RULE 129, 130, 132

EVIDENCE
CASE DIGESTS

Rule 129:

CLT Realty vs Hi Grade Feeds

G.R. No. 160684
Ponente: PEREZ, J.:

The properties in dispute were formerly part of the notorious Maysilo Estate left by Gonzalo Tuason, the
vastness of which measures 1,660.26 hectares, stretching across Caloocan City, Valenzuela, and
Malabon, covered by five (5) mother titles or Original Certificate of Title (OCT). One of the mother titles is
OCT No. 994, the mother title in dispute. Later on, smaller lots forming part of the Maysilo Estate were
sold to different persons. Several subsequent subdivisions, consolidations, and one expropriation of the
Estate, spawned numerous legal disputes, living-up to the name "Land of caveat Emptor" 1 one of these
disputed lots was lot 26, the property subject of this litigation.

The conflict arose due to an overlapping of the properties of CL T and Hi-Grade, which prompted CL T to
file a case for Annulment of Transfer Certificates of Title, Recovery of Possession, and Damages before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 121, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15463
against Hi-Grade.

FACTS:

 Version of Hi-Grade

o Respondent Hi-Grade is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land derived from TCT No.
4211 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal, registered under the names of
Alejandro Ruiz (Ruiz) and Mariano Leuterio (Leuterio ), which is a derivative title of OCT No.
994, the mother title.

o Tracing the line of transfer that preceded the title of Hi-Grade, it is averred that TCT No. 4211
was registered under the names of Ruiz and Leuterio on 9 September 1918.

o Later, Lot 26 was sold to Francisco Gonzalez (Gonzalez), which resulted in the cancellation
of TCT No. 4211 and its replacement by TCT No. 5261, registered under the name of
Gonzalez.

o Upon Gonzalez's death, TCT No. 5261 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 35486,
registered under the name of his surviving spouse Rufina Narciso Vda. De Gonzalez.

o The land covered by TCT No. 35486 was subdivided into seven (7) lots under subdivision
plan Psd-21154. By virtue of Psd-21154, TCT No. 35486 was cancelled and seven (7) new
titles were issued, TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374, registered under the children of Gonzalez.

o In 1947, the Government expropriated the seven lots. 6 By virtue of the expropriation, TCTs
No. 1368 to No. 1374 were cancelled and replaced by TCTs No. 12836 to No. 12842.

o Afterwards, by virtue of Consolidated Subdivision Plan, the Government consolidated the

titles and then further subdivided the property into 77 lots.
 o One of the 77 lots was registered in the name of Benito Villanueva under TCTs No. 23027 to
No. 23028, which was further subdivided into Lot-A and 17-B, pursuant to subdivision plan
Psd-276839.

o One of the properties in dispute is Lot 17-B, which was later on registered in the name of
Jose Madulid, Sr. (Madulid, Sr.), under TCT No. C-32979, which was later on sold to Hi-
Grade.

o Another lot resulting from the Government's consolidation and subdivision of the Maysilo
Estate into 77 lots, is Lot No. 52, which was registered in the name of Inocencio Alvarez
(Alvarez) under TCT No. 7363.

o Soon after, Alvarez sold Lot No. 52 to Madulid, Sr. TCT No. 7363 was cancelled and TCT No.
7364 was issued to Madulid, Sr. Afterwards, Madulid, Sr. sold the lot to Hi-Grade. This is
another one of the properties in dispute.

 As a review, first, Hi-Grade traces its title to TCTs No. 7364 and No. C-32979, which were
registered in the name Madulid, Sr., which in tum stemmed from TCT Nos. 36557-63/T-460.

o TCT Nos. 36557-63/T-460 were derived from TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374.

o TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374 stemmed from TCT No. 35486, which was subdivided into
smaller lots.

o TCT No. 35486 was derived from TCT No. 5261.

o TCT No. 5261 stemmed from TCT No. 4211.

o Finally, TCT No. 4211 was derived from OCT No. 994, the mother title.

 Version of CLT

o CLT is the registered owner of TCT No. T-177013, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale with Real
Estate Mortgage dated 10 December 1988, executed by the former registered owner, Estelita I.
Hipolito.

o CLT argued that Hi-Grade's title is null and void for being fake and spurious During trial, CLT
presented the following witnesses:
(1) Ramon Velazquez (Velazquez), Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Records Section, Records
Management Division of the LMB, who testified that the LMB does not have a copy of Psd 21154;
(2) Norberto Vasquez, Jr. (Vasquez), Deputy Register of Deeds of Caloocan City, who identified
the various titles relevant to the case;
(3) Juanita Bustalino (Bustalino), a licensed Geodetic Engineer, who testified that CL T engaged
his services to survey the subject property and discovered that there was an overlap between
CLT's and HiGrade's titles;
(4) Atty. Rafael Antonio M. Santos, one of the counsel of CLT; and
 (5) Aida R. Villora-Magsipoc, a Forensic Chemist of the Forensic Division, National Bureau of
Investigation, who examined the titles as an expert witness.
 On the other hand, Hi-Grade presented its sole witness, Atty. Jose Madulid, counsel for and
stockholder of Hi-Grade, and son of Hi-Grade's predecessor, Jose Madulid, Sr., who testified that
his family has been occupying the subject properties under the concept of an owner for more than
twenty-seven (27) years, until the properties were transferred to HiGrade.

 The Ruling of the RTC

o Ruled in favor of CLT. According to the RTC, Hi-Grade's title, the older title, cannot
prevail over CLT's title because it suffers from patent defects and infirmities. Although Hi-
Grade paid realty taxes on the subject properties, it is not considered as a conclusive
proof of ownership.

 Aggrieved, Hi-Grade filed a Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration on the grounds of newly
discovered evidence and serious and patent errors in the court's appreciation of evidence and
factual findings based on the decision of the court in Civil Case No. C-15491, entitled "CLT v. Sta.
Nino Kapitbahayan Association. "

 The RTC denied the motion for utter lack of merit. According to the RTC, the ruling in favor of Hi-
Grade in Sta. Nino is not a newly-discovered evidence, as Hi-Grade could not have failed to
produce such evidence if it exercised reasonable diligence. HiGrade' s reliance in the aforesaid
case is already moot and academic as the court in Sta. Nino already reconsidered its decision
and upheld the validity of CLT's title.

 The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

o During the pendency of the appeal, Hi-Grade filed a Motion to Admit and Take Judicial
Notice of Committee Report on Senate

o Inquiry into Maysilo Estate Submitted by the Committees on Justice and Human
Rights and on Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement (Senate Report) on 1
July 1998.

o The Court of Appeals granted the motion.

o Included in the Resolution, however, is a statement that although the Court of Appeals
takes judicial notice of the Senate Report, the Court of Appeals is not bound by the
findings and Conclusions therein.

 In the meantime, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Republic and in
representation of the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority, filed a Petition for
Intervention.
o The OSG averred that its intervention is indispensable as it is pursuant to its duty to
preserve the integrity of the Torrens system of registration and to protect the Assurance
Fund, in connection with which it can initiate necessary actions for the annulment of titles
irregularly and fraudulently issued.
o The Court of Appeals granted the OSG motion.
o The Court of Appeals resolved the issue on intervention. According to the Court of
Appeals, due to the magnitude and significance that will affect the stability and integrity of
the Torrens system, the State has sufficient interest in the case.

 Departing from the trial court's findings of fact, the Court of Appeals ruled as baseless the trial
court's reliance on the testimonies of CLT's witnesses, Vasquez and Bustalino, on the alleged
patent infirmities and defects in TCT No. 4211. According to the Court of Appeals, Vasquez and
 Bustalino never testified that the issuance of TCT No. 4211 failed to conform to the registration
procedures in 1917, the year it was issued. Also, Vasquez and Bustalino are incompetent to
testify on the customary practices in land registration at that time.

 Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

 In addition to the factual issues raised in the trial court, the Petition raised the following
arguments:
xxx
V. The Court of Appeals totally disregarded the rules on evidence and surrendered the
independence of the judiciary by giving full faith and credence to the findings and conclusions
contained in the Senate Committee Report No. 1031 by taking judicial notice of the same,
which report was rendered pursuant to proceedings initia conducted without notice to petitioner
CL T Realty and thus in gross violation of its right to due process, and was based on documents
that were never authenticated.
xxx

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it took judicial notice of
the Senate Report.

CLT’s Argument:

 CLT avers that taking judicial notice of the Senate Report is a violation of the Rules of Court and
CLT's right to due process. First, the Senate Report is inadmissible and should not be given any
probative value because it was obtained in violation of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
considering that the Senate Report is unauthenticated and is thus deemed hearsay evidence.
Contrary to the mandatory procedure under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which requires
examination of documentary and testimonial evidence, the Senate Report was not put to proof
and CL T was deprived of the opportunity to conduct a cross-examination on the Senate Report.
And it is also contended that the right of CL T to due process was violated because the
proceedings in the Senate were conducted without notice to CLT. Finally, the admission in
evidence of the Senate Report violated the time-honored principle of separation of powers as it is
an encroachment into the jurisdiction exclusive to the courts.

RULING:

 CLT misses the point.

 Taking judicial notice of acts of the Senate is well within the ambit of the law. Section 1 of Rule
129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

SECTION 1 . Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice, without
the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (la) (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on
without proof because these facts are already known to them; 13 it is the duty of the court to
assume something as a matter of fact without need of further evidentiary support. 14 Otherwise
 stated, by the taking of judicial notice, the court dispenses with the traditional form of presentation
of evidence, i.e. the rigorous rules of evidence and court procee dm. gs sue h as cross-exami.n
ati.o n.15

 The Senate Report, an official act of the legislative department, may be taken judicial notice of.

 CL T posits that the Court of Appeals violated the time-honored principle of separation of powers
when it took judicial notice of the Senate Report. This contention is baseless.

 We adopt the pronouncements of this Court in Angeles v. The Secretary of Justice:16

To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and Senate reports regarding OCT No.
994. In the 2007 Manotok case, this Court constituted a Special Division of the Court of Appeals
to hear the cases on remand, declaring as follows:

Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to adopt the findings made by the
DOJ and the Senate, or even consider whether these are admissible as evidence, though such
questions may be considered by the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the parties. x x x The
reports cannot conclusively supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if admissible they may
be taken into account as evidence on the same level as the other pieces of evidence submitted
by the parties. The fact that they were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself,
persuade the courts to accept them without inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in the
reports must still undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis, and certainly the courts will have the
discretion to accept or reject them.17(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

 Thus, the Senate Report shall not be conclusive upon the courts, but will be examined and
evaluated based on its probative value. The Court of Appeals explained quite pointedly why
the taking of judicial notice of the Senate Report does not violate the republican principle.
Thus:

However, the question of the binding effect of that Report upon this Court is altogether a
different matter. Certainly, a determination by any branch of government on a justiciable matter
which is properly before this Court for adjudication does not bind the latter. The finding of the
Senate committees may be the appropriate basis for remedial legislation but when the issue of
the validity of a Torrens title is submitted to a court for resolution, only the latter has the
competence to make such a determination and once final, the same binds not only the parties but
all agencies of government.18

That there is such a document as the Senate Report was all that was conceded by the
Court of Appeals. It did not allow the Senate Report to determine the decision on the case.

OTHER ISSUES:

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it admitted the Office of
the Solicitor General's Petition for Intervention

The Republic maintains that the proliferation of spurious or fake titles covering the infamous Maysilo
Estate poses a serious threat to the integrity of the Torrens system and the Assurance Fund. The
Republic asserts that because it is bound to safeguard and protect the integrity of the Torrens system and
Assurance Fund, it is duty-bound to intervene in the present case. In granting the intervention, the Court
of Appeals ruled that considering the magnitude and significance of the issues spawned by the Maysilo
Estate, enough to affect the stability and integrity of the Torrens system, the Republic is allowed to
intervene.
CLT, on the other hand, contends that the Republic's intervention is baseless. According to CL T, the
Republic has no legal interest in the properties as the subject properties are not public lands and as such,
will not revert to the Republic. Further, there is no threat or claim against the Assurance Fund. Anchoring
on Presidential Decree No. 478 and Administrative Code of 1987, CL T claims that the only action which
the Office of the Solicitor General may file on behalf of the Republic in connection with registered lands is
an action for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain and improvements thereon,
as well as lands held in violation of the Constitution. 19

RULING:

 This time, we agree with CLT.

 Intervention is only allowed before or during trial. Citing Sps. Oliva v. CA, 20 CLT argues that the
Petition for Intervention was time-barred for having been filed beyond the period prescribed in
Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, i.e., before rendition of judgment. In Oliva, the Court
clarified that intervention is unallowable when the case has already been submitted for decision,
when judgment has been rendered, or when judgment has already became final and executory.
And, intervention is only allowed when the intervenors are indispensable parties.

 Although we are cognizant of the exception that the Court may wield its power to suspend its own
rules and procedure in lieu of substantial justice and for compelling reasons, 21 the attendant
circumstances are not availing in the present case.

 The Republic is not an indispensable party in the instant litigation. An indispensable party is a
party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be
joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.22 Here, even without the Republic as participant, a final
determination of the issues can be attained.

 Anent the opportuness of intervention, the Court held in Carino v. Ofilada 23 that it may be allowed
only before or during trial. The term trial is used in its restricted sense, i.e., the period for the
introduction of evidence by both parties. The period of trial terminates when the judgment begins.
As this case was already in its appeal stage when intervention was sought, it could no longer be
allowed.

 CL T further avers that because there was no claim against the Assurance Fund, intervention is
improper. Section 95 of P.D. 1529 provides for the grounds when a party can claim against the
Assurance Fund:

Section 95. Action for compensation from funds. A person who, without negligence on
his part, sustains loss or damage, or is deprived of land or any estate or interest therein in
consequence of the bringing of the land under the operation of the Torrens system of arising after
original registration of land, through fraud or in consequence of any error, omission, mistake or
misdescription in any certificate of title or in any entry or memorandum in the registration book,
and who by the provisions of this Decree is barred or otherwise precluded under the provision of
any law from bringing an action for the recovery of such land or the estate or interest therein, may
bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction for the recovery of damages to be paid out
of the Assurance Fund.

 Indeed, whatever party is favored in this case, the losing party may file a claim against the
Assurance Fund as the present case involves the operation of the Torrens system. However, the
action to claim against the Assurance Fund may be dealt with in a separate proceeding.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53770, entitled "CLT Realty Development Corporation v.
Hi-Grade Feeds Corporation, Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III " dated 18 June 2003
and 28 October 2003, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

Alfelor vs Halasan GR No. 165987 March 31, 2006

Facts:
 January 30, 1998 - the children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor filed a
Complaint for Partition before the RTC of Davao City. Among the plaintiffs were Teresita
Sorongon and her two children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, who claimed to be the surviving
spouse of Jose Alfelor, one of the children of the deceased Alfelor Spouses.
 Respondent Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for Intervention. She claimed:
o she was the surviving spouse of Jose. Thus, the alleged second marriage to Teresita was
void ab initio for having been contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage.
o Further alleged that Joshua and Maria Katrina were not her husband’s children.
o Josefina attached to her pleading a copy of the marriage contract which indicated that
she and Jose were married on February 1, 1956.
 Josefina presented the marriage contract as well as the Reply-in-Intervention filed by the heirs
of the deceased, where Teresita declared that she knew "of the previous marriage of the late
Jose K. Alfelor with that of the herein intervenor" on February 1, 1956. However, Josefina did not
appear in court.
 Teresita testified before the RTC
o narrated that she and the deceased were married in civil rites at Tagum City, Davao
Province on February 12, 1966, and that they were subsequently married in religious rites
at the Assumption Church on April 30, 1966.
o Among those listed as secondary sponsors were Josefina’s own relatives–Atty. Margarito
Halasan, her brother, and Valentino Halasan, her father. 
o While she did not know Josefina personally, she knew that her husband had been
previously married to Josefina and that the two did not live together as husband
and wife.
o knew that Josefina left Jose in 1959. Jose’s relatives consented to her (Teresita’s)
marriage with Jose because there had been no news of Josefina for almost ten years. In
fact, a few months after the marriage, Josefina disappeared, and Jose even looked for
her in Cebu, Bohol, and Manila. Despite his efforts, Jose failed to locate Josefina and her
whereabouts remained unknown.
o that Jose told her that he did not have his marriage to Josefina annulled because he
believed in good faith that he had the right to remarry, not having seen her for more than
seven years.
o Teresita also declared that she met Josefina in 2001, and that the latter narrated that she
had been married three times, was now happily married to an Englishman and residing in
the United States.
 Trial court decision: Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an Order denying the motion and dismissed
her complaint, ruling that
o respondent was not able to prove her claim
o pointed out that the intervenor failed to appear to testify in court to substantiate her claim
o no witness was presented to identify the marriage contract as to the existence of an
original copy of the document or any public officer who had custody
o The determinative factor in this case was the good faith of Teresita in contracting the
second marriage with the late Jose Alfelor, as she had no knowledge that Jose had been
previously married.
o Thus, the evidence of the intervenor did not satisfy the quantum of proof required to allow
the intervention.
 o Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, the RTC ruled that while Josefina submitted a machine
copy of the marriage contract, the lack of its identification and the accompanying
testimony on its execution and ceremonial manifestation or formalities required by law
could not be equated to proof of its validity and legality.
o likewise declared that Teresita and her children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, were the
legal and legitimate heirs of the late Jose K. Alfelor

 Josefina filed a MR,  insisting that under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court, an
admission need not be proved.
o pointed out that Teresita admitted in her Reply in Intervention that she (Teresita) knew of
Jose’s previous marriage to her.
o Since the existence of the first marriage was proven in accordance with the basic rules of
evidence, pursuant to paragraph 4, Article 80 of the NCC, the second marriage was void
from the beginning.
o Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that
the person entitled to claim good faith is the "spouse present" (thus, the deceased Jose
and not Teresita). Josefina concluded that if the validity of the second marriage were to
be upheld, and at the same time admit the existence of the second marriage, an absurd
situation would arise: the late Jose Alfelor would then be survived by two legitimate
spouses.
 The trial court denied the motion in its Order

 Aggrieved, Josefina filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA,
o alleging that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring that she failed to
prove the fact of her marriage to Jose, in considering the bigamous marriage valid and
declaring the second wife as legal heir of the deceased.
o Also stressed that Articles 80 and 83 of the NCC provide for a presumption of law that
any subsequent marriage is null and void.
o Insisted that no evidence was presented to prove that she had been absent for seven
consecutive years before the second marriage.

 Teresita’s comment:
o Teresita and her children countered that anyone who claims to be the legal wife must
show proof thereof.
o Pointed out that Josefina failed to present any of the following to prove the fact of the
previous marriage:
 the testimony of a witness to the matrimony,
 the couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged
wedding;
 the birth and the baptismal certificates of children during such union, and other
subsequent documents mentioning such union.
o petitioners claim that it was mere hearsay, without probative value, as she heard of the
alleged prior marriage of decedent Jose Alfelor to Josefina only from other persons, not
based on her own personal knowledge.
o Pointed out that Josefina did not dispute the fact of having left and abandoned Jose after
their alleged marriage in 1956, and only appeared for the first time in 1988 during the
filing of the case for partition of the latter’s share in his parents’ estate.
o that Josefina does not even use the surname of the deceased Alfelor.
o Paragraph 2, Article 83 of the CC, now Article 41 of the Family Code, is applicable.
Moreover, her inaction all this time brought to question her claim that she had not been
heard of for more than 7 years.

 The CA Decision: reversed the trial court ruling

 o held that Teresita had already admitted (both verbally and in writing) that Josefina had
been married to the deceased, and
o under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, a judicial admission no
longer requires proof. Consequently, there was no need to prove and establish the
fact that Josefa was married to the decedent.
o Santiago v. De los Santos, the appellate court ruled that an admission made in a
pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and is conclusive
as to such party; and all contrary or inconsistent proofs submitted by the party who made
the admission should be ignored whether objection is interposed by the other party or
not.
o Concluded that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in ordering the dismissal of
Josefina’s Complaint-in-Intervention
 Thus, Joshua and Maria Katrina Alfelor filed the instant petition

 Petitioners’ arguments:
o limit the issue to the determination of whether or not the CA erred in ordering the
admission of private respondent’s intervention.
o Insist that in setting aside the Orders of the trial court, the CA completely disregarded the
hearsay rule.
o Aver that while Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides that an
admission does not require proof, such admission may be contradicted by showing that it
was made through palpable mistake.
o Moreover, Teresita’s statement in the Reply-in-Intervention admitting knowledge of the
alleged first marriage, is without probative value for being hearsay.

 Private respondent’s argument:

o reiterates that the matters involved in this case fall under Section 4, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence, and thus qualify as a judicial admission which does not
require proof.
o Consequently, the CA did not commit any palpable error when it ruled in her favor.

 Petitioners counter that while Teresita initially admitted knowledge of Jose’s previous marriage to
private respondent in the said Reply-in- Intervention, Teresita also testified during the hearing, for
the purpose, that the matter was merely "told" to her by the latter, and thus should be considered
hearsay.
o They also point out that private respondent failed to appear and substantiate her
Complaint-in-Intervention before the RTC, and only submitted a machine copy of a
purported marriage contract with the deceased Jose Alfelor.

Issue: Whether or not the admission of Teresita in the Reply-in-Intervention constituted judicial
admission?
Ruling: YES.
 The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs, petitioners, admitted the existence
of the first marriage in their Reply- in-Intervention filed in the RTC, to wit:
o 1.1. Plaintiff Teresita S. Alfelor admits knowledge of the previous marriage of the late
Jose K. Alfelor, with that of the herein intervenor were married on February 1, 1956;

 Likewise, when called to testify, Teresita admitted several times that she knew that her late
husband had been previously married to another.

 To the Court’s mind, this admission constitutes a "deliberate, clear and unequivocal"
statement; made as it was in the course of judicial proceedings, such statement qualifies
as a judicial admission.
  A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a
waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with.
 A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. 
 Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making
such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent
therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not.
 The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the
pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was
pleaded.

 CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED. The RTC, Branch 17,
Davao City, is ORDERED to admit respondent Josefina Halasan’s Complaint-in-Intervention and
forthwith conduct the proper proceedings with dispatch. SO ORDERED.

Other court discussion (motion for intervention):

 Under Sec. 1, Rule 19, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the
matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the parties;
(4) or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of
property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. 27Intervention is "a proceeding in a suit or
action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining
plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the
claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by
which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave
of court, of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person
becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be affected
by such proceedings."
 Considering this admission of Teresita, petitioners’ mother, the Court rules that respondent
Josefina Halasan sufficiently established her right to intervene in the partition case. She has
shown that she has legal interest in the matter in litigation.
 In Uy v. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed petitioners (who claimed to be the surviving legal
spouse and the legitimate child of the decedent) to intervene in the intestate proceedings even
after the parties had already submitted a compromise agreement involving the properties of the
decedent, upon which the intestate court had issued a writ of execution.
 Contrary to petitioners’ argument, the case of Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals is not in point, as the
Court therein did not discuss the propriety of allowing a motion for intervention, but resolved the
validity of a marriage. In relying on the merits of the complaint for partition, the Court ultimately
determined the legitimacy of one of the petitioners therein and her entitlement to a share in the
subject properties.

Rule 130:

Republic v Sandiganbayan
Facts:
 Twenty four years ago, the Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), commenced a complaint for “reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages” against Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. (Tantoco), Dominador R. Santiago (Santiago),
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda, R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco, and
Maria Lourdes Tantoco–Pineda
 Instead of filing an Answer, respondents Tantoco and Santiago filed a “Motion To Strike Out
Some Portions of the Complaint and For Bill of Particulars,” which were both denied for lack of
bases.
 On 27 July 1989, Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated
“Interrogatories to Plaintiff.”
  A month later, they filed both an “Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff” and a Motion for
Production and Inspection of Documents.
 This time, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the Motion for
Production and Inspection of Documents.
 When the PCGG elevated the issue to the Supreme Court, this Court, affirmed the Orders of the
Sandiganbayan in this wise:
o The Court finally finds that, contrary to the petitioner’s theory, there is good cause for the
production and inspection of the documents subject of the motion dated August 3, 1989.
Some of the documents are, according to the verification of the amended complaint, the
basis of several of the material allegations of said complaint. Others, admittedly, are to be
used in evidence by the plaintiff. It is matters such as these into which inquiry is precisely
allowed by the rules of discovery, to the end that the parties may adequately prepare for
pre–trial and trial.
 Pre–trial commenced, and from 3 January to 14 July 1993, the PCGG produced documents pre–
marked as Exhibit “A” to “LLL” before Atty. Renato T. Bocar and respondents’ counsel.
 On 10 September 1996, the pre–trial was declared closed.
 On 23 and 25 September 1996, the temporary markings of Exhibits “A” to “LLL,” together with
their sub–markings, were adopted. 
 However, over the objections of respondents Tantoco and Santiago, the PCGG produced
and caused the pre–marking of additional documents, Exhibits “MMM” to “AAAAAAA.”
 Tantoco and Santiago filed a “Motion under Rule 29 of the Rules of Court,” claiming that the
additional documents were never produced at the discovery proceedings and praying that
petitioner be sanctioned for contempt.
 The Sandiganbayan denied the motion on 17 February 1997 (First Resolution)
 Trial proceeded; however, new documents not shown at discovery were still being marked.
 Tantoco and Santiago again filed a “Motion to Ban Plaintiff From Offering Exhibits Not Earlier
Marked During the Discovery Proceedings,” which the graft court denied
 Petitioner filed its Formal Offer of Evidence on 16 March 2007
 On 15 January 2008, the Sandiganbayan ruled that with the exception of some documents,  “all
Exhibits... are denied admission.
o The due execution and authenticity of these documents remain challenged since the
prosecution failed to show otherwise.”
 On petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan partly relented and admitted
Exhibits “MMM” to “AAAAAAA” (Second Resolution).
 Respondents, in turn, filed their Motion for Reconsideration, to which the graft court issued the
assailed Resolution, stating:
o After a thorough review of the circumstances, this Court is convinced that it is fair and just
to grant defendants’ Motion under Rule 29 of the Rules of Court filed on October 1, 1996
and to sanction the plaintiff for its deliberate refusal and failure to comply with the
directive of this Court which was confirmed no less (sic) by the Supreme Court. The
plaintiff must be prevented from offering in evidence all the documents that were not
produced and exhibited at the time the plaintiff was under a directive to do so, i.e.
Exhibits “MMM” to “AAAAAAA” xxx. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court is not
unmindful of the fact that the exhibits involved have not passed the test of admissibility in
any event.

Issue:
Whether or not the documents should be excluded as evidence due to petitioner’s own failure to produce
them at the pre–trial

Ruling:
 YES
 In excluding Exhibits “MMM” to “AAAAAAA,” the Sandiganbayan properly exercised its discretion
over evidence formally offered by the prosecution.
 Nothing therein shows that the court gravely exceeded its jurisdiction.
 The Republic invokes the First Resolution, specifically the graft court’s view that the exclusion of
the Exhibits “would be too technical,” since their non–production “could be attributed to
inadvertence rather than willful disobedience.”
 However, this First Resolution merely disposed of respondents’ Motion to cite petitioner in
contempt.
 It does not constitute an irrevocable stamp of admissibility.
 Petitioner conveniently disregards the basic rule of evidence, namely, that the issue of the
admissibility of documentary evidence arises only upon formal offer thereof.
 This is why objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered,
and not earlier.
  Accordingly, the Court ruled in Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles as follows:
o The identification of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute
the formal offer of the document as evidence for the party presenting it. Objection to the
identification and marking of the document is not equivalent to objection to the
document when it is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the
objection to the document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.

xxxx

It would have been so simple for the defense to reiterate its former objection, this
time seasonably, when the formal offer of exhibits was made. It is curious that it did
not, especially so since the objections to the formal offer of exhibits was made in writing.
In fact, the defense filed no objection at all not only to the photocopies but to all the other
exhibits of the prosecution.
 Seasonable objection to the subject “Exhibits” can only be properly made upon formal offer.
 The Sandiganbayan acknowledged that Tantoco and Santiago had been consistent in reiterating
their objections.
 The court even clarified in its First Resolution that their “Motion Filed Under Rule 29,” was but in
pursuance of their continuing objection to the marking of evidence not produced at discovery.
 Hence, nothing in the said Resolution can be read as a ruling on its admissibility.
 Its dispositive portion clearly states: “Under all these circumstances, there is no basis for the
Court to declare plaintiff in contempt of court and it would be too much of a technicality to bar it
from introducing the additional exhibits in evidence.”
 The Second Resolution, while issued after petitioner had submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence,
noted that all the documents contained therein were photocopies.
 It stated that a mere certification from the Clerk of Court that they “appear to be the original copy”
would not suffice.
 The Sandiganbayan still admitted them as evidence, yet the only reason cited for doing so was
liberality, viz: “There is nothing in the rules which categorically prohibits the admission of
additional documentary evidence when called for as a case progress [sic].
 What is clear is that it is the Court’s discretion to allow or disallow its reception.”
 Thus, the Sandiganbayan fittingly corrected itself when once and for all, it excluded the
photocopies in its latest Resolution.
 This Court discusses the contents and implications of the two earlier Resolutions, because
petitioner simply has no other argument supporting its claim to reverse the Sandiganbayan.
 For those documents introduced in evidence as proof of their contents, the assailed Resolution
stated that petitioner has not made any effort whatsoever to explain why it submitted mere
photocopies.
 When the subject of inquiry is the content of a document, submission of a certified true copy is
justified only in clearly delineated instances such as the following:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;
 (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.
 Nothing on record shows, and petitioner itself makes no claim, that the Exhibits fall under any of
the exceptions to the Best Evidence rule.
 Secondary evidence of the contents of writings is admitted on the theory that the original cannot
be produced by the party who offers the evidence within a reasonable time by the exercise of
reasonable diligence.
 Even then, the general rule is that secondary evidence is still not admissible until the non–
production of the primary evidence has been sufficiently accounted for.
 The authority of the trial court to control its own discovery processes cannot be undermined.
 In this case, the Sandiganbayan’s exercise of this power is neither whimsical nor oppressive.

Issue 2:
WON the documentary evidence which are purportedly transmittal letters are admissible

Ruling:
 NO
 Petitioner remains unable to prove their due execution and authenticity.
 We subscribe to the view forwarded by the Sandiganbayan in its Second Resolution, which we
quote below:
o The fact that the documents were certified as true copies of the original by the PCGG
does not enhance its admissibility. These documents have remained private even if it is
in the custody of the PCGG. What became public are not the private documents
(themselves) but the recording of it in the PCGG. For, “while public records kept in the
Philippines, of private writings are also public documents...the public writing is not the
writing itself but the public record thereof. Stated otherwise, if a private writing itself is
inserted officially into a public record, its record, its recordation, or its
incorporation into the public record becomes a public document, but that does not
make the private writing itself a public document so as to make it admissible
without authentication.”
 Aside from lack of authentication and failure to present the originals of these documents, what
ultimately tipped the scales against petitioner in the view of the graft court was the former’s lack
of forthrightness in complying with the Supreme Court directive.
 The Sandiganbayan said:
o Thereafter, it did not take long in the process of the presentation of plaintiff’s evidence
before it became apparent that plaintiff’s exhibits consist mostly of documents which have
not been exhibited during the discovery proceedings despite the directive of this Court as
confirmed by the Supreme Court. Plaintiff’s failure to offer a plausible explanation for its
concealment of the main bulk of its exhibits even when it was under a directive to
produce them and even as the defendants were consistently objecting to the presentation
of the concealed documents gives rise to a reasonable [inference] that the plaintiff, at the
very outset, had no intention whatsoever of complying with the directive of this Court.
 Petitioner failed to obey the mandate of G.R. No. 90478, which remains an important case on
pre–trial and discovery measures to this day; the rationale of these rules, especially on the
production of documents, must be constantly kept in mind by the bar:
o The message is plain. It is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court the
facts in issue–fully and fairly; i.e., to present to the court all the material and relevant facts
known to him, suppressing or concealing nothing, nor preventing another party, by clever
 and adroit manipulation of the technical rules of pleading and evidence, from also
presenting all the facts within his knowledge.

xxxx

The truth is that “evidentiary matters” may be inquired into and learned by the parties
before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties —
before the trial if not indeed even before the pre–trial — should discover or inform
themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known to them
individually, but also those known to adversaries; in other words,
the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and the
Rules of Court make this ideal possible through the deposition–discovery
mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. xxx.

xxxx

x x x.   (I)t is the precise purpose of discovery to ensure mutual knowledge of all the
relevant facts on the part of all parties even before trial, this being deemed essential to
proper litigation. This is why either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts
he has in his possession; and the stage at which disclosure of evidence is made is
advanced from the time of trial to the period preceding it. 27 (Emphasis supplied)
After failing to submit the documentary evidence during discovery, when it was clearly ordered by both the
Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court to do so, petitioner also repeatedly failed to prove the due
execution and authenticity of the documents. Having failed in its belated attempts to assuage the
Sandiganbayan through the submission of secondary evidence, petitioner may not use the present forum
to gain relief under the guise of Rule 65.

Tangan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105830, January 15, 2002

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.

Nature of the case: This case is a motion for reconsideration of a decision of the SC.
“SC issued herein a Resolution for the MR”

Criminal case: HOMICIDE

Victim: 29-year old optometrist

FACTS:
 On February 23, 2001, SC rendered a decision which:
o Dismissed petition in GR No. 103613
o Affirmed appealed decision subject of G.R. No. 105830, with modifications
(1) Tangan is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, maximum, with all the accessory
penalties.
(2) Tangan is ordered to pay the victim’s heirs P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P42,000.00 as funeral and burial expenses, P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.

 Petitioner Eladio C. Tangan filed MR:

o Invoked the rule that factual findings of the trial court and CA are binding on this Court
o Hence, he argued that this Court erred in disregarding the mitigating circumstances –
which were appreciated by the lower courts and in raising the indeterminate penalty
imposed on him from a maximum of two years and four months of prision correccional to
a maximum of fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal
  This, he claims, exposed him to the “horrifying reality” of being
reincarcerated after having been preventively confined for more than four
years

ISSUE: Did the SC correctly disregard the mitigating circumstances appreciated by the lower courts?

RULING:
 Yes. The SC correctly disregarded the mitigating circumstances appreciated by the lower courts.

 It bears stressing that at no time during the trial of the case did petitioner raise self-defense
 Nevertheless, the trial court and CA found the attendance of the mitigating circumstances of
incomplete self-defense, sufficient provocation, and passion and obfuscation.
 When petitioner appealed the decision, he threw open the whole case for review
o It became the duty of this Court to correct any error as may be found in the appealed
judgment, whether it was made the subject of assignment of errors or not
 Thus, this Court reviewed the records of the case and found that the evidence fails to support
or substantiate the lower court’s findings and conclusions.
o Clearly, therefore, this case falls within the recognized exceptions to the rule that an
appellate court will generally not disturb the assessment of the trial court on factual
matters considering that the latter, as a trier of fact, is in a better position to appreciate
the same

As to the PHYSICAL EVIDENCE: (in relation to Topic)

 First of all, the physical evidence belies petitioner’s version of the incident.
 As we clearly explained in the assailed decision:
o The medical examiner testified that the distance between the muzzle of the gun and the
target was about 2 inches but definitely not more than 3 inches.
o Based on the point of exit and trajectory transit of the wound, the victim and the
alleged assailant were facing each other when the shot was made and the position of the
gun was almost perpendicular when fired.
o These findings disprove Tangan’s claim of accidental shooting.
o A revolver is not prone to accidental firing because of the nature of its mechanism,
unless it were uncocked, then considerable pressure had to be applied on the trigger to
fire the revolver.

 PHYSICAL EVIDENCE is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in the
hierarchy of our trustworthy evidence.
o For this reason, it is regarded as evidence of the highest order.
o It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.
 The physical evidence is amply corroborated by the eyewitness accounts of Rosalia dela
Cruz and Mary Ann Borromeo to the effect that petitioner took a gun from his car and suddenly
fired it at the deceased.

As to the Mitigating Circumstances:

 This Court found that the mitigating circumstances appreciated by the trial court are not
present.
 Petitioner refutes this and insists on his version of the facts.
 However, the testimony of his witness, on which he heavily relies, suffers from material
inconsistencies, which render it unworthy of belief.
 It was shown that defense witness Nelson Pante was 10 meters away when he saw the
incident, and his line of vision was blocked by petitioner’s car.
o From that distance and vantage point, he could not have heard anything or have had an
unobstructed view of the events.
o Sure enough, the details of his statement betray the falsity thereof.
 o He testified that petitioner was hit on the eyebrow, while petitioner said he was hit on the
jaw.
o Pante was also unable to identify Manuel Miranda, the person whom he supposedly saw
punch petitioner.

Re: Self-defense; Unlawful Aggression

 All of these, and the incredibility of petitioner’s account when compared with the physical
evidence, belie self- defense.
 From the established facts, it can be plainly gleaned that there was no unlawful aggression on
the part of the deceased
 What merely transpired before petitioner’s gun went off was a heated exchange of words
between the protagonists
 This does not qualify as unlawful aggression.

 UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or

imminent danger thereof.
 The person defending himself must have been attacked with actual physical force or with
actual use of weapon.
 Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
 There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an
unlawful aggression against the person defending himself.

Re: Sufficient Provocation

 By the same token, the evidence does not show the attendance of the mitigating
circumstance of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party.
 As stated, the PROVOCATION must be sufficient to excite a person to commit a wrong and must
accordingly be proportionate to its gravity.
 In this case, all that the deceased did immediately before he was shot was shout expletives and
slap petitioner’s hand when the latter pointed it to his face.
 These acts, while offensive, were grossly disproportionate to petitioner’s act of drawing and firing
of a gun.

Re: Passion and Obfuscation

 Furthermore, there was no sudden and unexpected occurrence that could have naturally
produced a powerful excitement in petitioner’s mind causing him to lose his reason and self-
control.
 As shown by the facts, no passion and obfuscation could have clouded his mind.

Therefore, this Court correctly imposed on petitioner the proper penalty for Homicide, without the
attendance of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, maximum.

Disposition: MR denied. Omnibus Motion to Re-Raffle/Transfer and/or to Recuse is likewise denied.

This denial is final.

Notes:
 While his Motion for Reconsideration was pending, petitioner filed with the Court an “Omnibus
Motion to Re- Raffle/Transfer and/or to Recuse.”
 He alleged, among others, that the ponente of the assailed Decision is biased in favor of
respondents and, therefore, must recuse herself from this case
 Petitioner’s accusation, however, is based on nothing more than this Court’s own evaluation of
the evidence and departure from the rule that findings of facts of lower court are not to be
disturbed
  Petitioner should bear in mind that the Decision, although penned by a member of the Court, is a
decision of the whole Court.
 Hence, any attack on the integrity of the ponente, or any member of the Court for that matter, is
an attack on the entire Court.
 More importantly, petitioner fails to establish with concrete proof his imputations of bias.
 Such irresponsible and unfounded statements will not be taken lightly by this Court

 Hence, petitioner and his counsel should be admonished for making such baseless and
unsubstantiated accusations of bias against the Court
 Moreover, the Omnibus Motion should be denied for lack of merit.

 Petitioner faults the Court for increasing the penalty five times such that, despite having served
the penalty imposed by the trial court, he now faces the “intolerable specter of
reincarceration.”
o It should be recalled that petitioner, by consciously and deliberately firing his gun, snuffed
the life out of a 29-year old optometrist.
o Suffice it to state that petitioner should bear the consequences of his felonious act.

People vs Romy Lim

GR. 231989, Sept 4. 2018
Appeal to the CA’s decision affirming RTC ruling Lim guilty for illegal possession and sale of shabu
Facts:
 An Information dated October 21, 2010, Lim was charged with illegal possession of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu)
 That on or about October 19, 2010, at more or less 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at Cagayan de
Oro City, Philippines, xxx Methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, a dangerous
drug, with a total weight of 0.02 gram, accused well-knowing that the substance recovered from
his possession is a dangerous drug.
 Contrary to, and in violation of, Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
 On even date, Lim, together with his stepson, Eldie Gorres y Nave (Gorres), was also indicted for
illegal sale of shabu,
 That on or about October 19, 2010, at more or less 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at Cagayan de
Oro City, Philippines, xxx Methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, a dangerous
drug, with a total weight of 0.02 gram, accused knowing the same to be a dangerous drug, in
consideration of Five Hundred Pesos (Php500.00) consisting of one piece five hundred peso bill,
with Serial No. FZ386932, which was previously marked and recorded for the purpose of the buy-
bust operation.
 Contrary to Section 5, Paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
 In their arraignment, Lim and Gorres pleaded not guilty . They were detained in the city jail during
the joint trial of the cases.
 The prosecution presented Intelligence Officer (IO) 1 Albert Orellan, IO1 Nestle Carin, IO2
Vincent Orcales, and Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Charity Caceres. Aside from both accused,
Rubenia Gorres testified for the defense.
PROSECUTION’s version
 'Around 8:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, IO1 Orellan and his teammates were at Regional Office
X of PDEA.
 Based on a report of a confidential informant (CI) that a certain "Romy" has been engaged in the
sale of prohibited drugs in Zone 7, Cabina, Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City, they were directed by
their Regional Director, Lt. Col. Edwin Layese, to gather for a buy-bust operation.
 During the briefing, IO2 Orcales, IO1 Orellan, and IOl Carin were assigned as the team leader,
the arresting officer/back-up/evidence custodian, and the poseur-buyer, respectively.
 The team prepared a P500.00 bill as buy-bust money (with its serial number entered in the PDEA
blotter), the Coordination Form for the nearest police station, and other related documents.
 Using their service vehicle, the team left the regional office and arrived in the target area at 10:00
p.m., more or less. IO1 Carin and the CI alighted from the vehicle near the comer leading to the
house of "Romy," while IO1 Orellan and the other team members disembarked a few meters after
and positioned themselves in the area to observe.
 IO1 Carin and the CI turned at the comer and stopped in front of a house.
 The CI knocked at the door and uttered, "ayo, nang Romy. "
 Gorres came out and invited them to enter. Inside, Lim was sitting on the sofa while watching the
television.
 When the CI introduced IO1 Carin as a shabu buyer, Lim nodded and told Gorres to get one
inside the bedroom. Gorres stood up and did as instructed. After he came out, he handed a small
medicine box to Lim, who then took one piece of heat-sealed transparent plastic of shabu and
gave it to IO1 Carin. In turn, IO1 Carin paid him with the buy-bust money.
 After examining the plastic sachet, IO1 Carin executed a missed call to IO1 Orellan, which was
the pre-arranged signal. The latter, with the rest of the team members, immediately rushed to
Lim's house. When they arrived, IO1 Carin and the CI were standing near the door. They then
entered the house because the gate was opened. IO1 Orellan declared that they were PDEA
agents and informed Lim and Gorres, who were visibly surprised, of their arrest for selling
dangerous drug. They were ordered to put their hands on their heads and to squat on the floor.
IO1 Orellan recited the Miranda rights to them. Thereafter, IO1 Orellan conducted a body search
on both.
 When he frisked Lim, no deadly weapon was found, but something was bulging in his pocket. IOl
Orellan ordered him to pull it out. Inside the pocket were the buy-bust money and a transparent
rectangular plastic box about 3x4 inches in size. They could see that it contained a plastic sachet
of a white substance. As for Gorres, no weapon or illegal drug was seized.
 IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of white
substance, and a disposable lighter. IOl Carin turned over to him the plastic sachet that she
bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic sachets. Despite
exerting efforts to secure the attendance of the representative from the media and barangay
officials, nobody arrived to witness the inventory-taking.
 The buy-bust team brought Lim and Gorres to the PDEA Regional Office, with IO1 Orellan in
possession of the seized items. Upon arrival, they "booked" the two accused and prepared the
letters requesting for the laboratory examination on the drug evidence and for the drug test on the
arrested suspects as well as the documents for the filing of the case. Likewise, IO1 Orellan made
the Inventory Receipt of the confiscated items. It was not signed by Lim and Gorres. Also, there
was no signature of an elected public official and the representatives of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the media as witnesses. Pictures of both accused and the evidence seized were
taken.
 The day after, IO1 Orellan and IO1 Carin delivered both accused and the drug specimens to
Regional Crime Laboratory Office 10. IO1 Orellan was in possession of the sachets of shabu from
the regional office to the crime lab. PSI Caceres, who was a Forensic Chemist, and Police Officer
2 (PO2) Bajas7 personally received the letter-requests and the two pieces of heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PSI Caceres got urine samples
from Lim and Gorres and conducted screening and confirmatory tests on them. Based on her
examination, only Lim was found positive for the presence of shabu. The result was shown in
Chemistry Report No. DTCRIM-196 and 197-2010. With respect to the two sachets of white
crystalline substance, both were found to be positive of shabu after a chromatographic
examination was conducted by PSI Caceres. Her findings were reflected in Chemistry Report No.
D-228-2010. PSI Caceres, likewise, put her own marking on the cellophane containing the two
 sachets of shabu. After that, she gave them to the evidence custodian. As to the buy-bust money,
the arresting team turned it over to the fiscal's office during the inquest.

Defense’s version
 Around 10:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, Lim and Gorres were in their house in Cabina, Bonbon,
Cagayan de Oro City. Lim was sleeping in the bedroom, while Gorres was watching the
television.
 When the latter heard that somebody jumped over their gate, he stood up to verify. Before he
could reach the door, however, it was already forced opened by the repeated pulling and kicking
of men in civilian clothing. They entered the house, pointed their firearms at him, instructed him to
keep still, boxed his chest, slapped his ears, and handcuffed him.
 They inquired on where the shabu was, but he invoked his innocence. When they asked the
whereabouts of "Romy," he answered that he was sleeping inside the bedroom. So the men went
there and kicked the door open. Lim was then surprised as a gun was pointed at his head. He
questioned them on what was it all about, but he was told to keep quiet.
 The men let him and Gorres sit on a bench. Lim was apprised of his Miranda rights. Thereafter,
the two were brought to the PDEA Regional Office and the crime laboratory.
 During the inquest proceedings, Lim admitted, albeit without the assistance of a counsel,
ownership of the two sachets of shabu because he was afraid that the police would imprison him.
Like Gorres, he was not involved in drugs at the time of his arrest.
 Unlike him, however, he was previously arrested by the PDEA agents but was acquitted in the
case. Both Lim and Gorres acknowledged that they did not have any quarrel with the PDEA
agents and that neither do they have grudges against them or vice-versa.
 Rubenia, Lim's live-in partner and the mother of Gorres, was at her sister's house in Pita, Pasil,
Kauswagan the night when the arrests were made.
 The following day, she returned home and noticed that the door was opened and its lock was
destroyed. She took pictures of the damage and offered the same as exhibits for the defense,
which the court admitted as part of her testimony.

RTC ruled guilty verdict on Lim for illegal possession and sale of shabu and acquitted Gorres for lack of
sufficient evidence linking him as a conspirator.
 With regard to the illegal possession of a sachet of shabu, the RTC held that the weight of
evidence favors the positive testimony of IO1 Orellan over the feeble and uncorroborated denial
of Lim.
 As to the sale of shabu, it ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the identity of the
buyer, the seller, the money paid to the seller, and the delivery of the shabu. The testimony of IO1
Carin was viewed as simple, straightforward and without any hesitation or prevarication as she
detailed in a credible manner the buy-bust transaction that occurred. Between the two conflicting
versions that are poles apart, the RTC found the prosecution evidence worthy of credence and no
reason to disbelieve in the absence of an iota of malice, ill-will, revenge or resentment preceding
and pervading the arrest of Lim.
 On the chain of custody of evidence, it was accepted with moral certainty that the PDEA
operatives were able to preserve the integrity and probative value of the seized items.
 as Gorres is concerned, the RTC opined that the evidence presented were not strong enough to
support the claim that there was conspiracy between him and Lim because it was insufficiently
shown that he knew what the box contained.

CA affirmed the RTC Decision

ISSUE: Whether Lim is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as to make him liable for illegal
possession and sale of shabu
Ruling: No, since it violates the chain of custody and
 At the time of the commission of the crimes, the law applicable is R.A. No. 9165.   Section 1(b) of
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements the law,
 defines chain of custody as- the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of
the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. 
 The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence must be
authenticated prior to its admission into evidence.  To establish a chain of custody sufficient to
make evidence admissible, the proponent needs only to prove a rational basis from which to
conclude that the evidence is what the party claims it to be. 13  In other words, in a criminal case,
the prosecution must offer sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably
believe that an item still is what the government claims it to be. 
 Thus, the links in the chain of custody that must be established are: (1) the seizure and marking,
if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the
turnover of the seized illegal drug by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3) the
turnover of the illegal drug by the investigating officer to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and (4) the turnover and submission of the illegal drug from the forensic chemist to
the court.
 Further, Seizure and marking of the illegal drug as well as the turnover by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer should be followed
 Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 states:
Sec. 21.  Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.  - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.] 19
 Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations(IRR)  of R.A. No. 9165
 In this case, here, IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic
sachet of white substance, and a disposable lighter. IO1 Carin also turned over to him the plastic
sachet that she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic sachets.
IO1 Orellan testified that he immediately conducted the marking and physical inventory of the two
sachets of shabu.27  To ensure that they were not interchanged, he separately marked the item
sold by Lim to IO1 Carin and the one that he recovered from his possession upon body search as
BB AEO 10-19-10 and AEO-RI 10-19-10, respectively, with both bearing his initial/signature.
 Evident, however, is the absence of an elected public official and representatives of the DOJ and
the media to witness the physical inventory and photograph of the seized items. In fact, their
signatures do not appear in the Inventory Receipt.
 The Court stressed in People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro: The prosecution bears the burden of
proving a valid cause for non-compliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165, as amended. It has the positive duty to demonstrate observance thereto in such a way that
during the trial proceedings, it must initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived
deviations from the requirements of law. Its failure to follow the mandated procedure must be
adequately explained, and must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on evidence. It
 should take note that the rules require that the apprehending officers do not simply mention a
justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground in their sworn affidavit, coupled with a
statement on the steps they took to preserve the integrity of the seized items. Strict adherence to
Section 21 is required where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is miniscule, since it is highly
susceptible to planting, tampering or alteration of evidence.
 It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical inventory
and photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their
safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate
retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected
official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest
efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official
within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no
fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5)
time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential
assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even
before the offenders could escape.
 In this case, IO1 Orellan testified that no members of the media and barangay officials arrived at
the crime scene because it was late at night and it was raining, making it unsafe for them to wait
at Lim's house.35 IO2 Orcales similarly declared that the inventory was made in the PDEA office
considering that it was late in the evening and there were no available media representative and
barangay officials despite their effort to contact them. 36 He admitted that there are times when
they do not inform the barangay officials prior to their operation as they. might leak the
confidential information.
 Hence, We are of the view that these justifications are unacceptable as there was no genuine and
sufficient attempt to comply with the law.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 23, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01280-MIN, which affirmed the September 24, 2013 Decision of Regional
Trial Court, Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2010-1073 and 2010-1074,
finding accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda guilty of violating Sections 11 and 5, respectively,
of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-
appellant Romy Lim y Miranda is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED
IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause.
Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

Trinidad vs Imson
G.R. No. 197728. September 16, 2015
PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:
 On August 17, 2007, herein petitioners filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig
City a Complaint for ejectment against herein respondent.

ALLEGATIONS OF THE PETITIONERS:

 they are the owners of a condominium unit, denominated as Unit 2203, which is located at AIC
Gold Tower, Emerald Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City
 they purchased the condominum unit from three (3) Indian nationals who originally contracted to
buy the said property from the developer, AIC Realty Corporation (AIC), but had not fully paid for
it yet
o petitioners' purchase was evidenced by a Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights
dated June 13, 2002 and, later on, a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 13, 2007 in the
name of petitioner Armando
  the time of petitioners' purchase of the subject condominium unit, the same was being leased by
respondent from the original owners
o the period of lease was from April 1, 2002 to March 1, 2003
 petitioners respected the contract of lease between respondent and the original owners
 however, since June 2002 up to the time of the filing of the complaint for ejectment, respondent
neither remitted nor consigned the monthly rentals due to petitioners for her continued use of the
condominium unit
o the rental arrears amounted to a total of P2,130,000.00
 petitioners sent a letter of demand to respondent requiring that she, together with any and all
persons using the said unit with her approval, vacate the premises and pay her arrears
o respondent ignored petitioners' demand letter
 petitioners tried to settle the case amicably but no agreement was reached.

ALLEGATIONS OF RESPONDENT:
 she, indeed, entered into a contract of lease with the original owners of the disputed
condominium unit which was to commence on April 1, 2002 and would end on March 1, 2003
 sometime in June 2002, she decided to purchase the unit
 however, since she was then undergoing proceedings to annul her previous marriage and
thinking that her purchase of the subject property would disrupt the property arrangements
already agreed upon, she thought it best not to have the condominium unit registered yet in her
name
o she requested Armando Trinidad, who was her confidante, to purchase the unit and
register it under his name with the understanding that the said property would actually be
owned by respondent
o Armando agreed without objection, which led to the execution of the Deed of Assignment
and Transfer of Rights in his name
 payments for the purchase price were made by respondent through cash and checks paid to the
original owners who acknowledged said payments
 aside from paying the purchase price, respondent also paid the real property taxes due on the
condominium unit as well as the association dues, water bills, common area real estate tax,
building insurance and other charges billed by the developer
 having full trust in Armando, coupled with her hectic schedule, respondent did not bother to
transfer ownership of the subject unit in her name; since April 2002 up to the time of filing her
Answer
 respondent has been in open and public possession of the subject property
 in 2007, while respondent was out of the country, Armando, without respondent's knowledge,
annotated his claim on the condominium certificate of title
 he also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in his favor on July 13, 2007.
o As a result, respondent was surprised to receive a copy of petitioners' demand letter and
complaint.

DECISION OF THE MeTC

 The MeTC found that respondent is the true owner of the subject property and that the true
intention of the parties is for Armando to hold the condominium unit in behalf of respondent until
the property could be placed in the latter's name.
 Petitioners filed an appeal with the RTC of Pasig City.

DECISION OF THE RTC OF PASIG CITY

 Decision dated August 8, 2008 rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 70, Pasig City is
hereby ordered REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one ENTERED
 the defendant-appellee [herein respondent] and all persons claiming rights under her to vacate
Unit 2203, AIC Gold Tower, Emerald Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City
  to pay rental arrearages from July 13, 2007, at the rate of P30,000.00 per month, until such
arrearages shall have been fully paid and the premises vacated and possession thereof restored
to plaintiffs-appellants.
 The RTC held that, by preponderance of evidence, the question of ownership is resolved in favor
of petitioners. 
 The RTC held that the subject Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights and the Deed of
Absolute Sale in the name of Armando is superior to the evidence presented by
respondent, which merely consisted of bills of payments of association dues, utility bills,
real estate tax on the common areas and building insurance.
 Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, respondent filed a petition for review with the CA.

DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

 On December 22, 2010, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision setting aside the RTC
judgment and ordering petitioners to return possession of the subject condominium unit to
respondent.
 based on the evidence adduced by the parties, respondent's claim of ownership deserves more
credence. 
 records of payment of the purchase price of the subject property, through respondent's
personal checks, acknowledgment of these payments by the former owners by way of
receipt and affidavit, and respondent's exercise of acts of ownership prove that she is the
owner of the disputed condominium unit and, thus, is entitled to the possession thereof.
 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated June
23, 2011.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of
determining as to who between the parties is entitled to possess the subject condominium unit?
RULING:
 Yes, the Court can resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining as to who
between the parties is entitled to possess the subject condominium unit.
 At the outset, the Court notes that both parties anchor their right to possess the disputed
property on their supposed ownership of the same.
 Thus, the courts are left with no recourse but to resolve the issue of ownership for the sole
purpose of determining as to who between the parties is entitled to possess the subject
condominium unit.
 However, as held by the CA, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of
possession, adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the
purpose of resolving the issue of possession.
 The adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between
the same parties involving title to the property.
 The resolution of the issue of ownership, however, would entail going into factual matters.
 Settled is the rule that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
 Section 1 of Rule 45 states that petitions for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth.
 Doubtless, in the instant case, the issue of whether respondent possesses the subject
property as owner, or whether she occupies the same as a lessee, is a question of fact.
o Thus, as a rule, it is not reviewable.
 Nonetheless, the Court has, at times, allowed exceptions from the above-mentioned restriction.
 Among the recognized exceptions are the following:
o (a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
o (b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
o (c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
o (d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
o (e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
 o (f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
o (g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
o (h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based;
o (i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
o (j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and
o (k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
 In the present case, the findings of fact of the MeTC and the CA are in conflict with those of the
RTC.
 It thus behooves this Court to look into the factual findings of the lower courts to determine the
nature of respondent's possession of the disputed property.
 After a careful review of the records at hand, the Court finds that the petition must fail as it finds
no error in the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the CA and the MeTC that respondent is,
indeed, entitled to the possession of the subject property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parole evidence rule can be applied in the case?
RULING:
 Yes, the Parole Evidence rules is applicable to the instant case.
 Petitioners argue that under the Parole Evidence Rule, when the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can
be, as between the parties, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.
 Based on this rule, petitioners contend that since the former owners, as well as respondent, are
all parties to the Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights, they are bound by the said Deed
and they cannot allege terms which are not found within the said agreement.
o The Court is not convinced.
 The fact that the Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights was put in writing and notarized
does not accord it the quality of incontrovertibility otherwise provided by the Parole
Evidence Rule.
 The rule on parole evidence is not, as it were, ironclad.
 Thus, the second paragraph of Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides the exceptions,
to wit: Section 9. Evidence of written agreements.—x x x However, a party may present evidence
to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
o (a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
o (b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties thereto;
o (c) The validity of the written agreement; or
o (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest
after the execution of the written agreement.
o The term “agreement” includes wills.
 As observed by the CA, respondent squarely put in issue in her Answer that the Deed of
Assignment and Transfer of Rights did not express the true intent of the parties.
 Hence, the exception applies.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was an implied trust created in respondent’s favor?
RULING:
 Yes, there was an implied trust created in respondent’s favor.
 As to whether or not an implied trust was created in respondent’s favor, the first sentence of
Article 1448 of the Civil Code provides that:
 o “[t]here is an implied trust when property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one
party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of
the property.”
 This is sometimes referred to as a purchase money resulting trust, the elements of which are:
o (a) an actual payment of money, property or services, or an equivalent, constituting
valuable consideration; and
o (b) such consideration must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a resulting trust.
 The principle of a resulting trust is based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration,
and not legal title, determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have
been contemplated by the parties.
 They arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction
whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to
hold his legal title for the benefit of another.
 Intention — although only presumed, implied or supposed by law from the nature of the
transaction or from the facts and circumstances accompanying the transaction, particularly the
source of the consideration — is always an element of a resulting trust and may be inferred from
the acts or conduct of the parties rather than from direct expression of conduct.
 Certainly, intent as an indispensable element, is a matter that necessarily lies in the evidence,
that is, by evidence, even circumstantial, of statements made by the parties at or before the time
title passes.
 Because an implied trust is neither dependent upon an express agreement nor required to be
evidenced by writing, Article 1457 of our Civil Code authorizes the admission of parole
evidence to prove their existence.
 Parole evidence that is required to establish the existence of an implied trust necessarily has to
be trustworthy and it cannot rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations.
 In the instant petition, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the
MeTC and the CA that, under the circumstances of the case, the parole evidence
presented by respondent sufficiently proves that an implied trust was created in her favor.
 Finally, a trust, which derives its strength from the confidence one reposes on another, does not
lose that character simply because of what appears in a legal document.
 Applying this principle to the present case, petitioner Armando, as trustee, cannot
repudiate the trust by simply relying on the questioned Deed of Assignment and Transfer
of Rights and the Deed of Absolute Sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court applies which would bar
respondent from asserting title over the disputed property?
RULING:
 No, the conclusive presumption under Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does
not apply, and respondent is not barred from asserting title over the condominium unit.
 Article 1436 of the Civil Code provides that “[a] lessee or bailee is estopped from asserting
title to the thing leased or received, as against the lessor or bailor.”
 In addition, the conclusive presumption found in Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court
known as estoppel against tenants provides as follows:
o Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The following are instances of conclusive
presumptions: x x x x
 (b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
 It is clear from the above quoted provision that what a tenant is estopped from denying is the
title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation.
 If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the
commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply.
 Hence, the tenant may show that the landlord’s title has expired or been conveyed to another or
himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title
paramount.
  In the present case, what respondent is claiming is her title to the subject property which
she acquired subsequent to the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation between
her and the former owners of the questioned condominium unit.
 Thus, the presumption under Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply
and respondent is not estopped from asserting title over the disputed property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the notarized Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights, and Deed of
Absolute Sale outweigh the pieces of evidence presented by the respondent?
RULING:
 No. The pieces of evidence by the petitioner does not outweigh that of the respondent.
 As earlier stated, petitioners relied heavily on the Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights as
well as the Deed of Absolute Sale, which were executed in Armando's favor, to prove their
ownership of the subject property.
 Having been notarized, they contend that these documents outweigh all the pieces of
evidence presented by respondent.
o The Court is not persuaded.
 It is true that the subject Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights and Deed of Absolute Sale
are notarized.
 It is well settled that a document acknowledged before a notary public is a public document that
enjoys the presumption of regularity. 
o It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive
presumption of its existence and due execution.
 However, the CA correctly held that the existence and due execution of these documents are
not in issue.
 Moreover, the presumption of truth of the facts stated in notarized documents is merely prima
facie, which means that this presumption can be overcome by clear and convincing evidence.
 Hence, the truth of the facts stated in the disputed Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights as
well as the Deed of Absolute Sale may be rebutted by evidence.
 In the present case, what is being asserted by respondent is that the above documents do not
embody the true intent and agreement of the parties.
 To this end, respondent submitted sufficient proof to refute the contents of the
aforementioned documents and to establish the real intent of the parties, to wit:
o (1) nine [9] checks drawn from the personal account of respondent, variously dated from
October 11, 2002 to June 11, 2003, each of which amounts to P416,666.67 and paid to
the order of Amarnath Hinduja;
o (2) Acknowledgment Receipt recognizing the various payments made by respondent to
the former owners of the subject property;
o (3) Real Property Tax Receipts evidencing respondent's payment of the real estate taxes
due on the property;
o (4) Certification issued by AIC Golden Tower Condominium acknowledging respondent's
regular payment of association dues, water bills, common area real estate tax, building
insurance and other charges billed by AIC;
o (5) Affidavit executed by the former owners acknowledging the supposed agreement of
the parties that the condominium unit shall be purchased in the name of Armando with
the understanding that he will hold it in behalf of respondent until the same could be
placed in her name.
 The MeTC and the CA were one in holding that the foregoing pieces of evidence submitted by
respondent, coupled with the surrounding circumstances in this case, are sufficient to
overcome the prima facie presumption of the truth of the facts stated in the questioned
Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights and Deed of Absolute Sale.
o The Court agrees.
  Indeed, petitioners failed to offer any credible explanation why payments of the purchase
price were made by respondent by using her personal checks if she is not, in fact, the
buyer of the property.
 Neither was there any justification why respondent paid the real property taxes due on the
property, as well as the utility bills, association dues, common area real estate tax and building
insurance.
 More importantly, petitioners also fell short in advancing a plausible refutation why the former
owners would execute an affidavit indicating therein that the agreement among the parties is that
the subject property shall be purchased in the name of Armando with the understanding between
the latter and respondent that Armando would hold the property in respondent's behalf until it will
be placed in her name, thus exposing themselves to possible perjury charges, if such agreement
is not really true.
 In addition, if petitioners are the real owners of the subject condominium unit, why did they
wait until February 19, 2007, or almost four (4) years after the supposed expiration of
respondent's lease contract, to demand that she vacate the disputed premises and pay
rentals.
 Moreover, as the MeTC has noted, it was only in 2007 that Armando annotated his claim on the
condominium certificate of title, executed the subject Deed of Absolute Sale and requested
certification of his ownership from the developer.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals, dated December 22, 2010 and June 23, 2011, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No.
110357, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

Rule 132:

Malayan Insurance vs Philippine Nails and Wires Corp

FACTS:
 Respondent Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation insured against all risks its shipment of 10,053.400
metric tons of steel billets valued at P67,156,300.00 with petitioner Malayan Insurance Company Inc.
 However, the shipment delivered was short by 377.168 metric tons.
 For this shortage, respondent claimed insurance for P2,698,637.04, representing the value of
undelivered steel billets, plus customs duties, taxes and other charges paid by respondent.
 Petitioner refused to pay.
 On July 28, 1993, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for sum of money with the RTC.
 Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it failed to state a cause of action, and
that it was filed in the wrong venue. The motion was denied.
 It thus filed a petition for prohibition with the Court of Appeals, which was also denied.
 On September 8, 1993, respondent filed a motion to admit an amended complaint which the trial court
granted.
 On November 4, 1993, respondent moved to declare petitioner in default. The trial court granted and
allowed the presentation of evidence ex parte, which the court granted.
 Respondent presented its lone witness, Jeanne King.
 On November 11, 1993, petitioner filed its answer with compulsory counterclaim; however, upon motion
by the respondent, the same was expunged from the records for late filing.
 The trial court rendered in favor of respondent, ordering the latter to pay P2,698,637.04.
 Respondent moved to execute judgement, which was granted.
 On the other hand, petitioner filed a notice of appeal which was given due course.
 Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a TRO to enjoin the implementation of the writ,
which was granted.

Petitioner’s argument on appeal

 The trial court erred in rendering judgment by default notwithstanding that issues were joined by
petitioner’s filing of an answer; in awarding damages to respondent based on unauthenticated
documentary evidence and hearsay; and in admitting documentary evidence which is irregular in nature
and not in accordance with the Rules of Court.

CA’s decision
 The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court.
 Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion nor err when it expunged the
answer from the records because petitioner answered way beyond the prescribed period.
 It further held that respondent’s witness, Jeanne King, was a competent witness because she personally
prepared the documentary evidence and had personal knowledge of the allegations in the complaint.
 The absence of a written report by the branch clerk of court on the ex parte proceedings did not
necessarily deny petitioner due process.

ISSUE 1: Was Jean King’s testimony hearsay?

RULING: QUALIFY

Petitioner’s argument on hearsay

 contends that Jeanne King’s testimony was hearsay because she had no personal knowledge of the
execution of the documents supporting respondent’s cause of action, such as the sales contract,
invoice, packing list, bill of lading, SGS Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy.
 Even though King was personally assigned to handle and monitor the importation of Philippine Nails and
Wires Corporation, herein respondent, this cannot be equated with personal knowledge of the facts
which gave rise to respondent’s cause of action.
 Even though she personally prepared the summary of weight of steel billets received by respondent,
she did not have personal knowledge of the weight of steel billets actually shipped and delivered.

Decision of the Court

 NO. Witness Jeanne King, who was assigned to handle respondent’s importations, including their
insurance coverage, has personal knowledge of the volume of steel billets being imported, and therefore
competent to testify thereon.
 Her testimony is not hearsay, as this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
 However, her testimony on steel billets received was hearsay.
 She is not qualified to testify on the shortage in the delivery of the imported steel billets. She did not
have personal knowledge of the actual steel billets received. Even though she prepared the summary of
the received steel billets, she based the summary only on the receipts prepared by other per.

ISSUE 2: Did King fail to properly authenticate respondent’s documentary evidence?

RULING:
 NO
 Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must
be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its execution was
acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and
recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously
confessed execution thereof.
 In this case, respondent admits that King was none of the aforementioned persons. She merely made
the summary of the weight of steel billets based on the unauthenticated bill of lading and the SGS
 report. Thus, the summary of steel billets actually received had no proven real basis, and King’s
testimony on this point could not be taken at face value.
 Here, respondent’s documentary exhibits are private documents.
 With the exception concerning the summary of the weight of the steel billets imported, respondent
presented no supporting evidence concerning their authenticity. Consequently, they cannot be utilized to
prove less of the insured cargo and/or the short delivery of the imported steel billets.

Sanson vs CA

FELICITO G. SANSON, CELEDONIA SANSON-SAQUIN, ANGELES A. MONTINOLA, EDUARDO A.

MONTINOLA, JR., petitioners-appellants, 
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DIVISION and MELECIA T. SY, as Administratrix of
the Intestate Estate of the Late Juan Bon Fing Sy, respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. 127745            April 22, 2003
PONENTE: CARPIO MORALES,  J.:

FACTS:

 On February 7, 1990, Felicito G. Sanson (Sanson), in his capacity as creditor, filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City a petition, for the settlement of the estate of Juan Bon
Fing Sy (the deceased.

 Sanson claimed that the deceased was indebted to him in the amount of P603,000.00 and to his
sister Celedonia Sanson-Saquin (Celedonia) in the amount of P360,000.00.1

 Petitioners-appellants Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and his mother Angeles Montinola (Angeles) later
filed separate claims against the estate, alleging that the deceased owed them P50,000.00
and P150,000.00, respectively.2

 Branch 28 of the Iloilo RTC to which the petition was raffled, appointed Melecia T. Sy, surviving
spouse of the deceased, as administratrix of his estate, following which she was issued letters of
administration.3

 During the hearing of the claims against the estate, Sanson, Celedonia, and Jade Montinola, wife
of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., testified on the transactions that gave rise thereto, over the
objection of the administratrix who invoked Section 23, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
otherwise known as the Dead Man’s Statute which reads:

SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party.—Parties or assignors of

parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind,
upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of
unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind. (Emphasis supplied)

 Sanson, in support of the claim of his sister Celedonia, testified that she had a transaction with
the deceased which is evidenced by six checks4 issued by him before his death; before the
deceased died, Celedonia tried to enforce settlement of the checks from his (the deceased’s) son
Jerry who told her that his father would settle them once he got well but he never did; and after
the death of the deceased, Celedonia presented the checks to the bank for payment but were
dishonored5 due to the closure of his account.6
 Celedonia, in support of the claim of her brother Sanson, testified that she knew that the
deceased issued five checks7 to Sanson in settlement of a debt; and after the death of the
deceased, Sanson presented the checks to the bank for payment but were returned due to the
closure of his account.8

 Jade, in support of the claims of her husband Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and mother-in-law Angeles,
testified that on separate occasions, the deceased borrowed P50,000 and P150,000 from her
husband and mother-in-law, respectively, as shown by three checks issued by the
deceased,9 two to Angeles and the other10 to Eduardo Montinola, Jr.; before the deceased died or
sometime in August 1989, they advised him that they would be depositing the checks, but he told
them not to as he would pay them cash, but he never did; and after the deceased died on
January 10, 1990, they deposited the checks but were dishonored as the account against which
they were drawn was closed,11 hence, their legal counsel sent a demand letter12 dated February
6, 1990 addressed to the deceased’s heirs Melicia, James, Mini and Jerry Sy, and Symmels I & II
but the checks have remained unsettled.13

 The administratrix, denying having any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the claims, nevertheless alleged that if they ever existed, they had been paid and
extinguished, are usurious and illegal and are, in any event, barred by prescription. 14 

 And she objected to the admission of the checks and check return slips-exhibits offered in
evidence by the claimants upon the ground that the witnesses who testified thereon are
disqualified under the Dead Man’s Statute.
 Specifically with respect to the checks-exhibits identified by Jade, the administratrix asserted that
they are inadmissible because Jade is the daughter-in-law of claimant Angeles and wife of
claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., hence, she is covered by the above-said rule on disqualification.
 At all events, the administratrix denied that the checks-exhibits were issued by the deceased and
that the return slips were issued by the depository/clearing bank.

 After the claimants rested their case, the administratrix filed four separate manifestations
informing the trial court that she was dispensing with the presentation of evidence against their
claims.16

 Finding that the Dead Man’s Statute does not apply to the witnesses who testified in support of
the subject claims against the estate, the trial court issued an Order of December 8, 1993, 17 the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, Judicial Administratrix Melecia T. Sy, is hereby ordered, to pay, in due course of
administration, creditors-claimants Felicito G. Sanson, in the amount of P603,500.00; Celedonia
S. Saquin, in the amount of P315,000.00;18 Angeles A. Montinola, in the amount of P150,000.00
and Eduardo Montinola, Jr., in the amount of P50,000.00, from the assets and/or properties of the
above-entitled intestate estate.

 On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the December 8, 1993 Order of the trial court, by
Decision of May 31, 1996, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and another order is
entered dismissing the claims of:

1. Felicito G. Sanson, in the amount of P603,500.00;

2. Celdonia S. Saquin, in the amount of P315,000.00; 20

 3. Angeles A. Montinola, in the amount of P150,000.00; and

4. Eduardo Montinola, Jr., in the amount of P50,000.00 against the estate of the deceased JUAN
BON FING SY.

 The claimants’ Motion for Reconsideration 21 of the Court of Appeals decision was denied. Hence,
this petition.

POSITION OF PARTIES:

With respect to the first assigned error, petitioners argue that since the administratrix did not deny the
testimony of Jade nor present any evidence to controvert it, and neither did she deny the execution and
genuineness of the checks issued by the deceased (as well as the check return slips issued by the
clearing bank), it was error for the Court of Appeals to find the evidence of the Montinolas insufficient to
prove their claims.

The administratrix counters that the due execution and authenticity of the checks-exhibits of the
Montinolas were not duly proven since Jade did not categorically state that she saw the filling up and
signing of the checks by the deceased, hence, her testimony is self-serving; besides, as Jade had
identical and unitary interest with her husband and mother-in-law, her testimony was a circumvention of
the Dead Man’s Statute.24

RULING:

 The administratrix’s counter-argument does not lie.

 Relationship to a party has never been recognized as an adverse factor in determining either the
credibility of the witness or—subject only to well recognized exceptions none of which is here
present—the admissibility of the testimony.

 At most, closeness of relationship to a party, or bias, may indicate the need for a little more
caution in the assessment of a witness’ testimony but is not necessarily a negative element which
should be taken as diminishing the credit otherwise accorded to it. 25

 The genuineness of the deceased’s signature having been shown, he is prima facie  presumed to
have become a party to the check for value, following Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law which reads:

Section 24. Presumption of Consideration. – Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima

facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person whose signature
appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value. (Underscoring and italics in the
original; emphasis supplied),

 Since, with respect to the checks issued to the Montinolas, the prima facie presumption was not
rebutted or contradicted by the administratrix who expressly manifested that she was dispensing
with the presentation of evidence against their claims, it has become conclusive.

 As for the administratrix’s invocation of the Dead Man’s Statute, the same does not likewise lie.
The rule renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted.

xxx
 The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to
disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in the above
enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or transaction between the
deceased and a third person, if he took no active part therein.

x x x27 (Italics supplied)

 Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case
is being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar to those
involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family members or relatives of the
parties. Should their testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of their
relationship to the parties, there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the transactions. In any
event, as will be discussed later, independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of the
Montinolas would still prosper on the basis of their documentary evidence—the checks.

MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as witnesses to each other’s claim
against the deceased are not covered by the Dead Man’s Statute

RULING: Yes. Only testimonial evidences are proscribed in a Dead Man’s Statute.

 As to the second assigned error, petitioners argue that the testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia
as witnesses to each other’s claim against the deceased are not covered by the Dead Man’s
Statute;28 besides, the administratrix waived the application of the law when she cross-examined
them.

 The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its decision on
review, the pertinent portion of which reads:

The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like interest, from testifying in
each other’s favor as to acts occurring prior to the death of the deceased.

Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a case without distinguishing between
testimony in his own behalf and that in behalf of others, he should be disqualified from testifying
for his co-parties. The law speaks of "parties or assignors of parties to a case." Apparently, the
testimonies of Sanson and Saquin on each other’s behalf, as co-parties to the same case, falls
under the prohibition. (Citation omitted; underscoring in the original and emphasis supplied)

 But Sanson’s and Celedonia’s claims against the same estate arose from separate transactions.
Sanson is a third party with respect to Celedonia’s claim. And Celedonia is a third party with
respect to Sanson’s claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on the other’s transaction.
 In any event, what the Dead Man’s Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence
upon a claim which arose before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to
the giving of testimony.29 Since the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported
by checks-documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said
checks.

 This brings this Court to the matter of the authenticity of the signature of the deceased appearing
on the checks issued to Sanson and Celedonia.

 By Celedonia’s account, she "knows" the signature of the deceased.

 xxx

Q:         Showing to you these checks already marked as Exhibit "A" to "E", please go over these
checks if you know the signatures of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy? on these checks?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         Insofar as the amount that he borrowed from you, he also issued checks?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         And therefore, you know his signature?

A:         Yes, sir.

x x x30

 Sanson testified too that he "knows" the signature of the deceased:

xxx

Q:         I show you now checks which were already marked as Exhibit "A" to "G-1" – Saquin,
please go over this if these are the checks that you said was issued by the late Juan Bon Fing Sy
in favor of your sister?

A:         Yes, these are the same che[c]ks.

Q:         Do you know the signature of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         And these signatures are the same signatures that you know?

A:         Yes, sir.

x x x31

 While the foregoing testimonies of the Sanson siblings have not faithfully discharged the quantum
of proof under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:

Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The handwriting of a person may be

proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen
the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or
been charged and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. x x x,

 not only did the administratrix fail to controvert the same; from a comparison 32 with the naked eye
of the deceased’s signature appearing on each of the checks-exhibits of the Montinolas with that
of the checks-exhibits of the Sanson siblings all of which checks were drawn from the same
account, they appear to have been affixed by one and the same hand.
  In fine, as the claimants-herein petitioners have, by their evidence, substantiated their claims
against the estate of the deceased, the burden of evidence had shifted to the administratrix who,
however, expressly opted not to discharge the same when she manifested that she was
dispensing with the presentation of evidence against the claims.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the impugned May 31, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
SET ASIDE and another rendered ordering the intestate estate of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy, through
Administratrix Melecia T. Sy, to pay:1) Felicito G. Sanson, the amount of P603,500.00;2) Celedonia S.
Saquin, the amount of P315.000.00;333) Angeles Montinola, the amount of P150,000.00; and4) Eduardo
Montinola, Jr., the amount of P50,000.00.representing unsettled checks issued by the deceased. SO
ORDERED.

Lazaro vs. Agustin GR No. 152364 April 15, 2010

Facts:

 November 4, 1998 - petitioners filed against herein respondents a Complaint for partition with the
MTCC of Laoag City, alleging:
o That the plaintiffs and the defendants are the descendants of the late Simeon C. Santos,
married to Trinidad Duldulao, who died intestate leaving a parcel of land situated in the
Barrio of Natividad Nstra. Sra., Laoag (Lot No. 10675)
o Simeon’s children, namely Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, all surnamed Santos,
consented that the parcel of land mentioned be titled in the name of Basilisa, being the
eldest and so Original Certificate of Title No. 20742 in the name of Basilisa Santos was
obtained although it was agreed among them that it did not and does not necessarily
mean that Basilisa Santos is the sole and exclusive owner of this parcel of land ( Lot No.
10676 of the Cadastral survey of Laoag)
o That there is a residential house constructed on the lot and in the construction of which
plaintiff Alejandra Santos, single, spent ₱68,308.60, while Basilisa Santos and her
children spent ₱3,495.00.
o Afterwards, Alejandra Santos got married to Isauro M. Lazaro who was employed in a
private company and when he retired from the service, some additional constructions
were made on the residential house and lot, the money spent for these additional
constructions came from the earnings of the spouses Alejandra Santos-Lazaro and
Isauro M. Lazaro. The said residential house is now covered by Tax Declaration in the
names of Basilisa Agustin and Alejandra Santos for the year 1994
o That without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs, the title of the lot was
transferred into another title in the names of Modesta Agustin, Filemon Agustin, Venancia
Agustin, Marcelina Agustin, Monica Agustin, Gregorio Agustin and Bienvenido Agustin
who are the children of the late Basilisa Santos-Agustin (defendants) with Monica Agustin
now deceased represented by her children Paul A. Dalalo and Noel A. Dalalo
o during the lifetime of Basilisa Santos-Agustin, plaintiff Alejandra Santos-Lazaro informed
the former, who are sisters, that the transfer of the title covering the lot in the name of
Basilisa Santos into the names of her children would erroneously imply that the lot is
solely and exclusively owned by Basilisa Santos-Agustin's children, but Basilisa Santos-
Agustin replied to plaintiff Alejandra Santos-Lazaro not to worry because an
affidavit was already executed by her recognizing and specifying that her brothers
Alberto Santos and Leoncio Santos, and her sister Alejandra Santos-Lazaro would
each get one fourth (¼) share of the lot;

 Respondents filed their Answer with Counterclaim:

o 1. The subject parcel of land is owned exclusively by the defendants as heirs of the late
Basilisa Santos, wife of Petronilo Agustin, who was the original registered owner of the
property; the plaintiffs never became owners of said land. There was never any
agreement between the ascendants of the plaintiffs and defendants, neither is there any
 agreement between the plaintiffs and defendants themselves that in the ownership, the
plaintiffs have a share over the lot;
 After the issues were joined and the pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits ensued.

 the MTCC Decision: dismissing the complaint and denying petitioners' prayer for partition.
o that no evidentiary value could be given to the affidavit allegedly executed by Basilisa ,
wherein she purportedly acknowledged her co-ownership of the subject property with her
siblings Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, because the affiant was not presented on the
witness stand, such that all the statements made in her affidavit were hearsay.
o Held that two credible witnesses testified in plain, simple and straightforward manner that
at the time the affidavit was supposed to have been signed and sworn to before the
notary public, Basilisa was already bedridden and an invalid who could not even raise her
hand to feed herself.
o MTCC also gave credence to the testimony of the notary public, before whom the
document was supposedly signed and sworn to, that the said affidavit was already
complete and thumbmarked when the same was presented to him by a person who
claimed to be Basilisa.

 Petitioners filed an appeal with the RTC of Laoag City.

 the RTC Decision: affirming, with modification, the judgment of the MTCC.
o found that the house erected on the disputed lot was built and renovated by petitioners in
good faith.
o held that petitioners were entitled to indemnity representing the costs of the construction
and renovation of the said house.
 Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA.
 CA decision: Affirmed RTC
 Hence, the instant petition

 Petitioners contention:
o that Basilisa's sworn statement which recognizes her siblings' share in the disputed
property is a declaration against interest which is one of the recognized exceptions to the
hearsay rule.
o argue that since the sworn statement was duly notarized, it should be admitted in court
without further proof of its due execution and authenticity;
o that the testimonies of Basilisa's nurse and physician cannot qualify as clear and
convincing evidence which could overthrow such notarized document;
o that the notary public cannot impugn the same document which he notarized for to do so
would render notarized documents worthless and unreliable resulting in prejudice to the
public.

Issue #1: Whether or not Basilisa’s alleged sworn statement was a declaration against interest?
Ruling #1: NO. it is an Admission against interest.
 At the outset, it bears to point out that it is wrong for petitioners to argue that Basilisa's alleged
sworn statement is a declaration against interest. It is not a declaration against interest. Instead, it
is an admission against interest.
 Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and declarations against
interest.
 Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or
identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is
available as a witness.
 Declarations against interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity
with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule.
They are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness.
  In the present case, since Basilisa is respondents' predecessor-in-interest and is, thus, in privity
with the latter's legal interest, the former's sworn statement, if proven genuine and duly executed,
should be considered as an admission against interest.
 A cursory reading of the subject sworn statement also reveals that it refers to a parcel of land
denominated as Lot No. 10678 while the property being disputed is Lot No. 10676. On this basis,
it cannot be concluded with certainty that the property being referred to in the sworn statement is
the same property claimed by petitioners.

Issue #2: Whether the subject sworn statement, granting that it refers to the property being disputed in
the present case, can be given full faith and credence in view of the issues raised regarding its
genuineness and due execution?
Ruling #2: NO. The Court rules in the negative.

 Settled is the rule that generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred
upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public
have in their favor the presumption of regularity. However, this presumption is not absolute and
may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
 Moreover, not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. 
 Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a public document just because it contains a
notarial jurat. The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long
as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular.

 However, a question involving the regularity of notarization as well as the due execution of the
subject sworn statement of Basilisa would require an inquiry into the appreciation of evidence by
the trial court.
o It is not the function of this Court to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative
value of the evidence presented. A question of fact would arise in such event.
o Settled is the rule that questions of fact cannot be raised in an appeal via certiorari before
the Supreme Court and are not proper for its consideration. The rationale behind this
doctrine is that a review of the findings of fact of the trial courts and the appellate tribunal
is not a function this Court normally undertakes. The Court will not weigh the evidence all
over again unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower courts are totally
devoid of support or are clearly erroneous so as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.
Although there are recognized exceptions  to this rule, none exists in the present case to
justify a departure therefrom.

 Petitioners rely heavily on the presumption of regularity accorded by law to notarized documents.
 While indeed, a notarized document enjoys this presumption, the fact that a deed is notarized is
not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. 

 The presumption cannot be made to apply to the present case because the regularity in
the execution of the sworn statement was challenged in the proceedings below where
its prima facie validity was overthrown by the highly questionable circumstances under
which it was supposedly executed, as well as the testimonies of witnesses who testified
on the improbability of execution of the sworn statement, as well as on the physical
condition of the signatory, at the time the questioned document was supposedly executed.
 The trial and appellate courts were unanimous in giving credence to the testimonies of these
witnesses.
 The Court has repeatedly held that it will not interfere with the trial court's determination of the
credibility of witnesses, unless there appears on record some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. The
reason for this is that the trial court was in a better position to do so, because it heard the
 witnesses testify before it and had every opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment
on the witness stand.

 Considering the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to reverse the rulings of the MTCC, the RTC
and the CA. Although the questioned sworn statement is a public document having in its favor the
presumption of regularity, such presumption was adequately refuted by competent witnesses.

 The Court agrees with the RTC ruling that:

o The testimony of [the notary public] Atty. Angel Respicio did not suffice to rebut the
evidence of the appellees considering his admission that the affidavit was already
thumbmarked when presented to him by one who claimed to be Basilisa Santos and
whom, the witness said he did not know personally. Further, what makes the documents
suspect is the fact that it was subscribed on the same date as the financial statement of
Alejandra Santos.

 Principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents. 

 When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of a document under his hand
and seal, he gives the document the force of evidence.
 Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public,
in addition to the solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to
authorize such documents to be given without further proof of their execution and delivery.
 A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative
agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed before
a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
 Hence, a notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with public
interest, with accuracy and fidelity. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
 In the instant case, the notary public should have exercised utmost diligence in ascertaining the
true identity of the person executing the said sworn statement.

 However, the notary public did not comply with this requirement. He simply relied on
o the affirmative answers of the person appearing before him attesting that she was
Basilisa Santos;
o that the contents of the sworn statement are true; and
o that the thumbmark appearing on the said document was hers.
 However, this would not suffice. He could have further asked the person who appeared before
him to produce any identification to prove that she was indeed Basilisa Santos, considering that
the said person was not personally known to him, and that the thumbmark appearing on the
document sought to be notarized was not affixed in his presence. But he did not. Thus, the lower
courts did not commit any error in not giving evidentiary weight to the subject sworn statement.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

Aboitiz vs Po
Facts:
 This case involves a parcel of land located in Cabancalan, Mandaue City, initially registered as
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-887, and titled under the name of Roberto Aboitiz (Roberto). 
 The land is referred to as Lot No. 2835. 
 This parcel of land originally belonged to the late Mariano Seno (Mariano)
 On July 31, 1973, Mariano executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his son, Ciriaco Seno
(Ciriaco), over a 1.0120-hectare land in Cebu.  
 This property included two (2) lots: Lot No. 2807 and the land subject of this case, Lot No. 2835.
 On May 5, 1978, Ciriaco sold the two (2) lots to Victoria Po (Victoria).
 o The parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. 
 On July 15, 1982, Mariano died and was survived by his five (5) children (Mariano Heirs):
o Esperanza Seno V da. De Kuizon, Ramon Seno,  Benita Seno Vda. De Lim, Simeon
Seno, and Ciriaco.
 In 1990, Peter Po (Peter) discovered that Ciriaco "had executed a [q]uitclaim dated August 7,
1989 renouncing [his] interest over Lot [No.] 2807 in favor of [petitioner] Roberto."
o In the quitclaim, Ciriaco stated that he was "the declared owner of Lot [Nos.] 2835 and
2807."
 The Spouses Po confronted Ciriaco.
 By way of remedy, Ciriaco and the Spouses Po executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated
June 28, 1990 in which Ciriaco agreed to pay Peter the difference between the amount paid by
the Spouses Po as consideration for the entire property and the value of the land the Spouses Po
were left with after the quitclaim. 
 However, also in 1990, Lot No. 2835 was also sold to Roberto.
 The Mariano Heirs, including Ciriaco, executed separate deeds of absolute sale in favor of
Roberto.
 Thereafter, Roberto immediately developed the lot as part of a subdivision called North Town
Homes.
 In 1991, the Spouses Po declared Lot No. 2835 for taxation purposes and was issued Tax
Declaration No. 0634-A.
 In 1992, Roberto also declared Lot No. 2835 for taxation purposes and was issued Tax
Declaration No. 1100, annotated with: "This tax declaration is also declared in the name of Mrs.
VICTORIA LEE PO married to PETER PO under [T]ax [Declaration] [N]o. 0634-A so that one
may be considered a duplicate to the other.  "
 On April 19, 1993, Roberto filed an application for original registration of Lot No. 2835 with the
RTC (Branch 28)
 In its Decision dated October 28, 1993, the trial court granted the issuance of Original Certificate
of Title No. 0-887 in the name of Roberto.
 The lot was immediately subdivided with portions sold to Ernesto and Jose.
 On November 19, 1996, the Spouses Po filed a complaint to recover the land and to declare
nullity of title with damages with the RTC (different branch – Branch 55)
 The trial court ruled in favor of the Spouses Po in its Decision dated November 23, 2009:
 The Spouses Aboitiz appealed to the Court of Appeals.
 The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated October 31, 2012, partially affirmed the trial court
decision, declaring the Spouses Po as the rightful owner of the land.
 However, it ruled that the titles issued to respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel should be
respected.
 Petitioner’s arguments:
o They argue that the Decision of Branch 55, Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City
granting the complaint of the Spouses Po is void for lack of jurisdiction over the matter.
They claim that a branch of the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to nullify a final
and executory decision of a co-equal branch; it is the Court of Appeals that has this
jurisdiction. 
o They likewise assert that the Spouses Po's cause of action has prescribed  and allegedly
accrued when the Deed of Absolute Sale between the Spouses Po and Ciriaco was
executed on May 5, 1978. They maintain that more than 10 years had elapsed when the
complaint was filed on November 12, 1996, thus barring the action through prescription.
o The Spouses Aboitiz further insist that "estoppel and laches have already set in." They
claim that they have been "in open, public, continuous, uninterrupted, peaceful[,] and
adverse possession" in the concept of owners over the property for "46 years as of
1993," without the Spouses Po acting on the Deed of Absolute Sale. They attest that the
development of North Town Homes Subdivision "was covered by utmost publicity," but
the Spouses Po did not immediately question the development or interpose any objection
during the registration proceedings. 
 o They posit that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po is
"clearly fake and fraudulent" 55 as evidenced by certifications of its non-existence in the
notarial books and the Spouses Po's failure to enforce their rights over the property until
18 years later.  They also affirm that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the
Spouses Po is inadmissible as no documentary stamp was paid and affixed. 
 The Spouses Po’s arguments:
o That the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction when it granted their complaint because the
case filed by the Spouses Aboitiz was for the registration of the land, while the case they
filed was for reconveyance.
o They insisted that their action had not prescribed because an action for reconveyance
prescribes in 10 years from the "date of issuance of the certificate of title over the
property."
o They argued that "laches ha[d] not set in."
o They claimed that the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale between them and Ciriaco was
not fake or fraudulent and was admissible in evidence whereas the Spouses Aboitiz
failed "to overcome [its] presumption of regularity and due execution." They asserted that
"the documentary stamps tax ha[d] been paid" 65 and that the Mariano Heirs were not
indispensable parties.
o They claim that respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel are not "innocent purchasers for
value."
o They allegedly knew of the defective title of Roberto because his tax declaration had the
following annotation: "This tax declaration is also declared in the name of Mrs. VICTORIA
LEE PO, married to PETER PO under tax dec. No. 0634-A so that one may be
considered a duplicate to the other. (Section 89 Paragraph H PD 464)."

Issue no. 1:
Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the Spouses Peter and Victoria Po's complaint;

Ruling:
 YES
 The Spouses Aboitiz argue that Branch 55, Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to nullify
the final and executory Decision of Branch 28, Regional Trial Court in LRC Case No. N-208. They
claim that that it is the Court of Appeals that has jurisdiction to annul judgments of the Regional
Trial Court.
 However, the instant action is not for the annulment of judgment of a Regional Trial Court. It is a
complaint for reconveyance, cancellation of title, and damages.
 A complaint for reconveyance is an action which admits the registration of title of another party
but claims that such registration was erroneous or wrongful.  It seeks the transfer of the title to the
rightful and legal owner, or to the party who has a superior right over it, without prejudice to
innocent purchasers in good faith. 77 It seeks the transfer of a title issued in a valid proceeding.
The relief prayed for may be granted on the basis of intrinsic fraud-fraud committed on the true
owner instead of fraud committed on the procedure amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
 An action for annulment of title questions the validity of the title because of lack of due process of
law. There is an allegation of nullity in the procedure and thus the invalidity of the title that is
issued.
 The complaint of the Spouses Po asserted that they were the true owners of the parcel of land
which was registered in the name of the Spouses Aboitiz. They alleged that they acquired the
property from Ciriaco, who acquired it from Mariano.  They claimed that the Spouses Aboitiz had
the property registered without their knowledge and through fraud.  Thus, they sought to recover
the property and to cancel the title of the Spouses Aboitiz
 Except for actions falling within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial
Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over actions involving "title to, or possession of, real
property." 
 An action for reconveyance and annulment of title is an action involving the title to real property. 
  The complaint of the Spouses Po is clearly an action for reconveyance and annulment of title.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear the case.
 Considering the Spouses Aboitiz's fraudulent registration without the Spouses Po's knowledge
and the latter's assertion of their ownership of the land, their right to recover the property and to
cancel the Spouses Aboitiz' s88 title, the action is for reconveyance and annulment of title and not
for annulment of judgment.

Issue no. 2:
Whether the action is barred by prescription,

Ruling:
 NO
 The Spouses Aboitiz argue that the Spouses Po's cause of action has prescribed. They claim that
prescription has set in because the original complaint was filed only on November 12, 1996, after
more than 10 years after the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and Spouses Po was
executed on May 5, 1978. 
 "[A]n action for reconveyance ... prescribes in [10] years from the issuance of the Torrens title
over the property."
 The basis for this is Section 53, Paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 in relation to
Articles 1456 and 1144(2) of the Civil Code.
 When a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title of property, a constructive
trust is created in favor of the defrauded party.
 Constructive trusts are "created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of
justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud,
duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in
equity and good conscience, to hold."
 When property is registered in another's name, an implied or constructive trust is created by law
in favor of the true owner. The action for reconveyance of the title to the rightful owner prescribes
in 10 years from the issuance of the title.
 Thus, the law creates a trust in favor of the property's true owner.
 The prescriptive period to enforce this trust is 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.
 In an action for reconveyance, the right of action accrues from the time the property is
registered . 
 In the case at bar, respondent's action which is for Reconveyance and Cancellation of Title is
based on an implied trust under Art. 1456 of the Civil Code since he averred in his complaint that
through fraud petitioners were able to obtain a Certificate of Title over the property. He does not
seek the annulment of a voidable contract whereby Articles 1390 and 1391 of the Civil Code
would find application such that the cause of action would prescribe in four years.
 An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from
the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.
 Registration of the property is a "constructive notice to the whole world." Thus, in registering the
property, the adverse party repudiates the implied trust.  Necessarily, the cause of action accrues
upon registration. 
 An action for reconveyance and annulment of title does not seek to question the contract which
allowed the adverse party to obtain the title to the property.  What is put on issue in an action for
reconveyance an d cancellation of title is the ownership of the property and its registration.  It
does not question any fraudulent contract. 119 Should that be the case, the applicable provisions
are Articles 1390 and 1391 of the Civil Code. 
 Thus, an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title prescribes in 10 years from the time of
the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. 
 Considering that the Spouses Po's complaint was filed on November 19, 1996, less than three (3)
years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property on April 6, 1994, it is well within the
10-year prescriptive period imposed on an action for reconveyance.

Issue No. 3:
Whether the doctrines of estoppel and laches apply;

Ruling:
 NO
 The Spouses Aboitiz insist that estoppel and laches have already set in.  They claim that they
have been in "open, continuous, public, peaceful, [and] adverse" possession in the concept of
owners over the property for "46 years as of 1993," without the Spouses Po acting on their Deed
of Absolute Sale.  Moreover, the development of North Town Homes Subdivision "was covered
by utmost publicity" but the Spouses Po did not promptly question the development.  In fact, they
did not interpose any objection during the registration proceedings. 
 There is laches when a party was negligent or has failed "to assert a right within a reasonable
time," thus giving rise to the presumption that he or she has abandoned it.   Laches has set in
when it is already inequitable or unfair to allow the party to assert the right.  The elements of
laches were enumerated in Ignacio v. Basilio:
o There is laches when: (1) the conduct of the defendant or one under whom he claims,
gave rise to the situation complained of; (2) there was delay in asserting a right after
knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after an opportunity to sue; (3) defendant had
no knowledge or notice that the complainant would assert his right; (4) there is injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant. 
 "Laches is different from prescription." Prescription deals with delay itself and thus is an issue of
how much time has passed.  The time period when prescription is deemed to have set in is fixed
by law.  Laches, on the other hand, concerns itself with the effect of delay and not the period of
time that has lapsed. It asks the question whether the delay has changed "the condition of the
property or the relation of the parties" such that it is no longer equitable to insist on the original
right. 
 This Court rules that the Spouses Po is not barred by laches.
 There is no showing that they abandoned their right to the property. The factual findings reveal
that the Spouses Po had their rights over the property registered in the assessor's office.  They
testified that they introduced improvements by cultivating fruit trees after they purchased the
lots. When the Spouses Po discovered that Ciriaco executed a quitclaim renouncing his interest
over Lot No. 2807 in favor of Roberto, the Spouses Po executed a Memorandum of Agreement
with Ciriaco to protect their interest in Lot No. 2835.
 The Spouses Po also had the property declared for taxation purposes in their names and Tax
Declaration No. 0634-A was issued.  Thus, when the Spouses Aboitiz also had the property
declared for taxation purposes, it had the annotation: "This tax declaration is also declared in the
name of Mrs. Victoria Lee Po, married to Peter Po under tax dee. no. 0634-A so that one may be
considered a duplicate to the other." 
 The Spouses Aboitiz only acquired their alleged rights over the property in 1990, when the
Mariano Heirs executed the Deeds of Sale in their favor.  Assuming the Spouses Aboitiz
immediately took possession and began construction in 1990, it cannot be said that the Spouses
Po were in delay in asserting their right. In the Spouses Po's complaint, they asserted that they
made demands upon the Spouses Aboitiz to reconvey to them the property.  They also referred
the matter to the barangay for conciliation
 When they discovered that the property was registered in the name of the Spouses Aboitiz in
1993, the Spouses Po then filed the instant complaint to recover the property sold to them by
Ciriaco, alleging that it was done without their knowledge, through evident bad faith and
fraud. 149 The Spouses Po filed this case in less than three (3) years from the time of registration.
 Based on these circumstances, the elements of laches are clearly lacking in this case. There was
no delay in asserting their right over the property, and the Spouses Aboitiz had knowledge that
the Spouses Po would assert their right.

Issue no. 4”
Whether the land registration court's finding that Ciriaco Seno only held the property in trust for the
Mariano Heirs is binding as res judicata in this case;
Ruling:
 NO
 The Spouses Aboitiz insist that there is already a finding by the Regional Trial Court in LRC Case
No. N-208 that Ciriaco merely held the property "in trust for the [Mariano Heirs]."  Thus, Ciriaco
could not have validly sold the property to the Spouses Po.  They claim that these findings are
binding on the whole world because land registration proceedings are actions in rem. 
 In the Decision in LRC Case No. N-208, no one opposed the application for
registration. Moreover, the Spouses Aboitiz presented only one (I) witness, Gregorio Espina
(Espina), an employee of Roberto,  whotestified:
o That this parcel of land is covered by tax declarations, to wit: 1) Tax Dec. No. 43174 in
the name of Ciriaco Seno for the year 1953 (Exh. "T"); 11) Tax Dec. No. 2835 in the
name of applicant, Roberto Aboitiz for the year 1991 (Exh. "DD").
o That the tax declarations covering Lot No. 2835 are in the name of Ciriaco Seno because
the heirs of Mariano Seno have agreed that Lot No. 2835 be held in trust by Ciriaco Seno
in favor of the heirs. 
 This Court rules that this cannot be binding in this action for reconveyance.
 Res judicata  embraces two (2) concepts: (i) bar by prior judgment and (ii) conclusiveness of
judgment, respectively covered under Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, paragraphs (b)
and (c)
 Res judicata  in the concept of bar by prior judgment proscribes the filing of another action based
on "the same claim, demand, or cause of action." 157 It applies when the following are present: (a)
there is a final judgment or order; (b) it is a judgment or order on the merits; (c) it was "rendered
by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties"; and (d) there is "identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action" between the first and second actions. 
 Res judicata  in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment applies when there is an identity of
issues in two (2) cases between the same parties involving different causes of action. 159 Its effect
is to bar "the relitigation of particular facts or issues" which have already been adjudicated in the
other case. 
 In this case, the Spouses Po allege that the registration was done through fraud.
 They contend that they were unaware and were thus unable to contest the registration and prove
their claim over the property. Aside from several tax receipts, the Spouses Po formally offered as
evidence, among others, the Deed of Sale executed by Mariano in Ciriaco's favor, the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Ciriaco in their favor, and the Tax Declaration under Victoria's name.
Additionally, they also submitted their Memorandum of Agreement with Ciriaco and the Quitclaim
executed by Ciriaco in favor of the Spouses Aboitiz.
 These documents were not considered by the land registration court when it issued the title in
favor of the Spouses Aboitiz. The Spouses Po also offered the Application of Original Registration
of Title of the Spouses Aboitiz to prove that the Spouses Aboitiz only submitted to the land
registration court the cancelled tax declarations of Ciriaco, instead of the tax declaration of the
Spouses Po. 
 Thus, the ruling of the land registration court cannot be so conclusive as to deny the Spouses Po
the remedy afforded to them by law. The action for reconveyance allows them to prove their
ownership over the property. Hence, they are not precluded from presenting evidence that is
contrary to the findings in the land registration case.
 The factual findings of the land registration court are not being questioned. An action for
reconveyance based on an implied trust seeks to compel the registered owner to transfer the
property to its true owner. 
 The rationale for allowing reconveyance despite the finality of the registration is that the issuance
of a certificate of title does not create or vest ownership to a person over the
property.  Registration under the Torrens system "is not a mode of acquiring ownership." A
certificate is only a proof of ownership.  Thus, its issuance does not foreclose the possibility of
having a different owner, and it cannot be used against the true owner as a shield for fraud. 
 In an action for reconveyance, the parties are obliged to prove their ownership over the property.
Necessarily, the parties may present evidence to support their claims. The court must weigh
 these pieces of evidence and decide who between the parties the true owner is. Therefore, it
cannot be bound simply by the factual findings of the land registration court alone.
 An exception to this rule is if the party claiming ownership has already had the opportunity to
prove his or her claim in the land registration case. In such a case, res judicata will then
apply.  When an issue of ownership has been raised in the land registration proceedings where
the adverse party was given full opportunity to present his or her claim, the findings in the land
registration case will constitute a bar from any other claim of the adverse party on the property. 
 However, this is not the circumstance in the case at bar. The Spouses Po were not able to prove
their claim in the registration proceedings. Thus, res judicata cannot apply to their action for
reconveyance.

Issue no. 5 (Main Issue)

Whether the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco Seno and the Spouses Peter and Victoria Po should
be considered as evidence of their entitlement to the property;

Ruling:
 YES
 The Spouses Aboitiz posit that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po is
fake and fraudulent.  They argue that this is evidenced by certifications of the document's non-
existence in the notarial books and the Spouses Po's failure to enforce their rights over the
property until 18 years later.  They also claim that the Deed of Absolute Sale is inadmissible as
no documentary stamp was paid and affixed. 
 This Court notes that the Spouses Aboitiz are raising questions of fact which are not within the
scope of a review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.  An appeal under Rule 45
must raise only questions of law, unless the factual findings are not supported by evidence or the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.  Absent these exceptions, the factual findings
of the lower courts are accorded respect and are beyond the review of this Court.
 The Spouses Aboitiz failed to prove that these exceptions exist in the case at bar. The Regional
Trial Court lent credence to documents presented by the Spouses Po, Peter's testimony about
Mariano's sale of the property to Ciriaco, Ciriaco's sale of the property to the Spouses Po, and the
issuance of a Tax Declaration in the name of Victoria. 
 During trial, Peter also testified that after they bought the land, they had a caretaker who
cultivated the property by planting fruit trees.  
 He claimed that when they subsequently discovered the quitclaim executed by Ciriaco in favor of
the Spouses Aboitiz, they executed a Memorandum of Agreement to protect their interests in the
property.  
 He stated that they filed a complaint in the barangay when the Spouses Aboitiz started cutting
down their improvements and that they subsequently discovered that Ciriaco was forced by the
Mariano Heirs to sell the property to the Spouses Aboitiz. 
 The Spouses Aboitiz presented as their first witness Armando Avenido, who testified according to
the records only.  
 He claimed that he was familiar with the land which was being developed by Aboitiz Land. He
testified that Roberto acquired the land through separate Deeds of Sale from the Mariano Heirs,
had the tax declaration transferred in his name, paid the taxes on the property, applied for the
property's registration, and developed the property into a subdivision. During cross-examination it
was revealed that the tax declaration of the Spouses Po was issued before the tax declaration of
the Spouses Aboitiz and that the Spouses Po acquired from Ciriaco the entire land, while the
Spouses Aboitiz purchased only one-fifth (1/5) of the property. 
 The Spouses Aboitiz's second witness, Bienvenido Escoton, testified that he was a mason
working in the subdivision on the road lot and that he knew no person claiming ownership of the
land since 1989. 
 The Regional Trial Court thus held:
o Analyzing the adduced and admitted evidence of both parties, Art. 1544 of the Civil Code
cannot be aptly applied in the case at bar, for reason that only the sale of Ciriaco Seno
(Exh. "A" Exh. All" Exh. 2"/ A, A-1 and A-2) has the validating elements of sale, whereas
 the rest of the Deeds of Sale (Exhs 1 to 5) executed by the Heirs of Mariano Seno in
favor of the Defendants are void, for containing untruthful statements as pleaded and
proven. They are no longer the owners of the subject property when they executed the
several Deeds of Conveyance to defendant Roberto Aboitiz.
 On the first issue on the identity and location of the land, the sale of Ciriaco Seno to Plaintiffs
(Exh. "A") reflected in the Tax Declarations that the Defendants used in their titling proceeding is
the very same lot as certified by the Barangay Captain dated July 28, 1999 under Plaintiff's
Request for Admission. Concerning the second formulated issue, only the Deed of Sale executed
by Ciriaco Seno was valid with all the attending requisites of sale.
 It was sold by the legitimate owner of the land, Ciriaco Seno to the Plaintiffs. The sale (Exh. A,
Exhibit "X") enjoyed preferential date of execution, being dated or executed in 1978 by the lawful
owner Ciriaco Seno who was first to register the sale in the Registry of Property office, and due to
such registration, the Tax Declaration of Ciriaco Seno, was cancelled and a new Tax Declaration
was issued in the name of Victoria Po for as shown in Exh. E the said tax declaration succeeded
in canceling the Tax Declaration of Mariano Seno (Exh. C) and was issued thereafter a Tax
Declaration in the name of C[i]riaco Seno (Exh. D). So, when the latter sold the subject land to
plaintiffs in 1978, the same was already owned by C[i]riaco Seno.
 When Mariano Seno died in 1982, the subject land owned by C[i]riaco Seno, naturally, is not part
of the estate of Mariano Seno, for at that point in time, the subject land is now owned by plaintiffs
Sps. Po, and the same was declared in their names (Exh. "D" "E" & "E-1 ").
 As to the issue whether defendant Roberto Aboitiz was a purchaser in good faith and for value,
the Court holds that defendant Roberto Aboitiz was not a purchaser in good faith and for value for
he was already informed of the ownership of plaintiffs over the subject land during the conciliation
proceedings before the barangay official when plaintiffs filed a barangay case against him.
 In this case, the Court believes that defendant Roberto Aboitiz is aware of the proprietary rights of
the plaintiffs considering the land was already declared for taxation purposes in plaintiffs' names
after the tax declaration of said land, first in the name of Mariano Seno was cancelled and
another one issued in the name of C[i]riaco Seno when the latter bought the said land from his
father Mariano Seno, and after the said tax declaration in the name of C[i]riaco Seno was
cancelled and another one issued in the name of plaintiffs herein.
 So, defendant Roberto Aboitiz purchased the subject land from the Heirs of Mariano Seno who
are no longer the owners thereof and the tax declaration of subject land was no longer in the
name of Mariano Seno nor in the name of Heirs of Mariano Seno.
 The City Assessor of Mandaue City even issued a Certification (Exh. X) to the effect that Tax
Declaration No. 0634-A in the name of Mrs. Victoria Lee Po married to Peter Po was issued prior
to the issuance of T.D. No. 1100 in the name of Roberto Aboitiz married to Maria Cristina
Cabarruz.
 Buyers of any untitled parcel of land for that matter, to protect their interest, will first verify from
the Assessor's Office that status of said land whether it has clean title or not. 
 With the exception of its ruling regarding respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel being purchasers
in good faith, these factual findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
 Thus, there is no showing that the factual findings are not supported by evidence or that the
judgment seems to be based on a misapprehension of facts. Therefore, the factual findings of the
lower courts are binding.
 Furthermore, this Court finds that the Spouses Aboitiz failed to prove their claim of fraud. The
Spouses Aboitiz attempted to prove that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the
Spouses Po was fake and fraudulent by presenting certifications of its non-existence in the
notarial books of the notary public who notarized the document.
 However, a review of the certifications does not even state that the document does not exist in
the notarial books.
 The Certification dated April 1, 1997 of the Records Management and Archives Office of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports states:
 This is to certify that per records of this Office, Deed of Sale executed by and between Ciriaco
Seno and Victoria Lee known as Doc. No. 66; Page No. 14; Book No. I; Series of 1978 entered in
 the Notarial Register of Notary Public Jesus Pono is not among the documents transferred by the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu for safekeeping. 
 Likewise, the Certification dated April 4, 1997 of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu, 7th Judicial Region, Cebu City provides:
 This is to certify that as per notarial records on file with this office, available and found as of this
date, Atty. Jesus M. Pono had been issued a Notarial Commission for the term 1978-1979.
 It is further certifie[d] that said Notary Public has not submitted his notarial reports for the year
1978-1979  in this office wherein the Deed of Sale as stated on the letter dated March 31, 1997
designated as Doc. no. 66; Page no. 14; Book no. I and Series of 1978 is allegedly included. 
 These Certifications do not declare that the Deed of Absolute Sale does not exist. They only state
that at the time of their issuance, the Notary Public had not submitted his notarial reports or that
the document had not been transferred to the archives for safekeeping. It cannot logically be
concluded from these certifications that the document is inexistent, false, or fraudulent. In any
case, the Notary Public's failure to submit his or her notarial report does not affect the act of
notarization. 
 Rule 132, Section 30 of the Rules of Court provides that:
o Section 30. Proof of notarial documents. - Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved
and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the
certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved.
 When a private document is notarized, the document is converted to a public document which is
presumed regular, admissible in evidence without need for proof of its authenticity and due
execution, and entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. 
 To overturn the presumption in favor of a notarized document, the party questioning it must
present "clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant evidence."
 Thus, parties who appear before a Notary Public should not be prejudiced by the failure of the
Notary Public to follow rules imposed by the Notarial Law. They are not obliged to ensure that the
Notary Public submits his or her notarial reports. 
 The Spouses Aboitiz failed to present clear and convincing evidence to overturn the presumption.
The notarized Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po is, thus, presumed
regular and authentic.
 Consequently, this Court can affirm the finding that the property was sold to Ciriaco in 1973, and
that Ciriaco, as the owner of the property, had the right to sell it to the Spouses Po. Hence, the lot
did not form part of the estate of Mariano, and the Mariano Heirs did not have the capacity to sell
the property to the Spouses Aboitiz later on.

Issue no. 6:
Whether the Mariano Heirs, as sellers in a deed of conveyance of realty, are indispensable parties;

Ruling:
 NO
 An indispensable party is the party whose legal presence in the proceeding is so necessary that
"the action cannot be finally determined" without him or her because his or her interests in the
matter and in the relief "are so bound up with that of the other parties."
 The property owners against whom the action for reconveyance is filed are indispensable
parties. No relief can be had, and the court cannot render a valid judgment, without them.   The
property has been sold to respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel. Thus, they are indispensable
parties.
 However, the seller of the property is not an indispensable party.
 The Mariano Heirs, as the alleged sellers of the property, are not indispensable parties. They are
at best necessary parties, which are covered by Rule 3, Section 8 of the Rules of Court:
o Section 8. Necessary Party. - A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who
ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already
parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.
  Necessary parties may be joined in the case "to adjudicate the whole controversy," but the case
may go on without them because a judgment may be rendered without any effect on their rights
and interests. 
 The Mariano Heirs may likewise be considered material witnesses to the action. A material matter
to which a witness can testify on can be a "main fact which was the subject of the inquiry" or any
circumstance or fact "which tends to prove" the fact subject of the inquiry, "which tends to
corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to such inquiry," and "which legitimately affects
the credit of any witness who testifies."
 The validity of the Deeds of Sale allegedly executed by the parties in this case is a material
matter in determining who the true owner of the property is. Thus, the Mariano Heirs, including
Ciriaco, may testify as to the Deeds of Sale they executed to prove which sale is the valid one.

Final Issue:
Whether the respondents Jose Maria Moraza, Ernesto Aboitiz, and Isabel Aboitiz are innocent purchasers
in good faith.

Ruling:
 YES
 Despite these findings, the Spouses Po cannot recover the property. Respondents Jose, Ernesto,
and Isabel are innocent purchasers for value.
 An innocent purchaser for value refers to the buyer of the property who pays for its full and fair
price without or before notice of another person's right or interest in it. He or she buys the
property believing that "the [seller] [i]s the owner and could [transfer] the title to the property."
 The rationale for this rule is the public's interest in sustaining "the indefeasibility of a certificate of
title, as evidence of the lawful ownership of the land or of any encumbrance" on it.
 Thus, respondents were not obliged to look beyond the title before they purchased the property.
They may rely solely on the face of the title.
 The only exception to the rule is when the purchaser has actual knowledge of any defect or other
circumstance that would cause "a reasonably cautious man" to inquire into the title of the
seller.224 If there is anything which arouses suspicion, the vendee is obliged to investigate beyond
the face of the title. 225 Otherwise, the vendee cannot be deemed a purchaser in good faith
entitled to protection under the law.226
 In this case, there is no showing that respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel had any knowledge
of the defect in the title. Considering that the annotation that the Spouses Po are invoking is
found in the tax declaration and not in the title of the property, respondents Jose, Ernesto, and
Isabel cannot be deemed purchasers in bad faith.

Sarto vs. People, G.R. No. 206284, February 28, 2018

Ponente: Martires, J.

Nature of the case: This case is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
decision and resolution of the CA – which affirmed the RTC decision in a criminal case finding petitioner
Redante Sarto y Misalucha (Redante) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of BIGAMY

FACTS:
 On October 3, 2007, Redante was charged with the crime of bigamy for allegedly
contracting two (2) marriages:
o First, with Maria Socorro G. Negrete (Maria Socorro), and
o Second, without having the first one legally terminated, with private complainant Fe R.
Aguila (Fe)
 The charge stemmed from a criminal complaint filed by Fe against Redante on June 4, 2007.

 During his arraignment (Dec. 3, 2007), Redante entered a plea of "not guilty."
  Pre-trial ensued wherein Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages BUT
interposed the defense that his first marriage had been legally dissolved by divorce
obtained in a foreign country.

 Defense filed a motion to allow the taking of Maria Socorro's deposition considering that she was
set to leave the country on the first week of June 2008.
o RTC granted the motion
 Prosecution moved for a modified or reverse trial on the basis of Redante's admissions
o RTC granted the motion
o Directed the defense to present its case ahead of the prosecution

Evidence of the Defense:

 Presented Redante and Maria Socorro as witnesses. Their testimonies, taken together,
tended to established the following:
o Redante and Maria Socorro, both natives of Buhi, Camarines Sur, were married on
August 31, 1984 in a ceremony held in Angono, Rizal
o Sometime thereafter, Maria Socorro left for Canada to work as a nurse
o While in Canada, she applied for Canadian citizenship
o The application was eventually granted and Ma. Socorro acquired Canadian citizenship
on April 1, 1988.
o Maria Socorro then filed for divorce in British Columbia, Canada, to sever her
marital ties with Redante
o The divorce was eventually granted by the Supreme Court of British Columbia on
November 1, 1988

o Maria Socorro came back to Buhi, Camarines Sur, sometime in 1992 for a vacation.
o While there, Redante's mother and grandparents, who were against the divorce,
convinced her and Redante to give their marriage a second chance to which they
acceded
o Their attempts to rekindle their romance resulted in the birth of their daughter on March 8,
1993 in Mandaluyong City
o In spite of this, Redante and Maria Socorro's efforts to save their marriage were futile.

o Sometime in February 1998, Redante met Fe to whom he admitted that he was

previously married to Maria Socorro who, however, divorced him.
o Despite this admission, their romance blossomed and culminated in their marriage on
December 29, 1998 at the Peñafrancia Basilica Minore in Naga City
o They established a conjugal home in Pasay City and had two children
o However, their relationship turned sour when Ma. Socorro returned to the Philippines and
met with Redante to persuade him to allow their daughter to apply for Canadian
citizenship
o After learning of Redante and Maria Socorro's meeting and believing that they had
reconciled, Fe decided to leave their conjugal home on May 31, 2007.
o On June 4, 2007, Fe filed a complaint for bigamy against Redante.

o Meanwhile, Maria Socorro married a certain Douglas Alexander Campbell, on August 5,

2000, in Chilliwack, British Columbia, Canada

 Also presented a Certificate of Divorce, issued on January 14, 2008, to prove the fact of divorce

Evidence for the Prosecution:

 Waived the presentation of testimonial evidence and
 Presented instead, the Marriage Contract between Redante and Maria Socorro, to prove the
solemnization of their marriage on August 31, 1984, in Angono, Rizal; and
  The Marriage Contract of Redante and Fe to prove the solemnization of Redante's second
marriage on December 29, 1998, in Naga City
 The prosecution also adopted the Certificate of Divorce as its own exhibit for the purpose of
proving that the same was secured only on January 14, 2008

RTC Ruling
 Found Redante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy (punishable under Article
349, RPC)
 Trial court ratiocinated that:
o Redante's conviction is the only reasonable conclusion for the case because of his
failure to present competent evidence proving the alleged divorce decree;
o His failure to establish the naturalization of Maria Socorro; and
o His admission that he did not seek judicial recognition of the alleged divorce decree.
 Aggrieved, Redante appealed before the CA.

CA Ruling:
 Affirmed the RTC decision
 Ratiocinated that assuming the authenticity and due execution of the Certificate of Divorce,
since the order of divorce or the divorce decree was not presented, it could not ascertain whether
said divorce capacitated Maria Socorro, and consequently Redante, to remarry
 It continued that Redante failed to present evidence that he had filed and had secured a judicial
declaration that his first marriage had been dissolved in accordance with Philippine laws prior to
the celebration of his subsequent marriage to Fe.

 Redante moved for MR, but denied by CA

 Hence, this present petition.

Note: The Court issued a Resolution requiring the respondent Republic of the Philippines to file its
comment.

OSG’s Manifestation:
 Advocates Redante’s acquittal
 It argued that:
o The RTC had convicted Redante solely because of his failure to provide evidence
concerning the date when Maria Socorro acquired Canadian citizenship
o It observed that Maria Socorro failed to provide the exact date when she acquired
Canadian citizenship because of the loss of her citizenship certificate at the time she took
the witness stand
o However, the OSG claimed that Redante was able to submit, although belatedly, a
photocopy of Maria Socorro's Canadian citizenship certificate as an attachment to
his appellant's brief
 The said certificate stated that Maria Socorro was already a Canadian citizen as
early as April 1, 1988
 Hence, the divorce decree which took effect on November 1, 1988 is valid
 The OSG further averred that substantial rights must prevail over the application
of procedural rules

ISSUE: Whether the trial and appellate courts erred when they found petitioner Redante guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of BIGAMY.

RULING:
 No. The trial and appellate courts DID NOT err when they found petitioner Redante guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of BIGAMY.

As to the Elements of Bigamy:

  For a person to be convicted of bigamy, the following elements must concur:
(1) That the offender has been legally married;
(2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case of an absentee spouse,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the provisions of the
Civil Code;
(3) That the offender contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

As to Burden of Proving the Termination of the FIRST MARRIAGE:

 It is a fundamental principle in this jurisdiction that the burden of proof lies with the party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action.
 Since the divorce was a defense raised by Redante, it is incumbent upon him to show that it
was validly obtained in accordance with Maria Socorro's country's national law
 Stated differently, Redante has the burden of proving the termination of the first marriage
prior to the celebration of the second.

Application:
 In this case, Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages.
 He, however, put forth the defense of the termination of his first marriage as a result of the
divorce obtained abroad by his alien spouse
 HOWEVER, Redante failed to prove his capacity to contract a subsequent marriage.

Re: DIVORCE DECREE

 A divorce decree obtained abroad by an alien spouse is a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage
 As in any other foreign judgment, a divorce decree does not have an automatic effect in the
Philippines.
 Consequently, recognition by Philippine courts may be required before the effects of a divorce
decree could be extended in this jurisdiction.
 Recognition of the divorce decree, however, need not be obtained in a separate petition filed
solely for that purpose.
o Philippine courts may recognize the foreign divorce decree when such was invoked by a
party as an integral aspect of his claim or defense
 Before the divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove it as
a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it
 Proving the foreign law under which the divorce was secured is mandatory considering that
Philippine courts cannot and could not be expected to take judicial notice of foreign laws.
 For the purpose of establishing divorce as a fact, a copy of the divorce decree itself must be
presented and admitted in evidence.
o This is in consonance with the rule that a foreign judgment may be given presumptive
evidentiary value only after it is presented and admitted in evidence

In relation to Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence:

 In particular, to prove the divorce and the foreign law allowing it, the party invoking them
must present copies thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
o Pursuant to these rules, the divorce decree and foreign law may be proven through
(1) An official publication or
(2) Copies thereof attested to by the officer having legal custody of said documents
o If the office which has custody is in a foreign country, the copies of said documents
must be:
(a) Accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept; and
 (b) Authenticated by the seal of his office.

Application:
 Applying the foregoing, the Court is convinced that Redante failed to prove the existence of the
divorce as a fact or that it was validly obtained prior to the celebration of his subsequent
marriage to Fe
 Aside from the testimonies of Redante and Maria Socorro, the only piece of evidence
presented by the defense to prove the divorce, is the CERTIFICATE OF DIVORCE allegedly
issued by the registrar of the Supreme Court of British Columbia on January 14, 2008

Re: the CERTIFICATE OF DIVORCE

 This certificate of divorce, however, is utterly insufficient to rebut the charge against Redante.
 FIRST, the certificate of divorce is not the divorce decree required by the rules and jurisprudence.
o As discussed previously, the divorce decree required to prove the fact of divorce is the
judgment itself as rendered by the foreign court and not a mere certification.
 SECOND, assuming the certificate of divorce may be considered as the divorce decree,
o It was not accompanied by a certification issued by the proper Philippine
diplomatic or consular officer stationed in Canada, as required under Section 24 of
Rule 132
 LASTLY, no copy of the alleged Canadian law was presented by the defense.
 Thus, it could not be reasonably determined whether the subject divorce decree was in accord
with Maria Socorro's national law.

 FURTHER, since neither the divorce decree nor the alleged Canadian law was satisfactorily
demonstrated, the type of divorce supposedly secured by Maria Socorro – whether an absolute
divorce which terminates the marriage or a limited divorce which merely suspends it – and
whether such divorce capacitated her to remarry could not also be ascertained
 As such, Redante failed to prove his defense that he had the capacity to remarry when he
contracted a subsequent marriage to Fe
 His liability for bigamy is, therefore, now beyond question.

Re: 2nd par. of Article 26 of the Family Code; citing Republic vs. Orbecido
 This Court is not unmindful of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
 Indeed, in Republic v. Orbecido, a case invoked by Redante to support his cause, the Court
recognized that the legislative intent behind the said provision is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse under the laws of his or her country
 The Court is also not oblivious of the fact that Maria Socorro had already remarried in Canada on
August 5, 2000.
 However, these circumstances, can never justify the reversal of Redante's conviction.
 In Orbecido, as in Redante's case, the alien spouse divorced her Filipino spouse and remarried
another.
 The Filipino spouse then filed a petition for authority to remarry under paragraph 2 of Article 26.
 His petition was granted by the RTC.
o However, this Court set aside said decision by the trial court after finding that that the
records were bereft of competent evidence concerning the divorce decree and the
naturalization of the alien spouse.
 The Court reiterated therein the rules regarding the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
and the foreign law allowing it, as well as the necessity to show that the divorce decree
capacitated his former spouse to remarry

 FINALLY, the Court notes that the OSG was miserably misguided when it claimed that the sole
reason for the RTC's judgment of conviction was Redante's failure to provide evidence, during
trial, of the date Maria Socorro acquired Canadian citizenship
 o An examination of the May 18, 2009 judgment would reveal that the trial court rendered
the said decision after finding that there was lack of any competent evidence with
regard to the divorce decree and the national law governing his first wife, not merely
because of the lack of evidence concerning the effectivity date of Maria Socorro's
naturalization.
o Thus, even if the Court were to indulge the OSG and consider Maria Socorro's citizenship
certificate, which was a mere photocopy and filed belatedly, it would not have any effect
significant enough to produce a judgment of acquittal.
o The fact that Redante failed to prove the existence of the divorce and that it was
validly acquired prior to the celebration of the second marriage still subsists

Disposition: Petition denied for lack of merit. Affirmed the assailed decision, which affirmed the RTC
decision
 Petitioner Sarto is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy
 Sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum

Tujan-Militante vs Nustad
G.R. No. 209518 June 19, 2017
Facts:
 On June 2, 2011, Respondent Ana Kari Carmencita Nustad (Nustad), as represented by Atty.
Marguerite Therese Lucila (Atty. Lucila), filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 55, Lucena City (RTC) and prayed that Ma. Hazelina A. Tujan-Militante (Tujan-Militante)
be ordered to surrender to the Register of Deeds of Lucena City the owner's duplicate
copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-435798, T-436799, T-387158 and T-387159,
which were all issued in Nustad's name.
 She averred that Tujan-Militante has been withholding the said titles.
 In its Order dated July 26, 2011, the RTC set the petition for a hearing 4.
 Instead of filing an Answer, Tujan-Militante filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and Annul
Proceedings dated September 2, 2011. She averred that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
her person as she was not able to receive summons. Moreover, she argued that the Order
appeared to be a decision on the merits, as it already ruled with certainty that she is in
possession of the subject titles.
 RTC denied Tujan-Militante's Motion and ruled that it has jurisdiction over the case. Further the
RTC stated that it has not yet decided on the merits of the case when it ordered Tujan-Militante to
surrender TCT Nos. T-435798, T-436799, T-387158 and T-387159 because it merely set the
petition for a hearing.
 He filed an MR, and alleged that the Power of Attorney executed by Nustad in favor of Atty. Lucila
is void and non-existent. Tujan-Militante likewise averred that Atty. Lucila is representing a
Norwegian, who is not allowed to own lands in the Philippines. Aside from the dismissal of the
case, petitioner prayed that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Land Registration Authority
be impleaded. Moreover, Tujan-Militante prayed for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees, and costs of suit. This was denied.
 Aggrieved, Tujan-Militante filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA,
 CA recognized the jurisdictional defect over the person of Tujan-Militante, but nevertheless ruled
that the flaw was cured by Tujan-Militante's filing of her Motion for Reconsideration.
 MR, but was denied.
 Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over Tujan-Militante?
Ruling: Yes.
 A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of summons.
However, it is equally significant that even without valid service of summons, a court may still
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears before it. 11
Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
 Section 20. Voluntary Appearance. - The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds of relief
aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance.
 By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, the individual [petitioner is] deemed to have
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court to secure the affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain
such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
 In this case, while Tujan-Militante's motion to dismiss challenged the jurisdiction of the court a
quo on the ground of improper service of summons, the subsequent filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration which sought for affirmative relief is tantamount to voluntary appearance and
submission to the authority of such court. Such affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position
that no voluntary appearance had been made, and to ask for such relief, without the proper
objection, necessitates submission to the [court]'s jurisdiction.

ISSUE: As to the claim of Tujan-Militante that the requirements laid down in Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court apply with respect to the power of attorney notarized abroad, what should be applied?
Ruling: this Court clarified that the ruling in the Lopez case is inapplicable because the Rules of
Evidence which were then effective were the old Rules, prior to their amendment in 1989. We rule on the
validity of the subject notarial document

Contention

He cited the ruling in Lopez v. Court of Appeals. In said case, this Court held that the power of attorney
must comply with the requirements set forth under Sec. 25 (now Sec. 24), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
in order to be considered as valid.

Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that:

Section 24. Proof of official record.- The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of
the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal
of his office. (emphasis supplied)

Section 19 of Rule 132 states that:

Section 19. Classes of documents. - For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are
either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

All other writings are private. (emphasis supplied)

In the Heirs of Spouses Arcilla v. Teodoro, this Court clarified that the ruling in the Lopez case is
inapplicable because the Rules of Evidence which were then effective were the old Rules, prior to their
amendment in 1989. When the Rules of Evidence were amended in 1989, the introductory phrase " An
official record or an entry therein" was substituted by the phrase "The record of public documents referred
to in paragraph (a) of Section 19", as found in the present Rules. Also, Section 25 of the former Rules
became Section 24 of the present Rules.

On this note, the case of Heirs of Spouses Arcilla explained further:

It cannot be overemphasized that the required certification of an officer in the foreign service under
Section 24 refers only to the documents enumerated in Section 19 (a), to wit: written official acts or
records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of
the Philippines, or of a foreign country. The Court agrees with the CA that had the Court intended to
include notarial documents as one of the public documents contemplated by the provisions of
Section 24, it should not have specified only the documents referred to under paragraph (a) of
Section 19. (emphasis supplied)

As the Rules explicitly provide that the required certification of an officer in the foreign service refers only
to written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers of the Philippines, or of a foreign country, as found in Section 19(a), Rule 132, such
enumeration does not include documents acknowledged before a notary public abroad.

Conclusion

With all these, We rule on the validity of the subject notarial document. What is important is that [Nustad]
certified before a commissioned officer clothed with powers to administer an oath that she is authorizing
Atty. Lucila to institute the petition before the court a quo on her behalf.

A notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and to overcome the same, there
must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant; otherwise, the document
should be upheld.
Lastly, Tujan-Militante's contention that the TCTs under the name of Nustad are invalid because of her
citizenship constitutes a collateral attack on the titles. The CA correctly ruled that the issue as to whether
an alien is or is not qualified to acquire the lands covered by the subject titles can only be raised in an
action expressly instituted for that purpose.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated February 27, 2013 and
Resolution dated October 2, 2013, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 124811 are AFFIRMED in
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