3 Abakada V Purisima

(2nd issue may not be important)
G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT

S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his
capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as
Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
BIR – Bureau of Internal Revenue; BOC – Bureau of Customs; DOF – Dept. of Finance; DBM – Dept. of Budget and
Management; NEDA – National Economic Development Authority; CSC – Civil Service Commission; DBCC –
Development Budget and Coordinating Committee
FACTS:
 RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation
of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board).3 It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment
status.
 The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year as
determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC)
 The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue
the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335,8 to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created for such purpose.
 Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax
reform legislation.
o contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters"
o claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection
o assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a
sufficient standard on that matter
o assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was undue delegation of legislative power
RULING:
 Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient
standard test.
o A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate.26 It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law
to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
o To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative
policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
 RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law.
 Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and the
BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to
Congress.30 Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes
the scrutiny of the DBCC.
 On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and identifies the conditions under which
officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from
the service.
(2nd issue may not be important)
 Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The
guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes
other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee.
ISSUE: W/N the Congressional Committee violates the separation of powers
RULING:
 The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the (IRR)
formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the
executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.
Concept & Bases of Congressional Oversight
 the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of
and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-
enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program
objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste
and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive
conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.
Categories of congressional oversight functions
a. Scrutiny – implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative operations. Its primary purpose is
to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative
scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the other branches of government. It can give
recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency involved
b. Congressional investigation – involves a more intense digging of facts
c. Legislative supervision – most encompassing; "Supervision" connotes a continuing and informed awareness on
the part of a congressional committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area.
congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and
permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.
 Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It typically utilizes veto
provisions when granting the President or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force
of law. These provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress,
which retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect
 Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed
by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect
 Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect.49 Such rules and regulations partake of the
nature of a statute50 and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself
 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions
of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect.

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(2nd issue may not be important)

G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT

ISSUE: Whether or not there was undue delegation of legislative power

ISSUE: W/N the Congressional Committee violates the separation of powers

Concept & Bases of Congressional Oversight

Categories of congressional oversight functions

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