ASSIGNMENT IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY | ROOM 301 | 7:30-9:30 PM

SUBMITTED BY:

JOSEPH P. GAVIOLA

SUBMITTED TO:

ATTY. BRENDA TANGARORANG

 I. CASE DIGESTS

CASE #1

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. MERLYN MERCADERA through

her Attorney-in-Fact, EVELYN M. OGA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 186027 December 8, 2010

FACTS:

Merlyn Mercadera, represented by her sister and duly constituted Attorney-in-Fact,

Evelyn M. Oga, sought for the correction of her given name from Marilyn L. Mercadera to
Merlyn L. Mercadera. R.A. No. 9048 now provides that the city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general can effect the change of first name or nickname and the correction of clerical or
typographical errors in civil registry entries. The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog
City, however, refused to effect the correction unless a court order was obtained "because the
Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly
act on petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by R.A. No. 9048."

Mercadera then filed a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the
Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). RTC scheduled
the said petition for hearing. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) deputized the Office of
the City Prosecutor to assist in the case. Without any objection from the City Prosecutor, the
testimony of Oga and several photocopies of documents were formally offered and marked as
evidence to prove that Mercadera never used the name "Marilyn" in any of her public or private
transactions.

RTC granted the petition and ruled that the documentary evidence presented by
Mercadera sufficiently supported the circumstances alleged in her petition. Considering that she
had used "Merlyn" as her given name since childhood until she discovered the discrepancy in her
Certificate of Live Birth, the RTC was convinced that the correction was justified.
 The OSG timely appealed praying for the reversal and setting aside of the RTC decision.
For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of Mercadera’s given name "is in truth a material
correction as it would modify or increase substantive rights", which would have been proper had
she filed a petition under Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds therefor.

The CA was not persuaded. The appellate court affirmed the questioned RTC order.

Unsatisfied with the decision, the OSG filed the present petition.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC falls before Rule 103 or 108?

RULING: The case falls under Rule 108.

The Supreme Court held that the "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and
Rule 103 must not be confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one’s name under
Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for
change of name under Rule 103, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change
and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess
the sufficiency of the grounds invoked, there must be adversarial proceedings.

In petitions for correction under Rule 108, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section
2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is
covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one’s name are confined
under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.

In this case, the use of the letter "a" for the letter "e," and the deletion of the letter "i," so
that what appears as "Marilyn" would read as "Merlyn" is patently a rectification of a name that
is clearly misspelled. The similarity between "Marilyn" and "Merlyn" may well be the object of a
mix- up that blemished Mercadera’s Certificate of Live Birth until her adulthood, thus, her
interest to correct the same.
 The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the
correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she could
remember.

Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it
simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means "to make or set
aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." From the
allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court "to remove the faults or
error" from her registered given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to
conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN." It does not take a complex assessment of said
petition to learn of its intention to simply correct the clerical error in spelling. Mercadera even
attempted to avail of the remedy allowed by R.A. No. 9048 but she, unfortunately, failed to
enjoy the expediency which the law provides and was constrained to take court action to obtain
relief.

CASE #2

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO CHANGE THE NAME OF GO CHANG TO

JAYME S. TAN, JAYME S. TAN, petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

G.R. No. L-16384 April 26, 1962

FACTS:

Go Chang, a citizen of the Republic of Nationalist China, but born in the Philippines,
filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) a verified petition for change of name, to Jayme S.
Tan.

During the hearing, the affidavit of the Publisher of the "La Prensa" and clippings of the
order (of hearing) were presented to prove compliance with the legal requirement of publication.
The motion for Bill of Particulars, presented by the Provincial Fiscal was denied by the trial
court on the ground that same was improper and would serve only to delay the proceedings. The
petitioner testified that when he started schooling at the "Colegio de Santa Maria", San Juan,
Rizal, he was enrolled under the name of Jayme S. Tan, which name he has continuously used up
to College; that he desires to change his name to clear up an error and avoid confusion and that
because of the discrepancy about his name in his school records and alien certificate of
registration, the Board of Medical Examiners refused to issue him a "Medical Number" to be
considered as a medical student, unless he secures a court order, allowing him to use the name
Jayme S. Tan, appearing in his school records.

After trial, the lower court rendered a judgment in favor of Go Chang.

The Provincial Fiscal of Cebu, moved for the reconsideration of the above judgment. The
motion was denied. The state made an appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Go Chang's petition should be granted

RULING: NO.

A discrepancy exists in the petition and the published Order. Whereas in the published
Order the name of petitioner was spelled Jaime S. Tan, the verified petition spell his name as
Jayme S. Tan (Exhs. A-1 to A-3). Even in the affidavit of the publisher of "La Prensa" (Exh. A),
the name appearing is Jaime S. Tan. Petitions for change of name being proceedings in rem,
strict compliance with the requirement of publication is essential, for it is by such means that the
court acquires jurisdiction (Aida Jacobo V. Republic, 52 O. G. No. 9, p. 2928). Considering the
fact that the proceedings is one for change of name, the defect in the petition and the order, as to
the spelling of the name of the petitioner, is substantial, because it did not correctly identify the
party to said proceedings. As the Solicitor General has aptly observed —

.... Not only was it misleading to the courts of Justice, but also prejudiced the interests of
the general public. By said act, he made it difficult or virtually impossible for anyone who might
have an adverse interest to oppose his petition. In the eyes of the law therefore, petitioner has not
complied strictly with the legal requirement regarding publication, thereby rendering the entire
proceeding had in the court below null and void.

It may be argued that the difference in the spelling is minor, that is the "i" has been
erroneously typewritten as "y" or vice versa. The difference of one letter in a name may mean the
distinction of identity of one person with that of another. If the projected change means so great
to the petitioner, he should, at least, have exerted efforts to correct the mistake, if it was a
mistake at all.

No reasonable circumstance exists or was proven to warrant petitioner's change of name.

Petitioner in his petition alleges that he was baptized as Jayme Go Chang and that throughout his
school days he has been enrolled under the name of Jayme S. Tan. His own documents, however,
belie said allegations because his baptismal certificate (Exh. D), shows that his baptismal name is
"Jaime Descals Go Chang". Except his own testimony, no other evidence was introduced to
show that in school and to his friends he was using and/or was known by the name of Jayme S.
Tan. Because of the discrepancy existing in his school records and his alien certificate of
registration, the Board of Medical Examiners allegedly refused to give him a "Medical number"
to be considered a medical student, unless he secures a court order allowing him to use the name
Jayme S. Tan. No corroborative evidence was adduced to show the veracity of his assertion. The
fact that the Certificate of Enrollment issued by the "Southwestern College" (Exh. E), mentions a
certain Jaime S. Tan as officially enrolled in the College of Medicine, would show that what
petitioner has alleged to the effect that since his first enrollment Grade I until college, he was
continuously using the name Jayme S. Tan, cannot be true. If the purpose of changing his name
is to correct an error or avoid confusion, the petitioner should retain the use of his name "Go
Chang" appearing in the Civil Registrar and Bureau of Immigration, the real and official name,
rather than change it. The real name of a person is that given him in the Civil register, not the
name by which he was baptized in his church or by which he has been known in the community,
or which he has adopted (Chomi v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, G. R. No. L-9203, Sept. 28,
1956, 52 O. G. No. 15, p. 6541). There was no reason for the Medical Board to require the
change of his name to Jayme S. Tan, considering the fact that the Certificate of Enrollment from
the Southwestern College mentions already of a medical student bearing a similar name. It would
seem that change of name sought for in the petition, would only add confusion to the already
confused state of things. There would also be no practical purpose in allowing name to be
changed, in order to give him a "medical number" as he claims, because not being a Filipino, he
could not be admitted to take the Medical Board Examinations. Moreover, petitioner-appellee
has continuously been violating the Anti-Alias Law (Comm. Act No. 142), for having been using
the name Jayme S. Tan, for various purposes. The granting of the instant petition would in effect
sanctioning an illegal act, which we cannot do.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the petition of Go
Chang to change his name to Jayme S. Tan denied. Costs taxed against the petitioner-appellee.

CASE #3

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGE OF NAME OF ANTONINA B. OSHITA.

ANTONINA B. OSHITA, petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
oppositor-appellant.

G.R. No. L-21180 March 31, 1967

FACTS:

Antonina B. Oshita filed a petition to have her name changed from "Antonina B. Oshita"
to "Antonina Bartolome" with the Court of First (CFI). The requirements for the publication of
the hearing of the petition were duly complied with. However, the Solicitor General filed a
motion to dismiss the petition. CFI denied the motion to dismiss and set the case for hearing.

Antonina B. Oshita is the legitimate daughter of Kishimatsu Oshita, a Japanese citizen,

now deceased, and Buena Bartolome, a Filipina; that she was born in the City of Davao on May
9, 1940, and has since then, up to the time of the hearing, resided in said city; that upon reaching
the age of majority, appellee elected Philippine citizenship and took her oath of allegiance; that
being already a Filipino citizen she desired to have her family name changed from "Oshita" to
"Bartolome", the latter being the family name of her mother, and because she felt embarrassed
when introduced as one bearing a Japanese surname; that her older brother and sister, who had
earlier elected Philippine citizenship, have been using the surname "Bartolome" ; and that she
has no criminal record nor a pending tax liability.

CFI granted Oshita’s petition. The OSG now appeals the decision of the CFI to SC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Oshita can use the surname of her mother.

Whether or not the lack of verification is a ground for dismissal.

RULING:

FIRST ISSUE: YES.

It is true that Article 364 of the Civil Code provides that legitimate children shall
principally use the surname of the father. But this rule is not absolute. Article 264 of the Civil
Code provides that legitimate children have the right to bear the surname of the father and of the
mother. Hence, if there is sufficient reason, the change of a child's surname from that of the
father, to that of the mother, may be authorized by the court.

In the instant case, it has been shown that Oshita is the legitimate daughter of Buena
Bartolome and Hishimatsu Oshita; that upon reaching the age of majority she elected Philippine
citizenship and took her oath of allegiance; that being already a Filipino citizen she desires to
adopt a Filipino surname; that her older brother and sister who had also elected Philippine
citizenship have been using the surname "Bartolome"; and that she desires to have the surname
"Bartolome" instead of "Oshita", because she felt embarrassed when introduced as one bearing
Japanese surname.

SECOND ISSUE: NO.

While it is true that under Section 2, Rule 103, it is required that the petition for change of
name be verified, nevertheless, there is no provision that exists in the rules which declares that
such a requirement regarding verification is jurisdictional. Absence of verification a mere formal,
not jurisdictional, defect. The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is simply intended
to secure an assurance that what are alleged in the pleading are true and correct and not the
product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.
The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is simply a condition affecting the form of
pleading. The non-compliance of the verification requirement does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. Hence, the court may order the correction of the pleading if the
verification is lacking, or act on the pleading although it is not verified if the attending
circumstances are such that the strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order
that the ends of justice or the law may thereby be served. This view finds support in the ruling
laid down by this Court in several decisions.

In relation to the present case, while the petition was not verified, it was, however,
subscribed and sworn to by the petitioner, and the Supreme Court believes that the lower court
did not commit a reversible error when it denied the motion to dismiss the petition upon the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the court was not affected by the absence of the
proper verification of the petition.

CASE #4

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR

CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN
CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected as
JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA
WANG, Petitioners, vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the
Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005

FACTS:

Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-
Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got
married on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the
child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study together with a
sister who was born in Singapore, Anna Lisa decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court
seeking to drop his middle name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed
from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of name
sought in the petition is that Julian may be discriminated against when he studies in Singapore
because of his middle name since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the
mother is not carried in a person's name.

After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the
grounds recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of a
person it cannot just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said
that legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and
there is no reason why this right should be taken from Julian considering that he was still a
minor. When he reaches the majority age he could then decide whether to change his name by
dropping his middle name, added the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC was correct in denying the petition

RULING: YES.

Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. When
an illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by
the father in a public instrument or private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his
mother's surname as his middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his
status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a
legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given name, a middle
name and a surname.
 The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right so that before a person can
be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he
must show proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason which may justify such change.
Otherwise, the request should be denied.

To justify a request for change of name, the petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. Among the grounds for the change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for
a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by the petitioner for dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such a change of name would make his integration into
Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of
his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable
cause to drop it from his registered complete name.

In addition, the petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his
petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his
judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not
yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at
this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
 CASE #5

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts
petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on
January 8, 2006.

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to
love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig
City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns
marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the NSO
informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law;
to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court.

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file
any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court.
She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she
be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.

The RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper
party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief,
similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as
well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the
doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an
interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right
to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

Whether or not Gerbert has legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree.

RULING:

FIRST ISSUE: NO.

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance
to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph
in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien
spouse. Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a
similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose
status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.

SECOND ISSUE: YES.

The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens
does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity
with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. The starting point in any recognition
of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice
of foreign judgments and laws. As a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country. This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with
the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in
another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.

In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody
of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a
copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed
to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point,
simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more
appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent
with the Canadian divorce law. We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action,
given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife (Daisylyns) obvious
conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to
oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by
proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before
a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and
the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration.
The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial
order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign
decree presented by Gerbert. Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, and
Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 both of which required a final order from
a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered
in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary
to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is
patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.

The recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by
itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a
foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in
a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court
supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule
108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must
be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be
filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;
and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.
As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot
consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

However, this should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the
registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign
decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of
the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

CASE #6

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON

COSETENG-MAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM
COSETENG), Respondent.

G.R. No. 189476 February 2, 2011

FACTS:

Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and
Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows,
contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.

Respondent claims that his parents were never legally married and filed a petition to
change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng before the RTC of Quezon
City. He attached the certification from the NSO stating that his parents’ marriage wasn’t found
in the National Indices of Marriage, his academic records from elementary to college that he did
carry the surname Magpayo and that when he ran and elected as Councilor in the 3rd district of
Quezon City, he used Julian M.L Coseteng.

Having no opposition, RTC granted the petition and ordered the City Registrar of Makati
to:

Delete the entry March 26, 1972 in Item 24 for DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE
OF PARTIES [in herein respondents Certificate of live Birth];

Correct the entry MAGPAYO in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent] to
COSETENG;

Delete the entry COSETENG in the space for Middle Name of the [respondent]; and
 Delete the entry Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr. in the space for FATHER of the
[respondent] (emphasis and underscoring supplied; capitalization in the original)

The Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG lodged a petition for review in light of the
denied motion for reconsideration on the ground that deletion of the entry on the date and place
of marriage of respondents parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil
status from legitimate to illegitimate wherein any change in civil status of a person must be
effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding. Hence, the RTC exceeded in its
jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the petition

HELD: YES.

Rule 103, Change of Name provides that a person can effect a change of name under
valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence
such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously
used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage;
(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is
no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest.

In this case, it is evident that respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be
considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds. The change being sought in
respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to
change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Such change as ruled in Labayo-Rowe vs Republic
are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate
adversary proceedings.

In this vein, it is Rule 108 and not Rule 103 which should govern the proceeding to effect
the change of status from legitimate to illegitimate. Under said rule, a petition which concerns
ones civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled
or corrected that of Makati in the present case, and all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby should be made parties to the proceeding.

However, in this case, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth
certificate was registered but in Quezon City neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father
and mother were made parties thereto. As ruled by the court in Republic vs Belmonte:

“The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108
concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and
distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of expediency.
To hold otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing
the change of ones name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only upon
meritorious grounds. . . .”

Hence, assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two
statutory remedies, respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied with Rule 108. For,
as reflected above, aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati
and all affected parties as respondents in the case.

Therefore, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.

CASE #7

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. NISAIDA SUMERA NISHINA,

represented by ZENAIDA SUMERA WATANABE, Respondent.

G.R. No. 186053 November 15, 2010

FACTS:
 Nisaida Sumera Nishina (respondent), represented by her mother Zenaida Sumera
Watanabe, filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a verified petition for cancellation of birth
record and change of surname. In her petition, respondent alleged the following: She was born
on October 31, 1987 in Malolos, Bulacan to her Filipino mother Zenaida and Japanese father
Koichi Nishina who were married. Her father later died. Her mother married another Japanese,
Kenichi Hakamada. As they could not find any record of her birth at the Malolos civil registry,
respondents mother caused the late registration of her birth under the surname of her mothers
second husband, Hakamada. Her mother and Hakamada eventually divorced. Her mother
married another Japanese, Takayuki Watanabe, who later adopted her by a decree issued by the
Tokyo Family Court.

It was filed and recorded in the civil registry of Manila. It surfaced that her birth was in
fact originally registered at the Malolos Civil Registry under the name Nisaida Sumera
Nishina,hence, her filing before the RTC of her petition praying that her second birth certificate
bearing the surname Hakamada, issued through late registration be cancelled; and that in light of
the decree of adoption, her surname Nishina in the original birth certificate be changed to
Watanabe. After hearing the petition, RTC, granted respondents petition and directed the Local
Civil Registry of Malolos to cancel the second birth record of Nisaida Sumera Hakamada and to
change it from NISAIDA SUMERA NISHINA to NISAIDA SUMERA WATANABE. Before
the Court of Appeals, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that petitioner
adopted a wrong mode of appeal since it did not file a record on appeal as required under
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41 (appeal from the RTCs) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellate court dismissed petitioners appeal, holding that since respondents petition
before the RTC is classified as a special proceeding, petitioner should have filed both notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within 30 days from receipt of the October 8, 2007 Order granting
respondents petition, and by not filing a record on appeal, petitioner never perfected its appeal

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal.

RULING:
 SECTION 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the orders or
judgments in special proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal, viz: SECTION 1.
Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. An interested person may appeal in
special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment: (a) Allows or disallows a
will; (b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of
the estate to which such person is entitled; (c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim
against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to
a claim against it; (d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian; (e)
Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the
administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of
the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator; and (f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the
substantial rights of the person appealing unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a
new trial or for reconsideration. The above-quoted rule contemplates multiple appeals during the
pendency of special proceedings.

A record on appeal in addition to the notice of appeal is thus required to be filed as the
original records of the case should remain with the trial court to enable the rest of the case to
proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by said court and held to be
final. In the present case, the filing of a record on appeal was not necessary since no other matter
remained to be heard and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order granting
respondents petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
 CASE #8

MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T.
BRAZA, Petitioners, vs. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY,
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA, represented by
LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE C. TITULAR, Respondents.

G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also
known as Pablito Sicad Braza, were married on January 4, 1978. Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in
a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.

During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, Private
respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille) began introducing minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza
(Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course of which
she obtained Patrick's birth certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental with the following entries:

Name of Child: PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL TITULAR

Date of Birth: 01 January 1996

Mother: Lucille Celestial Titular

Father: Pablito S. Braza

Date Received at the

Local Civil Registrar: January 13, 1997

Annotation: "Late Registration"

Annotation/Remarks: "Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza on January 13,

1997"
 Remarks: Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April 22, 1998 at
Manila. Henceforth, the child shall be known as Patrick Alvin Titular Braza

Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and
Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners to file in 2005 before
the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition to correct the entries
in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register.

Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage
between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting
marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo. Petitioners prayed for, among others, the declaration
of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the
declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.

On Patrick’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by Order of
September 6, 2007, dismissed the petition without prejudice, it holding that in a special
proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under the
Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo,
impugn the legitimacy of Patrick.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the Trial Court may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on
legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar under Rule 108.

RULING: NO.

The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction
to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the
procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding
contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and
other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or
writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a
misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be
allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due
process is properly observed.

The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners
seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and
impugn Patricks filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be
subjected to a DNA test.

It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and

filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not
through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.

CASE #9

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014

FACTS:

Merlinda requested from the NSO a CENOMAR as one of the requirements for her
marriage. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son
Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did
not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the
signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion
thereof. Merlinda impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged
husband, as parties to the case. During trial, Merlinda presented as witness a certain Eufrocina
Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune
was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was
definitely not Merlinda.

Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of
Merlinda, the court found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to straighten her record and rectify
the terrible mistake.

Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the
grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the
marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2)
granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is,
in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.

ISSUE/S:

Whether Rule 108 is applicable for the cancellation of entries in the Marriage Contract on the
basis that the same was forged?

RULING: YES.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the
correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the
civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary. As long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the
appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the
civil register.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage
by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
 In this case, aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show
the existence of marriage. Rather, Merlinda showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage
was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and
documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the
marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to
determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where
all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of Merlinda; the
procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and
examined. Merlinda indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to
speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the
evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by
cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void
as there was no marriage to speak of.

II. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Silverio and Cagandahan Cases)

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name
and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is,
"anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified
himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors
in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, and breast
augmentation. He underwent the sex reassignment surgery.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then
sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and
his sex from "male" to "female."
 On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No
opposition to the petition was made. Trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner.
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or
for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with
his present sex.

Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the
CA. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason
of sex alteration.

CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision
lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of
birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the CA granted the Republic’s
petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/s:

Whether or not the change of the petitioner’s name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed?

RULING: NO.

FIRST. A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular,
Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
 SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First
Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to
entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first
name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and
effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change
of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In
sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change
of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

 Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.
RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather
than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only
create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable
cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege,
any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s
first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed
with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper
remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It
was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his
true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

SECOND. No Law Allows the Change of Entry in The Birth Certificate As To Sex On
the Ground of Sex Reassignment

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and
the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in
so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such
matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a
 judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of

clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like,
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed
only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction
must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include
even those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can
justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to
change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something
that serves as a substitute." The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries
therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction
is necessary.

Sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it
recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly. A person’s sex is an essential
factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In
this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.
This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts
as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done
by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.

THIRD. Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate as to First Name or Sex Be Changed on
the Ground of Equity

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first
step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred
social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of
its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who
has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These
laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna
a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan
to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is
suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted
persons possess both male and female characteristics.

Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her

petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering
from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in
addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male
hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and
female.” The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed
before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE/s:

Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate may be changed.

RULING: YES.
 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the
case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme
Court made use of the available evidence presented in court including the fact that private
respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that
Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being male.”

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2)
how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult
for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that will
follow.

In the Silverio case, the topic was the change of sex on the ground of sex reassignment
surgery wherein the petition was denied. On the other hand, the Cagandahan case tackled the
issue of change of sex by reason of congenital adrenal hyperplasia wherein the petition was
granted.

In Silverio, the petitioner, with the name registered as Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio and
sex registered as male in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate), filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate by reason of sex alteration through a sex
reassignment surgery. The court denied his petition as there is no law allowing the change of
either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery.
On the other hand, in Cagandahan petitioner filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate to change her name Jennifer Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and gender from female
to male. She alleged that she was born and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live
Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to
have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted
possess both male and female characteristics. This condition causes the early or inappropriate
appearance of male characteristics.
 In the first case, it was emphasized that the change of name is a privilege, not a right.
Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. RA 9048 which governs the change of
the first name does not sanction a change on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than
avoiding confusion, changing the petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create
grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. As to the change of sex, it was
ruled that the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law
legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his
or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. In the second case, the court ruled that where
the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his
body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support
for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the
gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.

The Silverio case notes that when words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their
common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words sex,
male and female as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and
even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there
being no legislative intent to the contrary. The words male and female in everyday understanding
do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, words that are
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been
used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary. In contrast, the Cagandahan case
highlights that the respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him
belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the
primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and
maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent and in the absence of
evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who
are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the
respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.

III. SALIENT FEATURES OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9048

AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE

CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN
ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER
WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES
376 AND 412 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname
(SEC. 1)

General Rule: No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order

Exception: Clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulation.

Clerical or typographical error, defined (Sec. 2)

A mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying,

transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as
misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious
to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record
or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age,
status or sex of the petitioner.

Who may file the petition? (Sec. 3)

Any person having direct and personal interest in the correction of a clerical or
typographical error in an entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the civil register.
Where to file? (Sec. 3)

The verified petition should be filed with the local civil registry office of the city or
municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept.

In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the country:

The petition may be filed, in person, with the local civil registrar of the
place where the interested party is presently residing or domiciled. The two local
civil registrars concerned will then communicate to facilitate the processing of the
petition.

Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled in foreign countries:

Filed with the nearest Philippine Consulates.

Note: All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change of first names or
nicknames may be availed of only once.

Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname (Sec. 4)

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Form of the Petition (Sec. 5)

The petition shall be:

a. in the form of affidavit; and

b. subscribed and sworn to before any person authorized by the law to administer oath.
Contents of the Petition (Sec. 5)

The affidavit shall:

a. set forth facts necessary to establish the merits of the petition;

b. show affirmatively that the petitioner is competent to testify on the matters stated;
c. be supported with the following documents:
(1) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the registry book
containing the entry or entries sought to be corrected or changed.
(2) At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct entry or entries
upon which the correction or change shall be based; and
(3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal civil registrar or the
consul general may consider relevant and necessary for the approval of the petition.

Duties of the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General. (Sec. 6)

The city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general to whom the petition is presented
shall

1.) Examine the petition and its supporting documents;

2.) Post the petition in a conspicuous place provided for that purpose for ten (10) consecutive
days after he finds the petition and its supporting documents sufficient in form and
substance;
3.) Act on the petition and shall render a decision not later than five working days after the
completion of the posting and/or publication requirement;
4.) Transmit a copy of his decision together with the records of the proceedings to the Office
of the Civil Registrar General within five working days from the date of the decision.

Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General (Sec. 7)

The civil registrar general shall:

1.) Within ten (10) working days from receipt of the decision granting a petition, exercise the
power to impugn such decision by way of an objection based on the following grounds:
 (1) The error is not clerical or typographical;
(2) The correction of an entry or entries in the civil register is substantial or controversial as
it affects the civil status of a person; or
(3) The basis used in changing the first name or nickname of a person does not fall under
Section 4.

2.) Immediately notify the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general of the action
taken on the decision. Upon receipt of the notice thereof, the city or municipal civil registrar or
the consul general shall notify the petitioner of such action.

Remedies (Sec. 7)

The petitioner may seek reconsideration with the civil registrar general or file the
appropriate petition with the proper court.

Failure of the Civil Registrar General to exercise his power to impugn the decision of the
city or municipal civil registrar or consul general within the period prescribed by law: decision
shall become final and executory.

Petition is denied by the city or municipal registrar or consul general: Appeal to the Civil
Registrar General or an appropriate action in the proper court.

Penalty (Sec. 9)

A person who violates any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be
penalized by imprisonment of not less than six (6) years but not more than twelve (12) years, or a
fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more than One Hundred Thousand
pesos (P100,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court.

In addition, if the offender is a government official or employee he shall suffer the

penalties provided under civil service laws, rules and regulations.