Twelve Steps to Engineering Safe

Onshore Oil and Gas Facilities

J.E. Johnstone, SPE, and J.V. Curfew, SPE, Contek Solutions

Summary engineering practices, standards, and regulatory requirements. The

Late in the evening of a wintery night, a worker is hurrying to re- other path available is that of doing what inevitably leads to equip-
spond to an alarm that has gone off. Suddenly, the unexpected hap- ment failure, personnel injuries, and environmental damage.
pens. The worker is severely injured. The ensuing investigation Your first reaction to this is to ask yourself, “Why would any
finds that the incident could have been prevented if the equipment company choose not to follow the high road?” The answer to this
had been engineered properly. question is multifaceted.
How many times have you heard of incidents that have severely First, the company, particularly if it is a new exploration com-
injured a person and you thought, “That incident could have been pany, may not understand all of the detailed design work that goes
prevented if only the equipment had been engineered properly?” into building safe surface facilities. Often, personnel from other
One of the first lines of defense in preventing incidents is to “en- companies or other operating areas are asked to design and build
gineer out the hazards.” However, equipment is often installed facilities in new areas where production characteristics and produc-
without taking into consideration how it can be engineered prop- tion hazards are totally different. Cost is another factor, because
erly to minimize or eliminate operating risks. well-engineered facilities may be perceived as being more expen-
The safety of an onshore facility is a function of how safely the sive. These and other reasons lead some companies to take a dif-
facility is designed. People are hurt and sometimes killed when ex- ferent path when designing and installing facilities.
plosions, fires, and toxic-gas releases occur at oil- and gas-pro-
ducing facilities that were designed without regard to measures Twelve Steps
that could have prevented such incidents. The safety of people and 1. Set a Design-Standard Policy. Each producing company, no
equipment needs to be considered and included along every step in matter how small, must implement a policy regarding the use of
the engineering of oil and gas facilities. Properly designed oil and industry design standards on how surface facilities should be built
gas facilities can eliminate injuries and deaths. that can be articulated to the production-operations groups.
Many wellsites, tank batteries, and production facilities are at Companies must first justify internally the need for adopting a
risk because of design or installation errors. These errors may have design standard. Usually, companies will consider the impacts and
occurred when the facility was built or occurred over time because ramifications of how employees, shareholders, regulatory bodies,
the facility had been continually “added on to” through the years. and the public will react to facilities that are not built to current in-
Lack of proper engineering design can lead to equipment failure, dustry standards or regulatory requirements. A major incident at
lost production, human injury, or harm to the environment. a facility not meeting general industry standards or regulatory re-
This paper reviews the key areas for facility designers and engi- quirements can result in fines or judgments that can negatively af-
neers to include when designing facilities to ensure safe facilities. fect the company.
Use and incorporation of all safety engineering principles outlined Setting a design policy to use industry standards will also re-
in this paper should enable facility engineers and designers to build duce the risk of injury to personnel or the occurrence of an environ-
safe facilities that reduce the risk of major incidents. mental event at the facility. Most industry standards and regulations
were developed in response to safety-related events. Many stan-
Getting Management “On Board” dards, such as American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
One of the first questions asked by corporate executives and inves- B31.3 Chemical Plant and Petroleum Refinery Piping (1993), are
tors after a new discovery is, “How in the world are we going to continually evolving over time to incorporate “lessons learned”
produce this?” The completion engineers quickly figure out how from safety-related events. Building a facility to industry standards
to get the highly valuable well fluids to the surface. Then, everyone provides the user with industry-accepted safety criteria.
turns to the production and surface-equipment experts and asks, Another reason for a design policy standard is to make it clear to
“What equipment are we going to need to treat and sell oil and gas engineering design firms, construction firms, and other contractors
from this new discovery?” The answer to this question will impact what the company expects. Facilities may be built to criteria other
the safety and health of perhaps generations of workers who will be than industry standards if the design firm is directed to do so by the
working on and near this equipment for decades while the oil and operator. Some operators feel that industry standards establish the
gas is being produced. mimium criteria and choose to use more-stringent standards.
At this point, companies have the option of following two dif- An example of a policy on design standards would be for a com-
ferent paths. The first path is the “high road” of making sure that pany to state: “All facilities will be designed in accordance with
all facilities are designed and operated in accordance with good good industry design practices and codes, and also to meet all regu-
latory requirements.”
Copyright © 2012 Society of Petroleum Engineers 2. Lay Out the Site for Safety. One of the first tasks when build-
This paper (SPE 141974) was accepted for presentation at the SPE Americas E&P Health, ing a new facility is to properly lay it out on the pad. In planning
Safety, Security, and Environmental Conference, Houston, 21–23 March 2011, and revised the equipment layout, one must obtain a plot plan of the site and an
for publication. Original manuscript received for review 15 April 2011. Revised manuscript
received for review 1 November 2011. Paper peer approved 1 December 2011. equipment list showing the equipment to be installed.

38 Oil and Gas Facilities • August 2012

 Start first by locating the most-hazardous items of equipment failure. Regulations concerning the design and construction of tank
on the site. The most-hazardous items of equipment would include berms can be found in the US Environmental Protection Agency’s
a) Vents that may discharge poisonous gases (hydrogen sulfide) (EPA) Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure (SPCC) reg-
or flammable gases. Examples of such equipment may include ulations (US EPA 2005).
amine-unit process vents, tank vent lines, pressure-relief header The vents off of tanks should be treated just as other process
lines, and glycol-unit vents. vents or vent headers. The discharge of the vent should be located
Vents should be placed downwind of the facility and where the in a safe location so that vapors are dispersed so as not to cause any
prevailing wind will disperse the released gases to an area that is danger to personnel or the environment.
not inhabited or not expected to impact human life. The placement f) Site offices, electronic control equipment, batteries, and elec-
of the vent should also include provisions for accidental ignition by trical switchgear should be placed at the site in the safest location
lightning or other sources. possible. Usually, this is far away from vents, flares, fired ves-
The engineer should conduct both air-dispersion and radiant- sels, and engine-driven components. Site offices usually have the
heat modeling to make sure that vented or burned vapors do not highest occupancy level of any structure on the site. Nonclassified
impact personnel at the facility, nor at any other nearby public re- electrical equipment, such as computers, air conditioners, heaters,
ceptor (i.e., an occupied structure, road, park, or other area where electrical outlets, and other devices that could be a source of igni-
people may be present). tion, are located in site offices.
Standards relating to vent design include American Petroleum Electrical equipment needs to be located so that its electrical
Institute (API) recommended practice (RP) 521 Pressure-relieving classification meets the requirements found in API RP 500 Recom-
and Depressuring Systems (2007). mended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical In-
b) As with vents, flares should be located as far away downwind stallations at Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I, Division 1
from other equipment as possible. Additionally, they should be lo- and Division 2 (1997). The guidance provided in API RP 500 is to
cated such that any public receptors are not in danger from burned be used for electrical classification only.
vapors or noncombusted discharge components in the event of a There are three key documents that can assist the engineer in de-
flame failure. Hazards with flares include radiant heat and oxidized termining proper spacing. The first of these is National Fire Protec-
(burned) vapors that may pose a threat to human health. tion Association (NFPA) 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids
The engineer should also consider impacts if the igniter or pilot Code (1996). This document specifies minimum distances between
fails or if the flare’s flame goes out from other causes. As with tanks and property lines and from tanks to buildings on the same
vents, dispersion calculations need to be carried out to determine property. The Industrial Risk Insurers (IRI 1991) has developed
if a flame failure could result in any type of harm to human health charts showing distances between plant equipment. The Process In-
or the environment. dustry Practices (PIP), in June 2007, published PIP PNE00003 Pro-
Standards relating to flare and vent design include API RP 521 cess Unit and Offsites Layout Guide. This guide was developed to
Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems (2007). bring together the many regulatory and industry practices by “…har-
c) Fired process equipment should next be located on the plot monizing these technical requirements into a single set of practice.”
plan. Examples of fired equipment include heater treaters, heater/
separators, glycol reboilers, amine reboilers, and process heaters. 3. Personnel Safety. Personnel safety at the oil and gas site needs
Hazards from fired equipment include those associated with a to be examined to make sure employees do not place themselves
flame being present as a source of ignition, hot surfaces that may at risk performing routine operations and that the site conforms
be above the flash point of hydrocarbons, and the fact that fire tubes to US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) re-
are in direct contact with flammable liquids that can result in a fire quirements. OSHA regulations (see OSHA STD 29 CFR 1910.106
if a fire tube leaks. 2006) provide excellent guidance when designing walking surfac-
These equipment items should be located away from equipment es, exit routes, stairways, ladders, elevated platforms, and equip-
that store or process flammable hydrocarbons. Examples of these ment guarding.
devices would include atmospheric tanks, separators, compressors, There are many simple things, such as installing platforms, to
scrubbers, pumps, meters, and pipeways. Fired process equipment enable operators to more easily change filters or refill equipment
should also be located away from devices, such as pig receivers with lubricating oils or chemicals. Walkways should be provided
and vents, where hydrocarbons are released or known to be present. that are free from small-diameter lines or tripping hazards.
d) Engines and rotating equipment, such as pumps, should be Here are some other key personnel-safety items that need to be
located on the site to prevent harm from possible hydrocarbon re- included when constructing a lease site:
leases, ignition, noise, and other factors. Engine-driven compres- • Exit route (see OSHA STD 29 CFR 1910.36 2006): OSHA re-
sors have an inherent danger of natural gas being ignited by the quires that facilities have at least two exits. The minimum width for
ignition system or from the hot exhaust manifolds. Pumps are an exit walkway or gate is 28 in. Exits need to be clearly marked.
known to periodically lose seals, which can result in liquid hydro- • Stairs (see OSHA STD 29 CFR 1910.24 2006): Fixed stairs
carbons being released to the ground or atmosphere. (e.g., leading to the top of a tank or at a compressor) must be at
The engineer should always provide some form of catchment or least 22 in. in width. The stairs can be at an angle from 30 to 50°.
secondary containment around pumps and compressor skids. Com- All stairs must have railings on each side.
pressors usually leak small amounts of oil that, if not properly han- • Elevated platforms [see OSHA STD 29 CFR 1910.23(c) 2006]:
dled, can result in soil contamination around the unit. Likewise, the Elevated platforms may be found on tanks or around compressors
failure of a pump seal can cause leaks, resulting in contaminated and other pieces of equipment. Every elevated platform must be
soil or waterways. equipped with handrails, midrails, and toe boards.
e) Separators, tanks, and unfired vessels should be the next set • Guarding of equipment (see OSHA STD 29 CFR 1910.219
of equipment items to be located on the plot plan. Separators and 2006): Couplings on compressors, pumps, fans, flywheels, rotating
unfired pressure vessels should be located so that their associated weights, and other rotating equipment must be guarded in accor-
relief devices are designed to relieve to a safe area. A safe area for dance with OSHA regulations. Make sure that personnel are not
relief can be defined as one that does not cause direct harm to per- able to come in contact with any rotating piece of equipment.
sonnel or the environment. Additionally, the design team should consider human factors and
Atmospheric tanks are usually located inside of berms or other technical safety requirements in the design. Human factors might
secondary containment devices. The intent of the secondary con- include making sure that computer displays, equipment controls,
tainment device is to capture any fluids in the event of a tank leak or and manually actuated devices (i.e., switches and valves) are easily

August 2012 • Oil and Gas Facilities 39

identifiable and can indeed be operated in a timely manner. Poorly n Procedure-qualification record (PQR): A PQR is used
designed alarm points, valves that cannot be reached, or equipment to verify the WPS. The WPS is qualified by welding-
located too far from the operators often creates hazards that be- procedure-qualification test coupons. The variables and
come apparent during an emergency situation. tests used are recorded on a PQR.
Techncial safety includes making sure that proper safety limits n 
Welder-performance qualification (WPQ): The per-
are specified, control settings are designed to prevent a safety event, formance of the welders is verified by welding-perfor-
proper surveillance is “built in,” and other factors. mance-qualification test coupons. The variables and
tests used with the particular variable ranges qualified
4. Design Piping Properly. In order to design a safe and reliable are recorded on a WPQ record.
facility, it is imperative that the piping system be properly de- o Weld inspection: Inspection is necessary to ensure quality.
signed. OSHA addresses this topic in STD 29 CFR 1910.106(c)(1) Each piping code defines the amount of inspection that is
(i) (2006), stating that “The design (including selection of materi- required.
als), fabrication, assembly, test, and inspection of piping systems • Threaded and coupled
containing flammable or combustible liquids shall be suitable for o The ASME B31.3 code does not allow threaded connec-
the expected working pressures and structural stresses. Conformity tions greater than 2-in. nominal pipe size.
with the applicable provisions of Pressure Piping, ANSI B31 series o In all codes (ASME B31.3 and ANSI/ASME B31.4 and
and the provisions of this paragraph, shall be considered prima fa- B31.8), thread depth must be included as an “allowance.”
cie evidence of compliance with the foregoing provisions.” • Grooved and coupled
For oil and gas facilities, the primary ASME [formerly Amer- o In all codes (ASME B31.3 and ANSI/ASME B31.4 and
ican National Standards Institute (ANSI)] piping codes are B31.8), groove depth must be included as a wall-loss “al-
• ASME B31.3 Chemical Plant and Petroleum Refinery Piping lowance.”
(1993) o When field cutting grooves, care must be taken so as not to
• ANSI/ASME B31.4 Pipeline Transportation Systems for cut grooves excessively deep.
Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids (2010) o Many operators limit the use of grooved connections to 150
• ANSI/ASME B31.8 Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Class (285 psig).
Systems (2007) With all steel piping systems, it is usually necessary to include a
Because “upstream” oil and gas facilities are not specifically corrosion allowance (CA). Typical CA numbers range from 1/32 in.
covered by any of these codes, it is at the user’s discretion to select for mildly corrosive systems up to 3/32 in. or more for aggressive
the applicable piping code. The code most often referenced for sur- corrosion attack. It is up to the user to select the most appropriate
face facilities is ASME B31.3 Chemical Plant and Petroleum Re- CA. Additional information on piping materials and specification
finery Piping (1993). Another very important standard that needs breaks can be found in paper SPE 121031 (Johnstone 2009).
to be used is ANSI/NACE MR0175 Materials for use in H2S-con-
taining environments in oil and gas production (2009). This stan- 5. Select the Proper Pressure Vessel. Pressure vessels are gener-
dard should be used whenever hydrogen sulfide gas is present or ally defined by ASME Section VIII-DIV 1 of the BPVC as having
could become present as the field is produced. Interconnecting un- an internal pressure greater than 15 psig and an internal diameter
derground pipelines between wells and surface facilities are usu- greater than 6 in. The US Department of Labor’s OSHA has set
ally designed and built to either ANSI/ASME B31.8 (2007) for gas rules that require pressure vessels used in flammable- and com-
pipelines or ANSI/ASME B31.4 (2010) for liquid pipelines. Inter- bustible-liquid service to be “built in accordance with the Code for
estingly, the flowline from a remote well to the first separator is Unfired Pressure Vessels, Section VIII of the ASME Boiler and
specifically excluded from ANSI/ASME B31.8. Because the well Pressure Vessel Code” (OSHA Standard 1910.106 2006). OSHA
flowlines are multiphase service (oil, water, and gas), several op- later made it clear to the oil- and gas-producing industry that all
erators have adopted the practice of building the lines to ANSI/ pressure vessels must conform to ASME Section VIII in a letter
ASME B31.8 with a design factor of F=0.50. This practice yields from Richard E. Fairfax, Director, Directorate of Enforcement
pipe-wall thickness approximately equal to ASME B31.3 for com- Programs to Charles H. Morgan (Fairfax 2006).
parable materials and pipe sizes. The manufacturer’s name plate, which should remain perma-
It should be noted that API does not have a piping design code sim- nently affixed to the pressure vessel, must display the “U” stamp
ilar to the ASME codes. API has extensive specifications for piping as an indication that the design, fabrication, and testing were com-
materials, but it does not issue any documents covering design, selec- pleted in accordance with the BPVC. In addition, the purchaser
tion of materials, fabrication, assembly, test, and inspection. should obtain a copy of the U1A form from the manufacturer,
The most common joining methods are welded and flanged, which contains additional information on materials, fabrication,
threaded and coupled, and grooved and coupled. Each method has and inspection.
advantages and disadvantages, and it is up to the user to select the In order to maintain the integrity of pressure vessels, they must
joining method that is best suited. The following are general com- be inspected periodically. As a result of the inspection, sometimes
ments about each of the joining methods: the vessel must be repaired or rerated. The most common inspec-
• Welded and flanged tion code is API 510 Pressure Vessel Inspection Code: In-Service
o There are two basic welding standards: Inspection, Rating, Repair, and Alteration (2006). An alternative in-
n API STD 1104 Welding of pipelines and related facili- spection, repair, and rerating code is ANSI/NBBPVI NB23-2007
ties (2005). Usually for ANSI/ASME B31.4 and B31.8 National Board Inspection Code (NBIC) (2007). API 510 8.1 states
codes. “All repairs and alterations shall be performed by a repair organi-
n ASME Section IX Welding and Brazing Qualifications zation in accordance with the applicable principles of the ASME
(2010). Part of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Code, or the applicable construction or repair code.”
(BPVC). Usually used for pressure vessels and ASME Any pressure vessel that has been repaired or rerated should
B31.3 piping, but can also be used for pipeline welding. have an additional nameplate added with an “R” stamp displayed.
o There are three parts of a qualified weld:
n Welding-procedure specification (WPS): The WPS 6. Picking the Right Tank. In upstream oil and gas operations,
must contain the minimum requirements that are spec- there are two types of “tanks” according to OSHA:
ified by the code. The WPS provides guidance for • Low-pressure tanks—maximum allowable working pressure
welding by specifying ranges for each variable. (MAWP) from 0.5 to 15 psig

40 Oil and Gas Facilities • August 2012

 • Atmospheric tanks—MAWP from 0.0 to 0.5 psig Engines will typically have shutdowns for high jacket water
For low-pressure tanks, the OSHA requirements are very sim- temperature, low oil pressure, and low fuel pressure. Pressurized
ilar to those for pressure vessels. The design code is ASME Section natural gas is often used to start the units, and it can cause a fire
VIII or API STD 620 Design and Construction of Large, Welded, hazard unless the gas is vented properly. The air exchangers and
Low-Pressure Storage Tanks (2010). The inspection code is API drive shaft need to be guarded properly to prevent personnel injury.
510 or ANSI/NBBPVI NB23-2007, and the repair code is API 510. Engines should also be equipped with a device to close off the in-
For atmospheric tanks, the regulations are similar to those for coming air to prevent the engine from overspeeding if there is a gas
pressure vessels in that “tanks built in accordance” with API SPEC leak at the facility.
12B Specification for Bolted Tanks for Storage of Production The fuel used for a gas engine should be free of liquids and hy-
Liquids (2008), API SPEC 12D Specification for Field Welded drogen sulfide gas. Liquids in the fuel can cause premature engine
Tanks for Storage of Production Liquids (2008), or API SPEC damage by washing off the lubricating oil film from the cylinders.
12F Specification for Shop Welded Tanks for Storage of Production Additionally, slugs of liquid can cause the engine to overheat and
Liquids (2008) “shall be used only as production tanks for storage also can cause damage to catalytic converters that may be placed
of crude petroleum in oil-producing areas.” Basically, the API on the engines.
has provisions for manufacturers to self-regulate themselves. A Reciprocating Compressors. API STD 618 Reciprocating Com-
nameplate can be installed on the tank showing that the tank was pressors for Petroleum, Chemical, and Gas Industry Services
built to the particular listed API specification with or without the (2007) deals with low- to moderate-speed compressors, typically in
API monogram. Those using the API monogram must meet more- the 300- to 700-rev/min range, whereas API RP 11P Petroleum and
stringent requirements set forth by the API and enter into a licensing Natural Gas Industries—Packaged Reciprocating Gas Compres-
agreement with the API. An API monogram on the tank nameplate sors (2002) covers high-speed compressors (typically 900–1,800
is not required, but the other information required by the applicable rev/min) used in field compression applications.
API specification must be on the nameplate. In addition to the API All pressure vessels need to be protected with relief valves
series, tanks may also be built in accordance with the Underwriters on compressors. Relief valves are generally placed on the inlet
Laboratory standards. scrubber(s) and downstream of each stage of compression. High/
For atmospheric tanks, the inspection and repair code is API RP low pressure switches should also be placed on the inlet and outlet
12R1 Recommended Practice for Setting, Maintenance, Inspection, of each stage. High temperature shutdowns should be placed on
Operation and Repair of Tanks in Production Service (2008). the discharge of each stage to shut the unit down in the event of a
Additional information on venting capacity issues, corrosion mechanical (i.e., worn valves) problem. A check valve should be
control, and containment may be found in paper SPE 121031 placed downstream of the final discharge stage to prevent backflow
(Johnstone 2009). in the event of a leak or piping failure.
Electric Motors. The National Electrical Manufacturers Associa-
7. Specifying Rotating Equipment for Safety. Pumps. tion (NEMA) specifies motor enclosure types, insulation systems, and
Centrifugal pumps are specified by either ANSI/ASME B73.1 ratings for winding temperature rise. The NEMA standard for general-
Specification for Horizontal End Suction Centrifugal Pumps for purpose industrial alternating-current squirrel-cage induction motors
Chemical Process (2007) or API RP 610 Centrifugal Pumps for is designated as NEMA MG 1-2009 Motors and Generators (2010).
Petroleum, Petrochemical and Natural Gas Industries (2010). API Within this standard, descriptions are provided for various classifica-
RP 610 is generally used for pumps in severe service, being defined tions of protection for motor enclosures in Section 1—Classification
as hydrocarbon liquids in a high-temperature environment. ANSI/ According To Environmental Protection and Methods of Cooling.
ASME B73.1 specifications can be used in pumps with less rigor- NEMA provides definitions for various motor enclosures. In
ous service, where intrinsic reliability and high-temperature service general, there are two primary categories: open and totally en-
are not required. closed. An open motor has openings that allow external air to
The discharge piping of pumps should be equipped with a relief pass over and around the motor windings to provide the required
valve to prevent overpressure of downstream piping, a check valve cooling. Although it is not airtight, the enclosure of a totally en-
to prevent backflow, and a pressure high/low switch to alert the op- closed motor limits cooling of the windings from the external at-
erators in the event of a problem with the discharge. mosphere. Motor cooling for totally enclosed motors is typically
Questions are often asked about the need for a pressure safety achieved by some external means, such as a fan or water cooling.
valve (PSV) on the discharge of a centrifugal pump when the down- For Class I, Division 2 locations within the process area of a pro-
stream piping is rated higher than the shut-in head of the pump. duction facility, NEMA framed motors shall be totally enclosed fan
Centrifugal pumps can heat up the discharge fluids if the discharge cooled (TEFC). Class I, Division 1 locations require that NEMA
valve is closed while the pump continues to run. The increased tem- frame motors be explosion proof motors that are totally enclosed
perature can cause seal failure in a short time. For this reason, it is and supplied with positive-pressure ventilation from a source of
a good practice to install a relief valve or a recycle valve on the dis- noncontaminated air.
charge of a centrifugal pump. Other applicable standards for motors include:
A shut-in valve on the inlet to pumps in light hydrocarbon or • IEEE 841-2009 IEEE Standard for Petroleum and Chemical
crude service should be installed. This safety device can close off Industry-Premium-Efficiency, Severe-Duty, Totally Enclosed Fan-
flow to the pump in the event that there is a leak or fire downstream Cooled (TEFC) Squirrel Cage Induction Motors-Up to and In-
of the pump. cluding 370 kW (500 hp) (2009): This standard covers motors that
Internal-Combustion Reciprocating Gas Engines. Engine are a cast iron, heavy duty, industrial design motor, intended for the
manufactures generally follow International Standards Organi- chemical and petroleum industries.
zation (ISO) 3046-1:2002 Reciprocating internal combustion • API 541 Form-wound Squirrel-Cage Induction Motors—500
engines—Performance—Part 1: Declarations of power, fuel and lu- Horsepower and Larger (2004): This standard provides minimum
bricating oil consumptions, and test methods—Additional require- requirements for large, all form-wound squirrel-cage induction mo-
ments for engines for general use (2002) when reporting engine tors, 500 hp and larger.
horsepower ratings. Engine ratings will be degraded by ancillary • API 547 General-purpose Form-wound Squirrel Cage Induc-
equipment (e.g., fans, pumps), altitude, ambient temperature, and tion Motors—250 Horsepower and Larger (2005): This standard
fuel composition. The engineer should work with the engine man- provides minimum requirements for form-wound squirrel-cage in-
ufacturer to properly determine the available horsepower in accor- duction motors that are used in general-purpose petroleum, chem-
dance with ISO 3046-1:2002. ical, and other industrial severe-duty applications.

August 2012 • Oil and Gas Facilities 41

8. Relief-System Design Is Critical. The purpose of a relief sys- most likely case that will give the highest loading in the system.
tem is to protect piping and equipment from an excessive over- The most likely flow rate should be used for sizing the relief-system
pressure. Relief devices must comply with the appropriate ASME piping and determining the backpressures at each relief device.
vessel codes, and relief systems must also comply with state and Typically (but not always), the highest loading cases occur be-
federal laws and codes. State and federal regulations cover environ- cause of fire exposure. A conservative fire-circle diameter would
mental considerations as well as safety. The most common industry be 100 ft, with an assumed height of 25 ft.
references are After overpressure, capacity, and backpressure are determined,
• API 520 Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-re- the relieving device can be sized. Sizing equations for vapor and
lieving Devices in Refineries, Part I—Sizing and Selection (2008) liquid flow are presented in the GPSA Engineering Data Book
• API STD 521 Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems (GPSA 1987). The API has worked with the valve manufacturers to
(2007) establish standard orifice sizes for relief valves. After the exact size
• API 537 Flare Details for General Refinery and Petrochemical for the orifice required has been calculated, the next larger standard
Service (2008) orifice is selected.
• ASME Boiler Pressure and Vessel Code, Section VIII-DIV 1— The four main types of relief devices are as follows:
Rules for Construction of Pressure Vessels, 2005 Addenda (2004) • Conventional: Conventional safety valves can be specified to
An initial concern that should be addressed early in the design is vent either to the atmosphere or to a pressure-relief system. The
whether a relief system is necessary or if atmospheric vents are ac- conventional safety valve should be used when the discharge is
ceptable. This decision should be made primarily on the basis of the routed independently to the atmosphere. If the discharge is con-
type of fluids being handled and public exposure. In many cases, nected to a header system, backpressure buildup when one device
the safest, simplest, and most dependable means is direct venting is relieving will affect the relief setting. For this reason, the use of
to the atmosphere. However, releases of flammable liquids, con- a conventional safety valve should be avoided if backpressure ex-
densing vapors, and toxic vapors, and/or ignition of vented streams, ceeds 10% of the set pressure.
need to be assessed carefully. • Balanced: Balanced relief valves are springloaded and contain
When a vent or flare system is required, care should be taken to a bellows arrangement to keep backpressure from affecting the set
ensure that high-pressure reliefs dumping into a common system point. Balanced relief valves are recommended when backpressure
with low-pressure reliefs do not affect the operation of low-pres- exceeds 10% of the set pressure and can fluctuate up to a maximum
sure relief devices. When a great divergence in pressures exists at a of 30% backpressure.
single facility, it may be advantageous to use two systems. • Pilot-operated: Pilot-operated relief valves use the pressure in
Relief-system design begins with the criteria for individual re- the vessel to hold the valve closed, with a pilot to activate the mech-
lief devices. The initial considerations are set pressure, allowable anism. Pilot-operated relief valves have the advantage of allowing
overpressure, and relief capacity requirements. Overpressure is the operation near the set point with no chatter and are not affected by
pressure increase over the set pressure of the primary relieving de- backpressure. However, they will not function if the pilot fails.
vice. For single-relief-device systems, the set pressure of the device • Rupture disks: Rupture disks are diaphragms held between
can be no higher than the MAWP of the system. For multiple de- flanges and calibrated to burst at a specified static inlet pressure.
vice systems, the supplemental devices may be set higher than the A rupture disk is normally used as backup to a relief valve and, in
MAWP, the exact set pressure being determined by the purpose for this case, should be set at 120% of the MAWP at the maximum.
the additional capacity of the device. Normal system pressure should not be more than 70% of the disk
Relief capacity requirements for a device or set of devices are rupture pressure except for the reverse bucking type, which can be
determined by the worst-case upset scenario that can cause an over- up to 80%. Rupture disks are also used under relief valves to pro-
pressure condition. The most common upsets are as follows: tect them from corrosion. Rupture disks are very sensitive to the
• Blocked discharge: This condition occurs, for example, if the operating temperature.
equipment has been shut in and isolated, and an inlet valve has The relieved stream is either vented to the atmosphere at a safe
been opened without opening the outlet valve or this can also occur location or flared. The decision to vent or flare will depend on the
during an emergency shutdown (ESD), when several vessels and prevailing local environmental and OSHA regulations. However,
systems can be depressurized simultaneously. in small facilities and remote locations, the relief valves are nor-
• Fire exposure: The relief valve must be sized to handle the gases mally vented to the atmosphere through a tail pipe that points the
evolving from liquid if the equipment is exposed to an external fire. discharge vertically upward for better dispersion. In larger facili-
• Tube rupture: In a heat exchanger, a tube rupture can allow gas ties where the relieved streams can be a source of pollution or ig-
to flow into the shell at the maximum rate from both sides of the nition, relief valves usually will discharge into a common header
tube break, which can overpressure the shell side if the design and leading to an atmospheric vent or to flare systems. When venting
operating pressure of the shell side is lower than that of the tube side. to the atmosphere, make certain that all piping is securely braced in
• Control-valve failure (blow-by): Failure of an upstream control the event that moments are created because of fluid velocity in the
valve feeding a pressure vessel in the open position can send large nozzles. It is recommended to consider a vent scrubber or a flare
volumes of high-pressure gas to the vessel. knockout drum to separate liquids from the relieved stream before
• Thermal expansion: Blocked-in liquids can expand because of venting or flaring. The introduction of slugs of liquids in the atmo-
heating, which may cause an overpressure situation. spheric vent or the flare tip is a potential safety hazard.
• Utility failure: Failure of electric power to shut down pumps,
fans, compressors, or motor-operated valves can cause overpres- 9. Determining the Right Electrical-Area Classification. The
sure. Similarly, loss of cooling system (e.g., water, refrigeration) presence of electrical equipment continues to escalate, and
can create hazardous situations. surely will well into the future. Electrical equipment is used at an
The allowable overpressure is normally 10% of the set pressure increasing rate to automate remote-lease facilities. Solar panels
and is a consideration when evaluating the size for a relief device. have brought electricity to remote production facilities. Personnel
Depending on the relieving scenario, the overpressure can vary are also carrying more electronic equipment such as cell phones
from 10 to 21%. and laptop computers, which are usually “nonclassified,” as part
When more than one relief device (or set of relief devices) re- of their work. Along with the increase in electrical devices is the
lieves into a disposal system, determination of the maximum need to make sure that installed equipment meets the requirements
loading for system design can be complex. For system sizing, it is of hazardous locations as defined by the National Electrical Code
necessary to evaluate the upset conditions in order to determine the (NEC) (C2-1990).

42 Oil and Gas Facilities • August 2012

 Oil Tank

Vent
Wellhead

Division 2: 5-ft radius

Separator Division 1: 5-ft radius

Division 1: Inside of Tank Division 2: 10-ft radius
Division 2: Inside of Berm

Compressor

Division 2:
10-ft radius
Division 1

Division 2 Division 2: 10-ft radius

Fig. 1—Electrical-area classification for a basic production facility.

The NEC classifies hazardous locations generally into two dif- vents or stacks. Class I, Division 2 areas are generally confined
ferent “divisions” for the oil and gas industry. The first classifica- areas where vapors are not normally present and 10 ft around stacks
tion, Class I, Division 1 locations, are defined as locations where or vents. The area inside of a bermed area is also classified as Class
ignitable concentrations of flammable gases or vapors can exist I, Division 2.
under normal operations; may exist frequently because of repair or The area classification drawing should be used to determine the
maintenance or because of leakage; or may exist because of equip- placement and rating of electrical equipment. Only equipment that
ment breakdown that simultaneously causes the equipment to be- is certified by the manufacturer or allowed by the code should be
come a source of ignition. used in a classified area. An example of nonclassified equipment is
The second classification, Class I, Division 2 locations, are de- any electrical fitting or enclosure not labeled “Class I, Div 1 or 2.”
fined as locations where volatile flammable liquids or flammable Other examples would be nonrated junction boxes, exposed wiring,
gases or vapors exist, but are normally confined within closed con- batteries, transformers, light fixtures, controllers. or computers.
tainers; where ignitable concentrations of gases, vapors, or liquids Nonclassified electrical equipment should be kept away from
are normally prevented by positive mechanical ventilation; or adja- classified areas around vents, tanks, wellheads, separators, meter
cent to a Class I, Division 1 location where ignitable concentrations runs, compressors, and pumps, and outside of bermed areas. Areas
might be communicated occasionally. with straight runs of piping (all-welded closed-piping systems
The NEC also recognizes the International Electrochemical without valves or flanges) are generally nonclassified and are suit-
Commission (IEC) method for classification of areas. The two able for the installation of electrical equipment.
methods are compatible, and users can obtain equipment that meets
the requirements of both the NEC and the IEC. 10. Design the Instrumentation and Control System for Safety.
Many sites have been observed where the latest in low-voltage Instrument alarms and shutdowns provide the first level of safety
automation systems have been installed, but often these are not rated in the event that a process upset occurs. Control systems using
for classified areas. In many instances, this equipment has been used programmable-logic controllers, distributed control systems, and
in other industries and has not yet been rated for hazardous loca- supervisory-control and data-acquisition systems have greatly im-
tions. Personnel also need to recognize that carrying a “nonclassi- proved the safety of facilities by enabling advanced logic in safety
fied” device into a “classified” area is in violation of the  code. systems and by making it easier to add alarm and shutdown points.
The first step is to develop an “area classification” drawing for Safety systems can be examined in terms of levels of protec-
the site. API RP 500 Recommended Practice for Classification of tion to prevent or minimize the effects of equipment failure within
Locations for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities Clas- the process. Generally, facilities are built to have at least two levels
sified as Class I, Division 1 and Division 2 (1997) provides a de- of protection. API 14C Recommended Practice for Analysis, De-
tailed guide on determining the classification for each area around sign, Installation, and Testing of Basic Surface Safety Systems for
drilling rigs, production facilities, and gas plants. API RP 500 is Offshore Production Platforms (2001) provides an excellent refer-
based on and is consistent with NFPA 497 Classification of Flam- ence to help the engineer design in two levels of safety. Having two
mable Liquids, Gases, or Vapors and of Hazardous (Classified) levels of safety allows for safe operation in the event that one of the
Locations for Electrical Installations in Chemical Process Areas protection means fails to operate as designed.
(1997). Refer to Fig. 1 for an example of an area classification The two levels of safety should be independent and in addition
drawing based on API RP 500. to the control devices being used in the normal process operation.
Generally, API RP 500 sets Class I, Division 1 areas as being It is good practice for the two levels of safety to be provided by
confined areas where vapors are normally present and 5 ft around functionally different types of safety devices, the reason being that

August 2012 • Oil and Gas Facilities 43

 TABLE 1—PROTECTING FOR ABNORMAL CONDITIONS

Primary Secondary Location of Safety

Condition Cause Effect Protection Protection Devices

Overpressure High inflow Sudden rupture or Pressure safety PSV Gas vapor section
pressure; thermal leak high (PSH)
expansion
Leak Corrosion, erosion, Release of Pressure safety low Sump/drain PSL in vapor
mechanical failure, hydrocarbons to (PSL) to shut off system; LSH on section; LSL at
rupture, external the atmosphere inflow; check valve sump system lowest point in
damage to prevent atmospheric tank
backflow; level
safety low (LSL) on
an atmospheric
tank or vessel
Liquid overflow High liquid inflow; Overpressure or Level safety high Sump/drain LSH at high point in
upstream failure of excess liquids in (LSH) system; LSH on vessel or tank
a device; blockage downstream sump system
of liquid outflow devices; release of
hydrocarbons to
atmosphere
Gas blow-by Failure of liquid Overpressure of LSL Safety devices on LSL at lowest point
level system; downstream downstream in vessel or tank
opening of bypass components component
Underpressure Withdrawal in Collapse of the Atmospheric Atmospheric PSL at highest
excess of inflow; component; leak vessels: vent; vessels: second practical point;
thermal contraction pressurized vent or PSV; PSVs and vents in
when blocked in vessels: gas pressurized accordance with
makeup system vessels: PSL to good engineering
shut off inflow and practices
outflow
Excessive High inlet Reduction of Temperature safety high TSH for a fired TSH in exhaust gas
temperature temperature; heater working pressure (TSH) if caused by component; TSH for fired system;
malfunction; and subsequent fire or heated for heat medium oil TSH in liquid for
fouling; fires metal failure element; LSL if systems heat medium
caused by low system
level; flow safety high
by low flow

if one device fails, an identical device could easily fail from the • A greater understanding of how the facility functions and oper-
same causes. An example case of two functionally different safety ates by those working with the PHA process.
devices is a high-pressure alarm and a springloaded pressure-relief • Reduced downtime and maintenance because potential prob-
valve, to provide two levels of protection in the event of a high pres- lems are identified “up front.”
sure. Each of these devices works in a very different way and has • Optimization of equipment and potentially reduced equipment
different failure modes. purchases. Often, PHAs will identify valves, piping runs, and other
The engineer usually determines the minimum safety require- equipment items that are not needed.
ments for each process component. By examining each component There are many different types of PHAs that can be used to ana-
as an independent unit, and assuming the worst-case conditions for lyze a facility for hazards. Each different type of PHA has its advan-
input and output, the analysis will be valid for that component in tages and disadvantages. Some techniques are performed in a team
any process configuration. Table 1 illustrates how to determine format (e.g., what-if, hazard and operability study) while others are
protection requirements for a broad range of abnormal conditions. performed by experts in a particular technique (e.g., failure-mode
and effects analysis, fault-tree analysis). Usually, the best PHAs are
11. Conducting a Process Hazard Analysis. A process hazard those where the operations, engineering, and safety personnel can
analysis (PHA) (US DOE 2004) is a systematic method to iden- meet as a team and work through the hazards of the facility.
tify and analyze the potential hazards associated with a facility. The The results of the PHA should include findings, a risk ranking of
goal of the PHA should be to recommend any necessary design the findings, and recommendations to resolve any of the findings.
changes to make the facility “safe” during any abnormal or un- Recommendations should be followed up with a list showing the
planned operating condition. Each facility should be designed to responsible party for making corrections and also the time frame in
ensure that personnel, the environment, and equipment are “safe” if which the corrections must be made.
control equipment fails (i.e., liquid dump valves or pressure regula- Any additions or changes to the facility that might impact the
tors), human operating errors occur (i.e., turning of the wrong valve safety or materially change the PHA need to be reviewed. Compa-
or tanks overflowing), mechanical equipment fails (i.e., compressor nies usually employ a “management-of-change” process to make
valves or pump seals), or if natural causes occur (i.e., rain, freezing sure that changes do not degrade the safety systems put in place at
weather, or change of wind direction). Often PHAs are conducted the facility.
during the design phase of the project, but the final design of the
facility should undergo a PHA. 12. Design Verification and Commissioning. The successful pre-
The benefits of conducting a PHA for facilities include startup safety review (PSSR) is a formal process to ensure that each
• Increased safety for personnel working at the facility. component and system in a facility is thoroughly checked and ready

44 Oil and Gas Facilities • August 2012

to be brought into service. It is customary to use checklists so that • Are all atmospheric vents directed to safe locations and at safe
nothing is overlooked and signoff can be achieved as each section elevations?
is completed. The checklists focus attention on each key item and • Are all outlets of drain valves directed to avoid personnel in-
usually assign responsibility for completion. It is important that all jury (e.g., from liquid, flying gravel)?
disciplines be involved so that no detail is overlooked. Therefore, • Has the facility ESD been updated?
the checklists are as extensive as necessary for the particular facil- • Is new/existing gas (e.g., toxic, combustible) detection equip-
ity, but not so detailed that they become cumbersome and ineffec- ment operational?
tive. In the signoff process, any individual or group has the ability • Is equipment installed to prevent an emergency egress
to delay startup until the issue of concern is resolved. problem?
As part of the PSSR process, it is customary to generate “punch • Have appropriate signs (e.g., H2S, restricted entry, no smoking,
lists” describing actions that are necessary before startup as well as confined space) and/or safety paint for marking potential hazards
any items that will not hinder the startup but should be addressed as (e.g., tripping) been installed?
appropriate after startup. • Have cages and/or fall protection devices been installed on
Typical individual components of the PSSR process include the fixed ladders where required?
following topics. This is not meant to be an all-inclusive list, but ex- • Have cables for safety harnesses been installed?
perience has found these to be commonly overlooked. • Have additional safety apparatus (e.g., showers, eye-wash sta-
• Instructions/Directions: Details of who should be involved, tions) been installed where required?
what the schedule is, what material is required, and a definition of • Has the emergency response plan been updated?
the expectations. • Are there an appropriate number of fire extinguishers?
• Engineering: Verification that proper facilities design has been • Have appropriate measures been taken to minimize the noise
performed. Typical documentation should include the project de- from the new installation?
sign basis, material and equipment specifications, documentation • Does the lighting for the area meet OSHA requirements?
of equipment testing, material safety data sheet (MSDS), and other • Do steps (concrete and others) and handrails meet OSHA re-
baseline data. quirements?
• Drawings: Typical drawings include process flow diagrams, • Are vessels, tanks, and bulk-chemical-storage containers prop-
piping and instrumentation diagrams, piping isometrics, equip- erly labeled or placarded?
ment, civil, electrical/automation, and safety systems. • Are MSDSs readily available to the work force?
• Procedures: Including initial startup, normal operation, normal • Have valves, switches, and similar equipment been installed in
shutdown, emergency shutdown, temporary and simultaneous op- a manner to avoid pinch points and other potential causes of injury
erations, and measurement. during operation?
• Training: Verify that all affected employees have been ade- • Have reasonable ergonomic issues (e.g., computer work-sta-
quately trained and the training has been documented. tion setups, valves, and similar equipment conveniently located in
• Piping: Document that all piping components, valves, and con- facilities, including proper tools) been addressed properly?
trols are installed properly. Verify that components function prop- • Is the appropriate personal protective equipment (e.g., elec-
erly and are identified properly. trical, head, hand, chemical) available to the work force?
• Pressure-relief devices: Verify that all devices have been veri- • Have equipment-specific energy-isolation procedures been
fied for proper relief setting and are installed properly with any iso- prepared and communicated?
lation valves sealed open. • Have company and/or contractor safety orientations been per-
• Blinds: Ensure that all construction blinds and skillets have formed?
been removed and that the proper documentation is in place. Also, • Was a PHA conducted?
document any isolation devices that are used to block flow into
other systems that are not yet in service. Conclusions
• Startup screens: Document that startup orifices, screens, and/ Many incidents and injuries can be prevented if production facilities
or filters have been installed. are designed properly. The first step is to get management to “buy-in”
• Hydrotest: Verify that the system has been hydrotested to that all injuries are preventable and that the company’s facilities should
the appropriate pressure according to code and has been flushed, be built to good industry practices and to regulatory requirements.
pigged, cleaned, and/or dried. The recommended practices, codes, and standards for building
• Purging: Verify that the system has been purged properly to re- safe facilities are readily available. Most of these items were first
move oxygen. conceived after a major incident and have continued to evolve over
• Civil: Perform visual inspection for cracks, deformations, or the years. Engineers and operations personnel need to take the time
other defects on all slabs, floors, block piers, vessel foundations, to acquaint themselves with these recommended practices, codes,
and sleepers. Verify that dikes are installed and are of appropriate and standards so that they are comfortable in using them.
height to hold required fluid volumes. After the facilities are built, there are still two more things that
• General equipment: Verify that control valves fail to the cor- should be done. First, a final PHA should be conducted to make
rect position. Ensure that all flare lines, relief lines, and vent lines sure that all of the needed safety systems are in place and that
are free of liquid traps or low points. Check to be sure that equip- the operations personnel are not placed at risk. The second step
ment lubrication oil has been installed properly and that all valves is to conduct a PSSR to make sure that the piping, tanks, engines,
have been lubricated. pumps, and compressors have all been installed as planned.
• Pumps and compressors: Check to be sure that all equipment There are numerous other topics that could be addressed in sub-
is installed properly according to the manufacturer’s instructions. sequent papers after these twelve basic parameters are covered.
• Electrical: Verify that all equipment is properly grounded and These might include setting project goals, cost management, in-
that all necessary seals are in place. tegrity and knowledge management, constructability, mechanical
• Instrumentation: Check calibration, set points, and operation handling, risk management, interface management, drain-system
of all devices. Verify presence of proper identification tag. design, document control, and end-result realization.
In addition to the items just listed, the following general site- The bottom line is that we as engineers need to do our best to
safety questions should be answered as a final check: make sure that field facilities are designed to be started, operated,
• Are all valves upstream and/or downstream of PSVs locked and shut down so that no incident can ever occur from an unsafe de-
open? sign leading to personnel injury or property loss.

August 2012 • Oil and Gas Facilities 45

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46 Oil and Gas Facilities • August 2012