standpoint, when it comes down to systematic reflection on the question ‘What
can we adoptofthis and what may we pass on to those who will in turn follow
us?’ we are directly accountable to him whocalls every generation to their
owntask, (52k9)
The theory of modally qualified law spheres that Volienhoven and Dooye-
weerd developed during the 1920s is similar to Kuyper's theory of sphere
sovereignty, but also very different. This particular text seeks to address
and accountin part for both of these issues.
The fact that Vollenhoven seldom records the wrestling that preceded
his conclusions can be very frustrating to those attempting to reconstruct the
foundations and understand the developmentof his thinking. The theory of
sphere sovereignty (soevereiniteit in eigen kring,literally, of "sovereignty in
one's own sphere") was obviously made current by Abraham Kuyper. It
was thetitle and topic of his lecture at the opening of the Free University
(free from the state, commerce, and theinstitutional church and free to serve
God academically as a university) in 1880 and is a hallmark of his brand of
Calvinism. Kuyper's claims in this regard concerned primarily social insti-
tutions like church, home, school, business, and state. But the theory of
modally qualified law spheres touches not only realms of authority and
responsibility within society, but more broadly an irreducible diversity in
Draft D IHK Translation Page 80
the very ways of being that are intrinsic to all earthly {i.e., nonangelic)
creatures. Where did this theory about law spheres come from?
Vollenhoven mentions in this essay two factors that contributed to the
rise of the theory ofrelatively distinct modal law spheres: (a) Kuyper'sin-
sight that the methods used in the various sciences differ because of a differ-
ence in what they investigate and (b) the realization that what a science in-
vestigates, its “field of investigation,” is (just) an aspect of things, some of
which are objects and others are subjects, and both of which are subject to
the same law. These two factors, concerning what determines a science's
method and what a field of investigation includes, can actually be docu-
mented from his early publications. What follows is a sketch of the incep-
tion of the theory of modally qualified law spheres based (only) on refer-
ences to these two points as found in Vollenhoven's writings. !
Whendiscussing the nature of science in his 1894 encyclopedic study,
Principles of Sacred Theology, Kuyper made the claim that just as the object
of the different sciences varied, so also should their methods. Atthetime,
though acknowledging many sub-disciplines within each faculty, Kuyper
was defending the existence of five faculties or departments at the university
level: theology, law, humanities, medicine, and natural science. By locat-
ing "a principle group of the object of science [which includes al! existing
things,} in a realm of its own” (195), Kuyper was also hoping to vindicate
and secure a place for theology amongthe other disciplines. He apportioned
the realms these sciences study by using "antithetical" divisions between
God (theology) and man; man among men (law); within man, between soul
(humanities) and body (medicine); and between man and nature (natural sci-
ence). In each case, Man (understood as the universal human conscious-
ness), what Kuyper called "the subject of science," functions as, what he
called, "the principle of division" for making distinctions within "the object
of science" (190).
As Kuyper realized, the crucial question then becomes: which ob-
jects/things actually exist and what is the nature of the object in question
such that the method used to study it should differ? "Faith in the existence
of the object to be investigated is the conditio sine qua nonof all scientific
investigation” (48). One reason Vollenhoven became interested in
Meinong's theory of objects (Gegenstinde) was thatits classification of the
sciences was based on the object studied (18a173), but even more so because
it helped Vollenhoven define what he in 1918 understood concerning the
existence and nature of the object that mathematics studies, namely, number.
In fact, one of his objectives in his doctoral dissertation was "to provide
proof for the thesis that the three schools of thought in mathematics
(empiricism, formalism, and intuitionism, all of whom disagreed on the na-
ture of number] are direct offshoots of the three schools of metaphysics
(materialism, idealism, and dualism)" (1843). Another objective was to

point out the short-falls of monism (materialism and idealism) and defend a
theistic (dualism/intuitionism) view of mathematics. In that regard he very
much appreciated Bergson's negative critique of positivism (you can't per-
ceive things and relations without an acting mind that does the perceiving)
and rationalism (numberis not a product of pure thought; physics is not a
function of mathematics; and the world is not rationally transparent)
(18a228, 305; 21ms6; 224135). Vollenhoven's alternative regarding the
nature of number (given with passing reference to Richard Hénigswald and
support from Henri Poincaré and Jonas Cohn) is that number is sui generis,
arising from the interaction of ratio and empirie, such that thinking mustac-
knowledge but cannot fully explain the unique nature of number (182229).
Hencealso his conclusion, which he footnotes with reference to Kuyper's
principle: “the unity of mathematics in its various components is not due to
a common method as Cassirer claims, but to a common object" (18a230).
At the turn ofthe century, of course, fundamental changes were taking
place owingto a proliferation within the academy. The science of history
was coming of age, sociology and psychology were taking root as distinct
disciplines, new kinds of logic and other kinds of geometry were on the
scene, people were beginning to understand the process of cell nourishment
and division, some were saying that there is no such thing as absolute space
or time, and great advances were being booked in areas like physics, astron-
omy, linguistics, and cultural studies. People were also wondering howall
these things fit together. Suggested groupingsfor this plurality, like deduc-
tive/inductive, facts/values, descriptive/prescriptive, natural/cultural, objec-
tive/subjective, causal/normative, universal/individual, nomothetic/ideogra-
phic, were being bandied about. People also realized that these questions
were not just “academic,” but that they were beginning to redefine a com-
mon sense concerning order, forces, drives, life, emotions, reason, lan-
Buage, society, culture, artistic genius, faith, and religion; concerning right
and wrong and human place and purpose.
Vollenhoven was searching to arrange things in his mind as well. He
says as muchin letter he wrote to a friend (A. Janse) in November 1922, a
day prior to suffering a months-long stress related relapse:
The tentative solution as far as I see it is this. There is an [ultimate] ideal
world of validity [van her geiden]; neither psychic norrational, but “holding.”
Then a world of values: ethical, juridical, and religious values, and so forth.
Also a world of physical beings; probably also a world of that which is bio-
logical (to which I begin to attribute more independence than i did earlier).
The [mind's] faculties are not layers, but relations of the one soul to those di-
verse arenas. The psuche of plant, animal, and human is not distinguished by
the number of faculties (1, 2, and 3 respectively), but by the nature ofthe re-
lations between the respectively distinct souls on the one hand and these
worlds [on the other]. In this way the soul remains a unit. The whole human
soul, as unique new project of the Divine Artist, is immortal; psychology con-
tinues to have one Gegenstand and one method, namely inner perception.
Physiological psychology is not psychology, but physiology; which can inform
us at most aboutthe relation of soul and body, probably only about the latter
and its reactions and so forth, that accompany psychic acts, And we have
nothing born again that must be conceived as a donum superadditum.
There is too muchin this letter to comment on here, but his remark about
psychology illustrates the program of advocating a “pluralism of methods"
(30d90): a science's object should define its method.
Vollenhoven was advocating “obedience to the lawful authority of
these Gegenstande": “the object of physics is distinct from that of
mathematics [and that of psychology}.... Objectification is not a creating, as
the Marburgers think, but an apprehending, such that you cannot follow the
whim of your method, even if you do so systematically, because the method
is dictated by the metaphysical Gegenstand" (22d143}. In 1920(a12)
Vollenhoven had pursued a similar line of thinking in meticulously
following Hans Driesch's use of the phenomenological method ("Husserl's
objective logic, against which there are no objections as long as it remains
purely descriptive") “to arrange the sciences logically according to their
object: you know you are entering a new field of investigation every time
you have to introduce a new hypothesis or related group of hypotheses.
[For example,] the epistemological distinctiveness of biology is maintained
if you can nof work things out using just the hypotheses of physics.”
Volienhoven began to advocate the same approach: “The orderofthefields
can be derived from the logical arrangement [erdening] of the methods,"?
with the understanding that a difference in method is correlate to the differ-
ence in the field being researched (26242). As Vollenhoven reiterated years
later: for each science this means "that from the start a method has to
conform continually to the material being investigated” (61c2).
So, Vollenhoven consistently advocated this rule about scientific meth-
ods. All the same, because his understanding of “the object of science"
changed significantly between 1922 and 1925 caution should be taken lest
this continuity be misconstrued. The story of this changeis too longtotell
here, but a few "snapshots" from this period will shed some light and bring
us to the second factor that Vollenhoven mentions about "fields of investi-
gation" as contributing to the theory of modal law spheres.
Although he at no time denied God's sovereignty over all of life or
questioned the validity of a heteronomous worldview, before 1925 Vollen-
hoven embraced "self-consciousness" as his philosophic starting point. Un-
til 1927 his research and writing were primarily in the area of the theory of
knowledge and the sciences. He realized that "being is always richer than
thinking” (184437) and in 1919 “pointed to the need for pressing on, behind
knowing, to being, of which knowing is a part" (1963a97). He was also be-

ginning to make a point cf the fact that science is rooted in life, that there is
a difference between physical life and physics, between the life of the mind
and our study of the same: "The mind and nurturing are part oflife [staan
in het leven], [psychology and pedagogy] reflect on what's behind the psy-
chic and pedagogic phenomena" (letter to A. Janse, 17 November 1920).
However, what was beyond the sphere of knowing only became thematized
after 1924.
Until the early 1920s Vollenhoven was operating more or less un-
critically with a view of man and reality bequeathed to him by thelikes of
Kuyper, Bavinck, Geesink, and Woltjer: a dualistic psycho-somatic anthro-
pology; a theory of knowledge described by some as transcendental realism,
in which synthetic concepts seek to approach systatic ideas; and a meta-
physics that believed the malleable mind/matter mix of reality as we knowit
to be rooted in the systatic rest of metalogical ideality (see 3, 8). However
narrow this view was compared to the muchricher theory that was to surface
in just a few years, Vollenhoven celebrated the freedom and diversity ac-
knowledged in such a framework, because, as he puts it, it allows
“thinking,” in its methods, in working through the material, to develop its
own activity while at the same time acknowledging that norms and ideals
hold for this activity that don't hold elsewhere; because it "honors a relative
[zekere] autonomy for thinking in its own field": "Heteronomy, here too,
can easily be united with autonomy, with ‘sovereignty (of regulating, not
creating) in its own sphere" (21c80). So also, he was excited that studying
the object and methods ofscience, including Einstein's theories ofrelativity,
was bringing people (and himself) to acknowledge the “relative autonomy
[betrekkelijk zelfstandigheid] of the physical world with respect to the arena
of mathematics and biology" (22d137). While it would be too much to say
that his acknowledging the irreducible character of biology andbiotic life
began to break open his picture of the world, it is certainly the case that
Vollenhoven was putting a different foot forward when in 1925(ms3) he em-
braced subjectivity (to God) as his point of orientation and in 1926(a6) took
God's law as a more appropriate principium divisionis. Nevertheless, when
reading these early texts, you can't help but be struck by the degree of
methodological continuity on Vollenhoven's part, given the fact that he not
only follows Kuyper's rule about scientific methods and objects, but will
also continue to situate his philosophizing with respect to a “point of ori-
entation” and to set things out on the basis of principles ofdivision.
The second factor Vollenhoven mentions as contributing to the theory
of modal law spheres is the unsatisfactory equation, on Kuyper's part, of a
science's "field of investigation" with the "object" of that science. Actually
that is less than half of this story, because along with a revised view of the
object of knowing came a changed understanding of the subject of knowing

as well. (In 1918 Vollenhoven seems to leave the door open to the assump-
tion that there is a "supra-individual" subject of science. In later years, he
repeatedly, though almost always obliquely, censures that position. The text
in Chapter 4, interestingly enough, mentions Kuyper by name.)
in 1918 the qualitative differences, the dualities, in Vollenhoven's du-
alism are connected and working together through an_ interaction
[wisseiwerking] and cooperation [samenwerking], of thinking and being, of
soul and body, of subject and object, rooted ultimately in God. This inter-
action was foundational to Vollenhoven's understanding of reality as werke-
lijkheid; namely, not as "the given" realiteit out there "in the raw," but as
the known synthesis of being and thinking that science has to work with
(18a12). It also allowed him to hold high the unity he found in the psycho-
somatic substance of the human self, in everyday experience, and in reli-
gion, and to focus on intuition as the immediate experiencing of many-one-
ness (184397). Knowledge is likewise a relation rooted in interaction, “a
synthesis of objective and subjective factors, between a particular meta-
physical non-self and the metaphysical self” (184328). He discusses these
“factors” in terms of qualitatively different functions of things: "The subject
of knowing is a function of the self that wants to know and to that end sub-
jects itself to the norms of logic; the object of knowing is a function of the
thing outside me, its appearance, its manifestation to me, or its effect on
me" (18a228-9). The goal in this context is to get to know, via a thing's
appearances, that thing as substance; or in the case of self-knowledge, to
gain insight into “the unity and immutability of this self as the dominating
law in the flood of phenomena” (184433). All of this is possible because of
the subject's action upon the object and the object's action upon the subject;
with the assumption that where there is inter-action, connection will be pre-
sent as well.
Within ten years, Vollenhoven's thinking on many of these topics
changed significantly. Our focus here is on "object of science” and how
“field of investigation" opened new vistas in his understanding of the world.
Lest this section become longer than the essay it introduces, we will mention
only three points, each of which are touched upon in the last two quotations.
Thefirst has to do with a change in his understanding from law as idea to
law as limit, a notion we discussed previously (page 8). For the sciences,
including philosophy, this brings with it that what they investigate is not so
much objects as a field (of individually distinct things and relations) defined
by the laws laid in creation for that domain. The second point has to with
being subject and the third with the move from interaction to interrelation.
There was not a time that Vollenhoven did not acknowledge God as
creator and the author of all the laws and norms that hold for creation,
What did change was his understanding around 1924 of what this meant for
his theorizing about human knowledge and the sciences. One indication of
this changeis that after 1920 he no longer will talk about theself subjecting
itself to some law or norm or logical principle. No longer does a person
have a (knowing or sensing) subject; everyone, and everything creaturely, is
subject. In other words, after 1924, Vollenhoven's sense of "subject" is
different: "subject" means, in the first place, "subject to God [Gode
subjéct)" (25ms3); all subjects are “subjected to the laws of God” (26ms9);
and there is nothing besides Godthat is not subject to him. (This should not
be taken to mean that everyone obeys God and his laws; that some people
break the speed limit does not mean they are above or beyond these laws.)
The difference this makes in Vollenhoven's sense of philosophic orientation
might be compared to the change ofattitude a spouse would experience by
moving from the conviction "I also have a wife and am going home soon to
be faithful to her” to the sense "] am married and seek to be faithful to my
spouse in all things and at all times.” With a passing reference to Alberdi,
Vollenhoven in 1925(ms7) also describes the change as a move from
Aristotle's Greek upokeimenon {that which lies under) to the Latin's "more
passive form" subjectus (that which is placed under).4 People do not subject
themselves to the norms for right thinking because they want to come to
knowledge, but find themselves subject to those norms per definition,
because thinking and knowingare functions of the God-given office of being
human subjects (26b382).
One obvious conclusion that follows from this renewed sense of sub-
jectivity is that all "objects" are, with respect to God, “subjects” in this
sense. For example, things being sensed (perceived objects) as well as those
who are sensing those things (perceiving subjects) are both “subjects” in the
sense of subjected to God's law, and in this case to God's laws for sense
perception (26d177). However confusing terminologically this claim may
be, what Vollenhoven is now convinced of is a common field of shared
cross-sections, actually many qualitatively different cosmic connections, laid
in creation that no longer place subject over against object(ion) such that the
one must act upon the other (interaction), but that these two, at least in some
important respect, fit together, are interrelated, share common ground and,
to that extent, belong to the same field (25c392). For psychology this
means the psychologist studies the psychic law sphere, which includes the
entire domain of "that which is psychic [het psychische],"5 namely, the set of
ali things in so far as they are subject to God's laws for instinct, sensation,
perception, feeling, and emotion. The same holds for physics; its field of
investigation, the physical Jaw sphere, is different in character
(quality/modality) but includes theset of all things in so far as they are sub-
Ject to God's laws for energy. So too every science works within
"methodological limits" peculiar to its field: “Wherever the physicist finds

energy, he's got to measure it" (26d180). Vollenhoven understood these
fields to be “cross-sections of the cosmos" such that “cosmic units"
{previously substances) are “present in different fields" (26a13). Or as he
puts it in 1948(f83): "When it comes right down toit, scientific knowledge
directs itself not to objects, but to fields of investigation which include be-
sides objects, also subjects, and in the first place the interrelations
[samenhangen] between these two. These fields of investigation are modal
cross-sections of reality across the breadth of the cosmos and bear a univer-
sal character.”
Vollenhoven's newly reformed understanding of subjectivity impacted
his “calvinian theory of knowledge" (26d189) as well as his developing the-
ories about man and world. Further research may well expose more factors
that contributed to this fundamental reorientation. But one other angle
should still be pursued in trying to understand his transition from an as-
sumed opposition between subject and object (or surroundings [omgeving])
to laid connections inherent to creation. In his Isagoogé Philosophiae
(1945), that we will be coming to later, he discusses what is at issue here in
terms of the “connection betweenentities that differ individually” (see pages
201ff.) and we have already noted the rules of thumb that he, assuming this
affinity within the various fields of investigation, seems to be using along
the way (16). It is very difficult to prove how someone else comes to the
realizations that they do. But a brief chronicle of recorded insights may well
lend itself to a better understanding of how this particular change may have
come about:
— In 1919(a107), proceeding on the assumption that analytic intuition
“splits and compares," Vollenhoven suggests that whenchildren are learning
to compare and distinguish, the teacher can better show them two cats than
one dog and one cat. In 1926(d165, 173, 175) he makes the samepoint, but
now in general terms: comparison is only possible between two that fall
within the samefield.
— In 1920(a24-25) Vollenhoven notes that the science of biology (broadly
conceived) includes botany, zoology, and anthropology. Its common ele-
ment, granting the differences between these three, is "the organic form"
found in plant, animal, and human being and defined as "the form of the
material in interaction with the soul." Factoring in the difference that the
human soul makes, he seems to agree with Driesch that "the object of biol-
ogy is a sphere of cooperation" not between soul and body, but between
“that which is psychic,” an abstraction, and “that material which is orga-
nized inte a body (but without the soul)," which is also an abstraction.
“When the length ofthe intestines of tadpoles depends on the quantity and
quality of the food then that is primary adaptation. Not the length of the
Draft > JHK Translation Page 87
intestines, but the capacity to form these in relation to [samenhang met] the
food, displays a pure, form defining, and hence, qualitative character"
(20a4-5). Driesch's "pink slip" comes because he calls what is a concept,
namely, “organic form,” real,
— In 1922 Volienhoven not only criticized the positivistic reduction of ev-
erything to numbers and formulas, but also pointed out how importantit is
not to impose what people see or imagine (or not) on what is going on
physically. Although he disagrees with what Einstein has to say about ether,
he praises his theory of general relativity for its reminder that "to define the
concept ‘physical object’ with respect to ‘mathematical object' and
‘biological object,’ it is not necessary that euclidean space be presupposed”
(22d141). Einstein was highlighted again in 1926(d172): “he taught us to
reflect on the difference between perception and physical measurement.”
Movements have to be compared with other movements; motion is always
measured with respect to a moving or resting system. “Einstein came with
the sober remark that even though the standpointof the perceiver is very im-
portant for perception, the person busy with kinematics only has to take the
Kinetic side of things into account, to which, of course, the perceptual posi-
tion of every researcher is tied" (29d61).
— In 1927(ms81} Vollenhoven mentions Einstein again. He is leveling a
critique against frameworks in which an active creative subject stands over
against a passive created object, against views of the world and of knowl-
edge in which self stands marked off against non-self, and he concludes with
the remark that “you end up with as many lines of division as there are
selves and what for one is called the 'seif* belongs in the 'view' of the mil-
lion others to the 'non-self.'. The question, ‘Which point of view has prefer-
ence?’ is impossible to answer (Einstein)."
By 1927 Vollenhoven's discovery of how “being-subject" could func-
tion as his point of orientation completed his break with a dualistic frame-
work of interaction and the cosmos was embraced as philosophy's (limited
by law) field of investigation.
Vollenhoven’s publications document his indebtedness to Henri Berg-
son, Alexius Meinong, Bertrand Russell, Heinrich Rickert, Hans Driesch,
and others, as well as to Groen, Kuyper, Bavinck, Geesink, and Woltjer.
Vollenhoven was obviously more akin to the latter group. In neither case
was his acquiescence complete or uncritical; his indebtedness never simply a
matter of adoption, Vollenhoven had an antithetic attitude towards unscrip-
tural philosophy, but he also acknowledged that it is at least a catalyst for
scriptural philosophizing (29d63). This also proves to be the casein the de-
velopment ofthe theory of modal law spheres.
End notes
' For Herman Dooyeweerd’s contribtion to this process, see Roger Henderson's /-
luninating Law: The construction af Herman Dooyeweerd's philosophy (diss.
Free University, 1994} 136ff.
2 (26a36); “Biology and physics stand on a par next to each other as sciences, al-
though, as is evident from the biological method, the biotic field rests on the
physical field. And these fields are cross-sections of the cosmos, such thal a
cosmic unit... is present in a variety of fields" (26a13).
3 In 1926 he mentions the fields: (logical) relation, number, space, time, move-
ment, energy, biotic, psychic... economic, juridical, and ethics..., although late in
1926 the logical aspect, as the first law sphere subject to a norm, was relocated,
possibly on Dooyeweerd's urging, to follow the psychic. In 1928(c27) the modal
order was almost as complete as it would stay: arithmetic, spatial, mechanical
{energy, chemical), organic, psychic, logical (analytic/synthetic), social, historic,
linguistic, economic, juridic, ethical, pistical (with a place for the aesthetic ac-
knowledged but left unspecified). In 1930(d22) they run: arithmetic, spatial, me-
chanical, physical (energy), organic, psychic (emotional), analytic (“logical”),
historic, linguistic, social, economic, aesthetic, juridic, ethical, pistic." See also
pages 36 and 192,
* He continues to use the term “substance” sporadically into 1927, with “subject
unit [subjectseenheid}” coming on strong, and explicitly urges people to stop us-
ing it after 1929 (see e.g. 3068, 32d398).
5 (25ms9). Vollenhoven was aware ofhis use of substantives and one time warned
against their possible danger: "Thereis in this contextlittle to say concerning the
term ‘that which is created’ [het geschapene, which could also be translated as
“creation"]. Grammatically it is a substantive referring to the result of God's cre-
ating activity as distinct from the creator. Referring to it in this way does not
make it independent or divided from him, Language and thinking make use of
the substantive to isolate, with an eye to looking at, that to which it refers. But
that is no grounds for assuming that all substantives are references to detached
Dingen an sich, And certainly not in this case: the grammatical substantive,first
ofall becauseit is logically speaking a relational concept, indicates in which con-
nection it stands to the Creator, namely, as product of his labor.”
[/50n4)
Sphere Sovereignty
for Kuyper and for Us
A number of people have raised the question: Didn't Kuyper mean

something completely different with “sphere sovereignty" than does
calvinian philosophy andis that legitimate?
(/50n5) In this regard one does well to distinguish clearly between his-
torical interpretation on the one hand and systematic clarification and deep-
ening on the other hand.
When someone gives a different interpretation to words spoken in the
Past, great care must be taken not to insert into these sayings things that
aren't there. Those whotake this norm lightly fall into anachronisms: they
get predecessors saying things they never intended. We have to keep that in
mind here too.
The expression "sphere sovereignty” [literally, "sovereignty in one’s
own sphere"] comes, as many still know, from Dr. Abraham Kuyper.
Those who want to get to know Kuyper, then, have to accurately trace what
this expression meant for him as he used it. People who do this will come
to the conclusion that this great thinker, also on this point, did not always
express himself consistently. But what is clear is that when Kuyper uses
these words, he was thinking primarily of the diversity of creation
ordinances for everyday societal connections like church, state, and business
enterprise.
Now it happened repeatedly, that office bearers from one sector of so-
ciety would infringe upon the authority of office bearers in anothersector.
Church andstate, for instance, have gotten into each other's business more
than once. But wheneverthese kind of intrusions transpired, things in daily
life inevitably went awry.
This sequence of events is often quite obvious and was likewise, also
earlier, more than oncethe topic ofserious reflection. The part that the con-
flict (c,1250) between emperor and pope played in the Thomistic theme of
nature and grace is a case in point.
Kuyper, too, came to reflect on these conflicts. He obviously could
not accept Aquinas's solution. Kuyper was convinced that religious belief
belongs to human nature and is not a donum superadditum. Besides that, the
problem as he posed it was muchless limited. It was not simply a matter of
the relationship between church and state, but had to do with the mutual re-
Sphere Sovereignty for Kuyper and for Us
lationships between all societal connections. As a result, compared with the

Thomistic solution, Kuyper's was not only purer, but also broader, Kuyper
concluded from these recurrent events that the jurisdiction God established
for one sphere did not include the authority to intrude on another, if the life
in both societal connections is not to be damaged when such a conflict
arises.
Kuyperuses the term "sphere" then, almost exclusively, to refer to so-
cietal connections. Therein lies the limitation of this view. This shortfall
can also be related to the fact that Kuyper, because he had not yet clearly
distinguished sovereignty and autonomy, took these spheres to be regional in
character and not modal. Asa result, in 1913, for example, he was faced
with a painful dilemma when Talma's "Bakers Law” legislation was being
discussed.
In spite of this (if you will, “double") limitation, the sound scriptural
character ofthis perspective cannot escape those whotake a close look. The
diversity of these spheres is correlated with a diversity of authority, Their
origin is not rooted in man's will but in the abundance of God's creation
work,
The teaching of “sphere sovereignty" marked an important step forward
at the time. Noneof ourspiritual forebears, not even Groen Van Prinsterer,
showed such clear insight on this point. Groen saw the antithesis, but did
not follow through from thereto a different analysis of reality.
This view has certainly proven tenable in the practice of everyday. In
the first place, positively: the struggle here in The Netherlands for freedom
of choice in education, which remained unresolved in most other places,
would have never ended so quickly in a complete victory for the advocates
of this freedom had Kuyper's maxim not worked here to bring clarity to the
many involved. But whenit is lost sight of, confusion grows with leaps and
bounds. The Dutch political situation after the war is an unfortunate case in
point. Had more people taken Kuyper's view into accountat the time, we
would have been spared the experience that governmentauthorities repeat-
edly exerted a great deal of effort to arrangeall kinds of things about which
they lacked competence, while at the same time the promotion of the pov-
emment's interests for which they were officially responsible was scan-
dalously lost sight of.
But this is just in passing. Our topic here is not the importance of
Kuyper's teaching, butits limited character, Morespecifically: whether the
advocates of calvinian philosophy havekeptthis sufficiently in mind.
This question can be answered confidently in the affirmative. Indeed,
from this philosophy's circle of supporters there have been a number of
publications that, in addition to praising the originality and depth of
Kuyper's conception, clearly and explicitly address its limited focus. Two
titles would be C. Veenhof's little book on sphere sovereignty published in

1939 and J. Dengerink's Ph.D. thesis of 1948, which was a critical, histori-
cal investigation of the sociological development ofthe principle of sphere
sovereignty during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
That we are attributing the views of his pupils to Kuyper himselfis,
therefore, simply not the case.
But someone is bound to reply that if we, when interpreting the
founder of the Free University's principle of sphere sovereignty, truly are
aware that Kuyper's theory had to do primarily with what we today call
“societal connections,” how can we then use this notion in a much broader
sense?
The question is an understandable one and I am happy te deal with it,
all the more so because the answeris not difficult to come by. This shifting
and broadening ofthe term “sphere sovereignty" is the result of elaboration.
There is nothing unique about that. It happens everyday. Take the
word “love” for instance. However seriously intended, on the lips of a
young man and young lady who recently have taken liking to each other,
this word has a much less deep soundto it than when they use that word af-
ter many decades of being happily married. They are also very much aware
of this difference, Surely no one would deny them theright to use the same
word yearslater.
The situation is similar with the meaning of the term "sphere
sovereignty" for Kuyper and for his students. That he understood less with
these words than do we is obvious. But that is no reason for us to choose
different words! It is just the other way around. By consciously sticking to
the words he used we want to express the thought that what we advocateis
nothing more than an elaboration of what Kuyper had in mind. That is why
using the same term is entirely justified,
What remains to be shownis that our view is indeed an extension of
the line that Kuyper followed. To that end I want to point to a few ofhis
thoughts that did not fall under the term “sphere sovereignty" but which
with reflection proved to be very closely connected with it. (/50n6]
The first thing that comes to mind is the basic thought of his Ency-
clopedia of Sacred Theology, that the diversity of scientific methods is not
rooted in the human mind, butin the diversity of what is being investigated.
To grasp the weight of this premise one must take stock of what was
happening philosophically at the time. Kuyper lived during the era ofposi-
tivism, which, like seventeenth century philosophy, overestimated mathe-
matics and mathematical physics. Besides this similarity, however, there
was a significant difference. Descartes and Leibnitz had limited themselves
to the sub-analytic aspects. Enlightenment and pre-Romantic thinkers as a
result, with their keen interest in supra-analytic areas tike history, language,
social movement, art, government, ethical life, and faith, saw no chance to
include these fields under "science" and therefore assigned them to the do-
main of practical reason. Positivism, though it shared the breadth of the
Enlightenment’s scope, rejected that solution. If the supra-analytic aspects
do not fit the seventeenth century's notion of science, then the bounds of
science have to be expanded. The thoughtitself was a good one. The mis-
take was that, in spite of broadening the scope of science, they continued to
understand it mathematically, equating the latter with precision thinking. As
a result, people were forced to reduce the diversity in method, required by
the diversity of the research, to a difference in men's minds. Instead of ac-
knowledging a manifold of areas open for investigation, they proposed a di-
versity of points of view from which the human mind would viewreality.
To expand the range of the sciences was not a problem for Kuyper.
Nor was recognizing a diversity of methods. What he strongly protested
against was the positivistic derivation of this diversity. The many different
methods of the sciences are not rooted in the activity of the human mind, but
in the richness of God's work ofcreation,
How Kuyper worked out this thought can indeed, after the fact, be
criticized on more than one point. By latching on to the usual number of
departments within the university at the time he distinguished only five ar-
eas; and on top of that he equated "area" and “object.” On both points the
founders of calvinian philosophy have had to correct their mentor.
But, here too, pointing out this shortcoming was accompanied with a
thankful tribute to the validity of the basic thought. In this way, deeper re-
flection on Kuyper's results was simply a matter of course.
Kuyper's calvinian sense of reality twice led him to argue for the
recognition of diversity in God's works. But while he spoke of "sphere
sovereignty" in the case of societal connections, he did not do so with refer-
ence to the diversity that the sciences investigate.
Thedifference in Kuyper's stance here was no coincidence. According
to him, the connections of everyday life have to do with subjects, while re-
search deals with objecis. In addition, when he spoke of "sovereignty" he
thought not only of God's sovereignty, but, influenced by Romanticism,
also of the authority of office bearers in the various sectors ofsociety.
Here, too, further reflection brought light.
In the first place, equating "field of investigation" with "object" didn't
seem to work. I will use the example of psychology to make that clear. Its
field of investigation is the psychic or sensitive aspect of things. Is that the
same thing as “sensed object"? In no way! The sensitive aspect ofreality
does include sensed objects, like colors, but also much much more, namely,
the entire emotive, sensitive life of man and animal. In other words, it also
includes what wecall “psychic subjects.". Hence, psychology's field of in-
vestigation includes objects, but also subjects. Indeed, the latter are even
more important than the former. On the other hand, the higher, more com-
plex areas one finds with societal connections, may not be equated with
subject functions. The economic arena includes more than just economic
activity. Without objects—goods in this case—economic activity would
even be unthinkable. And so we see that “lower” arenas include more than
objects and that "higher" ones comprise more than subjects!
In like manner, the sovereignty of God had to be distinguished from
the authority of office bearers. Their authority does come from God and in
fulfilling their task to positivize God's law for a particular arena they do, in
their office, stand on the side of the law. But as office bearers they are also
human and remain subject to the law of God, even within the arena for
which they hold office, just like those over whom they are entrusted with
authority,
Both changes were conscious deviations from Kuyper. On the other
hand, they lay completely in line with what he had done. As Kuyper did
more than once, anyone who makes a case for recognizing the riches in
God's creation work cannotfail in the long mun to see the diversity of object
and subject. As far as the second point is concerned, things are even more
simple. To the extent that people, with Kuyper, bow before the majesty of
God, they will also outgrow their romantic perception of office bearers
whichis still evident here and there in Kuyper.
When both changes are accepted, however, all of it, whether it's what
Kuyper spoke of using “sphere sovereignty” or those arenas where he
couldn't dothis, all of it is subject to the law of God. This, of course, is
not to deny the diversity of these areas. But this diversity, however exten-
sive it may be, proves to be a diversity all of which is subject to the law and
therefore to God, whetherit functions as a subject or as an object.
That being the case, Kuyper's pupils are entirely justified in using
“sphere sovereignty” even when nottalking about societal connections.
The difference between “sphere sovereignty" for Kuyper and for us
rests, then, on a few corrections, by means of which greater justice is done
to Kuyper's deepest intention: respect for the diversity in God's work.
Thatis whythis difference should sooner be praised than censured.
These corrections were inescapable. Without them Kuyper's view
would have becomeinflexible and his work be erased in the future, That is
why I just had to continue to distinguish field of investigation and object,
even when a numberof theologians asked that I follow the principles of sa-
cred theology found in Kuyper's Encyclopedia. That the contact between
the special sciences and philosophy is beginning to bear somefruit in more
than one department can be ascribed to distinctions unfortunately dismissed
by some of Kuyper's students around 1930.
But let's be fair. That the theologians in particular were at the time
extra careful is understandable. Innovations in 1920 and 1926 had yielded
nothing but disappointment. On the other hand, they knew us. Andit isn't
difficult for a healthy intuition to figure out whether the critique by fellow
disciples of their common mentor comes from a range of ideas that [/50n7] is
totally foreign to his view and arbitrarily expressing scorn and jeers, or
whether it is moved by the desire to preserve the valuable stem even though
that might require some powerful pruning.
But enough of that. The purpose of this article and the next one is not
to dig up sad stories from the past, but just the opposite: to make a contri-
bution toward healing the unity in the camp of Kuyper's students. The point
now is simply this: when Kuyperianism first began to unfold on a limited
scale many opponents were initially interested and convinced; as time passed
it had difficulty recruiting continued support and hence needed correction on
a number of points; when calvinian philosophy introduced these necessary
revisions, it did not revolutionize things, but continued on in the spirit of
Kuyper.
4.
DISCERNING
LAWS AND PITFALLS
Someone happens along and says “The dog is white.” It is difficult to

know right off the bat what they mean. Is it just a shorter way of saying
“The white dog is a white dog"? Don't you have to know the context before
you can know what "The dog is white” means?
For example: they suspect someone of committing a crime; the description
adds: he often has a black dog with him. I come along and notice that Mr. A
fits the description, but his dog is white, “The dog is white” is then either a
denial of the augmented description or a perplexed response that will soon
raise the question: Is that dog really white oris it painted? Butif I'm telling a
child a story, “The dog is white” means: Imagine a dog whose coloris
white—I'm limiting the color representation. Or, maybe I’m dismissing a
mistake: No, the Korse was black, the dog was white. Besides, many other
propositions—everything I know about the dog—are taken upinto the subject
"the dog”: he is (respectively) the property of the suspect, he saved the prince
in the fairy tale, or was the cause of the accident with the buggy.
Yes, this is Vollenhoven, writing in 1918. At the time, he was making the
case that the norm of identity holds for Gegenstinde and that propositions
fall under the norm of contradiction. What makes a horse a horse is, of
course (for Vollenhoven at the time), a law. But to think and talk logically
you have to know which norms hold where and live accordingly. More
specifically, his point was one that he never forgot: “there is a direction in
the proposition and this is what is most important, ‘The dog is white’ is a
proposition used in a particular connection" (18a158-9).
The essays in this, the next, and the previous chapter were prompted
by a list of questions submitted by an unnamed Kuyperian who was
concemed that the tradition be preserved and not distorted. Vollenhoven's
task in the previous essay was not to discuss all that could be said about law
spheres or positivizing norms or the character of societal connections, but to
answer the question that was posed in such a way that his words would be
convincing to someone within the Kuyperian tradition. Likewise, in this
Draft) JHK Translation Page 96
essay from 1951, “Norm and Law of Nature,” he leaves a good deal
concerning laws and norms unsaid. And so, we will want to place this
discussion of norm and law of nature in the broader context of
Vollenhoven's understanding of law. This will not only contextualize this
essay, but also prepare us for a discussion of law-related traces of the Trinity
that boldly resurface in 1955.
The question the present essay addresses: "Is it correct to place law of
nature and norm under the heading ‘law'?"” seems innocent enough. We
will see that Vollenhoven, using an adroit variation on "it depends on what
you mean by nature," nonetheless answers just one third of the way into the
essay with clarity and poise: for both senses that the word "nature" could
have for a Kuyperian, the answer is "Yes." That most people mean some-
thing else by "nature" is given no more than a mention. The remaining two-
thirds of the essay is devoted to a different question that Vollenhoven raises
himself and then addresses, One that is much closer to home, namely: what
is the direction of the question posed? What is the connection such that
placing “law of nature" and “norm” under the same heading would be a
problem? In doing so, he also provides us an excellent glimpse of his
"problem-historic" approach. The end result will be a balanced critique of
Kuyper: s/s is good and thar is late-Aristotle behind a christian facade.
Although there is obviously more nuance to Vollenhoven's philo-
sophica} starting point than can be captured in one sentence, that sentence
would have to read: the beginning and end of Vollenhoven's philosophizing
is the relation of that which is creature to the Creator and, more specifically,
the relation of human beings to the covenanting God of Scripture. In order
te incorporate a deeper historical base regarding this key issue and how it
relates to Vollenhoven's understanding of law, the next few pages will
summarize his thoughts on the topic for the period 1930-1932. In the previ-
ous chapter we saw that 1925 marks a significant development regarding his
understanding of subjectivity (to God and his law), and extensive lecture
notes document how those thoughts developed during the rest of the decade;
in the first chapter we looked, among other things, at his notion of law as
demarcation, which remains crucial to his thinking over the years; and in his
1955 essay "The Unity of Life,” coming up in Chapter Seven, we will find a
striking continuity with what he was writing 25 years earlier. Again, what
follows in the next three pages is basically a weave of quotations drawing
only on texts from 1930 to 1932 that focuses on what Vollenhoven wrote
about the relation of that-which-is-subject to He-who-is-sovereign. The
primary text proves to be his introductory syllabus in philosophy dated
1930; the final edition of which we will come to in Chapter Eight.
Vollenhoven is very deliberate in talking (a) about what this relation

presupposes—"the living God, with his all-predestining council and creating
activity, with his all-controlling will," whose sovereignty is evidenced "in
his creating, in his speaking, and in the leading that he gives to every-
thing"—-and (b) about what this relation involves—that creatures are
“completely dependent on the Creator, subjected in their entirety to his
sovereign law, word revelation, and leading" (30d13)—and (c) about the
difference that acknowledging this relation will make—"the center of our
life lies outside ourselves...: Restored by God to a right relationship to him,
we learn to obey the love command through the spirit of Christ, who fills
our heart with the love he requires of all” (30d61). Each of these points de-
serves further attention.
(a) With an appeal to what Scripture says (plus one footnote to the Hei-
delberg Catechism Q&A 25), Vollenhoven explains that the relation of the
creature to God presupposes and is defined by three relationships of the
sovereign God to his subjects. The diversity of creating, speaking, and
leading, mentioned above, is rooted in “the diversity in God himself"
(30d48), that is, in the unity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The three di-
vine activities build upon each other: “the speaking (Logosrevelation] pre-
Supposes the creating [as act of the Father] and the leading [of the Spirit]
presupposes the speaking” (30d13). All three are important: “only when
we have seen [these three) do we grasp this relationship in its concreteness
and also, in so doing, what concrete existence is" (30d48).
Creating is an act of the Father and his law holds, remains valid
[geldt], for that which is creature: “the creature as created stands to God as
Creatorlike a subject does to the sovereign law-giver" (3048). As for the
second person of the Trinity: "When the sovereign God directs himself in
wordsto that which is created, he allows himself to be called Logos accord-
ing to this activity.... Logos revelation is God speaking to what already ex-
ists.... The word of God is the result of this sovereign activity” (30d49).
Scripture, then, is “the residue of Logos revelation; hence, law in the sense
of commandment” (30d84}.
(In Scripture,] this speaking of the Logos is often called a commanding (the
first time in Genesis 2:16). Every commandmentis the result of commanding
and presupposes a law. So also, a commandment of the Logos presupposes a
law of the Creator. This is why every commandment includes a law, but not
every law a commandment: the law first becomes a commandment through
the direction-indicating speaking of the Logos. Hence, every commandment
can be called a Jaw, but not every law be called a conunandment.... The dit-
ference between law and commandment is... correlate with the order in the di-
versity of Creator and Logos. (30d49)
Another way ofposing this is to say that in religion as unio foederalis “law
becomes commandment” (30e186). Andthen, the third person of the Trin-
ity. The Spirit is active, leading all creatures, even at the level of atoms that
are splitting: "here too there are different possibilities, which leaves room
for the sovereign leading of the Spirit" (30d50). The Spirit “displays the
same character of Leader in his work among those particular creatures to
whom the Logos directs himself in a way other than through a word that
called them into being. For he sovereignly leads them in their relationship
with respect to the word of God. Correlate with the leading of the Spirit is
the result it achieves: the setting of the direction in that which he leads
[which is ‘something other than the existential course of that which is led'
(31f43)]" (30d50). The Spirit's leading ties in with the word: “The word
reveals the law and indicates the direction, while the leading sets the direc-
tion" (31£43).
(b} The relation of creaturely subjects to the divine sovereign involves
the place and purpose of people in particular and everything else in general.
As for the unique place, character, and constitution of human beings,
Vollenhoven notes that they (1) have more functions than do the other crea-
tures, such that (2) the subject functions, like the spatial or physical, that
they have “in common" with nonhuman things are nonetheless different by
having more “anticipations," and finally (3):
In the third place, by virtue of their highest function, which depends onall of
the lower ones, people are open to God's claim on them and to the Spirit's
leading in determining their attitude regarding the commandmentgiven by the
Logos. Asa result, their cohabitation as well, based on the difference in sex,
is completely different in character from nonhuman things: pollinating and
copulating here make room for sexual intercourse, whereby the attitude re-
garding word revelation is of fundamental importance (Genesis 2:25 and 3:7).
(30d51)
These last three points are tied directly to being created in the image of God:
"Created as he is, with all of his functions, by the living God out of the
earth, and spoken to and led by Him, man,in this triune structure of cre-
ated, spoken to, and led, is as servant on the side of that which is created the
correlate of the triune God" (30d51). What is unique about being human
can also be summarized in terms of "what's religious in our life, the heart,
which, corrupted after the fall, lives again when it is made alive by the grace
of God"; in that context the functions can be appreciated “as mutually irre-
ducible channels for the issues of life” (32d402). In other words, being a
born-again Christian makes all the difference in the world, "precisely be-
cause it changes the direction of our activities in all of the functions"
(30b17).
As for the place and purposeof these irreducible functions, as well as
for every other creaturely thing in general, the focus with respect to the re-
lation of subject to sovereign falls primarily on the sovereign law. The en-
tire cosmos is created by God and there is a "limit that marks the creature
off from the Creator": "Everything on that side of this line is God and
everything on this side is created. This limit is the Jaw. Because the law
divides law-giver and subjects” (30d14); which is not to say that this line
sets God “outside what lies on the other side of the law, but only above it"
(31fl1). Every thing and all the functions of every thing are rocted in a
creative act of God and are subject to him and under his Jaws. The functions
of individually different things—referred to abstractly as “this's and
that's"—differ modally. The peculiar character of each mode exists "by
virtue of a unique law of God” (30b26), such that the modality of each of
the 15 functions is correlate with a similarly qualified law. Likewise, the
modality of interrelations is the same as the law sphere in which they are
found: “All the this's and that's for which the same law holds together
make up the domain or sphere ofthis law, its law sphere" (30d24). Thereis
a natural sequence (order) to these law spheres.
The laws for these spheres belong to those precepts of God [de wil des
bevels] that have been revealed, in the sense that they “can be knownin that
whichis subject to them"; but should not be equated with our formulation of
them (30b10). Some of these laws are norms. When that is the case
"direction" (towards or away from God) plays 2 primary role. The analytic
function is “the first normative subject function, in the sense that the logical
law is the first in the cosmic order that displays the character of norm"
(30d52). Direction also plays a role in the sub-analytic spheres (evil desires,
bad memories, mental health, sick bodies, pangs of guilt), but the possibility
of choice is not an option there. In other words, supra-psychic law spheres
“also have to display obedience to commands" (30b13):
Correlate with the norm on the side of the law is the choice on the side of the
subject: it has, namely, the choice between ‘listen to' and ‘be disobedient.’
While remaining subject to the normative law,it can be obedient and disobedi-
ent to the norm-dependent commandment. For example, a logical action can
be (correctly) logical or illogical, a historical action (correctly) historical or
unhistorical, a social action (correctly) social or unsocial, a pistical action cor-
rectly (=Christ) believing or unbelieving. (30d52)
"[NJothing can go against these laws of creation,” which is not to say that
commandments cannot be disobeyed (30d78).
Vollenhoven makes only passing reference to sphere sovereignty, men-
tioning the "competenceof office-bearers in societal connections to formu-
late for these connections the laws that hold for them” (30d77). In looking
for an analogy to get at the inspiration of Scripture, though, he is both frank
and enigmatic as to how tentative, but also trustworthy, this formulation is:
“The clearest way to get at what inspiration is like is to note the relationship
of a law holding for people and the formulation of such a law by those com-
petent to do so. The formulation is based on the knowledge the respective

office-bearer obtained about this law. In the case of [Scripture's] inspira-
tion, the human formulation is lacking" (30484).
(c) And finally, the difference that acknowledging this relation will
make is whattrue religion is all about: “a relationship to God such that, out
of thanksgiving to him, given his relationship to us, we want to keep his
commandments” (30b13), The peace that passes understanding is not found
"in any one function, but only in the functioning of everything in so far as it
happensout of love to God according to his precepts" (30b1 1).
Tuming from the early thirties to the next essay, we will see that Vol-
lenhoven begins with law as the line between creature and Creator. Thefirst
difference he notes within the law is between the law of love for God and
neighbor and the law for functional life. This distinction parallels the dif-
ference between the prefunctional human heart and the modally qualified
ways in which people function, Within the functional law he distinguishes
between those laws that are norms and those that are not. Rather than
“choice,” he uses "reflective activity” as the mark of creaturely functioning
that is subject to a norm. A beaver does not question whether his dam
makes the grade; when people distinguish their activity from the standard
they are following, then we are looking at normed behavior. Functional
laws that are not norms include laws for physical and organic (and probably
also instinctual) functioning. Interestingly, formulation is a factor in both
instances. Norms need to be formulated because people need "principles,"
in the sense of somewhereto start. These principles (not the norms) are
open to revision and their formulation is based on what has been grasped of
the law, that is, of the norm. Non-norming laws, in contrast, do not need to
be formulated; cell division did not have to wait until we had microscopes
strong enough to watch the proceedings. In fact, Vollenhoven deliberately
States that the formulas we commonly call the laws of nature, that is, of
physics and biology, are not so much formulations of the law for these func-
tions as "revisable formulations of established regularities that focus primar-
ily on relationships within [a law sphere]."
Vollenhoven does not rest his case with this discussion of terms, cate-
gories, and classifications. He tums to look at what is behind the question
posed by the Kuyperian interlocutor. Why would someone, whorejects a
division of life into (mathematically objective) facts and {subjective} values
and who also knows that more exists than nature can contain, raise a ques-
tion about grouping law ofnature and norm together? Why would a Kuype-
rian want to maintain that there is an inherent tension or opposition between
these two?
To answer these questions Vollenhoven turns to history, looking for
other “dualistic views that limit nature to the lower realm." Whathe finds
6.
DIFFERING WITH
DOOYEWEERD
In 1934 Vollenhoveninitiated a series of newspaper articles under the

heading "contemporary philosophy." In an early article he suggests that the
basic structure of someone's philosophy is defined by three connections: the
"slaltic" connection, how one stands with respect to contemporary figures
and issues; the "genetic" connection, how one stands with respect to prede-
cessors; and the "religious" connection, ultimately, how one stands with re-
spect to the Word of God. If we apply these coordinates to a "snapshot"
based on the material we have covered so far, we find that Vollenhoven and
Dooyeweerd, plus others supporting their project, were cooperating in a
philosophical venture that stood at odds with the efforts of most of their
contemporaries, with what Vollenhoven calls “current philosophy.” The
people who are wearing white hats in this “snapshot” all agree that true reli-
gion comes byfaith through Christ alone. Butit is not as though everyone
wearing a white hat in this picture is supporting the philosophical endeavors
of Votlenhoven and Dooyeweerd. In fact some are fighting these like the
plague (while most ofthose in "hats of color” notice next to nothing at all).
Some of these white hats trace their style to the pope, others to Luther, and
others, for example, to those passages in Kuyper that Vollenhoven was sug-
gesting were more influenced by Aristotle than they were in line with
Scripture. In the translation that follows we find ourselves onthis side of
the line, with Vollenhoven discussing in a drafted, internal memo a few of
the differences between him and Dooyeweerd.
The translation goes back to a hand-written manuscript, on top of
whichis written “Strictly Confidential,” found among Vollenhoven's Papers
and dated by Tol around May 1953.! The piece is composed in the form of
a report to a Foundation whose goal is to support special chairs of calvinian
Philosophyat the various national universities in The Netherlands. Vollenhoven
was the Chair of its Board. There is evidence that he discussed the contents of the
memo with Dooyeweerd; but a typed copy has not been found and more than likely
the report was never actually submitted the Foundation. The piece’s value
is a tradition that he not only can trace historically back (to Aristotle’s later
“monarchian" views on a universal or supra-individual mind) and forth (via
Galen, Sabellius and Marcellus, to Kuyper's view of the subject of science,
namely, universal consciousness), but will also critique negatively in a man-
ner that illustrates "Kuyper's intuition that heresy is the bastard of the con-
nection of Christendom and pagan philosophy." The crux of the issue in
this context proves to be twofold: how therelation between whatis univer-
sal and what is individual can best be understood and whether sin has af-
fected what logic studies.
Onthis last point, Kuyper had claimed in his Principies of Sacred The-
ology: "The formal process of thought has nor been attacked by sin, and for
this reason palingenesis (regeneration} works no change in this mental task.
There is but one logic, and not two" (159). Vollenhoven disagreed, calling
in 1932 for a christian logic: “Since the fall you can't just assume that ana-
lytic activity squares with the norm thatholdsfor it. There's simply no ba-
sis for the claim that the effects of sin, which misdirected all the activity of
human existence, left analytic activity untouched. Naturally, someone can
say that the fall did not change the structure of that which analytic, but that
is nothing special. Sin never undoes the structure, but everywhere reverses
the direction. Which is precisely the point here" (48f44). One of the most
basic bones of contention on this score is the foundational question: What
does and does notfall under the norms for right thinking? How universal,
how inclusive,is the analytic law sphere? Vollenhoven was convinced that a
logic that includes the mind of God in the domain ofthethis's and that's for
which the same law holds will be different from one that respects the laws
for analysis as the limit between creature and Creator.
The broader question of universality and individuality surfaces in this
essay as well. Vollenhoven's views on this topic are almost confusingly
simple. Herejects the primacy of one over the other (universalism and indi-
vidualism) as well as solutions that place the one (macro) nex fo the other
(micro) or the one above the other. As he sees things, everything under
God's sovereignty is always and at the same time both universal and indi-
vidual in the sense that being-human and being-this-human are always found
together (40a76; 56b3). Human nature is present in human beings. So,
when a science focuses on a defined law sphere, both the universal trait,
which characterizes the entire sphere, and the individual trait, which char-
acterizes the successive moments, simultaneous constituents, and the inter-
relations between these, are always both present. Within such a field, the
scientific (and philosophic) attitude usually focuses on the universal char-
acter of things, the "structure" of a thing or a connection. This universality,
as structure—not to be equated with the universality of the law as the demar-
cation between God and cosmos—can be found out through an abstraction
that researches the common functionality of things: statistical regularity in

any of the modal law spheres or the (un)lawfulness (wetmatigheid) in
normed law spheres (59f"calvinistische wijsbegeerte).
Even though, al] told, Vollenhoven wrote relatively little on the topic,
we will retum again in Chapter Seven to Volienhoven's view of law. Over
the years many have quite rightly wished that he had been less cryptic on
this pivotal issue and had maybe examined his own history and the founda-
tions of his own philosophy as extensively and repeatedly as he did, for ex-
ample, those of the various Aristotelian traditions. Even a straight-forward
acknowledgement that he himself had once juxtaposed norm and law would
have made understanding the direction of his pronouncements on this point
much more easy.
Whoever respects the line between God and cosmos, lets the humanistic con-
cept of subject as active substance go, and accepts the calvinian one of being
subjected to the Jaw, along with a difference in the various subject-qualities
correlate with the difference in law spheres, will start recovering from the
delusion that subdivisions from the old [body, soul, spirit] psychology can
supply a criterion for distinguishing the law spheres. All these law spheres,
and their respective subject-qualities, belong to that which is (het zijn]. The
opposition of thinking and being has to be rejected just as much as that of
norm and law. (26ms32-33)
[/51h3}
Norm and
Law of Nature
In the previous issue I listed a number of questions submitted to the

editor that ] feel must be taken seriously. No less than five points were
raised. At the time I discussed only the first of the five questions, under the
title "Sphere Sovereignty for Kuyper and for Us."
This time we will take a look at the second question, which has to do
with the relationship of norm and law. Onthis score calvinian philosophy
sees the norm as a specific kind of law so that its view of the relationship of
norm and of law of nature depends on what one understands by "nature."
On the other hand, the person asking the question is more inclined to put
law of nature and norm next to and, in a certain sense, over against each
other. Hence the question, as submitted: "Is it correct to group law of na-
ture and norm together?"
There is much more behind this than a question of terminology. That
is why 1 am also glad to deal with this topic in greater depth. First a word
elucidating my own conception of things.
[1. Norm and Law of Nature Viewed Systematically]
As is known, calvinian philosophy maintains that one should dis-

linguish three kinds of existing, namely, that of God, that of the law, and
that of the cosmos. The mutual relationships between these three are clear,
Godis the Sovereign, he created the world and laid downhis law forit: this
law (ordinance), prescribed by God for that which is created, holds for the
cosmos which is subjected to it; and the world, created by God, is subjectto
the law and, with that, to its God. Consequently, the law stands between
God and cosmosor, in other words, law is the line between God and cos-
mos.
Obviously, this view does not suggest that there is no mannerof diver-
sity to be noted in the law. Indeed, the opposite may be assumed. Afterall,
the law too comes from God. And all his works are characterized by a great
diversity.
Nowthelaw's diversity is not as broad as that of the cosmos. The law
differs from the world in that law folds, which cannot be said of that which
is created. And the validity of one law usually holds for a manifold of
creatures.
Norm and Law ofNature
Even though the law's diversity may not be as large as that of the cos-
mos, there is nonetheless diversity to be found here. Straightaway, and
analogousto the difference with human beings between soul and body, taken
in the scriptural sense of heart and cloak of functions, a difference can be
noted between summation and differentiation. The former summarizes the
core ofthe law to be a requirement of love for God and for the fellowman he
has placed next to us. This one law, however, is differentiated in a manifold
of laws for functional life.
The diversity in the law between law for that which is prefunctional
and Jaw for that which is functional is different from the diversity between
the various functional laws. Thefirst diversity is a binary distinction, while
the diversity of functions is not a duality but a plurality,
In cases like this plurality we are allowed no more than a bifurcation
with the help of a negation. In like manner wecan distinguish in the cosmos
between vegetal and nonvegetal creatures. But this does not give us the
right to consider plant and nonplant as two components from which the
world has been constructed. Distinguishing constituents that can be found
within the cosmos is one thing, a division of components the connection of
which would give rise to the world as a secondary unit is something totally
different!
There is an analogous case concerning the law. Somelaws are nomns,
while others do not display a norming character. But this diversity does not
negate that both groups of ordinances are laws set by God for that which is
created.
In general, this should all be fairly clear. But because the diversity of
Jaws that are norms and of laws that are not norms is especially important
for answering the question as to the relationship of law and norm,I deliber-
ately wantto take a closer lookat this diversity.
What is the root of this difference between laws that are correctly
called norms and those that do not have a normative character? I have dis-
cussed this question extensively elsewhere.’ In brief, the answer can be
summarized as follows.
For every law there is something correlate that is subjected to it. So
also, for every diversity of law that which is subjected to it also differs.
This rule applies as well for the functional laws. However, as a result, the
relation between the law and that which is subject to it in the one law sphere
is not the same as that relation in the others. This is so becausethis relation
is dominated by the character of the respective law sphere. When examining
the law spheres one by one wenote the peculiarity that in the analytic or
iogical law sphere the function is busy distinguishing. Which is to say that
' See my Hoofdlijnen der logica (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1948) 27, 28.
ils task is to take note of the diversity in God's works. That is why the an-
alytic law sphere is typified by the fact that that which is subjected to the
Jaw not only differs from this law, but that given its own nature it can as-
certain this diversity. That is the reason why logical thinking can also dis-
tinguish itself from the law that holds for it. The past preserves more than
one attempt oflogical thinking to formulate the law that holdsforit.
Those efforts result in what are called "principles." They may well
have been formulated by men of science, but principles are in no way scien-
tific in character, Actually, they are nothing other than the very law for that
which is logical, to the extent human thinking was successful in putting
these laws into words. Also, they hold for nonscientific thinking as much as
they do for scientific thinking. Nonscientific thinking benefits from know-
ing these principles too. That is why the principles play an importantrole in
life; [/51n4] the principles people accept as holding for their thinking matter
indeed.
Something similar is also present in the supra-analytic law spheres.
There too people are looking for principles, for somewhere to begin. We do
well always to distinguish these kinds of principles from the law. At best, a
human formula includes no more than what someone has grasped of God's
law. That is why principles can sometimes be altogether false and, even
when they appear to be sound, are never unchanging, as are God's laws, but
must be revised repeatedly.
In contrast, in the law spheres less complex than the analytic we do not
find a search for principles in this sense, Not that law and function coincide
in these law spheres. Here too, they remain two. This is also evident given
that we speak of normal and abnormal in the psychic and biotic as well. But
the biotic and psychic are as such not in a position to take note of the differ-
ence between law and function. Self-distinction is first present in analytic
life.
So, whereverlife distinguishes itself from the law that holds for it and,
to the extent it proceeds to formulate the law in terms ofprinciples, takes
them into account, we speak of "norms." Consequently, there is no room to
object to the distinction of laws that do norm life and those that do not.
Actually, it proves to be an excellent way to distinguish supra-psychic life
from sub-analytic life. But this distinction does imply that the norm is a
specimen of law; a view that is in line with the vocabulary of Scripture as
well as of everyday life.
That being said I also hope my view of the relationship of norm and
law will be clear. The question as it is posed, however, refers not just to
"law" but to "law of nature.” So let me add to the exposition of my point of
view a few words about this special topic.
Norm and Law of Nature
In calvinian philosophy the tern "nature" is used in two ways, namely,

in a specific and in a general sense.
In its specific sense "nature" is sometimes just another word for "what
is physical." “Law of nature" can then obviously be rendered by “the law
holding for that which is physical.”? If the term is used in this sense then
the relationship of norm and "law of nature," given the above,is quite clear.
The “law of nature" taken in this sense is one of the non-norminglaws, but,
as law, does not oppose any norm, each of which are laws as well.
In addition to this specific sense of “nature” there is also another,
broader one. Then this term is taken to mean the character of that which is
created. Think of expressionslike "the nature ofthings" or "human nature."
With this meaning the term can also be used in a religious sense. Think, for
example, of the reformers’ confession about the depravity of human nature.
This definitely does not refer simply to what is physical in us, but has to do
with our whole being. If the point is "nature" taken in this sense, then the
relationship of norm and law of nature is obviously completely different
from when one thinks of nature exclusively in the sense of that which is
physical. For it should be clear in light of the case just made that calvinian
thinking considers all laws to be laws for nature in that sense. Norms are no
exception to this rule. Norms, too, are laws for the supra-psychic con-
stituent of human “nature.” A norm is then not only a law, but when we
take "nature" in this broad sense, a norm is also a law ofnature.
Consequently, as I see it, the relationship of norm and law of nature is
that both the law of nature, taken in the specific sense of a law that is not a
norm, and the norms fall under the category “law,” while “law of nature"
understood in its broad sense takes in all laws. In neither case does norm
stand directly over against "law of nature."
[2, Norm and Law of Nature Viewed Historically]

To answer a question about principles requires more than systematic re-
flection. Whendifficulties arise, we are also obliged to take stock of how
they originated. That is why, after the systematics, we have to consult his-
tory.
The modern mind generally sees the relationship of norm and law of
nature as an antithesis. “Nature" is then understood as the entire area cov-
2 The “laws” of Newton and Boyle are revisable formulations of established regu-
larities that focus primarily on relationships within that which is subject in a
physical way. The extent to which these Jaws are in line with the actual law jor
that which is physical is a question that can't be dealt with here. Neveris it the
case, even after revision, that they are identical. "Laws" in this sense are not
even principles in the sense discussed above,
ered by a “mathematical physics” that has stepped far beyond its bounds,
while for norms, often downgraded subjectivistically to values, lithe more
remains than the direction or subjective sense of what is going on in this
field,
The opposition of law of nature and norm in this sense need not hold
me up here. However important it may be for understanding modem phi-
losophy in general, these problematics are not a factor for the person asking
the question, coming as he does from a Kuyperian perspective. For those
who might be tempted to question this, remember that according to his En-
cyclopedia Kuyper's theory of science leaves no room for accepting, let
alone over-estimating mathematical physics.
However, when we look in a less modern direction, the issue of
“norm/law of nature" understood as an antithesis proves to be far less perva-
sive. Even among dualistic conceptions, which see no reason to object to
teaching that a human being is constructed from a transcendent and a non-
transcendent component, only one of them attributes both supposed compo-
nents to human nature. The numberofdualistic viewsthat limit "nature" to
the lower [realm] are likewise few in number. The only place I have found
this used is amongspiritualists and a few aristotelian conceptions.
Spiritualism is undoubtedly, historically speaking, a rather strong
movement that was repeatedly influential also in christian circles. This
danger is no less today. Remember, for example, how back in the 1920s
more than one member of the younger generation, also among Calvinists,
was infatuated by Wilhem Windelband and Heinrich Rickert and that even
today Emil Brunnerfascinates many. But this tendency is more Anabaptist
than Kuyperian. I would certainly be misinterpreting the question if I un-
derstood it in this way. Consequently, I can also pass spiritualism by,
which some, it seems to me, wrongly accuse Kuyperof.
A few aristotelian type conceptions remain. This term here refers not
to one or another of Aristotle's own views defended during the course ofhis
development, but to systems of thinkers that aligned themselves with him
only in part. History includes a rather large numberof such conceptions.
All of these systems are oriented moreorless to Aristotle's final view
of things. This is evident in their preference for the theme of form and
matter coupled with the opposition of active and passive intellect.
Not all of these conceptions are important for us right now. This is
related to the fact that within this group scores of differences arose. The
most significant of these divergences had to do with the question whether or
not the active intellect was [/51h5] universal. Towards the end ofhis life
{d. 322 B.C.] Aristotle himself definitely had opted forits universality. It is
clear that he was teaching at the time that there existed a supra-individual
mind (nous) that descended as transcendent mental energy upon the mental
faculty of individual human souls (psychai) and activated it. But already
during the Roman Empire Porphyry [d. 303] and others, who via Boethius
(d. ca, 324] and others would come to influence Thomas Aquinas [1225-
1274) and others, disagreed with the master on this point. Others, in turn,
continued to maintain the universality of the active intellect.
in the present context we have only to do with this last group. Butit,
too, was not univocal in every respect. The primary difference among them
had to do with the relationship of the universal godhead to the likewise uni-
versal intellect. On this point Aristotle himself had taught that universal
thinking was not divine. This position was stilt held by Alexander of
Aphrodisias [ } and others during the Roman Empire. But already a century
earlier the famous aristotelian doctor Galen [d. ca. 200] had presented an
other view regarding this point. As far as he was concerned the universal
inteliect was divine as well, In the history of philosophy both conceptions
get hidden behind those of Porphyry and others. But they becomesignifi-
cant in the further courseofaffairs.
This can be attributed to the fact that the early christian thinkers dis-
played notonly a platonic leaning, but more than one of them tended toward
Aristotle. The conceptions of Alexander and Galen also gained a following
in these circles. Indeed, not much was needed to drift into a synthesis here.
They had "simply" to equate the Father with the godhead and the Word of
God, the Logos, with the universal intellect found in the final conception of
Aristotle. That some actually took this step, in part because of an incorrect
interpretation of texts, John !:9 among others, is evident from the history of
early christian philosophy. Arius [d. ca. 336], for example, worked
Alexander of Aphrodisias in in this way and Sabellivs (ca. 312) did the same
with Galen.
As a result neither could do justice to the trinity of Persons in God and
both ended up with a monarchian conception. In spite ofthis the difference
between them was quite large. Arius was forced to conclude that the Logos
was not divine, while Sabellius had to consider that the Logos was divine.
That is why the church, even thoughit resolutely rejected the subordination
of Son and Spirit in Sabellius's conception, had grounds for considering the
Sabellians less serious enemies than Arius and others.
This difference became much more prominent when with time both
groups, in part becauseof the critique they endured, became more moderate.
Neo-arianism, for example, despite its concessions, both whenit first arose
as well as later when it, owing to the permission of sympathetic caesars, was
preached to the Ostrogoths as a result of large migrations in Italy, Spain,
and northwest Africa and rose in prominence, was recognized immediately
by the church and rejected out of hand. In contrast, Marcellus [bishop] of
Ancyra [d. ca. 374], whose conception sought more orless to reconcile that
of Sabellius with the confession of the Church before it was definitely con-
demned in 381, initially presented orthodoxy with more than one puzzle to
solve.
This is not the place to follow Marcellus into all the details. It is suffi-
cient to note that while he more or less agreed with Sabeliius concerning the
Trinity, he clearly distantiated himself from him in other regards. For ex-
ample, he distinguished two kinds of universal Logos, namely, a divine Lo-
gos, which was initially at rest and with creation began to move, and a cre-
ated Logos. The latter was the thinking activity that descended upon the
thought function of human souls. That faculty, too, is a form, but an indi-
vidualized form due to its attachment to matter. The line [grens] between
universal and individual temporarily lies between the intellect and mental
faculty, but in the future, at least for those who are saved, once again be-
tween form and matter.
I need hardly note that this conception, too, contained litle that was
new. Kuyper's intuition that heresy is the bastard of the connection of
Christendom and pagan philosophy proves to be true here as well. The pa-
ganistic prototype of Marcellus was an aristotelian author who wrongly at-
tributed his work to Galen and hence is referred to in the history of philoso-
phy as pseudo-Galen. The difference between Galen and (this) pseudo-
Galen runs parallel in pagan circles with the difference between Sabellius
and Marcellus, At the same time, modal monarchianism can be traced back
in its entirety to aristotelian thinkers and not to Heraclitus.
This conclusion, that I recently found, is also important for under-
standing modern philosophy. Schleiermacher, who, as is known, was very
much influenced by Sabellius, was, though also an idealist philosophically, a
declared opponent of Hegel's penchant for Heraclitus. But more light now
falls on Kuyper as well. In the first place, the accusation of Hegelianism
leveled against him proves untenable. The universal consciousness in his
Encyclopedia is not Hege!'s Geist, but the supra-individual intellect of the
late Aristotle. And there is not even an ounce of similarity between
Kuyper's distribution of the sciences into those of mind for spirit] and mat-
ter, as far as its foundation is concerned, and Dilthey's similar sounding
distinctions. The accusation of Sabellianism should not be leveled too
quickly either. Kuyper's own critique of Schleiermacher is reason for cav-
tion on this point. In addition, we saw above that Sabellius and Marcellus
need to be distinguished. On the samescore, the influence of Marcellus on
Kuyper cannot be questioned. Already in 1903 S. Greijdanus pointed in that
direction. Because his critique has to do with Kuyper's teaching about the
Mediator I will leave that for the moment; it will probably come up again
Nerm and Law ofNature
when discussing a following point.” What does have to do with our topic
specifically is a hesitation I had already as a student with Kuyper's view of
the logical [realm], long before I ever heard of Greijdanus's objections.
This objection did not affect the core of his Encyclopedia, the view of two
kinds of science, which in contrast I found engaging from the start. It had
to do with Kuyper’s claim that the analytic [realm] was constructed from
two components, namely, individual function and universal force, that were
supposed to complement each other as nontranscendent “faculty” and
transcendent “activity.” This dualism ties logic to the hylemorphism and
faculty psychologyofthe late Aristotle. But not only that. It does nottally
with our unmistakable personal responsibility for our own thoughts.
Anyone who takes this last point seriously has to acknowledge that even
though the structure of that which is created, and hence also our analytic
life, remained untouched by sin, our logical function, seen as one of the
modes in which the direction of the human heart manifests itself, must have
been tainted bythefall.
The point in question is far from unimportant. Theissue hereis cer-
tainly not about attributing mistakes to a lack of natural ability or to sloppi-
ness and temporary fatigue. The entire history of current philosophy stands
as proof of how paganism dominates the problems it engages as well as its
solutions and basic concepts. Hence my plea for The Necessity of a Chris-
tian Logic (1932) and my attempt to carry through on that project in my
Contours ofLogic (1948). [/51h6]
The content of both of these publications is positive. Pointing out de-
ficiencies of others, let alone of Kuyper, was simply not their primary in-
tent. The first work lacks even an attempt at a historical analysis of his
standpoint. And the secondalso includes nothing more than a few short ref-
erences understandable only to the honed reader’ concerning the connection
between Kuyper's view and the system of the late Aristotle. At the time, it
was still not clear to me precisely how this relationship ran historically, I
began to understandthis a little better only after studying philosophy during
the Roman Empire further. Only when drafting my answerto the question
regarding the meaning of the opposition of norm and law of nature among
some of Kuyper's followers did things becomeclearer to me.
So, I am indebted to my esteemed opponentfor this gain. I hopethat
he in turn has been served by my analysis of the historical background to his
question; not to mention many others who, though followers of Kuyper,
may have questioned the validity of his view on this point.
* See (52k) "De visie op de Middelaarbij Kuyper en bij ons.”

* [see 4846; Kuyper himself was not mentioned in the work.]
Mayit be that the above helped them all to understand why on this
point calvinian philosophy must resolutely find its own way. All the same,
here too it can appeal again to Kuyper. His early writings do not presume
an untainted logical function and in his magisterial address "Sphere
Sovereignty,” with which he opened the Free University in 1880, he distin-
guishes on page 11 among other things "a realm of thinking over which no
other law than that of logic may rule."
That these two views are incompatible with each other goes without
saying: sphere sovereignty implies that what is universal and whatis indi-
vidual are both present in every law sphere. The former characterizes the
whole, the latter the parts. The speculative construction of the Logos the-
ory, in contrast, sees the logical [realm] as universal and the sub-logical
[realms] as individual. In practice that dovetails more easily with the
Roman Catholic subsidiarity principle than with the calvinian recognition of
diversity in life's reaches.
Kuyper himself was apparently not aware of this contradiction. In ad-
dition, because the founder of the Anti-Revolutionary Party staunchly held
sphere sovereignty high, it initially made little or no practical difference.
But nowthat three decades after the master's death more than oneofhis stu-
dents prefer to gyrate around speculative elements in his view, the question
ought to be raised as to whether the slackness that we see around us here and
there,also politically, is not in part a consequenceof this internal contradic-
tion.
Last time my contribution ended with an appeal to develop further,
where possible, Kuyper's principle of sphere sovereignty and not to be satis-
fied with just what hesaid.
This discussion of the second question went somewhatdeeper. It led to
distinguishing on a specific point in the work of our common mentor two
ways of understanding things that contradict each other, the oldest of which
proved to be more in line with Scripture.
That is why I want to formulate my intention somewhat differently
here. Whendisparate lines are visible in Kuyper's work, it is our responsi-
bility to embrace the one that is most scriptural and consistently to follow
through onit in the light of the Word revelation.
But that holds then for aif students of Kuyper.
An attempt undertaken to that end hence appeals to everyone who
thankfully links up with Kuyper.
>:
USING AND ABUSING
SCRIPTURE
“Religious belief," taken in the active sense of “believing,” refers to

accepting either God's word-revelation or whatever else one takes to have
the last word in their life. This may be the teachings of Mao or Mahatma
Gandhi, the dictates of hedonistic pleasure, or the revelations recorded in the
gospel according to Wall Street. In other words, faith orbelief is not always
christian; usually it is the opposite of that. There are thousandsofbelievers,
even more unbelievers; but there are no healthy mature human beings who
are nonbelievers.
To take God at his word, or to reject that word, is ultimately what
believing is all about. This believing is not simply cognitive, but it does
comprise an important element of knowing (or erring). This knowing, that
comes with believing in someone or something, is never a scientific kind of
knowing, certainly not in the first place. It is a forthright, wholehearted
kind of knowing that lays the foundation, that defines the home base, the
context, within which one lives and moves and has their being, obediently or
disobediently, before the face of God (coram deo). Science and theory can
reflect on the place and task of heartfelt believing and the resultantbeliefs,
but you don't need an expert to tell you what "heart" refers to: your inner-
most being, the gut of your self, the deepest center of your existence, the
source of your thoughts, feelings, and actions. And, as even Marxists and
Capitalists are well aware, this reality brings with it the move that what lives
in your heart is going to make a difference in what you say and do and don't
do. Basic beliefs that are not just confessed, but are also operative, mark
youfor life (or death) and will influence everything you do.
This knowledge of fundamental realities, commonly received through
the nurture of parents and schooling, delineates the horizon of a person's
life. As we noted earlier, the basic realities of creation, sin, wrath and
grace, and re-creation, once grasped and understood by the Bible-believer as
major issues, exhibit an all-inclusive character. Concepts oftheserealities
do so as well. These nonscientific, circumscriptive concepts help to define
Drafi D JHK Transtation Page 114
the framework within which Christians live and move and understand their
being here.
The essay that follows talks about these issues, particularly as they re-
late to philosophizing: about the relationship of worldview to life and of
philosophy to the sciences. Whether Scripture informs both of these rela-
tionships, and if so how, provesto be the pivotal issue.
Vollenhoven never really focused much on worldview as such. As a
result how he saw the relationship between worldview and academic disci-
plines, including philosophy, is not always as transparent as a generation
trying to play catch-up on this point might like. His remarks on the topic
are often made in passing. One reason he did not deliberate the issue was
because it was not a "problem" for him. His worldview and thefact thatit
was supposed to influence his philosophizing was simply pre-supposed, a
second nature assumption picked up from Kuyper & Co.
Vollenhoven, however, was explicit concerning what he meant philo-
sophically by "presuppose." In his lecture notes from 1927(ms37)there is a
short but noteworthy statement, that probably also sheds somelight on his
problem-historic method:
The “subject [onderwerp]” of philosophy is not a word, but what is presup-
posed [het onderstelde] in a problem, Its “subject” is that which is “given,”
what is placed-under [onder-steld] the question posed so as to solve it. A
philosophic “predicate” is likewise not a word, but that which, in the answer,
fills in what was still uncertain in the problem as to what needed to fill that
place when the question was posed. It is the momentof certainty in the propo-
sition that replaces the momentof uncertainty in the question.
Vollenhoven just assumed—it was a given—that everything must be directed
to the glory of God in love-filled obedience, from his Christian walk and
worship to his philosophizing (which was, of course, part of his walk).
Whathe said of his mentor Prof. Geesink (in 27290) also holds for himself:
He "was convinced about the possibility of a science that would not continu-
ally break down his reformed christian life of faith, but could live in full
harmony with it. This conviction may have moved him in his work, butit
could not supplantthe labor of thinking andreflecting."
Literally, the Dutch word "Jevens- en wereld-beschouwing" would be
translated "view of life and view of the world." We will use both "world
and life view" as well as the more common "worldview." Although Vol-
lenhoven never makesa pointofit again, he did record an interesting dis-
tinction when still a student. In a piece about Abelard published in
1914(a120), he writes that when there's a conflict between one's view of the
Trinity and of redemption, between dogmatics and ethics, the cause usually
will be found “in the life of one's own soul." Two presuppositions in this
context are, first, "the view you have of the Trinity dominates your concep-
tion of the world, as does your understanding of redemption your outlook on
life." The second assumption reads: “When a thinker develops a psychol-

ogy, the life of his own soul will probably be reflected in it." From the
very beginning Vollenhoven assumed that what lives within people
determines (or ought to determine) what they are about: in the decisions we
make daily, in the priorities we pose, in how we fill our days—all these
things will mirror what is going on within us. The impor of these
assumptions is that we are or ought to be of one piece, even in and through
the works of our hands or head. This proves to be the case in Vollenhoven's
early theism as well, where we see that his dualism of soul and body, of
mind and matter, comes to expression in a world and life view that is
oriented to otherworldly (perfect) ideas in the mind of God. Later on, the
word “heart" will take the place of "life of the soul," but Vollenhoven's
attitude as to what moves him remains the same. What lives within us
determines our attitude to life, how we deal with the nitty-gritty of
everyday, the contours of our worldview. We already have seen how the
emphasis comes to fall on the fact that God creates, speaks, and leads. But
over the course of his life Vollenhoven remained a champion of the unity of
life [levens-eenheid]: “Is it surprising that ‘business is business’ was met
with the refrain ‘and science is science’? But that's how the unity oflife is
broken even more. The onelives for God and his money, the other for God
and his thinking” (2JaI). Whether early (21allI) or late (65b5) in his life,
Vollenhoven remained convinced that life's unity could only be found
throughfaith.
A person's faith and a person's worldview are not the same thing, ac-
cording to Vollenhoven. He does maintain that taking God at his word, be-
lieving in him, "determines your wholeattitude to life,” whether you are at
peace or war (41d11). World andlife view is our outlook on life, our take
"on the whole, without clearly formulating it all"; for Christians, it has to
do with “that altogether healthy outlook on life we can thank Scripture
for" (35a38). But where exactly does that look come from? When Vollen-
hoven comesas close to an answer as he does, we hear before 1949 only: it
is derived from “the moments of the worldview (or in an earlier edition:
from the moments of the truth] contained in the Gospel” (41d3). In 1950,
his discussion of circumscriptive concepts, discussed above (70), does bring
a bit more conceptual clarity. Conceptually, worldview is a circumscribing
whole [omramingsgeheel], a “unity of vision." We could also say that it is
the sense of place, calling, purpose, and context that, owing to nurture and
informed by oneor another word revelation, has become second nature.
The vision that worldview is, as well as the beliefs and circumscriptive
concepts it includes, are all nonscientific in character. They are also presci-
entific, both in the sense of had prior to (and not dissipating during) theo-
retical investigation, but also in the sense of determining the basic contours
of the presupposed foundation from which the scientist proceeds and to

which she returns. In this context they function much like the "control be-
liefs" Nicholas Wolterstorff often talks about.’ What one finds through sci-
entific research fits into these contours sooner or later. Likewise, a christian
{philosophical) conception will not only contain thoughts concerning the
nature and the task of belief, but must also completely agree with what we
know to be the case in the light of Scripture. In other words, a Christian's
(philosophical) conception ought to be scriptural or, as Vollenhoven also
likes to put it (30), to be in line with scripture.
Compared to the special sciences (like biology, physics, psychology,
and economics), Vollenhoven will refer to philosophy as a general science,
whereby "general" is meant to connote both historical and logical priority.
Philosophy is the ofder science in the sense that, chronologically, most of
the sciences were originally part of the more encompassing discipline of
philosophy (back when universities only awarded PhDs and ThDs). One
reason Vollenhoven finds this significant is that the labyrinth of confusion
within science today can often be traced back to terminological and concep-
tual confusions within past philosophies. We will see in this essay that
Vollenhoven assumes that part of the philosopher's task is to inquire into the
various methods of the sciences and to reflect on the task of each, with an
eye to figuring out the place and structure (mutual connection) of their fields
of investigation. Vollenhoven's claim is that philosophy must “point the
way” for the special sciences and reflect on the combined results reached by
the specialists (55e1). Philosophy's Jogical priority over the special sciences
in this regard is due to the breadth ofits field of investigation: "Our view of
the details is more dependent on the view we have of the whole than vice
versa. Hence, in the relationship of philosophy and special science, the pri-
macy goes to the aforementioned” (36hh 163).
Vollenhoven's suggestion that philosophy reflects on the combination
of the results reached by those in the special sciences is worthy of note.
Philosophy's task is in many ways an integrative one, but only on the con-
ceptual level. Philosophy does not have to put back together what science
has taken apart; Vollenhoven rejects this cartesian spin on resolution and
composition. Philosophy is to take the results of science, not the realities
which this knowledge is about, and situate them with respect to the rest of
what one knows, reminding the specialists (when necessary) that their field
is a limited one and is connected to many others. At least that seems to be
Vollenhoven's suggestion in the analogy that he makes in this essay: phi-
losophy is for scientific knowledge what worldview is for nonscientific
knowing (126).
Philosophy, in the sense of a human theoretic pursuit and result, is
moved and defined in its religious direction by the human heart. Asall hu-
man efforts it is bound by the limits for that which is created. As a general
science it has to reflect on the structure of creatures and their ontic genesis,
on the place of the law and the structure of and mutual relationships among
man, animal, plant, and nonliving things. It is also supposed to be in line
with [stroken] the established knowledge (both the everyday knowing and
Special scientific knowledge) of the philosopher. The task Vollenhoven
gives the philosopher is to build on and be in agreement with both; with this
stipulation, at least through 1939, that the philosopher build on theseto the
extent that she "does not catch either making mistakes" (30d10/39h9),
Asfor the relationship of philosophy to other ways of human knowing,
Vollenhoven always gives clear priority to the nonscientific knowing of ey-
eryday. Anyone's philosophy, be they Buddhist or Baptist, remains depen-
dent on their worldview, even more so than the special sciences are. With
its glimpse of the whole, which, as we will see, any philosopher needs,
philosophy actually stands closer to the practical wisdom of everyday than
does any other science (36hh163; 41011; 35e1). But what kind of depen-
dence does philosophy have on worldview? Vollenhoven seems to give two
different but compatible answers to this question. The one answeris a con-
ceptual one, namely, of nonscientific basis and theoretic superstructure.
Philosophy is seen as the scientific formulation or theoretic assimilation of
the world and life view (56b1), in such a way that the scientific concepts,
“negatively, may not be incompatible with and, positively, should be in
agreement with [the nonscientific concepts]" (48f64; see below, 182). Phi-
losophy formulates what the worldview circumscribes. The advantage being
“that the entire process is summarized and can be conveyed in unambiguous
terms” (35438). The second answeris quite different in character. Here
philosophy is described as translating the deepest yearning of the human
heart: "the philosophic endeavor, if it is going to be done well, must
be
dominated by the longing ofthe ‘love, poured out in our hearts by the
Holy
Spirit'” (37d7; 45e27). These two answers are evidence of the fact that
Vollenhoven's systematics was the result of an inner connection between
an
inspired faith commitment and the intensive work of theoretic reflection.?
Vollenhoven knew full well that many before him had been
moved by
faith and in their thinking had reckoned with Scripture. But
he was also
convinced that in so doing many had compromised and warped some
basic
biblical themes. Butin this regard, for all his instructions about
avoiding
negative descriptions, Vollenhoven, all told, breaks his own rule
that one
can best concentrate on the positive formulation. When it comes to
the use
of Scripture in relation to philosophizing, he has more to say about
how
things have gone wrong onthis score than about how best to proceed.
In
this essay, as elsewhere, he distinguishes three typical ways in
which using
Scripture and doing philosophyyield less than desirable results.
(1) By far the most pervasive way in which biblical themes are mixed
with philosophy is the method of eisegesis-exegesis. The words "eisegesis"
and “exegesis” are derived from Greek compounds meaning “to bring into"
and "to lead out of." This procedure usually involves a “high view of
Scripture" that unconsciously ends up reading into the text, as in "reading
between the lines," what is not there, sometimes even interjecting what is in
conflict with Scripture. Then, when these foreign elements have been, so to
speak, read into the text, they are, when “just reading what the text says,"
taken out again, through unsound exegesis. Questionable beliefs and pagan
thought pattems are unwittingly carried into the text, in such a way that it
seems that the Bible sanctions them! Often it happened in the early church
that Christians in their debate with the pagans would say: "We believeit,
not because you say so, but because we know it from the Bible.” In such
cases they were trying not only to reckon with what Scripture reveals, but to
extract from the text a complete philosophy-in a chapter and verse, biblicis-
tic fashion. But what happens in these cases is that people are simply mak-
ing explicit what was implicit to their understanding already before going to
Scripture. This type of synthesis continues to cause endless grief within the
Church: Christians running the race under the umbrella of God's grace
nonetheless read different theories into Scripture and consequently run into
serious conflict with each other.
(2) A second kind of synthesis avails itself of a paradox. This
“method” is hard to comprehend because it implies a contradiction in one’s
thinking: a point of view is accepted that is at the same time realized to be
contrary to Scripture. In other words, paradox synthesis believes Scripture,
because it is the word of God, but also current philosophy—philosophy after
all is philosophy!—all the while recognizing that "here and there" they are
in conflict with each other. Hence the paradox: both Scripture and the ar-
guments of philosophy are true. Something similar is going on when a
christian school says on the one hand to do everything to the glory of God
and, on the other hand, advocates a behavioristic vision of culture that,
along with B. F. Skinner, is optimistically convinced that we have as yetto
see what man can make of man. Clearly, this is an untenable position. Yet
it constitutes an improvement on the method of eisegesis-exegesis, for it re-
alizes that logical argument cannot simply, withoutcritique, be incorporated
into what we know onthebasis of Scripture.
(3) The third kind of accommodation to unredeemed thought Vollen-
hoven calls nature/grace synthesis. This disposition surfaced in the sixth
century, prepared the way for medieval Scholasticism, and produced condi-
tions for a process of secularization that ultimately resulted in the triumph of
humanism. Even today the christian community is plagued by the effects of
a nature/grace mentality. Any sacred /secular dualism heard of today has its
roots here.
Vollenhoventraces this approach back to the Council of Orange which
when dealing with the state of man before and after the Fall, used terms that
distinguished and seemed to accept a difference between “natural grace” and
“supernatural grace." This set the stage for the notion that the Fall caused
man to lose something “super-natural." It was merely a matter of time be-
fore it was agreed which attributes could be assigned to “supernature," and
which ones to "nature." In effect, the anthropology implied by the Council
of Orange presents man as follows: before the Fall "natural" man possessed
a special measure of "supernature." When hefell, the “supernature” was
lost, while his "nature" remained essentially in tact. This common “nature”
—weakened by the Fall, but nonetheless present in everyone—still func-
tioned normally under the guidance of the "natural light of reason.” For as
Aristotle(!!) had said long ago: “reason” is the determining characteristic of
"natural man,”
This view of man became the basis for Scholasticism. According to
scholastic PhDs and ThDs, there are only those twoareas in life, namely,
the area of “nature,” which includes among other things the state, society,
philosophy, “reason,” law, and the sciences; then there is the area of "super-
nature," which includes grace, the Church, theology, faith, and "religion,"
The nature-grace framework sends theologians to divinity school, but re-
gards philosophy as “natural,” an expression of the “natural” man and there-
fore acceptable (to the extent it does not contradict what we know of and
from the “higher" realm of grace). Likewise, astronomy is astronomy and
zoology zoology. Consequently, there is no perceived need for a christian
philosophy on the one hand and, on the other, usually a receptive attitude to
whatis called "natural theology."
Medieval scholastics became very adept in their use of natural theol-
ogy. Can we know and describe God by means of "reason," by means of
tational arguments without using "the means of grace," like faith or Scrip-
ture? Vollenhoven cites proofs for the existence of God and repeated at-
tempts at logically explaining and describing the podhead, or how God
knows what he knows, as examples of misdirected projects of "unaided rea-
son” in service of the Creator. Along with John Calvin
(cf. institutes, 1,5,9), Vollenhoven was out to provide a more biblical alter-
native to natural theology. He celebrated the fact that God can be known
and worshipped, but also warned against reasoning and philosophizing about
God beyond what he has revealed about himself through Scripture and cre-
ation.
As we noted in Chapter One, synthesis philosophy, whatever its
method, is always an attempted combination, like irying to connect iron and
clay. And the result is always an artificial entwining, a forced mixture of

two mutually exclusive principles. It can never result in a fully unified per-
spective. A true synthesis, in the sense of attained unity between what
Bible-believers know from Scripture and the philosophizing of an unregener-
ate mind, is impossible. To use the words of Alvin Plantinga, the result at
best is an unintegrated pastiche.*
As we have seen along the way, Vollenhoven does have moreto say
than just what to avoid. In this essay too, he gives a numberofpositive in-
structions concerning the use of Scripture, as well. One important reminder
is, while working and researching, to keep in mind the more basic differ-
ences and their more encompassing, contextual connections—the most en-
compassing of which is the transcosmic connection, “the one which includes
the entire cosmic order, between God and humankind, that not only points
beyond the cosmos, but also makes it possible for us to see that which is
cosmic as it is" (36w53/39h53). Vollenhoven's claim is that scriptural phi-
losophyis a science "that at least in principle oversees the whole of the cos-
mos” andthat it is “based on something that has transcosmic certainty" (57).
The key here is Scripture used aright. His claim to oversee ar least in
principle the entire domain of the cosmosrelies on Scripture and builds on
what he knows(nonscientifically) from Scripture.
Only from God's word can Christians come to know about the
transcosmic certainty of the covenant between God and man, initiated and
maintained by the ever-faithful Creator and Sustainer of life. As we have
discussed before (97), what Vollenhoven sees, then, is the "cosmos in rela-
tion to God" as under his law and therefore subject to him. This should not
be confused with what many Christians espouse as the only correct christian
perspective, namely, seeing the world from God's point of view. As far as
Vollenhoven was concerned, a god's eye view is beyond our grasp.
End notes
' Reason Within the Bounds ofReligion ).

? These same characteristics Vollenhoven attributed to Geesink (27289). See
also (29b44): "Religious knowledge and the special sciences. Christ is the way,
the truth, and the life. Truth here means surety [vastheid] and hence has primar-
ily a religious, a nonscientific or religious sense. Still, this word is significant for
the theory of knowledge. It teaches us that completely independent of human ac-
tivity, truth and lies confront each other. Likewise, among human beings, we
find some who follow the Logos and others ‘the father oflies': wisdom and
foolishness. So also indirectly, and not always intended as such: knowledge and
error, So ‘believing in’ and ‘studying about,’ though different, are in no way at
odds. On the basis of this difference the Calvinist will not first of all measure his
neighbor according to logical and intellectual standards. At the same time, he
will also resolutely expect that those with the articulate arguments and a clear in-
tuition see this all as the outcomeof the primary (special) and secondary (general)
action of God's Spirit, and practice obedience, also in things logical, out of love
for him.”
3 “Advice to Christian Philosophers," 1984.....
SCRIPTURE USE
AND PHILOSOPHY
[/5316]
[INTRODUCTION]
The topic mentioned in the title may not be equated with that of "Scrip-
ture and philosophy." Naturally, Scripture and philosophy are presupposed
here, but (/5317) our use of Holy Scripture is something different from
Scripture itself. Scripture after all is divine. In contrast, our use of Scrip-
ture remains human. And while Scripture is holy, our use of Scripture, ev-
ery lime again, proves to be tainted with sin. Hence,its use lies at the level
of sinful human life, tied to Holy Scripture.
If we are going to talk then about Scripture use and philosophy, the
question is really: “How ought we be using Scripture when we are busy
philosophically?"
This question is going to be broached, of course, only among Chris-
tians. When people take no account of God and his word, this question nat-
urally is not a factor.
But even thoughthis question is asked only in christian circles does not
mean that the intent with which it is being posed is also always correct. The
very word “use” calls for caution here. This term need not, but can reflect a
misdirected intent. That is the case when westart with ourself and ask,
"What can I gain now from Scripture?" But, as | said, such a conception,
which must be labeled a misconception, is not inherent, so that, having
made the point, we can also move on.
What is more important is that we are not busy with Scripturefirst of
all philosophically. We do not go to Scripture in the first place as philo-
sophic people, but as people without anytitle, without any pretensions.
Holy Scripture directs itself first of all to the life of everyday. For
teaching, rebuking, but at the same time for consolation, so that we shall
have hope; so that our prospect as Christians will be toward things above; so
that we know there is a doorin life through which God comes in order to
speak to his people; a door through which we too with our response to that
divine Word may direct ourselves to God.
Scripture Use and Philosophy
In the second place, that Word allows us to see the whole world as it is
created by God. It tells us that this world is created by God and that we
may never hold anything in this world for divine. This, too, is meant
primarily in a practical sense: idolize nothing, neither things nor people!
Furthermore, God has placed this world under his law: love-filled
obedienceis the first thing that is asked of every one.
In that regard, in the beginning there was no talk ofspecial sciences
and philosophy. Everyday life concurs with that: there are millions who
recognize Holy Scripture as God's Word and have learned to take God at his
Word. And ofthose millions more than 95 percent do not busy themselves
with special science or philosophy.
Nevertheless, Holy Scripture does have something to do with philoso-
phy. What can we say aboutthis relation?
I. [ScriprurE USE AND PHILOSOPHY

FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF HISTORY]
To answer this question we will first look to Aistory.
fA. Synthesis-thinking]
The past teaches that people in christian circles usually laid the connec-
tion [between Scripture and philosophy] incorrectly. They proceeded from
what was originally a pagan conception and then turned to Holy Scripture.
The result was naturally a connection of pagan concepts with scriptural
themes. In other words, synthesis.
Survey texts are often in the habit of shortchangingthe history of syn-
thesis philosophy. This is understandable. When the relationship of Scrip-
ture and philosophy is not important then synthesis thinking and its results
will not be of interest either. But that standpoint cannot be the right one.
Synthesis philosophy introduced a large number of new themes. Besides
that, it dominated the thinking in western and southern Europe for about 15
centuries. These are two good reasons for not takingit lightly.
Further study shows that this epoch comprises three periods. The first
of these is the period of early christian thinking, the second that of the Mid-
dle Ages, and finally the period of the prereformation and “christian” Hu-
manism.
The first synthesis was the most original. Its results were assimilated
during the Middle ages into a learned scholasticism. The third period tried
in an antischolastic and reactionary turn to bring early christian thinking
backto life; only to find out to their disappointment that this did not work.
Scripture Use and Philosopity
Distinguishing these three periods is not encugh. Duringthefirst pe-

riod alone we find that synthesis occurred in a variety of manners. Basi-
cally, we can distinguish here three types of connection.
The oldest is the method of reading in and reading out [—tisegesis-ex-
egesis]. Those who followed this approach went to Holy Scripture looking
for some kind of philosophy. What they found in Scripture, so they
thought, were the same notions they had already earlier. This did not hap-
pen intentionally. It was certainly not the case that early Christians asked,
“How can I combine my system with Holy Scripture?" One factor was that
often the Old Testament was read only in Greek translation, which was also
the language of the New Testament. A few examples will suffice. Some
had previously been followers of a philosophy in which the term /oges had
an important place. Turning to read John chapter one, they found there the
term /ogos, but with a completely different meaning. That, however, was
missed; with the result that it was easy to introduce 2 concept that had be-
come a part of them, through upbringing and study, right into Scripture. In
this way the Word of God, given the sense this term had already in the Old
Testament, became the speech that proceeded from the life of the world,
which supposedly was one with the life of God. This obviously was not an
instance of exegesis [reading out), but of eisegesis [reading in]. They were
incorporating their own views into Scripture without being aware of doing
so, As far as they were concerned they were retaining their earlier but now
improved philosophy, for it no longer rested on human authority, but on the
authority of Gad's Word.
This method naturally ran stuck. There were soon many conceptions
that people claimed to find support for in Scripture. The number of
“christian” philosophies that surfaced in this manner was soonas large as the
number of previously existing pagan conceptions! Some of these were de-
nounced by the church, but there were also many that were not.
Meanwhile, there were also other Christians at the time who had a
sense that what they had taken with them was something other than what
Holy Scripture conveyed. As a result they were averse to this method of
eisegesis-exegesis. All the same, they were convinced that there is only one
philosophy, namely, Greek-Hellenistic philosophy; to which they remained
committed. But they also wanted to believe what Holy Scripture brought to
bear. They did feel some discord between the two however. That is why
they concluded that the truth of Scripture and the truth of philosophy stood
in a paradoxical relationship, This was the standpoint of a thinker like
Tertullian.
There was also a third view, almost as old, namely, that of nature and
grace. Wefind it articulated already at the Synod of Orange in 529, Ac-
cording to this conception we have to distinguish the natural and the super-
natural, Adam, in the state of innocence, had received the supernatural, but
forfeited it through the fall. The supernatural was said to have been restored
to the Christian by grace. The philosophy adopted from pagan thought be-
longed in turn to the realm of nature. But that philosophy also had thought
about God and had its own image of him. This was (/5318) an image other
than the church's, which subscribed in part to Holy Scripture and in part to
the tradition of eisegesis-exegesis. As a result, they ended up with a duality;
as had the paradoxical connection. Which is not to say they somehow
agreed with them. The reciprocal relationship of the pagan view and that of
the church was not paradoxical, but was referred to as that of portal and
culmination.
So these are the three connective frameworks of synthesis philosophy.
They managed to hold sway for some time. For example, they can be rec-
ognized in the three-cornered debates waged in scholastic style during the
early Middle Ages between thinkers like [Willem van Champeaux, Petnis
van Damiani and Lanfranc]. What did slowly change with the course of
history was the recruiting power of these three. The nature-prace approach,
which at the time of the church fathers had relatively few advocates, really
came into its own during the hey-day of the scholastics. But the other two
continued to hold people's interest as well. Still today biblical humanists
follow the reading in, reading out method; the followers of Kierkegaardlive
the paradox; and Roman Catholic thinkers, but Protestant ones as well, hold
to the nature-prace theme.
Those who notice this understand that the campaign we have to wage
toward a scriptural philosophy that is free of any kind of synthesis is partic-
ularly demanding.
[B. Scriptural philosophy]
What do we intend with the term "scriptural philosophy"?
First of all, we should not go to Scripture with our own conception in
place, looking for Scripture to sanction it, but, from our youth on,to let
Scripture have the last word in ourlives.
No one is born a philosopher. Everyone comes into the world as a
baby. Everyone begins their knowing lives with the nonscientific knowl-
edge of everyday experience. Infants already learn something about mom.
That infant is a littke human being. But don't read too much ofthe adult
into that young soul. On the other hand, don't walk around with the idea
that young children are actually little animals with nothing more to go on
than sense perceptions, and know their mother only for the food and warmth
she provides. Because they are young human beings, children also know
love and trust. That's also the way Holy Scripture sees them. David knew
aboutthat, that he trusted the Lord already as an infant; not that he could
have translated that faith, at the time, into words. What we do find is a
dedication to God in the faith commitment of the parents. Sometimes there
is already then also a direct bond in trust with God, a being secure in his
love.
Then we grow up and get to know our parents, our brothers and sis-
ters, our surroundings. First the crib, then the room, after that the back-
yard, the street, acquaintances and friends, school.
This is all nonscientific knowledge. And what's so nice aboutthis is
that it is not a stage that passes. There are many things that do pass during
the years of childhood, but nonscientific knowing stays. We know each
other as man and woman with nonscientific knowledge. As parents we
know our children with nonscientific knowledge. Most of ouractivities ev-
ery day we carry out with nonscientific knowledge.
Over a period of time a view develops, a unified look, that is not sci-
entific, Jet alone philosophic. It's a worldview on life. Like: Humanism,
Catholicism, Lutheranism, Calvinism.
Calvinism, too, is nonscientific knowledge. But it is more than a vari-
ety of knowledge based on a gradually widening horizon as we continue to
come into contact with other people and extend our perception's purview.
Wetake a view of things along from home or work hard at appropriating
another one. It's not a scientific conception, but a view of God, of the
world, of life, of being human, of our neighbors, also of ourself.
This kind of view of things marks a person. The humanism of some
humanists, like the catholicism of some Roman Catholics, is written all over
them. There are even those who look like they're Calvinists. But the view
we are talking about is not scientific. There are stalwart Calvinists, men and
women, who have no more than a high school education, who couldn't go to
college or didn't want to, but who nonetheless support and encourage
calvinian activities in their prayer, involvement, and gifts.
With that I come to scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge con-
tains special scientific knowledge, which limits itself to one field. But there
is also philosophic knowledge. These two are very closely connected with
each other, but do not coincide. Philosophy is the science that wants Lo
learn from all the special sciences, because it's interested in it all, but then
queries further, It is very much interested in the mutual connection of the
fields of investigation to which each special science is assigned one, butalso
in the method applied by each of these sciences as they proceed. Philosophy
is, therefore, the general science. Butit is not a big repository. What one's
view oflife is for nonscientific knowledge, that's what philosophyis for sci-
entific knowledge,
iC. The relationship between nonscientific and scientific knowledge]

What can we say about the relationship between nonscientific and sci-
entific knowledge?
We are not going to lose nonscientific knowing. Those who go on to
study build further on their nonscientific knowledge. There used to be a
time when science (hypercritically) considered all nonscientific knowledge
something that had to be replaced. But people are getting away from that.
The scientist, like everybody else, proceeds from sounds and colors. Yes,
they actually exist! Not within us, but out there! That color is over there,
you are hearing this sound from a distance of so many feet. All this exists
outside our thinking. It is from there that we proceed. Only when we hang
on to these can we go further, and study, for example. Otherwise every-
thing gets confused and there is nothing left standing after the hypercriticism
of science gone berserk.
When we continue, working further, we also need the general view of
philosophy. Butit, too, is in line with nonscientific knowledge; building on
it and thinking aboutit.
Of our nonscientific knowledge, faith knowledge also plays a role.
Those who do not believe, but live in unbelief, end up with a philosophy in
which that unbelief, that deception, plays a role. But those who take God at
his Word and trust that Word get a philosophy where that nonphilosophic,
nonscientific faith in Holy Scripture forms the basis. That does not make
faith philosophic.
Holy Scripture begins majestically with: In the beginning God created
the heavens and the earth. Believing that, will not turn you into a man or
woman of science. But neither should you stop believing that when you tum
to your studies, because there is no science that can take that away from
you. (Those wholose their faith at university cannot blame that on any of
their research. What they are losing is the struggle against unbelief, which
also makes use of many pagan traditions found within science.)
In this way we can build our science upon our faith in Scripture and in
Christ. The result will also be a philosophy that accomplishes in the realm
of science what Calvinism did for [/5319] world and life view in the nonsci-
entific realm.
Il. [THE BAsIs OF CALVINIAN PHILOSOPHY]

Calvinian philosophy ought to proceed then from a nonscientific basis.
In fact, that's what every philosophy does. But not every philosophy gives
an accountof this fact.
Said basis is given to us in Holy Scripture. For that very reason what
it tells us may not be used as something addedontop,either in a paradoxical
Draft PD JHK Translation Page 128
or supernatural sense. Nor may Scripture be interpreted philosophically.

Andcertainly not in the spirit of some pagan understanding.
If Christians are going to take some of these things seriously then they
are going to have to study thoroughly the history of pagan thought. Only
then will they be able to understand and repudiate its quandaries.
Monism and dualism is an example of one such dilemma. We can un-
derstand monism as that obligation to unity [eenheidsgedachte] which
alleges that God and world are really the same or that there is some one
thing from which God and world both spring. Dualism is tied to the theme
of correlation, according 10 which God and something else, e.g. world or
matter, have been each other's counterpart from the beginning. Dualism,
then, is something other than acknowledging duality. Those who confess
that God created the world will have no problem acknowledging that God
and world are two. At the same time, precisely because of their faith in
creation, they will forcefully reject the dualistic thought that God and world
are both eternal, or both temporal.
The law and that which is subject to it are correlates, not God and
world. To have a law without something for which it holds is as meaning-
less as a subject without a law.
It is well known that the law plays an important part in Calvinism. In
talking about the law of the ten commandments, we can distinguish its three-
fold use: it bridles our godlessness, leads us to Christ, and excites us to ho-
liness. Basically, this threefold use goes back to a single theme: the law as
love command is norm for human life. For after it was originally given to
us in Paradise, this law with its curse came to stand over against us when its
requirement was notlifted after it had been broken. But now, since Christ
fulfilled this law, it is once again acknowledged by Christians as norm for
our lives,
The Jaw in this sense remains outside us and above us. Even when, as
in the state of innocence and also with Christ, life is in line with the law,
this life does not coalesce with it. For the requirement "Thou shalt” is
something other than meeting that demand.
Calvinian philosophy can only say amen to these things. Meanwhile,it
encounters the term "law" also in other senses. There is also talk of “law in
the cosmos” and of “positive law."
When special sciences look for laws and formulate their tentative re-
sults, their goal is to track down regularities present in the cosmos. That is
reason enough to distinguish law in this sense from the love command. In
addition, since the fall, the regularity they are seeking concerns both whatis
in line with the love command as well as what is contrary to it. In other
words, there are statistics available for the number of marriages and births as
well as for the number of murders and divorces. That does not mean that
the opposition of good and evil, love and hate, obedience and disobedience
to the love commandis lost, but that the opposition of regularity and irreg-
ularity runs and cuts right through it.
The mutual relationship of these two laws is not a matter of higher and
lower functions. The love command claims the whole person and thestatis-
tical calculations of regularity and irregularity make sense for the knowledge
of the higher functions as well as of the lower functions. Nor can this rela-
tionship be reduced to a duality in sources of knowledge, as though the love
command could only be found with Scripture while regularity could be
found without it. The meaning of the love command becomes clear to us
only when we investigate the history of the cosmos; and the history of the
cosmos, which continues to play a major role in the sought after regularity,
cannot be understood unless we reckon with the broad lines of that history as
indicated in Holy Scripture.
It follows from a number of these things that even though incorrect
conceptions conceming the mutual relation of these laws are to be rejected,
both are definitely connected with each other.
This connection lies first of all in God. For behind both laws stands
his will. Think, for example, of the old distinction of the will of God's de-
cree and the will of his precept.
This distinction should not be equated with that of revealed and secret
wili. The first distinction touches on God's willing irrespective of its
knowability, the second one has to do with the relation of this willing to our
knowledge. In addition, the will of God's decree is not always completely
clear to us, while, on the other hand, the will of God's precept can also be
investigated by us to the extent that the precept has already been realized.
In this manner, finally, the meaning of positive law is also under-
standable. This law is certainly not the formulation of a discerned reg-
ularity. It does not record, describe, or explain anything, but aims to lead
life in a specific direction. Nor is it identical to the love command. Itis
actually because of this command that legislation has to be criticized repeat-
edly and, when that battle remains fruitless, rules that have been elevated to
positive jaws need to be replaced as quickly as possible with better ones.
But given the fact that positive law is identical to neither law as regularity
nor the love command, it can connect the two of them. That is why the au-
thorized office bearer has to take both of these into account when drafting
positive law. The sense of positive law is precisely this: that it positivize
God's love command in its specification for a [modally] qualified societal
connection, for one specific societal connection, during a specific time pe-
Tiod. Hence, a positive law binds only those who belong to the connection
in question, during the time it is valid. But it does so as the command of
God, all be it indirect. Think here of the motivation for this kind of respect
found in the Heidelberg Catechism [Q&A 104]: “for through them God
chooses to rule us."
Obviously, here too, many questions remain, The above is nothing
more than an endeavor that seeks to contribute to showing how calvinian
philosophy, also in its analysis of the concept of law, has its eyes open to
the demands of the special sciences as well as of everyday life, while
remaining trueto its religious basis. [ 5319//]
6.
DIFFERING WITH
DOOYEWEERD
In 1934 Vollenhoveninitiated a series of newspaper articles under the

heading "contemporary philosophy.” In an early article he suggests that the
basic structure of someone's philosophy is defined by three connections: the
“static” connection, how one stands with respect to contemporary figures
and issues; the “genetic” connection, how one stands with respect to prede-
cessors; and the "religious" connection, ultimately, how one stands with re-
spect to the Word of God. If we apply these coordinates to a "snapshot"
based on the material we have covered so far, we find that Vollenhoven and
Dooyeweerd, plus others supporting their project, were cooperating in a
philosophical venture that stood at odds with the efforts of most of their
contemporaries, with what Voilenhoven calls “current philosophy." The
people who are wearing white hats in this "snapshot" all agree that true reli-
gion comes by faith through Christ alone. Butit is not as though everyone
wearing a white hat in this picture is supporting the philosophical endeavors
of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. In fact some are fighting these like the
plague (while most of those in "hats of color" notice next to nothingat all).
Some of these white hats trace their style to the pope, others to Luther, and
others, for example, to those passages in Kuyper that Vollenhoven was sug-
gesting were more influenced by Aristotle than they were in line with
Scripture. In the translation that follows we find ourselves on this side of
the line, with Vollenhoven discussing in a drafted, internal memo a few of
the differences between him and Dooyeweerd.
The translation goes back to a hand-written manuscript, on top of
whichis written "Strictly Confidential," found among Vollenhoven's papers
and dated by Tol around May 1953.’ The piece is composed in the form of
a report to a Foundation whose goal is to support special chairs of calvinian
philosophy at the various national universities in The Netherlands. Vollenhoven
was the Chair ofits Board. There is evidence that he discussed the contents of the
memo with Dooyeweerd; but a typed copy has not been found and morethanlikely
the report was never actually submitted the Foundation. The piece's value
Draft x JHK Translation Page 132
lies in the fact that Vollenhoven directly addresses differences between him-
self and Dooyeweerd; something he did not do in the context of the class-
room until 1963 and not in a public forum until 1968.*
After a very gentle apology for why there are differences among like-
minded people and what can be done aboutit, Vollenhoven highlights three
points of divergence: (1) Dooyeweerd's talk of the law-side and subject-side
of the cosmos and his own distinction within the law between love com-
mand, lawful regularity, and positive law; (2) how time relates to the differ-
ence between heart and functions; and, only very briefly, (3) the difference
between faith as function and faith as heartfelt commitment. His 1953 essay
"Religie en geloof" begins to address the last question more extensively, but
is not included in this volume. The threefold law is the mainstay in Chapter
Seven, so we will leave that topic until then. Which leaves us with the
question of time: with Vollenhoven's understanding of time as past, pre-
sent, and future of creaturely change and with Dooyeweerd's claim that
modal order is an order of time and, more importantly, that the religious
center of a human being is the supratemporal root, a transcendent con-
centration point, of the modally qualified temporal aspects of that person's
functioning and that Jesus Christ is the true supra-individual concentration
point of the entire temporal cosmos.
One way to get at this difference between Vollenhoven and Dooye-
weerd is to focus on their understanding of how philosophy positions itself
with respect to the whole ortotality of the cosmos. Both agree that the cos-
mos in genera] and people in particular have a religious root and a divine
origin.? They also agree that philosophizing is a human activity directed to
the totality of the cosmos and is, as al] human activity, rooted in the human
heart (soul, self) which itself falls beyond the limits of theoretic analysis.
For Dooyeweerd, "Meaning is the being of all that has been created
and the nature even of our selfhood.” This implies that philosophy is
“theoretical thought directed towards the totality of meaning." In order to
glimpse or grasp this whole, I must “choose nry standpoint [not over against
or above or beyond, but] in this totality of meaning,” lest this totality, the
meaning of our temporal cosmos, “remain strange to me": “In my central
selfhood I mustparticipate in the totality of meaning [—in the Archimedean
point of philosophy)... if [ am not to lose myself in the modal speciality of
meaning...." This time-transcending Archimedean point “must truly be the
concentration-point for philosophic thought and as such it must transcend the
modal diversity even in its coherence." On the other hand, in transcending
temporal diversity, the philosopher is equipped for the task: "The intent of
philosophy is to give us a theoretical insight into the coherence of our tem-
poral world as an inter-modal coherence of meaning.” A person's selfhood
is a “radical religious unity,” the concentration-point of one's individual ex-
istence, but not of the entire temporal cosmos. Forthat, the self must come
to share in the new root of humanity, in the Second Adam. Thecentral and
radical unity of our existence is "at the same time individual and supra-indi-
vidual; that is to say, in the individual I-ness it points beyond the individual
ego toward that which makes the whole of mankind spiritually one in root,"
namely today, toward Jesus Christ, "the religious root of existence." The
fulness of meaning, as totality and radical unity, in which we participate in
Christ, “is not actually given and cannot be actually given in time, though
all meaning refers beyond itself to its supra-temporal fulfillment.” "[This]
deeper totality necessarily transcends the mutual coherence of all modal as-
pects of temporal reality, just as our selfhood transcends the coherenceofits
functions in these aspects.”
This introduction is just a draft and is not complete.
' See A. Tol and K.A. Bril, eds., Vollenhoven ais wijsgeer: Inleidingen en teksten
(Amsterdam: Buijten en Schipperheijn, 1992) 108-111. Tol’s primary indicators
for dating the piece are threefold: a faculty meeting on 5-7 April 1952 during
which Vollenhoven raised five of the three points elaborated on in this piece; the
threefoid distinction in the law, which was presented in a public context for the
first time at a conference on 6 January 1953 (being the Scripture use piece from
the previous chapter), is presumed in this report; and the apparent revision on
Vollenhoven's part concerning the expression of time in the arithmetic and spatial
modes of earthly being. This last point is somewhat technical, but is probably not
as new a revision as Tol suggests. Two examples easily documentthat the arith-
metic and spatial modes with respect to time were different for Vollenhoven from
the start. In 1926(a55), the order of the modes ran: logic, number, space, time,
movement, energy.... By 1927 the analytic mode followed the psychic and time
was no longer modal: “time is neither an individual or a modal difference. But
we do find it in all the modalities of an individuality” (31124). In 1930 and 1931,
the difference between these two modes and the others is said to lie in the fact
that the arithmetic and spatial are “non-active” (30d37; 31f33). So, Vol-
lenhoven's struggle with these two modes was not something peculiar to the early
1950s. Secondly, given what we have seen of Vollenhoven's long standing dis-
tinction between law and command (97) and that the place ofpositive law is ac-
knowledged from early on, points we will return to in the next chapter, the three-
fold distinction of the law is likewise not as unique to 1952 or 1953 as Tol sug-
Bests.
2 See in A. Tol and K.A. Bril, eds., "Problemen rondom de tijd” (1963) 160-198:
and “Problemen van detijd in onze kring” (1968) 199-211.
3 For Dooyeweerd neither the speciality (= diversity) of meaning nor the totality of
meaning exist by itself, but suppose "an archté, an origin which creates meaning”:
"All meaning is from, through, and to an origin, which cannotitself be related to
a higher arché.” Dooyeweerd refers to this dependence of meaning on the origin
as the “genetic relativity of meaning" and describes philosophic thought directed
to the origin as its “basic genetic tendency,” rooted in the “restlessness of our
ego... towards the arché of our selfhood and ofthe totality of meaning."
DIVERGENCES:
REPORTI
[/53mst11)
To the Board of the Foundation for Special Chairs in Calvinian Philosophy.”
INTRODUCTION
Among the instructors of calvinian philosophy, not all of whom are
connected with the Foundation as professors, there exist a number of diver-
gences. They cameto the attention of Professor H.J. Van der Maas already
in the summer of 1949 and since then have surfaced repeatedly during the
study conferences of the Association [for Calvinian Philosophy].
It should come as no surprise that differences like these occur in this
group too. It can easy happen that not everyone sees a specific difficulty, or
possibility, at the same time. Even when they do, they will very likely,
given the different path each has covered to date and the different task with
which each is entrusted, not always follow the same method in resolving the
issue. Besides, these divergences can only produce objections when people
lose sight of the [/53ms112} tentative character of, or individual stamp on, the
results booked so far.
In positive protestant circles there is a dual corrective for these kind of
lapses. It is preserved in the saying [of Groen van Prinsterer): "It is written
and it has happened." In our circles this amounts to: work continually by
the light of Holy Scripture and reflect on the history of philosophy in gen-
eral and on that of our own groupin particular.
Whencarrying out this twofold requirement, however, intensive delib-
erations among those concerned may not be lacking. That is why thankful
use is made of the Coetus Docentium [Meeting of Faculty] that was set up
by the foundation's board.
” The goal of this Foundation is to support special chairs of calvinian philosoph

y at
the various national universities in The Netherlands, There is evidence that Vol-
ienhoven did discuss its contents with Dooyeweerd; but a typed copy has not
been found and morethan likely it was never actually submitted to the Founda-
tion, of which he was the chair.
Divergences
Accepting this possibility naturally brings with it the obligation that we

once in a while inform the Board about the state ofaffairs. It goes without
saying that this can only be a general overview; but, as we understand it, the
Board was not looking for more than that.
Welimit ourselves in what follows to systematic issues. We will not
be able to talk aboutall of them. Amongother things, we are not going to
discuss the point about the reciprocal relationship of subject and individual-
ity and the whole question of the theory of knowledge. What does comeup,
we trust, will prove to be both extensive and significant.
BACKGROUND
Taking stock of the prehistory of calvinian philosophy, we see that its
fathers were influenced by the Marburpers and Husserl. Since that time, of
course, the work of these schools has also been subjected to a foundational
critique within our circles. But the course ofaffairs just mentioned has left
its marks here and there. In the theory about being, too muchattention is
focussed now and then on the functions and in the theory of knowledge, the
interest shown in special scientific knowledge is often too one-sided. One
result is that the rest of that which is created is easily referred to as thoughit
had something "mystical" about it. But we cannot forget that this “rest” in-
cludes the heart, the Church, the human nature of the Mediator, and the
world of angels, among other things, and demands that we make many more
distinctions and, of course, are also very careful when deciding on the ter-
minology.
OVERVIEW
Ordered systematically, the most significant difficulties concern the
following [/53ms113) points: (a.) law and subject, (b.) the structure of that
which is subject and time, and (c.) the prefunctional.
A. Lawand subject
For a long time Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven stood some distance
from each other on this point. Dooyeweerd placed both law and subject in
the cosmos; using the term "cosmos" to refer to the part of that which is cre-
ated that finds its centrum in man. That is why hedistinguishes within the
cosmos law-side and subject-side, which he takes to be related as that which
is universal to that which is individual. In contrast, Vollenhoven spoke of
the triad God-law-cosmos, in the sense that God exists independent of law
and cosmos andis not their correlate, but sets the law for the cosmoshe cre-
ated such that law and cosmos (cosmos taken as a whole) are each other's
correlate. That is why he could not talk about the "law-side” and "subject-
Divergences
side" of the cosmos. He understood the law to always stand above the cos-
mos, such that what was subject to this law was identical to the cosmos and
not one ofits sides.
With time both standpoints have approached each other in part.
Dooyeweerd wants to distinguish the ius divinum (divine law) in its temporal
refraction of meaning from the ius Aumanum (human law). Vollenhoven
also wants, in addition, to talk about law in the sense of regularity in the
cosmos,
Yet differences remain. Even leaving the “temporal refraction of
meaning” and the rather juridical connotations of "ius" stand for the mo-
ment, Vollenhoven considers the distinction of ius divinum and ius hu-
manuto be inadequate. He feels that a three-part distinction is called for:
(1) the Jaw of God that stands as norm above the cosmos, that on earth
touches only man directly, and that holds for the other creatures only indi-
rectly, in other words, only via man; (2) the cosmos, including man; and (3)
the positive law, through which office bearers, given their office in their
modally qualified and regionally defined societal connection, positivize
God's law, correctly or not, primarily for human life.
Re |: "Norm" here refers to “the Jaw of the Lord,” summarized by
Christ in the double love command. This law holds primarily only for hu-
man life. It makes no senseto talk about christian animals, plants, or physi-
cal things. But human life, too, can only be more or less in line with this
law. Even when human beings in their living obey this law (for example,
earlier in Paradise and presently in the human nature of the Mediator), they
in no way coincide with it. [/53ms11¢) Besides, the norm stands as holy over
against what is subject to it, which, except in the human nature of the Medi-
ator, since the fall is always, at least in part, not holy but sinful. That's
why Scripture can talk about the “curse of the Law" for those subjects who
transgress it and why cosmos (“world'), according to Scripture's religious
dialectic, in different places means "God's awesome creation,” "what's
warped by evil,” and "what's being saved.”
Re 2: In contrast, the rules or, if one prefers, laws in the cosmos have
to do with the regularity both of what does and of what does notline up with
the law in the sense of norm. Statistics can be assembled conceming dips
and rises in the number of murders committed as well as about frequencies
in the numberof live births. This area obviously is not disassociated from
the good-evil opposition. What Scripture is speaking about in terms ofthe
guilt or iniquity of sins are likewise facts that go into defining the subse-
quent course of affairs. But the difference remains. Therelation of guilt to
the norm is something other than rules and exceptions in the structure.
That's why when scientists examining the structure in the cosmos find an
Divergences
exceplion to what they thought was a rule, they look for a more en-
compassing rule that includes this deviation as well.
This insight sheds light on the mutual difference of normative and non-
normative laws. This difference does not correspond with that of higher and
lower modalities, For example, health stands over against sickness also in
the psychic and biotic modalities as the correlate of conforming to the norm
or not; so also with physical things, we read that they obey the Mediator.
Nor [does it correspond] with that of summary and temporal refraction of
meaning. For apart from the question of temporality, to which wewill re-
turn, the difference between the unity in the core and the diversity in the
elaboration is present in the norm as well as in what is subject to it. In ad-
dition, the diversity among the commandmentsof the second table of the law
is in no way correlate with the diversity of modalities in the outer cloak of
human functions.
Re 3: The difference between the law of God as norm and thepositive
law does not require as broad a discussion. The one thing that should be
noted is that the office bearers themselves are also subject to the norm in the
various societal connections. Scripture refers to them, on the one hand, as
“gods,” but also as "normal people.” Their work, too, always remains ac-
countable to the norm to which they and their countryman are bound in their
consciences, also when their task of positivizing implies that they have to
take their fellow citizen's hardness of heart [/53ms115] into account.
B. The structure ofthat which is subject and time

Proceeding from the scriptural distinction of heart and function,
Dooyeweerd considers (1) the functions to be temporal and (2) the heart to
be supratemporal.
1. The connection between time and functions
For Dooyeweerd, this [connection] is twofold, namely, (a) in the tem-
poral order of the functions and (b) in every function separately, such that in
the arithmetic [function] succession would mark the presence of time and
simultaneity do the samein the spatial [function]. Concerning (a): Arguing
against the first point, it was noted that only when we cometo events is
there talk of temporal order. To do the same with the relative order of the
functions makes it unnecessarily difficult for opponents to distinguish our
view from the evolutionistic one. Concerning (b): The same argument
holds with respect to time in the arithmetic and the spatial [functions]. Ein-
stein's conception cannot be used as a counter example, because he assumed
that time and space are both present in physical occurrences (which is in
confesso).
Meanwhile, other objections regarding this point can be introduced
here as well, Professor C.C. Jonker pointed outthatif time's presencein all
Divergences
the functions is marked by succession in the arithmetic function and bysi-

multaneity in the spatial, then an ontic retrogression would have to be noted
when moving from the arithmetic to the spatial, even though one would ex-
pect the reverse relationship, given that the spatial presupposes the arith-
metic.
A partial explanation for some ofthis can probably be found in things
that were happening during the early development of calvinian philosophy.
Vollenhoven's dissertation (1918) assumed, with Poincaré, that succession
was the correlate of time in the realm of numbers. Vollenhoyen, however,
did not speak there about time in the realm of space. This assumption early
on is connected with Dooyeweerd's later claim that time must be found in all
the functions. Given the argument that we can only talk about time in con-
nection with events (see a.) it is probably better not to look for evidences of
time in either numberor space. “Succession” need not be abandoned. It can
be understood as the nontemporal order of smali and large.
2, The supratemporal character of the heart
This topic gave rise to objections concerning (a) terminologyas well as
(b) [/53msi16] the issue itself. (a) Concerning the terminology it was pointed
out that instead of "above time," even given Dooyeweerd's Standpoint, it
would be better to speak, for example, of “beyond time." The term
“supratemporal” creates too much the impressionthat the difference between
functions and heart could be included under the higher-lower schema. An
added factor here is the practical consideration that pagan thoughtrepeatedly
uses the term in this sense. Thatis true for monists like Leibnitz, but also,
and morestrongly, for dualists. According to nondichotomistic thinkers like
African Spir [1837-1890] and Karl Barth [1886-1968] and dichotomists like
__. Klages (the purely phrenological thinkers and the spiritualists), what is
transcendent is completely supratemporal; for others like Carl Jung this is
only so in part. To hang onto this term thenincreases the likelihood that
the differences between calvinian philosophy, on the one hand, and synthetic
conceptions that simply must be rejected, on the other hand, are lev-
elled—which unnecessarily aggravates our struggle. Think here especially,
for example, of the members of the younger generation who have to become
acquainted with these conceptions as well as with our view and may happen
to set about looking for some kind of common ground. (b) Exchanging
“beyond time" for "above time,” however, would not address the other ob-
Jections to this notion that have been raised from more than one side. Ac-
cording to those writing this report, neither the procreation of the human
race nor its history are "beyond time." The same holds for the conversion
of the heart of the Christian in regeneration.
Divergpences
C. The prefunctional
Finally, we want to draw your attention to difficulties in connection
with the prefunctional [heart], apart from the question of time. Up until
now the anthropology of calvinian philosophy distinguished the heart and
the cloak of functions, taking faith to be the highest function.
From different sides a number of cbjections have been raised against
this view. They have to do in part with the place of faith taken in the sense
of allegiance, which cannot be functional, and also in part with the view of
the church as institute, especially its diaconate and discipline, to the extent
this also has validity for the kingdom of heaven.
To the extent these objections have not arisen from within our ranks,
they come to us from reformed Christians who should be taken seriously.
Meeting their objections would further our work immensely. On the other
hand, we have to maintain this distinction, lest we end up with the position
that the [/53ms117] instituted church either ought to dominatetheentire life of
the Christian oris really not a distinct societal connection. Neither of these
seem right to us. In the near future serious attention will also be given to
this point.
7.
TRACES OF THE
TRINITY
pages 141 to 145 are in process

THE UNITY OF LIFE
Commemoration lecture for the Utrecht chapter of the $.S.R. held on Octo-
ber 13, 1955° by Prof. dr. D.H.Th. Vollenhoven
Ourlife can be and ought to be of one piece. In this sense the unity of
life stands over against the brokenness oflife.
Of late, people speak almost exclusively about life's brokenness. If
this happened in a christian spirit, that would be one thing. Then we would
simply have to caution against being one-sided; even though that emphasis is
understandable to the extent we need to be reminded that since the fall we
will find unity of life only within life's brokenness. But the mind-set that
wants to discuss the topic "brokenness oflife" is a completely different one.
Orientating themselves to the recent past, people point out that reason with
its apriori concepts has fallen hopelessly short not only in the area of sci-
ence, but in practical things as well. That is why they disqualify reason. It
is not banned from the choir, but it will no longer carry the melody. Rising
above the voices assigned to theoretical and practical reason one hears the
shrill cry of the existentialist who, after dismissing history among other
things, only allows for reasonless decisions in concrete situations, and in so
doing tries to be "historical."
In many ways, this brokenness can be understood. Likewise, many
who have experienced this brokenness deeply deserve our pity. It is no
small matter if someone like Kierkegaard [1813-1855] collapses on a street
in Copenhagen at the age of 52 as a result of the seriousness with which he
sought to implement this existential attitude toward life. Yet his pursuit suf-
fered from a fatal misunderstanding that, given the fact that manystill today
are attempting to combine Christianity and existentialism, should certainly
be acknowledged. For the brokenness existentialism is getting at differs
fundamentally from the brokenness that Christianity recognizes. When Paul
moans “All fall short of the glory of God," that is something different from
being riddled in the cross-fire of rationalism and irrationalism. Paul's words
go much, much deeper. Pau! does not have the recalcitrance that ultimately
brings people, failing to free themselves from the rationalistic view of law
and at their wits end, to proclaim lawlessness. In contrast, Paul's words rest
on the weight of the fact that we do not measure up to God's norm: we
don't make the grade, and those who went before us were nobetter.
* Acknowledge benefitting from the Sweetman/Francke draft translation.

The Unity ofLife
But it is precisely because Paul fathoms our situation so deeply and

takes it very much to heart that he can also take seriously the gospel of
grace, which promises deliverance from this predicament. That is why he
can follow with: "and are justified freely by his grace through the redemp-
tion that came by Christ Jesus" (Romans 3:23-4).
As with Paul, so also is the Reformation. It began with Luther's
wrestling: How do | arrive at a merciful God? This question is extremely
significant. We can know neither ourselves nor our fellow man if we do not
also see the relation in which those others as well as we ourselves stand over
against God's law.
Here too, one should take care to avoid a one-sided emphasis. After
all, is this law really the only one? Is it not itself a component of something
that is much broader? Namely, the revelation of the Word? And we can
even go a step further. Is that Word revelation the only one? Does it pre-
suppose anything? And dcesn't it, in turn, point toward something else?
These questions must be answered in the affirmative. For the revela-
tion of the Word presupposes the creation and the law for creation; and it
points forward to the working of the Spirit which completes it. That is why
the ancient christian creed, which puts the Son in the center and correctly
concentrates at some length on his work, begins with the Father and ends
with the Spirit.
Therefore, we can only speak of unity of life when our living Anows
the unity of three types of law and reveres that threefald law.
I
First of all, this threefold law can be known,
The explanation of the Apostles’ Creed in the Heidelberg Catechism
begins with a threefold division whose first part reads: God the Father and
our creation.
Indeed! There is no talk of norm without prior creation. Every norm
presupposes the existence of that for which it holds. Norm is also
something other than command, and commandis precisely what is important
for creation. In the story about the creation we hear time and again the
commanding voice of God. The issue there is not ideas about which we
could speculate, but commands which must be obeyed. These commands of
creation are commands that dictate that all sorts of things comeinto being.
“Let there be light!" “Let there be an expanse!" "Let the waters be
gathered!” Later, the psalmist will summarize this as follows: He
commanded, and they were created (Psalm 33:9).
And after being created they also endured: You established the earth,
and it still stands (Ps. 119:90); all things remain to this day by your ap-
pointment, because they are all your servants (Ps. 119:91).
The Unity ofLife
Given with the created-being of that which is created is also its struc-
ture. For that which is created does not exist as a loose collection of sepa-
rate things. Within creation we discern kinds. Not in a morphological sense
that things are similar to each other, but in a genealogical sense. Creatures
are individual, but nevertheless capable of splitting, of reproducing, of
mating, of having intercourse. These kinds, in other words, know an earlier
and later. In addition, to the extent we are dealing with real kinds, which
naturally have variations, they are all created according to their own nature.
The higher kind does not come forth out of a lower one, but in the same
realm the later generation does come forth out of an earlier one. There is
evolving, but no evolution. This is not a process of constructing in the
mechanical sense of the word. The following kingdom does not originate
because an extra level is added to the things of the former, In each kingdom
the things are fully structured [doorgestructureerd|. They form an inner
unity. A plant is not a collection of atoms held together by a biotic ent-
elechy, nor is an animal a collection of plants to which an emotive life is
added from above.
Let me give an exampleofthis integral unity, of being fully structured.
Animals and human beings perceive things and in doing so use their senses.
These senses are organs. As organs they can be impaired as well as healthy.
When medically examined, they are treated as organs. When J] go to the
optometrist he doesn't ask me to read the letter charts straightaway, but first
has melook at a little red light while he uses a bright focused light to inves-
tigate if there is possibly 2 problem inside my eyes that he can't correct.
Only when they prove to be healthy does he check whether my eyes’ lenses
display any deficiencies.
But now this is what is unique: although the eye is an organ, we look
in vain for something like an eye in organisms. Plants have nothing analo-
gous to it. Sense organs are organs, but they are absent in organisms, in
other words, in things that are typified by the organic function, as the high-
est function they have. Organic things like eyes are only found in animals
and human beings, pointing forward to their activity in higher functions.
Human life, as well, is structured in this integral way.
It is not so that we are made up of a body, a group of sub-psychic
functions, on the outside, to which is added a soul that contains therest.
Even less so are we constituted by a body, soul, and intellect. All of these
are present in that unity, be it only on the out-side. For the unity of man
mustfirst of all be distinguished in an inner and outerlife.
Thus we see a lawfulness in the work of the Father. But there is more,
We speak of the Father and our creation, of the Son and our deliverance. In
the Catechism, as a book for general instruction,that is fine. But tonight we
must not be too hasty in this regard. We can only speak of redemption after
The Unity ofLife
misery has made its appearance. But the Son was busy long before that. As
Logos he is God in his speaking to the people, God revealing his Word.
This is a second [law]. It is not a command that creates nor is it a
structuring activity. Creation in all of its diversity is already presupposed
when the Word revelation begins. Man is there as well. But then something
new happens to man. Humankind was not separated from the rest of cre-
ation, but put in an exceptional position. And the Logos, God in his speak-
ing, then addresses man, revealing to him the thoughts ofhis heart.
This happened in paradise already, before the fall and completely inde-
pendent of it. At the time there is yet no talk of deliverance nor of the
knowledge of misery mediated by this Word revelation. It's the glory of the
Creator that is revealed. God speaks about his work to the man and also
shares with him something of his vision for humankind, and of the task that
awaits him. In speaking to the man in this way, God is showing his interest
in him, When God instructs Adam to take note of the animals and to give
them names on the basis of his findings, then God looks on, interested in the
results. For whatever Adam would call the animals, that would be their
name.
It is similar to that of a father who carefully observes what his child
can do already, It is early evidence of God's favor. Human beings are pre-
sented here as friends of the Lord and as co-workers.
There is actually more here than just the norm, The norm within this
Word revelation is simply that God wants something, that God gives the
commission to work the garden and to take care ofit: to workit, so that the
garden becomes fruitful; and to take care of [shamar, to guard] it, so that it
remains protected against the enemy man had yet to meet.
And in this way that Word revelation, including the norm, becomes a
source of blessing. When Adam sees the animals and observes them in the
congeniality of their nest life, he draws the analogy with himself, and he
misses something.
That first human being is special; for soon, out of him, another human
will be created. He is special in still another respect, for he is the first
Adam, the office bearer. But, on the other hand, he is also just a normal
human being. He has a need for companionship and, more specifically, for
the companionship of a woman. That is why God's providing him with Eve
is the solution to a problem he posed himself and the fulfillment of a wish.
We find here a relationship of Word revelation, of God speaking to
man, and the waiting for an answer. Only later, once the fall has set in and
the office is forfeited, does the norm in the Word revelation becomea source
for knowing misery. But by then also much has happened with the nature of
man. Notthat it has been lost. Not even partially: that nature has remained
The Unity ofLife
exactly the same; and yet it is completely changed, because its direction
turned around.
Humankind went, as it were, from right to left. God's co-worker
turned to one who flees before the face of the Lord. Consequences followed
straightway. God in his wrath came to man saying: You should not have
done this. You believed the wrong one.
There are also repercussions for human life. Adam and Eve wereini-
tially alienated not only from God, but also from each other. And later Cain
slays his brother.
There are consequences for the relationship between humankind and the
rest of creation as well. The earth is cursed "because of you." Man's labor
will be made difficult. The land will bring forth thorns and thistles. And
soon the earth will rear up against human life when it is forced to drink the
first human blood.
That will live on later as well. Then that norm will indeed become a
source for knowing misery. People in Sumer, centurieslater, will still know
that immortality was snitched from man by a snake. Still later, in Greece,
when Socrates, the idol of so many humanisis, claims that nobody intention-
ally does what they know is wrong, Euripides contests that position. He
registers his protest when he has a heroine say: We know whatis right, but
we don't do what is right; some because of sloth or because of some other
vice that they prefer to what is noble. This is what Holy Scripture calls con-
sciences accusing and excusing each other.
The law can also be known through tradition. This has nothing to do
with the Stoics’ construct of natural law, but it is something upheld by God.
And even thoughit is a source for knowing our misery, the law that is found
thereis still a blessing.
Word revelation continues. It also speaks of grace.
Law and Gospel do not oppose each other. Because when the law ac-
cuses, then the Gospel comes proclaiming the deliverance that God has de-
vised. The law and the Gospel are opposites only for those who negate the
law's charge; for the Pharisee who still thinks he can fulfill the law. But
they conflict so little that both law and Gospel are heard from the mouth of
the same Logos, from the same Person in the Divine Being.
And also later, rather than doing away with the law when he comes
down to earth to bear its curse for us, he discloses its deep meaning. He
shows that the law requires love, not only for the compatriot, but also for
the enemy. Shortly thereafter, he asks for mutual love in a new command,
in a new community to be founded by his blood. With that heis pointing
toward the work of the Spirit, who pours the love out in us, in our hearts.
The Uniry ofLife
Finally, there is a third law as well: the law of the Spirit. There is
talk of it already at creation. It is the law of the culmination. The Spirit of
God moves over the waters, and then things begin to happen with that work
of the Father.
That Spirit is also present in paradise. For a moment there, the ques-
tion was: will humanity, undivided and unswerving through the course of
time, allow God's Spirit to lead it to the finish or was something going to
intervene? Would humanity be divided, split up, and were those who would
once again follow the Spirit's leading only going to reach the goal after a
long detour?
The answer proved to be the negative one: notall will follow. For
them, the law of death revealed itself in the course of their lives, But on the
other side, there are likewise also many in whose lives the law of the Spirit
of life reveals itself, even though they had to reach their life's goal via a
detour.
In this way the fall intersects the work of the Spirit. But the Spirit's
leading proceeds uninterrupted. He maintains the structure of human nature
and through his work there are men and women who not only hear the norm,
but also listen to it. These are ones who accept and embrace the promises of
the Gospel still, however unbelievable they may sound, and who keep on
trusting the Logos.
Among these are the very first human beings. Adam in faith, in spite
of the misery in which they found themselves, soon calls Eve the mother of
all the diving.
TheSpirit's leading occurs in part through the offices: also via the par-
tial offices.{+)
The Holy Spirit does not recognize any geniuses. It does recognize
people who receive special protection from the Spirit, people who are given
special gifts by the Spirit. These include the builders of the temple as well
as rulers. The Spirit of the Lord even comes to Saul, in spite of his unre-
pentant heart. Through officials like these, the Spirit wants to uphold the
nation. He causes them to contend for authority and against revolution, to
shelter, in compliance with the sixth commandment, life against death, to
protect marriage from divorce, property from theft, good repute from libel,
and the love there is in life from the hate.
Butit is the same Spirit that withdraws grieving when Saul, after he's
become king in Israel, raises up a pillar for himself, desiring to deprive her
of its view of the future and of the Messiah. The Spirit also guards against
smaller sins. For example, when David misuses his authority to pursue his
private lusts and sendsa letter along with Uriah that contains a signed war-
The Unity ofLife
rant for his death. It is also the same Spirit that strikes David when his
pride brings him to order a census of the people.
The same Spirit is also involved with the consummate office, with the
Man Jesus Christ, because he receives the Spirit, the Spirit of the office,
without measure.
The Spirit also works outside Israel in the same way. There is not only
a hardness of hearts in human nature, but also a working for the good. Tne
government that does the task it ought need not describe the situation it en-
counters. It can leave that to science. The governmentis not there to study,
but to govern, even though it will have to make use of the results of all
kinds of research. What's the government to do then?
The government builds bridges between those other two laws for our
benefit. \t applies the norm of Godto the situation as it presents itself in
that jurisdiction and at that time.
In that way government can be a blessing to life.
It preaches as well, but not the law of God as such. It does not de-
scribe life, but applies God's law to the situation that's there.
Paul does the very same thing as apostle. He is confronted by bigamy.
It was quite common in those days. Paul determined that office bearers
could only have one wife. He is not introducing a double standard here, but
giving pedagogical leadership. Those whoare called to lead must also set an
example. Pretty soon the entire congregation will follow suit. And that is
what happened too. Even in circles long alienated from the Word, bigamy
is spoken aboutin horror and disgust.
And so we have found three types of law: in creation, in the Word
revelation, and in the Spirit's leading.
But these laws are not just loosely associated each other. Neither are
the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. These three are one. The
church with its confession of the Trinity has turned itself against separating
God's being one and being three. Monarchianism, for example, taught that
separation: it sought to preserve unity as highest final cause, the thinking of
thought, and placed the threefold distinction in a universal intellect that ac-
tualizes the thought of human beings. No, said the church, the same Godis
simultaneously one and three.
There is also a certain sequence. The Son most definitely does not
come to confound the work of the Father, but that of the devil. The Holy
Spirit presupposes the work of the Son, proclaiming that, in tum, to the
people. This threesome, however, is not the principle for the periods of
world history nor doesit give us grounds for speculating aboutthe relation-
ship of universality and individuality.
Likewise, the law is threefold and yet a unity. It is, as it were, parallel
with the Trinity of the God who gives us that law. This gives rise to the
The Unity ofLife
supposition that real unity of life can only be had where we hold to the tri-
une law of the Triune God.
Ii.
That is why we not only have to know that law. We must also ac-
knowledge it and submit ourselves to it. But watch your step with these
trinitarian traces (vestigia Trinitatis). There has always been a good deal of
speculation. Caution is required.
The gravest dangers are avoided by remembering that such a threefold
unity in our human lives is possible only under the law, precisely in connec-
tion with the threefold character of the law. God sets the law. The worldis
not God's correlate nor an emission of his being. It is created by him and
put under the law he gave. The worldis not correlate with God but with the
law.
How are weto listen to these Jaws then? To take them seriously and to
submit to them?
Wedoso first of all in the wisdom that knows God and oneself; that
knows God as King, Lawgiver, Judge: and that trusts him as the one who
will save us.
But we must do so then in practical, everyday knowledge as well as in
the sciences.
Practical knowledge comes first.
The mistake of contemporary existentialism is precisely the priority
given to science. After recognizing that that doesn't work, they put the do-
main of practical reason in its stead, only to embrace irrationalism when
practical reason falls short as well.
The order should be reversed. How we sequence these things should
be dictated not by the course ofaffairs in a failed Europe, but by the struc-
ture of life as God has made it. What is primary then is the knowledge of
God and ofourselves. {t is on this basis that we move into everyday life.
Nonscientific knowledge is not only prescientific. It is there prior to sci-
ence, but it also remains. We enjoy this kind of knowing so much, even
when a person's life is by and large devoted to science.
50, practical knowledge comesfirst.
Then we have to think about the structures and natures [of things] as
they are created. We needto distinguish different fields. It is hardly sur-
prising thatthis insight is acknowledged so seldom, but people always relied
on the philosophy that took the intellect to be the highest and could not ac-
cept it when the intellect distinguished all kinds of other activities in man.
That led them to talk about epiphenomena,or to think they were dealing
here with arbitrary creations of the human mind.
The Unity ofLife
If we distinguish different fields, then we will also start distinguishing

connections.
This too happened oniy gradually. Previously, people saw the obvious
differences, like those of church and state; especially when the slate was pa-
gan. But as the state came more and more under the influence of Christians
that proved to be more difficult. A number of constructs were used regard-
ing these two. Even the reformers lacked clarity. Fascinated by the old
city-state model, Calvin was of the opinion that in any one state there could
only be one church. Church membership would not need to be compulsory
because one could leave any particular city with one's honor preserved. But
the state could not tolerate a diversity of churches,
Only those who had leammed through history, like William of Orange,
have had better insights on this score.
But with the advances of rationalism, the problem of christian politics
surfaced again. Groen van Prinsterer felt something of this. He is no
statesman, but he did confess the Gospel; a professor of the Gospel in the
lecture halls of the state. Abraham Kuypercarried this further. He saw that
there were different societal connections, each with its own character and
with its own office bearers, whose authority was limited to just that connec-
tion. A younger generation has elaborated on that and underscored the fact
that there can only be talk of part and whole within the same kind ofsocietal
connection.
It is very important to realize that we are dealing here with creational
structures. Religious insight needs to be sharp, because we are never going
to work towards christian political action if we forget the work of the Son,
which relies on and connects with the work of the Father.
Then there are the laws of the Son; God's call that comes to us in the
Wordrevelation. He takes us to be responsible people, ready to answer the
questions he gives us.
Our laws, too, can't be acknowledged onrational grounds.
Aiter all, reason is a mirage: the result of rationalism's misleading at-
tempt to equip the understanding with apriori concepts and judgments.
“Reason” simply does not exist, and yet it does. It exists as delusion, as a
figment that controls many. Reason exists in the same way an idol does:
with a horde of supporters. It is there just like the mania of Hitler was that
brought Europeto the verge of the abyss.
But even without all these apriori apparitions, it is not to the un-
derstanding alone to accept these laws. This does not mean we haveto retire
the understanding altogether; indeed, we may not even undertake the at-
tempt. The call to conversion comes to the entire human being after all.
The understanding falls under the law that accuses and indicts, but likewise
Draft B SHK Translation Page 155
The Unity ofLife
under the preaching of the Son who wants to save the understanding too and
to sanctify it for his service through his Spirit.
Yet finally, in that practical knowledge of everyday there is also the
law of the Spirit's leading. It is there that we see the value of positive law
which tries as government to apply God's will, his law, to a specific situa-
tion that in no way meets that law. That does not happen by decreeing: The
Netherlands is christian! But it can happen by giving leadership, proceeding
deliberately, moving things in a specific direction.
Wecan be very thankful when things work this way. And even if peo-
ple work differently than this we will continue to see in government some-
thing that in spite of itself still contributes to protecting authority from rev-
olution, sheltering life from death, safeguarding marriage, and so forth. We
will also still ask a blessing for those through whom Godsees fit to rule us.
We do that because we know they have not only the might but also the au-
thority and that authority, following a mediated path, comes from God.
Finally, we have to take this threefold law into account also when it
comes to scientific knowledge.
Talk about an endless task!
Butlife's unity is not supposed to begin with the unity in science.
Even when it comes to knowledge, we are to begin with wisdom, with the
wisdom that takes stock of the relationship of God and man, and of hu-
mankind to God.
Oncethis unity is grasped in principle, we will do that in everydaylife,
in the knowledge of everyday, and ultimately also in science. Life does not
demand that everyone goes to college. But the unity of life does require that
those who do go on to study and whoseek life's unity through faith in
Christ Jesus will also strive for unity in science.
And that unity is within the realm of possibilities.
That is also true if the task is to immerse oneself in the details of re-
searching just one aspect of that life. Just think again, for an analogy, about
everyday life. We all have many experiences, we are always meeting new
people. Someofus stay in the same locale, but every day brings something
new. Others God calls to relocate and they move into totally new sur-
roundings. Or some may make a long trip, multiplying their experiences
time and again. But poor is the person whoselife's knowledge is nothing
more than the added sum of all those experiences. That's tiring enough to
kill you!
We have a view of life and the world within which we can place all
those experiences. We have circumscriptive concepts. They too were given
to us. Not in the sense of apriori concepts. We received them through nur-
Draft JHK Translation Page 156
The Unity ofLife
ture and upbringing, in the light of God's Word or not. If we have a world
and life view informed by the light of that Word, we can situate all those
daily experiences, We won't get hoodwinked by the first faction that comes
our way dreaming of a new society, because we suspect every human being
who wants to work by their own power. On the other hand, we do notdis-
trust from moment to momentthe area where the Spirit of Christ is working.
We know from Holy Scripture, from his promise, and see confirmed in ex-
perience that despite all the frailty and indifference, much more comes of
things again and again than we could have ever hoped.
Just as a view of life and the world sets the practical knowledgeofall
experiencesin the right context, we have something similar when it comes to
science. The unity of those many fields of investigation rests in God's cre-
ation. Moreover, the unity of the many special sciences rests in the general
science [we call philosophy] that reflects on the mutual connection of those
fields and disciplines and also ponders the nature of such a discipline and the
method needed to study it. Philosophy can assist us in a way similar to how
a world and life view helps us. It precedes the many experiences of every-
day life. Not in an apriori sense, but as circumscriptive whole. I am not
talking here about some perk we could add to the rest and that is extremely
difficult. On the contrary, philosophy's aid can lend us support and bring us
further because, in the midst of the multitude of details, it keeps in view the
unity.
In this way, it is possible to seek the unity of life, not only through the
wisdom that comes with living, but also in practical and scientific knowing.
This unity is, of course, always a unity in brokenness. Butit is also a unity
of life that is founded in the unity a threefold law that itself goes back to the
Trinity of God confessed by the christian churchofail ages.
8.
INTRODUCING
PHILOSOPHY
pages 157 through 171 are in process

INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY
PREFACE
First a few words concerning the name, purpose, and method ofthis
course and concerning the division of this syllabus,
1. Name
The name ofthis course consists of two parts: Thefirst is “isagoge";
to which is added as specification “philosophiae." We deal briefly with the
meaning of each of these words (a. and b.) and then with the meaning of
their combination (c.).
a, /sagoge is the transcription (rendering of a foreign word in the char-
acters of another language) of the Greek word “eisagoge." This word is a
compound of “eis-" "into" and “agoge" (from “agein") "a leading." Hence,
isagoge means introduction.
b. Philosophiae is an inflected form of “philosophia." This word is
also a compound. The constituent parts are “philos"—friendly and
“sophia"—wisdom. Hence, philosophy meanslove of wisdom.
Nowthis circumscription is very old; if we can believe tradition, it
stems from Pythagoras, a Greek philosopher from the sixth century B.C.
However, he combined it with a serious misconception. Pythagoras is re-
puted to have said that he, being a man, did not possess wisdom as did the
gods, but strove toward wisdom. He assumed that human thinking can as-
pire to the possession of divine wisdom. In orderto eradicate this miscon-
ception it is good to note at the outset that in the circumscription of
"philosophy" as “love of wisdom" we are concerned exclusively with what
human beings can attain, hence, with human wisdom.
As for the relationship of the term "philosophy" to this human wisdom,
note that though it first of all denotes this human striving, it also means
something else, namely, the complex of statements that express the knowl-
edge men obtained through this striving. Philosophy, therefore, signifies
both a deed and result.
Tsagoogé Philosophiae
c. Hence, “fsagoge philosophiae" means: firstly, introduction to phi-

losophizing, and secondly, introduction to an understanding of the result
obtained thereby by others.
Tsagoge, therefore, in whichever sense we use the term, is always an
introduction, that is to say, an auxiliary activity; and not a book or syllabus,
though we occasionally refer to the latter in passing with the same name.
Such a syllabus must not be “cased,” but is there to be used. For the sen-
tences denote thoughts that are meant to teach the reader to tackle the ques-
tions in different fields philosophically.
2. Purpose
In an introductionin the sense of activity we should distinguish, in ad-
dition to the person to be introduced and the person doing the introducing,
also that into which thelatter introduces the other. The image evoked is that
of a building. However, we mustbe careful with this image; if we press it
too far, we lose sight of the first meaning of the word philosophy, namely,
philosophizing, and see only the second, namely, that ofresult.
Now an introduction to philosophy in the second meaningofthis term
undoubtedly also makes good sense. This holds especially when one has to
acquaint oneself with the many results of numerous philosophers to be found
in bygone centuries. A good study of the history of philosophy is simply
not possible without an introduction like the one offered in the Conspectus
Historiae. An introduction to the work of contemporaries may also be nec-
essary; for example when what a given thinker has found presents difficul-
ties for a particular group of people. It is with this in mind that A. Drews
wrote an introduction to the philosophy of Ed. van Hartmann (1902), H.A.
van Andel one to the work of H. Bavinck, and E. Reyer oneto the thought
of E. Husserl and his school (1926). The author of such an introduction is
usually of the opinion that his teacher has a correct view of various prob-
lems. Yet such an introduction remains directly an adduction to thoughts
and books of another and only indirectly to the problems, namely, to the
extent they were seen and solved by this other person.
The important thing in both cases is the following: Has the person in
question seen the difficulties sufficiently and has he posed the problems cor-
rectly? These questions cannot be answered unless one also grapples with
the state of affairs that the thinker being discussed, if he did his work well,
thought about as well.
That is why a grappling with the state of affairs should have priority in
an introduction that is philosophic in character. In other words, if in some
investigation one cannot cometo clarity, the first question may well be:
“What did this or that person say about it?"—the answerto this question
may never be taken as final: What someoneelse says can help us, but it can
also set us back, That happens e.g. when the thinker in question did not
fsagoogé Phitosophiae
have an eye for difficulties that we ourselves did discern, and we thereupon
ignore them as well. Therefore, after reading a scientific work, the question
should always be asked, at least by those who want to work scientifically:
“Is what the author asserts correct, that is to say, does it comport well with
the state of affairs?" And only if one is of the opinion that this question may
be answered in the affirmative, can he uninhibitedly tum to writing, even
though this affirmative answer will be far from acceptable to many. In like
manner J.G. Walch gave an introduction to philosophy (1727}—1 mentionit
here because it is the oldest under that name in the time of the Renais-
sance—from a purely rationalistic standpoint. He maintained that what he
and those who thoughtlike him, the rationalists, had to say, was built on the
state of affairs.
A third group of introductions is prompted by the thought that the
problems with which philosophy was concerned hitherto were posed incor-
rectly, be it completely or in part. Such authors often begin with negations,
i.e, with the rejection of other theories, or at least integrate the same in their
exposition of what they claim to have found. J.G. Fichte (1797 and 1801)
and J.F. Herbert (1813) are examples of older writers, the Frenchman
Charles Renouvier (1895), the Dutchman J.P.N. Land (1889, 21900) and
J.G. Wattjes (1926), the Germans F. Paulsen (1892, 91924), O. Kiilpe
(1895, 121929), Erich Becher (1926), Wilhelm Wundt (1901, 81920) and W.
Windelband (1914, 31923),the Englishman G.S. Fullerton (1906) and B.
Russell (1912, 31918), and the Belgian L. Raeymaker (1938, 71944) are
more recent examples. Their works, which are to be used with the greatest
of caution given the fact that none stand on the scriptural standpoint, not
only acquaint us with what these writers positively claim, but also with what
they challenge.
Comment; The fact that some of these books were reprinted so often demon-
strates how great the need is for introduction, A need also recently expressed
in the cry for a “unity in style" in academic forming.
To the extent that their standpoint allows, these authors also deal with
the matters at issue. And everyone who does that can help us; everyone,
that is, to the extent they keep the limits of philosophy in mind and therefore
to the extent they philosophize well.
3. Method
A. The method of this course must in the first place be thetical. For the
point is to learn to approach the difficulties faced by thinking from one's
own point of view.
Comment: This thetical approach can never be replaced by historical ex-
positions: after all, the history of philosophy is something else than phi-
Isagoogé Philosophiae
losophy. For that reason, science about this history (“historica”) is something
else than introduction.
A combination of these two methods such as has recently (1929) been at-
tempted by F. Heinemann does not foster clarity and is therefore not to be rec-
ommended.
B. In the second place, however, the method oughtalse to be critical. A

person who philosophizes may not act as though his predecessors and con-
temporaries lacked philosophic interest. On the contrary, he must seriously
consider their expositions. However, he also may not swear by the words of
a human master or seek a solution in a patchwork, in which simply out of
awe for men of authority he borrows something from each of them. He
must always ask himself the question: "Did they sufficiently appreciate the
difficuities and did they pose the problem correctly?” And he mustalso, and
repeatedly, ask the same question of the result that he himself has arrived at.
This kind of fresh consideration of old answers and questions can lead to
two kinds ofresults; the solution being examined can besatisfactory or not,
either because it answers wrongly a correctly formulated question or because
it proceeded from a wrong formulation of the problem.
Criticism does not necessarily involve that the answer found earlier and
now subjected to a re-evaluation should be found to be unsatisfactory: criti-
cal examination can just as well result in cordially recommending theses ac-
quired by others or maintaining a thesis of one's own that others have con-
tested. "Criticism" is therefore certainly not equivalent to "negation." To
be sure, criticism can lead to a negative result. But such a negative result
has great value: tenaciously maintaining thoughts that constantly clash with
the main lines of a system undermines its power and prevents good questions
from being asked and new results from being acquired.
C. The thetical and the critical approaches in the method are not isolated
from one another. Therefore, we must add a word abouttheir relationship,
Theirrelationship, in my opinion, is as follows: every critical activity im-
plies that one takes a thetical position. It is quite possible that this position
will later prove to be untenable, but all that means is that one has modified
one's position somewhat; one has drawn back a bit or has adopted thesis
that one thought earlier had to be opposed. But whatever the case may be,
all criticism presupposes, if it is worthy of the name, that one is confident in
maintaining certain thoughts.
Comment: Ifthis is forgotten, then the extreme consequence could be that the
person adopts a position hypothetically: one moment accepting the thoughts of
P to criticize those of Q; the next minute adopting the position of Q to investi-
gate the thoughts of P. If, however, this kind of hypothetic reasoning is the
fsagoogé Philosophiae
only thing that a person does, it leads to nothing else but philosophic nihilism.
Usually a person stops before that. But even then, they do not always take
sufficient account of their own standpoint. This has the further consequence
that the formulation of a particular problem is accepted as correct but both the
negative and the positive answer to it are considered unsatisfactory. Hence
they combine the two: warning others for the one-sidedness of each of the two
parties separately, This kind of combination, if the question is indeed one that
can be answered by a clear cut yes or no, must be rejected, however. Forif
both parties are right-if this is not the case there would be no question of
combination—then the formulation of the problem is incorrect and must be re-
placed by another one and must not be cloaked by a combination,
A phenomenonthatis even less desirable is eclecticism. It usually does
not even penetrate as far as the problem, correctly formulated or not, but
simply supports a number of thoughts come across here or there, without
even bothering to inquire whether they are compatible,
It is by maintaining that which is tenable in one's own position, by
critically examining not only the result acquired by others but also the result
of one’s own thinking at an earlier time, and by having the courage to accept
the implications of one’s position, that one can make progress through
struggle and attain a double profit: a reinforced position and a more definite
rejection of whatever is inconsistent with it.
4, Division
The division of the material is correlate with the distinction within the
provisional result, that is to say, the distinction between positive and nega-
tive,
The positive must have precedence. If this is not the case, the anything
but imaginary danger looms that a person will never be done with his nega-
tion. Also the advocate of an opinion that is rejected has the right to know
what is behind the criticism that led to this rejection.
One way of proceeding is to take one particular question and deal with
it in a positive and then negative manner and consequently to turn to another
problem, etc. This procedure, however, meets with the following objection:
in order to clarify the diversity in the formulations of the question and an-
swers, it would be necessary in the case of every problem to outline the
schools of thought that have concerned themselves with this question and
would therefore necessarily lead to repetition. Hence preference must be
given, if only for reasons of economyoftime, to the procedure whereby the
positive result is given in a coherent whole.
This is, of course, not to say that whatever has implicitly been rejected
may also be ignored. Onthe contrary, it must be precisely presented in or-
der that people may also know and understand the conceptions and terminol-
ogy of others. This, however, should not be done in thepresent context, but
in the survey of the history of philosophy; forit is there that the different
fsagoogé Philosephiae
schools of thought are outlined within the framework oftheir basic thoughts
and in the context of their historic period.
For these same reasons, the Isagoge gives an account of my ownposi-
tive result. In the few instances where a negative comment has been made,
the only purpose has been to clarify the implications of the position spelled
out in the text.
INTRODUCTION
THE PLACE OF PHILOSOPHY

IN THE COSMOS AND ITS TASK
§. A preliminary question
Usually a person is philosophically busy for some time already before
he considers the question as to the place of philosophy in the cosmos and its
task. But he who wants to help others should certainly be able to shed some
light on this point. But even when this is the case, he is still confronted
with a difficult decision: Should he, in his attempt to help others, present
his view of the task and place of philosophy at the beginning or can he better
save that for later? An argument in favor of the latter solution is that the
precise determination of that place and the complete circurnscription of this
task always requires the use ofdistinctions that are related to the conception
as a whole and whose tenor becomes fully clear only after numerous exposi-
tions. On the other hand, many failures and disappointments in the fietd of
philosophy can be blamed on precisely this fact that people have failed to
face this preliminary question. Therefore an early warning is behooving.
It is for this reason that I, although I am ready enough to acknowledge
the objections against dealing with this question first, nevertheless begin
with a discussion of this point already here, albeit briefly.
6. The nature of this question
The distinctions alluded to above, that we cannot dispense with in an
introduction, belong for the most part to the theory about knowing.
Now believe that the import of most of these distinctions can clearly
be grasped only at the end of our discussion. That is why I simply use them
here as clearly as possible and refer the reader for further clarification to the
Appendix.
7. Being philosophically engaged is more than thinking
It is well-known how Descartes sought to build his philosophic system
on the basis of the proposition: “Cogito ergo sum," "I think, therefore I
In order to not deal with entirely different matters at the same time, I
am not at this point going to consider the second part of this proposition.
Nor do I want to raise the question at this point of whether the whole
thought experiment upon which this assertion is said to rest, namely, the at-
tempt to isolate thought from its foundation and its past, is even possible,
The only question I] want to raise here is whether, supposing the reasoning
of Descartes werecorrect, the term "thinking" [cogitare] is the right term for
Draft Db JHK Translation Page 179
lsagoogé Philasophiae
being philosophically active. In other words, | am asking only this: is

“philosophizing” indeed the same thing as “thinking”?
In searching for an answerto this question, we take into consideration
the fact that the word "philosophizing" has two meanings, namely, striving
after and the possession of philosophic knowledge and therefore in both
cases points toward knowing. Now the word "knowing" in the sense in-
tended here denotes something a constituent and not the whole of which, in
one way or another, is "thinking."
It is for this reason that the answerto the stated question must be nega-
tive. In other words: being philosophically active and philosophic knowing
is more than thinking.
8. Knowing and being
Let us look at the second member of Descartes’ proposition, namely at
his, “therefore I am" ("ergo sum"). Is this “therefore” ("ergo") tenable if
we replace—in conformity with §7—1he expression “I think" with "I know"
(replacing “cogito" by “cognovi")?
In order to make a decision on this matter, we must, of course, first
know what Descartes meant by this "therefore." In other words, the ques-
tion that arises is in the first place a matter of historical interpretation.
Some are of the opinion that this “therefore” denotes a connection of
identity. However this cannot be correct, for Descartes does not identify
being and thinking: besides thinking he also presupposes extension, There-
fore in his opinion, thinking is only a componentof being.
Now Descartes meant this in a rationalistic way, that is, in the sense
that thinking is the essence of being; an opinion that we of course Teject, as
much as we reject the division of being indicated here.
However, it is not rationalistic but correct to subsume thinking and
knowing underbeing; for it makes good sense to speak of a nonthinking and
a nonknowing being. There are clearly many things—think only of miner-
als, plants and animals—that are, but that do not know.
Weconcludetherefore:
a. negatively, that knowing is not identical with being;
b. positively, that knowing is a component ofbeing.
Comment: Therefore propositions such as the following are incorrect:
“Knowing is parallel with or reflects being"; "knowing precedes being and
constitutes it.”
9, Not all knowing is philosophic knowing

One remaining question is whether all knowing is philosophic know-
ing. Even if we restrict ourselves to the basics needed to answer this ques-
tion, it is not difficult to demonstrate that people do not always understand
Isagoogé Phitosophiae
the same thing by the term "knowing" (or by the term for the correlate of
knowing, namely, "knowledge").
The insight with which a businessman serveshis firm is to be sure the
result of more than just thinking. It is the result of knowing. But experi-
ence teaches that this knowledge can and often is present in cases where the
person concerned has no scientific knowledge. We must therefore in the
first place distinguish between scientific and nonscientific knowing. Philo-
sophic knowing does not fall underthelatter.
Therefore, the question must now be discussed whether language cor-
rectly distinguishes scientific and philosophic knowing. First of all, the
question arises: are both identical? In other words, can we say "All scien-
tific knowing is of a philosophic character"? That is certainly not the case:
many men and women are engaged in the special sciences with great compe-
tence without evincing much interest in philosophic questions. This byitself
is sufficient to distinguish within science between special science and philos-
ophy.
In summary, I cometo the following conclusion: philosophic knowing
is not identical with scientific knowing but is subsumed as nonspecial-scien-
tific knowing, together with the knowing of the special sciences, under sci-
entific knowing.
Put more briefly, philosophic knowing is scientific, but not special sci-
entific knowing.
10. The relationship ofphilosophic knowing and nonphilosophic knowing
In every case where two things are different, we can ask aboutthe rela-
tionship between the two, That is why we now come to the relationship
between philosophic and nonphilosophic knowing.
This relationship too cannot yet be extensively discussed. Nev-
ertheless, a few things can be said aboutit at this point; not only negatively,
but also in a positive sense.
On the negative side, we must hold fast to the insight that philosophic
knowing, althoughit itself is of a different nature, may not ignore nonscien-
tific and special scientific knowing.
Onthe positive side, the relationship between the two is a double one:
I. Philosophy presupposes both kinds of knowing and builds on both.
2. Philosophy must reflect also on the place and the task of both kinds
of knowing and must treat these points at greater length in the theory of
knowledge.
11. Philosophic knowing and the knowing in (sacred) believing
Among what is included in nonscientific knowing, we find also the
knowing that is included in (sacred) believing. First a word to clarify both
members of this term.
Isagoogée Phitosophiae
"Believing" is often understood to mean a knowing that is concerned

exclusively with the outside world: the knowledge that is its correlate is
said to be less certain than that conceming one's own existence. This
knowing is often seen then as the first step toward approximating sacred
believing. But the difference between the knowing of the inner and of the
outer world is not at issue at the moment. For that reason, a discussion of
the term “believing” in the sense of a knowing that is concerned exclusively
with the external world can beleft aside for the moment. “Believing” in the
present context means only “sacred believing": it is for this reason that the
adjective, as being in a certain sense redundant, has been put between
brackets.
The question remains as to the meaning of the term “sacred belief," the
last word taken in the active sense, i.e. in the sense of "believing." This is
to be understood as the acceptance of God's word revelation or of whatever
one looks upon as a word revelation. Such sacred belief is therefore not al-
ways christian; in fact, in the case of most people, it is its opposite. This
opposition is of course of the greatest importance, and philosophy can only
gain by doing full justice to it. In the present study, we have therefore paid
it the attention it deserves, For the moment, however,it is sufficient to ob-
serve that as long as this belief has not been undermined by certain influ-
ences every human being believes something. For example, that a favorable
or unfavorable judgment of God onthis life can be known.
Now this sacred believing comprises—as contemporary investigators
are again generally inclined to acknowledge—an element of knowing (or
erring). This knowing is therefore just as extensive as this believing, On
the other hand, there is only an extremely small percentage of people who
are engaged inscientific activity. in fact, the number of those who do have
some belief or other but nevertheless lack every scientific capacity is quite
large. Let this suffice as support for the thesis that knowing (or erring) be-
lieving belongs to the nonscientific life.
Nevertheless it is a matter of knowing. Here too it holds that philoso-
phy, however much it differs from this action and its correlate, must not
only reflect on the place and task of each, but should be mindful that it is in
accordance with both as well.
If philosophy neglects this, then it will leave its adherents behind as
people whoselife is rent by a struggle between head and heart. The history
of philosophy accordingly showsus that such harmony has been sought with
the greatest seriousness—not only by many Christians, but also in the circles
of Jews and pagans.
tsagoogé Phitosophiae
12. Philosophic knowing and believing the word revelation of God

Although wealso find the need for such harmony and the attempt to
satisfy this need elsewhere, it may certainly not be missing in the case of
Christians.
They ground their believing an unfavorable or favorable judgment of
God, but also a good deal more, on the acknowledgement of the true word
revelation which having been put into writing in Holy Scripture rejects all
other revelation as having arisen out of the heart of man and which brands
every belief in such an alleged revelation as unbelief.
Nevertheless, this completely justified sharp opposition within belief
does not abolish the similarity that exists between christian and unchristian
belief. A consequence ofthis is that the sacred belief of nonchristians, con-
tinues to be sacred belief (see A. Kuyper, E Voto DordracenoI, p. 128, Il,
p. 296 & Ill, pg. 534). But it also follows that christian belief and the
knowing that is included in it are of a nonscientific character, Millions of
people have died in Christ in the course of the ages and mostof these have
never been engaged in any science, in fact many of them lacked every ca-
pacity for science. Equivocating christian belief with science, even with its
earliest stages, also does violence to the life of today and yesterday, miscon-
strues the glorious reality and, when it comesto discerning the norm for the
life of belief, leads to an intellectualistic rigorism that does nothing but fos-
ter a quasi-scientific attitude.
In the meantime, this rejection of scholasticism may not for a moment
cause us to forget that the christian revelation belief always inherently in-
cludes knowing, albeit a nonscientific knowing. A christian philosophic
conception must therefore not only contain thoughts concerning the nature
and the task of scripture belief, but must also completely agree with this be-
lieving and with the knowledge that is correlated to it, that is, be scriptural
or, if you prefer, in line with Scripture. And the deepest motivation that
makes us pose this requirement is not the desire to avoid the anguish that
any division of life brings with it, but respect for God who forbids
fragmenting life in any way.
13. Three questions to be posed and answeredby scriptural belief
Scriptural belief adheres to Holy Scripture. The latter speaks in words
that people are able to understand. Now, words have a meaning, by which
they denote something and direct the attention of the hearer or reader to that
which is denoted.
Now Holy Scripture is peculiar in that its words point toward created
things as well as toward the Creator. As suchit also gives an answerto the
following three questions: “Who is the Creator?", "What is that which is
created in relation to him?", and "Wheredoes the line between them lie?"
lsagoogé Phitosophiae
I. To the question “Who is the Creator?" Holy Scripture unam-

biguously answers "God." Conversely, it never sees in him a regulative idea
or a speculative concept, but always the living God with his all-predestining
Counsel, his creating activity, his all-dominating will; in short, the
Sovereign in the absolute sense of the word.
I], The answer to the second question, "What is the created in relation
to him?", is determined by what was just found: That which is created is
completely dependent on the Creator, that is to say, wholly subjected to his
sovereign law, word revelation, and guidance.
III. The third question that we as christian revelation believers ask
Scripture is: “Whatis the limit that marks off that which is created from the
Creator?" One should understand “limit” as something such that one can
say: everything that stands on that side of this line is God and everything
that lays on this side is created.
A. In this way we are highlighting the relationship of God and cosmos,
not their similarity and difference.
Comment I: This means that we reject the following:
a. The attempt to understand the basic relationship between God and cosmos
purely in terms of their similarity. This happens when God and cosmos are
seen as manifestations or phases of a “being” or “process": in this way God
as well as cosmos are subordinated e.g. [as] coincidentia oppositorum
(Nicholas of Cusa and Hegel) to something that stands above both and hence
are coordinated with one another.
b. The attempt to understand the basic relationship between God and cosmos
purely in terms of their difference. This happens when people set God and
cosmos over against each other as the divine and the nondivine and conse-
quently call God the “wholly Other" (K. Barth); in this way this relation be-
comes a contradictory one.
Comment 2: Carefully note the circumscription ofthis limit in the question
asked. This limit docs mark off that which is created from God, but not God
from that which is created. To accept the latter position would be incompati-
ble with the acknowledgementofthe infinity of God who is always and every-
where acting in and upon—andcertainly not only from within—the cosmos.
Comment 3: “Line” [grens) should not be conceived of in spatial terms; for
spatiality itself belongs to that which created. Hence a spatial demarcation [or
boundary] is always a limit [or extent] within the created and never between
Creator and creation.
B. Now this demarcation is the law of God which is continuously posited
by God for that which is created. For al! who sovereignly give laws to the
cosmos and maintain them is God; on the other hand, all that which is cre-
ated is subjected to his laws. And it continues to be subjected because also
God's activity in the cosmos since the creation is never coupled with a vio-
lation of the law. Accordingly, it is impossible to mention anything divine
isagoogé Philosophiae
that stands under the law or anything that is created that stands above the
law.
Comment 4: This means that we reject the following:
a. Realism (in the classical sense) with its doctrine that the law also holds for
God: Godis not subjected to the law, although he is bound by virtue of his
faithfulness to maintain his law once put to the creature. We find the combi-
nation of these thoughts already in Calvin: "Deus legibus solufas est” and
"Deus non ex lex est.” *
b. The attempt to understand the basic relation between God and cosmos as
that between whole and part. This viewpoint allows for a numberof different
elaborations.
1, When consistently applied, there are two conceptions possible;
- God is the whole, the cosmos a part—for example, that part of him thatis
manifest: pantheism.
- The cosmos is the whole, God a part of the cosmos—-for example, the re-
sultant of the operation of many cosmic forces or else the result of pistic repre-
sentation: pancosmism.
2. When inconsistently applied, we also find two views:
- A part of the world is divine; partial theism.
- A part of God is cosmic: partial cosmism.
Comment 5: To speak of law as the line between God and cosmos does not
purport to indicate completely the difference between God and cosmos;
“difference,” as is denoted by word pairs like Creator and creature, infinite
and finite, is something other than “line” or “limit.”
Comment 6: The law's mode of being is that of “holding for." The law,
therefore, always stands above and outside that for which it holds—a comment
directed against objectivism and subjectivism. Law is therefore not
"regularity" etc.: processes subjected to the law are regular orirregular.
Comment 7: The law of God holds for everything and therefore brooks no
exceptions at all. This also holds for the normative laws: the fact that these
can be transgressed does not mean atal! that they are thereby also abolished.
To acknowledge law as the line between God and cosmos is a re-
quirement of the fear of the Lord, which is of significance for much more
than exclusively for science, but which also may not belackinginit either if
science is not to lead to putative or pseudo-knowledge, that is to say, to er-
ror rather than to genuine knowledge.
14, The significance of these answers for the determination of the place of
philosophy
Now these answers are of great importance, also for philosophy. As
we have seen, it is human striving and a result thereby obtained. Both be-
long to the created. They are not elevated above the law of God, but sub-
jected to it, to the word revelation and to the guidance of the sovereign God.
In summary: the arché, i.e, the dominating beginning, also of philoso-

phy, is God, and the limit that it will never transcend is the law of God
(more specifically, the law of God for philosophic knowing).
Comment: This holds even where it is not acknowledged. The philosophy
that declares itself autonomous, rejects the word revelation, and does not men-
tion the guidance of God in no way attains what it wants. As appears from its
present state, what it did attain is nothing but anarchy in its thinking as well as
in its terms.
15. The significance of these answers for the conception of the task of
philosophy
These answers imply however also a distinctive conception of the task
of philosophy.
A. In the first place they limit this task. Philosophy may never deny or
seek to push aside that which exists, not even to the smallest degree: to do
so would be to deny either God orall or part of his work, or fail to do jus-
tice to its nature.
1. That is why, in the first place, it cannot take the place of belief in
the word revelation of God; for all of our knowledge about God rests di-
rectly or indirectly on that belief, and what a philosopher who rejects the
word of God claims to know about him tums out upon closer investigation
to be pure speculation.
2, Moreover, secondly, philosophy can not annex other parts of the
nonscientific life either: philosophers may at times have governed state
wisely, but they did not do that exclusively by virtue of their philosophic
competence. For philosophy remains science, And although the man ofsci-
ence also received other gifts, the extension of his work is so demanding that
at least a part, also of his rapport, usually does not have the opportunity of
developing itself. That may be the case with another part—but even then,
whenthere is a harmony between the various branches of his work, the dif-
ference remains.
3. Finally: philosophy may also not push the special sciences to the
side. If it does this anyway, then an ignominious defeat, as it suffered e.g.
after Hegel, is well deserved.
B. But even thoughits task is limited, the philosophythat keeps the line
between God and cosmosin mind truly need not be in want of work. For he
whobelieves that God created the cosmos, proceeds every time again from
the presupposition that the wealth in that which is created will be much
greater than we ascertained up to that time. For that reason such a philoso-
pher can never say: "I am ready, look here, a closed system.” On the con-
trary: his result, though acquired systematically, is always a provisional
isagoogé Phitosophiae
one, for he remains filled with expectation, attuned to new surprises that
will no doubt complement the main conception that agrees with belief, yet
will time and again supplement and usually alter earlier findings.
16. Thefield ofinvestigation for philosophy
The question remains as to what philosophy can investigate. This
question can be completely answered only after a definition of "science,"
which is here inappropriate. Yet the preceding does offer sufficient basis in
orderto initially survey the field of investigation. It is the entire domain of|
the cosmos.
17. The point of orientation and the route ofphilosophy
A. Because the whole cosmos is subjected to God's law and therefore to
God, this being-subject is our point of orientation. Thatis to say, all further
determinants and differences are oriented to this being-subject.
B. This is also decisive for the route that we follow. Beginning with
subjectivity in this sense of the word, we look for the further determinants
of this being-subject and discern in them a great variety.
18. Division
Following the route mentioned above we find first of all a twofold
specification: for that which is subject to God is either heavenly (Part I) or
earthly (Part II). Both contain what is initially a completely unsurveyable
concrete wealth, of which that of the earth is best known to us. After the
analysis of the diversity in these two, we discuss the connection between the
two (Part IIT).
An Appendix presents the result of applying what is found to several
more complicated questions.
As was said, completeness is not to be had. The intention of the fol-
lowing is accordingly only to denote in words as clearly as possible the most
important determinants and distinctions that I have discerned in the cosmos
in order that others may see them as well.
fsagoogé Philosaphiae
PART I
THE DIVERSITY
AND CONNECTION OF THE DETERMINANTS
OF THE HEAVENLY-SUBJECT
19. Thefirst determinations of being-subject

Heaven and earth belong to that which is created. They are both simi-
lar in that they are subject to God. Nevertheless, the words heaven and
earth say more than being-created. They both denote determinants of being-
subject.
Upon comparison, we observe that the two are similar in that they are
both created.
Besides similarity there is, however, also difference.
20. The diversity in this first determination
A. Heaven, provided that this word is taken as denotating the world of
angels, is to be clearly distinguished from heaven in the sense of starry
heaven and firmament, which belong to the earth (Genesis 1).
However, we know nothing conceming that heaven except by way of
word revelation, and therefore on the basis ofbelief.
Nowit is true that the communications of word revelation on this point
are fairly scarce; they nevertheless cast a light on this part of the cosmos that
is completely different from philosophers,at least to the extent they were (or
are) interested in these matters, have thought.
In brief, the givens of Holy Scripture can be summarizedas follows:
1. Heaven and its dwellers belong to that which is created (Genesis
1:1).
Comment: This is in contrast to the worship of heaven in many pagan reli-
fons.
2. By virtue of creation, heaven is correlated with earth.

3. In heaven, there exist spirits, angels, and messengers whodiffer by
virtue of creation in individuality, task, and rank. The communications of
Holy Scripture conceming these matters are, however, exceedingly sparing
and even negative in part. That heaven and earth are very different can be
deduced, for example, from the fact that Scripture not only fails to speak of
female angels, but also explicitly denies the existence of wedlock between
angels (Matthew 22:30).
Nevertheless, the givens that Holy Scripture offers us about them are of
great importance because we thus possess information about creatures that,
Isagoogé Phiiosophiae
however they may differ from earthly creatures, have that mere-being-crea-
ture in common with us.
B. This conception consequently forbids us to equate earthly-being with
created-being; it is only a part of that which is created.
21. The antithesis and the worid ofthe angels
The difference in the world of angels between good and evil angels is a
difference different from those mentioned above.
Holy Scripture informs us that it arose through the fact that one of the
most important angels did not remain standing in the truth, that is to say, in
the constancy, safety, and faithfulness of God. In this irreparable fall he
was followed by many other angels and he with them cameto stand over
against the good angels.
In correlation with this difference there arose the difference between
heaven and hell. Also this difference therefore does not exist by virtue of
creation but by virtue of the judgment of God on account of the sin of the
angels. It is important to make a clear distinction between those two lest we
end up in an antithetic dualism (Parsiism or Zoroastrianism)orelse in a con-
ception that views the lowest as demonic, the highest as heavenly, and the
earth as the result of their combination (Babylonian world picture, astrol-
ogy).
PART Il
THE DIVERSITY
AND CONNECTION OF THE DETERMINANTS
OF THE EARTHLY-SUBJECT
Introduction
22. The many determinants of earthly-being
The word “earth” only implicitly refers to the wealth created in it by
God. Holy Scripture denotes the relationship of "earth" to this variegated
multiplicity as a relationship of that which was initially encompassing to that
which was initially encompassed (Genesis 1:2), and the evolving of the latter
out of the former as the work of the Spirit of God, who guides all ofthis,
reciprocally connected, to development.
Comment I: This evolving has reference exclusively to earth, not to heaven
and (certainly) not to God himself.
Comment 2: This evolving is not to be identified with evolution. The latter
presupposes the derivability of that which is higher out of that which is lower,
whereas evolving presupposes the derivability of that which is later from that
which is earlier.
Now the diversity that manifests itself thus is much too great to be able
to survey without further analysis.
In the first place, there is that unique relation between that which is
created and God, which we call “the covenant"; a relation in which
mankind, as is evident from its religion, occupies the most important place.
With this, the difference between mankind and that which is subject to
it is given; apart from this however, there exists a great diversity of Aing-
doms and kinds.
Within the kinds we finally come upon things. These are not present
separate and next to each other, but are connected with one another in all
kinds of ways and accordingly demonstrate a clear similarity in the structure
and diversity of their analytically irreducible determinants.
23. The needfor a double investigation
The sequence in which we just mentioned the many determinants of
earthly being was arrived at through resolution. Analyzing that which is
concrete, further and further, we finally arrive at diversities that cannot be
further analyzed.
Having arrived at these, it is also possible to follow the reverse route.
In this case we begin where analysis ended, that is to say, with the an-
alytically irreducible diversities and then proceed in the direction of ever
preater complexity,
Comment: The analytically irreducible diversities are therefore not elemental
in nature: to analyze is not the same as finding componentparts.
As it stands we could simply confine ourselves to the inquiry men-
lioned first, for it indeed has a greater advantage over the second. This ad-
vantage cannot lie in its being "creative," for that it is not. All human
knowing is a part of that which is created and this investigation is no excep-
tion to this rule. The advantage I have in mind has to do simply with the
fact that the "whole" comes to the foreground.
Butprecisely because this glimpse of the whole may notbe lacking, we
cannot confine ourselves to the second inquiry apart from the first. For a
clear view of the determinants, which are discerned later, can only be had if
their connection with that of which they are determinants is kept in mind:
the earth, after all, is not a collection of kingdoms, a kingdom is not a col-
lection of kinds, a kind is not a collection of things, and a thing is not a
collection of analytically irreducible determinants.
There are, however, great advantages to be had when the second inves-
ligation followsthefirst. In the first place, we eliminate the danger of never
getting beyond vague generalities and e.g. speaking of “wholes” without
ever seeing the wealth that they contain. Secondly, in this manner we
clearly see that the "whole" we saw first cannot be built out of the "parts"
obtained through resolution: what is lacking is precisely the connection that
was kept in mind when followingthefirst route.
24. Nevertheless a preference is necessary
Meanwhile the scope ofthis Isagoge does not permit us to devote an
equal amountoftime to both routes of this twofold investigation.
So as not to let the advantages of the second elude us andafter the brief
treatment of the first route above, we now turn our full attention to the sec-
ond,
25. Initially not discussing something does not imply its elimination
Hence we continuethe investigation in a moment by beginning with the
analytically irreducible determinants of a thing, so as to then proceed ever
further in the direction of that which is concrete.
In doing so it is unavoidable that much that is of primary importanceis
not discussed initially. At the same time one should keep in mind that we do
not for a momentexclude any ofthis in our knowing activity. For example,
the fact that along this route religion is discussed last, does not mean that we
eliminate it in our investigating. On the contrary: it is religion that also
distinguishes our knowing from that on nonchristian thinkers, Our concep-
tion concerning the arché and limit, our expectation in which we do ourin-
vestigation, always attuned to new surprises, and the determination both of
the field that we can explore and of the point of orientation that dominates
the entire route, all rely on the word revelation of God, accepted through
faith. Butthat is not all. We also owe to the word of God the insight that
what we, as a result of this postponement, examinefirst is not the full con-
crete life of everyday, whose wealth we will, precisely because of this de-
tour, be better able to appreciate.
Comment: The elimination of this knowledge and ofthe religion that obtained
this knowledgeis therefore not possible, and hence the question as to the de-
sirabitity of the same cannot even come up for discussion.
The same aiso holds, however, with respect to everything else that is
not discussed right away: it is tabled because it is simply not possible to
deal with everything at once.
26. Subdivision
The subdivision of this second part follows from the above. Wewill
discuss in:
Division I The structure of thing and man;and in
Division I] The structure of the kingdoms and of humankind
Division I
The Structure of Thing and Man
27. Subdivision
In the treatment of the structure of thing and man wediscuss the fol-
lowing:
Chapter 1 The two most simple determinants and their basic con-
nections;
Chapter 2 The third determinant and its combination with the others.
CHAPTER 1
THE Two Most SIMPLE DETERMINANTS
AND THEIR BASIC RELATIONS
28. Subdivision
In this chapter we will discuss the following:
Section 1 The two most simple determinants, the diversity within
both, and their combined occurrence.
Section 2. The two basic connections within these determinants, the di-
versity in both, and their combined occurrence.
lsagoogé Philosophiae
Section 1
The Two Most Simple Determinants,
The Diversity in Them,
and Their Combined Occurrence
29. Subdivision
Two of the most simple determinants are found in things. It is immate-
rial in what order we deal with them since they never occur separately.
They must both be discussed, however, before treating their combined oc-
currence.
From this follows the subdivision:
A. The first most simple determinant and its diversity;
B. The second most simple determinantandits diversity;
C. The combined occurrence of both most simple determinants.
A. THE FIRST MOST SIMPLE DETERMINANT AND ITS DIVERSITY
30. An example ofthe first determinant of earthly being-subject

When a person says “psychical” he is not denoting something that is
not earthly created. Psychic being does not exclude being earthly created,
but presupposes it. It is a matter of: being-earthly-created in a determinate
way. Put differently: the word "psychic" denotes something that is created
earthly with a further determination.
31. The diversity in thefurther determination of being earthly subject
Nowif all that which is created earthly were psychic it would be im-
possible to speak ofa diversity in the determination of being-earthly-subject.
All that which is created earthly, however, is not psychic. Other de-
terminants occur besides this one. In this regard, we distinguish the fol-
lowing: arithmetic, spatial, physical, organic, psychic, analytic, historic,
lingual, social, economic, aesthetic, juridic, ethical, and pistic.
Comment 1; By the arithmetic we must understand the domain of (unnamed)
niagnitude. In other words, that of more andless.
Comment 2: With reference to the spatial the following observations are in
order:
a. The spatial is not a mode ofintuition (Kant), but a property ofall things.
b. The spatial is not identical with “environment." This is because there are
other things in the environment of some thing that do share its spatiality but
also possess other properties, And the thing alluded to is in turn in the envi-
ronment of those other things; it too is spatial, but not exclusively.
c. Spatial is not the same as extended. Figures, planes, and lines are ex-
tended. But points, which have no extension, are spatial. A pointis neither a
number nor a movement.
isagoogé Philosaphiae
d. The spatial does not, as we might suppose on the basis of tradition, have a
Euclidian structure: Euclidian space is not truly spatial as we shall discover
later [See §65].
Comment 3: The following considerations are to be kept in mind with refer-
ence to the physical:
a. The term "the physical" is synonymous with "movement," “the energetic,”
“the kinetic,” and "the mechanical,"
b. As far as the first and last terms are concerned, we must beware of misun-
derstanding.
i. The movementin question hereis not the secondary or arbitrary movement
that arises as a result of a throw, but the primary movementthat by virtue of
its being created by God is properto the creature insofarasit is physical.
ii, “The mechanical" is not to be confused with "machine-like." The latter is
found only where there are machines, that is to say "(material) culture’; it is
not original, but presupposes humanactivity. We must therefore reject every
machine theory in the philosophy of nature; not only the “machine theory"
concerning the organic, but also that concerning the inorganic.
Comment 4: By the organic weare not to understand exclusively or even in
the first place the static features studied by morphology but primarily those
dynamic features investigated by physiology.
Comment 5: By "psychic" we are to understand exclusively that which is
studied by a scientific psychology that is mindfulofits limits. Thatis to say,
only the mode of behavior(in animal and man) that is of a primary sensitive
kind and that which (as object) is correlate with it (see below [§§65 and 66).
Comment 6: The “analytic” does not coincide with the logical; at least to the
extent that the latter is understoad as a collective term that, on the one hand,
does not embraceall that which is analytic but only the result of analytic activ-
ity and, on the other hand, includes a good dealthat is not analytic.
Comment 7; The “historic” is not the same as the "genetic": it is true that the
former never occurs without the latter, but genesis is found also in contexts
where we cannot speak ofhistory, as for example in the case ofthe splitting of
stars and of the reproduction of plants and animals. The "historic" is to be
understood in terms of power, including tradition and know-how [see §209].
Comment 8: By "lingual" we are to understand everything that is language;
that is, not only the spoken butalso the unspoken part of it,
Comment 9: “Social” has reference to intercourse and human interaction.
Comment 10: The economic is the domain of value-weighing thrift.
Comment 11: The aesthetic is the field of harmony.
Comment £2: The juridic is the domain ofretribution.
Comment 13: By the ethical we must understand that which has reference to
truth in friendship and marriage.
Comment 14: With reference to the pistic or pisteutical the following is to be
kept in mind:
a. Positively: these terms designate “sacred belief (or faith),"
b. Negatively: First of all, "belief (faith)" is not the same as “religion,” which
can only be dealt with later [see §115ff]. Secondly, as we have already ob-
served, “belief (faith)" is not identical with faith in Christ; all people believe,
but not everyone believes in the Christ of God [see §11).
It is plain that there is a rich diversity in this first determinant and this
rich abundance is perhaps even greater than we have seen so far.
32. Terminology
For the sake of brevity we call the diversity discussed above the "thus-
so-difference."
33. The mutual irreducibility ofthe thus-so determination
Within one and the same se, further determination of se can occur, as
we shall see below [§§37 and 60-63].
However, none of the thus-so determinations can be reduced to an-
other. If we attempt to do so, we become involved in antinomies. Anti-
nomies, however, by virtue of the being-subject of everything to a law that
is correlate to it, cannot occur in the cosmos in a primary sense, that is to
say, apart from human error. They are the result of a confusion we will dis-
cuss later [§§201 and 202).
34. Law determination

Since it does not make sense to speak of being-subject without ac-
cepting a law that holds for that which is subject to it, there is a determinant
of Jaw that corresponds to a determinant of being-subject. Therefore, if it
makes sense to speak of “psychic being-subject," then it makes just as much
sense to speak of a “psychic Jaw" that holds for the psychic, since this is
subject to that law.
35. The diversity in law determination
It follows from this however that a diversity in law determination runs
parallel to the diversity in the determination of earthly-being-subject. Con-
sequently, an arithmetic law holds for that which is arithmetic, a spatial law
for that which is spatial, a psychic law holds what is psychic.
In brief, the difference in being-subject is correlate with the difference
in law.
B. THE SECOND (THIS-THAT) DETERMINANT AND ITS DIVERSITY
36. The determinant denoted by “this"

To say "this number" is to say something other than simply "number";
and in this case too the difference in words corresponds to a difference in
that which is denoted by them. Let us take a closer lock at this difference.
lsagoogé Phifosophiae
That which is denoted by the words “this number"can be, for example,
the number ihree. The numberthree is a number. Thatis to say, it is sub-
ject to the arithmetic Jaw. But we do not find this property only in the case
of the number three, but in the case of everything that is number. The de-
terminant denoted by the word "this" is not in conflict with the similarity
between the number three and all other numbers. Nor does it do away with
this similarity: it presupposes it. It is simply an other determinant.
37. The nature ofthis determinant
This determinant too belongs to the analytically irreducible de-
terminants. That is why it is difficult to circumscribeit.
However, to avoid confusion,it is good to show briefly that it does not
coincide with the two other determinants that we already discerned in the
earthly subject [§33], namely, the thus-so determinant [A] and its further
specification [B].
A. To this end | ask myself in the first place the question: is this further
determinant something other than a diversity in thus-so determination? Let
us try to clarify the import of this question by a specific case. Thus ] can
put it, for example, in the following way: Is the relationship between mum-
ber and this the same as that between arithmetic and spatial, or not?
To ask the question is to answerit in the negative, for it is plain that
what causes the number to be “the number three" is something other than
Spatiality, which is entirely lacking here.
B. Is it then perhaps the case, someone might ask, that the determinant
“this” is a further specification of "thus"?
This question also must be answered in the negative. To support this
negation it is sufficient to juxtapose the term "this number" and the term
“rational number.” In the latter case, we have the designation of a further
specification of number as number; however, there are many rational num-
bers, but there is only one number three. Consequently, the determinant
being-individual does not further specify the numerality of three, but is a
determination that retains its significance even whenall further specifications
of its numerality have been added up.
38. The diversity in this-derermination
If no other numberexisted besides three, then it would be impossible to
speak of diversity in the this-determination of numbers. But since there in
fact are more numbers than this one alone, we must also deal with this diver-
sity.
As this number, three is different from all other numbers. The word
"other" here denotes that al! numbers that are subsumed underit lack the
determination being-three. Nevertheless they do most certainly have a qual-
italive determination of their own thatis entirely parallel to that of this num-
ber. This can be indicated by means of the terms “this,” "that," etc.
39. Terminology
In connection with what is noted above we can typify this determinant
briefly as shis-that-difference.
40. The law sphere
Therefore the this-that difference is not incompatible with the possibil-
ity that this and that are alike in that the same law holds for both.
All this's and that's for which the same law holds together constitute
the domainor the sphere ofthis law; they are its law sphere. Since there are
manylaws, there also exist therefore many of such law spheres.
Consequently, we may not deduce from the fact that weillustrated the
existence of the this-that-difference only in the case of the arithmetic law
sphere that this difference occurs only here. It occurs in all law spheres.
Forit is also true that the onespatial figure is not the other and that a dis-
tinction can be made between this and that energetic activiry, this and that
analytic activity, this and that ethical act, etc.
C. THE COMBINED OCCURRENCE OF DIVERSITIES

IN BOTH DETERMINANTS
41. Theline of thought

if it is to be possible that the diversities in both the determinants that
we have discussed so far can occur in combination then it is required that
they cannot be reduced to one another. We mustthereforefirst discuss this
mutual irreducibility.
42. The mutual irreducibility between the thus-so andthe this-that difference
A. Thethis-that difference in a law sphere presupposes the peculiar nature
of the law sphere (see §36). Therefore the difference in nature between the
law spheres is certainly not to be reduced to that ofthis-that.
B. However, the nature of the this-that difference has been shown to be
distinct from both every thus-so determination (see §37A) and from all fur-
ther specification of a thus or a so: it is an additional determination {see
§37B).
C. For that reason we can say that the thus-so difference and the this-that
difference are mutually irreducible.
Comment !: Toclarify the text we will occasionally add a diagram. If we
picture the difference betweena ¢his and a that as vertical lines then the thus-
so difference, given the fact that it is irreducible to the former difference, can
be pictured most adequately by means ofhorizontal lines. We get then:
1. Diagram for the difference of this and that:
2. Diagram forthe difference of thus and so:
Comment 2: The reason why the vertical lines are chosen for the formerdif-
ference rather than for the later can best be indicated tater [§55].
43. Clarification in terminology: the terms "individual" and "modal"

Upto this point we have made do with the expressions: “this and that"
and “thus and so." These do not however answer to the requirementthat
mustbe put to scientific language, namely that it must be unambiguous,that
is, that every word may have only one meaning. Both words are easily used
interchangeably and moreover they can refer to differences and properties
that are of no importancefor the structure of that which is created. Butit is
precisely this structure with which we are concerned here. Therefore the
continuance of our investigation will gain by the introduction of a clearer
terminology.
What we need on the basis of the irreducibility that we have established
is two words, each of which have a meaning of their own. That which is
designated by the one term mustbethe diversity between thus and so in the
sense of those properties that are relevant for the structure ofcreation,
whereas that which is designated by the second word must be the diversity
between this's and that's that are also relevant in the same sense for the
structure of that which is created.
Comment: The terms “quantitative” and “qualitative” may readily come to
mind. On further reflection, however,this pair will not serve in this context.
a, Of the two diversities in question, that between a thus and a so can cer-
tainly not be denoted by the word “quantitative.” But also for the designation
of the difference between a this and a that, this term can only be used within
the arithmetic; so that in this way the whole difference between this's and
that's in the nonarithmetic remains unnamed. Although we can speak of “two
stones” etc., the difference between the one stone and the other is no more
quantitative than that between two plants, animals, or men.
b. The term “quantitative,” therefore, can be applied in neither of the two
cases, whereas the term “qualitative” can be used in both cases, and is there-
fore inappropriate.
Wecould well explore several other terminological attempts at this point but
the scope ofthis study does not allow this and its purpose requires in this Divi-
sion only a positive exposition. That is why 1 begin here by establishing the
terminology and give only passing attention to the question whether or not it
meets insuperable objections,
I call the difference between thus and so modal andthe difference be-
tween a this and a that individual.
Now a person might say: “Both terms are well-known in philosophy
and often mean something other than what is intended here," But that is not
isagoagé Philosophiae
a problem. If one were to require of an unconventional conception that it

only employ terms that have never occurred in other systems then it would
be obligated to introduce new words everywhere. This would certainly not
enhance the readability of such a study (Richard Avenarius's attempt is an
example of such an approach). If this rule were to be consistently applied it
would havethe effect that no one could understand anyone else. To be sure,
it is not legitimate to deal arbitrarily with terminology, but it is questionable
whetherthe line [grens] between nonarbitrary and arbitrary coincides with
that between traditional and novel. Very often, as a result of all kinds of
misconceptions, a term has acquired a traditional meaning which can no
longer be maintained once the mistake has been unmasked.
Ofthe two terms suggested here the first is not likely to meet with re-
sistance from the side of tradition. The modal diversity may bericherin my
view than elsewhere but this does not immediately affect the meaning of the
term. There will be moreresistance from the side of the philosophic tradi-
tion against the use of the second term: is individuality not the exclusive
privilege of man? To counter this objection, however, we may point to the
results of recent discoveries in arithmetic, geometry, physics, etc. in which
the emphasis falls increasingly on the individual character of each number,
each spatial figure, and each atom. Consequently, the objection we have in
mind is not based on arbitrariness on our part but in the exaggerated impor-
tance attributed to man by the advocates ofthe traditional usage. This can
be documented in its historic development (for example, along the Greeks) @“°™
but is completely out of tune with all those special sciences that have broken
with this exaggerated view.
Because ] cannotin the present context discuss the developmentof this
misconception of the basic structures in the cosmos, let the counter argument
I have just mentioned suffice.
44. The terms "subject modality" and "law modality"
After what we havesaid in §43, the terms "subject modality” and “law
modality” will no doubt be clear. In connection with what was said at the
end of §34 we must point out that the modality of being-subject is always
the same as thatof the law correlate with it.
45. The combined occurrence of both determinants
Being-individual and being-modal are different from one another and
therefore had to be dealt with and named separately. But this difference
does not involve being-separate. In fact, neither of these determinants ever
occurs alone. For example, a specific number is both arithmetic (i.e.
modally different from space, for example) and also ris number (that is,
something which is individually other than every other number.)
Comment: The diagram for this oc-

currence in combination therefore be-
comes (following our comment in §42}
the following:
46. The occurrence of diversity in modality in this combination

A. Every circle is subject to both arithmetic and spatial laws. Every stone
is subject to these two as well as physical laws. In the case of a plant, we
distinguish besides the three subject modalities mentioned so far also an or-
ganic one. In the case of an animal, beside the four we came across in the
plant, also the psychical. A human being possesses, beside the five we have
mentioned, all the others that were enumerated in §31.
B. Actually what we have said so far is not even complete. For in all
these cases, the modalities that are not mentioned with them are nevertheless
present, even though they are not present in the same sense as is the case in
the examples we just mentioned. I hope to return to this point later [§65].
Be that as it may, in any case the examples mentioned in the first paragraph
are sufficient evidence that different subject modalities always exist together
in any individual shis; and that was the point of this subsection.
Comment: The diagram for this more
complicated combination therefore be-
comes:
47. The term “subject unit"

Taking account of what has just been said, such an individual this can
properly be called an “individual subject unit." Therefore, circles, atoms,
organisms, animals, humans, the state, and the church, etc., are all subject
units; numbers, however, are not included.
Keep in mind that this term serves exclusively to indicate the fact that
the individual determination occurs in all of this in combination with a mani-
fold of modalities. Yet there is much more involved in "things" than we
have discerned upto this point.
48. Modality and time
Included in that “much more"is time, at least insofar as it is modal and
can therefore already be discussed at this point. My not discussing time was
done advisedly. Only now is it possible to make clear the proposition that
time is neither an individual nor a modal difference. Nevertheless we do
find it in all the modalities of the subject units: in the arithmetic as succes-
sion, in the spatial as simultaneity, in the physical as the time of movement,
in the organic as development, in the psychic as tension, in the analytic as
prius and posterius, in the historic as period, in the lingual presently still as
adverbs of time and the tense of a verb, in the social in the giving ofpriority
[for example, “ladies first"], in the economic in the giving and receiving of
interest, in the aesthetic as aesthetic (not pure) duration, in the juridic as
length of validity (think of the retroactive force of a positive iaw), in the
ethical in the choice of the “right” time, in the pistic in the alternation of
liturgically festive and ordinary games. Has
Comment 1: Time is therefore not a mode ofintuition: it exists independently
of our mental activity.
Comment 2: Time is not a modality: therefore the juxtaposition of space and
time is incorrect.
49. The different modalities of ithe subject unit in time—the term subject
Junction
Since we are now also taking time into account, it becomes evident in
retrospect that we have so far conceived of the different modalities of an in-
dividual subject unit as though they were timeless. We can now dispense
with this abstraction: the modalities of an individual subject unit never exist
outside of time.
Once this insight has been gained, it is also possible to introduce a
shorter term for this being-subject of the individual subject unit to laws of
differing modality, namely "the functioning of the subject unit." Conse-
quently, we can say concisely: “a subject unit has more than one subject
function.”
The (subject) functions of a subject unit differ from each other, of
course, modally.
Section 2
The Two Fundamental Connections
in Both Distinctions
and Their Occurrence in Combination
50. Introduction and subdivision
We met with connection both between that which differs individually
and between the subject-modalities. These connections too always occur in
combination. Consequently, we make the following subdivision:
A. The connection between that which differs individually;
B. The connection between the subject functions:
C, The combined occurrence of both connections.
Draft pb JHK Translation Page 201
A. THE CONNECTION
BETWEEN ENTITIES THAT DIFFER INDIVIDUALLY
51. The being connected together ofa this and a that

We take our point of departure from the simplest case, namely, where
two individually differing entities are similar in modality of subject func-
tions and are therefore subjected tc the same law. However, similarity is not
the same as connection. Nevertheless such connections do exist.
For example, in the arithmetic law sphere the numbers 3 and 4 stand in
a certain relationship to one another. Twocircles can intersect; in the ener-
getic law sphere the one energy can be changed into another. Two organ-
isms can live in symbiosis. I can be subject to psychic suggestion by my
fellow man; in the analytic domain two propositions can stand in therela-
tionship of premise to conclusion.
52. The tern “interrelation”
So far, we have talked only of connection. We are now in need of a
term that denotes specifically the connection between that which differs indi-
vidually. Let us choose the term "interrelation" for this.
Comment: The diagram for an interrelation can best be drawn, following our
earlier diagrams, as follows:
1, In the world of numbers:
2. In the case of subject units:
53. The modality ofthe interrelation

It is possible to say that different numbers stand in a certain re-
lationship to one another. But we cannot say of numbers that they do or do
not intersect, that they are or are not of equal force, or that they live in sym-
biosis with each other. For numbers are something other than lines, forms
of energy, and organisms. The interrelation between two or more numbers
therefore turns out to be different from the connection between that which
differs individually in the nonarithmetic law spheres. In other words, the
modality of an interrelation is the same as that of the law sphere in which the
interrelation occurs; and terms such as “intersecting,” “being of equal
force,” etc. are therefore more concrete than the vague denotation
“interrelation.”
B. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN SUBJECT FUNCTIONS
54, Introduction
The fact that two entities that differ individually belong to a single law
sphere was not enough to establish the existence of a connection between
them (see §51). Noris sufficient reason given for the use of the term con-
Draft D JHK Transiation Page 202
nection between subject functions if we simply refer to the fact that they of-
ten occur together (see §46). For surely it is one thing to observe thata cir-
cle is subject to both the law for the arithmetic and to that for the spatial, but
another thing if f am able to give an answer to the questions: Is the spatial-
being of the circle connected with its (modal) property or function of being-
arithmetic? And, if so, what evidence is there of a connection between the
arithmetic and the spatial subject function?
However, if we attempt to answer these questions, then it appears in
both cases that there is something presupposed, namely a natural order of
subject functions.
Consequently, we must take a lookat this first.
55. The order of the subjectfunctions
Let us examine whether there exists any order between the arithmetic
and the spatial and if so, what it is. A polyhedron, for example, is subject
both to spatial and to arithmetic laws. It has a stereometric form and its
planes can be counted. But at the same time, there is more here than a
“both-and.” The fact is that spatial properties presuppose arithmetic ones
and not vice versa. For it is possible to express the magnitude of a line with
the help of numbers, but not possible to clarify the relationship of numbers
simply with the help of the relationship between radius and circumference,
Therefore, when | calculate the length of a line, I do have interrelations be-
tween numbers at hand, but [ have no use for the interrelations between lines
when I am busy with numbers.
This indicates a certain order between the two. There is number ev-
erywhere where there are lines, But it is quite possible for spatiality to be
absent when I speak exclusively about numbers. Numbers are therefore pre-
supposed in the case of lines, but lines are not presupposed in the case of
numbers. In the order of the subject functions, therefore, the arithmetic pre-
cedes the spatial.
Similarly, every movement presupposes spatiality. Every organic ac-
tivity presupposes the conversion of energy. A psychic state presupposes
organic life. Analytic discernment presupposes a sensitive attention
(sometimes only a very weak one) with reference to something. Historic life
presupposes the presence of some analytic judgment. Speech, whether it
comes 10 expression or not, presupposes historic activity. Social intercourse
presupposes language, etc. Conversely, it is not true that a line's being tan-
gential to another presupposes conversion of energy: 1 can no more explain
a tangential line in terms of the latter than I can explain the relationship of
numbers in terms of lines.
Comment [: In the foregoing, I have only indicated for the sake of brevity
that every function presupposes that which is next lower to it. However, this
implies of course thatit also rests upon all the other lower functions. This be-
comes evident, for example, from the fact that when there is something wrong
in those lower functions, the higher functions do not function well either.
Similarly, an inflammation in the organic is accompanied with pain in the psy-
chic. And certain kinds of brain damage disturb the function of thinking.
Thus, there appears to exist a natural order of subject functions in
which that which is more complicated always presupposes the less compli-
cated, but in which the lower does not presuppose the occurrence of the
higher functions.
Morespecifically, it turns out that the subject functions occur in the
order in which they were enumerated already in §31. Moreover, it will be
plain on the basis of this "being-presupposed" why I earlier [§46] chose
horizontal lines for the denotation of thus-so differences.
Comment 2: In the first place, we can not incorporate this order of sequence
in the diagram given in §46. To that end, one should begin with the listing of
the functions from the bottom, that is, with the arithmetic. It also turns out
that the differences between subject units, listed in §46A, can be represented
by the differences in length in the vertical lines of the diagram on the next
page.
pistic
ethical
juridic
aesthetic
economic
social
lingual
historic
analytic
psychic
organic
physical
Spatial
arithmetic
man animal plant chemical mathematical number
element figure
56. The terms "substrate" and “superstrate"

We may call those functions that are presupposed in a given function
its substrate and those functions that are not presupposedits superstrate.
In this way, the substrate of the psychic function includes the arith-
metic, spatial, physical, and organic function. Whereas its superstrate in-
cludes ail functions except the four we have mentioned and the psychic
functionitself.
The more substrate functions a given function possesses, the less super-
Strate functions and vice versa. For that reason, there are two limiting
[grens] cases: the lowest function, the arithmetic, is without any substrate,
whereas the highest is without any superstrate. All other functions possess
substrate and superstrate.
isagoogé Phitosephiae
57, Dichotomies and trichotomies ofthe total number of subject functions

If I now take any one function as a point of departure, then I can sum-
marize all the others as “not-thus." This negative expression indicates in the
case of the arithmetic function only its superstrate and in the caseof the pis-
tic, only its substrate. However, in the case ofall two-fold divisions of the
order of the subject functions, the negative term covers both substrate and
superstrate without distinguishing them terminologically.
For that reason,it is clearer to avoid the negative circumscription.
A. If I then first take the lowest and the highest function, then all the re-
maining functions can be designated positively, as its superstrate and sub-
Strate respectively,
In this way, without negation, I come to two dichotomies. There is no
preference for either above the other.
B. However, if I take one of the other functions (regardless of which one,
provided only that it is not the highest or the lowest) and I now avoid the
negation, then I come to trichotomies. Examples of such trichotomiesare:
spatial, subspatial and supraspatial; psychic, subpsychic and suprapsychic,
etc.
If the numberof subject functions is n then there are therefore n - 2 tri-
chotomies possible. There is no preference for any of these threefold divi-
sions above another. And there is nothing given here beyond a terminologi-
cal summary of substrate functions and superstrate functions. This is op-
posed to anthropological trichotomies like mind, soul, and spirit.
Comment 1: If a person forgets this and considers two or three groups of
functions of a thing as things then he must infer the existence of things, for ex-
ample, like the res cogitans of Descartes, that are taken to possess higher
functions but not lower functions. However, this is in conflict with the mutual
connection between the functions the existence of which is evident in all kinds
of ways.
Comment 2: The dichotomies and the # - 2 wichotomies of the total number of
subject functions are not in conflict with one another but are compatible.
58. The evidences for the mutual connection between subjectfunctions

The mutual connection between subject functions is evident on two
sides, namely, on the subject side and on the object side.
59. The evidences of the mutual connection between subjectfunctions on the
subject side
This consists in the analogy of one function with other functions. This
analogy is a double one; for a subject function is analogical on the one hand
with its substrate (if any) and on the other hand with its superstrate (if any).
60. The analogy of the subject function with its substrate; retrocipation
The more complicated subject function presupposes one or more less
complicated subject function(s). This means not only thatthe latter precedes
(or succeeds as the case may be) the function involved, in the order of sub-
ject functions as (a part of) its superstrate. But also that the more compli-
cated subject function in its turn refers back to its substrate. Thus a
“dimension” for example is definitely spatial in character. Nevertheless,
space refers back, in the multiplicity of dimensions (which can always be
multiplied), to number.
Comment 1: The number ofspatial dimensions can always be multiplied. Our
preference for three dimensional space can not be explained until later (see
§65).
This reference back of higher to lower functions can be given the per-
spicuous name retrocipation.
The examples of this connection—which does not occur in the arith-
metic because it lacks a substrate—can be found everywhere in the cosmos.
Thus all the supra-arithmetic functions retrocipate on the arithmetic: all
these functions possess a multiplicity that is inherent to them—a multiplicity
of dimensions but also of forces, of organs, etc. We discover something
similar in the supraspatial sphere: they retrocipate on the spatial; their oc-
currence transverses a course on the basis of whichit is possible to describe
this occurrence, as far as this analogy is concerned, with a curve. Further-
more, all the supraphysical retrocipates on the physical substrate: all these
functions bear a dynamic character—think only of growth in the organic,
emotion in the psychic, mobility in thinking, etc. Further examples of
retrocipation are: development in the supra-organic; the "feel" of things in
the suprapsychic; the (nonscientific) cognitive element (of both thinking and
knowing) in everything above the analytic; the role played by the scheme
means-ends in the supra-historic; the language of social intercourse, of
commerce, of poetry etc. in the supra-lingual; commerce in the supra-so-
cial; the thrift principle in the supra-economic; the harmonization of
interests in the supra-juridic and the assuranceofbelief in the pistic.
It follows from the above that the higher a functionis situated in the
order of functions the more retrocipations it possesses: whereas the spatial
has only one retrocipation, we find no fewer than thirteen retrocipations in
the pistic.
Comment 2: Ofthe retrocipations in the pistic, two have been prominent in
history: the retrocipation on the analytic (knowing) and that on the ethical
(trusting). However, these two are not the only retrocipations: another exam-
ple is sacrifice, in which the pistic retrocipates on the economic. It is of
course completely incorrect to conceive of the first two retrocipations as the
component factors of faith: they are only traits present in all faith alongside
other features.
The numberof retrocipations is therefore one (in the second function) plus
two (in the third function) + .. . 13 (in the 14th function), to make a total
of 91,
Comment 3: A retrocipation can be
represented schematically with the help
of an arrow pointing downward in the
following manner.
Comment 4: Since the retrocipation(s) to (all) its substrate function(s) is (are)
always inherent in a higher function it is possible to briefly denote which func-
tions are present in this way in an individual subject unit in terms ofits highest
function. Thus a circle is a spatial subject unit. A river is a physical one and
a plant an organic one. While the total of man's functions can for the time
being be called a pistic subject unit.
61. The analogy of a subject function with its superstrate: anticipation

The connection between subject functions is manifest however not only
in the fact that a function refers back to its substrate; the substrate also refers
forward to its superstrate.
Someone going through the series of positive whole numbers in an or-
derly fashion for the first time will mention only rational-natural numbers
and hence count: one, two, three, four, etc. But in doing so he only men-
tions “natural numbers" and does not take into account the connection of
these numbers to their superstrate. However, if he takes the retrocipation of
space to number seriously, then he will discover by way of this detour that
his enumeration is far from complete, For the length of every line can be
divided in all kinds of ways into a number of parts, including the length of
the hypotenuse of an isosceles right-angled triangle. Also in the case of this
division, the rule holds that the smaller the divisor of a number, the greater
the quotient. If we now postulate the length of the equal sides of the triangle
to be one, then the length of the hypotenuse is ¢-2. The j,-2 is a numberas
well, albeit an “irrational” number: it fits into the series of positive numbers
without any difficulty, The same holds for ,-3, etc. Evidently, the arith-
metic, as numberseries, therefore refers forward in the irrational numbers to
space. If we take this into consideration, then we no longer count1, 2, 3, 4,
but 1(= gl), 2, 93, 2(= 4), 5, 6. 7, 18, 3(= 179), ete.
This forward reference of a function to its superstrate may be desig-
nated with a term formed analogous to “retrocipation,” namely,
“anticipation.”
Anticipation, of course, occurs only where there is a superstrate pre-
sent. For that reason, it is lacking in the pistic, But also elsewhere the
presence ofa specific function does not guarantee that it here too anticipates:
different from retrocipations, it only does this in subject units in whichstill

higher functions are present.
Within this framework, we discover as rich a diversity of anticipations
as retrocipations. The arithmetic in non-spatial subject units, for example,
not only anticipates the spatial in the irrational numbers, but also the physi-
cal in differential and integral numbers. Similarly, the spatial anticipates the
physical: already Archimedes spoke of a gravitational "line" and a "center
of gravity" in mathematical figures. In the case of organisms, the physical
“anticipates” to the higher. An example of this would be the fluids that oc-
cur in plants as well as in animals and men. In the case of the plant, these
fluids anticipate exclusively to the organic, but as blood in animals and man
they also anticipate the supra-organic. There is a further difference here
between animals and men: in the case of an animal, the blood anticipates
exclusively to the psychic, for example, in the acceleration of circulation
when excited. But in the case of a human being, it also anticipates the
suprapsychic, for example in blushing. We find the same to be the case
mutatis mutandis in the organic. Animals (at least the more highly de-
veloped ones) and humans possess a brain, which is organic in character. It
is a part of the body and also displays organic defects; but nevertheless, does
not occur in plants. At the same time, there is once again a difference to be
observed between animal and man; in animals the brain anticipates the psy-
chic only. In man, on the other hand, it also anticipates the suprapsy-
chic—weneed only think of the significance of this organ for thinking and
speaking.
In the supra-organic there are anticipations to be observed as well, al-
beit only in the functional existence of human beings. Some examples of
this are the following: the psychic anticipates the suprapsychic as logical
feeling {in the case of success or lack ofit in analytic work), historic feeling,
lingual feeling, aesthetic feeling, juridic feeling, etc. The analytic antici-
pates in logical mastery to the historic, in the economy of thought to the
economic, and in the compatibility of both actions and results of thought to
the aesthetic. The historic anticipates the lingual in the recognition or denial
of historic significance and anticipates the social in that culture is bound to
society; the lingual anticipates the economic in economy of language and te
the aesthetic in harmony of language; the social anticipates to the economic
as effusiveness and reserve in the social graces. The economic anticipates to
the juridic in industrial regulations without juridic sanctions. The juridic
anticipates the ethical in the consideration of extenuating circumstances in
the making ofa verdict.
Comment 1: Anticipations can be pic-
tured schematically with the help of a
vertical arrow pointing upward in the
following manner:
Comment 2: In connection with the anticipations, the highest function of a
subject unit also fills the role of feading function.
Comment 3: The doctrine of anticipations has to date not been worked out
with the same degree ofclarity as thal of retrocipations. This has to do in part
with the state ofaffairs in the special sciences; arithmetic, for example, has not
advanced beyond the discovery of the anticipation of the arithmetic to the
physical.
62, The combined occurrence of retrocipation and anticipation

Whereas the highest subject function of a subject unit possesses only
retrocipations and the lowest possesses nothing but anticipations, both occur
in all the other subject functions. They retrocipate to their substrate and at
the same time anticipate to a superstrate (if present).
These remarks would seem to be nothing but a repetitive summary of
our earlier findings, yet this is only appearance. Thefact is that here again,
it is possible to obtain a deeper insight into the unity of subject units, more
Specifically with reference to retrocipations. After all, these everywherere-
fer back to the substrate. But in the doctrine of anticipations it became evi-
dent that the substrate in the case of subject units with different leading
functions is not the same. A corollary of this is that retrocipations to differ-
ent substrates are also mutually different.
Once again, an illustration may illuminate our point. Both in the case
of man and animal, the psychic retrocipates to the organic, whereas thelatter
in tum anticipates in both cases to the supra-organic. However, because the
anticipation in question—brains and senses—is anything but the same, the
psychic in each case does not retrocipate to a similar substrate and hence this
retrocipation is also not the same in man and animal. Man also suffers psy-
chically in a way other than animals. Not only, for example, because his
feeling for justice (which is lacking in an animal) has been offended, but
partially also due to the fact that the primary pain of a case of encephalitis
[inflammation of the brain] differs because that inflammation, too, is not the
same in man and animal.
The same is of course true for the retrocipations to the other sub-ana-
lytic functions and also for the retrocipations of these to their substrate,
Comment 1: We must now introduce the indication of retrocipations and an-
ticipations in our diagram of subject units. If we combine our earlier dia-
grams, we come up with the following:
a. Where no more than two functions are present:
| | | highest function
| | | lowest function
b, Where three functions are present:
Draft b JHK Translation Pape 209
Isagoogé Philosaphiae
| | | highest function
| | | intermediate function
c. Where more than three functions are present:
| | j highest function
i | | next to the highest function
intermediate function(s)
| | | next to the lowest function
63. The modality of the subject function—in connection with retracipations

and anticipations
The character of the subject function remains the same also in retroci-
pation and anticipation. Length remains spatial, that is, it is only subjected
to the law for that which is spatial; a gesture remains organic, that is to say,
it is only subjected to the law for that which is organic. The joy of faith is
not pistic, but psychic and an association that has the advancement of its
members’ economic well-being as it goal (e.g. labor organizations and man-
agement associations) is not itself a business enterprise: its president is not
related to the other members as employer to employees.
Comment: The analogies, then, are inherent to the subject function, If this
basic thought is neglected, we fall into a dangerous dilemma, for then one of
the following proves to be the case: either the retrocipations and anticipations
become intermediate functions between the function in question and the two
adjacent ones, or the function in question becomes a collection of three sub-
functions.
In the first case, we end up with a regressus ad infinitum: the analogies
that have been promoted to pseudo-functions in their turn require retro-
cipations and anticipations that again become intermediate functions now be-
tween the original analogies and the original function, etc.
In the second case, we end up with a strata-theory which opens the way to
an arbitrary grouping ofdifferent functions. This happens, for example, when
feeling, thinking and willing are brought together under the heading “psychic.”
64. A more complete sense of the term “subject unit"

Not every individual "this" is a subject unit. The latter name is only
used to denote an individual this that possesses two or more subject func-
tions. On the other hand, up to this point nothing further has been included
in this term.
However, in the previous sections, there was talk of a connection be-
tween the different subject functions of a subject unit. Now that we have
again seen in this way something more ofthe fully concrete, it is again evi-
dent that what seemed to be a terminal point before was no more than a
resting spot. Having come further since leaving this rest point and now
lsagoogé Philosophiag
looking back, seeing more, we can summarize the old with the new. Since
no subject unit exists without such a connection between its functions, there
is no reason to introduce a new term at this point. As long as I still need
this term I understand by it now: an individual this with two or more func-
tions that stand in vertical, mutual connection.
65. Evidences of the mutual connection of object functions on the object
side: Therepetition ofthe substrate in the superstrate
It is not uncommon nowadays to meet with the opinion that the differ-
ence of subject and object is nothing more than a distinction: that is, the
product of human thinking. Orelse, if this is not considered to be correct,
then in any case, that this difference occurs for the first time in that which is
analytic. However, this opinion is not consonant with the structure of the
cosmos.
If the existence of objects is recognized, however, then it must be seen
in its connection with the cosmos as a whole, so as to prevent an exappera-
tion of its importance.
If we do this, it turns out that the object is the repetition of the sub-
strate in the superstrate.
The simplest example of this can be found in the spatial law sphere. A
straight line as long as it is not intersected by another straight line is ex-
tended endlessly in a single direction or dimension. In the multiplicity ofits
dimensions, space retrocipates to the arithmetic law sphere. However, this
multiplicity of dimensions has as an implication that as soon as a straight
line is intersected by another one drawnin anotherdirection a point arises.
We are here met with something that up until now we have only
touched on in passing. For points do have spatial character, but unlike
lines, they are discontinuous.
Let ustake a closer look at these matters.
The discontinuity of points reminds us of that of numbers. We might
therefore be inclined to speak here of a retrocipation. Butthis is precisely
whatis forbidden us by the discontinuity of points, since the character of the
subject functions remains the samealso in retrocipation, and the spatial sub-
ject, also in its retrocipation, always shows continuity.
Wetherefore come upon something here that has to do with a connec-
tion with the arithmetic and yet does not coincide with the retrocipation.
Nevertheless, it is not isolated from retrocipation either: without the
multiplicity of dimensions, there are no points.
If we are to give account of what we have found, then we can say that
the discontinuity of number is here repeated within space, and thatthis Tepe-
tition is rooted in the fact that space retrocipates to the arithmetic.
Thecase that we have just dealt with is only one of many. This is al-
ready apparent in the case of that which is arithmetic. For this function is
repeated not only in the spatial, but also in all its remaining superstrate
functions. As an example, we might adduce here the phenomenonofvirtual
movement. That is to say, that movement by which the proper movement of
a physical thing or system is canceled out by motions that impinge upon it
and yet remains virtually present—as is apparent as soon as the forces
working in from without become weaker or stronger.
But there are also other functions besides the arithmetic that possess
such object functions in their superstrate spheres. For example, space is re-
peated in the physical as rectilinear movement. That is to say, as the kind of
movement in which the impinging forces cancel each other out. Other ex-
amples of a repetition of space are life space, perceptual space, analytic and
imaginative space—in other words, space in an organic, psychic, analytic,
and technical sense.
Comment 1: Technical space is Euclidean space. In this way it will be clear
why space in itself is not Euclidean. Similarly, it becomes clear why every
attempt to approach the existence of non-Euclidean space with the aid of
imagination is doomed to failure.
The supraspatial is also repeated in its superstrate. For example, physical
movement is repeated in the organic as stimulus, in the psychic as sensibly
perceptible (roughness, color, sound, taste, smell), in the analytic as the
knowable, in the technical as formable, in the lingual as nameable,etc.
The same holds for the leading function in plants and animals. In this
way, an organism that possesses subject functions in none of the supra-or-
ganic spheres does possess an cbject function in all these spheres. A flower,
for example, has no feeling, yet it is psychically perceptible. It does not
think, but it is analyzable. It is not technically busy, but in a nursery does
prove to formable. Moreover, it can be given a namelingually. It has so-
cial usefulness (for example, for highlighting a canal or dike) and although it
is not itself economically busy(lilies of the field do not toil, neither do they
spin), it does have an economic value; it is also aesthetically beautiful or
ugly; it can be juridically a possession or a corpus delicti, It is an ethical
symbol of troth in friendship and marriage ("Say it with flowers!") and it is
a pistic object of belief and unbelief.
Comment 2: This also casts some light on the sacraments: as far as their
leading function is concerned, they are nothing but water or bread and wine.
In other words, physical and organic subject units (and not the body of the
Lord as Luther believed, influenced as he was by the incorrect theory accord-
ing to which every statement is a statement ofidentity), But they lend them-
selves as pistic object to be the sign and seal of something.
In summary, every subject function possesses an object function in every su-
perstrate sphere.
fsagooge Philosophiae
Comment 3: Objects can be modally classified, just as retrocipations can be
within the subject—that is, they can be grouped as spatial objects, physical
objects, etc. Within every modal group, it again makes a difference as to
which substrate function is repeated in a given case. The numberof classes
within the different groups is therefore not equal: the spatial law sphere has
only one class of objects, namely points. The physical already possesses two,
the organic three, and so forth. The pistic law sphere has the greatest number
of classes of object functions, namely 13. The total number of these classes
therefore amounts to 91, and is therefore as great as that of the retrocipations.
Comment 4: Objects do not only play an important role in the cosmos, and in
our practical lives, but also in the history of philosophy and the special sci-
ences; we need only think of the debate about “secondary” qualities between
subjectivism and objectivism.
If we do not proceed from the subject functions, but from the subject
units, then it is correct to say that ali subject units, including those that do
not possess all the subject functions that occur in the cosmos, do have func-
tions in all spheres.
Conversely, in any given law sphere, every subject unit occurs, if not
as subject, then as object. This is sometimes also called the universality of
the law sphere.
Comment 5: It is under objects that we mustclassify a good number ofthese
so-called “secondary qualities."
66. The relationship ofsubjectfunctions to object functions

Wehave therefore learned to distinguish, apart from modal differences,
two kinds of being-subject. Namely, that of subject functions and object
functions. Let us nowtakea lookat the relationship of these two.
A. Concerning this relationship it was already possible for us to say posi-
tively that what is lower owesits presence as object in the higher law sphere
to the fact that the higher function retrocipates to its substrate.
B. Concerning the relationship of subject and object, we can say neg-
atively that it is not possible to derive subject functions from object func-
tions or vice versa, to derive object functions from subject functions: ac-
knowledging also in this regard the wealth of the cosmos, we are bound to
acknowledge each of them as existing next to each other.
1. It is not possible to derive subject functions from object functions.
Thus a (continuous) line can not be built up outofits (discontinuous) points.
Attempts to do this anyhow always rest on a failure to recognize the differ-
ence between subject functions and object functions. This is evident in that
the latter are first viewed as a subject function, whereby their derivation is
then an easy matter.
Comment 1; This is the mistake made, for example, by someone who wants
to construct a line out of its points and to this end begins by conceiving of
points as spatial subjects. That is, looks upon them as very small lines. This
mistake is often masked by saying that points are small lines (smaller than any
measure that can be laid next to them) andthat it is therefore possible to build
up the larger line only if one has an infinitely increasing number of such in-
finitely diminishing lines at his disposal. But one must choose between one of
two alternatives: either these “little lines" really are lines, in which case they
are first of all continuous and secondly finite (that is, intersected by two lines
of another direction), so that no more than a finite numberofthese finite, little
lines are necessary for the construction of a large finite line. Or else, these
“little tines” are not tines at all, but points; and in that case even the infinite in-
crease of them will not provide us with the continuity we are looking for.
2. On the other hand, the derivation of object functions from subject
functions is excluded as well. The theory of “self-objectification" forgets
this, believing that the "secondary qualities” can be explained from the self-
disintegration of a world subject.
Comment 2: The same mistake is made indirectly by the person who avoids
speculations about the origin of objects but classifies the object under the sub-
ject. That is done, for example, by someone who considers the secondary
qualities of physical things as an interrelation of different subjects, or else
takes these qualities, being nonphysical, to be intramental.
Comment 3: The expression “next to each other" in our text does not imply
that subject and object always belong to different subject units. Next to sub-
Ject-object relations where this is indeed the case (for example, in the case of
the human cultivation of plants and animals), there are also subject-object rela-
tions in which subject and object belong to the same subject unit, as is the case
€.g. with lines and points of the same figure, or with someone's cultivating “a
slim figure," etc.
Comment 4: Let us attempt to also picture the object functions in a schematic
diagram. Proceeding from the diagram of subject units found in §55 we can
use dotted lines to indicate what has reference to objects in it, The horizontal
dotted lines group the subject functions modally. The vertical ones do this in
accordance with the substrate to which they belong. In this way, the classes of
objects are indicated schematically by the intersecting points of the horizontal
and vertical lines.
Tsagoogeé Philosophiae
PIStiC peternceeeeee erates race acnereasies ee
ethical |. cbod
joridic .:.
aesthetic .:
economic
social
lingual
historic .3..:
analytic .:..1
psychic
organic
physical .:..:
Spatial .:
arithmetic | | | | | I | 1]
man I | ps dhanvoer
nrh patial figure
ig ysical element
m anism
a
c. THE COMBINED OCCURRENCE OF BOTH CONNECTIONS
67. The line of thought

What tumed out to be true of the combined occurrence of both deter-
minants (see §41) also holds with respect to the two connections discussed in
both preceding sections. For that reason here too their mutual irreducibility
is discussed first; thereafter, we discuss the combined occurrence of vertical
and horizontal connections.
68. The mutual irreducibility of both connections

A. Just as the modal diversity cannot be reduced to individual diversity,
so the connection between modally different functions cannot be reduced to
the connection between individually differing this's. In other words: retro-
cipations and anticipations and the repetition of the substrate in the super-
strate can not be reduced to interrelation.
B. The converse is also true. A connection between individual this's, i.e.
an interrelation, is a connection between two subjects in the same law sphere
and vertical connections, on the other hand, are connections between func-
tions in different law spheres. In other words: interrelation is not to be re-
duced to vertical connection,
C. The vertical connections (retrocipation, anticipation, and repetition of
the substrate) on the one hand and the horizontal connection (interrelation)
on the otherare therefore irreducible one to the other.
Comment: For this reason it is illegitimate to use one and the same term to
denote both horizontal and vertical connections. This happens only too often
in current philosophy. For example, the term “cause” is often used to denote
at the same time a particular interrelation in the supraspatial spheres and the
connections between thedifferent functions in a single subject unit. Whatever
the case may be, a choice will have to be made; keeping in mind, of course,
that in scrapping an incorrect term for one of the two mutually irreducible
connections, this connection most definitely continues to exist. How we de-
termine our choice in such cases is a question that, from the point of view of
the clarity of philosophic terminology, is of secondary importance. However,
“secondary” does not mean “arbitrary.” Hence, I would recommend that, for
example, the term "cause" (in view of the usage in the special sciences) be re-
served for certain supraspatial interrelations which we will discuss below (see
§78A comment).
69. The occurrence together af both connections

Here as elsewhere irreducibility does not mean being unconnected. On
the contrary, vertical connections occur only in combination with horizontal
ones.
70. Terminology: the terms “figure” and "thing"
To denote the combined occurrence of a "this" with more than one
subject function we earlier coined the name subject unit. Subsequently, it
turned out, however, that this term was in many respects an abstraction:
when we introduced it, we could not yet take into account the different con-
nections that have now been discussed nor, consequently, the combined oc-
currence of these connections. However, now that we can take these things
into account, the question presents itself whether there is not a fitting, more
current term to be found that also denotes these additional implications.
Such a term doesin fact exist: in ordinary language, in referring to what is
mathematical, we speak of "figures" and, in referring to what is more-than-
mathematical, of “things.” Consequently, there is now nothing to prevent us
from using these terms also in our philosophic work. "Figure" and "thing"
therefore include everything we understood by “subject unit" increased with
that which we discover in the theory about connections.
Comment; The relationship of mathematical figures and thingsis this, that the
former are always inherent in the latter and are gleaned from things by sepa-
rate treatment in mathematical analysis,
This analysis is not to be confused with “abstraction”: the mathematical
figure has the same concreteness as things, even though it does not occur out-
side of things.
71. Thing and interrelation

With the above we have just gained the insight that although thingis
not taken up inits interrelations, a thing without interrelations (a "Ding an
Sich" in this sense) does notexist.
Because the emphasis falls in this way on the interrelations in which a
thing stands, it is desirable to further investigate “interrelation.” For in this
term hitherto we have taken together a good deal that is mutually different.
Tsagoogé Phitosophiae
72. The direction of the interrelation

Up until now we only spoke of “the” interrelation between A and B.
However, that is an abstraction. For two interrelations exist between A and
B, namely, the interrelation of A to B and that of Bto A. For example, the
relationship of the circumference of a circle to its radius = 2p, that of the
radius to the circumference = 1/(2p); likewise, the route from Haarlem to
Amsterdam is an other than that from Amsterdam to Haarlem.
It is already evident from these few examples that both interrelations
are not equal, but differ according to the direction of the relation. Now this
direction is determined by the answer to the question as to which of both re-
lata is the starting point for the relation. The same holds for the
interrelation between a previous and a following moment and for the
interrelation between two figures or twothings.
Hence, the direction in the interrelation may not be neglected.
Twopoints follow from this:
i, When the relata remain the same, the one direction can not be replaced by
the other.
ii. When the direction remains the same, the relata are not interchangeable.
73. Interrelation between and in figures and things

Direction is present in every interrelation. Let us now examinethe pe-
culiarities that do not occurin all interrelations, but that enable us to distin-
guish groups ofinterrelations.
A. Take, for example, the interrelation between two circles that are tan-
gent to each other. Or the interrelation that presents itself when the cheer-
fulness of a friend who wrote me a witty letter has a contagious effect upon
me, In these cases there is an interrelation between the subject functions,
subjected to the same law, of nwo or more figures and things (human be- |
ings).
B. However, when | take note of the relationship between the radius and
circumferenceof a circle or of the case that at a given moment | remember
an earlier analytic activity of mine, these prove to be cases in which I have
to do with interrelations between relata both of whichlie in the same figure
and in the same thing (human being).
74, Terminology: the terms "interindividual-relation" and "intraindividual-
relation"
The interrelation between two subject units and the interrelation in one
subject unit can be distinguished as interindividual and intraindividual
(inter)relations.
Comment: The diagram for the dis-
tinction of both sorts is:
The large curves denote interindividual-relations; the small curves denote in-
traindividual-relations.
75. interrelations inside and outside a thing

An interrelation can be inside a thing: for example, that between
tongue and palate and that between tongue and food present in the mouth.
Besides these, there are also interrelations outside a thing: like that
between the head that rests on the hands and these hands, or also that be-
tween my eyes and the book I am reading.
76. Terminology: the terms "inner" and “outer” interrelation
It is appropriate to call interrelations inside a thing “inner,” those out-
side a thing "outer."
Comment: Do not confuse "inner" with “intraindividual” or “outer” with
“interindividual.” In both cases the terms are not congruent; as is evident from
the fact that they occur in all kinds of combinations. A few examples that
show the untenability of such an indentification may suffice.
1. The interrelation e.g. between a needle that penetrated into the body and
this body is interindividual and inner; needle and body remain individual dif-
ferences and yet their interrelation is an inner one.
2. The interrelation e.g. between two leaves from the sametree that touch
each other, between the tongue of a cat thatis licking itself and that part ofits
fur that is being washed in this way, between someone's head thatis resting on
his hands, and these hands, all of these are intraindividual and outer.
Distinguishing these four terms is especially important for the theory of
knowledge. In the mean time, the examples stated showthat this diversity is
significant, also apart from all knowledge.
77. Interrelation between simultaneous and nonsimultaneous relata
Let us take a closer look at the examples used in §73.
A. The interrelation of a circle that touches another and theinterrelation
between the radius and circumference of the samecircle differ mutually as
interindividual and intraindividual. But they are nevertheless similar in that
the relata are simultaneous.
B. The other two cases are completely different. The interrelation be-
tween the cheerfulness of my friend and of myself on the one hand and the
interrelation between my remembering and my rememberedactivity on the
other differ mutually as interindividual and intraindividual. That does not
however exclude certain similarity in another point: the relata of both in-
terrelations are not simultaneous.
78. Terminology: the terms “contemporary interrelation" and "successive

interrelation," "constituent" and "moment"
A. The difference between the examples in §77 A and B can be fastened
down with the use of the terms “contemporary” and "successive."
Comment: Theirreversibility of the direction of successive interrelations, for
example that of cause and effect and that of basis and consequence, rests on
the successive interrelation being combined with the inconvertibility of its re-
lata.
B. The difference between the relata in both interrelations can, correlate
with the above, be denoted with the words “constituent” and "moment."
Constituents are therefore always contemporary with respect to each other;
moments are always successive.
79. The combined occurrenceofthe differences that have beenfound
The differences found above occur together.
Cooperation when carrying a burden e.g. is contemporary in-
terindividual; the causal connection successive interindividual; the connec-
tion between the center and circumference of a circle contemporary intrain-
dividual; and the connection between two moments of the same existence
successive intraindividual.
All these combinations are themselves combinable with the in-
terrelations between subject functions as well as with those between a subject
function and an object function.
Every interrelation has one direction, regardless of the group to which
it belongs.
80. A fuller signification ofthe term “thing”
In order to deal with the cases denoted in §79 a numberofdistinctions
must yet be made. But it is now already possible to give a sharper descrip-
tion of "thing." If we bear in mind what was found in §§72-79, it now ap-
pears that a thing is a subject unit, with a leading subject function, that pos-
sesses Contemporary and successive intraindividual-relations and stands in
contemporary and successive interindividual-relations with other things.
81. Active and passive, Introduction

In current philosophy the correlation active and passive also plays a
large role. For that reason an introductory study should devote attention to
it as well, All the same, one should be on the alert not to overestimate the
significance due this correlation in the cosmos.
A. The correlation active-passive should not be equated with the dif-
ference between two groups of functions of the same subject unit, nor with
the difference between the active (supraspatia!) and the nonactive
Draft D JHK Translaion Page 219
(subphysical) functions. Its sole place is in the interrelation and then only in
those that are supraspatial.
B. But here too it has a much more discrete place than is often assumed.
1. Active-passive does not always coincide with the difference in in-
dividuality. This correlation, therefore, is not inherent to the interin-
dividual-relation. When e.g. two things cooperate, both stand in inter-
individual-relation, but both subject functions are active.
2. Active-passive also does not coincide with the relationship between sub-
ject and object functions: the emotively perceptible object function cclor
e.g. is not necessarily also a perceived color. On the other hand, subject
functions can also be passive, e.g. in the case of remembered activity.
C. That is why the correlation active-passive ought to be explicitly men-
tioned as always something extra.
In the following paragraphs I discuss a few combinations in which this
schema occurs,
82. The correlation active-passive in the interrelation between subject func-

tions
A. With interindividual-relations. When the one human suggests some-
thing to another, the one is suggesting or active, the otheris the recipient or
passive.
B. With intraindividual-relations. When someone remembers his own an-
alytic action of an earlier moment as a later moment, the earlier momentis
passive, the latter active.
Comment: Both interrelations can occur simultaneously: a recollection can be
contemporary with a suggestion.
83. The correlation active-passive in the interrelation berween a subject

Junction and an objectfunction
A. With interindividual-relations. When someone emotively perceives
someoneelse, the latter is passive.
B. With intraindividual-relations, When I soiled my hand and now emo-
tively perceive that, the intraindividual-relationship between eye and hand is
at the sametime a relationship of active-passive.
84. Further distinction desirable both between ways of cooperation and be-
tween the differences in the correlation active-passive
The cooperation of two active subject functions as well as the cor-
relation between an active function and a passive function evidence remark-
able differences that first become clear when one takes the difference in the
realms to which the things belong into account.
The discussion of this difference is availed however by first dealing

with the third determinant found in the cosmos.
CHAPTER 2
THE THIRD DETERMINANT, [Ts DIVERSITY
AND THE COMBINED OCCURRENCEOFTHIS
DETERMINANT WITH BOTH OF THE OTHERS
85. The third determinant
Besides the two most simple determinants discussed above, namely,
that of individuality and modality, a third most simple determinant occurs in
the earthly subject. It is that of "good" and "evil."
As in the case of the heavenly subject, here too this determinant is not
an original determinant. That is to say, its appearance is not by virtue of
creation,
Meanwhile, since the fall it does play an extremely importantrole in
the earthly subject and especially in human existence.
86. The diversity in this determinant
A. It ts that of good and evil.
B. The character bomeby this diversity is not only a purely dual one;it is
also antithetic. Evil stands over against good as disobedience over against
obedience.
87. The relationship of this diversity in the case of man to that discussed
previously
As was the case regarding the relationship between the modal and the
individual differences, here too we must first attend to the mutual irre-
ducibility of the opposition good-evil and the diversities dealt with earlier,
so as to then look for an answer to the question, how they are connected.
88. The irreducibility of this diversity to both of the others and to their con-
nections
Wewill first discuss (I) the impossibility to reduce the antithetic dual-
ity to either of the other diversities as such and their combination; subse-
quently (II) the impossibility of such a reduction to the diversities that pre-
sent themselves both in their connections and in their combination. In both
parts of this paragraph wewill investigate first whether or not there is any
talk of duality; only when that is the case do we ask the question whether or
not this duality is also antithetical.
I. The impossibility to reduce the antithetic duality to either of the
other diversities as such (A} and in combination (B).
Isagoagé Phitosophiae
A. Wefirst of al] take each of these separately. It is only by grouping

these diversities that they can be placed in dual schemas.
1. The modal diversity "thus-so" is only dual in the dichotomies men-
tioned earlier: arithmetic/supra-arithmetic and pistic/subpistic. Of these
two the former does not pertain: the opposition good-evil minimally pre-
supposes activity in both of the opposites. That leaves the dichotomy pis-
tic/subpistic. This too does not coincide with the opposition good-evil: the
pure good was andstill is present in all Jaw spheres (think, for example, of
the glorified and yet still today real human nature of Christ), and in the pis-
tic sphere evil is present just as elsewhere—think of the idolatry thatis still
present everywhere.
Comment 1: The verse that is quoted to support what is being rejected here,
“everything that does not come from faith is sin" (Romans 14:23), of course
does not say what people want to read there, namely, that Paul maintained a
dualistic view of human functions according to which the pistic function was
good andal! the lower functions, including also that of the state, would be sin-
ful in contrast. Were this in fact the case then according to Paul either Christ
too would be sinful according to the subpistic or the subpistic would be lacking
in Christ! What Paul means however, given the context, is something com-
pletely different. Paul, when dealing with Christians eating food offered to
idols, eating what according to pagan conception is pistic food, distinguishes
two groups: the strong and the weak. The strong, among whom heincludes
himself, know that an idol is nothing and thus deny all ties of any food to an
idol and enjoy this food too as a gift of God given them for Christ's sake. The
weak, in contrast, stand in a different position: they have not (yet) been able
to free themselves completely from the pagan conceptions in their surround-
ings and therefore see this food as pistic, but, given the fact that they are
Christians, also as pistically unclean. That is why they are offended by the at-
titude of the strong. If the weak in spite of their own objections would pro-
ceed to adopt the attitude of the strong and eat this food, then they would be
eating what according to their own (limited) insightis pistically unclean. Such
a use therefore would not take place as with the strong in the firm conviction
({Greek:] pistis) that they are not sinning, but in doubt. People eating meat
and doing so without firm conviction is what Paul calls sin. Consequently, this
text presupposes the antithesis in that which is pistic and is far from saying that
the subpistic in opposition with the pistic should be called sinful!
2. The diversity in the schema “this-that" is also only dual when we
form groups: for example, by the grouping in the schema "I / not-I," which
changes every time one takes an other I-sayeras starting point. This schema
coincides then in only one instance with the opposition good-evil, namely,
when Christ sets himself over against his surroundings: “Can any of you
prove me guilty of sin?" [John 8:46]. Consequently the basis for this does
notlie in this schema.
B, The irreducibility of the antithetic duality to either of the first di-

versities in combination.
In this structure, that of the subject unit, nothing is given that is dual,
other than the difference between the twofirst diversities themselves. But
this is in no way antithetic.
II. The irreducibility of the antithetic duality to either of the basic con-
nections as such (A) and their combined occurrence (B).
A. Again, we first will discuss the irreducibility of the new diversity to
each of the basic connections themselves.
1. In discussing interrelations we talked more than once of dual differ-
ences: for example, of the dual difference between interindividual and in-
traindividual, between inner and outer, between contemporary and succes-
sive interrelations. However, the groups in none of these differences stand
over against each other as good and evil. And this is no less the case when
it comesto the duality of direction in the interrelation.
Comment 2: The opinion,still often found among philosophers, that the mar-
riage bond is something evil is to be rejected. This notion is rooted in the de-
sire for autocracy (self-sufficiency), which when consistently applied must re-
sult in the destruction of every interrelation.
2. As for vertical connections, distinguish subject (a) and object (b) and
the interrelation between these two(c).
a) The subject. Retrocipation and anticipation offer a point of connec-
tion {o the extent that here again we are dealing with a dual difference that
is, in addition, a difference of direction. it is therefore also not surprising
that paganism time and again thoughtthat it was here on thetrack ofthe op-
position of good and evil. In this context we should distinguish two con-
ceptions. The one denies the schema of substratum and superstratum for one
or more of the higher functions, hence maintaining a partial apriorism, and
sees evil in the connection of what it takes to be apriori with that which is
not apriori, while the higher distances itself from the lower (ascetically and
in death) is seen as the good. The other conception, in contrast, thinks in
an ascending manner: the higher is seen to be the later, Sometimes it sees
the good in the connection of that which is lower with that which is
higher—that which is highest here is not only that which is later, but also
the goal towards which that which is lower has to strive. Sometimesit takes
the same connection to be evil: by directing itself to that which is higher,
that which is lower denies its basis, to which it must return.
Both conceptions, the partial aprioristic as well as the ascending con-
ception, are to be rejected: retrocipation and anticipation have only to do
with the mutual connection of the functions and not with the opposition be-
tween good and evil. Both theories then are also connected with uranic and
tellurian themes of paganistic religion.
Comment 3: The retrocipation of that which is higher to that which is loweris
therefore not “bodily” and the anticipation of that which is lower to that which
is higher (or of that which is higher to that which is still higher} is not
“spiritual”! In Holy Scriptures these terms have a completely different mean-
ing (see Col. 2:23). So also, to “not be brought under the power of any" (1
Cor. 6:12) is something completely different from partial aprioristic ascetism.
b) The object. This does not have anything dual aboutit and therefore
does notlend itself for speculative connection with the schema good-evil.
c) The connection between subject and object. It has one dual dif-
ference, namely, the difference in the direction of both interrelations: here
and there it was also connected with the difference between good and evil.
In this regard there are even two conceptions that stand in opposition to each
other. The one (objectivism) overestimates the object, making it the law for
the subject; the other, in contrast, like e.g. the theory of seif-objectification,
subjectivistically conceives the relationship in the reverse way. Both con-
ceptions are to be rejected: the law stands above the difference in subject
and object, both of which are subject to the law, and hence does notlie in
the object. On the other hand, the object proved above [§66] to be some-
thing completely other than the result of the breakdown of a world subject.
B. The irreducibility of the antithetic duality to both basic connections
occurring together.
In this structure, namely, that of figure and thing, nothing is given that
is dual other than the difference between the two basic connections them-
selves. But that is in no way antithetic.
in Summary: The antithetic diversity cannot be reduced to either of the
other diversities or to their connections.
89. The irreducibility of both of the other diversities to the difference good-
evil
The fact that it was possible to discuss these diversities, their combined
occurrence, their connections and their combined occurrence in figure and
thing, without taking into accountthe difference in the third schema shows
already that these cannot be reducedto the later.
90. The mutual irreducibility of the diversities in the three schemas
This follows from the two previous paragraphs.
91. The combined occurrence of these diversities
Here too irreducibility does not exclude a combined occurrence. Obe-
dience, just like disobedience, is neither a thing nor a function. In the case
of man, it is a direction in his functions.
Comment: The irreducibility requires that a "fhird dimension" be dis-
tinguished in the schemata. However, the combined occurrence Tequires that
Isagoogeé Philosophiae
this be possible in the schemata. To that end we now emphasizethe difference
between left and right, which was never rejected and was implicit in the
schemata from the beginning. We limit ourselves to drawing this difference in
the case of one function: denoting the two directions of the third determinant
with horizontal arrows pointing in opposite directions; not in the curves ofthe
interrelations, but in the function-line.| | } | | |
92. Terminology. "heart," "thing," and "man"

A. On earth we meet the good-evil opposition between people as well as
in people.
Because good and evil, in spite of the sharp opposition between them,
are both included under the "direction of human life” and becausethe differ-
ence in direction does not originate in the functions, which are rather deter-
mined by this difference in antithetical direction, we must look for some in-
dication of that which directs these functions for good and for evil and
which must, hence, itself lie before—of if you prefer, behind—all human
functions,
Here too Holy Scripture points the way. Simply think of the passage:
"Out of the heart are the issues oflife" [Prov. 4:23].
Comment |: The “issues of life" does not refer here to the funetions as
such—for then every thing would have a heart—but to the two religious direc-
tions in which the functions work in the case of man.
B. Although the structure of a human being, if we overlook the heart,
corresponds, as was seen, with that of things in that it too is functional, we
now understand how it can be that a human being is more than a thing:
what makesits structure differ from that of things is the heart in the sense of
“that which is prefunctional."
Comment 2: Instead of “heart” in this sense of the term—it does have
another meaning—you can sometimesalso say “soul” and “spirit.” But if you
use these words in the sense intended here, remember thatthey are identical
with heart and not with higher functions, like the supra-organic, suprapsychic,
or supra-juridic. Those who forget that fall into functionalism, overlook what
is peculiar about man, and end up in a teleological or ascetic pseudo-religion.
93. The relationship, in the case ofman, ofheart (soul) andthe rest (body)
The above also throwsscriptural light on the relationship between soul
and body.
Both have in common with each other that they only occur with human
beings (as members ofthe cosmos created with time).
The difference between these two, at least to the extent that it can be
discussed here, lies in the fact that the soul is prefunctional, while the body,
in contrast, is functional.
fsagooge Phiiosophiae
As far as the relationship of soul and body is concerned: it follows

from the above that they are not related to each other as higher group func-
tions and lower group functions, but as that which determines the direction
and that which in the same person is so determined in its direction. Hence
the connection between them both is intraindividual, Yet it is not an
intraindividual connection between functions or between constituents, mo-
ments, etc. For while the connections discussed previously al! lay in the
area of the functions, this connection is one by which theentire cloak of the
functions (2 Cor.5:1-8) is nothing more than oneoftherelata.
94, The relationship of men and things

This can only be fruitfully discussed after the structure of the kingdoms
and that of mankind in the cosmos is dealt with. That is why we now turn
our attention to these manners.
Division I
The Structure of the Kingdoms
and of Humankind
95. Introduction
In the previous division we dealt with the structure of things and man.
In so doing the concrete existence of that which is subject in an earthly way
was already approached in an important way. Yet in no way can it be said
that we have arrived. Thing and man are after all individual creatures but
both stand in genetic connection with other things and men and they also
take their own place in religion. Consequently these twotraits have to be
discussed in any case if we want to see that which is subject in an earthly
way in its concreteness,
CHAPTER I
THE STRUCTURE OF THE KINGDOMS
96. Survey
That which is subject in an earthly way, thing and man, does not stand
byitself, but is included genetically under one or another kingdom.
Consequently we have to discuss the variety of these kingdoms and
then their mutual connection.
Draft D JHK Transiation Page 226
Section |
The Variety of the Kingdoms
97. Introduction
That which is subject in an earthly way displays a variety of genetic
connections or kingdoms: the kingdom of physical things, that of plants,
that of animals, and that of human beings.
To the extent these genetic connections are all "kingdoms" there is a
similarity; to the extent a variety exists there is also a diversity.
Let us first of all ask about what is clear concerning this similarity and
this difference on the basis of what we have found up until now. Naturally
the answerobtained in this way will not be sufficient: the kingdom connec-
tion includes more. Yet that more stands out more clearly when we first see
how far what we discussed above reaches.
98. Points of similarity and difference between the kingdoms to the extent
that both ofthese can be clarified
A. Wecan state:
1. Concerning the similarity: the things that belong to one kingdom all
have a leading function in the same modality.
2. Concerning the diversity: the things belonging to different kingdoms
differ in the modality of the leading function.
B. Thinking through both statements further, we find:
ad 1: similarity with the things of one kingdom in:
a. the numberof subject functions and object functions;
b. evidences in everything of vertical connection between these
functions;
c. the structure of each of these functions in connection with the
numberand the nature of the anticipations and retrocipations;
d. the modal determination of the intraindividual and in-
terindividual interrelations.
ad 2: difference with the things belonging to diverse kingdoms in the same
points.
99. Another point ofsimilarity and difference
Up until now we have not discussed the genetic connection in the case
of things and human beings. However, this connection is present among
both things and people. If we take that into account now as well, then we
find two points.
1. Ali things, except for the first ones, arose and arise from previous
things. In other words, the rule “nothing comes from nothing," which obvi-
ously does not hold for the creating of the first things—that being a work of
isazgoogé Philosophiae
God—does hold without limit for later things. There is only one exception,
which we will get to below.
2. The genesis of these things takes place within the realm to which
that thing belongs. That is to say, the things of one realm, and this holds
for people too, agree in this that they are not genetically interrelated with the
things of the other realms.
Comment: This formulation is negative. That has to do with the fact that in
the nonhuman realms we do find a variety of genetic series or true
(genotypical, not phenotypical) species. While there is no compelling reason
to assume that these series were previously genetically interrelated, that is the
case for human blood groups.
100. What ihe genetic connection includes

Whattypifies the genetic connection is the evolving of the younger
thing out of one or more previously existing things.
Comment: This evolving is totally different from the process taught by sup-
porters of the functionalistic theory of evolution and of a certain kind of meta-
physics. Their claim is that the superstrate functions of the same thing pro-
ceed out of the substrate spheres (epiphenominalism) or, in the aforementioned
metaphysics, that the lower set of the presumed apriori group of functions pro-
ceeds from the higherpart ofthis group.
The genetic connection always includes the transition of one or more
things out of an intraindividual interrelation into an interindividual interre-
lation.
Whentwo or moreare involved in the genesis of a youngerthing, then
an additional transition takes place. The constituents of the later thing,
which originally were interrelated in an interindividual manner, together
take on an intraindividual interrelation.
101. The transition from an intraindividual interrelation to an interindi-
vidual interrelation present in every case of genesis
This transition, which is not connected with the other one, is found
among physical things as weil as organisms and lower level animals.
An example of this transition in the realm of physical things is when
atoms give off electrons. This process makes genetic sense for the emitting
stuff, the mother atom, because via this atomic “disintegration,” as daughter
atom, it becomes another element.
Comment 1: "Individuality" does not mean "indivisibility.“
Comment 2: Due to a change in our concept of elements, the formerly popu-
lar view that physical matter was devoid of genesis proves to be unfounded.
Matteris that which is physicalin its technico-historic object function.
In the realms of organisms and lower animal species we speak in analo-
fous cases of asexual reproduction.
102. Genesis with transition from an interindividual to an intraindividual in-

ierrelation
A. Wefind this kind of transition with chemical compounds.
1. In the simplest cases this is a rorai connection between two or more
differing things that each consist of only one element, each of which is dif-
ferent.
Comment I: The chemist is not at all interested in the individual path of such
a thing. He is focuses on the how-to of the connection and on the practical
uses of the resulting product. In contrast, the representatives of the relevant
special sciences (physicists and mathematicians) are much more interested in
questions having to do with the individuality of these physical things.
Both thingsfirst stood in an interindividual interrelation, but now take
on an intraindividual interrelation, so that they become one individual thing.
This change manifests itself in all the functions. Not only the physical
function changes, but also the spatial (2 shift in configuration), and likewise
the arithmetic (unit).
2. In other cases the connection is nor total, Then only parts of the
original things enter an intraindividual interrelation. Only these parts make
the transition from inter- to intraindividual interrelation, the remainder of
the original things does not.
That is why in these cases these transitions are accompanied by transi-
tions in the opposite direction. The parts that together took on an intraindi-
vidual interrelation now stand in interindividual interrelation to the rest of
the things from which they came (chemical decomposition).
B. Analogies of these kinds of connections can be found in other realms
as well.
I, [They are there] in the realm of plants and animals to the extent that
reproduction is sexual.
Comment 2: Just as with a chemical connection, there is no increase for
plants, animals, or for human beings, in the number of modally differing func-
tions.
Comment 3: The laws of Mendel deal with, among other things, changes in
the supraphysical functions of organisms, animals, and human beings.
2. With the respective differences being considered, the same happens
with human reproduction. This, of course, has to do with man as a living
soul, in other words, with man as whole, inclusive of the soul in the sense of
heart.
Comment 4: Reproduction for humans is not limited to the body. An
(individualistic) clamor for the opposite opinion regarding the creation of
Adam does not hold water. The origin of later human beingsis different from
that of Adam, for they all stem from Adam and Eve. There is only one ex-
ception to this rule, namely, the holy reception of the fatherly factor in the
Isagoogé Philosephiae
case of the Mediator according to his human nature. On the other hand, this
occurrence does not contradict the rule. Rather it confirms it: Christ, in
contrastto us, had to parallel Adam.
103. The correlation active-passive in this transition

Up until now we considered both constituents of the new thing as ac-
tive; hence the expression, “take on an intraindividual interrelation." This
terminology is also appropriate when the activity of one of the respective
constituents develops earlier than the other.
The schema ofactive-passive, however, can have a part to play in these
connections. For example, that happens when the future constituents of the
new unit are emitted by the original things.
Section 2
The Connection Between the Different Kingdoms
104, Introduction
Although there are no genetic connections between these kingdoms,
they are nevertheless tied to each other. That is obvious from the many re-
lations between things belonging to different realms.
These relations are primarily twofold. In the one case there is an
affinity among subjects from the various realms. In the other case the sub-
ject-object relation predominates.
105. This connection with respect to the affinity of subjects from different
kingdoms
There are many cases to distinguish here.
1. The connection is one of involuntary cooperation. The warmth gen-
erated by the sun, the ground loosened by the roots of lupines, and the col-
lection of honey by bees are al] examples. These fit in with certain expres-
sions of human activity and to that extent work together with it.
Comment: In these cases avoid an anthropomorphic interpretation of the ac-
tivity of the nonhuman things involved in this cooperation.
2. There is also a connection when the relation between subject func-
tions of things from various realms is coupled with the correlation active-
passive, as, for example, when growers and breeders intentionally promote
the growth ofplants and animals.
3. The affinity is even stronger when the interrelation between these
kinds of subject functions moves from interindividual to intraindividual.
These interrelations recently came to the forefront because of advances in
nutrition theory. Many inorganic salts proved to be vital for the healthy
functioning of organisms, animals, and human beings. So also, a number of
vitamins are necessary for preserving the organic function, and therewith the
existence, of man and animal.
106. This connection in the subject-object relation
In by far the most cases the connection between the different realms
Tuns via the subject-object relation. Here, the activity of a member of a
higher realm—man, animal, or plant—directs itself to one or more things of
another realm in their object function. These kind of interrelations exist
between all realms. A plant will use a stone to support or protectitself and
animals use plants for food and nests. But this connection plays an even
more important part in the relationship of people to things in the nonhuman
realms.
107. The place of the subject-object relation in the relationship ofhuman life
to the things of the remaining kingdoms
In the organic law sphere people, animals, and plants are subjects,
while physical things are objects. In the psychic law sphere people and ani-
mais function as subjects, while plants in addition to physical things function
as objects. Qua subject [functions], there is a parallel between man, plant,
and animal in the organic, and likewise another parallel in the psychic be-
tween man and animal.
There are no parallels in the suprapsychic [spheres]. Human beings
alone are subject there. The things from all the other earthly realms are pre-
sent only as objects. In addition, the number of object functions in these
higher spheres is larger than in the lower ones. That explains the great sig-
nificance of the subject-object relation in and for human life.
Complete insight into what this relation encompasses here obviously is
not possible as long as the theory of objects is not yet elaborated. So I will
limit myself here to outlining it briefly just for the analytic and historic law
spheres, both of which are of particular importance for human societal con-
nections.
108. The subject-object relation specifically in the analytic and historic law
sphere
A. Human knowing, as will become clear when we deal with the theary
of knowledgelater, in no way depends entirely on the subject-object rela-
tion. Understanding neighbors and oneself are obvious counter-examples.
But nevertheless this relation plays an important part in human knowing. If
physical things, plants, and animals did not function as objects in the ana-
lytic law sphere, even nonscientific knowledge about these realms would be
out of the question. Not to mention that know-how would lack its immedi-
ate foundation.
B. The subject-objectrelation is likewise not the only relation in the his-

toric law sphere. Cooperation is primarily a relation of subject-to-co-sub-
ject. This is not to say that the subject-object relationship is any less im-
portant here. OF course, its character in the historic law sphere is different
from what it is in the analytic law sphere: it is not directed to the subject
knowing the object, but to the subject mastering the object, and in so doing
includes a mastery of analytic life. When attention turns to the past, the
subject-object relation in the historic law sphere is present as reconstruction;
when human interest looks to the future, it is evident as know-how. This
too, given its significance for Western culture, requires broader discussion
below. But we note here already that know-how,too, stands or falls with
the subject-object relation in the historic [law sphere]. Withoutthis rejation,
further mastery of physical things (in this case matter), of plants, and of
animals would be impossible.
CHAPTER 2
THE STRUCTURE OF HUMANKIND
109. Introduction
The human race is not only connected with other kingdoms, but con-
structs in part upon this basis many societal connections, among which the
completion of his task is divided. Now, this task is given to humankind by
God. Hence, even more important than these connections is the relation in
which the human race religiously stands to God. Consequently, we have
now to deal with these connections and with religion.
Section 1
The Societal Connections
110. Survey
Wewill discuss respectively: the character of these connections, their
diversity, their mutual relationship, and their relation to religion.
111, The character
The connections to be discussed occur only in human life. They are
founded historically, contain in addition to this function also the lingual and
social, and intend cooperation in a supra-lingual sense.
In like manner, all these connections display the following traits. They
are connections of power by virtue of their historic basis. Their lingual
character comes out in the fact that consultation, conviction, and convincing
are everywhere present as constitutive factors. These connections derive the
Draft D JHK Translation Frage 232
commontrait and presence of the authority-respect correlation from the so-

cial function, Furthermore, the leading function of such a connection de-
termines its destination. Finally, those who bear authority, not without
contact with those who pay respect, of course, have to positivize and to
maintain the law that holds for that particular connection.
Comment 1: In order to distinguish the (theory about the) connections from
the (theory aboutthe) things, we can better call the leading function of a con-
nection the “prevailing function.”
Comment 2: Authority and those who bear authority should be clearly distin-
guished, The presence of the correlation authority-respect rests on the siruc-
ture of the cosmos and, hence, goes back to a creation ordinance. Those who
bear authority, however, are people picked out and acknowledged by others.
The fact that the office exists and is filled “by the grace of God" in no way im-
plies that office bearers have something divine within themselves, as the theory
about "the kingship of God's grace” posits.
Comment 3: Part of the task of those who bear authority is to maintain the
positivized laws. This includes two facets:
a) If the positivized laws no longer fit in the changed constellation or if they
display lacunas, then they ought to be replaced or amended. Maintaining laws
that are out of date brings injustice with it.
b) Office bearers have to maintain the connection against those belonging to
that connection whotry to withdraw themselves from requirements that the co-
operation in this connection sets.
For example, the state can not limit itself to simply making list of those
who refuse to serve in the military, Whoever does this, whatever the motive,
must also bear the consequences, e.g. being declaredstateless.
Given the fact that living together and ordered cooperation stand in the
foreground in these connections, the interhuman relation, that of subject to
subject, is dominant. Meanwhile, the subject-object relation is not absent
here either. The number of classes of object functions is, as we found ear-
lier, even greater in these spheres than in the subhistoric. This relation, too,
is in the societal connections supra-historic in nature, bearing a dominating
character, An example may clarify this. Business is one such societal con-
nection. Now physical things, plants, and animals possess an object func-
tion in the economic by virtue of their structure, hence, independentof all
human activity, They are economic goods. Were this not the case, there
could be notalk of price. Yet the price of these goods is something other
than the goods themselves, The “price” is determined by the need of the
human subjects, who can intentionally raise and lowerit.
These connections then, clearly display their supra-historic character in
their primary interhuman relations as well as in their secondary relation to
nonhuman things. Because of that decision-making stands in the foreground
of the first and activity in the foreground of the second. Given the fact,
however, that the social also relies on the analytic, both relations are in no
way irrational in nature.
112. The diversity
Here too, there are more than one of these connections. The founda-
tion is the same for all. In addition, often the same people are involved in
different connections. Consequently, the basis for this diversity can not lie
here, but must be sought elsewhere. Further investigation shows that this
diversity must be attributed to the difference in prevailing function.
For clubs and associations the prevailing function is the social; for
business and factory, the economic; for the artist's guild, the aesthetic; for
the state, the juridic; for the family, the ethical: and for the cultic connec-
tion, the pistic function.
Now each of these connections includes all of the human functions
between the historic and its destination function. Thus, most of these con-
nections also agree with each other in that they have morethan just the his-
toric, lingual, and social function in common. Factory, artist's guild, state,
family, and cultic connection all possess also an economicside; all of these
connections except the factory, also a juridic aspect; and both family and
cultic connection, an ethical function. Meanwhile, such communal areas, as
well as the historic and the lingual, certainly do differ from each other, due
to the fact that all of these functions are also determined differently on the
basis of the difference in destination function. That is why, for example,
justice for the cultic community is not the same as for the family and dif-
ferent again than that for the state.
Correlate with this double difference, namely, in destination function
and in the functions in between, is also the fact that the task of the office
bearers in each connection is unique. That is why a previous generation al-
ready, following Kuyper,rightly spoke of "sphere sovereignty.”
In practical life this adage soon got a strongly negative connotation.
But sphere sovereignty, also today, is truly not devoid of meaning. Yet,
here too, we oughtto see the position as the basis for the negation. This
principle means in the first place that those in authority in each institution
have to positivize the laws holding for that connection in consultation with
those who pay respect.
Comment 1; Kuyper's adage haslost nothing ofits power, even for ourtime.
Wecan soonersay thatits significance has increased. Think only ofthe re-
sponse that this conception received elsewhere: the rise of "the subsidiarity
principle” among Roman Catholics and the move for “functional decentraliza-
tion" in socialistic circles, Also, its significance was clarified in many ways
now that the younger generation of Kuyper's followers also took this thought
seriously in the theory of functions.
Comment 2: To avoid misunderstanding we ought more sirongly than did
Kuyper to distinguish sovereignty and autonomy. The first has to do with
modal differences, the second with individual differences. Family and factory
are both sovereign in their own realm; the first is ethically qualified, the sec-
ond is qualified economically. Within the circle of both connections, however,
exists a great diversity: there are many famities and many factories and busi-
nesses. Naturally, it makes no sense, in fact it is confusing, to also call the
freedom of the different families with respect to each other's internal rules
"sovereignty." In any case, there is a difference here and a distinction also in
terminology can only clarify things further. We find these differences else-
where as well. States have the same sovereignty, namely, juridic sovereignty.
However, with respect to each other they are not sovereign but autonomous,
as are the provinces within the territory of the samestate.
Comment 3: Autonomy should also be sharply distinguished from two other
matters.
(i) from Autonomyin the sense of the self-sufficiency declaration of men with
respect to God. This autonomy stands over against Heteronomy, that is to
say, the acknowledgment that the law is set by God and not by us, like auton-
omy tn the sense of being qualified to formulate rules for one’s ownterritory
stands over against heteronomy, standing under the laws of anotherterritory.
In this way we can understand that degenerate thought, basingitself on Auton-
omy, landed up time and again in Heteronomy. In contrast, Calvinism, pro-
ceeding from Heteronomy, was able to maintain both sphere sovereignty and
autonomy and in so doing, in a land as ours, whereit had great influence, be-
came and remained the “origin and security of our constitutional freedoms.”
(ii) from Autarky, that is to say, wanting to be self-sufficient. Included in
autonomy is the acknowledgment of being juxtaposed with other connections,
but autarky, temporarily or not, denies this juxtaposition.
113. The reciprocal relationship

It is twofold, namely, genetic and static. Societal connections are
given, be it potentially, with the structure of the human body, by virtue of
creation. But because they must becomerealized in their diversity by hu-
manity itself, we will discuss the genetic relationshipfirst.
A. The genetic relationship is determined by the genesis of full human
life. It is rooted in sexual reproduction that, as we saw, also has a prefunc-
tional side to it. The family is the institution in which man and woman
provetroth to each other. But that does not constitute the role of the family.
For whenever husband and wife are also parents, they also nurture their
children in the family connection. This nurturing aims to prepare their chil-
dren for living not only in their own family, but also in all of the other so-
cial institutions. That is why for the future unfolding of human life immea-
sureably much depends on this nurturing; and likewise, in this nurturing, on
answering the question whether this task is seen by both parents and whether
in so doing they have an eye for the uniqueness ofthe different institutions.
Comment 1: Nurturing is then the task of the family, primarily that of the par-
ents, in the second place, that of eventual brothers, sisters, and family helpers.
If the nurturing is endangered, by death, sickness, or also through neglect,
then other families, first of all among the relatives, have to lend a helping
hand. Only when this kind of help is not present does the cultic connection
have a task, and in its absence the state, because otherwise these connections,
too, as well as the others, eventually will suffer. This task is, however, an
extremely limited one. {t does not imply that these connections take the nur-
turing upon themselves, but only that they entrust the child to another family.
Comment 2: As children grow up, schools assist families with their children's
education. This assistance too, itself the result of the cooperation of many
parents if things are right, is not there to take the place of the family, but to
lighten and support the nurturing of the children by the family.
The principle of sphere sovereignty does have very special significance for
the school. It affects its relative independence with respect to sister institu-
tions, as is the case for the other life connections, butit also affects the goal of
its work, Education aims primarily at sharpening the ability to distinguish and
at conveying distinctions, But without distinguishing their destination, it is im-
possible to realize societal connections and, tied to that, the unfolding of hu-
manlife in the following generation, which the school, of course, is there to
heip educate. Consequently, in the near future the school plays only a sup-
portive, but importantpart in this realization.
B. Thestatic relationship can be defined positively as well as negatively.
1. Positively, this relationship ought to be one of genuine cooperation.
For all of these connections aim at developing different components of hu-
man life.
This cooperation includes two things:
(a) fulfilling one's own task. A state cannotflourish if economiclife, orga-
nized by trade and industry, does not grow. Family life, too, languishes
when thepistic connection falls short.
(b) acknowledging the unique task of the other connections. After all, they
owe neither their origin nor their continued existence to the goodwill of an-
other connection. Consequently, none of these connections have to seek
permission from any of the others to act or advance.
This double requirement does not only hold for the area of the prevail-
ing function, but also for the activity of different [societal] connections in
those law spheres that they have in common. Hence, cooperation does not
only imply that state, family, and cultic connection recognize each other's
unique nature, but also that they respect each others bylaws. That is why
particularly those who recognize both stipulations in all of these connections
have an important task. Loss is inevitable for those who do not acknowl-
edge them.
2. Negatively, two things are to be taken into account.

(a) In a preventive way, every connection has to keep from getting involved
in the internal arrangements of areas where other connections have compe-
tence. This is especially true for those arenas characterized by the prevailing
function of another [societal] connection. All the more so, any attempt to
sideline another connection by going beyond one's own competenceis for-
bidden.
(b) Once the correct relationship is disturbed, the threatened connection
should oppose the high-handed moves of the other one with any fitting
means available,
Remark 3: Repeatedly during the course of centuries cultic connections, in-
cluding pagan ones, were quick to guard against state interference in its do-
main—its ecclesiastical rights. On the other hand, more than a few times a
numberofstates waged a tough battle against the powerpolitics ofpistic office
bearers in political affairs. Along the same lines, families in the nineteenth
century protested against state-directed nurturing programs, while the state it-
self took action against the pretense of business and industry when the gov-
ernment had to prevent laborers from being so wrapped up in the demands of
industry that they had no timeleft to participate in thelife of the state.
This kind of resistance becomes more intense and varied when one
connection in functional life strives to be totalitarian, which is to say, tries
to crowd out all of the other connections; something that happens easiest
with the state for it already includes all the citizens. This kind of struggle
runs deepest, however, when, on top ofthis, one institution wants to be re-
ligious and in spite of its own functional character also attempts to involve
the heart.
114. The relation ofthese connections to religion
Wehave mentioned the human heart twice already: the first time when
dealing with the structure of man [§92] and the second when man's genesis
was being discussed [§102},
Societal connections, too, have something to do with the heart. For
although they carry a functional character, the realization of these connec-
tions is [rooted in] the obedient or disobedient response to a task given by
God and entrusted to the human raceofall ages. It is here, in carrying out
this task, that the direction of the human heart is decisive.
One case in point is how the struggle about the competence of connec-
tions has and continues to play a part in human life, and particularly when
the claim of totality from any connection also touches what is prefunctional
in human life. But even irrespective of the confusion about competence, the
question is always: In which direction is this or that [societal] connection
headed?
Tsagoogé Phiiosophiae
Heretoo,it is the law of God that decides what is good and evil. More
specifically, the second table of the ten commandments, which, in contrast
to the first, does not address man in his relationship with God directly, but
in his relationship to his fellow man.
Hence, in the first place, we have to ask about the contentof this law.
It reads, in the summary given by Christ (Matt. 22:39) and in accordance
with the Old Testament (Lev. 19:18): "Love your neighbor as yourself."
Three points respectively draw our attention here: the concept "neighbor,"
the "as," and the requirement "to love."
The neighbor, as well as those addressed in this commandment, is the
whole person to the extent we are placed in his or her proximity during the
divinely directed course of our lives.
"As"—Greek hoos—is not talking about an amount, as if it were
pointing in the direction of the “correct mean" between egoism and altruism.
Scripture does not see the arithmetic [sphere] as !aw for the rest. This term
means something else, namely, "in the same way as." This presupposes that
we also ought to love ourselves—of course, in the same way as we love our
neighbor. As a result, this Aoos requires a criterion that lies beyond the one
love [of self] as well as the other love (of neighbor]. The intent is that we
are 10 love ourselves and our neighbor as image of God, that is, to the extent
we and they, as children, are like unto the Father in Heaven.
Love. Take note of two things: love's antithetical structure and its
prefunctional character.
Thestructure of this love is antithetical. That is, the commandthat re-
quires me to love my neighbor and myself to the extent that we display traits
of our Father, also requires that I hate my neighbor and myself to the extent
that we display the opposite.
The character of this love is prefunctional. It does not coincide with
our functional existence, because love [or hate] defines that existence. Nor
should we equate this love with a specific functional relationship, e.g., with
ethical relationships, and certainly not with a sexual-ethical relation-
ship—although this love permeates both of these. Scripture neverrefers to
the secondtable of the law—andcertainly not all of the ten commandments
together—as the “moral law."
if we summarize the above then it appears that the task of bringinglife
connections to realization ought to be carried out according to the second
table of the ten commandments. That is what the law requires. Which is
not to say that this law is always observed. For even in relationship to that
part of the law that has to do with the relationship to one's neighbor, obedi-
ence as well as disobedienceis present.
Ultimately, these two do not stand alone. The same is true for the cor-
relate part of the law. For just as the law, to the extent that it demands lov-
ing our neighbor, is dominated by the command to iove God aboveall, so

also is one's relationship to his neighbor dependent on religion.
Consequently, practicing the task of neighborly love is not identical
with religion. But it is directly determined by religion,
With that we cometo our discussion ofreligion.
Section 2
Religion
A. INTRODUCTION
115. The line of thought

As Bible believers we continually reckoned with the word of God in
the foregoing. But the actions of God it presupposes and their correlate on
the part of man have not yet been discussed in detail.
The reason for this was primarily that not everything that can be ob-
served in creation can be dealt with at the same time. But why postponethe
discussion of religion to the very end? Certainly not because it is oflittle
significance. No, because it dominates the whole of human existence, it was
appropriate to first analyze that which is dominated.
We must now also examine religion more closely. For howevergreat
the diversity we have found so far in the basic structure of the earthly sub-
ject, we havecertainly not grasped the earthly subjectin its full concreteness
as long as religion has not been discussed.
In addressing ourselves to this part of our task, we must emphasize be-
forehand that it is impossible, in a study like this one, to give anything ap-
proaching a complete discussion of religion. We will restrict ourselves to a
summary of essentials. For the time being, we must limit ourselves to the
most important questions in this regard, namely 1) What is religion? 2)
What does it presuppose? 3) Whatisits structure? When these questions are
answered, the division of the remaining material will also be clear.
116. Wharreligion is
Religion is the relationship of mankind to the first and great com-
mandment: "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with
all your soul, and with all your mind, and with all your might."
From this summary of the first table of the law, which was given by
Christ (Matt. 22:37}—following the Old Testament (Deut. 6:5)—it is plain
that God appears here as the God of the covenant. Therefore religion is the
relationship of mankind to the God ofthe covenant in obedience and disobe-
dienceto his fundamental law oflove.
117. Whatis presupposed in such a covenant

In such a covenant there is presupposed:
A. The existence of God and his creative activity.
The activity of Logos and Spirit play a special role in the latter (Ps.
33:6). This creating does not of course presuppose the existence of anything
apart from God, e.g. matter that can be formed.
B. The result of this activity, i.e. the existence of Heaven and earth, and
Specifically (as far as the earth is concerned) the existence of man.
This man who with all his interrelated functions was formed by God
out of the earth and who becamea living soul by God's breathing into his
nostrils the breath of life, already with respect to this structure of his, dif-
fered from all other creatures. Moreover, he was created from the beginning
in the image of God, so that his nature was good and he, being created, ad-
dressed and directed to the good of God, could reflect in the covenant, as the
concrete correlate of the Friune God, his glory on earth (cf. 2 Cor. 3:18),
and could satisfy the requirementof his law in original righteousness.
Comment 1: The text cited does not refer to beholding, but to reflecting the
glory of God (specifically in the Mediator).
Comment 2: The formulation “being (created) in the image of God,” indi-
cating a relational state, is to be preferred over “the image of God,” since the
latter is an abstraction, a usage that has provedhistorically to have its dangers.
This danger becameparticularly acute when people wholaid the emphasis on
“image” then also lost sight ofits being related to God, subsequently began to
ask what that image might be and sometimes ended up identifying it with a
specific group of functions, or even with a supposedly innate understanding,
C. Theestablishment of the covenant between God and man onthe part of
God, including the appointmentof an office-bearer.
Comment 3: We should distinguish here God and his covenantrelation to the
human race—a possible absolutization of the covenantis thereby ruled out.
Comment 4; In the case of man we should likewise distinguish being-in-the-
image {initially of God) and office. The former belongs to the nature of man,
and is therefore te be found in every man, whereas only the first and the sec-
ond Adam were invested with the prefunctional office here referred to. The
mutual relationship of these twois that the first makes possible the second, and
is therefore presupposedin it.
A failure to observe the difference in question can occur in two ways:
a. Being-in-the-image is subsumed under office, in that case the former does
not belong to the nature of man, and can, like the office, be lost (Roman
Catholicism).
b. Office is subsumed under being-in-the-image; in that case the latter becomes
supra-individual. However, this is impossible in the case of a nature, since a
nature does not denote a relation.
118. The structure of such a covenant

As in every covenant, so in a religious covenantthere are, after its es-
tablishment, two parties: God and the human racein its religion.
Comment 1: After what was said above, there cam be no room for mis-
construing the term “party”: though man, being both created by God and put
in covenant with him, is the correlate of God in this covenant, he is of course
in no way God's equal. The instituting of the covenant is consequently
“unilateral,” its structure is “bilateral.”
A. Present in the covenant from God's side is Logos revelation. It al-
ways involves: on the one hand the promise of blessing in the case of
covenant-faithfulness, and on the other hand the threat of curse in the case of
covenant-breaking.
Comment 2: These two “sides” must be clearly distinguished from the two
“parties.”
B. From the side of the human racein its religion, there is always an ap-
pointed bearer of the prefunctional office who must act before God in the
things that must be performed on behalf of those comprehended in the
covenant,
Comment 3: This office therefore on the one hand has to do with the re-
lationship of the office-bearer and his own to God, and on the other, with the
relation of the office-bearer to those comprehendedin the covenant.
Besides the features indicated we can find others in the history of religion
that are not constant. These features have to do, on the side of the law, with
the content of the Logos revelation and, on the side ofreligion, with the
man invested with the office, with his relationship to the Word of God, and
with the relation of those comprehended in the covenantto the office-bearer.
119. Division
On the basis of the differences indicated, we must distinguish two
covenants in the history ofreligion: the covenantof creation and that ofre-
creation.
B. THE COVENANT OF CREATION
120. Introduction
A. Character
This covenant has two characteristics: with respect to Logos revelation
there is no reference to grace (in the sense of forgiveness) or to re-creation,
and as far as religion is concerned we maynote that the personinvested with
office was the first man, that his relationship to the word of God did not
Draft D JHK Translation Page 24]
prove constant, and that all those who were represented by this office-bearer
in his office descended from him, or were to descend from him.
B. Division
Since this covenant was not kept by the office-bearer concerned, we
must distinguish here two phases; namely that before and thatafter the Fall.
121. The covenant of creation before the Fall
Two stages are to be distinguished in this period. The correlation of
Logos revelation and religion occurs in both.
A. The first stage: before the creation of Eve.
1. The Logos revelation to Adam .
When the Triune God has called Adam into being, as the initial execu-
tion of his plan to create men "in our image,after our likeness" (Gen. 1:26),
Adam speaks to him as "Lord" [Yahweh], that is, as God of the Covenant
and God mandates him to till and keep the Garden of Eden (Gen. 2:15).
The first part of this mandate, which among other things meantthat
Adam was to examine thelife of other earthly creatures, referred primarily
to the relationship of Adam to an (admittedly limited number of) his fellow-
creatures (in a field that was still very restricted).
As to the second part, matters were different. It evidently referred to a
danger that was threatening from elsewhere, and consisted in this, that a part
of the world of angels had not remained standing in the truth, i.e. constancy
(John 8:44), and were threatening earthly life in the garden. Forthis part of
the mandate is followed immediately by the probationary command (Gen.
2:16 and 17}, in which the region is indicated where the attack of the enemy
can be expected. The revelation of the death penalty in case of transgression
was an additional incentive to stand firm in the face of a possible temptation
and thus to gain the blessing—to live eternally in God's favor. This
"keeping," therefore, directly touched Adam's relationship to God and his
prefunctionat office, as prophet, priest, and king, to be faithful to him.
This mandate was in both parts a demonstration of God's favor.
Comment 1: Hence the covenant of creation can also be called "covenant of
favor," although in my opinion the former term is to be preferred, both be-
cause it is more comprehensive, and because the conception of "favor" in this
meaning, namely "grace," is sometimes used in a2 broader sense than that of
“favor forfeited by sin." Whichever term is chosen, however, the doing of
worksin this covenant was not (nor does the term “covenant of works,” it in
any case did not arise until later, mean what, judging from experience, it tends
to suggest, namely) an earning of God's favor, but the execution of a double
task that was assigned to Adam by virtue of that favor. For obedience there
was the promise of blessing (victory over the enemy and the inability any
longerto die); as punishment for disobedience, on the other hand, was fixed
the curse (succumbing in the struggle, perishing in the wrath of God in the
first death).
2. Religion
It consisted in the acceptance, in faith, of task and office.
Comment 2; Then, just as now, faith meant holding for truth all that God has
revealed in his word, and relying on his favor; on the other hand, of course,
there is not yet any question offaith in “grace” (in the sense of forgiveness).
When Adam names the animals, he also pays attention to the genetic
connection between the older and younger generation, and on that basis to
the cooperation of the sexes. He then notices that he lacks the possibility of
such cooperation (Gen.2:20).
Comment 3: Holy Scripture does not represent Adam as an asexual being
preceding the differentiation of the sexes or elevated above it (monogenic in
the speculative sense attached to it by Parmenides and others): Adam is a
male, who feels keenly the need of a woman as helper,
Consequently, after this lack has been noticed by Adam and God has
supplied him with what was missing, in accordance with his plan (Gen.
1:26), Adam immediately acknowledges this, joyfully as the fulfillment of
his desire (Gen.2:23),
Comment 4: The information that Eve was created out of Adam tells us that
God did not call the second human being into being separately, from the first,
but preserved the unity of mankind from the outset.
B. The second stage: after the creation of Eve.
1. The first Logos revelation to Adam and Eve,
This revelation comprised the command offruitfulness and an exten-
sion of the task.
a. The command: “Be fruitful and multiply" is issued by the Logos.
This is already a clear indication that the depreciation of marriage which is
endemic to many schools of current philosophy finds no support in Scrip-
ture. We can gain a sound perspective on marital life onlyif, preserving the
word of God, we look with wonder upon the genetic development of human
life as the result of the Spirit's action, which causes human life to flourish
(Ps. 127 and 128), both through the proliferation of mankind and through
the flourishing of the life of plants and animals which keeps pace with the
former (Deut. 7:13 and many other places).
b. Following immediately upon the command of fruitfulness is the
mandate: "subdue the earth and have dominion overthe fish of the sea,"
etc. If we comparethis task with the task Adam had been entrusted with be-
fore the creation of Eve, then it appears that it has been considerably en-
larged: the mandate is no longer confined to the garden, but also has refer-
Draft b JHK Translation Page 243
ence to the earth and the sea. This extension is no doubt related to the pos-
sibility of the development of the human race given with the creation of Eve.
2. Religion
a. It is no longer the religion of a single person, but of a married cou-
ple. This has two consequences. The first spiritual institution is rooted
from the outset in the prefunctional: wedlock is viewed here as a relation-
ship of two fellow humans both of whom arecreated in the image of God.
Comment 5: We must, of course, be careful not to identify “being-in-the-im-
age-of-God" with this interhuman institution: there is no trace in Scripture
(unlike the conceptions prevalent among many pagan peoples) of a sexual
bend in God.
On the other hand, it is only here that Adam's prefunctional office
finds its completion. For it was not until after the creation of Eve that
Adam could act before God also on behalf of another in the things that must
be performed before him on behalf of that other (those others), and thus
could become “a type of the one who was to come" (Rom. 5:14).
b. With respect to their knowledge of the antithesis of good and evil,
the following should be kept in mind. Before the Fall Adam and Eve had by
experience that which was “good,” namely, to live as children of God who
showed the love of their heart through obedience and through observing the
warnings of the Logos against the danger that threatened from the world of
the spirits. One of the ways in which they did this was that each, in their
relationship to their neighbor, did notlive for themselves, as a little world in
itself (microcosmos) or as an individual that shuts itself off from its envi-
ronment, but in mutual relationship with his or her neighbor. That neighbor
was equipped in a different way, but stood in the same relationship to God
and was subjected to the same law(s).
Nevertheless, in this period some knowledge of evil was not lacking.
To be sure, the first human beings did not possess this knowledge by experi-
ence, unlike their knowledge of the good. Yet an easily pictured act had
been forbidden them. They were aware of this prohibition, and of the fact
that death was threatened in case the act in question was performed.
Thus even before the Fall life was not without the threat of danger.
Nor was it without the royal battle in fulfilling the task in service to God,
the struggle that constitutes the meaning of history. For the future of
mankind, therefore, everything depended on the question whether Adam, the
Office-bearer, would stand in obedience on God's side in this battle against
the evil one, or would be disobedient to his Creator.
122. The covenant of creation after the Fall
A. Human life in and immediately after the Fall.
Holy Scripture, the only source for our knowledge aboutthese things,
informs us that man was deceived by Satan. Morespecifically, he was de-
ceived with the help of cunning and delusion. For by the question: "Did
God say?" the covenant relationship was swept aside as well as the word of
God robbed of its character as law. With this the road was paved for the
proclamation of the ideal of Autonomy: eritis sicut Deus ("You will be like
God"].
The actual catastrophe took place when after Eve Adam also suc-
cumbed, For with that also the head ofthe covenant proved to be unfaithful
to God, willfully disobedient to his law, and the weaker one vis-a-vis the en-
emy.
As a result of the forbidden deed Adam and Eve now nolonger stand
in a relationship of trust to God: they now fear his wrath. But also the
reciprocal interrelation suffers the consequences: sincethey first imagine, in
their delusion of sovereignty, that they will become God, they are now
alienated from each other: he who denies that he is subjected to the laws
imposed by God will also fail to see the interrelationship, for this stands
subject to the laws.
Good and evil now no longer stand in their life in the relationship of
that which is present to that which is denoted, but in that of past to present.
Tainted by sin and moreover no longer able to do the good that the com-
mandment continued to require of them, and therefore also guilty in that in-
ability, they were now subjected to death. This was a penalty that also, on
the basis of Adam's position of office, spread to Eve and all her descendants
(Rom, 5:12).
The Fall of course did not elevate men above the law: the trans-
gression of the law occurs under the law. Nor did the changein the world's
State affect the structure of man and mankind: Adam and Eve will soon be-
comethe ancestors of their descendants.
The nature of man, however, was something that, though it was not
lost, did undergo a great change. As we have seen, being-in-the-image-of-
God and standing in original righteousness to his law was initially inherent
to man’s nature. Now both of thoserelational states turned into their oppo-
site at the Fall. As far as the former is concemed, the statement of Z. Ursi-
nus applies: "Man is transformed by the Fall from a glorious image of God
to an abominable image of Satan." And as to the second state: original
righteousness was now replaced by unrighteousness.
Comment 1: This twofold refusal can
be represented diagrammatically as
follows:
Draft p JHK Translation Page 245
It goes without saying that a man with such a radically altered nature
could no longer occupy the prefunctional office, in other words, that Adam
had to be relieved of his office.
Comment 2: On the strength of the distinction between being-image and of-
fice, the Reformation here asserted against Roman Catholicism that man's na-
ture, though transformed in the bad sense, was not lost; whereas his office
was.
B. The first Logos revelation after the Fall

It is primarily, after investigation, the pronouncementof punishment.
Part of this, as far as human life is concerned, affected Adam and Eve
together; another part, Adam alone.
The former consisted in this, that the human living souls suffered
death. This does not mean that they are annihilated (this part of his work,
too, God preserves against Satan), but that their entire existence, despite
procreation (which is made more difficult), is a constant death, until by the
sundering of body and soul as unity, they disappear temporarily out of the
earthly coherence. This misery is made even more onerous during man's
lifetime by the curse that God pronounced not only overthe serpent but also
over the ground, so that the latter would henceforth seriously impede its
cultivation by man.
Comment3: As faras this subdivision is concerned, therefore, the curse does
not consist in man's connection to the earth, but in the connection of the earth
to man.
The second punishmentapplied to Adam alone, specifically his holding
of office. Since he had not fought on God's side against Satan, his office
was taken away from him in the prediction of the conflict between the seed
of the woman and the seed of the serpent, and was destined for another, who
would after Eve be joined to Adam in the state of innocence, but would have
nothing to do with him in his double capacity of unfaithful office-bearer and
fallen ancestor.
Butthis last point already belongs in part to what follows.
C. THE COVENANT OF RE-CREATION
ft. Introduction
123. Line of thought

With respect to this covenant we must discuss in the first place: its
character, the way it is worked out in time, and the principle of division for
that which requires further treatment.
124. The character of this covenant

Here too we mustdistinguish points of similarity (A) and of difference
(B) (with the earlier covenant).
A. This covenant has in commonwith the first both that which is presup-
posedin it and the covenantstructure,
1. Asto the first point: re-creation is not the work of a God other than
the God of creation (gnosticism); nor does the second covenanthaverefer-
ence to something other than that which was created before (Anabaptism);
finally, the second covenant came into being because it was instituted, and
an office-bearer was appointed, exclusively on God'sinitiative.
Comment 1: As we have seen above, the existence of the cosmos belongs to
that which is presupposed of every covenant. Nowthis existence, in the case
of the second covenant, is of course a continued existence. All the same, this
continued existence remains something presupposed in the second covenant.
Consequently it is not the fruit of the latter, and thus not a result of re-creation
or of grace: for the punishmentfor breaking the first covenant was not the an-
nihilation of God's work but the death ofthe transgressor. And these two do
not cover each other. The transgressor was only a component of creation,
thougha very important part, and to die is to continue to exist under the wrath
of God, and in no way a not-existing,
2. Concerning the structure of the covenant: here too Logos revelation
and religion, evident in the obedience of the faith in the promises of God,
are correlate with each other.
B. Obviously, it is very important to keep in mind the points in which the
second covenant differs from the first.
1. In the Logosrevelation there is now, other than in the covenant with
Adam, talk of grace and re-creation,
Comment 2: Distinguish grace and gift of grace. Grace is a disposition of
God and the opposite of wrath. It does not stand over against sin. Graceis,
with wrath, not the opposite of sin, but one of its correlates. Even less so does
grace stand over against “nature,” which, without further specification philo-
sophically, can in this context be best taken in the sense of “that which has
been created in a specific direction.” "Gift of grace” is everything that the re-
cipient of grace receives on the basis of grace.
2. As far as religion is concerned, there is a difference with thefirst
covenant in office-bearer (a}, in his relationship to the word of God (b), and
in the relation of those comprehended in the covenant to the one invested
with the office (c).
a. The office-bearer
Since the covenant structure remained unchanged, oncetheinitial of-
fice-bearer had proved unfaithful, the first Adam was replaced by the sec-
ond. His work was also the execution of the task ofthe office, in order to
acquire the promised blessing: to live eternally in God's favor. This task
meant that the second Adam, unlike his predecessor, had to stand firm in
temptation. But since re-creation is not a second creation, he also had to
bear on behalf of his own the punishment that had been fixed for breaking
the first covenant, in order to satisfy God's justice and to propitiate his
wrath,
if we compare this task with that of the first Adam, then we observe
that it has become immensely more difficult. For the weight of God's wrath
against the sin of the entire human race could not be borne by any human
being: consequently the office-bearer of the second covenant had also to be
God. As man, as the seed of the woman, he had on the one hand to be
joined with Adam in the state of innocence, and on the other hand to be par-
allel with him, that is, to be free from his sin. Therefore we must distin-
guish in the Messiah (Greek: Christos) the unification of the Logos with a
concrete, individual human nature, and the conception ofthe paternal factor
of the latter from the Holy Spirit, although these two were not separate in
time. Furthermore, a distinction must be made between these two, which
made the execution ofthe task ofoffice possible, and the investiture with the
office.
Comment 3: The church here spoke of “nature,” and not of “person” (in dis-
tinction from Nestorius), in order to indicate that, supposing the concept of
person was serviceable in anthropology, the human constituent in the Mediator
never existed separately, that is as component, since its very origination was
subservientto the incarnation of the Word.
Consequently, the positive correlate of the rejection of the view advocated
by Nestorius is that the Person of the Son has united himself with the human
nature, and that the result of this unification (Henasis) is a unity (Henofes), not
a unit.
This formula is to be distinguished from a completely different one, ac-
cording to which the human nature of the Mediatoris said to be “impersonal”
(anhyposiatos). For this expression (which moreover has at least three senses
and thus can hardly be called univocal) means in essence that either something
of the nature in question is denied (either its individuality or its integrity) or
this nature is seen as a duality that requires a vinculum substantiale
[“sunstantial means of connection”), a role assumed in this case by the Son of
God. None of these constructions therefore agrees with Holy Scripture or
with dogma.
Comment 4: The virgin birth therefore does not imply a contempt for mar-
riage (as P. A. Kohnstamm and his followers believe) but on the contrary,
served the salvation ofall of humanlife, including marriage.
b. The relationship of the office-bearer to the word of God.
in contrast to the case of the first Adam, this relation is constant: in
life and death Christ according to his human nature placed his reliance on
the word of God, and does this still. Thus in the hour of temptation he
proved stronger than Satan, for which reason the angels came to serve him
(Matt. 4:1-11).
c. The relationship of the office-bearer to those comprehended in him.
This relation as well is different from formerly. Because while all
those comprehended in thefirst covenant were to descend from Adam, and
he did in fact become, through Eve, the ancestor of us all, one participates
in the Christ only by imputation. This imputation is two-sided: "God made
him who knew nosin to besin for us, so that in him we might become the
righteousness of God" (2 Cor. 5:21; [cf.] Rom 8:3; Gal. 3:13; 1 Peter 2:22-
24).
With respect to both sides (that is, also as far as the second part, being
declared righteous, is concerned) this imputation is anchored in election,
which is distinguished from predestination—the formeris only a decision for
good, the latter is a decision for both goodand ill.
Scripture tells us that both predestination and election exist. However,
it does not tell us by name who are included in election, except in a few
cases, and then only of persons who have died long ago (compare Gen.
26:23 with Mal. 1:2 and 3 and with Rom, 9:12 and 13). Yet we are not in
the dark in this regard. Predestination and election are worked out in time,
a process in which the God of the Covenant adheres to the structure ofhis
own work ofcreation.
125, The covenant worked out in time
In the process of working out the covenant, being declared righteous
becomes a being made righteous [justification].
Thelatter takes place first of all in the Mediator, specifically in the ac-
ceptance of his suffering and death at his resurrection from the dead
(Rom.4:25).
This fruit of his work is now conferred by the glorified Christ on all
who belong to him in their justification, which is comprised in that calling
by which he makes the spiritually dead alive. For this making alive or re-
generation is the turning around of the heart, which has the effect that the
renewed person, acquitted of guilt and punishment, and having a right to
eternal life, begins to walk accordingto all God's commandments.
Comment 1; This act of God takes place “immediately,” thatis, not by means
of the persuasion ofthe will (Remonstrants) or of the persuasion of predestina-
tion (school of Saumar), but directly by the word of God, in the sense of voca-
tio efficax: it is God who gives life to the dead and calls into existence the
things that do not exist [Rom. 4:17 RSV].
This turnabout can be diagrammed as
follows:
Isageogé Phitosophiae
This act of God is not to be identified with the preaching of his word
by the envoys of the Christ: for regeneration precedes the opening of the
heart to the word of their preaching (Acts 16:14).
Comment 2: The revival of this insight since the end of the previous century
is especially due to the influence of A. Kuyper.
However, this given of the Scriptures is combined in Kuyper with two
other statements that can in any case be distinguished from it and therefore
ought to be considered separately.
The content of these statements was that regeneration was the embryonic
seed, and furthermore thal it was accompanied by a testimony ofthe Spirit to
the effect that Scripture is God's word. With reference to the first statementit
may be remarked that Scripture (Luke 8:11 ff.) compares the (open) heart with
the (prepared) earth, but relates the image of the seed to the preached word.
With respect to the second notion we observe the following: it was Kuyper's
intention to keep the testimony in question purely “formal,” in opposition to
the doctrine of the “inner light," of which he was a vigorous opponent, His
conception regarding the restimonium Spiritus Sancti speciale must not be con-
fused with the theory of a testimonium Spiritus Sancti generale. Nonetheless
the former was certainly not without content either, which is not surprising
since a “testimony” simply cannot be formal. Moreover, such a testimony is
superfluous: Scripture in itself is credible, and must be acknowledged by the
regenerate without such a testimony; whatit tells us about the testimony of the
Spirit does not comeuntil after christian faith, and therefore is not dealt with in
this study until Jater. For that reason both additions are to be rejected.
However, this criticism may not lead to a rejection of the basic statement:
in the struggle against the overestimation of ecclesiastic office on the remote
and recent past, the latter constitutes an important gain.
Regeneration also effects a turnabout in the pistic function (the fides
qua creditur, i.e. faith by which a person believes}. By virtue of this turn-
about, faith is now directed to the word of God that is preached (by the ec-
clesiastic office-bearer), especially to its essence, namely the Gospel. En this
way faith, now in the sense of that which is believed (fides quae creditur), is
awakened by the preached word,
This awakening is followed by strengthening. This takes place par-
tially by that same preached word, partially by the use (in faith) of the
sacraments.
The preached word, which is always unconditional, comprises partially
prediction, partially promise.
The prediction concerns the first or second coming of Christ, which
took place (will take place) despite unbelief among God's people (Gen.
18:12, Isaiah 7:12ff, Luke 1:18 and 18:8).
The promise, on the other hand, has a different character. As promise
it is directed not only to the believers, but also to their children and to those
who have been taken up together with them into the fellowship of the
church; and now,as the promise of God, whois the faithful One, it demands
lsagoogé Phifosophiae
that it will be believed. Thus this promise comes as a command to the

covenant community (cf. Kort begrip der Christelijke religie, question 20:
“promised and commanded to believe").
Like every norm, this law has a double character: it promises blessing
to the obedient and threatens the disobedient with the vengeance of the
covenant.
The blessing consists in growth in grace, accompanied by the witness
of the Spirit with our spirit that we are children of God (Rom. 8:16, [cf.] 2
Cor, 1:22, 5:5, Eph. 1:13-14 and 4:30). This blessing awaits the obedient,
that is, the elect insofar as they did not die young.
The curse, on the other hand, consists in this, that the breakers of the
covenant will suffer a more severe judgment (Lev. 26:15, cf. 44: Deut.
31:20; Rom, 11:28-30; Heb. 10:28-31 and 12:25).
Comment 3; For the strengthening of his faith the Bible believer has recourse
not only to the guidance that the preaching of the norm offaith provides, but
also the use of the sacraments, which have been instituted in connection with
the structure of the pistic object.
Comment 4: The sacraments have been given to the Church; they therefore
presuppose, besides the preaching of the word of God, the existence of the
Church and thus the operation ofthe regenerating powerofthe Spirit on earth.
To prevent misunderstanding, however, we must distinguish between receiving
the sacraments and using them. Not only in the circumcision and baptism of
adults, but also at the Passover and Eucharist, using and receiving went to-
gether {if the life of faith was healthy); in the case of the circumcision and
baptism of children, on the other hand, matters were and are somewhat differ-
ent: whereas the children of believers receive this sacrament, the faith-
Strengthening use takes place especially on the part of the parents and the con-
gregation. And insofar as the recipients are not born again until after baptism,
there cannot be any question ofa faith-strengthening use (claiming the promise
that was given) while baptism is being received.
The proclamation within the church, both in the service of the word
and in catechism, must keep in mind the nature of the church as christian
pistic institution. Consequently, it is not evangelism (proclamation of the
prediction to those outside) but administration of the powerof the keys, both
to open and to close. Conceived in this way, it is a great influence on the
religion of the heart with its prayer, and makes the congregation a coura-
geous people—and at the same time one that is careful in its walk with God.
Thesignificance of the church, then, which has existed ever since the
Fall, is great. It is therefore of great importance to conceive correctly ofits
relationship both to religion and to the other institutions of human life.
The churchis the christian pistic institution of human life. On the one
hand, this means that it does not coincide with Christendom, for the latter
manifests its Christianity in other human institutions as well, for example in

christian family life.
Comment 5: This difference is sometimes indicated with the help of the terms
“church as organism" and "churchas institute." This way of distinguishingis
not particularly felicitous: "organism" has an established sense for the life of
plants, and “institute” for the result of juridic action. It is therefore preferable
to speak of Church and church, or else (perhaps this even clearer) of Chris-
tendom and church. We must keep in mind, however, that criticism of terms
that lack clarity does not do away with the difference that they intend to for-
mulate. This is especially important in the present context, since the alterna-
tive would be for all christian action to be reduced to ecclesiastic projects
which would not only hinder such action, but would also involve the church in
all kinds of questions that are not its concern, since its task consists
exclusively in the awakening and strengthening of christian faith through the
administration of the word of God and the sacraments, as well as throughits
discerned work. Especially as far as christian science and scholarship is
concerned, the church should take care not to venture into the latter's area;
whereas the latter must investigate, besides Scripture, the entire cosmos,
ecclesiastic dogma is bound exclusively to Scripture and moreover is non-
scientific in character.
On the other hand, the church is different from any other human institution.
This is rooted partially in its destination function, partially in its direction.
It is already by virtue of possessing a destination function of her own
that the church does notderive its right to exist from any other human insti-
tution: a pistic institution is sui generis, and differs on that basis from fam-
ily and school, stale, business, etc.
Moreover, the church in its entirety is directed to the right, for it is the
christian pistic institution. This makesit different from the synagogue and
other antichristian pistic institutions. But furthermore, on this basis, there is
no room for christian action in the church, parallel to that in the state. For
while the state includes all citizens, the church can recognize as members
only Christ-believers and their children. It is for this reason that a "national
church” must always lead a contradictory existence.
The church ought to be one, and may therefore differ only according to
lingual boundaries [grenzen], in connection with its preaching. We must
therefore not find excuses for what does not live up to this requirement.
Once again, however, we must not confuse law and subject: in many lands
there exists a variety of christian pistic institutions along side each other,all
of whom claim the name “church.” This situation arose through all kinds of
conflicts in the past, partially the remote past. Moreover, many of these
schisms have roots that go quite deep. Consequently, they cannot be ig-
nored, much less can they be removed in short order. However, if that
which is subject in this case is ever to conform to the law again, then this
will only come aboutas the fruit of a penetrating study of the history of the
schisms involved, and of continuing reformation in one's own circle. Nor

will a reunion on the basis of a compromise that levels the difference in
question improve matters; this would only increase the multiplicity by one.
Here too there is no other yardstick than the law.
Particular care must be taken, meanwhile, that nothing not found in
Scripture be introduced into dogma, since it is especially this that often fos-
ters division and delays reunion,
Comment 6: The study we here have in mind cannot neglect the influence of
the many differences in the philosophy current at the time: consequently, a
genuinely Calvinian philosophy will in many ways be able to promote the ef-
forts toward a reunion correctly understood.
In all of these efforts, however, the antithesis must be maintained: it is
certainly to the advantage of christian and antichristian pistic institutions to
gain a clearer insight into what is commonte the structure of both, and to
take this into consideration in their actions; but such reflection, if it takes
place in the light of Scripture, will only throw into sharperrelief the irrec-
oncilable opposition between the church, on the one hand, and the syna-
gogue and other antichristian pistic institutions on the other.
126. Division
In connection with the fact that the second Adam did not appear imme-
diately, a distinction must be made in the covenantof re-creation between
two main periods, namely the one before the incarnation of the Logos and
the one thereafter.
2. Before the incarnation ofthe Word

127. Introduction
A. Character
Prominent in the Logos revelation is the announcement of the second
Adam.
B. Division
In this connection we must distinguish two periods within this main pe-
riod, namely the one beforethe differentiation of the revelation in question,
and the one thereafter.
a. The period of the non-differentiated Logosrevelation
128. Introduction
A. Character
During these centuries the Revelation of the Logosis still the same for
all people.
B. Division
Tsagoogé Philosophiae
Within this period we must again distinguish two phases, namely the
one before and the one after the Flood.
129. Before the Flood
A. The Logos revelation
Since man had been seduced by Satan, the first rapprochement(if there
was to be any question of living-with-God-again) had to come from Gead's
side, something that was only possible through the love of God.
God did in fact come. Taking the new situation into account, his love
has the character of grace: already in Paradise he announces the Mediator of
the New Covenant. This Mediator, as the seed of the woman, will live in
enmity with the seed of the serpent, but will be victorious in that struggle.
B. Religion
1. Correlate with this change in revelation is a change in religion:
though saved from debasementit is not restored to the old situation, but be-
comes religion appropriate to the new situation, religion of grace. The re-
newed faith, likewise, no longer holds for truth only the word of God spo-
ken before, but also the promise of God concerning the deliverance ofall
who believe this promise (as the Heidelberg Catechism puts it [Q & A 21]:
“not only to others, but to me also").
2. Not all, however, participate in this faith: not a few arrogantly re-
ject the promises of God.
That difference can already be observed empirically in the life of the
first family: Eve accepts the promise and relies on the God of the Covenant
(Gen. 4:1). Cain, on the other hand, is arrogant: when God does not accept
his sacrifice he burns with anger, does not listen to the warning against a
new sin, and does not concern himself, even after his evil deed, about any-
thing but the preservation of his own life, now struck by a special curse
(Gen. 4:3-14),
Comment: The council of God also includes this difference. Predestination,
which has reference to all development, is of course double (gemina) with ref-
erence to the taking of these two ways; when it concerns a decision for good,
it is called election. Accordingly, election is not gemina, providedit is distin-
guished from predestination,
3. In connection with this difference in the human race, the antithesis
now revealsitself therein. This is of course also discernible in the working
out of the task that was assigned to mankind, andin the cultural results ofits
efforts.
130. After the Flood
A. The supplementation in Logosrevelation at the time of Noah,
1. Although faith in the promises of God remained (Gen. 5:24), sin
gained groundrapidly, and the earth was even filled with violence [cf. Gen.
Draft D JHK Translation Page 2.54
6:11]. Therefore God repented that he had made the creatures. Yet he did
not destroy his work, but decided to mitigate the outbreak ofsin.
2, Simultaneously with this announcementofhis instruction to Noah,
God also makes known to him the term “covenant” (Gen. 6:18) in order to
give an indication of life after the Flood in reliance on this grace. In ad-
ministering the covenant with a severely chastised humankind, which was
preserved in that very chastisement, God does not only refrain from punish-
ing men with a second Flood, but also communicates this intention of his,
proclaiming the appearance of the rainbow as a reminder of his promise. He
also allows the consumption of animal meat for food, promises a regular al-
ternation of seasons, and bridles sin by including in governmental law the
blood revenge that had already been exercised before (Gen. 4:23).
B. Religion
1. By faith (which is not only found among the Semites!) in this en-
riched promise, the periodic cultivation of the land, and of the animals that
are required for it, becomes possible. Presupposed in this faith is trust in
the basic promise of deliverance.
2. At the same time unbelief (which is also found among the de-
scendants of Shem!) has the effect that people regard as divine certain inter-
relations (e.g. between sky and earth or between the two sexes), offices
(office-bearers), things (sun and moon, etc.), or functions (thinking, imagi-
nation). Unbelief also attaches itself to the periodicity of seasonal change by
dishonoring God in the worship of plant gods. As a result ofall of this the
assurance of faith is replaced by a sense of insecurity. Thus we understand
how animism could forget that the nonhuman earthly creatures stand in reli-
gious relation to God, only by way of man, and, proceeding from the correct
assumption that there is psychic life also in animals, explained this fact to be
a result of the transmigration of the soul. In this way animism led to the
prohibition of slaughtering, by which the benefits of the Noachian covenant
were largely nullified.
Comment 1: The confusion of soul and psychiclife is an ancient error.
Comment 2: The covenant with Noah is therefore a phase in the covenant of
grace-the second in the period of nondifferentiated Logos revelation. The de-
nial of this character is related to two misconceptions. According to the first
of these, life between Fall and Flood had brought the late flowering of the
covenant of creation; according to the second, the covenant of grace did not
begin until Abraham. Neither of these views is correct: the main incision of
history is found not at the Flood, but at the Fall, and the covenant of grace al-
ready begins in Paradise, when God, in the absence of a worthy office-bearer,
promises provision in the mother promise.
This also disposes of the possibility offitting the relationship between the
covenant with Noah and that with Abraham into the scheme nature-prace,
b, The period ofthe differentiated Logos revelation

131. Introduction
A. Character
Whereas the supplementation in Logos revelation had still been made
known to all of mankind in the time of Noah, a remarkable change occurs in
the time of Abraham: the new supplementation in Logos revelation is fur-
nished to only a small circle,
B. Once again two phases are to be distinguished, namely the patriarchal
and the national phase.
132. The patriarchal phase
A. The Logosrevelation
It has immediate reference to the birth of the promised Messiah, whois
announced as the seed first of Abraham, then of Isaac, thereafter of Jacob,
and finally of Judah.
This revelation presupposes the revelation given to Noah, but also in-
corporates the assurance given to Abraham, or to one of his descendants,
that in him all the families of the earth will be blessed [cf. Gen, 12:3), over
against which Abraham, next to the requirement “walk before me, and be
blameless” [cf. Gen. 17:1], which always holds, is confronted with the re-
quirement of faith, particularly faith in this promise also. Circumcision
serves as sacrament that signifies and seals the eradication of sin.
B. Religion
1. Unbelief and faith with particular reference also to this promise are
in conflict in the hearts of Abraham and Sarah andin the hearts of their off-
spring,
2. Meanwhile, the exclusively Noachian religion also continues
(Melchizedek,etc.). In large measure, however, it has only a lingering ex-
istence. Yet, though the nations are increasingly estranged from the true re-
ligion through immorality, animism, and idealism, God does not withhold
his goodness from them: tangible judgmentfalls only on certain regions in
cases of outrageous excrescences of sin (Sodom).
133. The national phase

A. The Logos revelation
1. The Logos addresses himself first to Moses and Aaron and calls
them to lead Abraham's seed out of Egypt. The Passover serves as sacra-
ment, the meal of the sacrificial lamb which reminded Israel of how the An-
gel of perdition [cf. Gen. 12:23; Heb. 11:28] passed by their blood-marked
houses.
2. The inculcation of the law of the ten commandments presupposes,
apart from the foregoing, the deliverance out of Egypt.
lsagoegé Phitosophiae
Distinct from this law are the commandments for public life, which
now restrain blood revenge in family law, and the prescriptions concerning
ceremonial practices that certified promises or served to recall the mighty
acts of the God of the Covenant and to avert mingling with the pagansliving
in the area (for example, the command notto eat certain animals that played
a prominent part in many heathen religions precisely on the basis of their
connection with the grave and death).
Comment: In sharp contrast to a fascination with death found among some
nations in the vicinity who considered death to open the possibility for extraor-
dinary development, the word of God continued to see death as punishment.
ThatIsrael, in time, also came to know some things aboutthe difference in the
situation after death, between those who embraced and those who rejected
God’s promises, and especially with regard to the difference after the resur-
rection (Psalm 49), is obviously something completely different,
3. The prefunctional office of the Messiah is foreshadowedin the three
offices of prophet, priest, and king, which stand next to each other. The
Messiah, however, will fill all three together. He will be a prophetlike
Moses and a king like David. The priesthood proved to be more difficult,
for that was tied to a tribe other than Judah. Hencetheprediction about the
Messiah as priest and king talks of a future in which the differentiation of
the revelation to Abraham will be removed: the Messiah will be a priest in
the order of Melchizedek (Psalm 110). These prophesies are secure, even if
they are not believed, not even by those who, as membersofthe holy line,
will be most affected when they fulfilled (Isaiah 7:1-17).
B. Religion
1. The special promises to Israel also require a special faith. Unbelief
and the breach offaith on the part of membersof the national community are
soundly rebuked. If they do not take the warning to heart, then the curse
will come for breaking covenant. Differences still remain. The sin is more
serious as: the promises are repeated (Deuteronomy 29:21), the covenantis
renewed (Joshua 5:1-9), the command becomes morespecific (Joshua 6:18
and 7:1), the promise narrows to one family (2 Samuel 7 and Isaiah 7:17),
prophecy becomes less scarce (Isaiah 24:6), or the reformation among the
people was more robust (Zechariah 5:3) and with that the break more reso-
lute. The punishment, too, is correlated with the difference in guilt. Some-
limes the curse even affects the culture of those being punished (Joshua
7:24, Zechariah 5:4).
2. At the same time God remains a God of the nations who do not
know these rights (Psalm 147:20), live without the law, that is, this law
(Romans 2:12), but are then, without being judged by this law, also lost
simply by not believing the promises that were revealed to them. That does
not take away from the fact that God is good to individual aliens, outside Is-
rael's community and excluded from their paschal feast (Exodus 12:43 and
Deuteronomy 10:18), as well as to whole groups. For example, the heavy
punishmentthat strikes Egypt and Babylon stands over against God's good-
ness towards Nineveh when only the threat of judgment brings them to re-
pentance.
3. After the incarnation of the Logos

134. The abrogation of the differentiation in the Logos revelation with the
preaching of the Christ
A. The Logosrevelation.
1. The promised Messiah was conceived by the Holy Spirit (Matthew
1:18) and born of the virgin Mary. Heis, then, the head of the new human-
ity, yet, other than the first Adam, without sin. Just as he possessed all the
functions, so also he satisfied in everything the requirement of obedience,
including all the special laws holding for the Jewish people, for he was, of
course, born under and bound by the Jewish law. By being united in an en-
tirely unique way with the Logos, who took on the very form of a servant
(Philippians 2:7), he also bore the wrath of God against sin. In this way he
saved his own from the curse of the law, that is, from the curse that comes
to the transgressor of the laws God gave. After that, raised from the dead,
he will die no more, but sendthespirit's gifts he acquired out upon his peo-
ple. Giving to them in this way from his spirit, the spirit of obedience, he
himself is called the head of this body (Colossians 1:18) and the spirit (2
Corinthians 3:17) that preserves his people in communion with himself.
2. Correlated with the fulfillment of the promise there is also a change
in the law for the covenant people. First of all, with the promisefulfilled,
carrying out the ceremonial activities that pointed toward this fulfillment be-
comes meaningless. Christians are free from the commands in question.
The political difference between Israel and the peoples, to the extentit still
existed, is maintained; Christians from among the gentiles were not sub-
jected to Jewish political law. Andyet, the religious difference is abolished:
the preaching of the covenant of grace again links up with the form for those
not bound to Abraham andIsrael.
B. Religion
1. Christians from the Jews and from the gentiles now live next to each
other in the communion of Christ. To the extent that both believed the old
promises, they had only to discover the fulfillment of these assurances in the
Christ. Hence, on the one hand,the penetrating question of Nathanael (John
1:48) and, on the other hand, the conversion of 3,000 souls on one day
(Acts 2:41). In contrast, a radical change was required when they previ-
ously had not understood the promises (Paul) or had rejected them (the gen-
tiles). But now all live as justified and purified through the Christ.
2. As believers they now know all things (1 John 2:20), that is to say,
with respect to the previously and for the most part hidden will of God con-
cerning salvation, and yield fruits of the spirit in thanksgiving.
3. Moreover, they live and die in the expectation of Christ's return.
For, now that they can distinguish the two comings of God's Son, a clearer
light also falls on their dying. Dying, still now, involves a being
disengaged from one’s context. People dread that (2 Corinthians 5:1-4).
People prefer that the Christ would return, so that the way to the grave
would be replaced with a sudden and, they will admit, necessary change.
But two prospects will comfort Christians who die young. Thefirst is this,
that the punishment that will also befall them, as children of Adam, comes
along with a blessing. For them too,life's unity will be broken. But at the
same time, the struggle between "spirit" and "flesh," that consumed their
life, is over. While on earth evil desires sprang from their hearts too, now
their soul, purified of these things, lives with the Lord (2 Corinthians 5:8).
And their body will soon follow suit. Though buried in corruption,
dishonor, and weakness, their body, like their soul, will not fall prey to
death. This seed, connected as it is to the Holy Spirit, will be raised as a
spiritual body (1 Corinthians 15:42-3). The believers who do experience the
return of the Christ will, up until that moment, likewise be mortal and have
to “put on" immortality.
Both groups of Christians, those raised and those changed, are then
freed from the power of the second death to which the remainder will be
subjected (Revelation 20:14 and 21:8, compared to 2:11 and 20:6).
Comment: “To be subjected to the second death" is not "to be annihilated,"
just as “continue to exist” is not the same as "be immortal." Both confusions
can be found among advocates of what they call "conditional immortality." To
refute them soundly one must not only avoid the first mistake, but the second
as well. Scripture teaches that all human beings continue to exist in soul and
body after death. But, departing from humanistic usage which attributes im-
mortality only to the higher [part], but then also to the higher [part] of al! hu-
man beings already on this side of the grave (!), Scripture also teaches that
only believers in Christ will put on immortality, just after the resutrection and
as whole persons,
135. The struggle in the life ofa Christian

The center of our life, then, lies beyond us; so also beyond thefirst
Adam, with whom we are, meanwhile, connected as living souls. Restored
by God into a right relationship to him, we learn to be obedient to the love
command through the spirit of Christ, who pours out the love in our heart
that God requires from everyone.
All the same, this rest too is not without a struggle that is parallel with
the preaching of blessing and curse in the full Logos revelation. Under
God's restorative activity, our pistic function takes to be true and certain
what this revelation says to us, namely, that we have an eternal covenant
with God, and that what it says about the blessing and curse of that covenant
therefore also holds for us. As long as we keep this covenant, and put to
death our flesh, all things will work together for our good and, in spite of
our sins and as apparent from the chastisement, we will belong in life and
death to the Lord, irrespective of whether we know that or not (when sleep-
ing or unconscious). But if we turn away from the Christ, God will hide his
face from us as well and, if we do not return, we can expecta stiffer judg-
ment than those who have disregarded a narrower revelation. Accordingly,
the struggle rages precisely in the life of the Christian between "flesh" and
“spirit” (Romans 7), that is, between the old and the new man.
Comment: This struggle does not exclude that of one function against the hy-
pertrophy of another. That kind of difficulty, although an effect of the Fall, is
also evident among those who are entirely oblivious to the struggle of the
Christian. They consider the solution to this difficulty to be the most
important one and try with their own power to become its master. However,
this is what Paul refers to as “carnal.”
136. The strugale between Church and worid

Since opposition from the outside, that is to say, from the side of the
world and especially from Satan, comes on top ofthe inner struggle, Chris-
tians are dependentfirst of all upon prayer. In addition, they have to help
each otherin this struggle. The presence of the body (= trunk) of the Christ
(= head) provesitself in cooperation among believers, and not the least in
the familial nurturing of the next generation.
Associations as well as organizations are eligible means for lending this
help to each other in circles broader than the family.
Christian corporate life intends that association members help each
other sharpen their sensitivity for the opposition between Church and world
and for the structure of the cosmos, so that the members of the Church will
themselves clearly distinguish the different arenas and as a result also the
different life connections, with the prevailing functions that typify them.
In addition, organization is also necessary. Its goal is to resist open
attacks and the gradual debilitation of these structures through lies and deceit
by mobilizing all the forces that cooperating Christians have at their dis-
posal.
When organizational life has need of more permanent channels, it
moves from organizing to instituting, and the product ofits action is an in-
Stitute. These institutes are not tranquil shrines, but "bodies" in which peo-
pie work under a certain mandate and, at the same time, through their work,
influence those who have given them their mandate,
Here too, in all of these different forms of cooperation, God's word

remains the norm. ‘That is why the Logos requires that this word be
preached everywhere with the administration of the sacraments, which point
toward the fulfillment of the promise in the past, while the sacraments them-
selves indicate and promise his support of the faith in the present. It is then
also very important that, where this is still necessary, or once again, believ-
ers in Christ unite to establish and maintain an institute that has the regular
proclamation of the word and sacraments in view. In so doing they are
bound to have this institute function according to the offices that Christ
established forit.
Comment: That people already early on disregarded this requirement and of-
ten persisted in this failure up until today reflects very poorly on the christian
cooperation in associations and organizations.
This institute is the christian church (as institution). It presupposes not
only election and the covenant, but also the continued acceptance ofthat
covenant. That is why, though colored locally and nationally, it can only
seldom and then only very briefly include all the members of one nation or
people. And eventhen it is not simply a pistic institute, but really a chris-
tian pistic institution.
This christian institution would have never sprung up without the ac-
tion of an organized christian endeavor. With its pistic objective, this insti-
tution, just as the forces that organized it, stand on a historic basis. It is ac-
tive in the arena of language, has its own forms of social conduct (house
visitation), goods under its care, a unique beauty (with a calling to its own
church art), its own kind of justice (church law) and morals. Its aim, how-
ever, is pistic. That is why the offices of this institution lie exclusively in
the pistic sphere and may not be confused either with the prefunctional office
of Adam and the Christ or with the post of office bearers in (general or
christian) institutions whose prevailing function is supra-lingual, but not
pistic. That confusion only leads to tyranny and the obstruction of refor-
mation, which is always needed. On the other hand, that's also whyall of
this institution's activity in nonpistic arenas is to be subservient to the
undisturbed activity of the (christian) pistic function. This means, for ex-
ample, that the church’s training ofits future office bearers oughtto limitit-
self to preparing them for their future practical work (through ministerial
internships).
This cooperation of Christians takes places on earth and is perceptible
in time. However, in its interior struggie invisible powers aid the fight.
But these too stand in service ofits invisible King. That brings us to the
connection between heaven and earth.
PART Ill
THE CONNECTION
BETWEEN HEAVEN AND EARTH
137. Introduction
Wehave now dealt with the most prominent structures known to us of
that which is created. In Part I we discussed the few givens about heaven
and in Part IJ, those concerning the earth.
It still remains for us to turn our attention for a momentto the connec-
tion between these two.
138. The givens concerning this connection

Little is known concerning this connection. We gain knowledge about
it exclusively from the word of God, which on this point, however, is ex-
tremely restrained.
Basically the givens provided amountto this, that angels make a differ-
ence on earthly life, for better and for worse, but that this influence, ever
since resisting the temptation (Matthew 4:11}, stands at the disposal of the
Christ, who after his ascension sometimes opens heaven in order to encour-
age those who suffer for his sake (Acts 7:55 and Revelation 3:8).
Comment: As far as angelic influence "for worse,” being "possessed” is its
most abnormal form.
139, The negative significance ofthese givens

However sparse these givens may be, they do have great value; not
only for practical life, but for philosophy as well.
For while it's true that philosophy has little more to say aboutthis con-
nection than thatit differs from all of the other connections discussed up un-
til now, this tidbit is enough to cut off negation as well as a number ofspec-
ulations.
]. Negation appears where people forget, with some currents in current
philosophy, that there is a world of angels. They negate the correlate of the
earthly creation and hence also do not see the earthly part of the cosmosas it
is (compare the third petition).
H. Speculation comes in more varieties. The most prominenttypes are
mentioned here.
A. The dualistic-trichotomistic type.
They see the cosmos threefold: heaven, earth, and hell. The earth,
and man in particular, is also taken to be threefold: the lowest is demonic,
the highest is supposed to be heavenly, and whatlies in between,if it is not
a mixture of these two, then it is subjected to both oftheir influence.
B. The functionalistic-dichotomistic type.
The connection between heaven and earth is often equated with the
connection between the higher and lower functions of man. The claim is
then that human beings are made up of a spiritual and a material substance,
with the spiritual substance displaying varying degrees of affinity with the
heavenly spirits,
Against that the following can be noted.
1. In our investigation of the cosmos we have come across many things, but
no substances.
Comment: "Hypostasis” in Holy Scripture is in its religious sense “firm foun-
dation."
In its use outside Scripture distinguish with respect to this word its nonsci-
entific and scientific usage, and within the latter, between special scientific and
philosophic usage.
Here, of course, we are dealing exclusively with its philosophic usage,
where the word always implies possessing a self-sufficient ground (self-suffi-
ciency notin the sense of disposition). Its use in this sense is, then, obviously
out of the question.
2. This standpoint does not distinguish the spirit of men from the higher
functions. In other words, it honors a functionalistic conception of the hu-
man heart.
3. This approach does not bring out that the individual human being, also
functionally, is an unbroken subject unit.
4. Religion, in this view, is linked either to a presumed goal built into things
or to asceticism,
5. The genetic connection in which the individual human being stands to
Adam is denied for the higher functions.
C. Trying to avoid functionalism, some equate the difference between
heaven and earth with the intraindividual connection between the human
heart (soul, spirit) and the cloak of human functions (body). What they do
keep, however, is the idea of a composition.
One should be warned aboutthis position on the following grounds.
1. Spirit in Holy Scripture means directional principle. That is why this
word can be used in the sense of the religious center of earthly as well as
heavenly creatures that are directed, obediently or not, to serve God. There
are simply no grounds(also not in Holy Scripture) for concluding on the
basis of this common designation of creatures, which in this usage are named
after one side only, while actually belonging to different worlds, that there
exists a much more comprehensive connection. When spiritualism, true to
its individualistic roots, negates the [reality of] office, it ought to realize that
the realists (in the medieval sense of the word) had as much (or as little)
tight, based on the nameofthe office "angel" (= messenger), to postulate
the connection between heavenly and earthly hierarchy.
2, The connection between heart and function is at bottom intraindividual,

not interindividual. The heart is likewise not an addendum. Only after dy-
ing does it come to be a separately existing individual soul. Those who for-
get this deny the connection between Adam and humanity as a whole.
3. Also, after death, the soul awaits the revival of the body; differing in this
again from the angels. The ideal for the Christian is not "the return of souls
to their home,” but inhabiting the new earth, upon whichjustice lives.
4. Likewise, when it comes to eschatology, the paganistic conception ofsal-
vation is diametrically opposed to the christian view, which only finds rest
once it grasps that heaven and earth will be liberated from injustice.
D. Some equate the connection between heaven and earth with the con-
nection between God and the Christian.
In response, think of the following:
1, that heaven too is a creature and a longing for heaven is not the same
thing as true religion;
2. that the longing of the Christian for heaven has primarily to do, not with
heaven, but with the glorified Christ.
140. The positive significance ofthese givens
A. Concerning the structure of this connection.
The Christ as creature is given all power in heaven and on earth. Heis
then not only the second Adam,but also the Head of the angels. The con-
nection between heaven and earth should therefore not be soughtin each per-
son, as does individualism, but exclusively in the office of the Christ.
B. Concerning the nature of this connection.
This connection is the most inclusive within the cosmos. At the same
limeit is still entirely intracosmic.
C. Concerningthelimit of this connection.
The christian religion, although it cannot do without this connection,
has therefore also a deeper foundation. It rests in the connection, which
reachesstill further, between the Son and the human nature that he assumed,
in the sense of homo assumptus, integer, perfectus, singularis. This con-
nection is no longer intracosmic: it forms the tie between the Sovereign and
the in love-filled surrender, completely spiritual subject. Precisely for that
reasonit guarantees us the bond of Godto all that which is re-created, which
is included in this man, the man Jesus Christ, and with that, to the Church,
the victory of her (for now still) unseen King.
APPENDIX
A NUMBER OF THE MORE COMPLICATED

QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY
141. Introduction
The preceding was devoted to the first, necessary distinctions. Now
we come to a number of more complicated philosophic questions. A com-
plete systematic elaboration of these thoughts would undoubtedly makethis
Appendix broader than the above. Butthat is not possible in an introduction
and also not desirable. That is why we confine ourselves to those questions
whose clarification is needed in order to understand the Second Main Part,
which is devoted to the provisional negative result [being a survey of the
history of philosophy].
142, Subdivision and sequence
A. Subdivision
I will only deal here with the results following from the application of
the main schemata in the theory about knowledge and in the theory about
know-how [fechné] and art. 1 devote one part to each ofthese three.
B. Sequence
1, There are two reasons for the priority of theory of knowledge: nei-
ther expertise nor art is possible without knowledge. Henceit is good to
start by studying the latter. Moreover, to do so is urgently needed in light
of the confusing but nevertheless recurrent equation of philosophy and the-
ory of knowledge.
2. It also speaks for itself that in discussing skill and art the former
should be dealt with first: no art is possible without some skill.
fsagoogé Phiiosophiae
PART I
HUMAN KNOWING
imroduction
143. Here too the limit is maintained

The theory about knowledge is the answer to the question: What is
knowledge?
However, this question should reckon with what was found earlier.
"Knowledge," after all, is a word with many significations: that is why we
can é.g. speak of knowledge that God has and knowledge that creatures
have.
144. Terminology: "knowledge of" and "knowledge about"

If the theory about knowledgeis not to get entangled immediately in a
limit transcending conception, we have to makea strict distinction between
knowledge of (he who possesses this knowledge) and knowledge abour (that
which is known).
145. The knowledge of God and that of the creatures

The knowledge of God about himself and his creatures can be sharply
distinguished from that of the creatures about him and that which is created.
We only know through word revelation that God knows. But also that this
knowledge is not the same as ours. Only what God has wanted to communi-
cate to us in human language aboutthese things is knowableforus.
146. The knowledge of creatures
Here too we can distinguish:
A. We know through word revelation that the angels know as well: for
example, that they understand what God says to them, and also that they
make distinctions when speaking to him. But even though this knowledge,
whichis creaturely, can be distinguished from divine knowledge, we know
extremely little about it.
B. Lastly, we also find knowledge on the part of earthly creatures,
specifically in the case of man and animals.
1, Everyone familiar with animals knows that they know as well: they
know their master, their feeding trough, the path they have flown once or
more often, etc. (cf. also Job 28:7 and Isaiah 1:3). This knowing, which
especially of late is being investigated by psychologists, bears a purely emo-
tional character and implies: perception, reaction, the perseverance of pre-
vious moments in the following moments, and a memory that can react
afresh to that which lingers.
Isagoogé Philesophiae
2. The knowing of man is different; if for no other reason than that

here everything in the psychic is connected with the analytic. Moreover, the
nature of human knowing is not only emotive. In fact, the emotions play a
subservient role in human knowing. Yet it is good to have briefly men-
tioned the knowledge of animals. Doing so prevents thoughts from slipping
into the theory about human knowing that are rooted in a view as though
man were composed of a psycho-somatic substance, with which he would
approach the animal, and of a spiritual substance, through which he would
liken unto the angels: man is a unity and belongs to the earthly creatures.
And even though his knowing far surpasses that of the animals, not only in
the suprapsychic, but also in the psychic, no instance of human functional
knowing in the suprapsychic functions can be found in which the psychic
substrate is not present.
147. The theory about human knowing: its place in philosophy
A. We confine ourselves now to the theory about human knowing andac-
cordingly use the term “theory of knowledge" below exclusively in this nar-
TOW sense.
B. We now direct ourselves to the question as to the place of the theory of
knowledge, in its limited sense, in philosophy.
People often equate philosophizing as activity with reflecting on the
question: What is human knowing? In correlation with this question, they
then have to equate philosophy with theory of knowledge.
However, whoever sees that knowing is subsumed under being and
takes stock ofthe results that were previously summarized, also understands
then that answering the question "What is knowing?" can simply bring to
light the fact that the distinctions obtained also continue in the case of
knowing.
148. Subdivision
A. There are two kinds of knowing: a nonscientific and a scientific
knowing.
B. Seeing as that scientific knowing relies on nonscientific knowing, the
latter should be discussed first.
Division |
Nonscientific Knowing
149, Introduction
As for nonscientific knowing we can distinguish its structure andits
development. A chapter is devoted to the discussion of each of these two.
CHAPTERI
THE STRUCTURE OF NONSCIENTIFIC KNOWING
150. Whar knowing is
Knowing is having knowledge, hence living in a state of rest.
151. Knowing and coming to know
This state of rest follows on a state of greater or smaller effort, during
which one “comes to know."
152, What coming to know presupposes

A person only comes to know something when a suprapsychic (correct)
distinguishing of that which is mutually different is coupled with the pre-
serving, remembering, ordering, etc. of distinctions obtained before then.
This process therefore presupposes:
I. Being connected under the law of God with the entire cosmos.
2. Being subjected to the analytic and supra-analytic laws.
3. The activity of coming to know
4. That which is knowable
5. The resulting content of knowledge.
6. The assimilation of a number of matters.
153. Subdivision
Of the above mentioned prerequisites, 1 and 2 were dealt with earlier
and 6 can be attended to only later. Hence we now haveto deal with:
A. Theactivity of coming to know;
B. That which is knowable; and
C. Theresult.
A. The Activity of Coming to Know

154. The line ofthought
In the nature of the case coming to know differs modally according to
the law spheres within which it takes place.
For the sake of clarity 1 begin with the cognitive interrelation in the
lowest suprapsychic i.e. analytic law sphere: the advantage in doing so is
that I can temporarily confine myself to a discussion of the cognitive inter-
relation in this particular sphere and in this context leave the more compli-
cated supra-analytic spheres to the side.
155. The constituents of analytically coming to know
A. It is suprapsychic distinguishing.
By denoting this distinguishing as “suprapsychic” we achieve two
things:
1. We remember that the psychic belongs to the substrate ofall the higher
functions.
2. The mention of that which is analytic as well as that which is supra-ana-
lytic. People obstruct their own ability to discern the richness in nonscien-
tific knowing when they do not acknowledge these supra-analytic functions
or, as the apriorists, take them to be pre-analytic and, in so doing, have no
place for retrocipations to that which is analytic.
B. It is correct distinguishing.
If analytic functioning is poor due, for example, to exhaustion, then
mistakes are made andthe result is not knowledge buterror.
C. it is always a distinguishing of that which is different from the other
with which it is connected horizontally and vertically.
156. Division
In connection with the last point we must take note of the role of the
analytic interrelation (1) as well as of the vertical connection in the activity
of coming to know (2).
1, THE ROLE OF THE INTERRELATION

IN ANALYTIC COMING TO KNOW
157. introduction
The diversity within the analytic interrelation is just as great as the di-
versity in the horizontal connections of any other modality. We distinguish
the synchronic (a) and the diachronic (b) interrelations.
a. The synchronic interrelations in the analytic law sphere

158. Division
These interrelations are interindividual or intraindividual.
159. The synchronic interindividual-relations in the analytic law sphere

There are two cases to be distinguished here.
1. Sometimes the correlates are both active. Then we have a case of
analytic cooperation: for example, in a discussion that centers around non-
scientific distinctions, e.g. between God and cosmos, animal and plant, the
one person and the other, business and state,etc.
2. In other cases, the one correlate is active, the other passive. In-
terindividual perceiving and being perceived is a case in point. This
instance has to be dealt with further.
160. interindividual analytic perception

A. First a few remarks in connection with the terminology, which espe-
cially here cannot be clear enough.
1. It only makes sense to speak of inferindividual perception when an
infraindividual perception exists as well. That is indeed the case, as appears
from the foliowing paragraph.
2. The distinction of interindividual and intraindividual here too does
not coincide with that of outer and inner. Limiting myself to the interindi-
vidual: [ perceive the food I eat as long as it is still in my mouth with a per-
ception thatis interindividual as well as inner.
3. People are often of the opinion that the word “perception” denotes
something that only occurs with that which is psychic. Of course one can
fix this term in this way, and the analyst will then have to Jook around for
another word. Butis this limited use of the word actually in agreement with
the state of affairs? One says after all that Kepler by perceiving the Martian
orbit and Galileo by gleaning from his experiments found answers to ques-
tions that were keeping them busy. What they were looking for, however,
was not the emotional effects of the color of stars or of the noise ofrolling
balls on their senses! For even though the one as well as the other was pre-
sent, they were there only as the substrate of something else. And that
something else was the answer to the questions that Kepler was asking of
Stars and that Galileo was askingin the first place of mechanical things here
on earth. And so, what wefind here is almost the same as when I apprehend
a result that someone else arrived at. In that case too, the pointis not, as-
suming it happens by means of symbois (spoken, written, or printed words),
whether the tone or typeset was pleasing to me or not. What I am interested
in keenly is the thought the words refer to that can provide me with a link
still missing in my demonstration, or an example that illustrates one of my
expositions, or possibly a counter-example prompting me to be more careful
when defending a particular thesis.
When, as in instances like these, language plays a part, we talk about
“apprehending” [vernemen: to learn, hear, be told, understand}. But when
language does not perform the service of medium we speak of “perceiving.”
This usage is sufficient to support the claim that this perceiving is not purely
psychic, but is surely also analytic in nature; hence justifying the use of the
term "perception."
Comment |: Perceiving and apprehending can go together. For example,
whenI hear and see a speaker and understand what he says.
B. Whatis active in this interrelation of perceiving is the perceiver, who
directs his analytic subject function to that which is perceptible for him in
something that differs from him in individuality.
C. As a result, what was simply-perceptible becomes now-also-perceived,

and to that extent, something thatis passive.
Comment 2: The passivity of that which is perceived is simply the being per-
ceived. The term “passive,” then, should certainly not be taken here in a
broader sense. Hence, it is possible that what is being perceived is very ac-
tive, maybe even more so than the one perceiving. An orator on a platform is
perceived by his listeners if they take notice of him. He climbed the rostrum
to be noticeable for many and articulates clearly for the same reason. His
standing and speaking is together one activity. And yet the fact that he is per-
ceived ultimately depends on the activity of the perceiver.
D. What the perceiver perceives can also be an object. But it certainly
need not be. Two cases are possible.
1. Whatis perceived is an analytic subject. For example, an instructor
perceives that a student is alert. He does that directly when the studentis in
front of him and indirectly when he apprehends the same by meansofa in-
termediate, for example, via well posed written questions.
2. What is perceived is an analytic object; for example, a pearl, an elm,
a dog, or a psychic emotion of my neighbor's that I distinguish from his
other emotions,
Comment 3: Equating what is perceived with an “object” is often due to a
sloppy use of the language, It is worse when we come across that in philo-
sophic works as weil. Thenit is either due to a lack of critical reflection on
the validity of current theories of knowledge or, if we are talking about a pri-
Mary source, a symptom of a one-sided orientation to sciences about the sub-
analytic (so-called epistemological "naturalism”).
E. Direct interindividual perception of earlier moments is not possible.
Perceiving is always synchronous with what is perceived. Perception of
earlier moments is always perception of direct or indirect recollection
{symbols).
In summary: Interindividual perception is going on where an analytic
subject function directs the attention to something that is analytically per-
ceptible, in other words, to something that stands with this subject function
in a contemporary analytic interrelation.
Comment 4: Distinguish the perception from its interpretation. For example,
during a storm we perceive the lightening's flash before the thunder's rumble.
But we would be mistaken if, on the basis of the contemporaneous character of
the interrelation of perception, we would also conclude that the beam oflight
originated before the sound waves, Both came about at the same time. That
they did not reach us at the same time has to do with the difference in the
speed oflight and sound.
161. Intraindividual perception

A. The analytic subject function can also perceptually direct itself to
something that is both perceptible and, at the same time, also in-
traindividually connected with the perceiver. We speak then of in-
traindividual perception.
B. Here too we find that the distinction of interindividual and in-
traindividual does not coincide with the distinction of outer and inner. With
external perception, I can analytically perceive my hands, distinguishing for
example right and left hand, even though they are intraindividually con-
nected with the perceiver,
C. What is active in this interrelation of perceiving is the perceiver, who
directs his analytic subject function to what for him by himself is percepti-
ble.
D. As a result, what was simply-perceptible becomes now-also-perceived,
and to that extent, something that is passive.
E. Here, too, it is not necessary that what is perceived be an object.
1, When my hands, for example, touch a piece of cloth and I perceive
them doing so, then they are, though perceived, quite obviously busy in an
analytic function. What I am interested in is not whether the cloth feels
pleasant, but whether it is what they say it is, for example, whether it feels
like “real linen."
2. Whatis perceived intraindividually can, however, also be an object.
Then I am dealing with an intraindividual object function of myself. For
example, when I perceive my own psychic emotion as analyzable.
Comment 1: The inner object is a psychic one, but as object it is in the an-
alytic sphere. In its quality of psychic subject function, then,it is not passive.
Comment 2; As far as the disallowed equation of what is perceived with
“object,” what held for interindividual perception (see the commentin §160 D)
holds here as well.
F. Intraindividual perception, too, is always contemporaneous with what
is perceived.
162. interindividual and intraindividual perception

A. When we compare both, we find points of similarity as well as of dif-
ference that can easily be summarized. The points of similarity are listed
above. So now, a few words about the difference.
1. It is rooted in the this-that difference which we found everywherein
the cosmos. That is why it is impossible to reduce the one group ofpercep-
tions to the other.
fsagoogée Philosophiae
2. The distribution of analytic perceptions into outer and inner does not
coincide with that of interindividual and intraindividual, which crosses it.
Hence, there are, when we take both distinctions into account, not two
groups, but four.
Comment: We have io be very careful with the use of the terms "inner" and
“outer” as adjectives of "perception,"
1, They may never be used to refer to a difference in the function of what is”
perceived; as in, for example, inner perception is perception of the psychic
and outer is of the physical.
2. In order to say exactly what is meant when using these terms, mention
should also always be made of whether the interrelation of perception is in-
traindividual or interindividual; in other words, whether you are perceiving
something of yourself or of someone or somethingelse.
b. The Successive Interrelations in That Which is Analytic

163. intreduction and division
Both ofthe correlates in the cognitive interrelations we have dealt with
fit the schemaactive-passive. Time wise, they were contemporaneous.
However, there would be no talk of coming to know were there not
still other analytic interrelations to which the schema active-passive does ap-
ply, but which are successive, not contemporaneous.
Because the knower stands in successive connection with the past as
well as the future, we distinguish here two interrelations, namely, recollec-
tion and expectation.
164. The interrelation ofrecollection
A. The schema active-passive works here too. Recollecting is analytically
active and whatis recalled is analytically passive.
B. The successive connection here is such that whatis recollectable is the
earlier and the recollecting is the later.
C. What is active in the interrelation of recollection is the remembering
[person], who directs his analytic subject function to what is earlier and rec-
ollectable for him, with the result that what was simply recollectable be-
comes now-also-remembered, and to that extent, something that is passive.
Comment: As with theinterrelation of perception, whatis passive here can be
stronger, even much stronger than whatis active. A peculiar instance of that
is evident with eidetic phenomena, which because of their being so compli-
caied can only be discussed later (see §167).
D. Can wedistinguish recollections, just as we did perceptions, into in-
traindividual and interindividual?
in all probability, the initial inclination is to answer this question in the
affirmative. For example, if yesterday 1 looked at some prints, I can re-
isagoage Phitosophiae
member now that I looked as well as what I saw. Thefirst of these was an
activily on my part, the looking which I now recollect. Hence, that looking
stands in a successive intraindividual connection with my rememberingthis.
The second was what I perceived analytically at the time, namely,the prints
with which I then stood in an interindividual connection. The conclusion
would seem to be valid that there exist both interindividual and intraindivid-
ual interrelations of recollection,
However, further reflection brings to light that the cases are not the
same. It is possible that I recall that I saw something without knowing ex-
actly what I saw, in other words, what precisely that something was. For
example, when [ have to prove my alibi for the hour during which | was
busy with that looking, or am looking for a pencil that I think J have lost in
the mean time, then what I saw not only moves completely into the back-
ground, but recalling it is simply not included in the recollection of my ac-
tion. But now the other case. It can certainly happen that I remember very
well what I saw and barely that I saw it. That will happen often when what
I am looking at during the interindividual perception of my looking had my
complete attention. And yetit is not possible for me to recollect what I saw
as seen without having the other recollection, namely, the recollection of the
seeing, inherentto this recollection.
That is why an intraindividual action is primary when it comes to rec-
ollection.
E. Whatis recalled can be a subject as well as an object.
1. In the example just introduced, I remember my seeing of yesterday.
What is passive in this interrelation, then, is the functioning of a subjectin
the past.
2. In contrast, when I remember my biotic reaction to a previous
change in climate, what is being recalled is an intraindividual analytic ob-
ject.
F. In discussing perceptions, we noted that there are perceptions of per-
ceptions [see §§160D1 and 161E1]. Something similar is the case with rec-
ollection. I can remember that yesterday I was involved in a conversation
filled with recollections of my youth. In these cases, what is remembered is
always an action of the subject.
165. The mutual irreducibility of recollection and perception

Recollection establishes an interrelation between successive correlates:
perception, including intraindividual perceiving, does the same between
contemporary correlates. That is why neither can be reduced to the other.
There is no transition from even the sharpest recollection to the weakest of
perceptions.
This irreducibility does not exclude the possibility that both can be
there al the same time (see §166) and occur together (see §167).
166. The simuttaneity ofsome recollections with some perceptions

Someone can recall something and perceive something in the same
moment. I can see a speaker and at the sare time recall the argument that
he has presented so far.
This coincidence of recollection and perception as elements in one mo-
ment does not negate the difference between the two interrelations, in each
of which both of the elements of this moment make up oneoftherelata.
167. The combined occurrence of recollection and perception
Two things are to be distinguished here: there is recollection of ana-
lytic perception (A.) and analytic perception of recollection (B.).
A. Recaliing analytic perceiving is direct or indirect.
1. It is direct when someone remembers his ownearlier perception.
Comment: In this case as well, what is remembered can be so strong that the
recalling itself stands entirely in the background. When, in addition, what is
temembered was an interrelation of perception in which I just recently stood
and in which what was perceived demanded my complete attention, then
“eidetic seeing” can occur. I am no longer perceiving, but from the remem-
bered interrelation of perception am able to talk now about what was perceived
then with a precision that shows that the recalled perception, the "eidetic image
of recollection," still so entirely grips my attention that I am oblivious to the
cessation ofthe perceiving and to my having set the interrelation of perception
as passive correlate in an interrelation of recollection.. Eidetic seeing, then,
testifies to weak analytic activity,
2. It is indirect when someonevia his earlier perception remembershis
perception at that time of someoneelse's perception.
B. Perception of recollection
1. Perceiving someoneelse's recalling is possible only by means ofhis
expressions, 1 note that someone remembers something because I hear him
say, "Oh ya! Now I remember," or see from his happiness or shock that he
recognizes someone.
2. Perceiving recollection on the part of the perceiver occurs when he
remembers something and at the same time perceives this (intraindividual)
act of recollection.
168. The expectation interrelation

A. Here too the schema active-passive can be used: the expecting is ac-
tive, that which is expected is passive (analytically).
Isageogé Philosaphiae
B. The diachronic connection, also present in expecting, is here however

different from the case of recollection: the moment expected lies in the fu-
ture and is therefore the later and the expecting is the earlier.
C. The active constituent in the expectation interrelation is the expectant
whodirects his analytic subject function to the future that he expects. In so
doing what is “to be expected" (expect-able) becomes "expected."
Comment: Here too what is expected can be stronger than the expectation;
é.g., when what is expected is very desirable or very much feared.
D. That which is expected need notbe intraindividual, butit is possible.
i. I expect someone who wrote me that they would visit me for the
first time: that which is expected stands in interindividual interrelation to
me.
2. That, in contrast, is not the case when I am busy perceiving some-
thing and, on the basis of my recollection of earlier perceptions of a previ-
ously perceived course of affairs, do or do not now expectto perceive the
same thing. In such a case, where recollection via expectation codetermines
the future perception, we speak of apperception. I see someone who visits
mefor the second time differently than I did thefirst time.
E. That which is expected is as such passive and can be either a subject
(1) or an object(2).
1. In the example above I expect that the person in question will in fact
come.
2. When he comes again | expect that the perception as well as the then
to be perceived object will or will not be the repetition of the earlier one.
F. The expectation of expectation also occurs, When someone gets ready
to make a trip abroad, he expects to see manythings. If he gets sick in the
mean time, stifling the realization of his plans, then the expectation dies.
But when his doctor wants to keep the severity of the situation a secret and
appeases him with the promise of such a speedy recovery that the trip can
proceed as planned, even though the patient, who would like that, does not
himself think it probable, it can happen that he says to the doctor, “Please
don’t say that, otherwise I'll once again start to count on enjoying the trip.”
In other words, he expects that when the doctor repeats his optimistic words,
his expectations will be reawakened.
In such cases of expecting expectations, what is expected is an action of
a subject.
169. Recollection and expectation connected but not mutually reducible

Expectation is not possible without recollection, for example, recalling
a promise. And when what is expected actually presents itself and is per-
ceived by the one who was expecting it, the expectation later becomes rec-
ollectable. But however closely connected with each other, the act of recol-
lection never becomes expectation, nor the latter a recollection: they con-
linue to differ in time direction.
2. THE ROLE OF THE VERTICAL CONNECTION

IN ANALYTIC COMING TO KNOW
170. Introduction
Up until now I discussed only the horizontal connections in knowing.
Here too however, evidence of vertical connection is not absent. We find it
in thinking as well as in the knowable; for that which is analytic is far from
an isolated chamber of consciousness or categorial apparatus. | will only
discuss thinking here.
If there is to be talk of connection however, then there must also be
difference. That is why I first take up the difference and then the evidence
of connection.
171. The difference between the analytic and the otherfunctions
It is not necessary to work out the difference between the analytic
function and all of the others: an exposition of the difference between it and
a few of the others, mainly immediately adjacent functions is sufficient; but
also needed because of the prevailing confusion.
A. The difference between the analytic function and a few lower ones.
1. The analytic function is often identified with the mathematic func-
tion. This identification is rooted in different causes. Some call both the
analytic as well as the mathematic “abstract” (a}; on the other hand, others
view both as “apriori" (b).
a, The first way of speaking appeals to the fact that that which is math-
ematic is never present other than in nonmathematically qualified things and
thus must be separated out from these. But this process is entirely different
from that of abstracting, e.g. from individuality when thinking about math-
ematic figures and nonmathematic things.
b. He who calls the analytic and the mathematic both “apriori" is first
of all of the opinion that the analytic does not rest on the sub-analytic, but is
joined to the latter as a donum superadditum, and then connects this outlook
with the fact that that which is supra-mathematic presupposes that which is
mathematic. But against the first claim it can be remarked that nothing in
the cosmosis apricri, and against the second, that "being presupposed” sig-
nifies here “being substrate," thus implies the exact opposite of this sup-
posed apriority.
2. The still frequent confusion of the analytic with the psychic is usu-
ally rooted in the lack of clarity concerning that which is psychic; so that
when we summarizeall of the supra-biotic under the term “psychic,” think-

ing will naturally fall under this psychic. That is why many of those busy
with the psychology of thinking in fact also study the analytic (e.g. the ei-
detic). It is sufficient to recall here that psychic life is that which is emotive
and, be it differently, is also present in animals; and that the analytic is
nothing other than basic thinking, that we find on earth only among human
beings.
B. Thedifference between the analytic function and the next higher func-
tion.
Becauseofthe prevailing confusion we have to mentionhere the differ-
ence betweenthe analytic function and the two next higher ones.
1. The difference between the analytic and historic function.
Because people often equate the historic and the genetic, the difference
between the analytic and historic function is also often wrongly posed. It
can be briefly expressed as follows: thinking is not the same as cultivating,
and hence nonscientific knowing, though presupposed in it, is also not the
same as know-how [fechné].
2. The difference between the analytic and lingual function.
If acknowledged, people often look for this difference in that the
thought is not spoken while the word is spoken. But this answer cannot sat-
isfactory. Every person formulates many statements in language without
ever uttering them. The difference does not lie here either, but in the
meaning through words, both of things outside us as well as of thoughts.
That we often think and know without putting the thought and the knowl-
edge into wordsis evident from the recollection and expectation with which
we view daily life. When we get up in the morming we expect that every-
thing will be in the same place as last night. But we hardly ever putthat ex-
pectation into words except whenit is not fulfilled, for example, because the
wind blew something from its place or thieves, disturbed in their work, have
left a room in disorder.
172. The evidences of connection between the analytic and the other func-
tions
Here again wehaveto distinguish the analytic subject with its retroci-
pations and anticipations (A) and the analytic object (B).
A. The analytic subject.
1. Retrocipations. That the analytic retrocipates to the arithmetic is
evident from the multiplicity in thinking; to the spatial from comparison; to
the physical from, thought's strides from basis to consequence (analogous to
the causal correlation of cause and effect in the physical); to the organic,
from the brain-power; to the psychic, from the mind's will,
2. Anticipations. That the analytic anticipates the higher [functions] is

evident, among other things, from concepts and statements. With concepts
the analytic anticipates technical use, with statements, formulation in lan-
guage.
B. The analytic object.
Since the meaning of the sub-analytic repeats itself in all the higher law
spheres, this is also the case in the analytic law sphere.
This analytic object has great significance. It is true that the theory of
knowledge has difficulty accounting for knowing the [analytic] object, but in
order to gain knowledge aboutthe sub-analytic the analytic subject has to di-
rectitself in the first place to the analytic perception of the analytic object.
B. The Knowable
173. What is knowable
Perceiving, recollecting, expecting: these all proved to be a directing
of oneself to what is knowable in the present, the past, and the future. For
us to give account of what knowledge is we must also ask what is knowable
in that towards which suprapsychic distinguishing is directed.
The following are knowable:
A. God to the extent he has revealed himself both through his word as
well as through his creatures, to the extent we can know these.
Comment I: God, therefore, can be known through two means. If one uses
the terms “Scripture and nature“ for these means, one ought to keep in mind:
a) that there was a time in which the word of God was not yet written; and b)
that nature should be understood to be all the work of God and especially not
only a part of earthly creatures. In this sense “nature” also includes all institu-
tions and the genetic course ofaffairs therein, for better and for worse.
Comment 2: Not all of the works of God are knowable for us, as will be seen
below,
B. His law governing the cosmos and knowable by the light of the word
of God from the cosmos.
C. The cosmos; more specifically:
1, Heaven, in the sense of the world ofspirits, to the extent we receive
communication about it from the word of God.
2. Earth, a) to the extent we receive communication about it from the
word of God, and b) to the extent we can investigate its past, present, and
future.
As for the latter, we oughtto distinguish further:
1} the primary state of affairs, that is to say, what in that which is
knowableis notitself knowledge or error, and
2) the secondary state of affairs, that is to say, what is knowable,butis

also itself subsumed under knowledge or error about a primary state of af-
fairs.
Comment 3: Earth, therefore, can also be known through two means. Those
who do not accept this deny the possibility of christian science.
Comment 4: It is better not to call either of these means through which we can
know God, his law, and (a part of) the cosmos, a “source of knowledge.”
This term leaves the impression that human knowledge exists independent of
us not only in the as humanly communicated word of God and in the knowl-
edge of our fellowmen, but in all of nature, such that one runsthe risk of los-
ing sight of the difference between that which is humanly knowable and the
knowledge obtained by men.
174. The connection between the activity in coming to know and what is
knowable
The thinking subject belongs to the cosmos.
That is why, negatively, it cannot transcend the limits of the cosmos.
Onthe other hand, positively, it stands connected with all that is know-
able:
1. with God, who also calls coming to know into his service as expression of
love-filled obedience;
2, with God's law—the relationship to God's law is not simply con-
templative: this law is there neither exclusively nor even primarily to be
pondered, but to be obeyed;
3, also with the cosmos, to the extent it is knowable. That is why we turn
against skepticism, which still has ideals for knowing but despairs of their
realization, as well as against mysticism, which disqualifies coming to know
what lies outside of us as being "external" and considers the knowing pro-
cess to be introspective.
Comment: This connection is a direct one. In other words, it is not the case
that things or people first create impressions in me and that I then arrive at re-
sults by abstracting from the impressions present within me. No, the person
thinking focuses his attention on what is knowable, be it thing or person, and
analyzes it, abstractly or not, there where it is and in so doing arrives at re-
sults.
For that reason, contrary to what the copy theory claims, the connection
between what is knowable and the result is not direct. In between what is
knowable and the related result there is always the analysis of the person
thinking, who analyzes what is knowable correctly or not and, in turn, comes
to knowledge or error concerning what is knowable. Onthis score, Plato and
not Aristotle is right.
Meanwhile, keep in mind that this activity is analytic in character. Re-
jecting the copy theory given the aforementioned grounds in no way implies
that this activity is creative or even productive. We do not bring forth knowl-
edge or error from ourselves, but come to these two as though they were re-
sults, to be gained only through the analysis of something knowable.
C. The Result
175. Two kinds of result
Wedistinguish here concept and statement.
In the concept we know a state of affairs; in a statement, a state of af-
fairs in relation to something (namely, the subject of the statement).
176. Concept and statement, being determined by the norm, by that which is
known, and by the analytic activity
A, Concept
1. Being determined by the norm.
Not only the activity, but also the result is normed: That is why we
speak of contradictory and noncontradictory concepts.
2. Being determined from the side of that which is known. In this con-
nection we distinguish:
a. Primary concepts, that is to say, concepts aboutstates of affairs that
are themselves not knowledge or error and secondary concepts. Thelatter
are concepts about states of affairs that are conceptual.
b. Extensions of concepts: That the extension of the concept man is
broader than that of the concept woman is rooted in the relationship of the
number of women to the number of men.
3. Being determined from the side of the knower. Wedistinguish here:
a. Perceptual and abstracted concepts.
b. Simple and composite concepts.
B. The statement.
1. Being determined by the norm.
Distinguish contradictory and noncontradictory statements. Being
contradictory or not has to do neither with the statement's subject nor with
its predicate, but with their relation. A statement is contradictory only when
a predicate is and is not attributed to a subject at the same time. Of the fol-
lowing three statements, only the last one conflicts with the norm of prin-
cipium contradictionis [principle of contradiction]: "Truth and falsehood are
incompatible"; "This argument is contradictory"; and "This is true and not
true in the same respect."
2. Being determined by that which is known.
This determines the quality of the statement as well as its extension.
a. Quality here has to do with a statement's relation being positive or nega-
tive.
b. The extension of a statement's field has to do with the range covered by

the statement's subject.
3. Being determined from the side of the thinking activity.
Distinguish here between immediate and mediate, that is to say, be-
tween statements not gotten through proofs and those thatare.
CHAPTER 2
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NONSCIENTIFIC KNOWING
177. introduction
Until now I have limited myself to discussing the structure of knowing
at one moment. What was said already then also stood in connection with
the past and the future. But so as to not confuse things, I] proceeded as
though the moment of now would not soon belong to the past and, so also,
as though the past did not increase and the present did not shift. This, natu-
rally, was an abstraction, only permissible for the sake of clarity and under
the condition that | abandon it as soon as possible. Now that I have reached
that goal, I will let go of that abstraction completely so as to concentrate
now on what was disregarded in what was knowable and in knowing,
namely, on what is genetic in both.
178. That which is genetic in the knowable
A. In the word of God.
We saw previously (§§121-134) that this did not remain stationary, but
increased and changed. We also noted (§173) that the word of God is writ-
ten in human language and hence is knowable for us. Combining both of
these givens, we find that in the Aistoria revelationis the word of God, and
hence what is knowable for people, increased.
B. Likewise, that which is accessible in the cosmos to human in-
vestigation does not remain the same, Atoms disintegrate and stars collapse
and melt together; plants, animals, and people, interbreed, evolve, and
vary. A second important element is the fact that we can know the pastbet-
ter than we can the future and hence, as the past grows, what can be known
better does as well. Finally, do not forget the changes and expansionof that
which is knowable that arises from human endeavor: we no longer speak of
the Zuiderzee (South Sea), but of the Lsselmeer (Lake Issel); and on the
polders of tomorrow there will be obviously much more to distinguish
geographically than there is today. Here too then, there is an increase and
change in what is knowable for nonscientific thinking.
Comment: Tracing the evolving of humanity leads to a knowledgethat, in the
footsteps of Holy Scripture, people also often found in nonscientific circles
(family trees recorded on the front page ofthe old Bible).
179. Thai which is genetic in the knower

In the theory of knowledge humankind appears not only as part of that
which is knowable, but also as knower. Here too genesis can be detected.
180. The beginning ofthat which is genetic in our knowing
This beginning was not always tied to early youth. Holy Scripture
sketches Adam (and Eve) as adults, and lets us see how his (her) knowledge
increased. Insight into the difficulties that accompany the growth of our
knowledge increases when we compare both processes with each other.
A. The development of knowledge for Adam
1. In the foreground for Adam was knowing the God whocreated him.
Wealso find that he observed the difference in sex among the animals and
had some knowledge of good and evil.
2. As far as his self-knowledge is concerned, he knew that he stood un-
der God's law, differed from the animals, and later, after the creation of
Eve, that he was her fellowman.
In both series, then, we find knowledge about being creature, further-
more a Knowledge about belonging to a kingdom,orsort of animal and hu-
man being, based on perceiving sexual interrelations, and finally knowledge
aboutthe individual differences within such a realm.
B. For those whose increase in knowledge begins in early youth the pro-
cess is different, The sequence in which what he (and others) experiences
comes to his knowledge differs, because of, but not simply because of, the
Fall. The most drastic difference, however, is the alienation, found in dif-
fering degrees, from the word revelation.
1. It is the intracosmic differences that stand in the foreground. This is
true not only for perceiving, remembering, and expecting, but also for the
arranging that goes on with primary concept formation, which is not only
interested in the number of the repetitions of a perception, and in the
strength with which what is perceived draws one's attention, but especially
in the place that what one perceives occupies in the cosmos. In this way the
ordering of what we know happens in a completely different way than it did
for the first man, in the areas of both self-knowledge and knowledgeofall
the rest.
In addition, there is the increase of what is knowable, particularly of
what can be recollected, due to the communication of others. Especially
when children grow up in an environmentthat is not uprooted from the past,
their recollection of the things they've experienced is enriched by first or

secondhand stories of what happened to others.
2. All of this does not mean that knowing becomes burdensome. How
someone arranges what they know might well differ irom the order in which
they care to know it, but the experience of those who are older can also
shorten the process of knowledge about oneself and others. What does en-
cumber this process is the lack of knowledge too often evident about the
word revelation, either because parents themselves lack this knowledge or
because they have forgotten it or deliberately keep it from the child. The
deprivation or withdrawal of this light will cloud the mind.
181. The assimilation of that which is remembered
What is remembered also gets assimilated. What is of primary conse-
quence here are the historic will to order concepts and statements, the
lingual formulation and social-didactic ordering of these formulations, and
the social use in discourse of what is gained in this way. Theory of
knowledge should likewise attend to each of these three actions.
182. The ordering of concepts
The ordering of concepts is not a compendium of characteristics
(Hobbes) nor a deduction of the individual from the realm of possibilities
(Leibniz), but an arranging of concepts according to the extension with re-
gard to which they hold.
Comment |: “Hold with regard to” may not be confused (as do the neokan-
tians} with “hold for," and “holding according to” not be confused with
“holding by virtue or because of.”
The principle according to which concepts are ordered then is no longer
that of the genetic order in which they came to the knowerat the time, but
another one entirely. For the significance of the arenas involved depends on
the extension they have according to the knower. As a result it is crucial
that the one ordering these concepts sees their extensions and their mutual
relations correctly. For example, if you take the area ofthat which is cre-
ated too narrowly, you will end up deifying that part of the cosmosthat, as
you see it, falls outside it and you will begin to ask all kinds of questions
about the relationship between the parts of the one cosmos, which in this
way have been thrown asunder, etc. That makes it clear why whetheror not
one bows for the word revelation helps to decide about the value of such an
ordering. He who obeys God's word can certainly still err when it comes to
details, but he who does not, arrives at concepts that are false in their basic
structure.
Comment 2: The basic distinctions do not always stand in the foreground.
Whendefining a birch, the concept “tree that...” will usually be sufficient. But
things are different when speculation grips nonscientific knowing. Then even
knowledge about the sub-analytic is not safe: a tree is set as “living” over
against "dead" matter, and the like. These and similar distortions in concept
formation are especially dangerous for supra-historic life because the forming
of concepts belongs to its substrate. Misformed concepts will lead to a fault in
the foundation that will prove to be devastating for the edifice built upon it.
Owing to this, government, family, school, and church are continually under-
mined by an anthropology that places a part of man above God's law.
183. Statements andformulating statements

To discern [oordelen zelf] is an analytic activity, specifically, to ac-
knowledgethat a state of affairs (the predicate) is joined (the stated relation)
with something (the statement's subject).
Discerning presupposes conceiving as a less complicated phase in the
process of knowing. That is not to say that discerning always has to do with
concepts. Only seldom is it a matter of ascribing a predicate to a concept,
for example, when I state, "This concept is a contradictory one." Even less
often doesit involve the connecting of concepts, as for example in the state-
ment, “The concepts a and b coincide."
Discerning is nonetheless distinct from lingually formulating and di-
dactically ordering simple statements as well as from connecting the con-
stituents and presuppositions of simple statements.
184. The lingualformulation of statements
The simplest schema of a statement is: § (the subject of the statement)
is (the stated relation) P (the predicate).
ul
Comment: The “is" of a statement’s relation is not the same as the “is equal
to" of mathematics. It has any number of meanings.
185. The socio-didactic ordering ofstatements (theory ofcategories)

Statements are organized by a conception's theory of categories in con-
nection with the ontic order it accepts. That is also why this part of philoso-
phy is certainly not neutral.
In conjunction with the /sagoge weorderthese as follows:
I. Primary statements, that is to say, statements that although they pre-
suppose knowledge do not themselves deal with knowledge.
A. About God.
B. About the law.
C. About that which is subject.
1. Aboutthat which is subject in a heavenly way.
2, Aboutthat which is subject in a earthly way.
a. about religion: for example, "You are of Christ, and Christ
is of God.”
b. about worth: for example, "It is good to speak truth."
c. about the kingdoms:

1) statements about their structure: for example, “The
leading function of animals is the psychic."
2) statements about their genesis: for example, "This kind
proliferates quickly."
d. about inherence: "Bees collect honey.”
e. about relations: “This child grows faster than that one.”
Il. Secondary statements.
A. About conceiving and concepts.
B. About discerning and statements
Comment: Realism's theory of categories reduces all or almost all statements
to Statements about (primary and secondary) classes. This, however, is a mis-
conception of the diversity in the cosmos and overestimates the class concept.
“Beescollect honey” is not the same as “Bees belong to the class of honey-
collecting animals." The first of these is a simple statement, specifically one
of inherence. The second statement is neither of these and presupposes the
following:
I. one or morestatements about other animals: “They collect honey”;
2. connecting these two (or more) statements into a new one: “Bees and other
animals collect honey";
3. elevating the inherence of a particular characteristic occurring with a num-
ber of antmal species into a class that, in contrastto all species, does not pre-
suppose an actual reproductive interrelation, but owesits being there to an ab-
stract organizing principle;
4. subsuming one of these actual species underthis class.
186. Making composite statements

Our discussion until now was limited to formulating and ordering sim-
ple statements. There are, however, also composite statements.
Composite statements rest on the analysis of one simple statement or on
connecting more than one such statement.
187. Making composite statements on the basis of analyzing a simple state-
ment
This analysis sometimes has to do with inferences, sometimes with the
epistemological assumptions ofthe statement.
That is why we have to look at these two more closely.
188. Implications and epistemological presuppositions of the simple state-
ment
A. The implicationsare:
1. with respect to the predicate: the truth claim (to be noncon-
tradictory);
Tsagoogé Phitosophiae
2. with respect to stated relation: the quality—a statement is positive

or negative;
3. with respect to the statement's subject:
a. regarding its character: it is mathematic, dynamic, and either
genetic or not.
b, regarding its extension: it is universal or particular.
B. The epistemological suppositions are:
I. the statement is immediate or mediate; that is, had without or owing
to demonstration;
2. the statement made with or withoutcertainty.
189. The composition of statements resting on the analysis of a simple state-
ment according to its implications
Distinguish here the following.
A. Someone analyzing focuses on the truth claim of the predicate (to be
noncontradictory) and discerns, "This simple statementis true" (1), or "It is
false" (2). The first composite statement is one cfassent, the second of dis-
sent.
Comment 1: Distinguish assent and dissent from being positive and being
negative. The first two occur only with composite statements and, in addition,
are not always tied to the quality of the simple statement. So: every assentis
as such positive and every dissent is as such negative, but not every positive
statement is an assent and not every negative statement is a dissent.
Comment 2: If a dissenting statement A, rightly claims that a dissenting state-
ment B is simple, then B should be rejected as not true.
B. Someone analyzing focuses on the stated relation, making a simple
statement into the subject of a composite statement and the quality of the
simple statement into the predicate of the composite one. For example:
“The statement: 'S did not pass by recently’ is negative." Such statements
sometimes only have logical sense, as in this case. In an everyday context
they are usually an observational introduction to something else; for exam-
ple, to a question like, “But who was it then that did pass by?"
Comment 3; Distinguish such statements of quality from more composite, ob-
servational statements, For example, “It is not true that the statement x is nep-
ative.” This is a dissenting statement in which the predicate “negative” in x,
and not the quality of the stated relation of x, is directly at issue. For
example: let's say x was, “That man is being unsocial," and x,, "That
statement [namely x] is negative." Then x3 can claim, with an eye to the
difference between being unsocial and nonsocial, "x,, that predicated the
quality of x as being negative, is contradictory." After all, being unsocialis
being social in a wrong way, but is nonetheless social, so that whoever
Draft D JAK Translation Page 287
considers unsocial to be nonsocial is indeed claiming that something unsocial

is both social and not social.
Here too it is helpful to distinguish assent and dissent (when discerning)
from positive and negative (statements). Given that assent is as such positive
and dissent as such negative, assent leaves the quality of what is proposed un-
changed, but dissent turns this quality into its opposite.
C. When the analysis focuses on the statement's subject, distinguish the
following.
t, Analysis is looking at the character of the subject of the statement:
at, among other things, whether it is genetic or not. If it is genetic, then
possibility plays a part, if it is not genetic, then it is not a factor.
Comment 4: Possibility is neither “contingency” (Boethius) nor functionalistic-
apricri conceivability with epeché ["withholding judgment") concerning the
physical tikelihood of what will come later out of what is there earlier (not of
the lower out of the higher}.
2. Analysis is looking at the extension of the subject of the statement.
For example: "The statement ‘All men are mortal’ is a universal statement,”
and "The statements ‘Adam was created mortal’ and "Some people speak
Dutch’ are particular."
190. The composition of statements resting on the analysis of simple state-
ments: according to epistemological presuppositions
Distinguish two cases.
A. Analysis focuses on the logical path by which the statement was dis-
cemed, namely, without or with the means of demonstration. For example,
"It is proven that..." and "It is not proven that...."
Comment 1: The first of these statements are called “apodictic,” the pertinent
simple statementis called a “conclusion.”
B. Analysis focuses on the (un)certainty of the person doing the dis-
cerning. Whenthe condition is one of certainty, it does not draw attention
to itself and one speaks and acts with assurance. “I believed; therefore 1
have spoken.” It is when uncertainty arises that the attention slips from
what is known toward the knowing subject. Hence (problematic and as-
sertive) statements like: “It is still uncertain whether..." or "Once again it is
certain that...."
Comment 2; Note the difference in the conjunctions: “whether” indicates un-
certainty and “that” certainty.
191. The relationship ofsimple statements

A. Statements are compatible with each otheror not.
B. Special relationships can be found {among simple statements].
1. If predicates or the subjects of the statements are identical:

a. When two statements have the same predicate they can be conjugated.
Schema: S, = S, = P. Example: “John and Fred are blond."
b. When two statements have the same subject they are copulable. Schema:
S = P, + P,. Example: “John is blond andlarge."
2. When for two statements the subject of the one is the predicate of
the other and the predicate of the first is the subject of the other, they are
called each other's converse. Discussion of the conditions under which the
converse of a true statement will also be true, etc., would take me too far
afield.
3. Based on extension and quality, distinguish among statements be-
tween universal-negative, universal-positive, particular-positive, and partic-
ular-negative, The relationships of these four groups play an important part
in the doctrine of proofs. This division is faulty in that it does not take into
account the difference between genetic and nongenetic statements, which is
very important when it comes to proofs. Here too, I cannot now afford to
elaborate.
192. The relationships ofspecific composite statements
When the extensions of the subjects of two particular statements with
opposing predicates together include all of the relevant subjects, then the
dilemmatic statement holds, "S is either P or not-P," and there is no third
possibility. If these conditions are not met, then there is no dilemma and the
principium exclusi tertii [principle of excluded middle] does not hold.
193. Proofs and verification
A. On the basis of relationships between two statements it is possible to
derive another one. The first two are called "premises" and the latter
"conclusion."
Proofs are also found in nonscientific life. The simplest case is when a
conclusion can be derived from two statements that are themselves conclu-
Sions from still other statements. In many cases a proof does not mean so
much; the proven statement can often be reached through invention. For ex-
ample, in the case when from "2 times 2 = 4" and "3 times 2 = 6" I con-
clude that "5 times 2 = 10."
B. An exception to this rule is the conclusion that deals with something
expected in the future. Such a proof has a hypothetical character, but is of-
ten an aid to invention (discovery). Confirming the conclusion through per-
ception is called "verification." When, for example, A says to B, “Watch
oul, you can’t trust C. I've done x; now he's going to react by doing y," B
Draft 8 JHK Translaion Page 289
is going to watch C's behavior and will be able to verify whether the conclu-
sion A drew is correct.
194, Demonstration
Demonstrations are social in nature. They use proofs, among other
things, but also all the nonscientific knowledge available. By presenting an
argument onetries to convince one's neighbor squarely; sometimes, just to
persuade in a less objective manner. It is possible to convince someone on
sound grounds, but also on those that are less so. The means one uses to
achieve one's goal make up one of the factors that form a tradition. These
ways and means are of paramount importance for gaining insight into one
part of nonscientific knowledge.
Comment: There is so much more to social life than demonstrative proofs!
Leaders in this area fortunately also have other means at their disposal.
Maintaining invested authority does not stand or fall with the dexterity of the
office bearer in arguing what he considers to be right!
195. The supra-analytic interrelations in nonscientific knowledge

Nonscientific knowledge includes so much more than current books on
logic deal with. Andit is the person with a wealth of experience that always
eclipses the beginner; “experience” taken here in its everyday sense includes
a keen memory, a trained eye, and a cash ofrecollections and perceptions,
Comment: In order to understand the terminology current in scientific hand-
books one needs to know more about logic than can be dealt with here. For a
more extensive elaboration I would refer to my Hoodlijnen der logica
(Kampen: Kok, 1948). [A note revised in the 1967 edition.]
196. Distinguishing functions within nonscientific thinking

Nonscientific knowing also distinguishes a number of functions, pri-
marily prevailing and leading functions.
That is especially true of the supra-analytic [spheres], particularly in
the supra-lingual [fields] where the use of language, when clear, supports
discernment. In this way, people (without the help of science) distinguish
business, state, family, and pistic institution (church). Where Calvinism has
made inroads, people earnestly resist mixing up these arenas, and denounce,
for example, political strikes, ecclesiastical science, and thelike.
But also with respect to the sub-analytic, nonscientific thinking does a
good job distinguishing. A farmerdistinguishes stones, plants, animals, and
people more clearly than many who are stuck with an impoverished theory
of knowledge that in quasi-simplicity only knows a subject-object relation-
ship and understands this to be the relationship of thinking and what sense
perceives. [See §160 D, Comment3, and §171 A2.]
Isagoogée Phitosophiae
197. Nonscientific knowing and the theory of knowledge

Obviously, those who are not keen in analyzing nonscientific knowl-
edge will be unable to keep all this straight: primum vivere deinde
Philosophari ["first live, then philosophize"). Nevertheless, what is an-
alyzed here as nonscientific knowledge belongs without a doubt to the vivere
and is present in an abundance more varied than indicated here. No one,
even those who also workat a scientific level, can ever get too much nonsci-
entific knowledge.
Division IT
Scientific Knowing
198. Introduction
A. Scientific knowing everywhere relies on nonscientific knowing.
B. For now, J can only indicate very briefly what oughtto be discussed in
a theory aboutscientific knowing.
199, Division
Wedistinguish special-scientific and nonspecial-scientific [scientific]
knowing. [ devote a chapterto the discussion of each.
CHAPTER 1
SPECIAL SCIENTIFIC KNOWING
200. The connection between nonspecial-scientific and special-scientific
knowing
Knowing in the special sciences distinguishes itself from nonspecial-
scientific knowing by its ongoingisolation of increasingly refined interrela-
tions in the several law spheres. We speak of a special science when no
more than one nonanalytic modality is investigated.
Comment: "Mathematics," “astronomy,” “zoology,” etc., are terms, formed
at a time prior to a sharp demarcation offields of investigation, that indicate
sciences in an earlier stage. Today, they are separating more and more into
true special sciences. For example, mathematics into arithmetic and geometry,
and theology into pistology and ethics; ethics in this context, then, is always
theological ethics, but notall theology is christian or holy.
201. Method
Being busy in a special scientific way implies then that the analysis of
the investigator is directed to a nonanalytic law sphere.
A. Through analysis, and aided by the principium exclusae antinomiae

[principle of excluded antinomy], such a law sphere first needs to be ana-
lyzed out of the cosmic context in which it found. In doing so, it becomes a
"field of investigation.”
Comment 1: With respect to the connection seeking analytic activity, what is
being investigated is not active; it is, if you will, noetically passive. This pas-
sivity in no way restricts the eventual nonnoetic activity of the functions being
investigated, So, for example, energy is certainly active, even though it is
noetically passive in the propositions of energetics and physics.
The method of the special sciences is always binary, that is to say,
synthetic. Only analytics lacks this synthetic character, at least in part,
namely, to the extent that we do not approach it via the theory of knowl-
edge.
B. Then analysis proceeds in a noetically active fashion within the field
that was first analyzed outof its cosmic context.
Comment 2: Within the entire field of investigation of a special science, it is
possible to focus just on a part, for example, the physical [aspect] of [only]
stars and the organic faspect] of [just] one person, like myself or someone
else. But we may not forget that such a part, in spite of this limitation, re-
mains standing in limited and more openinterrelations with all of the rest.
So, after the field has been isolated, it is possible to introduce a second
isolation, either in a vertical direction (as above) or in a horizontal direction.
For example, scientific research can focus particularly on the anticipations or
retrocipations within one sphere, as do differential calculus and integral cal-
culus, or social psychology and the psycho-sociology.
Comment 3: The division of the sciences among faculties is rooted more in
tradition than in a cogent theory of knowledge. Studies in some fields never
developed, making it difficult in later years to incorporate them into existing
curricula.
202. The diversity in method

The plurality of methods used to analyze these fields is as large as the
diversity of nonanalytic functions. Because there are no dichotomous groups
of functions in the cosmos,it is also impossible to split the sciences into two
groups, like the sciences and the humanities. The distinction of apriori and
aposteriori knowledge also lacks credibility. That 2 times 2 equals 4 might
"speak for itself" to us, but this insight rests on nothing more than that the
arithmetic function is the least complex. A child, however, does not simply
discover this proposition without any effort. The division of sciences into
those of nature and of culture must likewise be rejected. Culture is always
the result of human mastery of the nonhuman, It can only be investigated
scientifically by looking at the modal differences that are present in both
nature and culture and that are the same in both.
203. The result

The result consists of scientific statements (propositions) whose content
is neither only analytic nor only nonanalytic. The proposition "2 times 2 is
4" is not only analytic nor only arithmetic, but a bi-unity; it is arithmetical.
204. The connection of statements
A person thinking at the moment can often perceive an interrelation
between the analytic functions of two (or more) propositions found earlier.
Such a person is then standing in an analytically perceptive interrelation with
the analytic functions of those propositions, and yet now sees the analytic
interrelation between the analytic functions of these two propositions. This
analytic activity is called a "scientific inference," the two propositions in this
context “scientific premises," and the proposition gained, a “scientific
conclusion."
Such a conclusion always presupposes two prepositions. These in turn
could have been inferred from others. With these inferences, the nonana-
lytic element of these propositions may not be lost sight of. That is some-
thing not gotten through inference, but through special scientific labor.
In addition, an inferred proposition can also be found through special
scientific research. Inferences then are nothing more than a shortcut and
stimulus for the work.
205. Cooperation in science
The complex of propositions a special science finds through research
and inference is represented in sentences, didactically ordered and communi-
cated to others. They in tum offer their considerations or continue the work
on the basis given.
CHAPTER 2
NONSPECIAL-SCIENTIFIC SCIENTIFIC KNOWING
206. Summary
Whatfalls under this heading can only be done justice with a broader
discussion than is now possible. Pedagogy, among otherthings, fits in this
bracket. It is much more than a special science.
PART Il
THE THEORYABOUT
KNOW-HOW AND TECHNOLOGY
207. Introduction
The theory about expertise can only be dealt with much more briefly
than the theory about knowledge. Know-how belongs under the historic
[function] and, hence, presupposes the analytic {functicn].
Wewill first discuss know-how and thenits relationship to science.
Division 1
Know-How
208. Introduction.
We will discuss the following: the relationship between the historic
[function] and know-how, technical mastery, the basis of what is being
worked and the working ofit, and the combination of mastery and assimila-
lion in a higher interrelation.
209. The historic [function] and know-how
Thehistoric [function] includes more than expertise. Even the subject-
object relationship in the historic cannot adequately clarify what know-how
{techné] is. There is also a practical understanding of products of skill.
Know-how can itself only be circumscribed as a practical effort in the rela-
tionship of subject to object within in the historic sphere whose goal is to
satisfy practical-historic needs.
210. Technical mastery
The subject-object relation in the historic [sphere] stands in the fore-
ground here, connected with the schema active-passive. An example can
elucidate this.
From physical things, from pieces of metal, people make machines,
among other things. Before that happened the economic object function of
the metal was not lacking, then already it had an economic value. But it was
not yet a machine. Before it could become that two things were needed.
Here too,it is first the subject function that has something to say. If metal
was less resistant to fire it would not be used for machines. You can only
get out of it what's “in it.” On the other hand, a thing does not become a
machine without "extracting" what's in it, that is, without the often diligent
industry of people.
fsagoogé Phitasaphiae
Comment 1: This example also has the advamtagethat those who take the time
to investigate it carefully will be cured once and for all of the theory that
claims that all the sub-economic spheres function like machines. Neither the
organic nor the physical (and therewith, the mechanical) [spheres] are ma-
chine-like.
Here, too, we meet the active-passive correlation. In this case it is
connected to a state of affairs that is somewhat more involved than what we
have found previously. The “mastery” is here that human activity, taking
the make-up of the "material" to be mastered into consideration, changes a
thing's already present object function according to a more or less articulated
plan in compliance with an observed need that someone wants to satisfy.
Comment 2; “To master"—broader than "to form"—is not, on the side of the
subject, "to create," for it presumes the presence ofthe individual created ma-
terial and of the working person. Neither is it, on the side of the object, a
matter of connecting functions it does have with those it doesn't. It is only a
change within the context of the functions already present in the material,
Comment 3: The “material” need not always be a physical thing. Plants and
animals, limiting ourselves for the moment to nonhuman things, can also be
used. Think of the part played by flora and fauna in a botanical garden and in
a zoo.
Why can this mastery only occur through human beings? The grounds
for this are not found in the active-passive schema, which we find already in
the physical [sphere], particularly, in the relationship between corpuscles.
The answer to this question first becomes clear after investigating what
Mastery presupposes modally: not only a psychic desire, but also an analytic
distinguishing, particularly, of means and end as technical correlates. Take
is why mastery is first present in the historic law sphere, in which only hu-
man beings possess a subject function. The more complicated the sphere is
in which the complex change lies, the more mastery it also presupposes.
Art, for example, as aesthetic mastery of material, presupposes more than
just know-how.
211. The basis of know-how
Distinguish between the basis of the mastering and of what is mastered.
A. The basis of the mastering varies, but is never lower than the historic
[function].
B. The basis of what is mastered varies as well. It always lies in the
highest of the law spheres in which the object involved still possesses a sub-
ject function. For metal that is the physical, for plants and animals, respec-
tively, the biotic and psychic law spheres.
212. The combination of mastery and its appropriation in higher interrela-

tion
A new combination in which the schemaof active-passive twice plays a
part occurs when what has been made is taken up into another interrelation.
Putting a machine into operation following its fabrication and putting coins
into circulation once they have been minted are two examples.
The modality of this combination is always that of want, in service of
which the mastery took place.
Division 2
Know-How and Science
213. introduction
Distinguish two things here: the relationship of know-how to special
science and to philosophy.
214. Relationship of know-how and special science
Know-how is present in every culture, but never without technical
thinking and knowing in the categories of means and end.
All the same, practical thinking and knowing is something other than
doing and having science. Likewise, know-how inits primitive forms is not
attached to the special sciences.
Therelationship is very different, however, in cultures with highly de-
veloped special sciences. There know-how banks on the special sciences.
Surgery builds on organology, chemistry on physics and organology, and
experiments on various special sciences.
That, however, is also the reason for the confusion in terminology be-
tween fechné (know-how) and technology. These should be distinguished.
Techné is the praxis, while technology is the science about this practical
know-how. Technology, then, is a subdiscipline of the science called his-
tory.
215. Know-how and philosophy
Philosophy, being science, also presupposes practical expertise as part
of nonscientific life.
On the other hand, philosophy has to reflect on the place, on thelimits,
and on the religious sense of practical know-how; something that happens
more and more nowadays.
Isagoogée Philosophiae
PART If
THE THEORY ABOUTART AND AESTHETICS
216. Introduction
Art falls under the aesthetic (law sphere] and hence presupposes much
more than the analytic [function], namely, the historic [function] and know-
how.
Wehaveto discuss here first art and thenits relationship to science.
Division 1
Art
217. Introduction
Once again our attention turns te the relationship between aesthetics
and art, then to artistic mastery, to the basis of what is mastered and of the
mastering, and finally to the combination of mastery and appropriation in a
higherinterrelation.
218. The aesthetic and art
The aesthetic [law sphere] includes more than art. Here too, even the
subject-object relationship in the aesthetic is not sufficient to make clear
what art is. The subjective enjoyment of objective natural beauty is aesthetic
but notartistic. Art, then, can be circumscribed as being practically busy in
the relationship of subject to object in the aesthetic sphere, with an eye to
satisfying aesthetic needs.
Comment: It is best not to replace “needs” with “taste,” which is too rational
and hence one-sided.
219. Antistic mastery

Here is the analogy with know-how. But with art, everything is at a
higher plane; not historic, but aesthetic.
220. The basis of what is mastered and ofthe mastery
1. What holds for the basis of what is mastered technically, holds here
as well.
2. The basis of the mastery is in this case, other than before, never
lower than the aesthetic [function].
221, The combination of mastery and its appropriation in higher interrela-
tion
Art works can be taken up into jural life, as property, into ethical life,
as gifts, and into the pistic, as symbol.
Division 2
Art and Science
222. Introduction
Heretoo, given the differences in science, distinguish the relationship
between art and special science and the relationship between art and philoso-
phy.
223. Art and special science
Art presupposes the aesthetic [function], that is, practical knowledge,
not science.
In turn, the science about art presupposes artistic life. This science of
art is a subdiscipline of aesthetics, which is broader.
224. Art and philosophy

Art does not need philosophy, but philosophy does presuppose art as
part of nonscientific living.
Philosophy aboutart runs parallel to the philosophy about know-how.

Vollenhoven Reader

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Vollenhoven Reader

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Vollenhoven Reader

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Draft D JHK Translation Page 27

Calvinism and the Reformation of Phi osophy

Is Calvinism anything like a noncritical admiration of everything

Forit all depends uponthis understanding. (/33a21]

THE BASIC THEMES

Scripture. And everything that belongs to the cosmos(/33a25) stands under

2 "Being-subject-to-God” is naturally something very different from “subjectivity” in

This is why anythingthat has toddo with revolution is foreign to the

* This is an elaboration of the same point 1 made already in my Logos en ratio

with economic instability. As long as people know they are dealing

® To forget this is the mistake of all functionalistic dichotomism. So-called

9 W.Bauer, Griechisch Deutsches Worterbuch zu de Schriften des Neuen Testaments

leads to relativizing this difference. (/33239]

Draft D JHK Translation Pape 44

That this distinction of heart and faith finds oe from Scripture is

nonchristians directs itself to a Surrogate astheystand in unbelief over ah

against God's word. Their ill-informed opinions about what Christians

2. Butit is also the case, as | move to the second half of my propo-

Adam,and the second, in contrast, coincides with the eternal punishment

8 Gen 2:17, as well as the texts in the second note back.

% | Corinthians 15:44. The Greek reads pneumarikos and is rightly translated as a

is used. Sometimes it denotes the makeup. Weuseit in this sense, e.g.,

* The Germantranslation adds “der gnostischen oder auch” (35f56).

Naturally, muchof this is known to my readers. But it would not do to

THE BASIC THEMES OF

27 A. Kuyper, E Voto Dordraceno (Amsterdam: Héveker and Wormser, 1905)1,

epiphenomenal thinkers,’ among cosmists between subjectivism and objec-

“Doesn't a bird's-eye view of an importantpart of philosophy's past provide

The science of psychology appeared on the academic horizon around

created de novo by God at conception. Bavinck also emphasized the

beyond generalities applicable to any of the other special sciences, is practi-

(nonscientific) concepts [omramingsbegrippen] of the knowing inherent to

Taking faith in the sense of religious faith or belief, and primarily in

Thus it can be understood that faith, although always a function of an

A. Being functional, faith is subjected to a functional law. In this re-

The Significance of Faith Knowledge

A. Theoretic thinking and knowing is completely different from non-

The 1950 text translated in this chapter records a critical appropriation

(materialism, idealism, and dualism)" (1843). Another objective was to

knowing, to being, of which knowing is a part" (1963a97). He was also be-

object of knowing came a changed understanding of the subject of knowing

"methodological limits" peculiar to its field: “Wherever the physicist finds

A number of people have raised the question: Didn't Kuyper mean

lationships between all societal connections. As a result, compared with the

titles would be C. Veenhof's little book on sphere sovereignty published in

Someone happens along and says “The dog is white.” It is difficult to

Vollenhoven is very deliberate in talking (a) about what this relation

petent to do so. The formulation is based on the knowledge the respective

In 1934 Vollenhoveninitiated a series of newspaper articles under the

that researches the common functionality of things: statistical regularity in

In the previous issue I listed a number of questions submitted to the

[1. Norm and Law of Nature Viewed Systematically]

As is known, calvinian philosophy maintains that one should dis-

In calvinian philosophy the tern "nature" is used in two ways, namely,

[2, Norm and Law of Nature Viewed Historically]

* See (52k) "De visie op de Middelaarbij Kuyper en bij ons.”

“Religious belief," taken in the active sense of “believing,” refers to

life." The second assumption reads: “When a thinker develops a psychol-

of the presupposed foundation from which the scientist proceeds and to

clay. And the result is always an artificial entwining, a forced mixture of