World Development, Vol. 21, No. 8, pp. 1355-1369,1993. 0305-750X/93 $6.00 + 0.

00
Printed in Great Britain. 0 1993 Pergamon Press Ltd

On the State, Democratization and Some

Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View
with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries

GUILLERMO O’DONNELL*
University of Notre Dame, Indiana

Summary. - The article argues that for proper understanding of many processes of
democratization, current conceptions of the state must be revised, especially with reference to its
legal dimension. On this basis several contrasts are drawn between representative, consolidated
democracies and the democratic (i.e., polyarchical) forms that are emerging in most newly
democratized countries, East and South. From this perspective, various phemonena not
presently theorized (except as deviations from a presumed modal pattern of democratization) are
discussed. Concepts such as delegative democracy, low-intensity citizenship and a state which
combines strong democratic and authoritarian features are introduced for the purpose of that
discussion. -

1. INTRODUCTION They differ, as Lijphart (1968 and 1984) first

showed, even in such important dimensions as
I must warn the reader at the outset. This whether they are based on majoritarian or on
paper contains ideas which are summarily de- more consensual rules for the access to, and for
veloped. I am in the process of writing a book in the exercise of public authority. But they share
which these and other ideas, and their empirical
referents, are treated much more properly. I *The ideas presented here owe much to the meetings
decided to publish the paper after the gentle and various intellectual exchanges of the project “East-
South System Transformation,” supported by the
insistence of various colleagues - including,
MacArthur Foundation. I am particularly grateful to
indeed, the editor of this issue - persuaded me
the director and intellectual leader of this project,
that it would make sense to offer for discussion, Adam Przeworski, for his many extremely helpful
even in their present form, my views about criticisms and suggestions. Some of the ideas of this
themes and problems which I believe have been paper have been inserted and polished by Przeworski in
neglected at rather serious cost in the current a volume (Slcstuinable Democracy, forthcoming) of
studies on democratization. Given the character which he is the principal author. I presented a previous
of this text I have limited citations to the barest version of this paper at the meeting on “Democracy,
minimum; the arguments I present here draw on Markets and Structural Reforms in Latin America,”
various streams of literature and many valuable sponsored by the North-South Center and CEDES,
held in Buenos Aires, March 1992, and at the meeting
contributions to which I will do proper justice in
on “Economic Liberalization and Democratic Consoli-
my book. dation,” sponsored by the Social Science Research
Council, for the project “Democratization and Econo-
mic Reform,” held at Bologna-Foil& April 1992. I am
2. THE STATE AND NEW DEMOCRACIES grateful for many useful comments received during
those meetings, including those of Eduardo Gamarra,
In the last two decades, the breakdown of Carlos Acutia and William Smith, codirectors of the
various kinds of authoritarian systems has led to first mentioned project. I owe very special thanks to
the emergence of a number of democracies. Laurence Whitehead, director of the SSRC project, not
only for his helpful criticisms and suggestions but also
These are democracies: they are political demo-
for his generous efforts to make the present text a
cracies or, more precisely, following the classic reasonably readable one - that he did not entirely
formulation of Robert Dahl (see Dahl, 1971), succeed is certainly not his fault. I also thank my
they are polyarchies. Several contributions have colleagues at CEBRAP and at the Kellogg Institute for
shown that there are various types of polyarchies. several enlightening discussions.

1355
1356 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

one crucial characteristic: they are all repre- but the practicability of such prescriptions is
sentative, institutionalized democracies. In con- contingent on the contextual situation in which
trast, most of the newly democratized countries those leaders find themselves.
are not moving toward a representative, institu- Although for “normal” liberal democracies, or
tionalized democratic regime nor seem likely to polyarchies, the conceptual baggage of political
do so in the foreseeable future. They are science may be satisfactory, to analyze the
polyarchies, but of a type not yet theorized. The present situation and prospects of most new
present text is a preliminary attempt to contri- democracies in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and
bute to that theorizing.’ This exercise may be Eastern/Central Europe, we must go back and do
warranted for two reasons. First, a sufficient some basic work in political and legal sociology.
theory of polyarchy should encompass all existing The discussion in this text will have as its main
(political) democracies, not only the representa- referents Argentina, Brazil, and Peru, but many
tive, institutionalized ones. Second, since many of the points have wider applicability.
of the new democracies have a peculiar political The analysis that follows is premised on one
dynamic, one should not assume that their point: states are interwoven in complex and
societal impacts will be similar to those of present different ways with their respective societies.
and past representative, institutionalized This embeddedness means that the characteris-
polyarchies.2 tics of each state and of each society heavily
On the other hand, recent typologies of the influence the characteristics of what democracy
new democracies based on characteristics of the will be likely (if at all) to consolidate-or merely
preceding authoritarian regime and/or on the endure or eventually break down. These state-
modalities of the first transition have little predic- ments are rather obvious, but we have not
tive power concerning what happens after the pursued sufficiently their implications in terms of
first democratically elected government has been the problbzatique of democratization. Part of the
installed. In regard to the countries of central reason is that we handle concepts (especially that
concern here - Argentina, Brazil, and Peru - of the state) which, as they are formulated by
the first was an instance of transition by collapse most of the contemporary literature, are not very
while the second was the most protracted and helpful for our theme.
probably the most negotiated (although not It is a mistake to conflate the state with the
formally pacted) transition we know of; on the state apparatus, the public sector, or the aggrega-
other hand, Argentina and Brazil were exclusion- tation of public bureaucracies. These, unques-
ary bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, while tionably, are part of the state, but are not all of it.
Peru was a case of incorporating military- The state is also, and no less primarily, a set of
authoritarian populism. In spite of these and social relations that establishes a certain order,
other differences, today it seems clear that in the and ultimately backs it with a centralized coer-
period after a democratic installation, these cive guarantee, over a given territory. Many of
countries (as well as Ecuador, Bolivia, the those relations are formalized in a legal system
Dominican Republic and the Philippines, all the issued and backed by the state. The legal system
democratizing or liberalizing East Asian and is a constitutive dimension of the state and of the
African countries, and most postcommunist order that it establishes and guarantees over a
ones) share important characteristics, all of them given territory. That order is not an equal,
pointing toward their “noninstitutionalized” socially impartial order; both under capitalism
situation.3 and bureaucratic socialism it backs, and helps to
In relation to those countries, the existing reproduce, systematically asymmetric power re-
literature has not gone much beyond indicating lationships. It is, however, an order, in the sense
what attributes (representativeness, institution- that manifold social relationships are engaged on
alization, and the like) they do not have, along the basis of stable (if not necessarily approved)
with a descriptive narration of their various norms and expectations. In one of those mo-
political and economic misadventures. These ments when ordinary language expresses the
contributions are valuable, but they are not power relationships in which itself is embedded,
deemed to yield the theoretical clues we need. when decisions are made at the political center
Furthermore, the characterization of these cases (the “orders given”) those decisions usually “give
by the absence of certain attributes may imply a order,” in the sense that those commands are
teleology which would hinder adequate concep- regularly obeyed. This acquiescence affirms and
tualization of the varied types of democracies reproduces the existing social order. Social rela-
that have been emerging. Other more policy and tions, including those of daily, preconscious
“elite’‘-oriented streams of the literature offer acquiescence to political authority, can be based,
useful advice for democratizing political leaders, as Weber argued, on tradition, fear of punish-
 THE STATE AND DEMOCRATIZATION 1357

ment, pragmatic calculation, habituation, legiti- ational rights that underlie this order. We saw
macy, and/or the effectiveness of the law. The that in all societies order is unequal, even if from
effectiveness of the law over a given territory the apex of the state it is claimed that such order
consists of innumerable habituated behaviors is an equal one for everyone qua member of the
that (consciously or not) are usually consistent nation. But this concealment (which is supported
with the prescriptions of the law.4 That effective- by the law, which structures the inequalities
ness is based on the widely held expectation, entailed by that order) does not preclude the
borne out by exemplary evidence, that the law reality of two fundamental aspects. First, as
will be, if necessary, enforced by a central already noted, this order is actually the supreme
authority endowed with the pertinent powers. collective good: it furnishes generalized social
This is the supporting texture of the order predictability backed by eventually decisive ac-
established and guaranteed by the contemporary tions of pertinent public bureaucracies. Second,
nation-state. We see that the law (including the even though it does not extend to other social
habituation patterns that the expectation of its relations, the equality guaranteed to all members
regular enforcement leads to) is a constitutive of the nation in terms of citizenship is crucial for
element of the state: it is the “part” of the state the exercise of the political rights entailed by the
which provides the regular, underlying texturing workings of democracy and, also, for the effec-
of the social order existing over a given territory. tiveness of the individual guarantees consecrated
In both the continental and the Anglo-Saxon in the liberal tradition.
traditions the law is, ultimately, a codified From the perspective I am proposing, citizen-
dimension, subject to the interpretations of ship does not stay within the (narrowly defined,
professionalized knowledge. The law has its own as most of the contemporary literature does)
organizational expressions, highly ritualized and confines of the political. For example, citizenship
institutionalized in contemporary democracies. is at stake when, after entering a contractual
Congress is supposed to be the place of debate relationship, a party which feels it has a legiti-
and enactment of the main laws of the land, and mate grievance may call upon a legally compe-
the judiciary is the place where conflicts of tent public agency, from which it can expect fair
interest and, ultimately, disputes about the very treatment, to intervene and adjudicate the issue.
meaning of the political community, are argued Even in the apparently more private realms of
and decided. As also occurs with other aspects of the private (or common) law, the legal system
the state, congress and the judiciary are the imposes the public dimension entailed by the
perceivable organizational embodiments of the virtual remission of that relationship for legal
broader phenomenon consisting of the social adjudication by a properly authorized agency of
effectiveness of the law. the state. This inherently public dimension of
The recognition of the law as a constitutive private relationships (or, equivalently, this tex-
dimension of the state has been hindered by the turing by the state-as-law of those relationships)
various approaches that have dominated Anglo- is violated when, for example, a peasant is de
Saxon political science since the “behavioral facto denied access to the judiciary against the
revolution.” On the other hand, in spite of the landowner. This “private” right must be seen as
contributions by authors such as Max Weber and no less constitutive of citizenship than the “pub-
Herman Heller, the approaches that prevailed in lic” right of voting without coercion.
continental Europe were narrowly legalistic; they Argentina, Brazil, and Peru (as well as other
were based on a formalistic analysis of the countries in Latin America and other regions)
written law, with scant attention to its sociologi- are not only going through a most serious social
cal and political aspects. One way or the other, and economic crisis. Although with different
these two great traditions have been color-blind timing and intensity, these countries are also
to the state as the complex reality entailed by its suffering a profound crisis of their states. This
organizational/bureaucratic and legal dimen- crisis exists in the three dimensions just discus-
sions. sed: of the state as a set bureaucracies capable of
There is still another dimension of the state, discharging their duties with reasonable efficacy;
ideological, that must be considered. The state of the effectiveness of its law; and of the
(more precisely, the state apparatus), claims to plausibility of the claim that the state agencies
be and is normally believed to be a state-for-the- normally orient their decisions in terms of some
nation. The state claims, from explicit discourses conception of the public good.5 These countries
up to the recurrent invocation of the symbols of are living the protracted crisis of a state-centered
nationhood, that it is the creator of the order and inward-oriented pattern of capital accumula-
discussed above as well as - in contemporary tion, and of the position of the state in such a
democracies - of the individual and associ- pattern. By contrast, some countries - Spain,
13.58 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

Portugal, South Korea, Taiwan, and Chile, to the lower limit among contemporary institu-
among the recently democratized or liberalizing tionalized democracies.
ones - under circumstances that do not concern In Latin America the countries of relatively
us here, were able to evade that generalized high homogeneity (especially territorial) are the
crisis. They emerged as export-oriented econo- ones which have an older and more solid
mies actively integrated into the world economy. democratic tradition - Costa Rica, Chile, and
For this task they counted (with variations I Uruguay. Peru is the polar opposite, recently
cannot discuss here) with a lean but powerful and further accentuated by Sender Luminoso and its
activist state apparatus. sequels. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia are
Too often contemporary discussions confound close to the pole of extreme heterogeneity. Brazil
two different dimensions. One pertains to the and Mexico, in spite of decades of centralizing
size and relative weight of the state apparatus. authoritarian rule, are also cases of high terri-
There is no question that in most newly democra- torial and functional heterogeneity. Argentina,
tized countries the state is too big, and that this together with Venezuela and Colombia - two
leads to numerous negative consequences. But, rather old but presently troubled democracies -
in this context, the antonym of big is not small lie somewhere along the middle of this con-
but lean; i.e., an effective and less weighty set of tinuum.
public organizations that is capable of creating What happens when the effectiveness of the
solid roots for democracy, for progressively law extends very irregularly (it does not alto-
solving the main issues of social equity, and for gether disappear) across the territory and the
generating conditions for rates of economic functional relations (including class, ethnic and
growth suitable for sustaining the advances in the gender relations) it supposedly regulates? What
areas of both democracy and social equity. The kind of state (and society) is this? What influ-
second dimension refers to the strength or ences this may have on what kind of democracy
weakness of the state as a whole; i.e., not only may emerge?
but including the state apparatus. A “big” or Here I will limit myself to discussing some
“small” state apparatus may or may not effective- themes that relate to the crisis of the state in the
ly establish its legality over its territory; accord- three dimensions I identified. In these situations,
ing to the view I am proposing, a strong state, ineffective states coexist with autonomous, also
irrespective of the size of its bureaucracies, is one territorially based, spheres of power. States
that effectively establishes that legality and that is become ostensibly unable to enact effective
not perceived by most of the population as just regulations of social life across their territories
an arena for the pursuit of particularistic in- and their stratification systems. Provinces or
terests. I argue below that current attempts at districts peripheral to the national center (which
reducing the size and deficits of the state-as- are usually hardest hit by economic crises and are
bureaucracy, mostly unknowingly but with nef- already endowed with weaker bureaucracies than
arious consequences of all sorts (including for the the center) create (or reinforce) systems of local
long-run success of the economic policies that power which tend to reach extremes of violent,
inspire those attempts, to say nothing of the personalistic rule - patrimonial, even sultanistic
achievement of institutionalized democracy), are - open to all sorts of violent and arbitrary
also destroying the state-as-law and the ideologi- practices. In many emerging democracies, the
cal legitimation of the state. effectiveness of a national order embodied in the
Current theories of the state often make an law and the authority of the state fades off as
assumption which recurs in current theories of soon as we leave the national urban centers. But
democracy: that of a high degree of homogeneity even there the functional and territorial evapora-
in the scope, both territorial and functional, of tion of the public dimension of the state shows
the state and of the social order it supports. It is up. The increase in crime, the unlawful interven-
not asked (and, if it is, seldom is problematized) tions of the police in poor neighborhoods, the
if such order, and the orders issued by the state widespread practice of torture and even summary
organizations, have similar effectiveness execution of crime suspects from poor or other-
throughout the national territory and across the wise stigmatized sectors, the actual denial of
existing social stratification.‘The ideal of “equal- rights to women and various minorities, the
ity before the law” has not fully been achieved in impunity of the drug trade, and the great
any country; see, for example, the universal numbers of abandoned children in the streets (all
finding of class biases in the administration of of which mark scant progress in relation to the
justice. But the Scandinavian countries come preceding authoritarian period) reflect not only a
quite close to full homogeneity, while the United severe process of urban decay. They also express
States, both territorially and functionally, is close the increasing inability of the state to implement
 THE STATE AND DEMOCRATIZATION 1359

its own regulations.’ Many public spaces dis- effectiveness of properly sanctioned legality),
appear, both because of its invasion by the both functionally and territorially; the green
desperate misery of many and because of the color indicates a high degree of territorial pene-
dangers entailed in using them. Fear, insecurity, tration and a significantly lower presence in
the seclusion of rich neighborhoods, and the functional/class terms; and the brown color a
ordeals of public transportation shrink the public very low or nil level in both dimensions. In this
spaces and lead to a perverse kind of privatiza- sense, say, the map of Norway would be domin-
tion that, as we shall see, has close correlates in ated by blue; the United States would show a
other spheres. To be sure, these and other ills are combination of blue and green, with important
not new, and some of them are more acute in a brown spots in the South and in its big cities;
given country than another. But, not only in Brazil and Peru would be dominated by brown,
Latin America, they have become worse with and in Argentina the extensiveness of brown
the superimposition of a huge crisis upon a would be smaller - but, if we had a temporal
feeble process of democratization. series of maps, we could see that those brown
Consider those regions where the local powers sections have grown lately.”
(both those formally public as well as de facto) In these areas there are elections, governors,
establish power circuits that operate according to and national and state legislators (in addition, in
rules which are inconsistent, if not antagonistic, many cases those regions are heavily overrepre-
with the law that supposedly regulates the sented in the national legislatures). The parties
national territory. These are systems of private operating there, even if they are nominally
power (or, better, of privatized power, since members of national parties, are no more than
some of the main actors hold state positions), personalistic machines anxiously dependent on
where some rights and guarantees of democratic the prebends they can extract from the national
legality have close to nil effectiveness. This and the local state agencies. Those parties and
extends to numerous private relationships which the local governments function on the basis of
are usually decided, even by the judiciary of phenomena such as personalism, familism, pre-
those regions, on the basis of the naked power bendalism, clientelism, and the like. As anthro-
asymmetries that exist among the parties. These pologists know, this is a world that functions
neofeudalized regions contain state organiza- according to an elaborate, if unwritten, set of
tions, national, provincial, and municipal. But rules, where - in contrast to “traditional”
the obliteration of legality deprives the regional societies - there exist state bureaucracies, some
power circuits, including those state agencies, of of them big and complex, and where under
the public, lawful dimension without which the extremely politicized and poorly paid bureaucra-
national state and the order it supports vanish. cies the very meaning of the term “corruption”
The mistake of reifying the state may not be becomes fuzzy.
evident when theorizing about homogeneous These circuits of power are re-presented at the
countries; but it becomes apparent when the center of national politics, beginning with the
obliteration of their public dimension makes of congress, the institution that is supposedly the
some state organizations part of circuits of power source of the existing, nationally encompassing
which are perversely privatized.’ Parts of the legality. In general, the interests of the “brown”
northeast and the whole Amazonia in Brazil, the legislators are quite limited: to sustain the system
highlands in Peru and various provinces in the of privatized domination that has elected them,
center and northwest of Argentina, are examples and to channel toward that system as many state
of the evaporation of the public dimension of the resources as possible. The tendency of their vote
state and, consequently, of the odd “reification” is, thus, conservative and opportunistic. For their
of the state as exclusively consisting of organiza- success they depend on the exchange of “favors”
tions that, in those regions, are part of privatized, with the executive and various state bureau-
often sultanistic, circuits of power. cracies and, under weakened executives that
Although these characteristics of Latin Amer- need some kind of congressional support, they
ica are well known, to my knowledge no attempt often obtain the control of the state agencies that
has been made to link them with the kinds of furnish those resources. This increases the frag-
democracy that have emerged in Argentina, mentation (and the deficits) of the state - the
Brazil, Peru, and similar countries in Latin brown spots invade even the bureaucratic apex of
America and elsewhere. Let us imagine a map of the state. Furthermore, the game that these
each country in which the areas covered by blue individuals play (both in and out of congress)
would designate those where there is a high benefits from the existence of parties which are
degree of state presence (in terms of a set of not only of very low ideological content (which
reasonably effective bureaucracies and of the per se is not necessarily bad), but are also totally
1360 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

opportunistic in their positions, have no disci- course, depends on how we define state and
pline, and where changing parties or creating regime. In respect to the latter, I will repeat my
new ones can be done at virtually no cost - proposed definition
extreme trunsformismo is the rule. Some recent the ensemble of patterns, explicit or not, that
studies have pointed out the deleterious conse- determines the forms and channels of access to
quences that this has, among other areas, on the principal governmental positions, the characteristics
functioning of congress and on the emergence of of the actors who are admitted and excluded from
a reasonably stable party system (see Mainwar- such access, and the resources [and] strategies that
ing, 1990) - hardly a good prospect for institu- they can use to gain access (O’Donnell and
tionalizing democracy. For obvious reasons these Schmitter. 1986, Vol. IV. p. 73).
politicians, too, converge with the delegative, With some variations, this kind of definition is
caesaristic orientations of the executive in their noncontroversial in the literature. Instead, as we
hostility to any form of horizontal accountability; saw, the definition of the state is problematic.
even though sometimes they have acute conflicts Against the prevailing view, what I am arguing
with the executive, they work together with the leads to the conclusion that attributes such as
latter in preventing the emergence of solid “democratic” or “authoritarian” do not only
representative institutions. correspond to the regime but also to the state.
In a sense the regime that results from this is This can be seen reasoning a contrario. An
very representative. It is consistent with the authoritarian context has a fundamental charac-
reality of countries whose patterns of political teristic: there does not exist (or, if it exists. it
representation further heterogenize them. The does not have real effectiveness, or can be
problem, of course, is that this representative- annulled ad hoc, or is subordinate to secret rules
ness entails the introjection of authoritarianism and/or to the whim of the rulers) a legal system
- understood here as the denial of the public- that guarantees the effectiveness of rights and
ness and of the effective legality of a democratic guarantees that individuals and groups can up-
state and, hence, of citizenship - at the ver hold against the rulers. the state apparatus, and
center of political power of these countries. 1X others at the top of the existing social or political
Some important issues, none of which I fully hierarchy. This is a truncated legality: even in the
address here, are raised by our mapping exercise. case of institutionalized authoritarianism, it does
What type of state are those of countries where not contain the guarantee of its own enforcement
the brown areas dominate? What kind, if any, of against the rulers and other higher powers. This
democratic regime can be established over such affects a constitutive dimension of the state: the
heterogeneity? To what extent can we extrapo- type of legality (which may entail, in extreme
late to those cases theories of the state and of cases, almost absolute arbitrariness) that textures
democracy which assume far more homogeneous the particular order that is enforced over a
countries? In their more general terms these territory. From this point of view I do not see
questions have been central to the comparative how we can evade the conclusion that the state
endeavors of the social sciences. But they have to may also be authoritarian.
be recalled and specified when the generalized The converse seems to me no less clear. As
feeling of a universal victory of capitalism, and long as a legal system includes the rights and
maybe of democracy, has led to their neglect. We guarantees of Western constitutionalism and that
may be going back to some mistakes of the 196Os, there exist public powers which are capable and
when many theories and comparisons were flat, if willing to enforce - according to properly
not ethnocentric: they consisted of the applica- established procedures - such rights and guaran-
tion of supposedly universally valid paradigms tees even against other public powers, that state
which ignored the structured variation to be and the order it helps to implant and reproduce,
found outside of the developed world. Today, are democratic. Against the truncated legality of
mainstream economics is a clear case of this the authoritarian state, that of the democratic
problem, but sociologists and political scientists state, as Kelsen argued in a somewhat different
are not exempt from it. context, is complete; it “closes” its own circuits
We should remember that in a properly by the universalistic application of its rules even
functioning democratic order, its legality is uni- against other state organizations. This is what
versalistic: it can be successfully invoked by happens in the blue areas and what does not
anyone, irrespective of his or her position in happen in the extensive (and increasing) brown
society. Coming back to a rather old discussion, areas of many new democracies.
can the attributes “democratic” and “authori- In countries with extensive “brown” areas,
tarian” be applied to the state or should they be democracies are based on a schizophrenic state:
exclusively reserved for the regime? This, of it complexly mixes, functionally and territorially,
 THE STATE AND DEMOCRATIZATION 1361

important democratic and authoritarian charac- cies, usually the specifically political conditions
teristics. It is a state in which its components of for the existence of polyarchy are met. But
democratic legality and, hence, of publicness and peasants, slum dwellers, indians, women, etc.
citizenship, fade away at the frontiers of various often are unable to receive fair treatment in the
regions and class, gender and ethnic relations. courts, or to obtain from state agencies services
As a political form effective over a given to which they are entitled, or to be safe from
territory, democracy is necessarily connected police violence, etc. These are “extrapolyarchi-
with citizenship, and the latter can only exist cal” but still politically relevant restrictions; they
within the legality of a democratic state. The entail the ineffectiveness of the state-as-law, the
complete universalization of citizenship is an abating of some rights and guarantees that, as
ideal which existing democracies approximate much as voting without coercion, are constitutive
more or less closely. But the big (and growing) of citizenship. From this results a curious disjunc-
brown areas in many new democracies should not ture: in many brown areas the democratic,
be written off as irrelevant to our theories of state participatory rights of polyarchy are respected.
and democracy. Nor should we assume that there But the liberal component of democracy is
is some inherent virtuous effect of political systematically violated. A situation in which one
democracy and/or of economic change that will can vote freely and have one’s vote counted
eliminate those areas. It is not the case, as it is in fairly, but cannot expect proper treatment from
institutionalized democracies, of some authori- the police or the courts, puts into serious ques-
tarian components in a state which can still be tion the liberal component of that democracy and
considered democratic; in the countries that severely curtails citizenship.” This disjuncture is
concern us here, the authoritarian dimension the other side of the coin of the powerful mix of
intermixes complexly and powerfully with the democratic and authoritarian components of
democratic one. This mixing demands reconcep- these states.
tualization of the very state and the peculiar The denial of liberal rights to (mostly but not
democracy (and regime) that exists there. exclusively) the poor or otherwise deprived
A state that is unable to enforce its legality sectors is analytically distinct from, and bears no
supports a democracy of low-intensity citizen- necessary relation to various degrees of social
ship. In most of the brown areas of the newly and economic democratization. But, empirically,
democratized countries, the political rights of various forms of discrimination and extensive
polyarchy are respected. Usually, individuals are poverty and their correlate, extreme disparity in
not subject to direct coercion when voting, their the distribution of (not only economic) re-
voted are counted fairly, in principle they can sources, go hand in hand with low-intensity
create almost any sort of organization, they can citizenship. i2 This is the essence of the social
express their opinions without censorship, and conditions necessary for the exercise of citizen-
they can move freely within and outside the ship; how can the weaker and the poorer, even if
national territory. These and other attributes of they remain poor, be empowered in terms
polyarchy are met in those regions. This is the consistent with democratic legality and, thus,
difference between say, Poland and Argentina on gain their full, democratic and liberal, citizen-
one side, and Romania and Guatemala on the ship? Even a political definition of democracy
other; whatever their constitutions say, the actual (such as that recommended by most contempor-
workings of political life disqualify the latter as ary authors, and to which I adhere) should not
polyarchies. But countries with extensive brown neglect posing the question of the extent to which
areas which actually meet the attributes of citizenship is really exercised in a given country.
polyarchy - arguably, the universal core of This, let me insist on a point which lends itself to
democracy - are democracies. misunderstandings, is not per se how much one
Among the countries that meet the criteria of regrets inequalities and would like to redress
polyarchy, different degrees and dimensions of them; the argument refers to the consequences of
“democraticness” can be distinguished. This re- those social conditions on the type of polyarchy
fers to issues of equity and equality in various and on the extent of citizenship with which we
societal spheres (or, equivalently, to social and are dealing in each case.
economic democratization; O’Donnell and In the following sections I discuss, in the highly
Schmitter, 1986). But the concept of low- stylized way that space permits, some themes
intensity citizenship does not refer to those - that relate, first, to the crisis of the state and,
admittedly very important - issues. It refers second, to a certain kind of economic crisis.
specifically to the political sphere, to the political These discussions will allow us to gain a more
theory of political democracy, or polyarchy. As concrete perspective on some of the issues raised
noted above, in the brown areas of new democra- in the present section.
1362 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

3. ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS OF spectacular decay of the physical plant (perhaps
THE STATE nothing is more discouraging than hammering at
a worn-out mechanical typewriter in an office the
There is abundant evidence that the extraordi- painting and furniture of which have not been
narily severe socioeconomic crisis most newly renewed for many years). This is extremely
democratized countries are suffering furthers the propitious for the existence of a poorly motivated
spread of brown regions. These impacts derive and unskilled bureaucracy. This feeds back into
not only .from various processes of social and the innumerable anecdotes that support the all-
economic disintegration; they also result from out assault on the state, and erodes the political
the profound crisis of the state, as effective support that would be necessary for effecting a
legality, as a set of bureaucracies and as a better balanced policy of the government toward
legitimized agent of the common interest. But its own bureaucracy.
those impacts also result from the strong antistat- Furthermore, under conditions of high and
ism of neoliberal ideas and policies,‘3 especially erratic inflation, in one month state employees
the commitment to diminish at all costs the size may lose 30, 40, and even 50% of their real
of the state bureaucracies and its deficit. income. Under these circumstances they cannot
Many efforts are being made to reduce the but despair and demand immediate redress. They
fiscal deficit. On the expenditure side, the main go on strike and demonstrate, at times violently.
features have been privatizations and attempts The result is frequent paralysis of essential public
to get rid of “excess personnel.” The latter has services. The consequences of these protests hit
not been easy, in part because in most cases the the largest cities hardest, the center of power and
tenure of those employees is legally protected, politics. These protests make a large contribution
and in part because strenuous opposition from to the feeling that democratic governments and
the latter’s unions has proven costly for shaky politicians are unable, and for demagogic reasons
governments. More effective for reducing the even unwilling, to prevent “chaos” and further
fiscal deficit have been policies that resulted in general economic deterioration. Furthermore,
the precipitous decline of the salaries of most the rational - and desperate - behavior of state
public employees. employees feeds the generalized image of an
In addition to sharply falling salaries, there are unruly public bureaucracy that is far more in-
many indications of a severe degradation of the terested in defending its “privileges” than in
functioning and of the very idea of a public discharging its duties. Finally, even though the
service. Many of the more capable officials have evidence on this matter is impressionistic, the
left the public for the private sector. For those public employees’ strikes and other protests, as
that have remained, their status has declined no they paralyze and further degrade essential
less sharply than their salaries: prevailing anti- public services, antagonize the public, including
statist ideologies view their jobs at best with many middle-class segments. The anger of these
mistrust, and the news as well as public lore are sectors, who are more dependent on most public
replete with anecdotes of their (too often true) services than the higher classes, adds weight to
idleness, lack of competence and interest in their the antistatist offensive and mixes up the (neces-
jobs, and corruption. If some time ago to be a sary) task of achieving a leaner state apparatus
state official was a symbol of high status, now- with the (suicidal) weakening of the state in all its
adays it is almost the opposite. dimensions.
Probably worse still, before the present crisis Shrinking personal income, dwindling career
to be a public official was to be installed in a career. prospects, bad working conditions, a hostile
This meant to work in a setting which provided a political environment and, at the same time, the
predictable path toward promotions, and to re- countless interventions that the state undertakes
ceive a monthly income and various fringe benefits are perfect soil for an enormous growth of
which allowed a solid middle-class lifestyle (which corruption. In many bureaus few things work
usually included good housing and affording the without graft that is petty for the rich but which
university education of their children). Except heavily taxes the poor. At the top and even
for some privileged pockets (typically the central middle levels of the bureaucracy, corruption
banks) this is no longer true in the countries entails huge amounts of money which plunder
affected by the present crisis. The bleak picture the slender public resources. In addition, when
results from the decapitation of the top and more some of those acts become public scandals, they
specialized bureaucracies due to the exodus of undermine trust, not only in the workings and
the more qualified individuals, the politicization role of the state but also in governments which
of those positions, numerous and always failed appear incapable of correcting this situation, if
“rationalizations” and “reorganizations,” and the not active participants in it.
 THE STATE AND DEMOCRATIZATION 1363

For governments desperate for funds, the with assumptions that everyone else will do the
temporary solution has been to increase indirect same. A gigantic - national level - prisoner’s
taxes and the prices of public services. But this dilemma holds when a profound and protracted
feeds inflation and has deleterious distributional economic crisis teaches every agent the following
consequences. In terms of an income tax, it can lessons: (a) Inflation will continue to be high, but
only be easily applied as withholdings on the it is next to impossible to predict in the medium
salaries of the formal sector of the economy run, to say nothing about the long run, inflation
(including public employees). If we consider, in fluctuations; (b) among such fluctuations will
addition, that the formally employed are the probably be periods of extremely high or hyper-
main contributors to social security, the result is a inflation (say, rates of 50% and above per
powerful incentive, both for them and for their month); (c) at some point the government will
employers, to leave the formal sector; in periods make some drastic intervention, aimed at taming
of uncertain employment and falling salaries, the inflation, but that intervention is likely to fail;
sharp deterioration of most social services (d) expectations about the future situation of the
(observed both in Latin America and in postcom- economy are strongly pessimistic; and (e) predic-
munist countries) adds to the misfortunes of vast tions about the future economic situation of each
segments of the population. Furthermore, the in- agent are contingent on shrewd and timely
come and the social security taxes imposed on the adaptation to the conditions imposed by the
formally employed entail a burdensome tax rate preceding points.
which very few pay but which is nominally Although there is a dearth of studies at the
effective for the whole economy - this increases appropriate micro level, anyone who has lived
the incentives for tax evasion, and diminishes the under these circumstances knows that this is a
cost of bribing. The result is generalized protests harsh, nasty world. Rationally, the dominant
about “excessive taxes” at the same time that the strategy is to do whatever is necessary to protect
overall tax income for the state diminishes, with oneself against the losses threatened by high and
direct taxes - those that, supposedly, a demo- erratic inflation. Remaining passive and/or not
cratic government would emphasize - dropping having the power resources for running at the
even more sharply. The long agony of the state- speed of inflation guarantees heavy losses - in
centered, import-substitutive pattern of capital extremes, for some bankruptcy and for others
accumulation has left us with a dinosaur incap- falling into abysmal poverty.
able even of feeding itself, while the “solutions” This is a world of mauve qui put, and playing
undertaken lead toward an anemic entity which this game reinforces the very conditions under
may be no less able to support democracy, decent which it is played. The first, more basic pheno-
levels of social equity, and economic growth. menon is generalized desolidarization. Every
rational agent acts at the level of aggregation and
with the time horizon that she deems more
4. ON CERTAIN ECONOMIC CRISES efficacious in her defensive moves. The adequate
time horizon is the very short term; what sense
I will discuss here a particular kind of econo- would it make to sacrifice short-term gains for
mic crisis: the one suffered by countries - the sake of longer term ones, when the future
Argentina, Brazil, and Peru - that locked situation of the world cannot be predicted with
themselves into a pattern of high and recurrent any accuracy, and if abstaining from maximizing
inflation14 (eventually reaching hyperinflation), short-term gains may provoke heavy losses?
punctuated by repeated failed attempts to control Some agents, difficult to identify topically with
inflation and undertake “structural reforms” of the data available, reap big profits. The ways to
the kind presently recommended by international achieve this are many, but the chances across
lending organizations. This is, fortunately, a classes are extremely skewed. Some of the more
small set of countries; but several postcommunist important of those ways entail the plundering of
and African countries seem to have already fallen the state apparatus. For players of this game,
in, or are at the brink of falling into this pattern. broad, long-run economic policies, negotiated
It can be postulated that the longer and the and implemented with the participation of highly
deeper this crisis, and the less the confidence that aggregated, interest-representation associations
the government will be able to solve it, the more are not important; as the government also has to
rational it becomes for everyone to act: at highly dance at the rhythm of the crisis, its capacity to
disaggregated levels, especially in relation to formulate those policies is very limited, and very
state agencies that may solve or alleviate the often their implementation is canceled or captur-
consequences of the crisis for a given firm or ed by the disaggregated strategies just described.
sector; with extremely short time horizons; and What is truly important for defending oneself,
1364 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

and for eventually profiting from the crisis is probability of future policy failure, which of
(basically but not exclusively for capitalists) open course increases the likelihood of that same
and fast access to the state agencies that can failure.
deliver the resources hoped for. Privileges and On their part, the more spirals occur, the more
favors of all kinds are procured by the minimum- desperately governments try to find a way out of
size coalition that is able to obtain the appropri- the crisis. But the accompanying disintegration of
ate decisions by a given public agency. More- the state apparatus, increasing fiscal deficits, a
over, those advantages must be obtained quickly, hostile public opinion, political parties that anti-
if not, continuing inflation would eat them up. cipate future electoral gains by harshly criticizing
Under this situation, the rational strategy con- the government (including leaders of the gov-
sists of a double disaggregation: first, act alone or erning party, who see themselves dragged into
allied to the minimum possible set of agents that the abyss of the government’s unpopularity), and
can guarantee the desired outcome; second, the anticipatory hedging of powerful economic
colonize the state agencies that can provide the actors diminish the probability that the next
sought-after benefits, avoiding more aggregated policy attempt will succeed. This also means that,
and/or public arenas that would only complicate for an economy with increasing levels of immuni-
the attainment of the topical benefits expected. zation, the next stabilization attempt will be a
Various processes noted in the literature, such as more radical intervention than the preceding
the loosening of popular collective identities, the one. The stakes of the game become higher at
implosion of historically rooted parties, and the every turn of the wheel.
decreased importance of capitalists’ organiza- The repetition of policy failure continues the
tions are expressions of the perverse collective process of Darwinian selection, at each turn
consequences of rational defensive behavior. made easier by the decreasing ability of the
Capitalists in Argentina, Brazil, and Peru have government to control the distributional con-
an important advantage. This is not a new game sequences of its policies. In particular, since
for them; only the urgency, the stakes, and the many segments of the middle class are, in relative
level of disaggregation have increased. Capital- terms, affected most severely, widespread cries
ists in those countries, and elsewhere in Latin of “the extinction of the middle class” are heard,
America, have long experience in living off the sometimes with overtones that are not exactly
largesse of the state, and in colonizing its consistent with the foundations of democracy. In
agencies. They do not have to find many new this situation, the government projects a curious
counterparts inside the public bureaucracies, or image that mixes omnipotence with naked impo-
to invent new ways to engage them in manifold tence. On one hand, every attempt at solving the
forms of mutual corruption. But, nowadays, the crisis is resonantly announced as the one that
depth of the crisis has accentuated those ills. will succeed, and therefore justifies further sacri-
First, there is evidence of a great increase in fices of the population. On the other hand, aside
corruption. Second, there is an enormous frag- from the welcome relief of a temporary decline in
mentation of the state apparatus - or, equiva- inflation (usually at high cost in terms of econo-
lently, its sharp decline of autonomy - not in mic activity and distribution) it soon becomes
relation to “a” capitalist class but in relation to evident that the government will not be able to
the innumerable segments in which this class has implement other, also necessary, policies. This is
disaggregated itself at the rhythm of the crisis. another factor in shortening the time horizons
The problems noted in the preceding section are and in worsening the expectations that dynamize
multiplied by these consequences of the econo- the overall game.
mic crisis, at the same time that the resulting In these conditions, a society perceives an ugly
disintegration of the state apparatus makes it image of itself. One could collect thousands of
even less capable of solving that crisis. expressions of the deep mu&e that follows. The
Every spiral of the crisis is unlike the preceding evidence of widespread opportunism, greed, lack
one. Actors learn. Those who were cunning of solidarity and corruption does not present a
enough to survive and even gain ground, can buy positive image. Furthermore, many of those
at bargain prices assets the losers had. The rapid actions entail blatant disregard for the existing
concentration of capital in these countries re- laws; when it becomes clear that many violate the
flects the gains of the Darwinian survivors. law and that the costs of doing so are usually nil,
Agents assume that as the previous stabilization the lesson learned further erodes the predictabil-
efforts failed (and as the government was further ity of social relations; widespread opportunism
weakened by that failure) the future efforts of the and lawlessness increase all sorts of transaction
government will also fail. Thus those agents costs, and the texturing of society by the state-as-
hedge their bets against the high estimated law weakens at every turn of the spiral.
 THE STATE AND DEMOCRATIZATION 136.5

Bitter denunciations and desperate appeals to nal pockets, these conditions nowadays are
overcome the “moral crisis” follow. The media nonexistent. Finally, some policies can be suc-
and daily conversations become full of exhorta- cessfully implemented only if they go through
tions for “restoring national unity,” for the complex negotiations with the various organized
panacea of socioeconomic pacts (that in these private actors that claim legitimate access to the
conditions no rational actor would enter into in process. The extreme disaggregation with which
good faith), for “moralizing” public administra- it is rational to operate under the crisis, however,
tion and business, and the like. Moralistic critic- erodes the representativeness of most organized
isms and pious exhortations - however valuable interests. Who can really speak for someone else
they are as an indication that basic values of in these countries? What ego can convince alter
public morality somehow survive - ignore the that what he agreed to with her will be honored
locking in of social action in a colossal prisoner’s by those he claims to represent? The atomization
dilemma.i5 Moreover, such utterances can easily of society mirrors and accentuates the disintegra-
escalate into a full-fledged condemnation of the tion of the state.i6
whole situation, including a democracy that How can this world of actors behaving in
performs poorly in so many respects. extremely disaggregated, opportunistic and
The angry atomization of society is the other short-term ways be politically represented’?
side of the same coin of the crisis of the state, not Which can be the anchors and links with the
only as a set of bureaucracies but also - and institutions (of interest representation and the
even more - as the lawful source of social properly political ones, such as parties and
predictability. In addition, the crisis leads to the congress) that texture the relationships between
decreasing plausibility of the state as an author- state and society in institutionalized democra-
itative agent of the country’s interests; rather, it cies? What representativeness and, more broad-
increasingly appears as a burdensome apparatus ly, which collective identities can survive these
allowing itself to be plundered by the powerful. storms? The answer is that very little, if any,
The disintegration of the state apparatus and the progress is made toward achieving institutions of
decreasing effectiveness of the state-as-law representation and accountability. On the con-
makes it incapable of implementing minimally trary, connecting with historical roots which are
complex policies. It is no easy matter to decide deep in these countries, the atomization of
what segments of the state should be given society and state, the spread of brown areas and
priority for making them more effective; or to their peculiar ways of pushing their interests. and
implement an industrial policy; or to decide the the enormous urgency and complexity of the
degree and sequencing of the financial and problems to be faced feed the delegative propen-
commercial opening of the economy; or to agree sities of these democracies. The pulverization of
on salaries and employment policies, etc. With- society into myriad rational/opportunistic actors
out this “restructuring” neither the current neo- and their anger about a situation which all -
liberal policies or alternative ones may succeed. and, hence, apparently nobody - seems to
In order for those policies not only to be cause, has a major culprit: the state and the
decided (the easier part, obviously) but to be government. This common sense is, on one hand,
implemented, three conditions must be met. fertile ground for simplistic anti-statist ideolo-
First, both private and state agents must have at gies; on the other, it propels the abysmal loss of
least the medium run as their relevant time prestige of the democratic government, its shaky
horizon. But in the conditions we discussed this is institutions, and of all politicians. Of course,
unlikely to be the case. Even government leaders these evaluations have good groundings: the
are unlikely to have other than a short time policy failures of government, its blunderings and
horizon because the crisis means that they must vacillations, its impotent omnipotence, and too
focus their attention in extinguishing the fires often the evidence of its corruption, as well as the
that pop up everywhere, and that their jobs are in dismal spectacles also too often offered by
perpetual jeopardy. In addition, if stabiliza- politicians in and out congress and parties, give
tion and especially structural policies are going to the perfect occasion for the projective exculpa-
be something more than a crude translation of tion of society into the manifold ills of state and
whatever interests have access to them, the government.
relevant state agencies must be able to gather and The least that can be said about these prob-
analyze complex information, be sufficiently lems is, first, that they do not help to create
motivated in the pursuit of some definition of the a consolidated, institutionalized democracy;
public interest, and see their role in putting up second, that they make extremely difficult the
such policies as a rewarding episode in their implementation of the complex, long-term, mul-
careers. As we saw, except for some organizatio- tisided negotiated policies that could take these
1366 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

countries out of the muddle; and, third, that (not never was as high in Mexico as in Argentina,
only in Latin America, indeed) these problems Brazil, and Peru (or, for that matter, as it is today
powerfully interact with a tradition of conceiving in most of the former Soviet Union); the PRI
politics in a caesarist, anti-institutional, and provided a more effective instrument for policy
delegative fashion. implementation than anything available to the
At this point an overdue question must be latter countries; and the geopolitical interests of
posed: is there a way out of these downward the bordering United States are helping the still
spirals? Or, more precisely, at what point and painful and uncertain but comparatively easier
under what conditions is there such a way out? navigation of this country toward the achieve-
We must remember that we are dealing with ment of the long-run goals of its current policies.
countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Peru) which Another country is Bolivia, where the implemen-
unfortunately suffered a pattern of recurrent high tation of policies which were successful in taming
inflation, punctuated by periods of hyperinflation inflation and liberalizing trade and finance (but
or very close to it (depending on definitions I not, at least until now, in restoring growth and
need not argue with here), and which suffered investment) was accompanied by a brutal repres-
several failed stabilization programs. sion which can hardly be seen as consistent with
One country which recently suffered these democracy. A more recent candidate for this list
problems but that seems to have found a way out is Argentina. Focusing on the South American
is Chile. The policies of the Pinochet government cases, what do Chile, Bolivia, and Argentina
accomplished, with an effectiveness that Lenin have in common? Quite simply, the crisis in these
would have admired, the destruction of most of countries - in the first under authoritarian and
what was left (after the Allende government) in the two latter under democratically elected
of the domestic-market, import substitution- governments - reached the very bottom. The
oriented bourgeoisie - which was too grateful to bottom is the convergence of the following
have been rescued as a class to organize any conditions. First, state that as a principle of
concerted opposition. Of course, the Pinochet order has a tiny hold on the behavior of most
government also brutally repressed the labor actors, as a bureaucracy reaches extreme limits of
organizations and the political parties which disintegration and ineffectiveness, and at some
could have mounted an effective opposition to its point becomes unable to support the national
policies. In this societal desert, huge social costs currency. Second, a workers’ movement is thor-
were incurred, and although with various oughly defeated, in the sense that it is not any
changes and accidents, the neoliberal program longer able to oppose neoliberal policies except
was mostly implemented. The new democratic by means of very disaggregated and short-lived
government in this country has the still serious protests. Third, a capitalist class has to a large
but less vexing problem of preserving low infla- extent devoured itself, with the winners trans-
tion, reasonable rates of economic growth, and a forming themselves into financially centered and
favorable international climate. That govern- outwardly oriented conglomerates (together
ment is also faced with the problem of how to with the branches of commerce and the profes-
alleviate the inequalities that were accentuated sionals that cater to luxurious consumption).
by the preceding authoritarian regime. But the Finally, there is a generalized mood that life
sober fact is that the distributional consequences under continued high and uncertain inflation is so
of more ambiguous and less harsh policies in intolerable that shy solution is preferable, even if
countries such as Brazil, Argentina, and Peru that solution ratifies a more unequal world in
have not been better than the ones under the which many forms of solidaristic sociability have
Pinochet’s government. Furthermore, the re- been lost. At this point whoever tries to control
sources presently available to the Chilean gov- inflation and initiate the “restructuring” advised
ernment for alleviating equity problems are by neoliberal views does not confront powerful
relatively larger than the ones available to Brazil, blocking coalitions: the more important fractions
Peru, and Argentina. Finally, the fact that Chile of the bourgeoisie no longer have antagonistic
was some time ago, but is no longer trapped in interests, the various expressions of popular and
the spirals depicted here means (although this is middle-class interests are weak and fractional-
not the only reason, there are other historical ized, and the state employees that have survived
ones which I cannot elaborate here) that its state their own ordeal can now hope to improve their
is in better shape than in the countries discussed situation. The pulverization of society and of the
above for dealing with the equity and develop- state apparatus, together with the primordial
mental issues it inherited. demand to return to an ordered social world, end
Another such country could be Mexico. But up eliminating resistances that, unwillingly but
inflation (with its manifold social dislocations) effectively, fed the previous turns of the spiral. In
 THE STATE AND DEMOCRATIZATION 1367

Chile this happened through the combined depicted? The prisoner’s dilemma has a powerful
effects of the crisis unleashed under the Unidad dynamic: invocations to altruism and national
Popular government and the repressive and unity, as well as policy proposals that assume
determined policies of the Pinochet period. In wide solidarities and firm identities, will not do.
Bolivia and Argentina it is no small irony that, If there is a solution, it probably lies in finding
after hyperinflation, the (apparently, far from areas which are important in their impacts on the
clearly achieved yet) end of the spirals came overall situation and in which skilled action
under presidents originating in parties/ (particularly by the government) can lengthen
movements such as MNR and Peronismo; it was the time horizons (and, consequently, the scope
probably incumbent on such presidents, and only of solidarities) of crucial actors. The best-known
to them, to complete the defeat of the respective invention for such achievement is the strengthen-
workers’ movement. ing of social and political institutions. But under
Brazil was the last of the countries discussed the conditions I have depicted this is indeed a
here encountering this type of crisis. This was most difficult task. In the contemporary world,
closely related to the larger size of its domestic the joyful celebration of the advent of democracy
market and to its more dynamic economic per- must be complemented with the sober recogni-
formance, which have created a more complex tion of the immense (and, indeed, historically
and industrialized economy than that of its unusual) difficulties its institutionalization and its
neighbors. In a “paradox of success”” this rooting in society must face. As Haiti, Peru, and
advantage may turn out to be a severe disadvan- Thailand have shown, these experiments are
tage. In Brazil there are more and more powerful fragile. In addition, there are no immanent
agents capable of blocking the more or less historical forces which will guide the new demo-
orthodox neoliberal policies that, in any case, cracies toward an institutionalized and represen-
have been and will be attempted again. Con- tative form, and to the elimination of their brown
versely, if there were no alternatives to con- areas and the manifold social ills that underlie
tinuing the downward spiral until a complete them. In the long run, the new democracies may
collapse, the degree of economic destruction split between those that follow this felicitous
would be much larger. Furthermore, socially, in course and those that regress to all-out authori-
contrast with the situation of the Southern Cone tarianism. But delegative democracies, weak
countries before their own spirals, in Brazil there horizontal accountability, schizophrenic states,
is already a vast segment of the population that brown areas and low-intensity citizenship are
has nowhere lower to fall. part of the foreseeable future of many new
democracies.
5. A PARTIAL CONCLUSION
Are there alternatives to the crisis I have

NOTES

1. In addition to its rather sketchy character, this democracies, to the creation and strengthening of
text has a major limitation: I do not deal directly with political institutions and, especially, to what I term
international and transnational factors, even though “horizontal accountability.” By this I mean the day-by-
they often enter implicitly in my discussions. day control of the validity and lawfulness of the actions
of the executive by other public agencies which are
2. One limitation of not dealing with international reasonably autonomous from the former. Furthermore,
factors and only very passingly with historical ones is as we shall see, the liberal component of these
that I will not be able to discuss here an assumption that democracies is very weak. Some authors tend to
sometimes creeps into the literature: that new demo- confuse delegative democracy with populism; both, of
cracies are “only” going through stages that institution- course, share various important features. But, in Latin
alized democracies passed before. America at least, the latter entailed a broadening (even
if vertically controlled) of popular political participa-
3. In another work (O’Donnell, 1992) I labeled tion and organization, and coexisted with periods of
these “delegative democracies,” to contrast them with dynamic expansion of the domestic economy. Instead,
institutionalized (or, equivalently, consolidated or delegative democracy typically attempts to depoliticize
established or representative or, as we shall see, the population, except for brief moments in which it
liberal) democracies. With the term “delegative” I demands its plebiscitary support, and presently coexists
point out to a conception and practice of executive with periods of severe economic crisis. While my
authority as having been electorally delegated the right previous text was basically a typological exercise, this
to do whatever it seems fit for the country. I also argue paper examines some societal processes which seem
that delegative democracies are inherently hostile to closely related to the emergence and workings of
the patterns of representation normal in established delegative democracies.
1368 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

4. 1 am using cautious language because I cannot 10. Consider the present political problems of Italy,
deal here with the various nuances and qualifications which is arguably the most heterogeneous of institutio-
that a more extended treatment of this matter would nalized democracies (with the exception of India, if this
have to introduce. For a good discussion of these extremely heterogeneous country can still be consi-
matters see Cotterrell (1984). dered to belong to that set) but is much more
homogenous than most of the countries I am discus-
5. Many postcommunist countries suffer the addi- sing. Those problems are closely connected to Italy’s
tional, and enormous, problem that not even their brown areas and to the penetration of legal and illegal
geographical boundaries are beyond dispute and that representatives of those areas in its national center. In
various ethnic and religious cleavages prevent minimal the United States, it seems indisputable that in the past
degrees of allegiance to the respective states. In this decade the brown areas (particularly around large
sense, while several Latin American countries are cities) have experienced a worrisome growth. Further-
undergoing processes of acute erosion of an already more, these problems are also appearing in other rich
existing nation-state. several postcommunist ones are countries, related to a series of global (especially
facing the even more vexing problem of beginning to economic) transformations. But in the present text I
build, under very uncongenial economic and social want to stress some factors, specific to certain coun-
circumstances. a nation-state. tries, that greatly accentuate those problems. Again,
and as always, comparisons are a matter of degree.
6. Truly, “state penetration” was one of the “crises”
conceptualized in the famous 1960s series of volumes 1 I. As Ware (1992) puts it, “The claim of the liberal
on “political development” of the Social Science democracies to be liberal democracies rests on the
Research Council (see LaPalombara, 1971, pp. 205- claim that they have both well-established and also
232). This same issue is central to Huntington (1968). accessible procedures for protecting the liberties of
But while these works are concerned with the spread of individual citizens.”
any kind of central authority, my discussion here refers
to the effectiveness of the type of legality that a 12. The extensive poverty and high inequality found
democratic state is supposed to implant. in most of Latin America and the rest of the Third
World (the sediment of a long history, accentuated by
7. Of course, these are matters of degree. For the current crisis and economic policies) is different
example, the United States stands as a case where in from the process of rapid unequalization taking place in
the past some of these problems were pervasive - and postcommunist countries; whichever pattern turns out
they have not been entirely eliminated until today. But to be more explosive, the latter points toward democra-
there (as well as in England before) those problems cies which, almost at the very moment of their
motivated the creation of a rather effective “apolitical” inauguration, are suffering a steep decrease in the
national civil service. In contrast, underlining some of intensity of their citizenship.
the tragic but mostly ignored effects of the deep crisis
some countries are undergoing and of the economic 13. By “neoliberal” policies I mean those advocated
policies in course, the inverse is what is happening by international lending institutions and mainstream
there: the destruction of whatever effective state neoclassical theories. These policies have undergone
bureaucracies and notions of a public service existed. some changes, presumably prompted by the very mixed
record of their application. But a very strong - and
8. One important symptom of this is the degree to indiscriminate - antistatist bias continues to be at their
which the main operations of the drug trade thrive in core. For a critique of these policies, see especially
these regions, often in coalition with local and national Przeworski et al. (forthcoming) (even though I agree
authorities based there. This convergence (and that of with this critique and am one of the cosigners of this
numerous other criminal activities) further accentuates book, it is ethically proper to add that 1 did not
the perverse privatization of these regions. participate in that part of this volume). See also
Przeworski (1992).
9. It should be noticed that the measures of hetero-
geneity I am suggesting do not necessarily mean only 14. By this I mean periods of three years or more
one nationality under one state (for example, the when monthly inflation averaged above 20% per
dominant color of Belgium is blue). The disintegration month, with peaks of three-digit figures per month.
of supranational empires such as the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia may or may not lead, in the respective 15. Although I cannot expand on this point here, it
emerging units, to states which are homogenous in the should be noted that the situations I am depicting do
sense I am specifying here. For example, the erosion of not have any of the conditions that the literature has
public authority and the widespread disobedience of identified as conducive to cooperative solutions in the
legislation issued in Russia mean that, even though this prisoner’s dilemma.
unit may be more “national” in the sense of containing
a rather homogeneous population, in terms of the 16. One should not forget the longer term effects of
dimensions of “stateness” I have suggested, it would the crisis and of the indiscriminate anti-statist ideology
indeed be dominated by brown. For a vivid description that underlies the current economic policies, on factors
of the fast and extensive “browning” of today’s Russia, crucial for sustaining economic growth. I refer in
see Reddaway (1993), pp. 30-35. particular to education, health, and science and tech-
 THE STATE AND DEMOCRATIZATION 1369

nology policies, and to the modernization of the effective state apparatus is required.
physical infrastructure. These areas are being grossly
neglected, in spite of many warnings and complaints. 17. I have discussed Brazil’s apparent paradoxes of
But to undertake those policies a reasonably lean and success in O’Donnell (1992a).

REFERENCES

Cotterrell, Roger, The Sociology of Law: An Introduc- O’Donnell; Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence White-
tion (London: Butterworths, 1984). head (Eds.), Transitions From Authoritarian Rule:
Dahl, Robert, Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition Prospects For Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hop-
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). kins University Press, 1986).
Huntington, Samuel, Political- Order in dhanging O’Donnell, Guiliermo, “Transitions, continuities, and
Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1968). paradoxes,” in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Don-
LaPalombaia, Joseph, “Penetration: A crisis of go;- nell, and Samuel J. Valenzuela (Eds.), Issues in
ernmental capacity,” in Leonard Binder, et al., Democratic Consolidation: The New South American
Crises and Sequences in Political Development Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1992a), pp.
Lijphart, Arend, “Consociational democracy,” World 17-56.
Politics, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January, 1968), pp. 207- O’Donnell, Guillermo, “Delegative democracy?,”
225. Working paper No. 172 (Notre Dame, IN: Kellogg
Lijphart, Arend, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian Institute, March 1992).
and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries Reddaway, Peter, “Russia on the brink,” New York
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). Review of Books (January 28, 1993), pp. 3&35.
Mainwaring, Scott, “Politicians, parties and electoral Przeworski, Adam, “The neoliberal fallacy,” Journal of
systems: Brazil in comparative perspective,” Work- Democracy, Vol. 3, No. 3 (July, 1992), pp. 45-59.
ing paper No. 141 (Notre Dame, IN: Kellogg Przeworski, Adam, et al., Sustainable Democracy
Institute, June 1990). (forthcoming).
O’Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe Schmitter, Transi- Ware, Alan, -“‘ Liberal democracy: One form or
tions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions many?,” Political Studies, Vol. 40 (1992), pp. 130-
About Uncertain Democracies, Vol. IV of Guillermo 145.