Raffel Sys. v. Man Wah Holdings - Claim Construction Order
Raffel Sys. v. Man Wah Holdings - Claim Construction Order
Raffel Sys. v. Man Wah Holdings - Claim Construction Order
Plaintiff,
Defendants.
Raffel Systems, LLC alleges that it is the owner by assignment of all rights, titles, and
interests in four utility patents for lighted cup holders for seating arrangements1 and one
design patent for the ornamental design of the cup holders.2 Raffel sues Man Wah Holdings
Ltd., Inc., Man Wah (USA) Inc., and XYZ Companies 1–10 (collectively “Man Wah”)
alleging that that Man Wah is making, using, offering for sale, selling, importing, and/or
distributing products that infringe Raffel’s patents. (Counts 2, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 15 of Fourth
The parties dispute the construction of several terms found in Raffel’s utility patents
and the construction of Raffel’s design patent. (Joint Claim Construction Chart at 3–4, Docket
# 86.) The parties filed claim construction briefs (Docket # 77, Docket # 78, Docket # 83,
1
U.S. Patent No. 8,973,882 (“the ‘882 Patent”); U.S. Patent No. 10,051,968 (“the ‘968 Patent”); U.S.
Patent No. 8,714,505 (“the ‘505 Patent”); U.S. Patent No. 7,766,293 (“the ‘293 Patent”).
2
U.S. Patent No. D643,252 (“the ‘252 Patent”).
August 15, 2019. (Docket # 94.) The case was subsequently reassigned to me. The question
of claims construction has been fully briefed and is now ready for resolution. I will address
the parties’ arguments related to the utility patents and the design patent in turn.
1. Utility Patents
“[T]he interpretation and construction of patent claims, which define the scope of the
patentee’s rights under the patent, is a matter of law exclusively for the court.” Markman, 52
F.3d at 970–71.4 Thus, when the parties present a fundamental dispute regarding the scope of
a claim term, it is the court’s duty to resolve it. Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks,
815 F.3d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “In construing claims, the analytical focus must begin
and remain centered on the language of the claims themselves.” Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v.
Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Generally, the words of a claim are “given their ordinary and customary meaning,” Vitronics
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996), which is “the meaning that the
term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question . . . as of the effective filing
date of the patent application,” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005).5
In this case, Raffel asserts that the disputed claim terms in the utility patents should be
given their plain and ordinary meaning and thus need no construction. Although utilizing a
3
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
4
Federal Circuit precedent governs matters of substantive patent law. In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams.,
605 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
5
The parties do not dispute that a person of ordinary skill in the art in this case is someone with a
Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering or a related discipline, with at least two years
of experience in product design. (Man Wah’s Opening Claim Construction Br. at 7, Docket # 78;
Raffel’s Resp. Br. at 29, Docket # 84.)
when a term has more than one “ordinary” meaning or when reliance on a term’s “ordinary
meaning” does not resolve the parties’ dispute. Eon Corp. IP Holdings, 815 F.3d at 1318 (citing
O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). A
court need not, however, “attempt the impossible task of resolving all questions of meaning
with absolute, univocal finality.” Id. The court’s duty at the claim construction stage is simply
to “resolve a dispute about claim scope that has been raised by the parties.” Id. at 1319.
When the meaning of a claim term as understood by persons of skill in the art is not
immediately apparent, the court looks to “those sources available to the public that show what
a person of skill in the art would have understood disputed claim language to mean.”
Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Intrinsic evidence (the claims, specifications, and prosecution history) should be examined
first. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. Extrinsic evidence (expert testimony, dictionaries, and learned
treatises), although useful, is “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the
legally operative meaning of disputed claim language.” C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
388 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the end, “[t]he
construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s
description of the invention will be . . . the correct construction.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs
Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
The parties dispute the construction of the related terms “A cup holder apparatus for
a seating arrangement” (“A1”), “A lighted cup holder apparatus for a seating arrangement”
(“A3”). The dispute essentially concerns whether these terms should be read according to
their plain and ordinary meaning, or whether they should be construed as including certain
other elements. I note at the outset that the patents refer to “master” and “slave” circuitry.
Except when quoting directly from the patents, I use the term “primary” in place of “master”
During the Markman hearing, the parties summarized the two major disputes regarding
A1, A2, and A3: First, whether a “cup holder apparatus” must also contain a “seating
arrangement.” (Markman Hearing Tr. at 10–11.) Second, whether a “cup holder apparatus”
necessitates that there be a primary/secondary relationship among multiple cup holders. (Id.
at 11.) The parties’ proposed constructions of the disputed terms are summarized in the chart
below:
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Although Man Wah initially proposed that all three terms should have the same meaning, it offered
alternative constructions as a “compromise” in its response brief to address some of Raffel’s
arguments. (Man Wah’s Resp. Br. at 4 n.2, Docket # 83.) I confine my focus to Man Wah’s alternative
arguments.
(Docket # 86 at 3–4.)
All four of the utility patents contain the term “cup holder apparatus.” Raffel argues
that “cup holder apparatus” can be understood according to its plain and ordinary meaning.
(Raffel’s Opening Claim Construction Br. at 6–10, Docket # 77.) Man Wah argues that “cup
primary/secondary relationship between multiple cup holders. (Man Wah’s Opening Claim
The resolution to this dispute begins and ends with the language of the claims.
Beginning with Man Wah’s argument that a “cup holder apparatus” includes a seating
arrangement, the claim language says otherwise. For example, in the ‘505 patent, Claim 1 is
an independent claim for “a cup holder apparatus for a seating arrangement.” (U.S. Patent
No. 8,714,505 col.7 l.55–56 (filed May 6, 2014), Ex. 2 to Fourth Am. Compl., Docket # 108-
2) (emphasis added). It does not say including or any other word that would indicate that the
apparatus includes the seating arrangement. Claim 1 then goes on to articulate what the
“apparatus” comprises. (‘505 col.7 l.57–64, col.8 l.1–8.) Both the ‘882 Patent and the ‘293
Patent similarly claim a “cup holder apparatus” or “lighted cup holder apparatus” for a
“seating arrangement” and then further state what comprises the “apparatus.” (U.S. Patent
Patent No. 7,766,293 col.7 l.50–67, col.8 l.1–8, Ex. 1 to Fourth Am. Compl., Docket # 108-
1.) Thus, for the ‘505, ‘882, and ‘293 Patents, defining the “cup holder apparatus” as including
the “seating arrangement” is nonsensical. The “cup holder apparatus” cannot include the
In contrast, the ‘968 Patent claims “a movie theater seating arrangement comprising a
cup holder apparatus,” and then states what comprises the “cup holder apparatus.” (U.S.
Patent No. 10,051,968 col.8 l.61–67, col.9 l.1–7, Ex. 4 to Fourth Am. Compl. Docket # 108-
4) (emphasis added). Thus, for the ‘968 Patent, the “movie theater seating arrangement” does
Man Wah also argues that “cup holder apparatus” should be construed to require a
primary/secondary relationship between multiple lighted cup holders. The “Summary of the
Invention” for all four utility patents contains the following language:
Some forms of the invention include a master lighted cup holder and one or
more slave lighted cup holders operatively connected to the master lighted cup
holder in such a manner that the light sources in the slave lighted cup holders
produce light only when commanded to do so by the master lighted cup holder.
(‘505 Patent col.2 l.45–50; ‘882 Patent col.2 l.47–52; ‘293 Patent col.2 l.36–41; ‘968 Patent
For the ‘293 Patent, this dispute is resolved through the claim language. In the ‘293
Patent, Claims 1 and 6 are for: “A lighted cup holder apparatus for a seating arrangement,
the apparatus comprising: at least one lighted cup holder . . . .” (‘293 Patent col.7 l.50–52; ‘293
Patent col.8 l.24–26) (emphasis added). These claims presume that the apparatus may have
only one lighted cup holder, in which case there would not be primary and secondary lighted
cup holders. Claim 9, which is a dependent claim that adds further limitations to Claim 6 (and
primary lighted cup holder and the lighted cup holder apparatus further comprises a
secondary lighted cup holder. (‘293 Patent col.8 l.57–60.). Thus, interpreting the language in
Claim 9 superfluous. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1334, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (concluding that an independent claim should be given broader scope than a dependent
claim to avoid rendering the dependent claim redundant). Thus, the term “a lighted cup
holder apparatus for a seating arrangement” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning
For the ‘505, ‘882, and ‘968 Patents, the relevant claims themselves do not mention
the primary/secondary relationship between cup holders. Raffel argues that given the
language in the specifications that some forms of the invention include primary/secondary
lighted cup holders, the cup holder apparatus may or may not contain primary/secondary
lighted cup holders. (Markman Hearing Tr. at 11–12, Pl.’s Opening Br. at 9–10.) In other
words, the scope of the patent is broad enough to cover potentially infringing products that
Man Wah argues that the specifications themselves provide a definition of the disputed
claim terms that includes primary/secondary lighted cup holders. Man Wah points to fig.1
and its description in the ‘968 Patent, the ‘505 Patent, the ‘882 Patent, and the ‘293 Patent.
total of four cup holders. The “Detailed Description of the Preferred Embodiment” of fig.1
states as follows:
(U.S. Patent No. 7,766,293 col.4 l.29–33 (filed Aug. 3, 2010), Ex. 1 to Fourth Am. Compl.,
Docket # 108-1.) Man Wah points out that the figure shows an arrow for “100” (the “lighted
cup holder apparatus”) that appears to point at the entire object. Similarly, fig.6 in the ‘293
patent shows “a lighted cup holder apparatus 200, according to the invention, includes a
seating arrangement 202 having three upholstered reclining chair portions 206 . . . Master and
slave lighted cup holders 106, 108, configured and connected in the manner described above
in relation to the first exemplary embodiment 100, are mounted in the modular spacers 206.”
(Id. at col.6 l.41–51.) Man Wah argues that these figures and descriptions define the “lighted
But the fact that these figures and their descriptions depict an apparatus that includes
both a seating arrangement and primary/secondary lighted cup holders does not mean that
the scope of the claim is limited to such apparatuses; these figures are merely the “preferred
embodiment” of the invention. While “a patentee’s choice of embodiments can shed light on
the intended scope of the claim, [ ] a patent claim term is not limited merely because the
embodiments in the specification all contain a particular feature.” C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S.
Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 865 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Further, to “act as his own lexicographer,”
a patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term” other than its plain
and ordinary meaning. Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (quoting CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
It is not enough for a patentee to simply disclose a single embodiment or use a word in the
same manner in all embodiments; the patentee must “clearly express an intent” to redefine
the term. Id. Here, I am not convinced that the patentee “clearly express[ed] an intent” to
redefine the terms. The specifications state that only “some” forms of the invention include
primary/secondary lighted cup holders, and these figures show only one possible form that
passenger vehicle as follows: “a seating arrangement comprising a cup holder apparatus, the
cup holder apparatus comprising . . . .” (‘968 Patent col.8 l.16–19.) Dependent Claim 6 claims
“[t]he passenger vehicle of claim 1, wherein the seating arrangement comprises a master
lighted cup holder apparatus and one or more slave lighted cup holder apparatuses . . . .” (Id.
already include the primary/secondary cup holders would render Claim 6 redundant. See Dow
Chem. Co., 226 F.3d at 1341–42. Thus, I find that the patentee did not intend to limit the
patents’ scope to only those cup holder apparatuses containing a primary/secondary cup
holder.
The parties also dispute the meaning of the term “control switch [or connection].”
Raffel argues that this term should be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning,
while Man Wah argues that “control switch” and “connection” should both be defined as “A
Again, I begin with the language of the claims themselves. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc., 308
F.3d at 1201. All four utility patents contain the following fig.7:
10
(‘293 Patent col.6 l.53–67; ‘505 Patent col.6 l.59–67, col.7 l.1–3; ‘882 Patent col.6 l.62–67,
It is clear from this language that “control switch” and “connection” have separate
meanings. The specification states that the flange may contain “other types of controls and
headset and an example “control” as a powered, reclining mechanism. (‘293 Patent col.6 l.61–
67.) The specification states that “[b]y incorporating such controls and connections into the
lighted cup holder, construction of the seating arrangement may be simplified, and aesthetic
appearance be approved.” (‘293 Patent col.7 l.1–4) (emphasis added). Thus, the patent clearly
intends “connection” and “control” to refer to separate elements. It seems evident that
between these two terms, a “position[able/ally] actuated on-off switch” would be a control,
not a connection.
11
by using the term consistently throughout the patent. See Homeland Housewares, LLC v.
Whirlpool Corp., 865 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]hen a patentee uses a claim term
throughout the entire patent specification, in a manner consistent with only a single meaning,
he has defined that term ‘by implication.’”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Man
Wah points to two specific places in the patents where “positionable actuated on-off switch”
is used: in the “summary of the invention” and in the description of the preferred
embodiment. The “summary of the invention” explains that the invention may be used on
seating arrangements having cup holders mounted on folding backrests, or other stowable
portions of the seating apparatus. (‘293 Patent col.3 l.37–44; ‘505 Patent col.3 l.45–52; ‘882
Patent col.3 l.47–54; ‘968 Patent col.3 l.66–67, col.4 l.1–6.) In “such embodiments, a lighted
cup holder apparatus, according to the invention, may include a positionable actuated on-off
switch configured to automatically override the light-sensitive element, to turn off the
illumination when the movable portion of the seating arrangement is placed in the stowed
position.” (Id.) In the preferred embodiment, the patents similarly describe a form of the
12
Patent col.6 l.62–67, col.7 l.1–3.) In both places, the term “positionally actuated on-off
switch” refers to a switch overriding the light-sensitive element when a stowable structure is
in the stowed position. In contrast, in both the specifications and the claims, a “control
switch” refers to several different features that can be controlled by a switch, such as power
reclining, volume, or a massage mechanism. (See ‘293 Patent col.6 l.54–67, col.7 l.1–4.) The
patentee did not use the term “control switch” in a manner consistent with the single meaning
of a “position[able/ally] actuated on-off switch.” Thus, I find the terms “control switch” and
“connection” should be given their plain and ordinary meaning and do not include a
1.2.3 Flange
The parties dispute the term “flange.” The crux of the parties’ dispute is whether the
term “flange” includes only flanges that are non-removable (i.e., are attached to the cup
holder body as a single unit), or both removable and non-removable flanges.7 Raffel advocates
for the plain and ordinary meaning of “flange,” which includes both removable and non-
removable flanges. Man Wah would limit the meaning of “flange” to non-removable flanges.
13
All four utility patents contain the following fig.3 and fig.7:
In fig.3, the “flange” is labeled 136. In fig.7, the “flange” is labeled 302. Raffel acknowledges
that while the flange of fig.3 appears to be part of a single piece with the cup holder body, the
flange in fig.7 does not depict a single piece construction. (Raffel’s Opening Claim
Construction Br. at 18.) Raffel argues that fig.7 depicts a “flange and cupholder that could be
Man Wah contends that the term “flange” in the subject patents is limited to a “non-
removable” rim attached to the cup holder body as a single unit. Man Wah argues that Raffel
disclaimed any meaning of flange that is removably connected to the cup holder body in the
prosecution history of a related patent obtained subsequent to the patents at issue in this
case—U.S. Patent No. 9,867,471 (“the ’471 Patent”). (Man Wah’s Resp. Br. at 8, citing
14
prosecution history of a related patent can be relevant if, for example, it addresses a limitation
interpretation specific meanings disclaimed during prosecution.’” Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple
Inc., 856 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d
1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). For prosecution disclaimer to attach, the alleged disavowing
actions or statements made during prosecution must be both clear and unmistakable. Id. In
Aylus, the Federal Circuit noted that although this doctrine arose in the context of pre-issuance
prosecution, it has also applied the doctrine in post-issuance proceedings before the USPTO.
Id. at 1360.
The ‘471 Patent was prosecuted in 2017 and granted in January 2018. U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (“USPTO”), U.S. Patent No. 9,867,471, http://patft.uspto.gov/ (last visited June
15, 2020). The ‘471 Patent is undoubtably part of the same patent family as the patents at
issue in this case and contains the same fig.3 and fig.7 reproduced above. Id. During
prosecution of the ‘471 Patent, the patentee asserted the following claim: “a flange removably
connected to the cup holder body at the open top end thereof . . . .” (Declaration of Michael
L. Lindinger (“Lindinger Decl.”) ¶ 7, Ex. 4, Docket # 79-4 at 2.) The patentee’s claims
regarding the flange were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for failing to comply with the written
description requirement. (Lindinger Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. 5, Docket # 79-5 at 4.) 9 Specifically, the
9
A patent specification must contain an adequate written description. 35 U.S.C. § 112; Moba, B.V. v.
Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003). “Although the statute proscribes
addition of new matter to a specification or claims under [35 U.S.C.] § 132, the United States Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals decided to police the addition of new matter to claims separately using
§ 112.” Moba, B.V., 325 F.3d at 1319. “The written description is the metric against which a
subsequently added claim is measured to determine if it is due the priority date of the original patent.”
15
connected to the cup holder body. (Id. at 4–5.) The rejection further stated that it was not clear
how the flange would be removably connected to the cup holder body. (Id. at 5.) The patentee
amended the ‘471 patent by removing the “removably connected to the cup holder body at
the open top end thereof” language, leaving simply “flange.” (Lindinger Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 6,
Docket # 79-6 at 3–4.) Man Wah argues that by removing this limitation, Raffel disclaimed
any meaning of “flange” that is removably connected to the cup holder body.
At the Markman hearing, Raffel argued that the examiner was not rejecting the claim
based on its breadth or the scope of “flange”; rather, it made a “new matter rejection,”
rejecting use of a word that was not found in the application. (Markman Hearing Tr. at 51–
58.) Raffel argued that there was no determination whether the language of the patent’s
specifications included both removable and non-removable flanges, and that it was clear that
Raffel’s assertion is belied by the fact the examiner specifically rejected the claims on
the basis that the specifications and drawings of the flange (specifically 136 and 302) did not
disclose the flange as removably connected to the cup holder body. (Docket # 79-5 at 5.) The
examiner went so far as to say that it was unclear just how the flange would be removably
connected to the cup holder body based on the specification and drawings. (Id.) (“[N]or is it
Id.; see also In re Wright, 866 F.2d 422, 424 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“When the scope of a claim has been
changed by amendment in such a way as to justify an assertion that it is directed to a different invention
than was the original claim, it is proper to inquire whether the newly claimed subject matter was
described in the patent application when filed as the invention of the applicant. That is the essence of
the so-called ‘description requirement’ of § 112, first paragraph.”). The purpose of the written
description requirement is to prevent an applicant from later asserting that he invented something he
did not invent. Moba, B.V., 325 F.3d at 1319. Thus, the invention must be described in enough detail
that future claims can be determined to be encompassed within the original invention. Id.
16
examiner’s concern is apparent from the drawings themselves. Raffel admits that fig.3 shows
a flange that is part of a single piece with the cup holder body. (Raffel’s Br. at 18–19.) And
while Raffel argues that fig.7 could depict a removeable or non-removeable flange, nothing in
the drawings or specifications actually indicates that the flange is potentially removable.
Given the USPTO’s rejection language and the patentee’s subsequent amendment removing
the “removably connected to the cup holder body” language, it is reasonable to interpret the
patentee’s action as acknowledging that the flange was not “removably connected.” If the
patentee intended to convey that the flange was either removable or non-removable to satisfy
the examiner’s concerns that the specifications and drawings did not describe a removably
connected flange, it is unclear how deleting the “removably connected” language would
accomplish this.
The purpose of the prosecution disclaimer doctrine is to ensure that claims are not
“‘construed one way in order to obtain their allowance and in a different way against accused
infringers.’” Aylus Networks, Inc., 856 F.3d at 1360 (quoting Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG
Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). As the Supreme Court has explained:
Roemer v. Peddie, 132 U.S. 313, 317 (1889). While Raffel points to the general language in its
response that it was making its amendments “without prejudice to or disclaimer of subject
matter therein” (Docket # 79-6 at 5), this language appears to be boilerplate and not tailored
specifically to the scope of “flange.” Cf. Aylus Networks, Ind. 856 F.3d at 1359 (explaining that
17
the patentee’s amendment a clear and unmistakable disclaimer of the “removably connected”
Given the close relation between the ‘471 Patent and the patents at issue in this case,
the prosecution history of the ‘471 Patent informs the patentee’s intent regarding the meaning
of the term “flange” in the prior patents. The fact that the patentee attempted to broaden the
meaning of “flange” in subsequent patents to include removable flanges suggests that the prior
patents included only non-removable flanges. The prosecution history, coupled with the
2. Design Patent
in the patent. Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995). As with utility
patents, determining whether a design patent claim has been infringed requires determining
its meaning and scope. Id. However, because design patents “typically are claimed as shown
in drawings,” the court is not required to attempt to provide a detailed verbal description of
the claimed design. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 679 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation and citation omitted). Rather, “[a] design patent’s claim is . . . often better
represented by illustrations than a written claim construction.” Sport Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman
Co., 820 F.3d 1316, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Although providing a verbal description of a design
is generally unfavored, the Federal Circuit has found that a verbal description may be helpful
to the trier of fact in circumstances where the design contains both functional and non-
18
Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Where a design contains both functional
and non-functional elements, the scope of the claim must be construed in order to identify the
non-functional aspects of the design as shown in the patent.”). The Federal Circuit has
“emphasize[d] that a district court’s decision regarding the level of detail to be used in
describing the claimed design is a matter within the court’s discretion.” Egyptian Goddess, Inc.,
The ‘252 Patent includes eight figures depicting the ornamental design for a cup
holder. (Docket # 108-6.) While Raffel relies on the eight figures depicted in the patent, Man
Wah argues this patent requires a detailed verbal description. Man Wah relies principally on
a statement made by the inventor, Paul Stangl, to the USPTO regarding the placement of
As an engineer, I am well versed in the many different factors that go into any
design decisions regarding the shape, location, or proximity of elements in an
apparatus (e.g., placement of switches). To say that the shape or location of an
element within a well-designed structure is merely “a design preference” or
only “aesthetic” in nature is to mischaracterize the process involved in creating
such a structure.
(Lindinger Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. 3, Declaration of Paul Stangl ¶ 7, Docket # 79-3.) Man Wah argues
that Stangl’s statements “make clear that Raffel believes that the shape, location, and
proximity of the elements in the cup holder are functional.” (Man Wah’s Br. at 20–21.) Man
Wah intends to argue that the ‘252 Patent is entirely functional and therefore invalid. (Id. at
As Judge Jones noted at the Markman Hearing (Markman Hearing Tr. at 88.), on the
current record the court cannot construe which portions of the design are functional and
19
ornamental aspects or features of a cup holder depicts in FIGS. 1–8.” Man Wah is free to
CONCLUSION
TERM CONSTRUCTION
A1: A cup holder apparatus for a seating Plain and ordinary meaning.
arrangement
A2: A lighted cup holder apparatus for a Plain and ordinary meaning.
seating arrangement
A3: A movie theater seating arrangement Plain and ordinary meaning.
comprising a cup holder apparatus
Control Switch [or connection] Control Switch – Plain and ordinary
meaning.
COURT:
BY THE COUR
URT:
NANCY
A C JOSEPH
OS
United States Magistrate Judge
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