5 Cases On Miscellaneous Matters Re LR

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1. PRINCE TRANSPORT, INC. VS.

GARCIA
G.R. No. 167291 January 12, 2011

FACTS:
Prince Transport, Inc. (PTI), is a company engaged in the business of transporting passengers by land;
respondents were hired either as drivers, conductors, mechanics or inspectors, except for respondent
Diosdado Garcia, who was assigned as Operations Manager. Sometime in October 2007 the commissions
received by the respondents were reduced to 7 to 9% from 8 to 10%. This led respondents and other
employees of PTI to hold a series of meetings to discuss the protection of their interests as employees.
Ranato Claros, president of PTI, made known to Garcia his objections to the formation of a union and in
order to block the continued formation of the union, PTI caused the transfer of all union members and
sympathizers to one of its sub-companies, Lubas Transport (Lubas). The business of Lubas deteriorated
because of the refusal of PTI to maintain and repair the units being used therein, which resulted in the
virtual stoppage of its operations and respondents' loss of employment. Hence, the respondent-employees
filed complaints against PTI for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. PTI contended that it has
nothing to do with the management and operations of Lubas as well as the control and supervision of the
latter's employees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practice

HELD:
Petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practice. The Court held that respondents’ transfer of work
assignments to Lubas was designed by petitioners as a subterfuge to foil the former’s right to organize
themselves into a union. Under Article 248 (a) and (e) of the Labor Code, an employer is guilty of unfair
labor practice if it interferes with, restrains or coerces its employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization or if it discriminates in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
2. 7K CORPORATION v. EDDIE ALBARICO
G.R. No. 182295 June 26, 2013

FACTS:
When he was dismissed on 5 April 1993, Albarico was a regular employee of 7K Corporation, a company
selling water purifiers. He started working for the company in 1990 as a salesman. Because of his good
performance, his employment was regularized. He was also promoted several times: from salesman, he
was promoted to senior sales representative and then to acting team field supervisor. In 1992, he was
awarded the President’s Trophy for being one of the company’s top water purifier specialist distributors.
In April of 1993, the chief operating officer of 7K Corporation terminated Albarico’s employment
allegedly for his poor sales performance. Albarico had to stop reporting for work, and he subsequently
submitted his money claims against 7K Corporation for arbitration before the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB). The issue for voluntary arbitration before the NCMB, according to the
parties’ Submission Agreement was whether Albarico was entitled to the payment of separation pay and
the sales commission reserved for him by the corporation. As for its defense, 7K Corporation claimed
Albarico had voluntarily stopped reporting for work after receiving a verbal reprimand for his sales
performance; hence, it was he who was guilty of abandonment of employment While the case was
pending before the NCMB, Albarico filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA. The latter ruled
in favor of Albarico. However, the NLRC, on appeal, vacated the decision of the LA on the ground of
forum-shopping, without prejudice to the pending NCMB arbitration case. The decision of the NLRC
became final.

Issue:

Whether or not the voluntary arbitrator properly assume jurisdiction to decide the legality of Albarico’s
dismissal

Held:

YES. The Court ruled that although the general rule under the Labor Code gives the labor arbiter
exclusive and original jurisdiction over termination disputes, it also recognizes exceptions. Under Article
262, the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also
hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.

On the issue of whether respondent was entitled to separation pay and to the sales commission the latter
earned before being terminated, the Court ruled that although petitioner correctly contends that separation
pay may in fact be awarded for reasons other than illegal dismissal, the circumstances of the instant case
lead to no other conclusion than that the claim of respondent for separation pay was premised on his
allegation of illegal dismissal. Thus, the voluntary arbitrator properly assumed jurisdiction over the issue
of the legality of his dismissal.
3. Heirs of Edwin Deauna vs Fil-Star Maritime Corporation

G.R. No. 191563 June 20, 2012

FACTS: Edwin boarded on August 1, 2004 for a nine-month engagement as Chief Engineer of the Sanko.
He suffered from abdominal pains and was found to have kidney stones for which he was given
medication. Edwin was then repatriated. Respondents claimed that Edwin requested for an early
termination while petitioners averred that Edwin was repatriated due to the latter's body weakness and
head heaviness. Edwin was discovered to have Glioblastoma WHO Grade 4 (GBM) . It was then noted
that Edwin could have acquired the cancer as a result of radiation or vinyl products, or had worked in the
vicinity of power lines. Respondent claimed that out of compassion and intent to avoid legal battles, they
extended to Edwin an allowance of US$6,033.36. They also offered the payment of US$60,000.00
disability benefits despite having no obligation to do so on their part as GBM can only be considered as
work-related if a person who suffers therefrom had exposures to radiation or vinyl products, or had
worked in the vicinity of power lines. The respondents claimed that Edwin did not have such exposure
while under their employ. Petitioners then asked for disability benefits, but were denied by respondents.
They then filed a complaint for disability benefits, medical and transportation reimbursements, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees were filed before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). Edwin died on April 13, 2006 during the pendency of the proceedings. He was substituted
therein by the petitioners who sought the payment of death benefits under the International Bargaining
Forum/Associated Marine Officers and Seamens Union of the Philippines/International Mariners
Management Association of Japan Collective Bargaining Agreement (IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA).
Voluntary Arbitrator Rene Ofreneo (VA Ofreneo), invoking the provisions of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA SEC) and the
IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA, awarded death benefits to the petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of VA Ofreneo. Petitioners contend that they are entitled to death benefits.

ISSUE:

Whether or not within the purview of the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA, Edwin's death on April 13, 2006,
or more than a year from his repatriation, can be considered as one occurring while he was still in the
employment of the respondents.

SC RULING:

YES. Edwin's death can be considered can be considered as one occuring while he was still in the
employment of respondents. Under the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA provisions, Edwin's death a little
more than a year from his repatriation can still be considered as one occurring while he was still under the
respondents' employ.
4. Magsaysay Maritime Corp. vs Wastfel-Larsen Management

G.R. No. 177578 January 25, 2012

FACTS: Petitioner Magsaysay Maritime Corporation is a domestic corporation and the local manning
agent of the vessel MV "Fossanger" and of petitioner Wastfel-Larsen Management A/S. Respondent
Oberto S. Lobusta is a seaman who has worked for Magsaysay Maritime Corporation. Lobusta boarded
MV "Fossanger" on March 16, 1998. After two months, he complained of breathing difficulty and back
pain. On May 12, 1998, while the vessel was in Singapore, Lobusta was admitted at Gleneagles Maritime
Medical Center and was diagnosed to be suffering from severe acute bronchial asthma with secondary
infection and lumbosacral muscle strain. Dr. C K Lee certified that Lobusta was fit for discharge on May
21, 1998, for repatriation for further treatment. Upon repatriation, Lobusta was referred to Metropolitan
Hospital. The medical coordinator, Dr. Robert Lim, reported that Lobusta has been diagnosed to have a
moderate obstructive pulmonary disease which tends to be a chronic problem, such that Lobusta needs to
be on medications indefinitely. Petitioners "then faced the need for confirmation and grading by a second
opinion" and "it took the parties time to agree on a common doctor, until they agreed on Dr. Camilo Roa."
According to Dr. Roa, Lobusta is not physically fit to resume his normal work as a seaman due to the
persistence of his symptoms. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation suggested that Lobusta be examined by
another company-designated doctor for an independent medical examination. Dr. David opined that Mr.
Lobusta ought not to be considered fit to return to work as an Able Seaman. As no settlement was reached
despite the above findings, the Labor Arbiter ordered the parties to file their respective position papers.

ISSUE: Does the poea contract consider the mere lapse of more than one hundred twenty (120) days as
total and permanent disability?

SC RULING: No. A temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the
company physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-
day medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a
permanent disability. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to
sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent
disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician[,] but in no case shall this period
exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. Upon repatriation, Lobusta was first examined by the
Pulmonologist and Orthopedic Surgeon on May 22, 1998. The maximum 240-day (8-month) medical-
treatment period expired, but no declaration was made that Lobusta is fit to work. Nor was there a
declaration of the existence of Lobusta’s permanent disability. On February 16, 1999, Lobusta was still
prescribed medications for his lumbosacral pain and was advised to return for reevaluation. May 22, 1998
to February 16, 1999 is 264 days or 6 days short of 9 months.
5. Pedro Libang, Jr. vs Indochina Ship Management,Inc.

G.R. No. 189363 September 17, 2014

Facts:

Libang entered into a nine-month employment contract with ISMI, a domestic manning agency that acted
for and in behalf of its foreign shipping company, Majestic. Libang was engaged as a Cook 1 for the
vessel M/V Baltimar Orion. While Libang was on board M/V Baltimar Orion, he experienced numbness
on the left side of his face, difficulty in hearing from his left ear, blurred vision of his left eye and speech
problem. Libang was eventually repatriated. Two days later, he reported to ISMI and was endorsed for
medical attention to the companydesignated physician, Dr. Robert Lim (Dr. Lim) of the Marine Medical
Services in Metropolitan Hospital. Dr. Lim issued to Libang a medical certificate which states that the
hypertension of Libang “could be pre-existing”. Considering Dr. Lim’s failure to assess Libang’s
disability despite his health status, the latter sought medical attention and assessment from another doctor,
Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo (Dr. Vicaldo) of the Philippine Heart Center. A medical certificate issued by Dr.
Vicaldo states that Libang has Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease, Diabetes Mellitus and S/P
Cerebrovascular accident and gave Impediment Grade VI (50%). Libang filed with NLRC a complaint for
disability benefit. The respondents disputed any liability arguing that the disability was pre-existing.

ISSUE: Is Libang entitled to disability benefit?

Held:

YES. Given the failure of Dr. Lim to fully evaluate Libang’s illness, disability or fitness to work, the
seafarer was justified in seeking the medical expertise of his physician of choice. The NLRC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in considering Dr. Vicaldo’s assessment. As against an incomplete
evaluation by Dr. Lim, the medical certificate issued by Dr. Vicaldo included a determination of the
disability grade that applied to Libang’s condition. Libang was diagnosed to have both Hypertensive
Cardiovascular Disease and Diabetes Mellitus with an Impediment Grade VI. He was declared to be unfit
to resume to work as a seafarer in any capacity. The respondents could not be allowed to benefit from
their physician’s inaction or refusal to disclose the results of the diagnostic tests performed upon Libang,
the extent of the patient’s illnesses, and the effect of the severity of these illnesses on his fitness or
disability. The respondents even failed to sufficiently dispute the finding of the LA and NLRC that
Libang’s illnesses had resulted in a Grade VI disability.

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