AC72063 AFM PT 5 Tactics For Stability PDF

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Army Field Manual

Tactics for Stability Operations
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Land Warfare Development Centre AC 72063

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RECORD OF AMENDMENTS
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Contents
Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations | i
Foreword
CFA Foreword to Tactics for Stability Operations
AFM Tactics for Stability Operations bridges Joint doctrine and ADP Land Operations.
It is comprehensive and permits the reader quickly to understand the complexities
and implications of military engagement in stability operations. Emphasis is placed
on the need to consider wider implications generated by operating as part of the full
spectrum approach and in harmony with other partners across government and civilian
organisations and agencies, many of whom may be international. This AFM provides
the overarching doctrine for stability operations; more specific tactical detail for each
type of operation will follow in subordinate publications, as outlined in the Preface.
Stability operations may be conducted prior to, during or after combat and should
not be seen in isolation. In major combat operations the levers of Integrated
Action will be orchestrated at Divisional level; in stability operations it is more
likely that Information Activity and Capacity Building will have greater primacy
and that the capabilities will be available at lower levels of command.
The complexities of the operating environment will change continuously as the context
evolves. As we transition from high-intensity to stability operations, tasks that support
human security are vital. Dealing with complex issues such as facing an armed combatant
of primary school age or the aftermath of conflict-related sexual violence are not ordinarily
tasks for our soldiers. This AFM provides soldiers and their commanders with guidance and
a genuinely useful resource to support the delivery of human security. There is a professional
obligation on land forces to read and be guided by this AFM. I commend it to you.
Commander Field Army
May 2017
Contents
ii |
ii | Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations
Preface
Tactics for Stability Operations
Army Field Manual (AFM) Tactics for Stability Operations is the primary source of doctrine for
the UK land contribution to stability operations from 2017 until the early 2020s. Building on
the foundations laid by higher-level NATO and Defence doctrine, it provides the philosophy and
principles that guide land forces’ approach to stability operations.
AFM Tactics for Stability Operations is required reading for all staff officers and land force
commanders from subunit upwards. They must explain the doctrine to their subordinates and
ensure that the whole land force operates in accordance with its principles. It is also useful for
allies, joint staffs, civil servants, contractors and civilians working alongside land forces.
Unless otherwise specified, all definitions used in AFM Tactics for Stability Operations are
consistent with those of Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) Land Operations 2017 and NATO Allied
Administrative Publication (AAP) 06, NATO Glossary of Terms.
This publication stems from ADP Land Operations and forms the overarching guidance for the
span of stability operations. The different types of stability operation will be covered in detail in
Parts 1 – 5 as outlined in the schematic below. Delivery of the Parts will follow the publication
of this AFM in 2017/18. The Stability Tactics Handbook will be held as a live publication on
the Army Knowledge Exchange (AKX) and will comprise a number of tactics, techniques and
procedures (TTPs). The complete doctrine structure for stability operations is outlined below:
Doctrine Hierarchy - Stability Operations
ADP Land
Operations
AFM Warfighting AFM Tactics for Stability

Tactics Operations
Part 1 - Corps Part 1 - Counter Irregular Activity

Part 2 - Division Part 2 - Peace Support
Part 3 - Brigade Part 3 - Humanitarian Assistance
Part 4 - Battlegroup Part 4 - Stabilisation and Reconstruction
Part 5 - Capacity Building
Stability Tactics Handbook (TTPs)
Warfare Branch, HQ Field Army

Contents
Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations | iii
Structure of the AFM. As the overarching publication, AFM Tactics for Stability Operations has
three parts, A-C.
Part A establishes the context in which stability operations take place and informs on the
fundamentals of land doctrine.
Chapter 1 describes the role of the state in maintaining its own stability within the wider
context of the international system. This includes examining the elements of a stable
state and what causes them to break down. It also discusses how instability can lead to
violent intra-state conflict and the need to understand the causes to frame a successful
intervention.
Chapter 2 addresses the Full Spectrum Approach and the role of Government. It provides
commanders at all levels with a bridge to Joint Doctrine Publication 05 – Shaping a
Stable World: the Military Contribution (JDP 05). This is required because deployments
on stability operations will generally require a higher level of understanding than the
standard ‘two up’ on more conventional combat operations.
Chapter 3 examines the UK military approach to stability operations.
Chapter 4 summarises the relationship between combat and stability operations.
Part B describes the fundamentals of land doctrine for stability operations.
Chapter 5 covers the ten principles of stability operations.
Chapter 6 explains the four operations themes: warfighting, security, peace support and
Defence Engagement (DE), and provides a framework for understanding the context and
dynamics of conflict.
Chapter 7 gives an overview of the types of stability operations. They are not mutually
exclusive and are often executed concurrently with other types of operation within the
mosaic of conflict.
Part C provides generic guidance on how stability operations can be planned and executed.
Detailed coverage of the specific types of stability operation can be found in Parts 1-5 of
this AFM.
Chapter 8 describes the operating environment in which stability operations are likely to
occur with implications for the application of Integrated Action.
Chapter 9 provides a detailed description of the stability activities.
Chapter 10 concerns the orchestration and execution of the stability activities across
the corps, divisional, brigade and battlegroup levels of command. The annexes offer
an overview of the land response to immediate threats to human security likely to be
encountered on stability operations.
This manual continues the evolution in land forces’ doctrine, using ADP Land Operations 2017 as
a framework. The AFM complements joint doctrine through reference to JDP 05. Where possible,
it also complements NATO doctrine and while not exhaustive, the linkages to key NATO and joint
publications are shown overleaf.
Stability Operations Doctrine Hierarchy
AJP-3.16 AJP-3.22
Security Force AJP-3.4
NATO Stability
NA5CRO
Assistance Policing
AJP-3.4.5
AJP-3.4.1 AJP-3.4.2 AJP-3.4.4 AJP-3.4.9
Stabilisation &
NATO Allied
Peace Support NEO Counter Insurgency CIMIC

Reconstruction
JOINT
JCN 1/14 JDP 05 JDN 1/15
Defence Joint Shaping a Defence
Operating Concept Stable World Engagement
iv | Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations
LAND ADP
Land
Operations
AFM AFM
Tactics for Stability Warfighting
Ops (TFSO) Tactics
UK Land and Joint Doctrine
AFM TFSO Part 1 AFM TFSO Part 2 AFM TFSO Part 3 AFM TFSO Part 4 AFM TFSO Part 5
Counter Irregular Peace Support Humanitarian Stabilisation and Capacity
Activity Assistance Reconstruction Building
Legend:
AJP – Allied Joint Publication JDP – Joint Doctrine Publication NA5CRO – Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations
ADP – Army Doctrine Publication JDN – Joint Doctrine Note CIMIC – Civil-Military Cooperation
AFM – Army Field Manual JCN – Joint Concept Note NEO – Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations
Contents
Contents
Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations | v
Contents
CFA Foreword i
Preface ii
Stability Operations Doctrine Hierarchy iv
Contents v
PART A - Stability Operations: Context
Introduction PA-1
Chapter 1 - Delivering Stability 1-1

Introduction 1-1
Security 1-2
Governance and the Rule of Law 1-4
Social and Economic Development 1-6
Political Settlement 1-7

Regional and External Influences 1-8
Societal Relationships 1-8
Achieving Stability 1-9
State Resilience 1-10
Chapter 2 - The Government Approach 2-1

Introduction 2-1
National Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 2-1
Building Stability Overseas Strategy 2-2
Conflict, Stability and Security Fund 2-3
Relationship between Stability, Stabilisation and Stability Operations 2-3
HMG’s Approach to Stabilisation 2-4
Full Spectrum Approach and CJIIM 2-7
The Stabilisation Unit 2-11
The Role of the Military 2-12
Graduated Response 2-12
Contents
vi | Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations
Chapter 3 - The UK Military Approach 3-1

Introduction 3-1
UK Defence Doctrine 3-1
Defence Joint Operating Concept 3-1
JDP 05 Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution 3-2
ADP Land Operations 2017 3-2
Operations Themes and Types of Operation 3-2
Integrated Action 3-4
Consequence Management 3-4
Chapter 4 - Combat and Stability Operations 4-1

The Application and Threat of Force 4-1
Combat 4-1
Stability Operations 4-1
Operating Environment 4-2
pART B - Fundamentals of Stability Operations
Introduction PB-1
Chapter 5 - Principles of Stability Operations 5-1

Introduction 5-1
Principles of War 5-1
Principles of Stability Operations 5-1
Chapter 6 - Operations Themes and Stability 6-1

Introduction 6-1
Warfighting 6-1
Security 6-2
Peace Support 6-2
Defence Engagement (DE) 6-2
ANNEX A - The Land Contribution to Defence Engagement 6A-1

Introduction 6A-1
Context 6A-1
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A - Supporting the Prosperity Agenda:

UK Defence and Security Exports 6A1-1
Underpinning Governance and Process. 6A1-3
Contents
Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations | vii
Chapter 7 - Types of Stability Operations 7-1

Introduction 7-1
Types of Stability Operations 7-1
PART C - Delivery
Introduction PC-1
Chapter 8 - The Operating Environment 8-1

Building Stability Overseas 8-1
Understanding 8-2
Transition and Stability Operations 8-3
The Security-Development Nexus 8-5
Threats to Stability Operations 8-6
Legitimacy and Force 8-7
Audiences, Actors, Adversaries and Enemies (A3E) 8-9
Audiences 8-10
Local, Regional and National Authorities 8-11
Military Forces 8-11
Commercial Actors 8-13
The Media 8-13
International Organisations (IOs), NGOs and Human Security 8-14
Chapter 9 - Stability Activities 9-1

Introduction 9-1
Security and Control 9-2
Support to Security Sector Reform 9-5
Support to Initial Restoration of Essential Services 9-10
Support to Interim Governance Tasks 9-14
ANNEX A - Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration 9A-1
Chapter 10 - Orchestrating and Executing Stability Operations 10-1

Introduction 10-1
The Corps and the Division 10-2
The Brigade 10-7
The Battlegroup 10-13
Contents
viii | Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations
ANNEX A - Women, Peace and Security and Gender Mainstreaming 10A-1

Introduction 10A-1
Context 10A-2
Definitions and Descriptions 10A-2
Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) 10A-3
The International Response 10A-5
Improving Operational Effectiveness by Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective 10A-8
Gender Balance on Operations 10A-9
Operational Planning and Preparation 10A-9
Disrupting and Reporting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence 10A-10
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 10A-13
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A - Reporting with a Gender Perspective 10A1-1
ANNEX B - Children and Armed Conflict 10B-1

Introduction 10B-1
Definitions 10B-2
Child Soldiers 10B-2
Schools in Conflict 10B-5
Tactical Responses 10B-6
ANNEX C - Human Trafficking 10C-1

Introduction 10C-1
Definitions 10C-2
Tactical Response 10C-3
ANNEX D - Cultural Property Protection 10D-1

Definitions 10D-1
Introduction 10D-1
Objectives 10D-2
Responsibilities 10D-2
Military Infrastructure and Cultural Property 10D-3
Best Practice 10D-4
Contents
Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations | PA-1
PART A
Stability Operations: Context
Introduction
Part A – Context
Part A provides the context from which flow the
 Delivering stability
fundamentals of stability operations. Central to Part
 The Government approach
A is the idea that stability operations, as conducted
 The UK military approach
by land forces, represent only a fraction of the
 Combat and stability operations
ways supporting the ends of state stability.1
Part A describes in detail the other actors land Part B – Fundamentals of Stability
forces must understand, partner or support Operations
to promote the ends of stability, not least • Principles of stability operations
those involved in political processes promoting • Operations themes and stability
stability. Implicit, is the importance of land • Types of stability operation
forces being able to operate efficiently among
the people as well as on the battlefield. Part C – Delivery
• Operating environment
Part A complements AFM Warfighting by emphasising
• Stability activities
that both combat and stability operations may be
• Orchestrating and executing stability
required within a particular operations theme. 2
operations
Stability operations should not be seen as distinct
from combat because enemies and adversaries
may seek to block the path to stability or may hold a different vision as to what stability
entails. Crucially, executed well, stability operations can help to prevent and reduce violent
conflict threatening stability before, after or during the conduct of combat operations.
Chapter 1 describes the role of the state and its government in maintaining stability.
This includes examining the elements of a stable state and what causes them to break
down. It also discusses how instability can lead to violent intra-state conflict and the need
to understand the causes to frame a successful intervention. Chapter 2 addresses the
Full Spectrum Approach and the role of Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) in promoting
stability. It provides commanders at all levels a bridge to JDP 05, as deployments on stability
operations will generally require a higher level of understanding than the standard ‘two up’
on more conventional combat operations. Chapter 3 examines the UK Military Approach
while Chapter 4 summarises the relationship between combat and stability operations.
I cannot envisage a conflict where there will be no role for stabilisation operations,
but equally, stabilisation is highly likely to involve combat.
General Richard Dannatt
1 State stability is defined in para 1-01 and stability operations in para 2-14.
2 The operations themes are: warfighting, security, peace support and defence engagement. See para 3-14.
Contents
AFM TFSO
Chapter 1
Contents
Delivering Stability
Contents
Contents
Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations | 1-1
Chapter 1
Delivering Stability
Introduction Delivering Stability

1-01. HMG defines a structurally stable state • Security
as that which possesses ‘political systems • Governance and the Rule of Law
which are representative and legitimate, • Social and economic development
capable of managing conflict, change • Political settlement
and other pressures (both internal and • Regional and external influences
external) peacefully. This means societies • Societal relationships
in which human rights and rule of law are • Achieving stability
respected, basic needs are met, security • State resilience
established and opportunities for social and
economic development are open to all.3
In the realm of stability operations, however, it is important to understand that this
is but one view of the stable state. This will be discussed in more detail below.
1-02. Security, governance and the rule of law, and social and economic development
are inextricably linked – stability is generally determined by how they interact. Critically,
this interaction is held together by societal relationships, influenced by regional and
external factors and enabled by an overarching political settlement as outlined below:4
So stability can be maintained within a functional national state or polity (see p 1-4); but
is also built from people with resilient communities and businesses, and a regional and
global community that addresses transnational issues which impact a country’s stability
and development. An effective approach for external intervention is one which engages
at each of these levels where relevant, underpinned by regular contextual analysis.5
nd external infl
al a ue
ion nc
eg e
R
Security
Political settlement
Social & Governance

Economic and
Development Rule of law
Societal
relationships
Figure 1-1. The stable state model (JDP 05)
3 Building Stability Overseas Strategy, dated 2011, page 5.

4 JDP 05, para 2.17.
5 Department for International Development (DFID) Building Stability Framework, 2016.
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1-2 | Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations
Security
1-03. Security is part of the foundation on which stability is built, alongside economic and
infrastructure development, political settlement, societal relationships, governance and
the rule of law. Security has traditionally been understood as national security, concerned
with territorial integrity and the protection of the institutions and interests of the state
from both internal and external threats. Increasingly, however, the understanding
of security has broadened to include the notion of human security, emphasising the
protection of individuals, their communities, and their resources for survival.6
1-04. Human Security. Human security is the collective expression of legitimate individual and
group needs required to maintain authority and stability in democratic states as explained
in Doctrine Note (DN) 16/02: Human Security: The Military Contribution. Characteristics
are described in Table 1-1 below and selected themes and land tactical responses are
discussed in the annexes to Chapter 10. Part 2 to this AFM covers the protection of
civilians in detail.
Human security is characterised by: Human security is threatened by:
The availability of essential commodities such

Political/ideological tensions
as water, medical aid, shelter and food
Broader environmental security* Environmental events
Freedom from persecution, want and fear Racial, ethnic or religious tensions
Protection of cultural values Poverty, inequality, criminality and injustice
Responsible, representative and transparent

Competition for, and/or access to, natural resources
governance
Corrupt and inept governance
Table 1-1. Human security: characteristics and threats
* Note that some cultural values and practices may be at odds with International Human Rights Law. Commanders
should seek mission specific guidance on how to approach/report these issues. Examples include Female Genital
Mutilation and forced marriage.
1-05. The Security Sector. A poorly managed or dysfunctional security sector hampers
development, discourages investment and may perpetuate poverty and corruption.7
Similarly, it may act as a serious cause of popular grievance as well as undermining the
legitimacy of the state.
1-06. In liberal democracies, the security sector is typically employed to protect the basic
survival needs of both the state and its population. In addition to securing territory,
borders, key installations and legitimate sources of revenue, the state can meet
the legitimate political, economic, societal, religious and environmental needs of
individuals and groups. An effective security sector underpins the state’s ability to
govern and maintain law and order. This supports the stability necessary to encourage
essential investment required for economic growth and the prevention of poverty.
1-07. Alternatively, a government may choose to use the security sector to protect its own
interests and position. The security sector may also be used as a matter of deliberate
policy, to forcibly exclude groups from positions of political power or compel them
6 For example, see Barry Buzan’s People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations.
7 The subject of corruption is covered in detail in Part 1 of this AFM.
Contents
to submit to the existing political status quo. This may fuel discontent, but balanced
against other elements, may still create a stable state in the sense that it is not subject to
immediate turmoil and change. This situation is common within autocratic states.
1-08. A weak security sector and the loss of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force
has wide implications, not least an increase in the freedom of action offered to enemies
and adversaries.8 In some cases these groups may be able to convince the population
that they offer a better source of security, as was managed by the Taliban in certain areas
of Afghanistan or Boko Haram in Nigeria. In some cases, the UK may choose to favour
certain non-state actors in contravention of a state’s wishes, especially if that state is
threatening stability and the UK’s interests. Security Sector Reform (SSR) is discussed in
detail in Chapter 9.
Defining State and Non-state Actors9

Understanding the construct of a state is important when understanding how land forces
can support efforts to promote state stability. The state is the principal unit for exercising
public authority in defined territories in modern times. It is also the central structure in
international relations. The state consists of:
a. institutions or rules which regulate political, social and economic engagement across a
territory and determine how public authority is obtained and used (e.g. constitutions,
laws, customs). These may be formal or informal.
b. organisations at the national and the sub-national level which operate within those
rules (e.g. the executive, legislature, judiciary, bureaucracy, ministries, army, tax
authorities).
A government refers to the specific administration in power at any one moment (the
governing coalition of political leaders), while the state is the basis for a government’s
authority, legality, and claim to popular support. The state provides the edifice [complex
system of beliefs] within which a government can operate.
Non-state actors include civil society organisations (CSOs)10 and the private sector,
as well as traditional authorities, and informal groupings such as social networks and
religious communities. In some cases, non-state actors may oppose governments through
both violent and non-violent means. They may even challenge the notion of a particular
state. Non-state actors are an important factor in the rule of law system as part of the
checks and balances, and governance of state-centric power.
8 There is increasing understanding and evidence supporting that over 80% of a population’s security and justice needs are
in fact provided by non-state actors, certainly in more ‘traditional’ societies, and arguably even in Western liberal countries
(neighbourhood watch, shopping mall guards, train attendants, all supported increasingly by technology rather than
people) - see e.g. Albrecht, P et al (eds) Perspectives on Involving Non-State and Customary Actors in Justice and Security
Reform (2011, p3). Western support upsetting this intricate web of social contracts threatens the societal relationships
noted in Figure 1-1.
9 Building Peaceful States and Societies: a DFID practice paper 2010, page 12.
10 Civil society organisations (CSOs) include such groups as registered charities, NGOs, community groups, women’s
organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trade unions, social movements, business associations,
and advocacy groups.
Contents
Governance and the Rule of Law

1-09. A stable state has a sustainable political structure that permits the peaceful resolution
of internal contests for political power. It sometimes provides public goods, which
may, in some polities, even include the provision of welfare, education or healthcare,
but always, at a minimum, the resolution of disputes which parties themselves
cannot resolve. This is achieved by the state exerting effective control or influence
over its population and territory in a manner that is viewed as broadly legitimate by
the overwhelming majority of those governed.11 This may not always be the case;
it is important to recognise that governance can be applied through persuasion;
administration; and compulsion. The level of economic investment within and into a
country relies heavily on legitimate government and good governance to enforce the
rule of law, securing private property and contracts and guarding against corruption.
Polities
A polity is any kind of political entity that is organised. It is a group of people who are
collectively united by a self-reflected cohesive force such as identity and who have a
capacity to mobilise resources. Like a state (which is also a polity), it does not need to be
a sovereign unit. For example, a militia in Libya or a tribe in Somalia may perhaps be said
to be polities, just as much as Afghanistan is, but the Pashtun people may not be.
Public goods
Public goods are those things that are in the collective interest of all in a society. Public
goods tend to be services, such as state education or justice, common infrastructure such
as roads and utilities grids, or a condition, such as the rule of law or a regulated market.
Public goods may be provided by the state, the private sector or civil society organisations.
1-10. While the rule of law has no universally agreed definition,12 it is nonetheless fundamental
to what the UK deems to be ‘good’ government. Rule of law is essentially the principle
‘that all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private, should be
bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly and prospectively promulgated
and publicly administered in the courts.’13 In the context of interventions overseas, it
is also important to consider that rule of law may be upheld through informal societal
mechanisms and behaviours.
1-11. The precise form and practice of the rule of law will vary from polity to polity depending
on the social, cultural and political context of a particular society and may include
informal societal mechanisms of dispute resolution, of association and rules of behaviour.
For HMG and the United Nations (UN), but not necessarily all states, the rule of law
includes human rights and also refers to the ends that a society values that are generally
agreed to be desirable in a fair, open and democratic society.14
11 The concept of legitimacy is explored in: Weigand, Florian, “Investigating the Role of Legitimacy in the
Political Order of Conflict-torn Spaces” , ERC and LSE International Development paper, April 2015.
12 Keene, S. Afghanistan UK Rule of Law Interventions: Lessons Identified, Stabilisation Unit, 24 March 2016, para 1.4.
13 Lord Bingham of Cornhill’s The Rule of Law, (London, 2010).
14 DFID Rule of Law Policy Approach, 12 July 2013.
Contents
1-12. ‘Good’ rule of law systems will tend to abide by the following four principles:-
a. The laws are clear, publicised, stable and just; are applied evenly and protect
fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property.
b. The government and its officials and agents, as well as individuals and private entities,
are accountable under the law.
c. The process by which the laws are enacted, administered and enforced is accessible, fair
and efficient.
d. Justice is timely, and delivered by competent, neutral and fair processes and people.15
1-13. The opposite of the rule of law is the ‘rule of man’, where arbitrary and unpredictable
rule is in force, individual rights are not respected and those with power are above the
law. While it is very often violent, chaotic and repressive, a ‘rule of man’ state can also be
viewed as broadly legitimate by those it governs, as long as it maintains general order and
is capable of engendering in the governed the belief that such a rule and its institutions
are appropriate and proper for that society. Minimal rule of law allows, however, an elite
to capture wealth and power, make laws in their own interests and corrupt public goods
to private ends with impunity. Rule of law is thus intimately related to the legitimate
use of force in society as people must obey the law because there is a credible threat
of enforcement. Equally, the law must be seen to deserve their respect because of its
legitimacy and fairness.16 A concept of the rule of law is a necessary precondition for a
definition of corruption.
An understanding of the many different models that exist internationally for internal
security, policing and criminal justice is essential. But those models cannot be
considered in isolation because what works in one country will not necessarily work
in another which may have different traditions. It is therefore critical for SSR strategy
to take full account of the history, culture and inherited practices of the country
or region in question. The strategy also needs to be informed by the views and
aspirations of the local population.
Sir John Chilcot, The Iraq Inquiry (2016
1-14. Governance generally refers to all processes of governing, whether undertaken by

a government, market or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal
organization or territory and whether through the laws, norms, power or language.17 A
government that is founded upon a theoretically stable political settlement can still be
undermined by poor governance and good governance can theoretically exist without a fair
political settlement. The more inclusive a state’s political settlement is, the more resilient
it is likely to be in the face of maladministration. A sustainable political structure will
not be completely free of corruption or significant governance inefficiencies. Corruption
or inefficiency may not become causes of instability if the population considers them
as either acceptable or inevitable. Poor governance, which is often characterised by
corruption and contributes to weak rule of law, provides a significant opportunity for both
internal and external actors to a state to exploit the failings in its political settlement.
Such exploitation erodes wider societal relationships and can destabilise the state.
15 Adapted from principles set out by the World Justice Project and Lord Bingham of Cornhill’s The Rule of Law, (London, 2010).
16 DFID Rule of Law Policy Approach, 12 July 2013.
17 Bevir, Mark (2013). Governance: A very short introduction. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Contents
Supporting Formal and Informal Justice Systems in Nigeria18

In Nigeria, the rules governing people’s daily interactions are established through formal
and informal institutions and at various levels (international, federal, state, community,
religious and tribal). The majority of Nigerian citizens tend to rely on traditional leaders,
customary courts or community-based security providers as their first port of call.
Department for International Development (DFID) Nigeria is working with a range of

different security and justice service providers. These include the formal court system and
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (such as citizen mediation centres) to promote
access to justice, the Nigeria Police Force, and selected informal policing structures (such
as ‘neighbourhood watch’ arrangements). Improving the capacity of informal policing
structures has enabled them to work within the law, and increased their respect for
human rights. Integrating their roles within the operations of the formal police has helped
them become more accountable to the communities they serve. DFID also supports
the training of traditional rulers and customary court judges in the use of simplified
procedural guidelines to help guarantee fair hearings.
Social and Economic Development

1-15. A stable state is likely to have the necessary economic and industrial base, to keep
pace with societal demands and withstand unexpected changes in circumstances.
Many so called ‘developing countries’ are confronted by enduring economic
problems, despite holding natural resources, such as: failing infrastructure; rising
unemployment; insecurity; and competition from illicit (criminal) economies.19 These
factors also make them more vulnerable in the event that natural disasters occur.
1-16. The way in which economic opportunity and benefit is distributed across identity groups
can also have a key impact on stability. States and communities are more stable when
different groups are included in the benefits of economic growth. Economic exclusion
can worsen grievances which fuel violent conflict, especially when combined with other
group inequalities.20
1-17. In developing and unstable countries, unemployment and underemployment are

likely to be high. Many of the basic social service delivery functions provided by the
state in developing countries - such as health, education, water and sanitation - may
increasingly be delivered by civil society organisations and the private sector, or rely
upon substantial international aid. Such aid can be both financial and functional, with
international and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) directly delivering public
services which, wrongly presented, can further degrade the legitimacy of the state. In
extreme circumstances, even non-state armed groups may directly deliver such services
(e.g. Daesh), constituting an even more direct challenge to state legitimacy and the
basic functions expected of the state may depend upon substantial international aid.
1-18. Fragility in the economic sector impacts in the decisions of international and domestic
commercial investors, from the multinational corporations to the modest market stall
holder. Investors lose confidence when they are unable to make financial decisions based
on calculated risk.
19 A developing country, also called a less developed country or underdeveloped country, is a nation or sovereign state
with a less developed industrial base and a low Human Development Index (HDI) relative to other countries.
20 DFID Building Stability Framework, 2016.
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Economic Development in a Crisis: Providing Opportunities for Displaced

Populations21
Jordan has assumed a heavy burden through hosting refugees from the conflict in Syria,
which has imposed severe stress on its economy and host communities. A new paradigm
to promote economic development was needed for both Jordanians and refugees.
The 2016 Syria Conference established a new approach to support Jordan’s growth
agenda while maintaining stability. This included improved EU market access, creating
jobs for Jordanians and refugees while supporting the post-conflict Syrian economy. It
enabled Syrian refugees to apply for work permits and set up new businesses.
Political Settlement
1-19. A stable state delivers security, governance and economic development through a
legitimate political settlement. A political settlement is best summed up as the forging
of a common understanding, usually between political elites, that their best interests or
beliefs are served through consent to a framework for administering political power.22
This common understanding may take the form of an accepted process for brokering
power as well as being an end-point. Political settlements are often subject to constant
renegotiation and may even tolerate a low level of violence as part of their working.
In essence, political settlements are in place wherever those with the power to threaten
state-structures [or social structures] forego that option either for reward (which may
simply be personal security), for the sake of belief, or to wait for an opportunity to
become the government overseeing the existing structures.23 Like the rule of law
or governance, it can be achieved through informal agreements as well as formal
institutions.
1-20. While formal and informal power-sharing mechanisms can make an important
contribution to ending conflicts and creating short-term stability, they are often difficult
to sustain. Understanding a political settlement requires an understanding of the
incentives that encourage elites to abide by the political settlement. Intervening armed
forces, despite their intentions, can often influence or destabilise a local or national
political settlement unintentionally by virtue of their latent ability to apply violence. Their
actions or their presence can also impact elite incentives, without the force realising it.
1-21. In theory, the more open and inclusive the settlement, the less likely it is that
conflict will arise from political, ethnic or ideological tensions. For this to be the
case, however, a settlement has not only to be inclusive but to be perceived to be
fair. Social identities play an important role in a political settlement- see Societal
Relationships, para 1-24. If the social identity of the area encompassed by a political
settlement is too weak or has to contend with too many strongly-held, local identities,
then its very inclusiveness may damage it. Agreeing unified strategies when actors
have different political and ideological perspectives is problematic and can lead to
population groups demanding change. Primacy of political purpose is a fundamental
principle of stability operations and will be covered in detail in Part B, Chapter 5.
21 Ibid
22 See Bell, C 2015 ‘What we talk about when we talk about Political Settlements: Towards Inclusive and Open Political
Settlements in an Era of Disillusionment’ Political Settlements Working Papers, no. 1, Political Settlements Research
Programme.
23 States in Development: Understanding State Building, DFID working paper, 2008, p.7.
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The Evolution of the Political Settlement in Kenya24

With a mandate from the African Union and the support of the UN, Kofi Annan
mediated a post-election agreement in Kenya in early 2008 to rearticulate the
political settlement and make it broader and more inclusive. The agreement
led to a coalition government based on power sharing among different ethnic
groups. This is proving to be a coalition under strain, built on a stagnant political
settlement which has yet to address the underlying grievances within Kenyan
society. In the long run, the fundamental fault lines in Kenyan society (e.g.
ethnicity, regional identity, the distribution of land ownership) will need to be
accommodated in the underlying political settlement if peace is to be sustained.
Regional and External Influences

1-22. States are more stable when they are able to benefit from external opportunities
and peacefully manage regional threats and shocks. Conversely, fragile states are
particularly vulnerable to transnational threats. Violent extremist and terrorist ideologies,
transnational organised crime, illicit financial flows and international corruption challenge
the stability of both state and regional-level institutions. Climate change is a “threat
multiplier”, accelerating pressures on fragile states and challenging their capacity to
manage change. Significant commodity price shocks, or major flows of ‘hot’ money, can
also have destabilising effects.
1-23. A country’s regional environment can reinforce or undermine its stability. Migratory and
refugee flows can generate instability and trigger conflict as they increase competition
over resources and economic opportunities. Arms flows are a significant indicator of
conflict risk. In contrast, regional integration, trade bloc accession and the diffusion of
institutional norms through regional organisations can be powerful stabilising factors.
Burma: a Regional Perspective25

Burma has suffered from decades of conflict. Ethnic armed groups fight with the
government for rights and autonomy, but also for control over the illicit jade, timber
and drugs businesses. In this context, external drivers of conflict are extremely powerful.
Neighbouring countries provide: markets for illegal trade (e.g. $30 billion of mostly illicit
jade export); shelter for armed groups; arms, and facilities for money laundering.
Societal Relationships
1-24. A stable state has a population that is bound together by a combination of social,
cultural, economic and ideological factors. This evokes a sense of loyalty to the state
and to each other and provides the shared identity that is fundamental to achieving a
political settlement.
1-25. The societal status quo can be challenged by many things, including; perceived
inequalities in political power, economic opportunity, and access to services (including
25 DFID, Building Stability Framework, 2016.
Contents
security and justice), based on identity (ethnicity, religion, caste, geography, gender,
etc.); large scale migration; and inter-state tension where religion or ethnicity spans
the borders. Any such break down of this societal bond risks undermining the
political settlement and disrupting the security, economic and governance sectors.
State Legitimacy and State-society Relations26

Issues of legitimacy lie at the heart of state–society relations. States are legitimate when
elites and the public accept the rules regulating the exercise of power and the distribution
of wealth as proper and binding. States can rely on a combination of different methods to
establish their legitimacy, including international recognition, performance (e.g. economic
growth, service delivery), ideology, procedural forms (e.g. democratic procedures), or
traditional authority. Building legitimacy is a primary requirement for peace, security and
resilience over the long term.
For example, the authoritarian Suharto regime in Indonesia was tolerated by citizens as it
delivered on basic services (primarily health and education) and the development of rural
constituencies. As soon as it became apparent that personal politics and advancement
began to replace these concerns, the government began to lose legitimacy, which
ultimately brought about its downfall.
Achieving Stability
1-26. ‘Structural stability’ (as defined in para 1-01), in a given state, is the longer-term goal
to which all stability operations contribute. It is important to understand that such
operations cannot deliver this longer-term stability in themselves. They can, however, play
an important role in countering different elements of instability that a state or region may
be facing at any given time.
1-27. In the short term, external coalitions and alliances may take significant responsibility
for delivering security, essential services and economic opportunity. But central to the
success of stability operations is the extent to which they support the emergence -
through non-violent political processes - of legitimate authorities capable of doing
this themselves, leading societies on the longer-term journey to structural stability.
1-28. The transition of responsibility to these partner-nation political authorities may be a

lengthy process. Ideally, transition should be conditions based and not simply based on
political timelines; there is no value in handing over responsibility for a state function if
it cannot be sustained and developed further. Transition across the state is therefore
likely to vary as it will be dependent on the adversary threat, mix of actors and availability
of resources.
1-29. There will be situations where transition is accelerated due to the political imperative.
This may come from the partner state as it starts to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the
population or from external governments keen to see the contribution scaled down. For
example, the withdrawal timelines from Iraq and Afghanistan were largely set by political
direction and were not necessarily based on operational level conditions. For such reasons,
coalitions should be planning for transition right from the start of all military operations.
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Negative external influence Breakdown in security

• Breakdown in regional security • Widespread organised crime
• Lack of freedom of movement and trade • Failure of host-nation security institutions
• Economic contagion • Rise in malign actors
• Increased vulnerability to shocks • Risk of state failure
Societal disintegration
• Rise in tension between groups
(ethnic, tribal, religious)
• Horizontal inequality
nd external infl
nal a ue
io nc
eg e
R
s
Security
Political settlement
Social & Governance

Economic and
Development Rule of law
Societal
relationships
Economic collaspe Failure of state institutions

• Destruction of infrastructure • Loss of government monopoly on legitimate
• Rise of black market and inability of use of violence
government to collect revenue • Endemic corruption in formal and informal
• Rising unemployment and dependence on aid governance
• Increased potential for humanitarian crises • Arbitrary application of justice
Figure 1-2. Breakdown of the stable state model (JDP 05)
State Resilience
1-30. One of the key indicators of a genuinely stable state is the ability to anticipate,
and contend with, strategic shocks – in other words, its level of resilience.
Shocks generally result in degradation or collapse of one, or more, of the elements
required for stability (as illustrated in Figure 1-2) putting the remaining elements
under increased pressure.27 Shocks could come about through events such as:
a. Violence (either from within that state itself or from external intervention/contagion);
b. A major natural disaster, including a health emergency;
c. Mass inflows of refugees or migrants;
d. Economic crisis; or
e. Contests for the transition of power.
27 Shocks are described in detail in DCDC. (2014) Strategic Trends Programme: Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2045,
Shrivenham, Ministry of Defence.
Contents
1-31. Weakness in any one element could lead to the erosion and subsequent failure
of another. Where insecurity and conflict are not already present, this erosion
can set the conditions for it to occur and may result in a fracture of the political
settlement that regulates key societal and state relationships. Contextual variations
notwithstanding, a fragile state could rapidly break down as shown in Figure 1-2.
1-32. No single measure of state resilience exists. Instead, metrics tend to be developed by
organisations with interests by sector. For example, DFID has created mechanisms for
measuring state resilience to food shortages.
State-level Shocks
Type of shock Examples and Impact
Balkans. In 1990, member republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, such
Violence – internal or
as Slovenia and Croatia, demanded greater autonomy. When this was refused by Serbia,
external
violence broke out across the region leading to a decade of instability.
Haiti. On 12 Jan 2010, a devastating earthquake with a magnitude of 7.0 struck Haiti,
killing more than 160,000 and displacing close to 1.5 million people. Six months after
Major Natural the quake an estimated 20 million cubic metres remained, making most of the capital
Disaster – including a impassable with thousands of bodies left in the rubble. The number of people in relief
health emergency camps after the quake reached 1.6 million, and almost no transitional housing had been
built. Most of the camps had no electricity, running water, or sewage disposal. Crime in
the camps was widespread, especially against women and girls.**
Lebanon. As of 1 Mar 2016, 4.7 million people had fled the war in Syria as refugees. In
Mass inflows of Lebanon, this meant that one in five people were Syrian refugees. By fleeing the violence
refugees or migrants in their own country refugees destabilised neighbouring countries.*** This destabilisation
can lead to other shocks, such as violence.
Venezuela. The collapse in the price of oil in 2015 created economic shocks in a number
of oil-producing states. Venezuela was particularly badly affected with export revenue
Economic crisis
greatly diminished. The government was unable to import as much food leading to
increasing violence on the streets.
Libya. Following the removal of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, Libya was plunged into
Contest for the
violence as rival militias and armed factions vied for control. This led to a breaking down
transition of power
of the functions of the state, greatly impacting upon human security.
Table 1-2. Types of shock with examples
** See United Nations. (22 Feb 2010). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti,
New York, United Nations.
*** See Mercy Corps. https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/iraq-jordan-lebanon-syria-turkey/quick-facts-what-you-need-know-
about-syria-crisis .
Contents
AFM TFSO
Chapter 2
Contents
The Government Approach

Contents
Contents
Chapter 2
The Government Approach
Introduction The Government Approach

2-01. This chapter outlines how HMG uses stability • NSS & SDSR
operations as a tool to support its strategic • Building Stability Overseas
objectives. It identifies the key strategies and Strategy
policies and provides the foundation for the use • Conflict, Stability and Security
of land forces conducting stability activities. Fund
• Relationship between stability,
The National Security Strategy (NSS) stabilisation and stability
operations
and Strategic Defence and Security • HMG’s approach to stabilisation
Review (SDSR)28 • Full Spectrum Approach
• Stabilisation Unit
2-02. The combined NSS and SDSR (2015) serves
• Role of the military
as a strategic framework document that
• Graduated response
looks at security holistically, enabling cross-
• Conflict sensitivity
Government policy to reflect the UK’s security
priorities and objectives. It considers the
UK’s place within the international order, outlining the strategic thinking required to
underpin its actions over the next five years. Although the UK remains relatively secure,
international events, many unexpected, have led to greater insecurity and uncertainty.
2-03. There are three high-level, enduring and mutually supporting National Security Objectives
(NSO) listed within the NSS and SDSR:
a. NSO 1. Protect our people – at home, in our overseas territories and abroad, and to
protect our territory, economic security, infrastructure and way of life.
b. NSO 2. Project our global influence – reducing the likelihood of threats materialising
and affecting the UK, our interests, and those of our allies and partners.
c. NSO 3. Promote our prosperity – seizing opportunities, working innovatively and

supporting UK industry.
2-04. These objectives are threatened by amongst others:
a. International terrorism affecting the UK or its interests.
b. An international military crisis between states, drawing in the UK and its allies as well
as other states and non-state actors.
c. Risk of major instability, insurgency or civil war overseas.
d. A significant increase in the level of organised crime affecting the UK.
e. Short to medium term disruption to international supplies of resources essential to

the UK.
28 NSS and SDSR 2015 – A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, dated Nov 2015.
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2-05. The eight missions given to the Armed Forces in the NSS and SDSR are the ways to
achieve the three NSOs and prevent the aforementioned risks undermining the UK’s wider
security. Three of these might involve land forces participating in stability operations:
a. Reinforce international security and the collective capacity of our allies, partners and
multilateral institutions.
b. Support Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR), and conduct

rescue missions.29
c. Conduct operations to restore peace and stability.
2-06. Land forces will, however, rarely operate in isolation. Seamless cooperation
between the military and civilian agencies is essential in stabilising fragile states,
using all the tools of national power available, coordinated through the National Security
Council (NSC).
Building Stability Overseas Strategy

2-07. Sitting beneath the NSS and SDSR, the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) is an
integrated cross-Government strategy to address instability and conflict overseas.
It focuses on strengthening cross-Government cooperation and improving performance
through three mutually supporting pillars:
a. Early warning through the anticipation of instability and potential triggers of conflict.
b. Rapid crisis prevention and response through appropriate and effective action to
prevent a crisis or stop it spreading or escalating.
c. Investment in upstream prevention to help build robust, legitimate states capable

of managing tensions and shocks and lower the likelihood of instability and conflict.
2-08. The 2010 SDSR committed the Government to produce the Building Stability Overseas
Strategy, which is one of several strategies stemming from the 2010 NSS. It is aligned
with related strategies, notably the Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST), the Organised
Crime Strategy, the Cyber Crime Strategy, and the International Defence Engagement
Strategy (IDES). It takes into account the Government’s strategies in areas such as
proliferation and arms control, energy security, and climate change and resource
competition, which it complements. The 2015 NSS and SDSR also promoted the role of
Defence in building stability overseas.
Strategic Defence
and Security
Review 2010
(SDSR 2010)
International
Building Stability Counter Terrorism Organised Cyber
Defence
Overseas Strategy Strategy Crime Crime
Engagement
(BSOS) (CONTEST) Strategy Strategy
Strategy (IDES)
Figure 2-1. Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010 and complementary strategies
29 See Part 3 to this AFM.

Contents
Conflict, Stability and Security Fund

2-09. The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) replaced the Conflict Pool in April
2015, as part of a new, more strategic approach to enhancing the delivery of our
national security interests. The CSSF is one of two funding instruments (along with the
Prosperity Fund), which operates on a similar cross-Government basis overseen by the
National Security Advisor.
2-10. The Fund is shaped by a reformed strategy and prioritisation process which produces a
more streamlined, less layered, structure with a clearer line of sight from NSC decisions
and to programme priorities, and greater alignment between UK security interests and
conflict prevention goals. The Fund contains a blend of Official Development Assistance
funding and Non-Official Development Assistance resources. These programmes can
fund a range of activities, from SSR and training to projects implemented by grassroots
NGOs and civil society organisations, so long as they are aligned with a NSC strategy.
2-11. The CSSF is now one of the world’s largest mechanisms for addressing conflict and
instability.30 Its programmes deliver against over 40 cross-Government strategies set by
the NSC. Together, these activities help to secure the UK, promote peace and stability
overseas and contribute directly to the NSS and SDSR’s objectives. The fund is designed
as a flexible resource and supports peace processes for example; supporting Colombia by
tackling organised crime (counter-narcotics) in the Caribbean, helping Ukraine to build its
resilience to withstand external threats, funding the deployment of British personnel on
UN peace support operations, and has supported reforming of police forces and militaries
in some of the world’s most challenging environments.
CSSF allocation of funds 2016/17 (£millions)
Peacekeeping & Multilateral 385.7
Regional/Country Strategies 577.8
Security & Defence 150
Delivery Support, including the Stabilisation Unit & National School

13.5
of Government International
TOTAL 1127
Table 2-1. CSSF allocation of funds for 2016/17 totalling £1.13Bn 31
Relationship between Stability, Stabilisation and Stability Operations

2-12. The term stabilisation has varying meanings and connotations depending on different
perspectives within national and international communities. UK and NATO definitions
vary, as shown in the box overleaf. Nonetheless, the variations are minimal; both focus
on the promotion of legitimate political authorities using integrated civilian and military
actions to set the conditions for (but not achieve) longer term stability. Where our shared
interests and values coincide, we will act with others using NATO doctrine as a common
reference. The definition of stabilisation, therefore, for all UK military doctrine should
be consistent with that used within Allied Joint Publication-3.4.5, Allied Joint Doctrine
30 It should be noted too that half (approximately £6bn per year) of DFID’s aid expenditure is now spent in unstable and
conflict affected states, contributing directly to the NSC strategies for those countries. Note that DFID’s budget is distinct
from the CSSF.
31 Conflict Stability and Security Fund 2015 /16 and settlement for 2016 /17: Written statement - HCWS123
delivered by Ben Gummer (Minister for the Cabinet Office and Paymaster General) on 21 Jul 2016.
Contents
for Military Support to Stabilization and Reconstruction. The civilian definition is taken
from HMG’s Approach to Stabilisation, dated 2014. Note that the term stabilisation
in a UK context is equivalent to stabilization and reconstruction in a NATO context.
NATO definition (military)

Stabilization is an approach used to mitigate crisis and promote legitimate political
authority, using comprehensive civilian and military actions to reduce violence, re-establish
security, end social, economic, and political turmoil…and set the conditions for long-term
stability.32
UK national perspective (HMG)

Stabilisation is one of the approaches used in situations of violent conflict which is
designed to protect and promote legitimate political authority, using a combination of
integrated civilian and military actions to reduce violence, re-establish security and prepare
for longer-term recovery by building an enabling environment for structural stability.33
2-13. Stabilisation is, however, not an end in itself. To bring about structural stability,
stabilisation needs to be applied with other approaches, including longer-term state
building and peacebuilding as described by DFID.34 The stabilisation approach is
intended to provide sufficient stability to initiate an inclusive political settlement and
begin to address the primary drivers of violent conflict. Stabilisation is the first step
towards progress in state building and peacebuilding in very insecure environments.35
2-14. Stability Operations. Stability operations can be described as multifunctional

operations that encompass those military activities contributing to conflict prevention and
resolution and crisis management, or serve humanitarian purposes, in the pursuit
of strategic objectives.
2-15. In a land context, stability forms the ends, the different types of stability operations the
ways and land forces the means.
HMG’s Approach to Stabilisation

2-16. The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation complements BSOS and explains why
and when the UK engages in stabilisation and sets out how the stabilisation approach
links to other tools and approaches used in situations of violent conflict.36 Stabilisation is
applied in politically messy, violent, challenging and often non-permissive environments
in which the legitimacy of the state and political settlement is likely to be contested,
and in which other types of stability operations are unfeasible. The central challenge of
stabilisation is to bring about some form of political settlement in a pressured and violent
context, to create an environment where longer-term peacebuilding and state building
processes may have a chance of success.37 JDP 05 identifies three pillars of stabilisation:
32 Allied Joint Publication-3.4.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Support to Stabilization and Reconstruction.
33 The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation, dated 2014, page 1.
34 Building Peaceful States and Societies: a DFID practice paper, 2010, page 14.
35 Ibid., page 36, para 86.
36 The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation, dated 2014, page 1.
37 While NATO refers to ‘Stabilization and Reconstruction’ operations, the UK government’s position is to
call this type of intervention Stabilisation, and to prioritise the political aspect of the challenge.
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a. P1 – Protect political actors, the political system and the population. The
stabilisation approach explicitly enables the deployment of land forces to generate
and maintain security through the application and threat of force. This may require
coercive (military) as well as political intervention, whilst working towards addressing
the causes of underlying tensions. This may also involve active pursuit of groups who
refuse to take part in a non-violent political process. In some contexts, for example
if the UN judges that a state is in breach of its international commitments or poses a
threat to wider peace and security, an external military presence can be deployed to
reduce the threats posed by unaccountable state security forces, whose actions can
undermine a political settlement and the security of the population. Stabilisation is not
about stopping violence and restoring the status quo, it is about shifting incentives,
capabilities or opportunities for an inclusive political settlement to emerge.
P1 – Likely Military Tasks
of key sites and infrastructure; e.g. market places, government buildings,

Static protection military depots, power stations, strategic bridges, media outlets, refugee
camps, natural resources, airports, ports etc.
Persistent security in areas secured and held; e.g. intensive patrolling and check points.
Targeted action against adversaries; e.g. search or strike operations.
Population control for example, curfews and vehicle restrictions.
Protection of specific of key politicians/government functionaries, civilian reconstruction and

individuals/groups stabilisation personnel (international and domestic), aid workers, etc.
Support indigenous
both State and non-State
security providers
b. P2 – Promote, consolidate and strengthen political processes. The stabilisation

approach focuses on incentivising agreements between political actors and finding
workable alternatives to violent contest. When there is a political imperative to act,
particularly to protect civilians, there may be insufficient knowledge or entry points
to influence the political process in the immediate term. Failure to subsequently
incentivise and support political processes is highly likely to undermine the chances of
overall mission success.
NATO Operation to Protect Civilians in Benghazi, Libya

While this intervention altered the balance of power, the ability of new political players,
including the National Transitional Council was overestimated. Despite elections, a
political settlement remained elusive and there was no monopoly on the use of force
within the country following the end of Gadhafi’s rule.
Activities to foster a political process will be carried out in partnership with other
governments and multilateral partners. In some instances, comparative advantage will
lie with those external actors who have the ability to persuade or compel local actors to
come to the table. In other contexts, the neutral ‘good offices’ of multilateral bodies such
as the UN will be sought out to facilitate. Priorities include the de-escalation of conflicts
through the negotiation and facilitation of ceasefires, the establishment of conflict
management and resolution structures; support for peace processes, including political
outreach and negotiated reconciliation; and support for interim constitutional processes.
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Provision of a secure
for negotiations
environment
Protection and freedom of

for those engaging in political processes
movement
Protecting sites where political processes take place, e.g. polling stations.
Identifying interlocutors and spoilers
Monitoring of ceasefires, peace agreements, etc.
c. P3 – Preparing for longer-term recovery. At whatever stage of a crisis stability

operations are conducted, the focus must remain on supporting political processes
which are inclusive and robust enough to negate the need for violent contestation,
and the corresponding emergence of legitimate political authorities. Any support
to infrastructure repair, service delivery, economic development and other longer-
term recovery objectives should only be conducted to the extent that they directly
support these political processes and authorities, are based on a deep understanding
of the conflict dynamics (see para 2-30), and incorporate planning for transition to
local authorities. Conducting such activities directly may seem like a good way of
demonstrating good will and progress, but they are unlikely to be sustainable in the
absence of a broader political settlement, and may well prove counterproductive.
For example, direct military delivery of essential services, infrastructure repair and
humanitarian assistance is fraught with risk and the chances of doing harm are high;
(1) Militarising humanitarian assistance can significantly undermine the

independence, neutrality and impartiality associated with humanitarian aid that
civilian agencies rely on for their security and access.38
(2) Substituting state service delivery is unsustainable and may directly undermine the
legitimacy of the state/local authorities.
(3) Delivering projects (including Quick Impact Projects) can frequently be

destabilising and create divisions within and between communities, for example
undermining the local economy through over-pricing.39
(4) Those who win contracts may well be the representatives of the corrupt elites/
criminals/warlords/old regime who ostensibly, we aim to confront.
(5) Institutional governance transformation takes time.40
In a stabilisation context, early engagement in the security sector is unlikely to produce

sustainable arrangements, but it can provide time and space for a political authority to
gain legitimacy or acceptance. Security Sector Stabilisation (SSS) helps to provide a basis
for other stabilisation activities and a bridging activity towards longer-term recovery
including SSR.41 SSS is also important for transforming relationships between different
actors, particularly between different armed and unarmed groups. The process by which
new temporary security arrangements are designed and implemented can be used to
build or re-set relationships between different groups.
38 Note that the military can also suffer from association with NGOs perceived to be performing badly by local populations.
39 Part 5 to this AFM provides advice on consent winning activity.
40 A mechanism for coping with all these challenges is covered under the subject of conflict sensitivity later in the chapter.
41 See Security Sector Stabilisation, Stabilisation Unit, 2014.
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ensure freedom of movement and protection of key actors,

locations and infrastructure to allow others to deliver humanitarian
Maintain security
assistance and basic services, and create the space and confidence
for economic activity to restart
Support restoration/delivery
water, sanitation, health, power etc.
of essential services
Support repair of key

hospitals, schools, clinics, bridges, markets etc.
infrastructure
Support delivery of
emergency humanitarian medical, logistic, protection
assistance
2-17. Stabilisation can be summarised by four key characteristics:
a. Stabilisation is planned and implemented with an overtly political outcome in

mind. All activities in fragile and conflict-affected states need to have a clear political
purpose and underpinned by a shared understanding of how the planned activity is to
deliver a shift away from the current instability.
b. Stabilisation is an integrated, civilian led approach, which unifies effort across

HMG. Even when there are military-led and implemented tasks, their application
should occur in the context of an operationally civilian-led, politically engaged,
stabilisation approach.
c. Stabilisation is both flexible and targeted. Any support to infrastructure repair,

service delivery, economic development and other longer-term recovery objectives
should only be conducted to the extent that they directly support political processes
and authorities. They should be based on a deep understanding of the conflict
dynamics (‘conflict sensitive’, see paragraph 2-30), and should incorporate planning for
transition to local authorities.
d. Stabilisation mandates will be transitory but cannot be short-term in outlook.

It is important to ensure that opportunities to build local capacity and promote local
ownership during stabilisation interventions are taken, given the clear advantages
these will bring during and after transition from violent conflict.
2-18. These four characteristics are reflected in the principles of stability operations for the land
environment described in Part B, Chapter 5 of this publication.
The Full Spectrum Approach and the Combined, Joint, Inter-agency,

Intra-governmental and Multinational (CJIIM) Environment
2-19. Successful strategy requires an inter-agency approach to integrate the application of the
military, economic and diplomatic instruments of power, at all levels of command and
throughout the campaign. Ultimately, states resort to the use of force when diplomatic
and economic power cannot achieve the outcome required. When military power is
used, it is in conjunction with the other two. It is, therefore, important to understand
which agencies function at the operational level, how they will affect the tactical level,
and the impact they will have on the conduct of operations. The CJIIM environment
includes supranational organisations, for example the UN; Government departments
other than the MOD; national intelligence agencies; partner nation or other indigenous
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partners; NGOs; humanitarian groups; private security companies; other contractors;

and commercial organisations. Usually, a single department will be nominated to lead
the effort, based on the nature of the crisis or intervention. AFM Command describes
how land forces should operate within multinational command structures and the CJIIM
environment more broadly.
2-20. The 2015 NSS and SDSR describes the UK’s response to crisis, conflict and instability
as one which will use all the tools of national power available (diplomacy, defence,
development, intelligence, etc.), coordinated through the NSC. It describes this
variously as an ‘integrated’, ‘whole-of-government’, and ‘full spectrum’ approach.
This is complemented by our intent to ‘invest more in our alliances, build new stronger
partnerships, and persuade potential adversaries of the benefits of cooperation, to
multiply what we can achieve alone’. In this publication we will use the term Full
Spectrum Approach to describe this concept. Similarly, NATO doctrine describes a
comprehensive approach in which military and non-military actors contribute with a
shared purpose, based on a common sense of responsibility, openness and determination.
This is facilitated by civil-military cooperation, which applies at the strategic, operational
and tactical levels.
2-21. Essentially the above terms describe the same method; that of the UK using the full
spectrum of civil-military, whole-of-government, levers of power in an integrated manner
in pursuit of a common (NSC approved) strategy, in collaboration with international
alliances. It recognises that using the full range of knowledge, skills and assets of
government departments in a mutually reinforcing manner will have far greater impact
than departmental priorities being delivered in silos.
2-22. Today, a wider array of government departments than ever before is engaged in delivering
the UK’s Full Spectrum Approach to conflict and instability. Not least, this is driven by
the ever increasing link between overseas instability and domestic UK stability (through
radicalisation, terrorism, migration, cyber, organised crime, and threats to energy
security). But for any overseas stability operation, the presence of these government
departments at what the military terms the strategic, operational and tactical levels
varies enormously (note that civilian departments do not refer to or generally recognise
these levels). To understand how to best work with partners to deliver the Full Spectrum
Approach, land forces need to understand this reality.
2-23. On overseas operations, the key government departments in theatre tend to be the
FCO (diplomacy/politics), MOD/British Armed Forces (defence/security) and DFID
(development). Intelligence agencies are of course also present, and where migration,
radicalisation and organised crime are major issues of UK concern, the Home Office and
National Crime Agency are increasingly present (largely at the capital level). Regarding the
three major departments, presence and working practices are as follows.
2-24. The FCO is focused on promoting British interests overseas and works primarily at the
state-to-state level. It employs around 14,000 personnel, of which just one third are
UK citizens, spread around 160 countries (and London). Most embassies contain only a
handful – sometimes just one or two – UK staff, bolstered by locally employed staff. They
focus on national capitals and largely on the formal political systems that exist within
each country. Most decision-making and planning sits with policy makers in London,
whilst ambassadors and high commissioners enact those decisions overseas.42
42 For further info on the FCO see https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/foreign-commonwealth-office.

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2-25. DFID is focused on poverty reduction and humanitarian assistance. It has around 3,000
personnel (about half of which are based in London). Half of its £12bn (in 2016) annual
budget is spent in unstable and conflict-affected states. In these contexts much of its
work is focused on building stability, as without this platform it recognises that poverty
reduction is exceptionally difficult to achieve. Decision making in DFID is largely devolved
to country level, with the DFID Country Head having a great deal of autonomy. DFID is
primarily a funding agency (a ‘donor’), and hence most of its implementation is conducted
through partners; IOs (such as the UN), NGOs (both international and national), private
contractors and, where considered feasible, through host national governmental bodies.
From a UK staff perspective, permanent presence tends therefore to be concentrated at
the capital level. DFID has a strong network of influence and knowledge down to the
tactical level, but this is through third parties who will likely have very different attitudes
towards cooperation with UK land forces. In contested environments this ambivalence
may well stem from a need to appear neutral, for both security and access reasons.43
2-26. The MOD/British Armed Forces are focused on the use or threat of force. Of the three key
overseas-facing departments/organisations it is by far the largest with well over 200,000
personnel (including military and civilians). It has, theoretically, a very strong presence
at the strategic, operational and tactical levels: in particular, the military represents the
only UK department in which personnel are dedicated to operating at the tactical level.
2-27. In terms of resources at the strategic level, therefore (Whitehall and in-country capital
level), all relevant departments are well represented. But at the operational (sub national)
and tactical levels in particular, the UK system struggles to resource a fluently balanced
political, economic and security approach. The security resources (the military) are less
than comfortably aligned with the economic/development resources (DFID’s implementing
partners); and there are no formal political means (FCO) at this level at all. Furthermore,
in terms of unity of command, at no level does the mechanism exist for formally
subordinating personnel from one department to another. This means that decision-
making at every level must be driven by consensus, and is why inter-departmental
integration is won or lost in term of relationships – which is a high risk approach to C2.
2-28. In some theatres (Afghanistan) we have responded to this challenge by establishing

sub national integrated teams (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, for example).
PRTs have been the exception, not the rule, and it should not be assumed they
will exist in new theatres. Another response has been the increasing introduction
of civilian staff into military headquarters (HQs) on operations and exercises
(Stabilisation, Humanitarian, Political, Gender, Strategic Communications,
Cultural, and Security and Justice advisers, to name but a few). Sometimes these
staff are direct representatives of key government departments. More usually
they are experts (see para 2-32) with a strong working knowledge of political,
economic and security dimensions of the environment and good links with Other
Government Departments (OGDs) and international and national partners.
2-29. Physical presence is not the only constraint to integrated working. Time horizons and
approaches to planning are very different too. The FCO does not have a strong planning
culture; core work tends to be driven by short-term priorities driven by fast changing
political realities. In contrast DFID tends to adopt a much longer-time horizon, using
multi-year programmes and projects to nudge what might need to be generational
change. The military is the only part of the UK system that studies campaigning, but
operationally will often focus on gains achievable in a six-month deployment.
43 For further info on DFID see https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-international-development.

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2-30. At the operational and tactical level, integrated working means all personnel having
a true understanding of: the UK’s ‘operational system’; integrated strategies and
campaign plans; how each department operates and how to liaise effectively. For the
military, one consequence of this in the context of stability operations may be that
appropriate limits of exploitation may well need to be defined by non-military means.
For example, if success relies on military progress being aligned with political and
developmental input, the military may need to advance operationally at no greater
speed than other departments (or their international and national partners) can follow.
Politics &
Governance
Ministry
of Defence
Security Development
Figure 2-3. Key departments supporting the Full Spectrum Approach
UK’s Humanitarian Assistance Response to the Ebola Virus Disease

HMG’s humanitarian response to the Ebola Virus Disease was led by a DFID 2* supported
by an Army 1*. The MOD deployed 750 personnel to help with the establishment of
treatment centres and an Ebola Virus Disease Training Academy. Royal Fleet Auxiliary
ARGUS was also deployed to provide crucial aviation support to the region enabling
manoeuvre of medical teams and aid experts. The UK committed to delivering more than
1,400 treatment and isolation beds to combat the disease, protect communities and care
for patients.
The Training Academy achieved its mission of training over 4,000 healthcare workers,
logisticians and hygienists including Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces and prison
staff. The military had the capacity and resources at high readiness able to react in a
timely manner, in the view of DFID: ‘No contractor could have undertaken this role.’ Over
1,600 National Health Service (NHS) staff, deployed to West Africa to help those affected
by Ebola. Deploying NHS personnel were trained at the Army Medical Services Training
Centre in York.
The UK continues to play a leading role, particularly in Sierra Leone where, due to its
strong bilateral links, it chose to focus its efforts as the framework nation. A $664.65
million package of direct support was committed to help contain, control, treat and
ultimately defeat Ebola.
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The Stabilisation Unit44

2-31. The Stabilisation Unit is an operational cross-departmental agency whose purpose
is to help HMG respond to crises and address the causes of instability overseas.
It is a uniquely integrated civil-military operational unit, with core staff members
from ten government departments, including serving military and police officers. It
is the Government’s centre of expertise and best practice for stabilisation, conflict,
security and justice, and is designed to be agile, responsive and well equipped to
operate effectively in high-threat and high-risk environments. It supports the NSC
departments but does not take ownership of individual crises or policies. Humanitarian
and consular crises remain the preserve of DFID and the FCO respectively. The
Stabilisation Unit is funded by the CSSF, and is answerable to the NSC (Officials).
2-32. The NSS and SDSR 2015 recognises the Stabilisation Unit’s role in supporting more
effective cross-Government crisis response, stabilisation and conflict prevention
in fragile states. In this capacity, the Stabilisation Unit may engage in:
a. A rapidly evolving crisis where the NSC and Cabinet Office is driving coordination and
the pace of activity is frenetic;
b. An ongoing crisis where our Government’s activity, though high profile, is at a more
normal pace or until central coordination mechanisms are established; or
c. Upstream prevention, in respect of ‘watch-list’ type countries, where there is cross-

departmental interest and the potential for focused support.
2-33. The Stabilisation Unit supports the Full Spectrum Approach to stabilisation, conflict and
instability in a number of different ways:
a. Analysis. Supporting the Government’s analysis at a regional, national or sub-national

level (including joint analysis of conflict and stability).
b. Crisis planning and developing strategy. Participating in crisis planning processes

and developing response strategies.
c. Programme development, review and evaluation. Supporting programme

development, scoping, review and evaluation. Where strategically important and
practically feasible, conducting detailed programme and project design.
(1) Technical assistance. Providing direct support to Government officials or key

multilateral partners. This includes being the UK’s hub for international policing
support to fragile and conflict-affected states.
(2) Deployments. Finding the right people, with the right experience, and deploying
them safely, with the right equipment, to the right place at the right time.
d. Lesson learning and knowledge. Capturing, analysing and sharing across

government evidence of what works, to inform future conflict and stabilisation
planning and response.
e. Training. Delivering cross-Government training on: conflict, stability and security;

security and justice; women, peace and security; conflict sensitivity and monitoring and
evaluation. Participate in departmental/military training courses and exercises.
44 JDP 05, paras 3.34 to 3.38.

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f. Surge capacity. Providing surge capacity and backfilling support to departments

working in, or on, fragile and conflict affected states.
2-34. The Stabilisation Unit also controls the Civilian Stabilisation Group – a pool of
over 1,000 civilian experts drawn from the public and private sectors. The Civilian
Stabilisation Group has experts in stabilisation, governance, rule of law, livelihoods,
communications, infrastructure, public finance, SSR and a myriad of other critical
areas who work with local partners to assist a country’s recovery. The Group is made
up of some 800 independent consultants (deployable civilian experts or ‘DCEs’),
as well as over 200 civil servants, from over 30 departments, across all grades. The
Stabilisation Unit can also call on a pool of serving police officers when required.
The Role of the Military

2-35. The military contribution to stability will be covered in the next chapter, but an
explanation of where it fits into the Full Spectrum Approach is prudent within the context
of the Government’s approach.
2-36. In support of NSOs and rarely on a unilateral basis, the military provides critical
capabilities that can support stability, tackle threats at source and respond to crises
overseas. Examples include:45
a. Regional and International Security Cooperation. In many circumstances,

instability within a state or region can be reduced by partner governments and regional
organisations with limited external support from the wider international community.
b. Counter Weapons of Mass Effect Proliferation. Instability may be the catalyst

for weapons of mass effect technology to fall into the hands of belligerent states or
armed non-state groups. In these cases land forces may become involved in counter-
proliferation operations.
c. Deterrence or Containment. Instability within a state may provide a haven for non-
state actors intent on attacking the UK, its allies or its interests.
d. Building Stability in Support of Wider State building. In some circumstances, state

instability engages the UK’s interests or obligations to such a degree that deterrence
alone will be ineffective.
Graduated Response
2-37. This variety of roles and capabilities offers HMG choices for how to use the military
instrument of power in support of national security objectives. The scale of military
commitment can range from providing a solitary advisor, a single unit, an aircraft
or a ship to conduct international security cooperation, to deploying a sizeable
joint force (see Figure 2-3). The least intrusive form of response, consistent with
achieving national objectives and policy imperatives, will ordinarily be the goal.
45 JDP 05, paras 3.30 to 3.31.

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Joint
force
Individual deployment
military
Training capabilities
teams
Advisers
Regional military presence and advice
Figure 2-3. The graduated range of military commitment46
Conflict Sensitivity47
Conflict sensitivity means acting with the understanding that any initiative conducted
in a conflict-affected environment will interact with that conflict and that such interaction
will have consequences that may have positive or negative effects.
2-38. The UK recognises that international interventions in fragile and conflict-affected states,
including those specifically targeted at addressing conflict and instability, have the
potential to inadvertently worsen the situation or cause harmful consequences. As such,
in order to maximise the positive impact of its engagement on conflict and stability,
the UK is committed to pursuing a conflict sensitive approach to its interventions. Land
forces’ application of Integrated Action directly promotes conflict sensitivity by linking
understanding to actions, effects and outcomes.48
2-39. Key elements of conflict sensitivity are:
a. Understanding the context (see JDP 04);
b. Understanding the interaction between land forces’ engagement and the context;
c. Acting upon understanding to avoid negative impacts (risks) and maximise positive
impacts (opportunities).
2-40. ‘Do No Harm’ (a term commonly applied in the field of sustainable development) is the
minimal application of conflict sensitivity, where we simply aim to identify and minimise
the negative effects of our interventions. Wherever possible, we should be aiming for a
fuller application of conflict sensitivity, where we equally focus on maximising our positive
impacts on existing conflict dynamics.
2-41. Interventions can inadvertently exacerbate conflict or undermine prospects for stability
by, for example, deepening divisions between groups, creating economic dependencies,
entrenching war economies or by supporting elites with limited popular support. This
46 Ibid., page 70.

47 Stabilisation Unit, Conflict Sensitivity – Tools and Guidance.
48 ADP Land Operations 2017, Chapter 4.
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tends to happen where there is a lack of in depth understanding of the context, inability
to adapt approaches to a rapidly-changing situation or failure to identify and effectively
manage the trade-offs between different objectives. In the context of stability operations,
we might even be conflict actors ourselves when providing military support with actions
which can, over the short term, be inherently destabilising as we seek to promote stability.
Potential Negative Impacts of Intervention

Selective support reinforces or creates grievances. Programmes where the
distribution of assistance mirrors cleavages in a conflict (geographically, politically, and
socially) can fuel grievances and deepen the conflict (e.g. in Nepal, Afghanistan, Sri
Lanka). Conflicts between communities may be fuelled over locations of projects and the
hiring of labourers.
Elite capture, diversion of resources to particular groups. Where leaders directly

benefit from assistance, taking credit for it, or seeking to control who benefits,
inequalities and patronage can be reinforced and inclusivity undermined (e.g. in Uganda,
Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka).
Reinforcing corruption, competition over aid resources, distorting the economy.

Assistance can reinforce corruption through multiple layers of subcontracting, or generate
competition and conflict over aid resources, often along factional, tribal or ethnic lines. A
quick increase in aid can generate an aid economy that distorts the local economy. (e.g.
Afghanistan, Iraq, South Sudan and Nigeria).
Supporting political processes that are not inclusive. Striking a deal may be a
priority in the short term, but the exclusion of key groups, such as women, may enhance
grievance and lay the foundation for future conflict (Libya, South Sudan).
Working with or bypassing the state. Working through a government or military

that is (or is perceived to be) exclusionary, corrupt, or a party to the conflict can cause
resentment and reinforce conflict actors. Not working through state can in some contexts
be equally harmful (e.g. Mali, Lebanon, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Democratic Republic
of Congo).
2-42. Conflict sensitivity does not mean being risk averse. Instead, it entails adopting a
deliberate and systematic approach to ensuring policy and intervention decisions are
made on the basis of a robust and credible analysis of the context. It involves adopting
a critical lens, testing and challenging assumptions about how we contribute to stability,
identifying key trade-offs and dilemmas inherent in our actions and seeking the right
balance between different objectives and approaches, benefits and harms, and categories
of risk.
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2-43. Women, Peace and Security. The Women, Peace and Security agenda has, in
recent years, emphasised the contribution women can make to the stabilisation
process in conflict-affected areas. Understanding the impact of a conflict on women
and girls should be part of the effort to be conflict sensitive. The UK Government
has committed to putting ‘women and girls at the centre of all our efforts to
prevent and resolve conflict, to promote peace and stability, and to prevent and
respond to violence against women and girls. Building equality between women
and men in countries affected by war and conflict is at the core of the UK’s national
security and that of the wider world - it is necessary to build lasting peace’.49
2-44. This commitment stems from the international community’s increasing recognition of
the different vulnerabilities to conflict experienced by women and girls, the impact
on a society’s prospects for post-conflict recovery and long-term stability caused by
all forms of sexual and gender-based violence (against men as well as women), and
the positive role women can play in building sustainable peace. This was articulated
in 2000 through the UN’s Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and
Security, and has subsequently been strengthened through many additional resolutions.
The UK’s National Action Plan for implementing our commitments related to this
agenda includes many commitments specific to the military. But in parallel to these
formal commitments, there is also a growing recognition across NATO, the UN,
and the British military that adopting a gendered lens on stability operations can
directly improve our operational effectiveness. It can improve our understanding of
the context, our intelligence and our force protection, and impact directly on how
we interpret our mandate and translate this into action at the strategic, operational
and tactical levels. Annex A to Chapter 10 provides more detail on this agenda.
49 UK National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security, 2014-2017.

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AFM TFSO
Chapter 3
Contents
The UK Military Approach

Contents
Contents
Chapter 3
The UK Military Approach
Introduction The UK Military Approach

3-01. This chapter identifies doctrine that enables land • Introduction
forces to conduct stability operations and contribute • UK Defence Doctrine
to HMG’s strategic objectives (see stability • Defence Joint Operating
operations doctrine hierarchy, page iv). Concept
• JDP 05 – Shaping a Stable World:
UK Defence Doctrine50 the Military Contribution
• ADP Land Operations
3-02. Conforming to the 2015 NSS and SDSR, UK
• Operations themes and types of
Defence Doctrine outlines the broad philosophy
operation
and principles underpinning how Defence is
• Integrated Action
employed, and is the foundation from which
all other national doctrine is derived.
3-03. It outlines the shape of the military instrument, it reinforces the combined,
joint, inter-agency, intra-governmental and multinational (CJIIM) character of
most operations and highlights the significance of Campaign Authority.51
Defence Joint Operating Concept

3-04. The Defence Joint Operating Concept (DJOC) provides the high-level vision and
unifying conceptual thinking to help develop and employ the Armed Forces
effectively in support of national policy and strategy; it will shape the next
iteration of UK Defence Doctrine. It focuses on resetting them for engagement,
deterrence and contingency. In the short term it provides a conceptual
framework for the International Defence Engagement Strategy (IDES).52
3-05. The DJOC emphasises that the Armed Forces must retain their warfighting excellence
as the foundation for credibility and utility. But must also be better able to
contribute to the NSS and SDSR through actions short of war. This, amongst other
ways, will be achieved by building partners’ capacity to tackle emergent threats at source
and dissuading potential adversaries from pursuing undesirable courses of action.
3-06. This resetting is achieved by introducing the concept of the Engaged Force to deliver
the required increase in strategic understanding and the intended broader contribution
to the NSS and SDSR. These are forces forward engaged overseas to understand and
shape the strategic context and operating environment. Alongside the Committed
Force, they deliver the IDES and provide the strategic orientation required by the
Responsive Force (i.e. Joint Expeditionary Force) to be appropriately configured.
50 JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine, dated Nov 2014.

51 Ibid, para 2.65.
52 Joint Concept Note 1/14, Defence Joint Operating Concept, dated Mar 14, para 1.
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JDP 05 Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution

3-07. The purpose of JDP 05, Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution is to provide
context and guidance on how, and why, the military instrument of power can be used
in support of national strategies for addressing instability, crisis and conflict overseas.53
3-08. It explains how the military contributes to the core components of stabilisation
described in The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation, providing the
context for stability activities as a subset of tactical activities (see Figure 3-1 ).
3-09. JDP 05 outlines how the UK seeks to help shape a more stable world as part of
our national strategy and examines the military role within this. The publication
recognises the deliberate shift away from recent campaigns towards a more forward
leaning and engaging approach. The need for cross-Government cooperation
and understanding as part of the Full Spectrum Approach is fundamental.
3-10. JDP 05 was developed concurrently with several new doctrinal and other, related Joint
publications. In 2018, JDP 05 will be reviewed, consolidated and merged with a number
of related Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs). The primary focus of JDP 05 remains stabilisation
(responding to situations of conflict and instability) but also considers the wider subject
of stability.
3-11. A variety of stakeholders were consulted in the publication including the FCO, DFID,
the MOD and the Stabilisation Unit. It is important to understand, however, that
JDP 05 is principally a military publication intended for a military audience. It is both
consistent and coherent with the position of other stakeholders and, in particular, with
The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation produced by the Stabilisation Unit.
ADP Land Operations 2017

3-12. ADP Land Operations builds on the foundations laid by UK Defence Doctrine to provide
the philosophy and principles for the British Army’s approach to operations. As ‘capstone’
doctrine it provides an overview and a framework for understanding, which reinforced
by this publication, establishes the doctrine for land forces delivering stability activity.
3-13. The document outlines the NATO codification of operations themes, types of operation
and tactical activities. This enhances and aids interoperability with allies and aiding
understanding of the mosaic of conflict. Those relevant to land operations are shown in
Figure 3-1 and will be expanded upon in Parts B and C.
Operations Themes and Types of Operation

3-14. Operations may be assigned or described in terms of particular contextual themes. These
operations themes allow the general conditions of the operating environment to be
understood, informing the intellectual approach, resources available (including force
levels, rules of engagement (ROE) and force protection measures), likely activities required
and levels of political appetite and risk. There are four themes, aligned to the functions
of land power: warfighting, security, peace support and DE.54 These themes provide
a framework for understanding, in general terms, the context and dynamics of a conflict.
53 JDP 05, Abstract para 1.

54 AJP-01. Note that UK doctrine refers to DE which is largely the same as NATO doctrine’s description of peacetime military
engagement, but is not constrained to peacetime situations. United States doctrine use the term ‘security cooperation’.
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A theme may be set at the strategic level and forms part of the narrative for operations,
but this will not necessarily happen. As a conflict evolves, the thematic designation
may change. It is important for the operational and strategic levels of command,
informed by tactical commanders, to anticipate the need for any change. Within a single
operations theme more than one type of operation will often occur simultaneously.
Operations themes
Types of operation
Warfighting
Combat Tactical activities
Security Stability
Offensive activities Defensive activities
• Counter-irregular
• Attack • Defence
Peace activity (Counter-
• Raid • Delay
support insurgency, Counter-
• Ambush
terrorism, counter-
• Exploitation
Defence criminality)
• Pursuit
• Military contribution to
engagement • Breakout Enabling activities
peace support
• Feint • Reconnaissance
• Military contribution to
• Demonstration • Security
humanitarian aid
• Reconnaissance in force • Advance to contact
• Military contribution
• Link up
to stabilisation and
Stability activities • Withdrawal
reconstruction
• Security and control • Retirement
• Military support to
• Support to security sector • Relief of troops in
Capacity Building
reform combat and encircled
• Non-combatant
• Support to initial forces
evacuation operation
restoration of essential • March
• Extraction
services • Obstacle breaching
Military aid to the • Support to interim and crossing
civil authority governance tasks
Figure 3-1. Operations themes, types of operation and tactical activities
3-15. Within the operations themes, certain types of operation exist. They are not mutually
exclusive and are often concurrent with other types of operation within the mosaic
of conflict. As doctrinal definitions, they are neither designed nor do they necessarily
correspond to UK Defence planning tools or assumptions.55 Rather, they aid analysis
and articulation of complex missions and provide the essential gearing required to
sequence a series of tactical activities to achieve operational objectives. Note that unlike
NATO doctrine, ADP Land Operations includes an additional, discrete type of operation
described as capacity building. Types of operation and operations themes are covered in
more detail in Part B.
3-16. Within all types of operation, land forces conduct all or some of a range of tactical
activities, often concurrently. The balance between the different activities varies from
one operation to another over time. The four stability activities are described in Part C.
55 ADP Land Operations 2017, para 2-16.

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Integrated Action
3-17. Integrated Action describes how land forces orchestrate and execute operations in an
interconnected world, where the consequences of military action are judged by an
audience that extends from immediate participants to distant observers. Integrated Action
requires commanders and staff to be clear about the outcome that they are seeking
and to analyse the audience relevant to the attainment of their objectives. They then
identify the effects that they wish to impart on that audience to achieve the outcome,
and what capabilities and actions are available. These lethal and non-lethal capabilities
may belong to the land force itself, or to joint, intergovernmental, inter-agency, non-
governmental, private sector and multinational actors involved in the operation. What is
important is for commanders and staff to work out how to synchronise and orchestrate
all the relevant actions to impart effects onto the audience to achieve the outcome.
3-18. Where stability operations are concerned, land forces face the challenge of identifying
all actors affecting the path to stability. Identifying the correct actions and effects to
promote stability is dependent on creating a network of understanding within the
operating environment.56 This can be achieved through the intelligent application of tools
and resources and a careful approach to the allocation of supporting and supported roles.
3-19. Throughout the phases of combat we understand the roles and hierarchy of the levers
of Integrated Action and the capabilities to employ and orchestrate them are, largely,
available to the Division. In stability operations it is more likely that information activities
and capacity building will have greater primacy and that the capabilities will be available
at lower levels of command. This is explained in more detail in Part 5 to this AFM and
Doctrine Note 17/05: Information Activities.
Consequence Management
3-20. Consequence management is a process by which a headquarters plans for, and
reacts to, the consequences of incidents and events which have a direct physical and
psychological effect on people [audiences]. Headquarters must consider consequence
management throughout the planning process and execution of operations. In
the context of Integrated Action, consequence management provides a reactive
mechanism to maintain progress towards desired outcomes following incidents.57
56 JDP 04 – Understanding and Decision Making.

57 See ADP Land Operations, Chapter 9, Annex A – Undersanding Risk.
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AFM TFSO
Chapter 4
Contents
Combat and Stability Operations

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Contents
Chapter 4
Combat and Stability Operations
The Application and Threat of Force Combat and Stability Operations
4-01. The primary role of land forces is to fight and • The application and threat of
therefore delivering lethal force is the purpose for force
which they should be most prepared. Campaigns • Combat
and operations, however, generally rely on more • Stability operations
than simply combating the enemy to be successful. • Operating environment
While land forces can contribute to successful
conflict resolution through the application of
force or the threat of it, they must also be prepared to support non-lethal civilian-led
initiatives. This can be achieved by supporting the Full Spectrum Approach, combining
the three instruments of national power; diplomatic, economic and the military.
Combat
4-02. Combat cannot be considered in isolation from the other types of operation. It is
vital, when preparing for combat, to consider how it might impact on other, perhaps
subsequent, activities. It is also important that the build-up to combat does not gain
unstoppable momentum. Conflict prevention, for example, through deterrence, is
usually preferable to the consequences of committing to battle. Nonetheless, a force
will only deter if it is militarily credible and this means being capable of combat.
Combat occurs, or is liable to occur, in most of the operations described below. It is the
intensity of the combat that varies. Intensity can be measured in terms of scale (size
and numbers), longevity, rates of consumption and degrees of violence and damage.58
Stability Operations
4-03. Stability operations may be conducted prior to, after, or during combat, supporting the
ends of stability. While the military instrument may lead in combat operations, albeit
within the Full Spectrum Approach, in stability operations the military instrument is
typically a supporting element. This distinction is reflected in the principles of stability
operations.59 These apply to all land stability operations, the balance of emphasis
reflecting the nature of the specific task. While combat operations are largely enemy-
centric, stability operations tend to involve the influencing of a wider range of actors.
4-04. Given the significant complexity and challenges involved during stability operations, land
forces often play a crucial role because they possess unique capabilities and capacities
designed for such environments. Their key function is to provide a safe and secure
environment for other actors to operate within. When other actors are unable to operate
due to non-permissive environment it falls to the land forces to consider the broader
aspects of stability activities.
58 ADP Land Operations 2017, Chapter 8, Annex C.

59 These reflect joint doctrine’s stabilisation security principles, see JDP 05, Shaping a Stable World page 26.
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4-05. In stability operations the military should generally be employed in a supporting

role, helping to resolve a violent challenge to peaceful politics, usually by providing
security. Most of the Army’s operations since 1945 have been stability operations,
ranging from capacity building through UN peacekeeping to complex counter-
insurgency (COIN). In higher-intensity stabilisation campaigns, although enemy force
elements are small, for some force elements combat may be more or less continuous,
and sometimes intense. Doctrinally, the use of force against adversaries in stability
operations intends to gain and maintain, and deny the enemy, popular support.
Operating Environment
4-06. The nature and character of conflict are different. The fundamental nature of conflict
does not change; it is adversarial, human and political. The character of conflict
changes continuously, as a consequence of a number of factors, including the politics
and technology of the age, and each conflict’s unique causes, participants, technology
and geography. When the UK is a participant, our particular political, economic,
geographic and historical position becomes a factor in the character of the conflict that
we experience. A single description of the character of contemporary conflict is not
possible due to the variations described. Nonetheless, success on stability operations
is dependent on understanding the factors that influence the conflict’s character and
their implications. Parts 1-5 to this AFM provide guidance of the characteristics of the
operating environment in which the different types of stability operations occur.
4-07. Although land forces are inherently versatile, they must be adaptable to deal with new
and changing situations. Future conflict cannot be predicted accurately, so land forces
must prepare for the most complex and demanding operations but be able to adapt
rapidly to specific operational requirements. Having adjusted to deal with the new
situation, the force must adapt during conflict. Adversaries and enemies seek to deceive
and surprise us, and themselves adapt: if we are to succeed we must adapt more quickly
than they do.
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Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations | PB-1
pART B
Fundamentals of Stability
Operations
Introduction Part A – Context
Part B provides the fundamentals of stability • Delivering stability
operations. The ten principles of stability operations • The Government approach
are covered in detail in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 • The UK military approach
the four operations themes, warfighting, security, • Combat and stability operations
peace support and DE are described from a stability
perspective. Chapter 7 gives an overview of the types Part B – Fundamentals of
of stability operations which are not mutually exclusive Stability Operations
and are often executed concurrently with other
 Principles of stability operations
types of operation within the mosaic of conflict.
 Operations themes and stability
 Types of stability operationr
Part C – Delivery
• Operating environment
• Stability activities
• Orchestrating and executing
stability operations
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AFM TFSO
Chapter 5
Contents
Principles of Stability Operations

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Chapter 5
Introduction Principles of Stability Operations

5-01. The principles of war constitute the fundamental • Introduction
basis for military activity and doctrine. They are • Principles of War
pre-eminent and apply across all campaigns and • Principles of Stability Operations
operations. The principles of stability operations
provide additional guidance to promote the
ends of stability.60 The two sets of principles are not exclusive and will often be applied
concurrently, across the operations themes, types of operation and tactical activities.
Principles of War
5-02. The principles of war are listed below. With the exception of the master principle, which
is placed first, the relative importance of each principle may vary according to context;
their application according to judgement, common sense and intelligent interpretation:
a. Selection and maintenance of the aim.
b. Maintenance of morale.
c. Offensive action.
d. Security.
e. Surprise.
f. Concentration of force.
g. Economy of effort.
h. Flexibility.
i. Cooperation.
j. Sustainability.

5-03. In enemy-centric combat operations the military is likely to be the supported element.
The principles listed below provide a guide for understanding the supporting,
population-centric role of the military when conducting stability operations.61 Note
that at all times the primacy of political purpose provides the context for activity.
a. Primacy of political purpose.
b. Unity of effort.
c. Understand the context.
60 ADP Land Operations 2017, pages 8C-5/6.

61 Note that this role aligns with the support and engage functions of land power.
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d. Foster partner nation governance and capacity.
e. Prepare for the long term.
f. Provide security for the population.
g. Neutralise adversaries.
h. Gain and maintain popular support.
i. Anticipate, learn and adapt.
j. Operate in accordance with the law.
5-04. Primacy of Political Purpose. This principle informs all others and dictates the
desired outcome, planning and conduct of the campaign. Military actions must
always be subordinate to, and aligned with, the overall inter-agency, politically-led
campaign. The political authority, which may be a UN Special Representative to the
Security General, another international appointee or the partner nation government,
will usually have overall responsibility for military operations. Depending on the
operation, lower level representatives of the authority may play an important role in
operations, even to the point of authorising military action. From a UK perspective,
the in-theatre political lead is likely to be the Ambassador or High Commissioner. The
relationship between the UK political lead and the in-theatre military commander
is therefore crucial, and can have a major impact on mission success.
5-05. Primacy of political purpose necessitates that all tactical actions are aligned with the
desired political end state. This is achieved by land forces understanding the context,
maximising the benefits of unity of effort and preparing for the long term. In
both combat and stability operations, land forces operate in support of legitimate
political objectives. The campaign plan will be rooted in the political narrative and
as such should be at the forefront of the commander’s planning, implementation
and assessment efforts, noting political direction can change course. Land forces
are guided by political processes by means of the Full Spectrum Approach.
5-06. While a campaign plan maps the critical path, conflicting pressures and the daily frictions
of operating at the tactical level will be significant and should not be underestimated.
Stability activities may meet their military objectives but if they are conducted in
isolation and at odds with political objectives, the results may be counter-productive.
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Primacy of Political Purpose – France and Algeria (1954 – 62)62

The French experience in Algeria demonstrates the consequences of a failure to maintain
the primacy of political purpose during a campaign. It also shows the need to avoid a
purely military campaign focus. From the beginning of that conflict, the French military
enjoyed considerable operational success, forcing the Front de Libération Nationale
(FLN) on to the defensive and restricting them to an urban terror campaign in Algiers.
Insurgents were also isolated from rural support by large-scale resettlement activity
and a formidable system of barriers to reduce infiltration from Morocco and Tunisia. A
psychological operations campaign was established which aimed at persuading Muslims
that the French administration was a more attractive long-term option than support for
an increasingly-ineffective terrorist movement. This military approach did not, however,
lead to essential political success. While the FLN was effectively destroyed in Algiers,
they were able to internationalise the war, gaining recognition from the non-aligned
movement in 1955 and from the UN in 1960.
In the US, the Eisenhower administration wanted the conflict resolved before it weakened
NATO, and Senator Kennedy spoke of the need for French withdrawal in the 1960
election campaign. In France there was considerable intellectual and press protest. Public
opinion swung towards Algerian independence. In Algeria the French were thus robbed
of any real hope of mobilising moderate Muslim support. The necessarily political aspects
of civic action drew the army increasingly into the political arena. De Gaulle’s hints in
1959 that self-determination was a possible option enraged the French Army who saw
it as a betrayal at a time when they felt they were effectively winning the conflict. This
led to an attempted military coup against de Gaulle in 1961. A terrorist campaign spread
to mainland France. Independence was granted in 1962 following a collapse in French
domestic popular support for the campaign. The campaign illustrates the irrelevance
of tactical success in the absence of a viable political settlement, and when there is
confusion and incoherence in the political purpose of intervention.
5-07. Unity of Effort. All agencies, military and civilian, international and partner nation must
be encouraged to cooperate if stability is to be successfully achieved. In a military context,
the latter provides the desired outcome for Integrated Action. The need to cooperate
means that within the security line of operations, the activities of the other actors,
particularly those with intelligence and security responsibilities, should be coordinated
down to at least unit level. Coterminous military, police and government boundaries, with
cooperation committees at each level of authority, are commonly used to achieve unity of
effort.
5-08. Unity of effort reinforces the primacy of political purpose and supports prepare for
the long term principles. Stability activities are characterised by their cross-Government
and inter-agency nature but relationships between organisations have no agreed
template. The unity of command experienced in warfighting is unlikely to pervade in
stability missions. If the organisations operating within the CJIIM environment achieve
unity of effort, their collective progression towards the desired political end-state stands
a greater chance of success.
62 Horne, Alastair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962. Beckett, Ian, Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies.
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5-09. Coherence in planning resulting from Integrated Action at both operational and tactical
levels offers a number of advantages: effective analysis and shared understanding of a
situation; deployment of national resources (including civilian expertise) and focused use
of military resources.
5-10. Stability operations will therefore provide extra challenges to the tactical commander as
disparate organisations with a variety of philosophies, motivations and cultures operate
in the same battlespace. Unity of effort seeks to corral this expertise and ensures
all efforts and activity work toward a common end. While a commander may wish to
coordinate these efforts, some organisations may be reluctant to comply with the military
for reasons of impartiality and force protection. Uncoordinated activity and disagreement
will present structural and conceptual gaps – opportunities adversaries will exploit.
Unity of Effort – Borneo (1963 – 66)

In the Borneo Campaign, Commonwealth forces defeated a complex insurgency
being supported by infiltrating Indonesian forces. A combination of security, judicial
and political action based on a coordinated civil-military plan, and extensive use of
psychological operations, suppressed the urban insurgency. The conflict was displaced to
the jungle interior, where ultimately a well-coordinated approach led to the insurgents’
defeat. Extensive manoeuvre, using aviation, created an illusion of large-scale military
presence, the impact of which was amplified by highly-aggressive, but carefully-targeted,
military action. Sensitive handling of locals led to Commonwealth forces, rather than
the insurgents, being regarded as providers of security. Through a well-orchestrated
combination of physical and psychological effects, the Commonwealth forces succeeded
in the complete demoralisation of Indonesian forces and the defeat of the internal
insurgency. This enabled an enduring political settlement in the north of Borneo that
led to the provinces of Sarawak and Sabah remaining secure within the Federation of
Malaysia.
5-11. Understand the Context. To ensure that the military campaign, operations and tactical
activities are consistent with the political purpose, the historical, regional and political
context of the situation must be understood. Without an adequate understanding of
the physical, threat, human and information environments land forces will be unable
to influence effectively the relevant audiences, actors, adversaries and enemies (A3E).
Understanding, and the intelligence networks and cultural expertise that underpin
it, has to be built over time, and involve significant cooperation with other agencies.
Understanding the gender relations at play in the operating environment (relative
power and influence of women and men, both formal and informal, and vulnerabilities)
is becoming an increasing focus for NATO and UN militaries, as we increasingly
recognise how such understanding can improve our operational effectiveness.
5-12. Contributions to wider political, security and economic development activity will be
grounded in our understanding of the context, underpinning our Integrated Action.
To influence actors’ behaviour we must first understand their motivations. There are
clear operational imperatives to understanding the physical terrain (manoeuvre) and
the enemy (application of force) in a warfighting context. In stability operations the
need to understand the broad range of actors affecting stability is equally vital.
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5-13. Any opportunity to immerse in relationship-building should be exploited.63 Once

deployed, the engage function of land power will promote a firm knowledge and
understanding of the context. This is a continuous collection process managed
and integrated in the same way information/intelligence is maintained on the
adversary. Deployed units, commanders and staff officers will become more
adept at understanding the broad and complex nuances of sociology, regional
influences, geography, local politics, local economic pressures and language.
5-14. Engaging with key local leaders, tribal or societal groups will foster good relations,
avoid misunderstandings and reduce the consequences of conflict amongst the people.
Accessing the knowledge and influence of women must not be overlooked (they
generally constitute 50% of the population), and may require additional approaches
to harness, such as the use of engagement teams. At the tactical level it is likely
there will be more opportunities to collect information on the population in which
we operate than an adversary who may wish to remain covert. Both groups must
be understood and this should not be left to ‘cultural specialists’. Understanding
the context is every soldier’s responsibility. Partner nation security forces and the
population will also need to understand British soldiers and build positive relationships.
This may be over short periods of deployment and under stressful conditions.
Understand the Context: Operation SERVAL (2013 – 14)64

Operation SERVAL was a short-notice, French-led contingent operation executed in Mali
from January 2013 at the request of the acting President of Mali. The purpose of the
deployment was to assist the Malian armed forces in halting the advance of insurgent
groups which had seized control of the northern half of the country. Rapid French
Political/Strategic/Military decision-making, with a compressed chain of command,
allowed for an early political decision of “move now, orders to follow”. This generated
a standing start intervention with less than 24 hours warning, and was enabled
through the French understanding of the regional context based on historical ties, other
government departments’ representation regionally, pre-positioned military forces and
on-going contingency planning. It was also complemented by the exploitation of host
nation human intelligence. Initial stability operations were successful and French forces
transitioned to Operation BARKHANE moving to a regional approach.
5-15. Foster Partner Nation Governance and Capacity. The force must help to
develop the partner nation’s ability to govern effectively, as demanded by the
campaign plan. In the security sector this is likely to include the capability needed
to conduct effective and appropriate security and stability operations.
5-16. Governments function by maintaining their monopoly on the use of force. In fragile
states this authority may be eroded or non-existent in the eyes of a partner-nation
audience. To develop governance capacity, commanders and soldiers must first
understand the context. Fostering partner nation governance and capacity will also
mean providing security for the population and gaining and maintaining popular
support. Governance is undermined by the perception or reality of corruption, greed,
63 Examples include upstream capacity building activity, DE or pre-deployment reconnaissance.

64 Warfare Branch, Lessons Team Op SERVAL Newsletter dated July 2013.
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incompetence, bias, disregard for the rule of law and disenfranchisement.65 Therefore,
one aim of a campaign should be to foster indigenous authority and capacity, through
military and other capacity building, economic support and diplomatic activities.
5-17. The approach commanders and soldiers take to foster authority and build indigenous
capacity is vital to success. Indeed, campaign authority is dependent on it. Opportunities
and activity will range across the stability activities (see Part C). At all times, commanders
should seek sustainable local solutions to issues affecting stability. Information
activities should convey the growing capacity of partner nation organisations, building
legitimacy and authority for the partner nation government. Cultural differences
and attitudes towards local methods should not be allowed to fester but understood
and accommodated. Corruption or behaviour which threatens the authority of
the partner nation (such as sexual violence conducted by its armed forces) should
be actively discouraged. The approach should therefore be honest but firm with
every opportunity taken to connect the audience to the legitimate government.
Foster Partner Nation Governance and Capacity – Sierra Leone (1991 –

2002)
In addition to its human consequences, the 11-year war also brought about the
destruction of the country’s economy, infrastructure and state institutions. During the
conflict, the often unpaid and unfed Sierra Leone Army (SLA) was as much a source
of instability as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). They were known by the civilian
population as ‘sobels’ – (soldier by day, rebel by night) due to their violent and predatory
activity. Their ineffectiveness, along with that of other state institutions such as the police,
saw the use of local militias and private military security companies against the RUF.
The UK’s joint task force, deployed in May 2000 (Operation PALLISER), went through a
number of mission and role transitions. Initially an evacuation force, then a stabilisation
force, before concluding as a training organisation. One of the keys to long-term success
in Sierra Leone was the UK’s commitment to training and institution building. Within
an equivalent to the Full Spectrum Approach, the UK’s forces initially operated as short-
term training teams and later as a permanent International Military Advisory and Training
Team. This small but high-profile team helped build the new Republic of Sierra Leone
Armed Forces, and reassure the population that they had not been abandoned when the
UK military withdrew. This addressed their concern that the SLA may regress to its old
ways. Confidence was bolstered by use of highly visible demonstrations in support of
the Government through short-term military deployments, ship visits and joint training
exercises to coincide with local political events, such as elections.
5-18. Prepare for the Long Term. Attaining stability in conflict-affected states is likely to
be a slow and difficult process. Planning must be objective and long-term in outlook
based on a thorough understanding of the operating environment. Following combat
operations, land forces may only be permitted to conduct stability operations for
a short period. Enemies and adversaries may exploit this weakness by emphasising
their own enduring presence. Not all deployments are preceded by a crisis or combat
operations. Part 5 to this AFM describes how security capacity building (a part of DE)
can provide persistent engagement in support of long-term SSR projects and stability.
65 Note that corruption may be part of the fabric of some societies.

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5-19. In a security context, given the limited duration of interventions, land forces must aim to
support developments on which successor international and partner nation authorities
and forces can build. At the tactical level, this can be enabled through the development
of effective relationships with actors supporting long-term stability, especially partner
nation personnel. The disruptive effect of limited operational tour lengths should be
overcome through well constructed handover plans, staggered postings and, where
possible, continuity staff.
Prepare for the Long Term – The ‘NITAT Moment’ in Northern Ireland
(1972)66
The first units to deploy to Operation BANNER in 1969 had no pre-deployment training.
The need for theatre-specific training became increasingly clear: generic colonial-era COIN
methods were inappropriate. The Northern Ireland Training and Advisory Team (NITAT)
was established in 1972 to fill the gap. The idea adopted an approach used successfully at
the Jungle Warfare School at Kota Tingi in 1948 to train units deploying to the Malayan
Emergency. Using high-quality military and police instructors fresh from operations to
design and deliver the training, NITAT also developed specialist training areas and ranges
representative of the conditions in theatre. Despite the costs and distraction from training
for general war on NATO’s Central Front, a second team was established at Sennelager
shortly afterwards, to train units deploying from Germany, and then a third in Northern
Ireland to train individual reinforcements. This enterprise required a leap of faith. It was
by no means clear that the campaign would be protracted, but the necessary investment
was made to put force preparation on a campaign footing. Operational standards were
raised and without doubt lives saved. From 1973 onwards no unit or individual deployed
to Northern Ireland without passing through NITAT, which constantly adapted to meet
evolving threats and changes to the operational requirement.
5-20. Provide Security for the Population. The first duty of any government is to provide
security, including human security, for its people. Where the partner nation is unable or
unwilling to protect the population, land forces may be called upon to intervene as part
of the Full Spectrum Approach. If not, enemies and adversaries can exploit this weakness
for their own ends.
5-21. Typically, land forces can deliver security through security and control activities (short-
term) and through support to SSR (longer-term). Land forces support to the restoration of
essential services and interim governance will also benefit the security of the population,
albeit less directly. In the context of Integrated Action, actions taken to improve security,
and their effects, have the potential to influence the behaviour of the population for the
better, reducing the influence of enemies and adversaries. In turn, enhanced security
is likely to improve the prospects for long-term stability. Selecting the correct security
actions and effects relies entirely on gaining a thorough understanding of the population
(see JDP 04: Understanding).
66 Operation BANNER - An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland, Army Code 71842 dated July 2006.
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Provide Security for the Population – East Timor (1999)

Following a referendum on independence from Indonesia, violent clashes, instigated
by a suspected anti-independence militia, sparked a humanitarian and security crisis
in the region. On 15 Sep 1999 UN Security Council Resolution 1296 authorised the
establishment of a multi-national force to restore peace and security in East Timor.
International Force East Timor (INTERFET) was created and led by Australia.
There were multiple and diverse threats to the population and security forces, including
various hostile elements (opposing militia factions) to the deteriorating environmental
conditions in an already poor nation. An Australian-led force achieved security for the
local population, firstly through an initial presence and the threat of discriminate force,
and secondly through active engagement with the people at every level. Initially extensive
patrolling in force cleared the capital and other areas of militia. The decision was taken
to use armour as an integral part of the force, despite it going against the conventional
wisdom of staying in direct contact with the population in stability operations. The
INTERFET forces found that not only did the tracked vehicles increase their mobility in
difficult terrain but that the militias were overawed and dispirited by the presence of
armour. Once initial security was established, frequent and visible patrolling served to
reassure the population, who then cooperated with the force to isolate and control
the militias. Key Leader Engagement (KLE) initiatives under-pinned the credibility of the
security force to do its job.
The intervention force rapidly established security for the population of East Timor and
successfully transferred responsibility to the UN.
5-22. Neutralise Adversaries. The neutralisation of adversaries, and their supporters, can
occur in a number of ways including deterrence, defeat, dispersal, disarmament or
absorption into legitimate security forces, political movements and society. Armed forces
play a significant role in neutralising adversaries. Depending on the circumstances this
can include combined arms manoeuvre operations, raids, patrols, searches, precision
attacks and through a contribution to demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration
(DDR) efforts. To be effective and to avoid undermining the security of the population,
the military contribution to the neutralisation of adversaries requires considerable
understanding of the operating environment, including accurate, actionable and
integrated intelligence.
5-23. The principles of understand the context and anticipate, learn and adapt guide
us in undermining adversaries and weakening their resolve. Neutralisation then paves
the way for maintaining popular support, providing space to develop partner nation
security forces. This may ultimately lead to the transition of security responsibility to
partner nation government structures. History suggests security cannot be achieved
solely through the presence of military forces. The stability activities do not focus on the
destruction of the enemy. Set in the context of Integrated Action, their collective pressure
(over time) aims to isolate and neutralise enemies and adversaries who prevent us from
achieving our mission, giving space for political processes that may incorporate them.
5-24. While significant combat operations may take place in the physical domain, we may
see a powerful contest for domination of the information environment. The adversary
will employ information activities in a similar way to land forces in order to influence
the behaviour of the population. The extensive use of social media sites to attract
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recruits, publicise events and dissipate their message across international boundaries is
one example. The adversary must not be allowed to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the
population. The military force will therefore be required to kill or capture those individuals
who cannot be reconciled and neutralise the remainder such that they become irrelevant
(attack the network). There must be no safe havens or locations where the adversary can
prepare and regenerate fighting power. In the context of insurgency, safe havens often
exist across international boundaries and may be difficult for the tactical commander
to influence from within his own resources. Armed forces must operate in accordance
with the law and the utmost care taken not to be drawn into actions which may be
counterproductive or undermine the credibility of the mission.
Neutralise Adversaries – Oman (1965 – 1975)

In a classic example of economy of effort, a Special Air Service (SAS) squadron of about
90 men deployed into the Omani hinterland fusing the civil and military elements of the
COIN strategy. The British wished to keep the strategic footprint small, enabling plausible
deniability of direct involvement in the conflict. For this reason, a significant number of
additional British officers were privately contracted to the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) in
specialist, mentoring and leadership roles. The SAS raised, trained and led jebali militias
known as firqats which isolated the insurgents from the locals, and set secure conditions
allowing effective implementation of the civil aid programme. The SAS were also directly
involved in the provision of civil aid, helping to establish clinics, schools and bore holes.
A Royal Engineer squadron provided specialist support with infrastructure projects and an
ambitious road building programme dramatically improved SAF access into the mountains.
A UK military medical unit provided ad hoc medical and health care while clinics were
constructed. Civil aid was complemented by an information operation which countered
the insurgent’s communist ideology; this was largely delivered directly to the jebalis by
the SAS teams. SAS-led firqats fought a series of small, but intense, battles to neutralise
insurgents which enhanced the effect of regular SAF operations. The SAF successfully
interdicted the border with Yemen and denied insurgent movement in the mountains
through the extensive use of barriers and airpower. Once the insurgents were isolated and
neutralised the new Sultan was able to establish an ambitious programme of change.
5-25. Gain and Maintain Popular Support. In stability operations, the state, its security forces
and intervening external actors (civil and military) are in competition with adversaries for
the support of the people. The side that succeeds in gaining the support of the people,
and denies that support to the other side, is likely to win in the long term. Gaining
and maintaining support depends in part on providing security, but it also depends
significantly on the day-to-day conduct of the authorities, their security forces and
international partners, and their impact on people’s daily lives.
5-26. The application of this principle is made possible by understanding and providing security
for the population. Nonetheless, security by itself is not enough to make the population
support its government. The simplest way military units can lose popular support is by
operating outside the law. Any erosion of legitimacy for the mission is damaging, be that
caused by collateral damage, maltreatment of prisoners, or sexual exploitation. At best,
the loss of support may be irreversible but in the worst instance it can serve as motivation
to armed adversaries.
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5-27. On entry to theatre, land forces may not be popular, credible or particularly well
understood. Those actors it wishes to influence such as the population, partner nation
security forces, key leaders and reconcilable adversaries must be given the opportunity
to assess our actions and motivations in a positive way. Information activities will
underpin this effort by imparting an effective narrative which appeals to the population.
But in the end, in stability operations it is our daily conduct which must remain
exemplary. With the power of social media, misdemeanours by individual soldiers
can have a profound effect on our wider legitimacy in the eyes of the population,
but also in the eyes of the international community and our domestic audience at
home. On stability operations, every soldier is an ambassador as well as a soldier.
5-28. While the land force commander’s approach may be to ‘under-promise and over-deliver’
in the initial stages of a mission, the pace of transition demands support for the partner
nation security forces. It is this popular support that generates consent amongst the
population and support for the narrative. With positive momentum commanders can
expect spin-offs such as a flow of actionable intelligence, increased recruiting for the
partner nation security forces, reduced violence and a rising acceptance of a legitimate
government.
5-29. No operation is without unexpected or negative incidents. In these instances commanders

must attempt to mitigate the loss of popular support by employing rehearsed and credible
consequence management procedures which must include expeditious information
activities. While the definition of this principle has focused on in-theatre support, tactical
actions have the potential to adversely impact on popular support at home. There is
potential scope for conflict between national security priorities and maintaining public
support for operations that require sustained effort over a protracted period. This is
often the case in peace support or counter-insurgency operations. The longer such
an operation endures the more information activities remain on the crucial path.
Gain and Maintain Popular Support – Later Stages of Northern Ireland

(2009)
On the night of 7 March 2009, two British soldiers were murdered outside Massareene
Barracks in County Antrim. The Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), a dissident splinter
group of the IRA, accepted responsibility. The murders were seen as defiance of, and
a challenge to, the popular cross-community support and commitment to the political
process outlined in the 1998 Good Friday Peace Agreement. Martin McGuinness, Deputy
First Minister of Northern Ireland, a former senior member of the IRA, made a public
statement that those carrying out attacks in Northern Ireland were ‘traitors to the island
of Ireland’ and reaffirmed that the ‘only legal mandate’ was the Good Friday Agreement.
His actions reinforced the credibility of the Stormont Assembly and broad support for the
political settlement. The effect was the further isolation of violent dissident groups and
growing support for the political process.
Contents
5-30. Anticipate, Learn and Adapt. The effective force improves all aspects of its performance
throughout the campaign. This requires formal systems to look for new ways of doing
things, and learning lessons from effective and ineffective practice. The ideas and lessons
must be disseminated to benefit the whole force, which requires the capacity to adjust
doctrine, training, equipment and other aspects of capability. The Operations Process
supports this effort (see AFM Command).
P
s
A
es
RE
sse
N
Ass
PA
PLA
ss
RE
Commander
EXECUTE
A ssess
Figure 5-1. The Operations Process
5-31. Land forces’ ability to react to dynamic threats and emerging tactics of our adversaries
is underpinned by understanding. To successfully neutralise those individuals or groups
who oppose the mission requires a mind-set that is prepared to question, inquire
and review all tactical actions. At the operational level a campaign plan will identify
key decision points and risks to the operation. It will establish the critical information
needed to inform progress and robust measures of performance (MOP) and measures
of effectiveness (MOE).67 This flow of information to commanders allows the combined
force to adapt (at the operational level) to changing circumstances. Deployed civilian
support from Operational Analysts (OAs) and Scientific Advisors (SCIADs) reinforces
our ability to accurately identify ‘success and risk’. The process is entirely scalable and
applicable at the tactical level and reflects human nature to assess what works and
where a change of approach is required. Subconsciously or through more formalised
processes our adversaries will be reviewing their own actions and take every opportunity
to reinforce success and capitalise on our mistakes; their survival depends upon it.
5-32. Anticipation at all levels inculcates a culture of initiative and provides the time and space
to operate one step ahead of our adversaries. We will not always outwit our enemies
but the speed at which UK and partner nation forces change their behaviour to mitigate
67 Other Government Departments may use the term ‘Monitoring and Evaluation’.
Contents
threats will help maintain the pace of transition and progress towards the desired political
end state. Types of stability operation such as counter-irregular activities, demand
we constantly review and capture the lessons identified then refine our training and
education both at the tactical level (adapting TTPs) through to force generation (individual
and collective mission-specific training events). Anticipate, learn and adapt is command-
led but all soldiers must be actively engaged.
Anticipate, Learn and Adapt

‘In these dirty little wars, political and military tasks intertwine and the objective is more
often “nation building” than the destruction of an enemy army. The ability to learn
quickly during such operations in order to create an organizational consensus on new
ways of waging war - or of waging peace - may be of more importance for modern
military institutions than ever before. Armies will have to make the ability to learn to deal
with messy, uncomfortable situations an integral part of their organizational culture. In
T E Lawrence’s metaphor, they must learn how to eat soup with a knife. The process will
not be comfortable, but it could not be more important’.
Nagl, J. (2002) Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p 223.
5-33. Operate in Accordance with the Law. The armed forces and the other agencies
involved in stability operations must abide by the law and be seen to do so. This is more
than a matter of the standing requirement to act lawfully. As the armed forces of a
country which adheres strictly to the rule of law, our moral authority to intervene and
conduct stability operations depends on our lawful conduct: it is about our integrity.
This also applies to any alliance or coalition we are part of, and the partner nation. It
is a critical aspect of gaining and maintaining popular support, and of undermining
any perceived legitimacy of adversaries. It is often the case that adversaries commit
serious crimes and therefore our lawful conduct sets us apart. If members of the security
forces are accused of breaking the law, legitimacy is maintained by visible and effective
investigations and where necessary, prosecutions. In the end, cover-ups destroy legitimacy.
5-34. It should be self-evident that professional, well-trained and well-led armed forces
must operate in accordance with the law. Operating outside international, national
or partner nation law will lose us popular support, eroding the chances of stability.
Operating in accordance with the law not only fosters the rule of law, which is an
important end in itself, but it is a crucial part of maintaining legitimacy of the partner
government and of the security forces. Land forces may find themselves operating
with coalition partners and/or other allies, including partner nation security forces.
Combining the military capabilities of different nations brings depth, breadth and
legitimacy to a military force. It also generates complexity and frictions associated with
interoperability. The difference in interpretation of national law is one example which
must be overcome. For multinational operations or ad hoc coalitions, national caveats are
usually declared reflecting the law and policy of each respective nation in areas such as
the interpretation and application of ROE for offensive force, targeting and detention.
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5-35. The application of coalition or combined force fighting power will generate specific
legal considerations for tactical commanders. Particular laws and practices may be
at odds with our own. Where, for example, partner nation security actors are known
to abuse or torture detainees then UK land forces may be unwilling to transfer
detainees in their custody until political agreement and assurances are made.
There have been instances in the recent past where it was alleged and occasionally
subsequently proven that British forces broke the law. Irrespective of whether the
allegations are proven or not, the consequences of the allegations or crimes have
major implications for the conduct of the campaign and the overall reputation and
standing of the UK. No matter what tactical circumstances a soldier or commander
may find themselves in, expediency is not an excuse to operate outside the law.
Operate in Accordance with the Law: Camp Breadbasket: Iraq (2003)

In 2003, British and Coalition campaign authority was damaged when military personnel
failed to apply the principle of operating in accordance with the law in their handling
of local nationals. ‘…Iraqis detained by British soldiers were abused after taking part
in looting at a depot known as Camp Breadbasket, where supplies from the UN World
Food Programme were housed. Four soldiers were found guilty of the mistreatment of
Iraqi prisoners in January and February 2005. This mistreatment came to the attention
of the global media after one of the soldiers involved sent a photographic film in to be
processed. It contained images of Iraqi detainees being forced to simulate sex.’ Actions
such as these at the tactical level have the potential to reduce room for manoeuvre at the
political level.
See Basham, V. (2013) War, Identity and the Liberal State. Abingdon: Routledge, p 148.
Contents
AFM TFSO
Chapter 6
Contents
Operations Themes and Stability

Contents
Contents
Chapter 6
Introduction
6-01. Operations may be assigned or described in
• Introduction
terms of particular contextual themes. These
• Warfighting
operations themes allow the general conditions
• Security
of the operating environment to be understood,
• Peace support
informing the intellectual approach, resources
• Defence engagement
available (including force levels, rules of
engagement and force protection measures), likely
activities required and levels of political appetite and risk. There are four themes, aligned
to the functions of land power: warfighting, security, peace support and DE. Ultimately,
the purpose of all these themes is to promote stability benefiting the UK (see Figure 3-1).
6-02. The themes provide a framework for understanding the context and dynamics of a
conflict. A theme may be set at the strategic level and form part of the narrative for
operations, but this will not necessarily happen. As a conflict evolves, the thematic
designation may change. It is important for the operational and strategic levels of
command, informed by tactical commanders, to anticipate the need for any change.
Within a single operations theme more than one type of operation will often occur
simultaneously.68
Warfighting
6-03. In warfighting (also referred to as major combat operations), most of the activity is
directed against a significant form of armed aggression perpetrated by large-scale
military forces belonging to one or more states or to a well-organised and resourced
non-state actor. These forces engage in combat operations in a series of battles and
engagements at high intensity, varying in frequency and scale of forces involved. The
immediate goal is to ensure freedom of action at the expense of their opponents. The
rhythm of operations is often high with high logistics consumption. Enemy armed
forces may also use irregular and CBRN capabilities to support conventional forces’
military objectives. Operating in a context where warfighting is the predominant
theme may be further exacerbated, perpetuated or exploited by irregular actors
seeking to benefit from instability, whether through insurgency, terrorism, criminality
or disorder. These themes are collectively known as irregular activities.

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Security
6-04. The transition from combat operations to multi-agency stability operations (to re-establish
stability and prosperity, underpinned by the rule of law) is important to establish a
perception of security.69 It is likely to be characterised not by the attainment of specific
end states (such as absolute victory) but by incremental conditions-based outcomes
(albeit they may reflect political direction to achieve particular goals according to a rough
timetable). The mix of actors, and their respective motivations, will be highly dynamic.
Conventional opponents, even once defeated, may re-appear as or be reinforced by
irregular forces; the threat they pose may need to be countered at the same time as
re-establishing legitimate indigenous governance and authority. Pursuing the gradual
transition towards stability, land forces are likely to support the activities of other actors
in protecting, strengthening and restoring civil society, governance, rule of law and the
economy. Operating in a context where security is the predominant theme requires an
increasing number of stability activities together with offensive and defensive activities.
Peace Support
6-05. The peace support theme describes an operating environment following an agreement
or ceasefire that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent
and compliance is high, and the threat of disruption is low. Where peace support
is the predominant theme, land forces may expect to conduct almost exclusively
stability activities, even if ready for offensive and defensive activities. The purpose
is to sustain a security situation that has already met the criteria established by
international mandate; the use of force by peacekeepers is normally limited to
self-defence. Peace support activities include peacemaking, peace enforcement,
peacekeeping and peace building. Peace support activities are most often mandated
and coordinated by the UN, but may be delegated to a military alliance such as NATO.
Defence Engagement (DE)

6-06. DE is the means by which we use our Defence assets and activities, short of combat
operations, to achieve influence. It includes state-to-state military dialogue, bilateral
or multinational training and exercises, and capacity building in which UK forces train,
advise, assist and accompany partner nation security structures. DE spans the mosaic
of conflict and types of operation; it is most effective when initiated in peacetime,
continuing if necessary through conflict and into post-conflict stability operations. Its
purpose is to sustain the UK’s position and influence, protect and promote prosperity and
security, build capacity and establish comprehensive relationships and understanding.
6-07. Early, effective and enduring DE within the Full Spectrum Approach can help to avert
instability and, if not, reduce the likelihood of it being prolonged. It is a necessary
theme of all operations. The land contribution to DE is covered in detail in Annex A to
this chapter, being an emerging area of doctrine with limited coverage in other land
publications.
69 Most notably, human rather than state-centric security will be crucial in gaining the trust and confidence of local
populations.
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Persistent Engagement
Through Persistent Engagement we are able to develop a network of reliable

and trusted partners in the land environment (‘building friends forward’) and, by
trading on our reference status, progressively and permanently build their capacity,
in concert with our allies, across the priority regions. Through this activity we will
qualitatively and quantitatively improve the way we understand priority regions
(understanding risk ‘forward’), be better able to shape and influence events within
them and better posture ourselves to respond to emergent threats to our national
interests. At its most effective, this will increase the ways open to the UK to
achieve our national objectives by, with or through the actions of others. In turn,
this offsets our lack of mass, attends to the political reluctance to employ military
force at scale or for protracted lengths of time in all but the most dangerous
situations, and preserves the priority given to the Army’s modernisation agenda to
restore our war fighting competence.
Major General G P Hill, GOC 1 (UK) Div, 2017
Annex:
A. The Land Contribution to Defence Engagement

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Contents
Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations | 6A-1
ANNEX A to Chapter 6:
The Land Contribution to Defence

Engagement
Introduction
6A-01. Joint Doctrine Note 1/15 Defence Engagement provides a detailed description of
DE at the joint level. The land contribution to DE should be focused on establishing
relationships, increasing access and influence, developing and enhancing understanding,
and building capability and capacity for specified partner nations. It is not about
conducting activity, but the achievement of UK effects or objectives; it therefore needs
to be coherent, coordinated and prioritised across Defence and Government. Those
involved in DE activity need to have an understanding of the UK strategic plan for
the partner nation in which they are deployed and what their part in the plan is.
Context
6A-02. Strategy. DE is cross-Government business. The NSS and SDSR 15 explicitly direct
that the nation should use its capabilities to build prosperity by extending the UK’s
influence in the world, and strengthen security. Key documents are Building Stability
Overseas Strategy (BSOS) and the joint MOD/ FCO International Defence Engagement
Strategy (IDES). Seminal MOD documents such as Future Operating Environment 2035
(FOE35), the Defence Joint Operating Concept (DJOC), Defence Plan and Defence
Strategic Direction provide strategic direction on the conduct of DE as part of this wider
Government direction. International Policy and Planning (IPP) and the Euro-Atlantic
Security Policy (EASP), European Bilateral Relations & EU Exit (EBRX) and Wider Europe
Policy (WEP) teams own the MOD’s regional strategies, informed by the global network
of Defence Attachés.
National Security Strategy &

Strategic Defence and Security Review (2015)
Building Stability Overseas Strategy International Defence Engagement

(2011) Tripartite (FCO, DFID & MOD) Strategy (2017) Bipartite (FCO & MOD)
Army Defence Engagement Strategy
Strategy flow down to Army generic
Formation level
Orders/Plans
Figure 6A-1. The unbroken chain linking higher-level strategy to delivery
6A-03. All Army DE (otherwise known as Army International Activity (AIA)) is subordinate
to and guided by the regional and country strategies which are owned by the MOD
international policy staffs.
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6A-2 | Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations
6A-04. National Prosperity Agenda. The 2015 SDSR clearly states the role Defence has in our
nation’s economic security and prosperity. The Prosperity Agenda is the golden thread
which runs through all Army DE. The land contribution to prosperity is described in
detail in Appendix 1 to this annex.
6A-05. IDES. The IDES describes how DE supports HMG strategy through the Full Spectrum
Approach. Developed by the MOD and FCO, it brings together all the levers available to
achieve the NSS objectives. The 2017 IDES sets out five DE objectives, nested under the
three NSOs of SDSR 2015:
a. Develop understanding. d. Promote prosperity.

b. Prevent conflict. e. Access and influence.
c. Capability and capacity building.
6A-06. In devising DE strategy, the MOD follows a similar approach to other cross-Government
work that uses a logical framework to link inputs to aims through activities, outputs,
and objectives and this is shown at Figure 6A-2.70 Each category in the logical
framework is described in detail in JDN 1/15.
Inputs Activities Outputs Objectives Aims
Interoperability Influence in
support of
Enduring UK interests Sustain our
footprint Visits position and
Cooperation
influence
Understand
Understanding other nations’
objectives
Establish
Personnel, Influence Defend the UK,
its overseas comprehensive
Operational resources
territories relationships
footprint and
Regional and interests and
enablers
stability understanding
Deter
Internal
threats to
stability
UK interests
Build
Dynamic Training Deterrence international
footprint and Protect UK capability,
education citizens abroad capacity
Exports and will
Military Promote and

capability protect UK Protecting
prosperity and
Non- Exercises Defence
deployed and promoting
governance Build our
footprint operations
international prosperity
Partner capacity, and security
capability capability and will
Figure 6A-2. The DE logical framework (JDN 1/15)
70 Joint Doctrine Note 1/15: Defence Engagement, para 2.7.

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6A-07. While a large element of DE is conducted at the operational and strategic levels,
tactical-level activity has the capacity to deliver strategic effect. The Army therefore
has a key role to play. The Army DE Sub-Strategy provides high-level direction on the
execution of Army International Activity (AIA).
6A-08. DE Activities. DE activities include the following:71
a. High Level International Engagement (HLIE) Chief of the General Staff (CGS).
b. Senior Level International Engagement (SLIE) (1* – 3*).
c. Formal staff talks.72
d. Liaison Officers (LO) and Exchange Officers (EO).
e. Loan service.
f. Training and Education (including Overseas Training Exercises (OTX) and International
Defence Training (IDT)).73
g. Defence Sections.
h. Regimental affiliations and alliances.
6A-09. Army International Activity (AIA). AIA supports the achievement of UK effects and
objectives by pursuing the following outcomes:
a. Achieving high levels of cross-DLOD74 interoperability with our allies to sustain our
position of influence and leadership with our strategic partners.
b. An army persistently engaged overseas to understand and shape while becoming

a reference army which other army’s view as their primary partner and a capability
benchmark within the international military community.
c. An army that maintains our status and leverage abroad and one that seeks to
establish comprehensive relationships with emerging powers and other emerging
states if significant to the UK.
d. To support wider Defence efforts to prevent conflict, protect and encourage stability
in priority regions through capacity building and enhanced persistent engagement.
e. To support the UK Prosperity Agenda through support to industry and defence

exports while training our forces for contingency in diverse and austere conditions
around the world.
6A-10. AIA sees the Army persistently and actively engaged overseas, international by
design. Through AIA we enhance our ability to understand, shape and respond
to emerging opportunities, threats and trends. Regional alignment to specified
countries and regions drives much of this interaction. This allows the Army to develop
understanding, establish relationships, increase access and gain influence to better
coordinate Army activity and deliver DE effect. There are three areas of AIA:
71 Doctrine Note 15/03: Land Contribution to Defence Engagement, page 1-9. Details of how DE activities interconnect are
described in detail in the JDN 1/15 and the Army Sub-Strategy.
72 Army Staff Talks (AST) are undertaken annually, and complement Defence Staff Talks (DST).
73 Prioritisation of training will be driven by: commitments to allies; political/military prioritisation; the Prosperity Agenda;
partner nation pull; and resources.
74 Defence Lines of Development (Training, Equipment, Personnel, Information, Concepts and Doctrine, Organisation,
Infrastucture, Logistics).
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a. Interoperability.
b. Security Cooperation.
c. Capacity Building.
6A-11. None of these exclusively supports or replaces any one DE activity although there are
varying degrees of overlap between elements. They are the Army’s ways to achieve the
ends of the IDES.
6A-12. Interoperability. Interoperability is the ability to act together coherently,

effectively and efficiently to achieve Allied tactical, operational and strategic
objectives.75 This broad definition can be broken down into three dimensions:
a. Breadth. NATO divides interoperability into Human, Procedural and Technical.

Human interoperability is the mutual trust and shared understanding generated
through shared experience. Procedural interoperability covers national policy as well
as SOPs, TTPs, and doctrine. Technical interoperability is predominantly focused on
equipment capability solutions, but is underpinned by the need to communicate and
share data.
b. Depth. ‘Fight tonight’ interoperability mitigates gaps through warfare development

to ensure that contingent forces can operate effectively at high readiness in
multinational coalitions. ‘Fight tomorrow’ interoperability designs multinational
solutions into the Funded and Future Force through capability development. ‘Fight in
the Future’ aligns multinational ideas for the Conceptual Force.
c. Level of Ambition. Interoperability requires nations to allocate resources and cede

sovereignty. Strategy must align interoperability outcomes by agreeing an achievable
level of ambition. Defence Strategic Guidance 2008 and Defence Strategic Direction
2016 defined three levels of interoperability ambition: ‘Integrated’ - forces able
to merge seamlessly and are interchangeable; ‘Compatible’ - forces able to
interact with each other in the same battlespace in pursuit of common goal; and
‘Deconflicted’ - forces can co-exist but not operate in the same battlespace.
6A-13. This area of DE focuses on the development of capability in order to allow the UK to
work alongside close allies (principally its two strategic partners, USA and France),
including alliances. It enhances the credibility of the military deterrent and at the
operational and tactical levels it provides a more flexible and dynamic capability to the
theatre commander. It encompasses near, mid and far-term activities, and can include
training and education. Interoperability can reduce risks in multinational operations, but
it requires nations to compromise in order to agree common standards, and to accept
risk in sharing military information and pooling capability. Director Capability (D Cap)
leads on interoperability.76
75 AAP-06 – NATO Glossary of Terms.

76 Doctrine Note 15/03: Land Contribution to Defence Engagement, page 2-1.
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British soldiers train with US Army Domestic All-Hazards Response Team (DART) during Exercise IRON STRIKE, 2014.
Staff Sergeant Boomer.
6A-14. Integrated Action requires significant cooperation between all elements of

the CJIIM force. The key enabler for military cooperation is interoperability. The
purpose of professional study and working and training together with other forces
and nations is to build interoperability. Interoperability strengthens and amplifies the
unique contributions of all forces and agencies at every level. Multinational and inter-
component interoperability is usually more challenging and needs more effort and
resources than interoperability within UK land forces, but even this requires conscious
effort. The exact requirement for interoperability is determined according to operational
need and political ambition.77
6A-15. Security Cooperation.78 This promotes close bilateral Army-to-Army relationships with
specified partner nations: fostering exchanges; developing insight and understanding;
and growing capability. Annual staff talks are the usual method of maintaining these
relationships, and this is supplemented with a steady drum beat of activity conducted
77 See ADP Land Operations 2017, Chapter 7 and British Army Interoperability Policy and Country Plans (1* re-draft), dated
13 Feb 17 for further details.
78 Note that Defence Engagement broadly equates to Security Cooperation in US doctrine whereas Security Cooperation is a
sub-set of DE in UK doctrine.
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through the Liaison Officer (LO) and Exchange Officer (EO) networks. Security
cooperation can also be achieved through training and education. This activity is
focused on countries where the UK aims to have a positive long-term relationship,
a short-term security interest or a political/military requirement to engage. Equally,
the generation of insight and understanding with countries where there is a less
developed relationship leads to increased combat effectiveness and better regional
understanding. More details on Security Cooperation are contained in the Army DE Sub-
Strategy. Assistant Chief of the General Staff (ACGS) leads on security cooperation.79
6A-16. Capacity Building. Capacity building concerns efforts to optimise indigenous

security forces, build institutional capacity and provide support to institutional reform
and/or gain greater local, national or regional influence. It leads to better regional
understanding and is often conducted with countries on the fringe of areas of potential
conflict. Closer cooperation leads to better ‘day one’ understanding should conflict
arise, and provides land forces with better situational awareness, a network in place,
and linguistic and cultural expertise.
a. Specialised Infantry Group (SIG). The SIG oversees and commands the Specialised
Infantry Battalions (Spec Inf Bns). These battalions are geographically aligned to
specific regions to provide long-term, enduring partnerships that are culturally and
linguistically attuned to the detailed needs of that country or region. They offer a
tailor made, credible, connected, persistent and agile ‘understand and train, advise,
assist, mentor and accompany’ capability that will complement the existing and
continued work of regionally-aligned brigades. They will be the first echelon of UK
DE capability; designed principally to operate in the more demanding higher risk/
higher threat areas.
b. Measurement of Effectiveness (MOE). In the conduct of capacity-building

tasks overseas, MOE indicators are necessary in order to provide both quantitative
and qualitative assessments. MOE also provides evaluation of project progress, to
determine value for money and to confirm projects are achieving outcomes
(against objectives) supporting desired impacts or effects. Detail on MOE is
provided in Part 5.80
6A-17. Formation Alignment. The alignment of the 1 (UK) Div brigades, and selected Force
Troops Command (FTC) brigades to priority regions of the world, allows the Army
to deliver command-focused defence engagement that will contribute to national
and defence policy. This is to be achieved by the commanders and staffs of each
formation working on behalf of the MOD, using land delivery plans (LDPs), to build
relationships and regional expertise that will, in turn, lead to prioritised engagement
tasks. For the Army, this will maximise the opportunities for regional engagement, and
will contribute to the development of regional expertise within aligned formations.
6A-18. Persistent Engagement. Persistent engagement is often delivered through capacity

building. Commander Field Army (CFA), through GOC 1 (UK) Div, will continue to
develop capacity building activity, to develop regional understanding and establish
relationships and influence, while supporting the Government’s Prosperity Agenda. CFA
will ensure that the understanding generated by the regionally-aligned brigades and
Spec Inf Bns is shared across land forces, both during routine peacetime engagement
79 Doctrine Note 15/03: Land Contribution to Defence Engagement, page 2-1.

80 Ibid, Annex C.
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and in the event of contingent operations. 1 (UK) Div will be made available to inform
operational design as appropriate and to assist in the operational gearing during
transfer of responsibility from a regionally-aligned brigade to a deploying force. The
regionally-aligned brigades, in support of Defence Attachés, will shape demand from
countries in their regions which land forces can support and which is beneficial to the
UK’s interests in terms of regional security, influence and prosperity. Land delivery plans
(LDPs) will be used to plan, cohere and coordinate all AIA within each region/country.
IDES regional strategies activity-output mapping, owned by IPP, will inform the shaping
process. 1 (UK) Div will maintain the proponency for capacity building within the Field
Army and will coordinate with the Army Directorate of Operations and Commitments
(ADOC) to ensure a coherent, persistent effect in the delivery of capacity building
through short-term training teams and, where appropriate, overseas training exercises.
6A-19. DE in Relation to Crisis. DE will be conducted during the build up to a crisis, as a

minimum by providing early warning via Defence’s Global Network. At that stage it
may be possible to help avert the crisis (and instability) through upstream engagement.
During a crisis, DE can be used to guarantee access to a theatre and basing and
overflight rights. Capacity building activities may also be possible. After a crisis DE
can contribute to stability through capacity building activity as occurred in Sierra
Leone following Operation PALLISER and during Operation TORAL in Afghanistan.
6A-20. Figure 6A-3 illustrates this for a hypothetical situation, it is not intended to
be viewed as linear. We must accept that it is possible that our intervention may
destabilise a state if conflict sensitivity is not applied. At all times, the overall military
response will involve DE activities, not least because those activities make a major
contribution to our understanding of the operating environment or theatre in question.81
Maintain Threat Crisis Crisis Rules-based

rules-based emerging resolution international
international order
order re-established
Weight of effort
Combat operations
Defence Engagement activities to reassure, persuade, empower, deter
Engage to Engage to
promote Engage to Engage to promote
Engage to win
security and prevent instability stabilise security and
prosperity prosperity
Understand
Figure 6A-3. DE activities in relation to crisis
81 Joint Doctrine Note 1/15: Defence Engagement, dated Aug 2015, para 1.7.
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Contents
Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations | 6A1-1
Appendix 1 to Annex A to Chapter 6:
Supporting the Prosperity Agenda:

UK Defence and Security Exports
Introduction
6A1-01. Background. Arguably the most important role for the Government to play in the
current economic and political environment is to both maintain the stability and enhance
the prosperity of the UK. In a globally interconnected and economically dependent
world, this is largely achieved through exports which support UK jobs, provide corporate
and individual income, enhance Treasury and MOD revenue, and spiral back into
benefits for the UK’s own defence procurement and support programmes. It is therefore
not surprising that the NSS and SDSR 15 made supporting prosperity a specified task for
MOD and the Armed Forces for the first time and defined it as more than just setting
the conditions of national and international security in which it could flourish. It implies
a far more proactive role in getting alongside UK defence industry and, crucially, in close
coordination with other key HMG stakeholders such as the Department for International
Trade’s Defence & Security Organisation (DIT DSO), assisting and facilitating their
sales campaigns in ways that lend themselves to military input and are commercially
appropriate. This requires a clear understanding of stakeholders’ aims and posture,
the alignment and planning of mutually supporting activities, and the exploitation of
opportunities and strategic advantage, all directed by appropriate cross-Government
governance and underpinned by coherent and coordinated planning processes at
all levels. The following sections aim to show how this can best be achieved.
6A1-02. The Army Defence Engagement (DE)/Army International Activity (AIA)

contribution. Those involved in DE activities can assist the prospects for defence
exports in a number of ways as follows:
a. Act as eyes and ears for overseas capability gaps and requirements.
b. Identify where these could align to interoperability and dependency opportunities.
c. Being aware of UK defence and security industry capabilities, products, prospects,

campaigns and contracts either existing in or planned for the country concerned.
d. Provide military-to-military SME advice on the operational and training use of UK

military and equipment capabilities.
e. Be prepared, when asked by DIT DSO, to demonstrate UK equipment on inward and

outward training exercises or training team deployments.
f. Provide training support to equipment sales contracts when requested and endorsed
by MOD and DIT DSO.
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6A1-2 | Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations
6A1-03. Codes of Behaviour. Ground rules for dealing with industry are as follows:
a. UK and international law must be obeyed at all times.
b. UK forces need to be aware of what UK made products and Defence services

will be used for. They should report any suspected illegal, immoral or politically
embarrassing activity immediately.
c. UK military advice must be impartial (regardless of the pressure for UK Defence sales)
if credibility is to be maintained.
d. Do not compromise land forces’ reputation, your own integrity or the DE activity you
are primarily engaged in by being seen to be an overt salesman.
e. Do not compromise commercial confidences with potentially rival companies and

countries.
f. Ensure your support has been endorsed by both MOD Export Policy and DIT DSO,
and that you get appropriate pre-deployment briefing from them.
g. Get briefed by in-country defence sections before contact with the partner nation
or in-country UK industry representatives, and refer any issues arising from meeting
engagements with the latter two to DIT DSO.
h. Only comment on in-service equipment that you know and have knowledge or
experience of its use.
i. In the absence of Lines to Take (LTT), adopt a non-committal position before referring
the matter to DIT DSO.
6A1-04. Achieving Coherence with DE. Coherence between DE and defence exports is best
achieved by adhering to the following three steps, which are further illustrated in the
diagram at Figure 6A1-1.
6A1-05. Identify and understand what export prospects and campaigns are relevant to the
country or region you are engaged in by accessing relevant data sources, getting
appropriate briefing and maintaining an appropriate level of awareness of activities and
issues pertinent to your destinations. Examples of this include the MOD’s ESCAPADE
database, DIT DSO country briefs, campaign trackers and dashboards, and briefings
from MOD IPP/EASP/EBRX/WEP, Army International Branch (AIB), MOD Export Policy
and DIT DSO.
6A1-06. Deconflict and align DE and export activities through persistent engagement and
liaison with key stakeholders in order respectively to avoid duplication or contradictory
messaging and exploit areas of mutual interest.
6A1-07. Consider UK export interests in all DE planning activity in order to exploit both to
optimum effect.
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Governance
Identification Deconfliction Planning

and and and
understanding alignment exploitation
Process
Governance
Figure 6A1-1. Model for DE and exports coherence
Governance
Underpinning Governance and Process.
6A1-08. It is essential that DE and export activity is properly cohered and coordinated through
a recognised governance structure and with robust underpinning processes. Army DE
policy and MOD export policy are authoritative for the Army and MOD respectively,
but in essence the following principles, leads, bodies and documents apply:
a. All Army DE activity is subordinate to and guided by the regional and country
strategies which are owned by the MOD international policy staff and Army DE
Policy.
b. All DE activity related to export opportunities is subject to endorsement by MOD

Export Policy and DIT DSO.
c. MOD DE is governed by the 3* Defence Engagement Board (DEB), 2* Joint

Commitments Strategic Steering Group (JCSSG) and its subordinate groups, and 1*
Strategic Regional Implementation Group for DE (STRIDE).
d. Army DE is also governed by the DE Steering Group (Army) (DESG(A)), 2* DE

Meeting, Army DE Working Group (ADEWG), Formation Regionally Aligned Directive
(FRAD) and Land Delivery Plans (LDPs).
e. DIT DSO is routinely represented at the STRIDE, DESG(A) and ADEWG, and must be
involved wherever possible in all LDP development work and major DE planning.
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AFM TFSO
Chapter 7
Contents
Types of Stability Operations

Contents
Contents
Chapter 7
Types of Stability Operations
Introduction
Types Stability of Operations
7-01. This chapter provides an overview of the
• Introduction
different types of stability operations with
• Types of Stability Operations
full detail being provided in Parts 1-5 of
this AFM. Each type of stability operation
must be understood in terms of how it supports the ends of stability.
Types of Stability Operations82

7-02. Counter-irregular activity (see Part 1). Counter-irregular activity comprises three
overlapping and interrelated categories: counter-insurgency (COIN), counter-terrorism
and counter-criminality.
a. COIN. COIN is defined as: comprehensive civilian and military efforts made to defeat
an insurgency and to address any core grievances. It encompasses those military,
paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civil actions taken by a government
or its partners to defeat insurgency. The approach involves neutralising insurgents
by killing, capturing, marginalising or reconciling them. COIN is characterised by
controlling the level of violence and securing the population through instances of
combat, normally conducted at relatively low tactical levels. Consumption of resources
and violence are low (relative to focused combat operations), but the nature of
violence is likely to be more shocking because of its context, where normality is sought
or actually appears to exist. See Part 1 to this AFM for further detail.83
b. Counter-terrorism. Counter-terrorism describes all preventive, defensive and offensive

measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and infrastructure
against terrorist threats and/or acts. Counter-terrorism operations may be conducted
against state-sponsored, internal or transnational, autonomous armed groups who are
not easily identified, and who may not fall under the categories of combatants defined
in international law. Measures taken include those activities justified for the defence of
individuals as well as containment measures implemented by military forces or civilian
organisations. The latter are primarily conducted by police and special forces supported
by conventional land forces. Land forces have a greater contribution to creating and
maintaining effective protective measures to reduce the probability and impact of
terrorist attacks against infrastructure or people.
c. Counter-criminality. Counter-criminality is the action focused on preventing

organised criminal groups from escalating their activities to the point where they
become a threat to allied forces. The character of conflict is such that insurgency,
terrorism and criminality will often feed off each other. Land forces’ contribution to
counter-criminality will be very much in support of specialist agencies, requiring deep
contextual understanding to inform and assist these agencies as necessary.

83 Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency is extant, but will be revised in 2018, becoming Part 1,
Counter-irregular Activity.
Contents
7-03. Military contribution to peace support (see Part 2). Peace support activities
concern the impartial use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit
of UN Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Following an
intervention, land forces’ freedom to operate will be determined by the willingness
of the opposing parties to seek resolution. Any reluctance may result in combat,
either directly or in the protection of other agencies and the local population.
7-04. The distinguishing factor of peace support operations is that land forces are impartial,
supporting an international mandate rather than a partner nation government
necessarily. Peace support efforts include conflict prevention, peacemaking,
peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. DE is intrinsic to all. This
categorisation does not represent a sequential process where one necessarily
leads to the next; for example, peacekeeping will not necessarily be preceded
by peace enforcement. Land forces must understand how the different types of
efforts relate to, complement or overlap each other so that their actions support,
rather than undermine, an on-going political process. Figure 7-1 provides a basic
conceptual framework to visualise how these activities may relate to each other.
Conflict prevention
Conflict
Peacemaking Peace enforcement

Political process
Ceasefire/peace agreement
Peacekeeping
Peacebuilding
Figure 7-1. The military contribution to peace support. Note the position of the types of
peace support activities in relation to conflict. The political process must have primacy throughout all
peace support activities as illustrated by the arrow. All tactical activities may apply at any stage although
non-lethal variants are more likely once a peace agreement is in place.
a. Conflict prevention. A range of activities, including DE to keep inter and intra-state

disputes from escalating into armed conflict.
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b. Peacemaking. Conducted after the initiation of a conflict to secure a ceasefire or

peaceful settlement involving primarily diplomatic action supported, when necessary,
by direct or indirect use of military assets.
c. Peace enforcement. Designed to end hostilities through the application of a range

of coercive measures, including the use of military force. It is likely to be conducted
without the strategic consent of some, if not all, of the major conflicting parties.
d. Peacekeeping. Designed to assist the implementation of a ceasefire or peace

settlement and to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace. It is conducted with
the strategic consent of all major conflicting parties.
e. Peacebuilding. Designed to reduce the risk of relapsing into conflict by addressing

the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. It requires
a commitment to a long-term process and may run concurrently with other types of
peace support efforts.
7-05. Military contribution to humanitarian assistance (see Part 3). Military support
to humanitarian assistance is the use of available military resources to assist
or complement the efforts of responsible civil actors in the operational area or
specialised civil humanitarian organisations in fulfilling their primary responsibility
to alleviate human suffering. They may occur in response to both natural and
man-made disasters, and result from conflict or flight from political, religious or
ethnic persecution. Military support to humanitarian assistance is limited in scope
and duration. In a NATO context, it includes disaster relief, dislocated civilian
support, security, technical support and CBRN management. For UK humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief operations, joint doctrine should be consulted.84
7-06. Military contribution to stabilisation and reconstruction (see Part 4).

Stabilization and Reconstruction is the NATO term used to cover what the UK
defines as Stabilisation. It is applied in politically messy, violent, challenging and
often non-permissive environments in which the legitimacy of the state and political
settlement is likely to be contested, and in which other types of stability operations
are unfeasible. The central challenge of stabilisation is to bring about some form of
political settlement in a pressured and violent context, to create an environment where
longer-term peacebuilding and state building processes (including reconstruction)
may have a chance of success. It requires protecting and promoting legitimate
political authority, using a combination of integrated civilian and military actions
to reduce violence, re-establish security and prepare for longer-term recovery.
7-07. Capacity Building (see Part 5). Capacity building, a component of Integrated Action,
is used to maintain or change the capability, will, cohesion and perceptions of friendly,
neutral and even hostile actors. It includes land forces’ support to SSR, support to initial
restoration of essential services and to interim governance tasks. Capacity building can be
a discrete type of operation, occurring across the mosaic of conflict, as well as a tactical
function. As an operation, it may be conducted discretely or alongside other operations; it
may form part of DE (AIA) or in less benign circumstances, including in combat situations.
Capacity building concerns those actions taken to improve security and, when necessary,
civil and infrastructure capability. The military’s contribution is but one element of the
Full Spectrum Approach, which requires cooperation among all agencies engaged.
84 JDP 3-52, Disaster Relief Operations; the Military Contribution, 3rd Edition.
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Contents
Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations | PC-1
PART C
Delivery
Introduction Part A – Context

Part C provides an overview of land forces’ tactical • Delivering stability
contribution to stability operations. Detailed • The Government approach
guidance in the context of the specific types of • The UK military approach
stability operations is provided in Part 1-5 and the • Combat and stability operations
supporting TTPs in the handbook to this AFM. Part B – Fundamentals of
Chapter 8 explains the nature of the operating
environment into which land forces might deploy. • Principles of stability operations
Chapter 9 describes the stability activities in detail • Operations themes and stability
while Chapter 10 provides general guidance on the • Types of stability operation
orchestration and execution of stability operations across
divisional, brigade and battlegroup levels of command. Part C – Delivery
Success in applying Integrated Action across the  Operating environment

operations themes requires a military mind capable of  Stability activities
understanding the nuances and subtleties of stability  Orchestrating and executing
operations. This part draws out those elements. stability operations
Approaching Stability Operations
‘At the root of the problem lies the fact the qualities required for fighting
conventional war are different from those required for dealing with subversion
or insurgency; or for taking part in peace-keeping operations for that matter.
Traditionally a soldier is trained and conditioned to be strong, courageous, direct
and aggressive, but when men endowed with these qualities become involved
in fighting subversion they often find that their good points are exploited by the
enemy.’
General Sir Frank Kitson GBE, KCB, MC*. (1971), Low Intensity Operations. Faber and Faber, London, p 200
Contents
AFM TFSO
Chapter 8
Contents
The Operating Environment

Contents
Contents
Chapter 8
The Operating Environment
Building Stability Overseas Operating Environment

8-01. Land forces are directed to conduct stability • Building stability overseas
operations overseas in anticipation of, during, • Understanding
or following a crisis.85 While a broad range • Transition and stability
of actors can contribute to stability, including operations
Other Government Departments (OGDs), • The security-development nexus
Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and • Threats to stability operations
International Organisations (IOs), land forces offer • Legitimacy and force
unique capabilities. These capabilities allow them • Human Terrain
to promote stability using operational art.86 The • Media
primary challenge is to understand how tactical • International organisations
activities might support long-term stability.
8-02. The following sections, derived from NATO doctrine, develop understanding
of the operating environment commonly encountered during stability
operations.87 The operating environment can be described as a “composite
of the conditions, circumstances and influence that affect the employment of
military capabilities and bear on the decisions of a commander”.88 Understanding
the complexity and interrelationships between elements of the operating
environment is fundamental to the efficient conduct of stability activities.
“Never walk into an environment and assume that you understand it better than
the people who live there.”
Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General
8-03. While this chapter isolates aspects of the operating environment, land forces should
be cognisant that the operating environment is dynamic, interconnected and constantly
evolving. The operating environment may also be shaped deliberately and unintentionally
by external factors which may both support or frustrate the execution of stability
activities.
85 BSOS, Chapter 2.
87 ATP-3.2.1.1.
88 AJP-3.4.4.
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Understanding
8-04. Knowledge, Understanding and Respect for Local Culture. As the support of
the population is a key factor in long-term success in stability activities, the way land
forces behave in that context is crucial. While stability activities are demanding and time
consuming, ignoring local norms will isolate the force from the population. Furthermore,
lack of local support and understanding can stimulate popular support for the adversary’s
ideas. Academic and partner nation expertise should be employed before and during
deployment to enhance understanding. The following measures should be implemented
with support from the Defence Cultural Specialist Unit (DCSU) and unit cultural advisors
(CULADs):
a. Pre-deployment Training. Basic notions about local language and culture (religion,
traditions, ways and customs, antagonisms) should be taught. This includes explaining
appropriate rules of behaviour once deployed. Focus should be on personnel who
will encounter the population on a regular basis. A single disrespectful or humiliating
act perpetrated by any one of them could disrupt or eliminate progress towards
encouraging the population to support the government and land forces’ wider efforts.
Additionally, a disrespectful act could make a whole community rally to the insurgents.
Guidance should be provided and explored on potential cultural dilemmas that may
be faced. For example, when is gender-based ‘abuse’ considered a cultural issue to be
tolerated, and when is it considered a violation of rights?
b. On Deployment. Once deployed, all personnel must behave in a manner which gains
the confidence of the local population. This will reinforce legitimacy and help the force
maintain situational awareness.
c. Changing perceptions. Some simple ideas should always be remembered: be aware

that today’s enemies and suspicious civilians could be tomorrow’s partners and vice
versa. For example, the way prisoners or civilians in combat areas are treated, or even
the way a patrol is conducted will impact on how the population perceives us. All
opportunities should be seized to talk with locals to demonstrate genuine interest in
their plight. Dismounted patrols should be preferred over mounted as they enhance
interaction with the population and facilitate intelligence gathering.
d. Unit rotations. Progress in civil relations may be put in jeopardy by frequent rotations.
Land forces must make every effort to ensure the preservation of public confidence
despite the disruption caused by rotations. A proactive Key Leader Engagement (KLE)
plan will assist in a successful handover transition, along with effective employment of
continuity staff.
8-05. Interpreters. A lack of language skills within the deployed force can hamper
interaction with the local population. Having a basic understanding of the languages
used in a theatre of operations is important to the understanding of the adversaries,
belligerents, neutrals and the locals’ agenda. Land forces should have at least a
basic knowledge of local languages and how to use interpreters effectively.
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Transition and Stability Operations

8-06. Operations themes describe the general conditions of operating environments. These
conditions may necessitate standalone stability operations, where no enemy is present,
or at the other extreme, transition from major combat operations within a mosaic of
conflict. This section emphasises stability activities in the context of transition from major
combat operations while Parts 1-5 to this AFM describe the specifics of the five types of
stability operations.
8-07. The need for transition from major combat operations to stability operations is not always
apparent. Nonetheless, planning for stability operations is inherent to any campaign
plan and should be conducted concurrently to warfighting, rather than once it is clear
transition has begun. This is a key lesson from the invasion of Iraq in 2003 in which
insufficient planning for transition enabled enemies and adversaries to seize the initiative.
Planning for Transition: Iraq 2003
The overall civil-military Campaign Plan developed as experience and exposure to

the scale and realities of the task emerged. Military aspects of the overall plan –
primarily about security and building Iraqi Army/security forces – were developed
under Gen Abizaid [Commander CENTCOM] and Gen Sanchez [Coalition Ground
Commander] but we were not able to synchronise this fully with civilian aspects
(governance, reconstruction, the economy, medical, education etc.) until much
later.
We lacked clear statements from Capitals on Coalition political – military objectives,

timelines, what the end state should look like or how we were to get there. At the
outset, we had no clearly stated definition of what “success” would look like for
the Iraqis, the region or the international community. So we suffered from lack of
clarity about Ends, Ways and Means. The Plan emerged piecemeal and was prone
to dislocation by breaking news and by events.
Lieutenant General Sir Freddie Viggers, notes submitted to the Iraq Inquiry on 8th December 2009
8-08. The boundaries between combat and stability operations will be blurred at the tactical
level and may occur sporadically and unexpectedly across the area of operations.
Indicators are likely to be:
a. A ceasefire or surrender of enemy forces.
b. An increase in population movements and requests for assistance.
c. A reduction in violence or the threat of violence directed at land forces by an enemy

force.
8-09. There will not necessarily be a reduction in other forms of violence, for example criminal
or terrorist-initiated violence.
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8-10. Command Compression. The boundaries between the tactical and operational
levels of command are likely to be compressed during transition in several ways.
Joint capabilities such as ISTAR, Aviation and Offensive Support may even be
placed under land forces’ command or control for specific operations. Interagency
activities to initiate development, governance and rule of law programmes or deliver
strategic or political objectives may also require support by land forces. Command
responsibilities and demands will both compress and may also broaden concurrently.
Land forces will increasingly become the supporting rather than the supported
component. Note that command compression can work both ways. While this
might mean joint capabilities supporting a battlegroup, it might also mean elements
of a battlegroup being tasked directly by the Joint Commander (or higher).
8-11. Legal Ambiguities. During transition, the legal framework of the state may not have
re-asserted itself sufficiently and there may be a judicial vacuum or a state of legal
uncertainty which may be filled by a combination of national, international and local laws.
Land forces can overcome this friction through a clear understanding of the legal basis of
their own intervention. The legal basis can and does change over time, as occurred during
operations in Iraq.
8-12. Establishing a Secure Environment. Establishing a secure environment in which other

stability and development activities can flourish is likely to be the primary role of land
forces. This will require a change from an enemy to a population-centric approach.
Restraint and a more centralised control of fires will characterise such operations.
Given land forces’ capabilities, they will be more focused on security than other equally
important components of the rule of law. The exact approach will differ per the
circumstance but is likely to include tasks such as:
a. Supporting the Rule of Law. Stability policing may be required in the absence of
a viable indigenous or international police force or other forms of implementing law
and order which are accepted by the population, for example tribal law. This will
require clarification of the legal framework under which land forces will operate and
a continuous appreciation of the national legal balance of power. It will be crucial
that support to one part of the criminal justice chain, such as stability policing, is
equally matched by development support to other parts of the criminal justice chain,
such as pre-trial detention centres, access to legal aid, judicial independence, court
infrastructure, and correction services among others. Without balance throughout
the chain, efficiencies in one part can cause overload in other parts leading to a
multiplication of human rights abuses, miscarriages of justice, and increase in impunity,
all the while undermining legitimacy of national forces. Curfews and riot control
measures should be considered where violence is in danger of escalation.
b. Separation of Forces. Regular or irregular forces may seek to settle their differences
through violence, threatening the security of local nationals and civilian agencies. Land
forces may be required to separate such forces by a mix of interposition, deterrence,
interdiction and negotiation. Communication and coordination will be required with
all parties. Marking of boundaries and arrangements for dealing with intentional and
unintentional infringements will be required.
c. Protection of Critical National Infrastructure. A breakdown in the rule of law

leading to increased criminality may require urgent local responses to protect critical
national infrastructure until rule of law can be re-imposed. Defending or guarding
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communications, power and waste installations may be necessary in the short term.
The generation and organisation of local security forces to relieve our own troops
from static guarding tasks will be necessary to avoid becoming fixed and unresponsive
because of such tasks. Commanders should note that the overt presence of UK land
forces may increase the threat to critical national infrastructure if our forces are
targeted by enemies and adversaries. The same considerations should be applied to
cultural property protection (see Annex D to Chapter 10).
d. Intelligence Operations. Attacks against civilians are a favoured tactic by an

enemy force seeking to undermine the legitimacy of state-sponsored forces. Early
opportunities may be present during transition to gather significant amounts of
intelligence on organisations and individuals who might present a threat to the
mission. Opportunities to gather, process, and if necessary act on intelligence should
be taken to disrupt the formation of opposition groups to deny them the opportunity
to thrive. The intelligence that can be garnered from men or women should be
actively sought (by appropriate means), and their capacity to influence both ‘friendly’
populations and adversary groups should be explored.
e. Civil-Military Operations Centres (CMOCs). CMOCs serve as a meeting place for

military and civilian entities involved in stabilisation, governance, humanitarian relief
and construction activities in an area of operations. It is normally located outside a
military area and establishes an interface between military and civilians, providing a
conduit for coordination of activities and advice for the populace on the availability
and mechanics of military assistance.
8-13. Boundaries. Where possible, military areas of operation should be established with
contiguous boundaries aligned to existing national, regional, government and police
boundaries which will help the re-establishment of normality. If boundaries must be
different then consider using tribal/ethnic boundaries or ceasefire lines. Advice from local
authorities and civil society, from Political Advisors (POLADs), Legal Advisors (LEGADs),
Stabilisation Advisors (STABADs) and Cultural Advisors (CULADS), as well as IOs and NGOs
will be required to ensure that all boundaries support the long-term stability of the region
or campaign.
The Security-Development Nexus

8-14. The term security-development nexus introduces the idea that there cannot be
security without development and vice versa, a theme reflected in the principles of
stability operations. The same idea indicates that security and development are rarely
achieved sequentially. So, if pursued concurrently, land forces will encounter and will
have to engage with development actors. In this context, commanders must be mindful
of the risks associated with the securitisation of the humanitarian and developmental
space.89 Equally, the routine execution of non-lethal stability activities does not exclude
the possibility that land forces might have to conduct offensive activities in response
to threats.
8-15. Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and Consent Winning Activity (CWA). QIPs are
short-term, small-scale initiatives designed to deliver an immediate and focused
impact on target audiences, primarily civilian. They are commonly associated with
89 Described in detail in Part 3 to this AFM, due to published in 2017.

Contents
support to the initial restoration of services. CWA is a tactical-level tool aimed at

forming economic relationships, establishing communication channels and enhancing
cooperation with a local community. CWA has the potential to overcome the ‘consent
gap’. This is the period after the ‘honeymoon’ of initial defeat of an enemy during
which QIPs might be employed that endures until longer-term, large scale development
projects are delivered. QIPs and CWA should also be supported by a baseline study,
project managed throughout, with clear and measurable objectives, and defined
measurements of effectiveness. This subject is covered in detail in Part 5 to this AFM.
Threats to Stability Operations

8-16. There are five major categories of threat which might be encountered on stability
operations. These may appear in isolation or as a combination:
a. Traditional threats emerge from states employing recognised military capabilities and
forces in conventional forms of military competition and conflict.
b. Irregular threats are those posed by an adversary employing unconventional,

asymmetric, and often illegal, methods and (not exclusively irregular) means to counter
traditional military advantages.90
c. Catastrophic threats may involve for example, the acquisition, possession, and use of
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons (potentially by irregular
activists), also called weapons of mass destruction and effects.
d. Disruptive threats involve an adversary using new technologies that reduce land
forces’ advantages in key operational domains. For example, information activities
using social media or cyber-attacks. Cyberspace in particular presents significant
opportunities and threats in the context of stability operations. Integrated Action is
enhanced by cyberspace’s ubiquitous, interconnected and dynamic nature. These same
factors, however, also enable threats such as espionage, sabotage and subversion.
CJIIM interoperability is particularly challenging. However, since the effects of
actions taken in cyberspace and the electromagnetic environment are not necessarily
geographically bounded, de-confliction and mutual understanding are imperative.91
e. Environmental and natural threats are described in detail on page 81 to JDP 3-52
Disaster Relief Operations and in Part 3 to this AFM. These threats often trigger the
international community to provide humanitarian assistance which may involve a
military contribution. All types of stability activities might be used in a humanitarian
operation.
8-17. Enemies and adversaries will seek to gain an advantage over land forces by exploiting
threats. For example, adversaries may seek to interdict land forces attempting to enter
a crisis area. If land forces successfully gain entry, the adversary (in the case of an
insurgency) may seek engagement in complex terrain and urban environments as a way
of offsetting land forces’ advantages. Methods used by adversaries include dispersing
their forces into small mobile combat teams – combining only when required to strike
a common objective – and becoming invisible by blending with the local population.
90 See Warfare Branch. (2016) Irregular Adversaries: Land Component Handbook.

91 See ADP Land Operations 2017, Chapter 7 and JDP 0-50 UK Cyber Doctrine for further detail on cyber.
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8-18. Threats that occur from an internal conflict in a region may necessitate the deployment
of land forces to perform stability activities in the framework of peace support
(peacekeeping, peace enforcing, peacemaking and peacebuilding). These types
of threat will possibly be a combination of traditional and irregular threats.92
8-19. Conflicts are much more likely to be fought ‘amongst the people’ instead of ‘around
the people.’ This fundamentally alters the ways in which military units can apply force to
achieve success in a conflict, since collateral damage should be avoided wherever possible.
Legitimacy and Force

8-20. Campaign Authority. Campaign authority is the authority established by
international forces, agencies and organisations within both combat and stability
operations. Campaign authority comprises four interdependent factors:
a. The perceived legitimacy of the mandate.
b. The perceived legitimacy of the way those exercising that mandate conduct themselves
both individually and collectively.
c. The extent to which factions, local populations and others consent to, comply with, or
resist the authority of those executing the mandate.
d. The extent to which the expectations of factions, local populations and others are
managed, or met, by those executing the mandate.
8-21. Land forces’ contributions to stability should be both legal and purposeful. They
should also be, and be perceived to be, legitimate, acceptable and appropriate in
a broader sense. Campaign authority derives from confidence that the appropriate
and legitimate measures are employed by land forces. This helps to maintain
support from those that shape opinion, share power and grant consent.
8-22. Legitimacy. Legitimacy encompasses the legal, moral, political, diplomatic and
ethical propriety of the conduct of military forces. As the justification for using
force, and the way it is applied, legitimacy has both collective and individual
aspects, both of which directly affect the utility of force. Legitimacy is based upon
both subjective considerations, such as the values, beliefs and opinions of a variety
of audiences (at home and overseas), and demonstrable, objective legality.
8-23. Law and the Use of Force. Law governs the use of force in several different
ways; it regulates when States can resort to using force, for example by sending
their troops onto the sovereign territory of another State. It also establishes how
force can be lawfully used once those troops have been deployed, whether in an
armed conflict, or on a peacekeeping mission or other operation. It is important
to distinguish between laws that regulate how a State may act, and those that
govern the conduct of the individual/unit. These distinctions must be made in
order that rules of engagement (ROE) can be viewed in a proper context.
8-24. While it is the responsibility of those who authorise ROE to ensure that the permissions
contained in them are lawful, commanders at all levels remain responsible for ensuring
that forces under their command operate within the law. Furthermore, everyone remains
ultimately responsible in law for his/her actions. Typically, the amplification to the
92 See Part 2 to this AFM, due to be published in 2017.

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Political Policy Indicator within the ROE profile will explain the legal basis for action.93
Nevertheless, both this amplification and the ROE profile exist only to give guidance; they
cannot by themselves guarantee the lawfulness of any action. An appreciation of the
relevant legal principles is essential.
8-25. A complex mixture of international and domestic (national) laws regulate when and how
force may be used. The principal sources of these laws include:
a. The UN Charter.
b. The Hague Regulations, the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols; Customary
International Law.
c. International Human Rights Law including, in some circumstances, the European

Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
d. The Criminal Law Act 1967 and section 76 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008
and the common law defence of self-defence.
8-26. The specific circumstances of each operation, including the location of the actions
undertaken, and the nature of any conflict will influence which of these laws will apply.
Most stability operations will spring from a UN resolution, an invitation from the partner
nation, or some kind of international agreement like a treaty. That authority determines
all freedoms and constraints: control of and/or responsibility for territory and people,
lethal effects, the ability to capture and detain, intelligence collection and interaction
with civil defence institutions.
Mandates, Rules of Engagement and Use of Force
Mandates can be seen either as ceilings or floors [constraints or freedoms].

Conservative, risk-averse UN officials or commanders constrained by their home
governments will interpret the mandate as a ceiling. By contrast, creative and
decisive commanders will take a leadership role by interpreting the mandate as
a floor, defining it operationally and using all their capabilities to implement the
spirit, not just the word, of the mandate.
Major General (Retd) Patrick Cammaert UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations
8-27. Ethics and Morality. Ethical and moral considerations underpin the law and the
administration of justice, and are also reflected in operational decision-making and
military conduct. Commanders are accountable for their actions and the actions
of those under their command. Commanders are duty-bound to ensure that the
highest moral and ethical standards are maintained by their subordinates and can
achieve this through a robust ethos, personal example, training and education.
8-28. Land forces will be exposed to challenge and complexity during stability operations.
They will face opponents and partners with different moral, ethical and legal
boundaries and perspectives, while themselves operating under intense scrutiny.
93 This gives overall direction to commanders for how the ROE are to be applied, including if new circumstances evolve and
swift direction from higher authorities is unavailable. In addition, it provides an indicator to commanders of those ROE
changes that are likely to be acceptable.
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The trend towards transparency and greater regulation of Defence activities reflects
the expectations of the society we serve and whose values we reflect. If we are to
maintain campaign authority, then we must respect the morals and ethics of our own
culture. Moreover, while never compromising our own moral standards, we must
respect local traditions, customs and practices and pay appropriate attention to the
needs of minority or otherwise vulnerable groups, such as women, children and ethnic
minorities. Our challenge is to ensure that society’s expectations of greater legal and
ethical regulation are balanced against the imperatives of operational effectiveness.
8-29. General Conduct. Land forces can threaten stability and campaign authority through
inappropriate conduct, on and off duty, including when their spending power attracts
criminal or unethical activity. By, for example, using sex workers, or exchanging favours
for sex, soldiers and foreign aid workers support the sex trade and undermine local
values. Foreigners may also distort the local economy and undermine justice and
other local values by paying bribes or over-paying for contracts. Commanders, their
staff and all personnel must be clear about the importance of exemplary behaviour
on and off duty, and must state explicitly what is and is not acceptable.94
Conduct on Operations
‘For Western societies that are increasingly sceptical about the use of military
force in interventions of choice, perceived to have only a tenuous link to national
interests, the ethical and legal justification underpinning these operations is vital
ground, before and during the operation. This is most acute because ethics and
morality have become weapons used by non-state players against states. The ever-
present spectre of the ‘propaganda of the deed’ ensures that any armed conflict is
conducted in several theatres simultaneously. Therefore, while a particular incident
in a campaign may have little operational effect on the ground, it could generate
strategic effect within public opinion of the country concerned and consequently
on the world stage. The ethical narrative used in the justification to deploy military
forces must therefore be sustained by the ethical component within that operation
both in the actions and behaviour of military personnel but also in the manner in
which the operation is conducted by commanders at all levels’.
AGILE WARRIOR report 2014/2015, page 70, June 2015.
Audiences, Actors, Adversaries and Enemies (A3E)

8-30. Introduction. Integrated Action requires us to gain a sophisticated understanding of
the operating environment and situation. We need to defeat or neutralise those who
oppose us while winning over and possibly empowering those who are neutral and
friendly. To do this we must identify audiences, actors, adversaries and enemies.95
94 MATT 6, including the Army Standards, is a useful reference.

95 See ADP Land Operations 2017, Chapter 4.
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Audiences Audience. All the groups and individual

people whose perception and interpretation
of events and subsequent behaviour contribute
to the success or otherwise of military action
Actors Actors. A group or person that

takes action or directly
exerts influence
Adversary. A group or person that

Adversaries
seeks to prevent us from achieving
our objectives
Enemy. A group or person that seeks

Enemies to defeat us through armed lethal means
Figure 8-1. Audiences, Actors, Adversaries and Enemies
Audiences
8-31. The population may be divided by ethnic, religious or political affinities or origins.
These are often deeply rooted in history and may be the very origin of the conflict.
These complex divisions may cause problems during stabilisation and reconstruction
operations. This subject is covered in more detail in Part 4 to this AFM. Frequently, military
intervention is required because a decaying local state apparatus is unable to rule and
provide reasonable public services to the population. Accordingly, the population becomes
the centre of gravity for both the alliance and the insurgents.
8-32. A population may be rich in history, traditions and culture which must be understood by
land forces. Local society is often structured in traditional communities and organised in
solidarity (tribal) networks. Leaders of traditional, cultural or religious organisations are
key interlocutors and must be considered as part of the KLE programme.
8-33. Groups. Social groups are generally based on nationality; family, clan and tribe; with
language, religion, culture, ethnicity, beliefs and values held in common. Different
groupings will hold different views on such fundamental issues as birth, life and death,
honour and dishonour and the role and position of men, women and children in society.
Care must be exercised when interpreting the behaviour of a group against our own
values and standards. Strict observance of a religious dogma or set of beliefs or significant
hatred of a group may provide an insurgent with an unshakable will to die for their
cause. Non-combatants may be hostile, ambivalent, tolerant or friendly in nature and may
change their attitude because of actions by any actor. Their consent could be given freely
or may be conditional, but cannot be assumed.
8-34. Leadership and Authority. The leading personalities within the human environment
will differ from state to state or region to region depending on the culture, education,
religion and political beliefs. This results in a complex linkage by which authority and
power may be exercised. This is of relevance, as the allegiance of a group may not be to a
Head of State but to someone else inside or outside the state borders. Respect for chiefs
or an elder is traditionally maintained in many societies. These key leaders may have
been influenced or marginalised by other actors such as insurgents, warlords or criminals.
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Nevertheless, linked to the stability operations principle of understanding the context, a

commander should endeavour to discover who the social leaders are as they are likely to
have knowledge of, and exert influence in, the community.
8-35. It should be noted that in many societies women are excluded from formal leadership
positions, but nonetheless are likely to play an important role in influencing societal
attitudes and perspectives. The informal nature of these leadership and influencing roles,
combined with the potential difficulty of accessing women in conservative societies,
can make it easy to overlook women in outreach or engagement programmes. This
needs to be guarded against, and creative ways found to achieve this engagement.
Local, Regional and National Authorities

8-36. When intervening in a crisis overseas, land forces must recognise that as well as being
part of a UK Full Spectrum Approach they will also have to work closely with local,
regional and national authorities. These actors may well have the capacity to take
some if not full responsibility for the planning and execution of the crisis response.
A military force simply acts as an instrument of power employed by a government.
Land forces must be aware that their supporting role is only temporary and that the
aim is to return to a situation in which their contribution is no longer required.
8-37. Good cooperation with partner nation representatives is essential from the outset.
Consultation and joint planning must start at an early stage. The use of Liaison Officers
(LOs) is important. Following the partner nation’s plan where possible, land forces can
then promote stability through tactical activities.
8-38. When deployed overseas, in some cases, land forces have been inclined to help local
societies by introducing their own forms of administration and their own norms.
Often, this ignores how societies have evolved in their own context. Although these
initiatives are well meant, this approach is not always successful. For example,
agricultural societies have a different level of organisation from industrialised societies.
Military Forces
8-39. General. The range of military actors in an area of operations can be almost as diverse
as the number of civilian actors. Not all military actors, or perceived military actors,
conduct themselves with the appropriate level of professionalism. Nor do they always
act in accordance with international law and the Geneva Conventions. The prior
actions of armed, uniformed elements may make initial engagement with the local
community quite difficult. For many civilians, it is virtually impossible to distinguish
between one camouflage uniform and another. Considerable time and patience may
be required for UK land forces to build a workable rapport with the local community.
8-40. Foreign Military Forces. Foreign military forces are military elements – friendly or
adversarial – from other nations influencing or operating within the borders of the partner
nation. These forces may be present due to a request for intervention or assistance, or
by aggressive military action. Investment in understanding the motives of these foreign
forces will allow land forces to select the necessary actions to be taken to influence them.
8-41. Coalition Forces. Operations conducted as part of a coalition will be subject to

additional frictions. Each contributing nation is likely to have strategic objectives that are
not necessarily aligned with the UK’s, and their forces may be under different remits. ROE
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and chains of command may be complex. National agendas and their implications for the
employment of their troops must be understood and considered when planning. Decision
making is likely to be slower, more complicated and perhaps more frustrating than when
a single nation is involved. This will in part be due to the problems with language and not
having a common understanding of terminology. National reporting chains should not be
allowed to side-line the coalition chain of command. The coalition view of events should
always be considered.
8-42. Partner-Nation Forces. Partner nation military forces are those forces raised, trained and
sustained by the partner nation as part of the national defence. These forces may include
the military services such as; army, navy, marines and air force. Some nations may also
have paramilitary forces that are not part of the defence force. These paramilitary forces
typically have responsibility for internal security and might include police or specialist
security forces.
Partner Nation Forces. Kurdish Peshmerga during British training near Irbil, Iraq, 2015
8-43. Former Partner-Nation Military Forces and Non-State Security Forces. In a post-
conflict or fragile state situation, a partner nation may have forces that are not under its
control. Former military forces that are in the process of demobilising may have retained
their uniforms and weapons. Non-state security forces may have been raised for special
or particular interests. Both may have significant grievances with the partner nation
government and challenge its authority.
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Commercial Actors
8-44. Local Contractors. Local companies or local civilian workers may be offered contracts
by land forces for construction and logistical work. Part 1 to this AFM provides guidance
on how to avoid distorting the local economy and reduce the risk of corruption through
conflict sensitivity.
Local contractors: Afghan contractors work to build a new facility at Kabul International Airport in 2010. (U.S. Air
Force photo/Senior Airman Matt Davis).
8-45. Commercial Organisations. Multinational corporations are often engaged in

reconstruction, security, economic development and governance activities under contract
from supporting governments. These companies are, or could become, part of the
redevelopment of the state and should be part of the partner nation’s overall plan for
development. As a minimum, military commanders should know which companies are
present in their area of operations and where those companies are conducting business.
8-46. Private Security Services/Companies. See Chapter 9, para 9-34.
The Media
8-47. National and international media are routinely interested in stability operations. Due to
rapid information transfer, images and articles in the national or regional media may
influence the opinion of the population and politicians, including military departments.
In addition, the media may exert direct and indirect influence on the operational
planning process and C2, therefore potential media effects should be considered. Further
guidance can be found in JDP 3-45.1 and Doctrine Note 17/05: Information Activities.
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Social Media and the Arab Spring
As a result of the many technological advancements and innovations that have

revolutionized how individuals communicate, an abundance of information
has become available to everyone. Depending on where the information is
found, however, its reliability can be questioned. With the growing number of
international, self-described (both non-for-profit and for-profit) organizations such
as Facebook, Wikipedia, Wikileaks and more, much of the information provided
is now often opinionated and biased, nonetheless, truthful. Ultimately, public
information supplied by social networking websites has played an important role
during modern-day activism, specifically as it pertains to the Arab Spring. In Arab
countries, many activists who played crucial roles in the Arab Spring used social
networking as a key tool in expressing their thoughts concerning unjust acts
committed by the government.
Being capable of sharing an immense amount of uncensored and accurate

information throughout social networking sites has contributed to the cause of
many Arab Spring activists. Through social networking sites, Arab Spring activists
have not only gained the power to overthrow powerful dictatorship, but also
helped Arab civilians become aware of the underground communities that exist
and are made up of their brothers, and others willing to listen to their stories.
In countries like Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, rising action plans such as protests
made up of thousands, have been organized through social media such as
Facebook and Twitter. “We use Facebook to schedule the protests” an Arab Spring
activist from Egypt announced “and [we use] Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube
to tell the world.” The role that technology has taken in allowing the distribution
of public information such as the kinds stated by the aforementioned activist, had
been essential in establishing the democratic movement that has helped guide
abused civilians to overthrow their oppressor.
Kassim, S. (2012). Twitter Revolution: How the Arab Spring Was Helped By Social Media. Mic.Com.
Accessed 30 Jan 17. Available at https://mic.com/articles/10642/twitter-revolution-how-the-arab-spring-was-
helped-by-social-media
International Organisations (IOs), NGOs and Human Security

9-48. Role of Land Forces. Given the population-centric nature of stability operations,
land forces must understand the threats to human security within their area of
operations. The threat to human security as a direct or indirect consequence of conflict
is not a new phenomenon; the issue is as old as warfare itself. Within the context of
Integrated Action, guided by the Conflict Sensitive approach, the promotion of human
security may bring considerable benefits in positively shaping actor behaviour.
8-49. In most operations, the military is likely to play a role in helping address elements of
the human security needs of the population. Responsibilities may include protecting
the population from adversaries and fulfilling human rights obligations. In most
circumstances, the military will almost certainly be in a supporting, rather than leading,
Contents
role, working with other agencies as part of a Full Spectrum Approach. There are many
aspects of human security that armed forces do not always have the capabilities to
address. For example, land forces will rarely be able to provide long-term humanitarian
assistance, unlike dedicated civilian agencies. Details on the execution of tasks supporting
human security can be found in the annexes to Chapter 10. Other CJIIM actors involved
in the provision of human security likely to be encountered on operations are:
a. Other Government Department (OGDs). These are departments of state with

specific remits and are sometime known as ‘Partners Across Government’ (PAG).
They include:
(1) The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The FCO safeguards the UK’s
national security by working to reduce conflict and builds our prosperity by
promoting sustainable global growth. In human security, the FCO is engaged
in such areas as human rights protection, preventing sexual violence, and the
protection of child soldiers.
(2) The Department for International Development (DFID). DFID’s goal is to

promote sustainable development and to eliminate global poverty. Within this
mandate DFID supports all dimensions of human security.96
b. International Organisations (IO). These are organisations supported by states from

within the international community which attempt to set the agenda on development
issues. Examples of UN affiliated IOs can be found in Figure 8.1 below. These
organisations are covered in more detail in Parts 2 and 3 to this AFM.
c. International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs). These include

international non-profit organisations and worldwide companies, for example, Save
the Children and Médecins Sans Frontières.
d. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC is a humanitarian
institution which does not fall neatly into the categories above.97 Signatories to the
four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols have given the ICRC
a mandate to protect victims of international and internal armed conflicts. Such victims
include war wounded, prisoners, refugees, civilians, and other non-combatants. ICRC
is the only institution explicitly named under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as a
controlling authority.98
e. Impartiality. INGOs, NGOs and the ICRC often prefer to operate alone and without
direct military support to maintain impartiality. Humanitarian organisations use their
impartiality to gain access to all those in need, which often incudes dialogue with all
parties, including adversaries.
96 See Chapter 2 for further detail on FCO/DFID roles.

97 See https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5w9fjy.htm.
98 The terms ‘law of armed conflict’ and ‘international humanitarian law’ are terms of art and mean the same thing as both
are concerned with the way armed force is used in conflict. See para 1.2 to JSP 383: Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict.
General Subsidiary Organs Funds and Programmes Other Entities
Assembly
Main and other sessional committees UNDP United Nations Development ITC International Trade Centre
Human Rights Council Programme UNCTAD United Nations Conference
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme on Trade and Development
Organs (established by UNFPA United Nations Population Fund UNHCR Office of the United Nations
Security UN-HABITAT United Nations Human High Commissioner for Refugees
Council but not under the authority
of the Security Council) Settlement Programme UNOPS United Nations Office for
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund Project Services
International crime tribunals
WFP World Food Programme UNRWA United Nations Relief and
Peacekeeping and political missions
Work’s Agency for Palestine Refugees
Sanctions committees
in the Near EAST
UN-Women United Nations Entity
Economic and Functional Commissions for Gender Equality and the
Social Council Africa Empowerment of Women
Crime
Drugs Europe
Population Latin American and the Caribbean
Social Development Asia and the Pacific

Women Western Asia
Secretariat
Departments and Offices include

EOSG Executive Office for the Secretary-General OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
DESA Dept of Economic and Social Affairs OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
DFS Dept of Field Support OLA Office of Legal Affairs
DM Dept of Management PBSO Peacebuilding Support Officer
International DPA Dept of Political Affairs SRSG/SVC Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict
Court of DPI Dept of Public Information UNISDR United Nations Office for Disorder Risk Reduction
Justice DPKO Dept of Peacekeeping Operations UNODA United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Figure 8-1. UN organisations likely to be encountered on stability operations

Contents
Contents
Contents
AFM TFSO
Chapter 9
Contents
Stability Activities
Contents
Contents
Chapter 9
Stability Activities
Introduction Stability Activities

• Introduction
9-01. Part B provided an overview of the link between
• Security and Control
operations themes, types of operation and
• Support to SSR
tactical activities (Figure 3-1). This chapter
• Support to Initial Restoration of
describes in detail the category of tactical
Essential Services
activities known as stability activities. While
• Support to Interim Governance
stability activities are central to stability
Tasks
operations, other tactical activities may need to
be executed within the same area of operations. Annex
In operational design and tactics, the groups • Support to DDR
of tactical activities are closely related.
9-02. Within all types of operation, land forces conduct all or some of a range of tactical
activities, often concurrently. The balance between the different activities varies
from one operation to another over time, as illustrated in Figure 9-1 below. Tactical
activities are either offensive, defensive, stability or enabling. In the mosaic of
conflict a force may be required to conduct all activities simultaneously. Also, these
activities are not mutually exclusive. A single force element may link them by a simple
transition from one activity to another without breaking contact with an enemy; for
instance from a defensive activity to an offensive one. Enabling activities are never
conducted for their own sake; their purpose is to enable or link other activities.
Figure 9-1. Within the mosaic of conflict, the balance of tactical activities vary over time and between operations
9-03. Stability Activities. Stability activities are bespoke tactical methods used for delivering
the stabilising aspect of any land operation. They require the application of the Full
Spectrum Approach in cooperation with partner nations and allied agencies. This
collaboration requires individuals with the right skills and personalities99.
99 These are broadly the same as the five aspects of human interoperability (language, rapport, respect, knowledge
and patience).
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There are four types of stability activities:
a. Security and Control.
b. Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR).
c. Support to Initial Restoration of Essential Services.
d. Support to Interim Governance Tasks.
9-04. Note that this chapter explains the characteristics of the stability activities only. Chapter
10 provides guidance on how they might be executed at the Divisional, Brigade and
Battlegroup levels of command.
9-05. Tactical Functions. The tactical functions represent the full breadth of a land force’s
activities when conducting operations. They are a device that helps to organise activities
into intelligible groups; they have no effects, whereas the activities do. Few, if any, stand
alone. All activity needs to be commanded and sustained for example. The bigger and
more combined arms the force is, the more likely it is to have the ability for significant
activity under every heading.
9-06. As a rule of thumb, corps and divisions are designed to conduct all the tactical
functions simultaneously. Subordinate force elements may be able to apply all the
functions to lesser degrees or specific ones to great effect. For example, an engineer unit
has less access to fires than a combined arms battlegroup, which in turn may have fewer
opportunities for capacity building than one scaled for security force assistance tasks. The
tactical functions also provide a useful checklist for commanders when assessing a plan,
and a common vocabulary for describing a force’s overall capabilities. See Chapter 8, ADP
Land Operations for further detail.
Security and Control

9-07. Introduction. Security and control is likely to be the activity which requires most military
effort. Security is a fundamental human need and motivates and regulates behaviour.
Security (human, personal, regional, national and physical) creates the conditions in which
other activity crucial to well-being can take place. People will generally give their loyalty
to the group that best meets this need. Winning the contest for security is therefore
essential to establishing the security of a state. The early establishment of a secure
environment and a degree of law and order, following military intervention helps to:
a. Provide a permissive environment for external, civil actors to operate.
b. Promote campaign authority.
c. Provide the opportunity for the development or resumption of normal security, social,
political and economic activity.
d. Provide the opportunity for dialogue between opposing factions leading to political
activity.
9-08. Security and control activities are intended to avoid actions by adversaries and reduce civil
disorder and violence from uncontrolled groups; other goals are to enforce ceasefires,
and forge peace agreements to ensure long-term security. A secure situation is required
prior to starting the reconstruction of a country or region after a crisis (conflict or natural
disaster). Independent of the origin of the crisis, should the local security forces be unable
to act, land forces should gain control of the situation at the earliest opportunity possible.
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9-09. Achieving Security. Security is achieved and maintained through:
a. Deterrence. Through deterrence, land forces can discourage the adversary from acting
against the interests of the partner nation government and its military forces. This is
done by showing them that the cost of their action will be higher than the potential
benefit.
b. Control. Through control, land forces can gain awareness of the situation and
anticipate the evolution of events, so they can plan an action or a reaction to
what might be a threat to security. Control involves securing borders, lines of
communication, key points, population and towns, as well as occupying key areas and
facilities. It requires dynamic planning and implementation; passivity must be avoided.
In addition, control will be more efficient if deterrence and an appropriate response
capability are combined.
c. Response. If deterrence is ineffective and control does not prevent or counter hostile
aggression, land forces, along with the partner nation’s security forces, can provide an
effective response to restore the conditions to its former state. The response should
consist of a rapid and balanced reaction to the aggression which will counter, neutralise
or destroy the adversary, if needed. Similarly, the response should include the capacity
for monitoring and crowd control activities.
9-10. Planning considerations. Success in establishing a secure environment depends upon

many variables, some of which are outside the control of an external military force. All
these factors should have been considered by the strategic comprehensive estimate and
are linked to the principles of stability operations.100 Variables to consider when planning:
a. Social, Ethnic and Political Factors. The social and ethnic mix of a society and its
propensity to violence because of its history, political divisions or criminality will impact
on the security environment.
b. The Nature of the Political Settlement. A comprehensive peace settlement reduces

the scope for further violence.
c. The Nature and Extent of the Demobilisation of Combatants. Failure to conduct

a comprehensive and timely demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR)
programme can perpetuate violence and lawlessness. Equally, an overly ambitious
programme can also lead to a security vacuum that can be exploited by protagonists
(see Annex A)
d. Regional Stability. The influence of neighbouring states can exacerbate or improve

a situation.
e. The Size, Posture, Command and Skills of the Military Force. The military force
providing security and control must be configured, trained and resourced to conduct
the mission. For example, large numbers of combat-ready soldiers who remain in
barracks will be of little use in promoting stability. A continuous presence on the
ground can have a stabilising effect.
f. The Extent of Organised Crime. In a transitional phase, organised crime can emerge
as an ally of spoilers and rejectionists. Criminals will benefit from a lack of law and
order and will exploit any security vacuum. It is therefore essential that credible and
100 For example, through Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure (PMESI) and Area, Structures, Capabilities,
Organisations, People and Events (ASCOPE) analyses.
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impartial criminal justice systems and the civil police service are developed early. Part 1
to this AFM provides further details on counter-criminality.
The Allies and the Mafia: Sicily, Second World War
“The Allied occupation undeniably gave new oxygen to the mafia. Anxious to
exclude both Communists and Fascists from power, the occupying Anglo-American
Army – whether knowingly or unknowingly – installed several prominent mafiosi
as mayors of their towns. (An Italian-American mafioso, Vito Genovese, managed
to become interpreter for the American governor of Sicily, Colonel Charles Poletti,
during the six months of military occupation.) Criminal elements succeeded in
infiltrating the Allied administration, often with the help of Italian-American
soldiers. They managed to smuggle supplies from military warehouses and ran
a flourishing black market in such scarce commodities as food, tobacco, shoes
and clothing…the aftermath of World War II was a time of chaotic freedom and
economic expansion which the mafia exploited ably.”
Stille, Alexander. (2011). Excellent Cadavers: The Mafia and the Death of the First Italian Republic. Random House,
New York City, pp 17-18.
a. Condition of Security Sector. The capacity and capability of the partner nation’s
security sector will influence the security situation.
b. History. Analysis of the history of conflict (including key events such as uprisings,
assassinations and peace agreements) and associated changes in governance, security
and socio-economic development will provide an insight into local attitudes towards
violence and proposed solutions.
9-11. Intelligence. Intelligence will prove essential in the conduct of security and control tasks
to permit both the precise targeting of individuals and organisations and informing wider
situational awareness. Integral assets (Field human intelligence (HUMINT) Teams, signals
intelligence (SIGINT) teams etc.) may be augmented by partner nation assets, where
appropriate, and other international intelligence organisations (e.g. INTERPOL).101 The
sharing of intelligence will help to develop a climate of cooperation between land forces,
partner nation forces and other organisations. Commanders will require guidance from
PJHQ as to what can be shared and this guidance should be kept under review. Equally,
advice from LEGADs on intelligence and information gathering is essential given the
considerable array of legal frameworks that may be constraining the intervention
9-12. Establishing the Rule of Law. Successful implementation of the rule of law requires
an effective criminal justice system consisting of police, judiciary and penal elements.
Early establishment of rule of law will increase the chances of mission success. Delivering
personal security (part of human security) for the population should be a high priority and
will set the conditions for the resumption of normal economic and social activity. See para
1-11 and note that Part 1 to this AFM covers detention operations.
9-13. Stability Policing. Experience has shown that it can take a considerable amount of time
to build and deploy a civilian police force. During the initial stages of a conflict, military
forces may be required to maintain internal security and fill the security vacuum in the
101 AFM Vol 1 Part 3A ISTAR and Doctrine Note 16-06 ISR contain more detail on intelligence activities.
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absence of a viable indigenous or international police force. Where this is necessary,

combat force elements should be complemented by military and civil law enforcement
capabilities, such as the Military Police, and replaced entirely by an appropriate civilian
organisation as soon as practicable. Stability policing needs to be linked to judicial and
penal processes and will set the foundations for wider SSR as the operation progresses.
Specialist pre-deployment training may be required for force elements due to the complex
legal issues surrounding stability policing. Legal guidance and clarification must be sought
concerning powers of stop, search, arrest and detention.
9-14. Military Police. Military Police (MP) are a significant force multiplier during stability
policing operations due to their specialist knowledge of police-specific considerations and
operating within a non-permissive environment. Their employment as part of the stability
policing force is essential to safeguard the reputation of land forces when operating
under the complex legal conditions that accompany this type of activity. Due to MP being
a finite and limited resource, the scale and remit of their employment will be determined
by the Force Provost Marshal (FPM). AJP-3.22 Allied Joint Doctrine on Stability Policing
provides detailed guidance on the employment of MP during stability operations.
9-15. Civilian Police. Typically, following stability policing activity or where the security
situation permits, UK land forces may deploy civilian police. These personnel are likely to
be deployable experts working for the Stabilisation Unit. They are particularly useful in the
training and mentoring of partner nation police forces and may reduce the requirement
for Military Police support in that role.
9-16. Information Activities. Information activities are actions designed to affect information
or information systems. They can be performed by any actor and include protection
measures. Activities include: psychological operations (PSYOPS); engagement; operations
security (OPSEC); deception; electronic warfare (EW); cyber; presence, posture, profile
(PPP); special capabilities (SPECAP); and physical destruction.102 More detail is in Doctrine
Note 17/05: Information Activities.
Support to Security Sector Reform

9-17. Introduction. SSR is a comprehensive set of programmes and activities undertaken to
improve the way a partner nation provides safety, security and justice. SSR is a long-
term effort conducted by the partner nation’s government requiring extensive resources
and participation of many security sector actors. Land forces’ principal contribution to a
partner nation’s SSR is through capacity building. This subject is covered in more detail in
Part 5 to this AFM and AJP 3.4.5 Stabilization and Reconstruction.
9-18. The Security Sector. The composition of the security sector differs from country to
country so there is no universally applicable definition of it. There are four generally
accepted categories comprising the security sector:
a. Security Actors. Armed forces; police and gendarmeries; paramilitary forces;

presidential guards; intelligence and security services (military and civilian); coast
guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence
forces, national guards, government backed militias) and veterans’ groups.
102 NATO includes civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) as an information activity whilst the UK views it as an element of capacity
building. More detail on CIMIC is in Part 5 to this AFM.
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b. Security Management Oversight Bodies. The executive; national security advisory

bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal
affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management
bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial planning and audit units); civil
society organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).
c. Justice and Law Enforcement Institutions. Judiciary; justice ministries;

correctional facilities; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights
commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems.103
d. Non-Statutory Security Forces. Liberation armies, private security companies (PSC),

guerrilla armies, private bodyguard units and political party militias.
9-19. Objectives. There are four primary objectives when conducting SSR:
a. Increase the capacity for effective governance, oversight, and accountability in the
security sector.
b. Improve delivery of security and justice.
c. Assist local leadership to develop an ownership of the reform process.
d. Support the development of sustainable security and justice delivery.
9-20. The Full Spectrum Approach. To be successful, SSR requires all elements of national
power to be applied in a coherent fashion and in coordination with other donors and the
recipient or partner nation. See para 2-19.
9-21. Security concepts. International consensus supports the idea that the foundation of
state security action should be the protection of the people. This idea is based on two
principles:
a. The security interests of the state should not conflict with the security interests of its
citizens.
b. The state is ultimately responsible for providing the security conditions for the
wellbeing of its population.
9-22. In developing countries that security is not provided exclusively by western-style

statutory bodies but also comes from traditional and non-statutory systems. The
conditions are not limited to law and order issues but include all political, economic
and social issues that ensure life is as free from risk as possible. Ideally the security
sector will be controlled and guided by a national security strategy. If one does
not exist its development could be an early element of the SSR programme.
9-23. Supporting the Development of a Partner Strategic Plan for SSR. The military
contribution to a SSR programme should be incorporated within an overall partner
nation strategic reform plan, developed by the partner nation with support from all
the stakeholders, including the intervention force where applicable, IOs, and NGOs.
9-24. Security is the essential element to effective rule of law, political participation, legitimate
governance and ultimately state sovereignty. For states that are fragile due to armed
conflict, natural disaster, or other events that threaten the national government, an
effective security sector builds legitimacy, secures the people from harm, fosters economic
and social development, and encourages foreign investment.
103 Guidance on the reform of these sub elements of the security sector can be found in ATP-3.2.1.1, page 2-12.
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9-25. Partner Nation Defence. Military forces are developed primarily to counter external
threats. The design of these forces develops from the analysis of those threats and the
specific capabilities required to counter them. Providing humanitarian assistance and
countering certain types of internal military threats can also be a necessary capability.
Defence reform should be structured by the constraints of relevant partner nation
executive and legislative branch directives, legislation and policy documents. Partner
nation national security strategies, policies, acts and budgets are examples of documents
which should inform the design and implementation of defence reform and SSR
programmes. Assisting the partner nation to craft them if they are absent or out-dated
becomes an essential feature of the reform process.
9-26. The activities of land forces are generally focused on reforming the partner nation’s
military forces, but those actions are only part of a broader, comprehensive effort to
reform the entire security sector, which is composed of individuals and institutions that
provide safety, security and justice for the people of a state.
9-27. Execution of comprehensive SSR unites all elements of the security sector through the Full
Spectrum Approach. See Figure 9-1 below for other elements within the security sector
and their relationships.
The Security Sector
Non-state Other Actors

Actors State Security Civil Management/ • Donors
• Rebels Providers Oversight Bodies • Intl. Financial
• Militias • Police/Military • Executive Institutions
• Gangs • Paramilitary • Civilian ministries • Neighbours
• Criminal orgs • Border security • Legislatures • Regional
• Cartels • Coast guards • Justice system organizations
• Private security • Intelligence community • Municipal and district/
companies • Customs agents governments/councils
Civil Society
• Media
• Academia
• Civic groups
• Think tanks
• Business communities
Figure 9-1. Elements of SSR (from ATP-3.2.1.1)
9-28. Leadership Capacity Building. Challenges associated with developing legitimate, and
accountable security forces require capable leadership in the partner nation security sector
at all levels. To establish the conditions for long-term success, SSR may help the partner
nation identify and begin training and advising security force leaders as early as possible.
Such efforts must avoid undermining partner nation legitimacy while recognising that
assistance, advice, and education may be needed. Programmes focused on developing
senior leaders may prove helpful.
9-29. Advisor, trainers, mentors, monitoring and liaison staff should be carefully selected to deal
with the frustration of working with developing security forces. Advisors’ tour lengths
should be long enough for relationships to be forged and for a deep understanding of
how best to develop the indigenous force to emerge. See Part 5 to this AFM for further
details on this subject.
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9-30. Public Trust and Confidence. In rebuilding the institutions of a fragile state,
commanders must engender trust and confidence between the local population and the
security forces. As SSR proceeds, these security forces carry a progressively greater burden
in ensuring public safety. Frequently, they do so in an environment characterised by crime
and violence. This proves true in areas recovering from violent, predatory forces. Recovery
requires a community-based response that uses the unique capabilities of the security
forces and police. Operating in accordance with the laws of the partner nation, the
success of these forces will help to gain the trust and confidence of the local population.
Furthermore, increased public confidence engenders greater desire among the people
to support the efforts of the security forces. Note, though, gaining trust can be a huge
challenge, especially where the security forces themselves have historically been viewed
by the public as corrupt and predatory.
9-31. Partner Nation Dependency. During reform, the risk of building a culture of
dependency is mitigated by adopting a training process. This process sequentially provides
training and equipment to security forces, a dedicated advising capability, and an advisory
presence. After initial training efforts, this reform helps partner nation security forces
progress toward the transition of security responsibility. A robust transition plan supports
the gradual and coherent easing of partner nation dependency, typically in the form of
increased responsibility and accountability.
9-32. Depending on the security environment, external actors in SSR may need to protect
new partner nation security forces from many direct and immediate threats during
their development. While this requirement usually applies only during initial training,
security forces remain at risk throughout their development during SSR; these threats
may contribute to problems with discipline, dependability, and desertion. In extreme
circumstances, protecting partner nation security forces may necessitate training outside
the physical boundaries of the state. Prior to this, detailed analysis must be conducted of
cultural and security implications.
Training the Libyan General Purpose Force, Bassingbourn Camp (2014)

In 2014, an attempt was made to train around 300 members of the Libyan General
Purpose Force (GPF) at Bassingbourn Camp, Cambridgeshire. The programme was part of
a wider international effort to stabilise Libya following the fall of Colonel Gaddafi. Many
of the recruits had taken part in the revolution, serving within irregular militias.
The project was unsuccessful for a variety of reasons. The Full Spectrum Approach was
not applied well with disconnects between departments regarding the running of the
programme. The Libyan Government was so dysfunctional that members of the GPF
could not be paid. Cultural awareness training for both British and Libyan personnel
had been lacking at the start of the programme leading to tensions between them. The
British understanding of the training audience was so poor that members of rival factions
were unwittingly placed within the same platoons and sections. This had been due to an
inability to conduct prior assessments in Libya on account of security concerns. During the
training, members of certain factions demanded to be sent home early, depleting the unit
and damaging its esprit de corps. Despite these setbacks, Jordanian instructors, sent to
the UK, were able to engage more positively with the training audience.
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Following highly publicised criminal behaviour by Libyan recruits, the political decision
was made to end the programme. For a time, this meant the GPF had to be contained
in Bassingbourn Camp to reassure concerned locals. This required reinforcements to be
sent to Bassingbourn including an additional infantry company, military working dogs,
and military and civilian police. The failure of the programme has led to an institutional
reluctance to conduct such training in the UK again.
9-33. Non-State Security Forces. Local militias, neighbourhood watches, and tribal forces
are a frequent response when the state is unable to provide effective security to
local communities and may be significant employers within local communities. SSR
programmes must acknowledge the presence of these non-state actors and determine
how best to deal with them. Indeed, intervening forces may quickly achieve a measure
of local legitimacy by partnering with local non-state security actors in such situations.
9-34. Local militias and other non-state security forces are less legitimate and functional
at the district and provincial levels, though their activities may undermine state
authority at those levels due to the disconnects between local actors and the district
and provincial government bodies that are charged with formal responsibility for
public safety. Given many non-state security actors tend to lack inclusive and formal
accountability and oversight mechanisms, over time they tend to become major
abusers of human rights and predators in their own and other communities.
9-35. Uncontrolled violence, once accepted by state authorities or intervening forces, is very
difficult to restrain. The DDR of non-state security forces is essential to reforming a
partner nation’s security sector. Where bearing weapons is a socially accepted feature of
adulthood, disarmament will be problematic at best. Disarmament processes may require
a nuanced approach that differentiates between personal weapons and heavy or crew-
served weapons. The perception that former combatants are receiving benefits that are
not broadly available to civilians may generate resentment, if not open hostility. To add
to the complexity, combatants may be adamant they have earned such benefits. Without
adequate economic opportunities for reintegration, disarmament and demobilisation
activities alone will gain little traction. A summary of DDR can be found at Annex A.
9-36. Private Security Companies and Security Forces. The private security industry
comprises those individuals and institutions that provide security for people and property
under contract and for profit. The activities of an uncontrolled or poorly regulated private
security industry can present unique governance problems and act as an obstacle to SSR
programmes directed at both military and law enforcement forces. Increased security
provision by non-state actors is prevalent in all regions of the world. SSR planners
therefore must consider the potentially serious implications of the private security industry
in the partner nation, as well as the effects of limited regulation and accountability of a
market, which continues to grow in both size and importance.
9-37. Intelligence and security service reform is a key element of SSR that is often
overlooked. Intelligence and security services are normally located within central
government, typically reporting directly to senior decision makers. They should provide
warnings and insights about threats and trends which impact on the security and
economic well-being of a state and allow decision makers to shape policy. Intelligence
services can make a significant contribution to the process of building a nationally-
owned and led vision of security through the provision of tactical or strategic intelligence
assessments on the range of threats faced by the state.
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9-38. In addition to assisting the overall SSR process, intelligence services themselves frequently
require reform. Intelligence services of the state may have been involved in human rights
abuses or colluded in the rule of a corrupt or tyrannical regime. Thus, there may be a
requirement to reform the intelligence services and structures of a state as a part of the
comprehensive SSR programme. This is not a specifically military problem, but given our
potential reliance on local intelligence agencies to develop our own understanding reform
is very often in land forces’ interest.
9-39. Border forces. The control of border areas by state-sanctioned border forces will be
necessary to prevent any movement of hostile actors into a fragile state. This helps to
restore the idea that the state is sovereign. Border forces are often involved in detecting
and preventing crime in border areas, including illegal trafficking and entry. These forces
can include border guards, coast guard, and immigration and customs personnel. In many
states, ineffective border management systems frustrate efforts to detect and prevent
organised crime and other irregular activity. Border forces can also be associated with
corruption, which reduces state revenues, erodes confidence and discourages trade and
economic activity. Issues to be considered in the initial development of a border control
force are:
a. Facilitating the efficient and regulated movement of people and goods, thereby
achieving an appropriate balance between security, commerce, and social normalisation.
b. Building capacity to detect and combat illicit trafficking, organised crime, terrorism and
other factors leading to insecurity in border areas.
c. Strengthening revenue-generating capacity, promoting integrity and tackling corruption.

d. Establishing a border guard under central government control.
e. Harmonising border control and customs regulations regionally and enhancing cross-
border cooperation.
f. Establishing cross-border protocols with adjoining states.
9-40. Perseverance. SSR is a complex activity, and participants must demonstrate persistence
and resilience in managing the dynamic interactions among the various factors
affecting the reform programme. Within the SSR processes, some failures are likely.
Early identification of potential points of failure allows for mitigating action.
Support to Initial Restoration of Essential Services

9-41. Introduction. Sustainable human security depends on providing essential services, for
example medical services, electricity, water, sewerage and food. The more demanding the
physical environment and the more destructive the preceding fighting, the greater the lack
of services will be felt. Most of the solutions are in the hands of the civilian components
supporting the Full Spectrum Approach and the main military contribution should be
the provision of sufficient area-based security to enable this. If the security situation is
not permissive to civilian specialists, military forces may need to directly support local
authorities (state or non-state) to deliver these services, or, in extremis, directly
deliver themselves.
9-42. Definition and scope. Restoration of services comprises life-saving activities and essential
services for a limited period. Life-saving activities are those actions that, within a short
time span, remedy, mitigate or avert direct loss of life, physical harm or threats to a
population or major part thereof. Essential services are those that satisfy basic human
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needs and provide the necessary infrastructure for economic recovery as efficiently as
possible. They cover Sewage, Water, Electricity, Academics (i.e. education), Rubbish,
Medical and Security (SWEAR-MS).104 Land forces may have to intervene to support the
initial restoration of essential services for the following reasons:
a. Civil agencies are incapable of delivering the required effect due to the security
situation. Note that military restoration must complement longer-term partner nation
development plans and avoid creating dependence on military support.
b. To improve security:
(1) Directly, by fixing populations (for example, by the provision of clean water in a
given area), improving routes (permitting, armoured vehicles/quick reaction force
access), improving street lighting etc.
(2) Indirectly, by removing cause for discontent amongst the civil population and
denying a shadow government and/or adversaries the opportunity to occupy a
vacuum.
c. To promote campaign authority.
d. To support the logistic and infrastructure requirements of a military force.
e. To act as a catalyst for governance, economic and social activity (for example by
repairing strategic infrastructure and improving transport links).
f. Legal obligations placed upon occupying powers by international law to provide and
care for civilian populations.
9-43. The restoration of essential services for a civilian population, linked to information
activities and other lines of operations, is an early measure that can be taken to increase
the chances of mission success. Restoration work must be linked to information activities
to capitalise on the good will from the local population and deny criminal groupings
from taking unwarranted credit. Restoration activity is likely to be conducted primarily by
military engineers or contractors with STABADs playing a coordinating role. The military
medical services may also be involved where there is a requirement to restore medical
facilities for the civilian population and to provide advice on environmental health issues.
9-44. The nature and size of the military contribution will vary. In some circumstances, it may
be appropriate to focus military engineer effort on the restoration of services for the
population at the expense of the provision of facilities to the force.
9-45. Restoration Planning. Restoration planning should be undertaken early, as part of the
integrated planning process in the absence of appropriate civilian agencies. An overall
assessment of the partner nation’s infrastructure should be made and used to focus
military and civilian resources to best effect in support of the campaign plan. Short-term,
quick-win solutions should be aligned with long-term objectives and resources identified
and allocated to conduct both. Provision should also be made for the military to hand
over responsibility for restoration tasks to appropriate civil actors or partner nation
institutions as soon as is practicable while having contingency plans to retake the lead
in periods or in areas where the security situation deteriorates and prevents other actors
from carrying out their role. The partner nation should be involved as early as possible
in the planning of work and the allocation of priorities with partner nation personnel
employed wherever possible.
104 Adapted from ATP-3.2.1.1. The NATO version uses ‘trash’ rather than rubbish.
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9-46. Risks. Military forces will often face a dilemma. In the short term there will likely be
pressure for immediate results to be shown in the re-establishment of essential services,
and short-term stability may partly depend on this. In the absence of civilian agencies,
under pressure from local populations and authorities to assist, and with military
capabilities available, it may be that in some circumstances providing this direct support
will be necessary. Military commanders must not forget that their greatest contribution
will always be the provision of sufficient security to allow partner nation authorities and
supporting civilian agencies to conduct this service provision.
9-47. Military delivery is unlikely to be sustainable and solutions provided may detract from
the local development of more permanent solutions. They may also indirectly undermine
the legitimacy of local authorities, underlying their inability to provide basic services to
the population. They also run a very real risk of exacerbating conflict dynamics if they
inadvertently favour different groups over others. Where UK civilian departments and the
military agree that direct military involvement is appropriate, these risks can be minimised
by, for example, ensuring military restoration planning is conducted in cooperation with
local communities and authorities. Wherever possible, plans should be made to monitor
and evaluate the effectiveness of interventions and their impact on overall conflict
dynamics. As a minimum, the conflict-sensitive approach should be applied.
9-48. Military support within Integrated Action. The restoration of essential services can
contribute directly to improvements in the security situation. Restoration actions, most
likely in the form of information activity and capacity building should aim to deliver
non-lethal effect within a broader Integrated Action sequence. Within both combat and
stability operations, expert advice from military engineers and cultural property protection
specialists should be used to:
a. Avoid, where possible, damaging or destroying infrastructure that will be required to

achieve long-term stability.
b. Minimise the long-term damage to any infrastructure that must be targeted to achieve
a required effect during combat operations.
c. Protect infrastructure crucial to stability that might be vulnerable to other threats

during combat operations.
d. Identify infrastructure whose protection or repair will positively affect actor behaviour.
9-49. Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE). Basic services and infrastructure
should be examined as part of the IPE process during all phases of a campaign. Correctly
focused restoration effort can achieve significant results.
9-50. Short-term gains will need to be balanced against long-term objectives and the impact
on perceptions of local populations should be considered. Restoration activity should be
conducted in support of and exploited by information activities (failure to do so may leave a
vacuum that is exploited by opposition groups). Information activities may also be required to
produce a remedial effect where critical infrastructure has been damaged because of military
action or to manage expectations when quick repairs are not achievable.
9-51. Coordination of Activity. Military restoration activity must be coordinated with the
efforts of civil actors and in line with long-term strategic objectives. The process of
integrated planning and coordination should continue at the operational and tactical
level. Stabilisation Advisors and CIMIC staff will play a role in this process, conducting
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liaison with civil actors and, where the situation permits, establishing a Civil Military
Operations Centre (CMOC) as a mechanism for coordination.105
9-52. Funding. Ideally, funds for restoration activity should be made available from a single
source at the national level and channelled to partner nation institutions as they develop
their capability and capacity. Restoration activity must be adequately resourced with
funds being made available at the tactical level to deliver targeted effect. The mechanism
for obtaining funds for restoration activity is theatre specific and must be understood.
Financial authority must be delegated to the appropriate level106 to ensure that sufficient
funds can be used in a timely manner to achieve desired effects. Restoration work with a
direct impact on the military mission, such as repair of street lighting in an urban area to
reduce the requirement for patrolling, should be funded through the military.
9-53. Military units. Military units with specific capabilities may be directed to support the
initial restoration of essential services, particularly:
a. Engineer units. Military engineering resources will be limited, reinforcing the need for
the appropriate targeting of assets and effective liaison and coordination of effort with
other actors, including contractors.
b. Logistic Units. Varied support tasks can be developed by these units: provisional
water/fuel supply, humanitarian relief tasks; airport/port management support, etc.
Logistic units need to be flexible in their delivery of CSS to OGDs and NGOs and must
be able to support the rebalancing of land forces during the transition to stability
operations.
c. Medical Units. They may, in extremis, provide limited medical support until the local
medical facilities are rehabilitated. Medical support may range from local medical care
to health inspection through prevention campaigns (vaccination). Veterinary services
may also be required.
d. CIMIC Units. Working with STABADs, they will enable cooperation between the
military forces and civil actors in support of the mission.
9-54. In some circumstances, it may be necessary to surge additional engineer resources to a

theatre to cope with the infrastructure demands of the civilian population and the
military concurrently.
9-55. Non-local civil organisations. A few IOs and NGOs may start their activities within the
area of operations from the very beginning of the conflict. They will play an increasingly
important role to support the restoration of basic services, when security conditions
are appropriate. Under such conditions, specialised civil agencies or corporations
(contractors) – either local or foreign – may effectively participate in restoration activities,
complementing land forces’ efforts or replacing them for the performance of this type
of task.
9-56. Use of Local Expertise and Labour. A challenging but essential task is to make the best
use of available local expertise as soon as possible.107 To set the conditions for long-term
success and the eventual transfer of responsibility to the partner nation’s institutions,
105 See AJP 3.4.9: CIMIC for more detail.

106 Some funding could be made available to ground holding unit commanders, but funded projects must contribute to the
overall effect that is trying to be achieved
107 A risk is that intervention alters the dynamics of the local economy potentially creating dependency cultures
and fostering corruption. This subject is covered in Part 1 of this AFM, Counter-Irregular Activity.
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indigenous personnel should be involved in problem solving and decision making from the
outset. Institutional capacity should be developed alongside technical ability and planning
processes (prioritisation of tasks, securing of funds etc.) linked to governance activities.
9-57. Wherever possible, local labour should be used on reconstruction projects to boost
local economies and provide legitimate means of income to the local population.
DDR programmes may be linked to reconstruction projects to provide employment
opportunities for ex-combatants.
9-58. Quick impact projects. Ultimately, support to restoration of services will contribute
to the longer-term campaign objectives of allowing the nation to recover and become
self-sustaining in terms of stability. In the short term, the development of quick impact
projects is very useful to demonstrate that things are evolving in the area for the benefit
of the population. These quick solutions should be aligned with the long-term objectives
and resources, and they should contribute to increasing partner nation ownership.
They should only be started if there is a certainty that they can be finished and must be
conducted with conflict sensitivity in mind.
9-59. Quick impact projects should provide the community with an immediate benefit, which
should win the good will of the community. This will set the conditions for the local
community and the alliance to cooperatively identify, plan and implement longer-term
projects. Highly visible improvements for the population are a decisive starting point on
the way to success.
9-60. Transition Management. Where the military has been obliged to undertake activity
normally carried out by civil actors there will be a requirement to hand over responsibility,
either by province or nationwide, to partner nation institutions or other appropriate
civil actors. Depending upon the situation (capability and capacity of partner nation
institutions, security etc.) the time required for the transition process will vary. It should
be a conditions-based activity and decisions to conduct a transfer of responsibility should
be linked to other relevant lines of operation (for example Governance). Information
activities should exploit opportunities to highlight progress and the effectiveness of
legitimate partner nation institutions.
Support to Interim Governance Tasks

9-61. Introduction. It is accepted that the provision of governance is not generally a military
responsibility and if land forces do get involved it is most likely to be in a supporting role.
In some circumstances, however, the military may be the only organisation able to take
responsibility for governing an area.
9-62. Land forces may be required to undertake a range of civil administration tasks in support
of a weak partner nation government or in the absence of a working indigenous
or international administration. Such tasks may range from CIMIC liaison to the
establishment of an interim military government and are likely to include some degree
of responsibility for the provision of essential services. The military should seek to hand
responsibility for governance tasks to an appropriate indigenous or international civil
organisation at the earliest appropriate opportunity. Its primary role will be in establishing
the environment in which civil actors can operate.
9-63. Planning considerations. Comprehensive and detailed planning will be required with
input (and ideally the lead) from OGDs, the partner nation government and other IOs and
NGOs as appropriate. Considerations include:
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a. Mandate. The mandate under which the force is operating will articulate
responsibilities and structures for government.
b. Understanding. Existing structures and legislation need to be clearly understood and

their existence and ability to function effectively assessed. The subtleties of the local
environment should be understood. To understand fully the local situation, an analysis
of existing power bases and the interrelationships between them should be conducted.
9-64. A Possible Approach. Although there is no template for best practice in governance, the
following functions are likely to be required:
a. Rule of Law. Some form of rule of law should be established. Land forces may be
required to perform the role of a police force through stability policing, or assist local
police; protect and assist existing, or establish, some form of judiciary; and support
or establish some form of penal system. This will usually involve working with both
formal (state) and informal (customary or community-led) security, justice and conflict
resolution providers.
b. Civil Authority. A mechanism for meeting the immediate needs of the civil population
(shelter, food, water, medical provision, sanitation, fuel, power etc.) must be
established. Committees comprising prominent local citizens may provide a suitable
means for determining needs and establishing priorities. How these members are
selected so that they are seen to broadly represent the local population (including
women) can be crucial to their legitimacy and stabilising influence. An understanding
of the local politics will be essential in negotiation and communications in general.
c. Communications. Communication is critical to the establishment of civil authority and

the rule of law. Information activities will be required to support governance activity,
and information collection to provide data on the civil authority being established, the
role of the military etc. An information vacuum risks exploitation by elements hostile to
the military force or the supported civil authority.
9-65. In all cases, best use should be made of local expertise, structures and capabilities.
Adequate resources should, ideally, be provided to allow local officials to resolve their
own issues. Strict standards of accountability should be enforced to lessen the effects of
corruption.
9-66. Protection of Existing Facilities. Early effort must be made to protect existing
government infrastructure. Failure to do so is likely to increase the amount of resources
and time required to establish even basic partner nation governance facilities and
capability/capacity.
9-67. Use of Existing Institutions. Experience has shown that using existing government
institutions produces quicker results than building new ones from scratch. The prominence
afforded to non-state institutions also requires careful consideration. Frequently
these will continue to operate in the absence of state institutions. Even when state
institutions are available, non-state institutions are often the preferred service provider
for most of the population (for example, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
as opposed to the formal court system). To provide an initial degree of governance
there may be a requirement to permit former, undesirable regime elements to remain
in post (under close supervision) until they can be replaced by a suitable alternative.
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9-68. Elections. The military may also support an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in
organising elections. The temptation to hold early elections to meet deadlines and exit
strategies should be avoided to prevent the legitimisation of spoilers and disruption of the
long-term democratic process. Studies suggest that it is desirable to hold local elections
in the first instance to provide the opportunity for local leaders to emerge and gain
experience and for political parties to build a support base. Extended preparation periods
also facilitate the establishment of other aspects of civil society, such as a free press.
An Iraqi woman prepares to cast her voting ballot into one of the bins after filling it out at a polling site in Rawah, Iraq
during the country’s first parliamentary election in 2005. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Corporal Shane S. Keller
(RELEASED).
9-69. Coordination and Consistency. The activities of all agencies involved in the provision
and development of governance and capacity must be coordinated. A consistent
approach should, ideally, be adopted by all actors.
9-70. Control of Partner-Nation Security Forces. SSR activity must include the development
of how partner-nation security forces are controlled by a legitimate government. Attempts
should be made to include this principle from the outset of any governance activity.
Contents
Annex A to Chapter 9
Demobilisation, Disarmament,
and Reintegration
Introduction
9A-71. A further intervention role for land forces is in the DDR of armed elements of a conflict.
DDR usually forms part of a peace agreement and is conducted within the wider post-
conflict recovery process.
9A-72. Purpose of DDR. DDR seeks to increase the stability of the post-conflict security
environment by ensuring that combatants, and their weapons, are taken out of the
conflict and provided with at least a minimal transition package so that they can return
to their civilian life and forego returning to arms again. The complex DDR process has
dimensions that include culture, politics, security, humanity, and socio-economics. In a
UN context, the ‘UN Integrated DDR Standards’ will apply.
9A-73. Ex-combatants in Society. While the process is focused on the ex-combatants, the
wider community will also feel the benefits of a successful DDR programme that
enhances security and is a clear sign of progress to peace. Communities will require
assistance to successfully absorb such ex-combatants. If combatants are disarmed too
quickly then this may create a security vacuum, if they are detained for too long in
encampments this may create unrest. Without a fully funded reintegration programme,
militia leaders may simply re-form their groups for criminal purposes, creating a new
security problem.
9A-74. Gender, ethnic and minority issues must also be considered in the design of DDR
programmes. For example, while women are sometimes used as armed combatants,
frequently their role in armed groups may be as cooks, spies or porters, or as sexually
enslaved ‘wives’ of male combatants. As such, the criteria for entry into DDR schemes
needs to look beyond simple ownership of weapons, and special arrangements made
in relation to subsequent demobilisation and reintegration support provided to groups
such as women and children.
9A-75. Effective DDR planning relies on analysis of possible beneficiaries, power dynamics, and
local society as well as the nature of the conflict and on-going peace processes. External
and partner nation military forces and police working together in a peace support role
may facilitate the process. Former combatants must develop confidence in DDR and the
organisations charged with implementing it. To build this confidence, the programme
must be focused on promoting a stable society, government, and economy at all
levels. This leads to the partner nation taking responsibility for DDR processes. Some
former combatants will be incorporated into the armed forces, while others may not.
Contents
9A-76. Role of Land Forces. Generally, UK land forces do not lead the planning and execution
of DDR programmes. When involved, land forces should be integrated in the planning
from its inception and may assist more directly in the disarmament and demobilisation
stages. Military forces and police, whether from external sources or the partner nation, are
fundamental to the broad success of the programme, providing security for DDR processes.
Successful programmes use many approaches designed for specific security environments.
9A-77. Each programme reflects the unique aspects of the situation, culture, and character
of the state. International DDR approaches must comply with “The Principles and
Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups”, also known as
The Paris Principles.108 The legal advisor is responsible for providing command guidance
on any situations pertaining to child combatants. See Annex B to Chapter 10.
9A-78. Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of small

arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of former combatants,
belligerents, and the local population. Disarmament also includes the development of
responsible arms management programmes. Ideally, disarmament is a voluntary process
carried out as part of a broader peace process. Disarmament functions best with high
levels of trust between those being disarmed and the forces overseeing disarmament.
Some groups may hesitate to offer trust and cooperation or even refuse to participate
in disarmament efforts. In these circumstances, disarmament may occur in two stages:
a voluntary disarmament process followed by more coercive measures. The latter will
address individuals or small groups refusing to participate voluntarily. In this second
stage, disarmament of combatant factions can become a contentious and potentially
very destabilising step of DDR. Military forces should manage disarmament carefully to
avoid renewed violence.
9A-79. Demobilisation is the process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military

establishment and defence-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration
while maintaining national security and economic vitality. Within the context of DDR,
demobilisation involves the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from
armed forces or other armed groups. Demobilisation includes identifying and gathering
former combatants for processing and discharge orientation. This extends from the
processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in
camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas,
or barracks). In many societies, women and children are active participants in violent
conflict. During demobilisation, separate facilities are necessary for adults and children.
Additionally, child soldiers require specific services including health, education, food,
assistance with livelihood development, and reintegration into communities. This
subject is covered in more detail in Chapter 10. SSR programmes must adequately
address demobilisation to avoid renewed violence from combatant groups or organised
criminals.
9A-80. Reinsertion is also part of the demobilisation phase. It is the immediate assistance
(usually cash) provided to demobilised combatants to allow them to return home
and support themselves and any dependents until such time as their reintegration
programmes commence.
108 The Paris Principles (2007) are designed to guide interventions to prevent unlawful recruitment of children, to facilitate the
release and reintegration of children associated with armed forces or armed groups, and to ensure the most protective
environment.
Contents
9A-81. Reintegration is the process through which demobilised combatants receive amnesty,
re-enter civil society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members
of the local population. It usually teaches marketable skills to participants and provides
them with psycho-social support. To minimise tensions with host communities, ideally
ex-combatant reintegration should be complemented with parallel community-based
programmes that provide economic and livelihood support to the wider population.
Local leaders gather for a reintegration shura on Forward Operation Base Pasab, Zharay district, Afghanistan, 2011.
The shura aimed to coordinate the reintegration process and celebrate the release of prisoners as part of the process.
Specialist Jason Nolte, US Army.
Contents
AFM TFSO
Chapter 10
Contents
Orchestrating and Executing

Contents
Contents
Chapter 10
Orchestrating and Executing
Introduction Orchestrating and Executing

10-01. Land forces have four inherent attributes:
• Introduction
people, presence, persistence and versatility.
• The Division
The key quality which alters these properties
• The Brigade
so they are relevant in new and changing
• The Battlegroup
situations is adaptability.109 Stability
operations routinely present new and Annexes: Human Security
Themes
changing situations requiring adaptability,
not least in how the force is organised. • Women, peace and security
• Children and armed conflict
10-02. Transition. Parts 1-5 to this AFM
• Human trafficking
concern the discrete types of stability
• Cultural property protection
operations. The emphasis in this chapter
is on the execution of stability activities
in the context of transition from major combat operations.
10-03. In stability operations, at the operational or higher tactical level, corps and divisions
orchestrate Integrated Action and align their activity with joint, inter-agency and
multinational operations. The orchestration of operations concerns the direction and
arrangement of actions, sequentially and simultaneously, to create desired effects.
Brigades, units and other force elements, operating at the tactical level, plan and execute
their contributions to the divisional operation. Throughout, formations and units will
apply the Operations Process as described in Chapter 4 to AFM Command. The likely
weight of effort against the stability activities can be seen in Figure 10-1 below.
Support to Support to Support to

Security and
Security Sector Initial Restoration Interim
Control
Reform of Services Governance
Division/2* Node
Brigade
Battlegroup
Figure 10-1. Likely weight of effort in stability operations by formation. Lighter areas indicate more limited
involvement. A Corps responsibility would be similar to the Division/2* node.

Contents
10-04. This chapter provides guidance on how stability activities might be executed at the corps,
divisional, brigade and battlegroup levels of command. The annexes to this chapter
provide guidance on the land contribution to human security by theme, linking to the
population-centric nature of stability operations.
The Corps and the Division

10-05. Introduction. The role of the corps, 2* node or divisional HQ in stability operations is
to coordinate, synchronise, prioritise and resource the activities of force elements under
command.110 It must engage with the partner nation to understand its vision and how
existing institutions work. It will also need to understand the divide between its tasks
and those of subordinate formations. The corps or division can also support civilian-
led elements of the campaign plan through active participation in the Full Spectrum
Approach. Generic tasks are:
a. Planning, resourcing and coordinating the restructuring of partner nation’s security

forces. This includes assessment of Security Sector Reform (SSR) activity.
b. ISTAR and targeting.
c. Joint and combined operations, lethal or non-lethal.
d. Coordinating and resourcing divisional/brigade actions with capabilities retained at the

divisional level, such as command support, aviation, artillery, ISTAR and sustainment
assets, including the identification and committal of reserves.
e. Coordination with higher political and military authorities.
f. Future and contingency plans.
g. Information activities, including the provision of metrics and the resources to monitor
and analyse influence outcomes.
h. Focus for media operations.
i. Synchronisation of military operations and information with the development of

essential services and the economy.
10-06. Organisation. The requirement to conduct stability operations concurrently with

warfighting will see corps and divisional HQs relying on subject matter experts such as
those listed below:
a. Information activities and capacity building specialists.
b. Legal Advisor(s) (LEGAD).
c. Policy Advisor(s) (POLAD).
d. Operational Analyst(s) (OA).
e. Stabilisation Advisor(s) (STABAD).
f. Gender Advisor(s) (GENAD). See Annex A to Chapter 10.

g. Cultural Advisor(s) (CULAD).
110 In a NATO coalition context, refer to AJP-3.4(A), Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations.
Contents
h. Religious Advisor(s) (RELAD).
i. Environmental Protection Advisor(s).
j. OGD liaison officers.
10-07. Staff may need to take on additional roles to enable the HQ to plan and execute
certain tactical activities. In particular, support to SSR, interim governance tasks and the
restoration of essential services. Pre-deployment preparation should include role-specific
individual training for staff, and HQ collective training should include attached civilian
and multinational staff. Limited resources mean commanders and staff must understand
that a balance needs to be struck between force elements conducting security tasks
and those conducting civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). The point where the balance
lies will depend on the security situation and the level of effort required to conduct the
core military tasks. As the security situation improves over time, or when partner nation
security forces become more capable as part of SSR, more divisional force elements can
be flexed to support civil effects or to meet changing requirements. In most circumstances
the headquarters is likely to be augmented by specialist personnel from Force Troops
Command, in particular 77 Brigade.
10-08. Executing the Stability Activities.
a. Security and Control. Establishing and maintaining the rule of law is essential,
particularly in transition, where partner nation law and order institutions may not
be functioning effectively and where international police may not immediately be
available. Initial responsibility for enforcing law and order will likely fall to the military
through the conduct of stability policing. The HQ will therefore be required to plan
and resource accordingly. Consideration should be given to rerolling troops that are no
longer employed in major combat. See the brigade and battlegroup sections below for
a description of the tasks associated with security and control. Corps/divisional level
considerations are captured in Table 10-1 below.
Step Execution/Activity Resources
Understand the means available Legal Advisor.

to the military to enforce the • Stabilisation Advisor and
rule of law. This includes the use other HQ based civilian
1. Understand legal of force, powers to stop, search, advisors.
detain and intern civilians. • DFID in-country advisor.
authority.
• Ensure that actions taken to • FCO Security and Justice
establish the rule of law are Advisor.
legal.
• Understand partner nation
criminal laws and powers.
Engage prominent local figures Tac Psyops Teams.

2. Communicate. Expected within the civil community. • Legal Advisor.
behaviour, restrictions and • Use local media. • Interpreters.
consequences must be • Use information activities • Military personnel
clearly articulated to the civil to inform and influence • Civpol advisors.
population. behaviour. • Information activities &
media.
Contents
Step Execution/Activity Resources
Consider use of curfews. Interpreters.

• Conduct patrolling activity (if • Civpol advisors.
possible with local police • Legal Advisor/Army Legal
service and or indigenous Service.
armed forces). • Royal Military Police.
• Stop/search/detain persons • Med.
as necessary. • Royal Engineers.
• Establish and run temporary • Military Provost Staff.
3.Stability Policing and detention facility. • Prison Service advisors.
support to Rule of Law. - Include inspections by IOs • Log & Med sp.
and prominent local • Clerical support.
figures. • Interpreters.
- Provide opportunity for • Information activities.
enquiries & visits by family • Stabilisation Advisor and
members (through other HQ based civilian
International Committee advisors.
of the Red Cross). • DFID in-country advisor.
Agree conditions for transfer Stabilisation Advisor and other

of authority early. Note that HQ based civilian advisors.
this must be to a legitimate, • DFID in-country advisor.
accountable entity in order • Interpreters.
that campaign authority is • Civpol advisors.
maintained. • Legal Advisor/ Army Legal
• Assist with the development Service.
4.Transfer responsibility to
of police, judicial and penal • Royal Military Police.
appropriate organisation.
systems. • Med
These could include international
• Address as part of broader • Royal Engineers.
or partner nation Police and
SSR (see Chapter 9). • Military Provost Staff.
Prison Services and judicial
• Prison Service advisors.
systems.
• Log & Med sp.
• Clerical support.
• Interpreters.
• Information activities.
• Army Legal Service.
• Clerical support.
Table 10-1. Establishing temporary rule of law
b. Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR). The scope of corps/divisional support to

SSR will vary according to the level of reform required and the security environment. In
an unstable environment, it is likely that the military will be required to initiate capacity
building, which will be conducted in line with reform criteria developed during the
SSR pre-assessment. The priority will be to ultimately establish a secure environment,
preferably using indigenous forces. Planning by the HQ should address the need for
support to SSR. This will include an assessment of the threat to security, existing
security sector capabilities, likely responsibilities and tasks of the security sector and
an articulation of the characteristics of the reformed security sector (role, function,
primacy, size, structure, gender distribution, equipment). It needs to be recognised that
a meaningful reform plan will not be possible without partner nation leadership and
ownership. Nonetheless, initial planning, with as much partner nation participation
as is practicable, will at least start to identify the broader parameters of the Security
Sector challenge, and put initial military tasks into a broader context. See Part 5 to this
AFM for detail on the execution of SSR.
Contents
c. Support to Initial Restoration of Essential Services. The HQ may be required

to assist in the restoration of essential services during transition. Planning should
be conducted early as part of the comprehensive planning process, including an
assessment of partner nation infrastructure. Functional and integrating cells should
assess how their approach to targeting must change as the emphasis shifts from an
enemy to population-centric approach in transition. Quick-win solutions must be
aligned with long-term objectives, with resources identified and allocated to conduct
both. Responsibility for restoration tasks should be handed over to appropriate
civil agencies or partner nation institutions as soon as is practicable, while having
contingency plans to retake the lead in periods, or in areas where the security situation
deteriorates. Empowered partner nation personnel should be involved in prioritisation
and planning, and best use made of the HQ’s STABAD. It may be necessary to surge
additional resources to a theatre to cope with the concurrent infrastructure demands
of the civilian population and the military. Tasks potentially requiring land forces’
support include:
(1) Conducting existing infrastructure technical assessments.
(2) Preparation of an emergency infrastructure plan.
(3) Advising on targeting and effects.
(4) Securing key infrastructure assets.
(5) Managing contracts processes.
(6) Programme and project management.
(7) Repair, maintenance and operation of infrastructure.

(8) Re-establishment, training and mentoring partner nation service institutions.
d. Support to Interim Governance. The military will likely be in a supporting role, given
that its primary role will be security related. An HQ may be the only organisation able
to take responsibility for governing an area. AJP-3.4.1. Peace Support Operations
identifies that the military may be required to undertake civil administration tasks
in support of a weak partner nation government, or in the absence of other
administrative structures. The HQ should seek to hand responsibility for governance
tasks to an appropriate civil indigenous, or International Organisation at the earliest
opportunity. Guidance on the division’s contribution to governance can be found in
Table 10-2 below. A preceding step to all this activity is to conduct a conflict sensitivity
assessment to ensure all activity will at a minimum not exacerbate existing conflict
dynamics and at best contribute positively to reducing instability.111
111 See Conflict Sensitivity - Tools and Guidance, Stabilisation Unit, 2015.
Contents
Activity Execution Resources
• Hold meetings with civil • Safe, neutral venue for

society representatives (use meetings.
J2 assessments etc. to ensure • Interpreters.
appropriate personalities are • CIMIC staff.
1. Communication. Establish
involved). • Tac Psyops teams.
a dialogue with key community
• Use media/information • Media teams.
figures (including women) to
activities to inform local • Clerical support to record
increase awareness and manage
opinions, perceptions and proceedings.
local expectation.
expectations. • STABAD and other HQ based
• Publicise activities. civilian advisor.
• Protect civil representatives • RELAD.
as necessary. • DFID in-country advisor.
• FCO representatives.
• Consult widely on what • Safe, neutral venue for

selection criteria should be meetings.
to ensure broad community • Interpreters.
representation and • CIMIC staff.
2. Identify and prioritise
legitimacy of all committees. • Clerical support to record
local requirements.
• Hold regular meetings to proceedings.
Establish committees of local
establish priorities and • STABAD and other HQ based
representatives to represent and
update on progress. civilian advisors.
prioritise the needs of the civil
• Identify and include local • DFID in-country advisor.
population.
expertise (e.g. facilities
managers).
• Encourage local ownership
of issues.
• Establish sector working • Meeting venues.

groups (e.g. water, power, • Interpreters.
law and order) comprising • Subject matter experts (e.g.
local and military experts. Army Legal Service, Royal
• Develop working group Engineers, Army Medical
capability with military elms Services) and technical
increasingly performing a support.
mentoring role. • Clerical support.
• Establish a mechanism to • Source(s) of funding.
3. Provide administration and allocate funds/resources and • Financial support.
essential services. Meet the monitor effectiveness (the • Information activities.
needs of the civilian population committee(s) established in • CIMIC staff.
and encourage local ownership. step 2 may form the basis of
this).
• Publicise activities and
responsibilities to enhance
legitimacy of organisations.
• Manage expectations.
• Audit accounts and
expenditure.
• Link to national structures as
soon as practicable.
• Identify and agree conditions •

CIMIC staff.
to be met for transfer to •
Information activities.
occur early. •
Interpreters.
4. Set conditions for and • Identify suitable •
STABAD and other HQ based
handover of responsibility. organisations to accept civilian advisors.
Responsibility for governance responsibility (partner nation • DFID in-country advisor.
should be handed over to the institutions, IOs, NGOs,
partner nation authorities or OGDs etc.).
an appropriate international • Develop capacity of local
civil organisation at the earliest organisations.
practicable opportunity. • Publicise achievements.
• Manage expectations
(local population, local
administrators, NGOs, own
forces etc.).
Table 10-2. Establishing civil authority

Contents
The Brigade
10-09. Introduction. Brigade stabilising actions will usually be conducted within a
divisional framework. The 2* HQ will provide the command experience and staff
capacity to deal with the significant complexity and inter-agency nature of stabilising
actions, allowing the brigade to concentrate on tactical delivery. The challenges of
stabilisation may see additional functionality devolved to the brigade; influence,
civil effect, additional intelligence, stabilisation and cultural advisors may all be task
organised. The brigade HQ will need to reconfigure to integrate and optimise these
assets. The sub-division of function and task between brigade and division will vary
depending on context. Generic brigade HQ on stability operations tasks are:
a. Intelligence gathering and identifying sources of instability.
b. The over watch, training, supervision and mentoring of partner nation security forces.
c. Security operations.
d. Surge operations as required to restore law and order.
e. Coordination with NGOs, civil ministries, donors, reconstruction agencies and

contractors.
f. Border security (where appropriate until relieved by partner nation security forces).
g. Infrastructure security until relieved by partner nation security forces.
h. Supporting information activities
10-10. Transition. Once the brigade has achieved an acceptable level of security and public
order, the commander should consider moving to a partner nation security lead.
This will be a political as well as security judgement. There are at least two options:
transition from the brigade to an indigenous military security lead; or transition
direct to a civil (police) lead, i.e. police primacy. Police primacy should be the goal
as it can bolster the perception of progress and reinforce the impression of hostile
groups as criminals rather than freedom fighters. It demonstrates the partner nation’s
commitment to governing through the rule of law. Police primacy will often be
unachievable until relatively late in the campaign and may even be an alien concept
in some societies. Security transitions are often periods of high risk and uncertainty
for the brigade, which if enacted prematurely can be counter-productive.
10-11. Organisation. To carry out stability activities, the brigade may need to adapt
individual and unit roles, composition, equipment, operating procedures
and training. If the initial deployment of the force is based on a contingent
intervention operation which then transitions to a stability operation (e.g. Iraq
2003 – 2004), then the force may have to adapt in contact. Commonality of CIS
and a shared information environment must be sought despite challenges such
as security clearances. As the operational context evolves, the force must remain
responsive to the ever-changing demands of the operating environment.
10-12. The initial composition of the brigade and its options for adaptation should be
one of the major tasks to fall out of the commander’s analysis. A typical brigade
composition to conduct stabilising actions is likely to contain the following generic
elements:
Contents
a. Integrated Headquarters (HQ). The brigade HQ structure is likely to require

adjustment and, as a minimum, will need to integrate liaison officers, multi-agency
partners and staff such as stabilisation, policy or cultural advisors. There is likely to be
an increased emphasis on future plans/operations. In areas of limited permissiveness,
the brigade HQ may need to host OGDs and agencies. The aim must be to promote
coherence across civil and military activity. Full integration may only be necessary in
the most complex of tasks and even then, may be difficult to achieve. Exchanging
empowered planning staff or simply collocating HQ are viable alternatives in less
demanding scenarios.
b. Framework Forces. Framework forces enable and conduct the bulk of the routine
security operations. They will largely be focused on securing key installations, locations
and population centres.
c. Strike Forces. Strike forces are used to disrupt and defeat the insurgent, often in
depth. These forces can take both lethal and non-lethal actions to achieve these effects
and may need to be supported by, or augmented with, specialist targeting capabilities.
d. Surge Forces. Surge forces are deployed to reinforce framework forces to achieve
specific effects, for example the provision of security and control during elections. They
can be based over the horizon or in-country.
e. Capacity Building Forces. Capacity building forces are made up of brigade specialists
who should have a deep cultural understanding of the local population and will need
to build robust working relationships with them. They may also deliver combat enabling
capabilities, such as air and medical support that indigenous security forces lack.112
f. Joint/Multinational Enablers. Joint enablers are those elements that move,

sustain, maintain and support the brigade. These often prove to be a very large
proportion of a stabilisation force and the requirement for joint enablers should not be
underestimated.
10-13. Augmentation. During transition, the brigade may be augmented with additional
personnel (including liaison officers) and capabilities. Examples are as follows:
a. POLADs. POLADs are responsible for advising on aspects of UK defence policy and
practice that affect decision making.
b. LEGADs. LEGADs are usually military lawyers, held at brigade or divisional level but
may be task organised with a battlegroup for specific missions or activities. They are
responsible for offering legal advice to the deployed force. They have a wide range of
duties, covered in detail in JDP 3-46.
c. STABADs. STABADs are deployed civilian experts from the Stabilisation Unit. They
work with the brigade commander, integrating cross government stabilisation
strategies and programmes into brigade planning.
d. Operational Analysts (OAs). OAs can provide a range of specialist analytical

and assessment products and advice to support land forces’ mission planning and
execution, such as assessment of local variation from standard planning data or in
support of Course of Action (COA) evaluation. OAs will also be able to advise on
setting, collecting, and analysing Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) in support of the
Effects Matrix or Campaign Plan.113
112 Note that the Specialized Infantry Battalion concept is under development.
113 OAs were employed at the brigade level on Operation HERRICK but are generally a divisional level asset.
Contents
a. Security and Control. Success in achieving security is a precursor to enabling all the
other lines of operation to flourish. The early establishment of a secure environment
and a degree of law and order following military intervention provides a permissive
environment for external and civil actors to operate. The brigade will contribute to
the provision of security usually on behalf of the partner nation government. This may
range from advice, military assistance, offensive actions to contain or deter, or a full-
scale intervention to combat a violent insurgency. In the latter case, the brigade will
need to engage in offensive actions to suppress the insurgent, to wrest the initiative
from him to dictate terms, and to demonstrate the partner nation government’s
authority. Offensive action carries the risk of military and civilian casualties and the
insurgent may deliberately target the population and through violence and intimidation
try to dissuade the population and international community from supporting the
government’s efforts. The following tasks may be executed as part of security and
control:
(1) Establishment of Tactical Bases. Static, tactical bases are used to support a
continuous and effective security presence. Tactical bases will be established when
the command decision is made that they offer sufficient tactical advantage over
relying solely on vehicle and dismounted operations. They are the hubs around
which forward operations are conducted on an enduring operation. Main bases
are sited for strategic purposes such as theatre entry, whereas the locations of
tactical bases are determined primarily by tactical considerations. Some bases are
established to provide indirect support to operations such as communications
nodes or to control border-crossing points. Others are required to establish the
essential framework for security operations. In counter-insurgency and stability
operations, this latter category is used to secure the population, establish a
stabilising presence and create local influence.
(2) Protection of political processes. The central challenge of stabilisation is to

bring about some form of political settlement in a pressured and violent context,
and supporting the evolution of political processes is key to this. Brigade level
contributions to this challenge include:
(i) Provision of a secure environment for negotiations, including protecting

key sites where political processes take place.
(ii) Ensuring freedom of movement and protection of those engaging in

political processes.
(iii) Monitoring of ceasefires.
(3) Promotion of Human Security. Winning the contest for human security is
fundamental to the development of partner nation government authority and,
ultimately security of the state.114 The commander can employ a range of
techniques including:
(i) Protecting the Population and Key Assets. Winning the contest for
human security is fundamental to the development of partner nation
government authority and, ultimately security of the state.
114 This subject is covered in detail in the annexes to this chapter.

Contents
(ii) Establishing Secured Areas. By providing secured areas the brigade

will isolate the adversary from the population. Securing key areas helps
to support economic activity, enables major infrastructure projects and
encourages effective governance and the rule of law. Once the situation
allows, such areas should be consolidated and expanded. Support to local
governance and development, together with initiatives that generate local
employment and economic growth, will be critical to maintaining security
and stability.
(iii) Border Forces. Effective border control is essential to combat regional

criminality and the movement of foreign fighters, weapons and supplies. The
brigade may be tasked to patrol borders and mentor customs, immigration
and border control agencies.
(iv) Provide Humanitarian Assistance. The greatest contribution to the

delivery of humanitarian assistance that the brigade can generally make is
to ensure area security and freedom of movement and access for civilian
agencies delivering that humanitarian assistance. In extremis, the brigade
may be asked to facilitate this provision more directly by providing direct
convoy protection, or even to deliver it themselves. The brigade should only
engage in these more direct forms of support after close consultation with
DFID or other IOs leading aid distribution, such as the UN. This subject is
covered in detail in Part 3 to this AFM.
(3) Countering Adversaries. Direct military action against adversaries is likely to be

a central component of the brigade contribution to the wider campaign to build
stability. In this case, setting the conditions for a negotiated political settlement
may entail breaking the ideological, financial or intimidation links within and
between different adversarial and belligerent groups, as well as between them
and the local population.
‘In wars among the people, if you are using a lot of firepower, you are almost
certainly losing.’
General Sir David Richards, Chief of the Defence Staff (2010-2013)
(4) Key Leader Engagement (KLE). KLE is recognised as an important element

of the influence process and needs to be synchronised at brigade level with
fires, manoeuvre and other information activities to achieve the required
effects (Integrated Action). Engagement is predominantly conducted to gain
information or influence behaviour and is a key enabler of human terrain
analysis. The Commander will usually engage directly with the perceived key
leader of the intended target audience. At brigade level, KLE mission analysis and
planning should be conducted by the information activities staff or a designated
engagement staff officer. While frequently excluded from holding formal
positions of leadership, women generally play an important role in influencing
societal attitudes and perspectives. The informal nature of these leadership and
influencing roles, combined with the potential difficulty of accessing women in
conservative societies, can make it easy to overlook women in KLE programmes.
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This needs to be guarded against, and creative ways found to achieve this
engagement.
(5) KLE must be focused. All engagement should take place under a single
competent authority – which then determines the effects required and the means
best suited to delivering those effects. KLE must not be passed to a separate part
of the HQ. The conduct of KLE might be planned by information activities staff –
the execution of KLE must be more coherent and part of a whole HQ.
b. Support to SSR. The precise scope and nature of military support provided by the
brigade will vary per the level of reform required and the security environment. The
brigade will require a SSR cell to carry out the level of planning and liaison required
with the partner nation and OGDs. The brigade contribution to SSR is likely to focus on
capacity building, covered in Part 5 to this AFM. Other tasks may include:
(1) Support to DDR. Further details can be found in Chapter 9.
(2) Initial Generation and Management of Indigenous Forces. The condition

and suitability of existing indigenous security forces should be assessed before
a decision is made to generate new forces. The commander should ensure
training teams establish basic support structures parallel to operational training,
as the operational capability of local forces is likely to reflect the quality of basic
administration: pay, feeding and equipment husbandry.
(3) Support to the Judicial Sector. During the initial stages of a campaign, the
brigade may be required to identify and provide protection to any functioning
judicial mechanisms, both formal (state) and informal (customary, community-led),
to ensure ongoing citizen access to justice and dispute resolution. Identification
of what systems are functional will also provide important information to reform
planning processes, once these commence. The brigade may also be required to
begin the refurbishment or reconstruction of facilities, possibly including court
houses and correctional facilities, or at least to provide security.
(4) Developing Indigenous Police Services. The brigade may need to lead on basic
police training. The responsibility for on-going internal security should ideally
be provided by a demilitarised police force with a mandate for law enforcement
and strong links to the judiciary. Ideally, this sees the creation of a community-
based police service in the brigade area of operations, with a clear separation
between the roles of the partner nation’s police and the military. Police primacy
for internal security should remain an aspiration, however, community policing
models assume consent which is unlikely to be achievable during violent conflict.
Therefore, the policing model must be realistic.
c. Support to Initial Restoration of Essential Services. The brigade may be required

to contribute in the early stages of an operation, or subsequent periods where the
security situation deteriorates and civil agencies are unable to deliver. The nature and
size of the military contribution will vary; in some circumstances, it may be appropriate
to focus brigade engineer effort on restoration of services for the population at the
expense of provision of facilities for brigade personnel. The ability to provide essential
services demonstrates visible signs of progress and effective local governance and
the two should be linked where possible. The brigade contribution may be optimised
in supporting local and international humanitarian and development organisations
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to expand their access to the population. Where these agencies cannot operate, the
brigade may be asked to provide direct assistance. In deciding whether and how
to respond, the risks of exacerbating conflict dynamics must be considered, and a
conflict-sensitive approach adopted. In extremis, support to the restoration of services
may provide land forces with leverage over certain actors.
d. Support to Interim Governance Tasks. Where possible, governance activities should

be implemented by civilian actors and enabled, only where necessary, by the brigade.
The military contribution to governance will depend on the level of security and in
non-permissive environments where civilian access is limited the brigade may be drawn
into those areas of governance essential for early progress. Civilian expertise must be
integrated into planning through reach back/outreach or by in-theatre governance
advisors and responsibility handed over as soon as practicable. Governance tasks
should seek to build on the foundations of existing capacity, however informal or
unsubstantial. By building on existing structure the expansion of governance is more
likely to succeed than a system imposed by outsiders. This may mean the brigade
carrying out much of the planning and delivery while ultimate responsibility lies
with the local authorities. There may be a requirement for the commander to focus
heavily on supporting key governing actors and this may take up a large proportion
of his time. All brigade activities must strengthen the partner nation government and
reinforce its legitimacy with the people. Typical tasks may include:
(1) Support Development of Local Governance. It should be recognised that local

governance is usually an intricate, highly politicised space, and direct military
involvement should be a last resort. Even where civilian agencies are not present
for security reasons, consultation with DFID and involvement of the Stabilisation
Advisor should be sought. They will also help local people devise local solutions
to problems and help the population and community leaders to build skills in
community decision making. In best-case scenarios, this can provide greater
transparency in resource allocation and other decision making processes. At the
local level, support should be provided for the organs of the state (such as the
Police) to help them build consent with the local population. Effective cooperation
between state and non-state systems should be supported.
(2) Dispute and Conflict Resolution. The brigade may be involved in supporting
mechanisms that facilitate non-violent political contestation and the peaceful
resolution of disputes and conflicts, and that assist communities to connect with
local authorities. These may include:
(i) Providing a secure environment for negotiations and dispute resolution

processes.
(ii) Direct and regular engagement with key elites and government authorities.
(iii) In extremis, settling disputes, for example over land or property seizure.
(iv) Public outreach and information programmes.

(v) Enforcing ceasefires and support to transitional justice arrangements.
(3) Supporting Elections. The ability of the partner nation government to run
fair and secure elections is an important indicator of stability and should be
implemented by the partner nation government where possible. The brigade
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may be required to provide security for the civilian agencies that administer the
election process and the wider community to enable maximum participation.
Where possible security for elections should be provided by partner nation
security forces, preferably police, supported and reinforced where necessary
by the brigade. If elections are held too early they may provoke an increase in
violence. The commander should assess their likely impact on security and advise
the partner nation government and international agencies accordingly.
(4) Countering Corruption. Corruption undermines confidence in the state,

impedes the flow of aid, concentrates wealth in the hands of a minority and can
be used by elites to protect their positions and interests. See Part 1 to this AFM
for more details.
‘At Combined Force level, extension of governance was achieved most easily where
the combination of governance, security and development were well integrated
and the security situation was stable enough to permit regular engagement
between the governance actors and the people…’
Commander 4 Mechanised Brigade Op HERRICK 12, 2010.
The Battlegroup
10-15. Transition. During transition the battlegroup is unlikely to be optimally task organised
or equipped to execute all the stability activities required to fulfil medium and long-
term stability objectives. The focus should thus be directed at setting the conditions and
enabling stability activities to begin, mostly through the provision of security and control.
10-16. Information Activities. During transition, information activities will refocus to place
more emphasis on engaging with local nationals and both international and UK
audiences. Local national consent and support is likely to be fragile and may benefit from
early interaction. Detailed guidance can be found in DN 17/05: Information Activities.
10-17. Organisation. Battlegroups may need to retask subunits out of their primary
role to generate additional mass and reinforce some specialist capabilities. Re-
rolling non-infantry subunits to conduct a ground-holding infantry role may be
required to achieve sufficient presence across a battlegroup area of operations.
Drivers, medics, combat engineers, logisticians and intelligence analysts may need
to be centralised. A1 Echelon is likely to be a supported, rather than supporting
element and may be regularly employed on the battlegroup main effort.
10-18. Augmentation. During transition, the battlegroup may be augmented with additional
personnel (including liaison officers) and capabilities. Examples are as follows:
a. CULADs. CULADs advise the battlegroup commander and his staff on cultural norms
and practices of the partner nation to further KLE activities and assist the battlegroup
in understanding the environment in which they are operating. They are key members
of the battlegroup planning team and can be used as a Red Team player offering
contrary views from the partner nation aspect.
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b. STABADs. STABADs are deployed civilian experts from the Stabilisation Unit. They
work with the battlegroup commander, integrating cross government stabilisation
strategies and programmes into battlegroup planning.
c. Defence Advanced Search Advisor (DASA). DASAs advise battlegroup commanders

on the employment of specialist search capabilities, such as the Defence Advanced
Search Team (DAST) or the All Arms Search Teams and are part of the Battlegroup
Engineer party.
d. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Operator. Operators advise battlegroup

commanders on the destruction or exploitation of explosive ordnance and Improvised
Explosive Devices. They deploy with a team and equipment to conduct explosive
ordnance disposal operations within battlegroup areas of operation.
e. Combat Camera Team (CCT). Army CCTs are deployed by PJHQ. They deploy with
battlegroups to record video and voice data in support of media operations. They are
often tasked by media staff within either the brigade or division.
f. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). Experts from 77 Brigade will normally deploy to

conduct discrete PSYOPS within the battlegroup area of operations. This may include
messaging, information campaigns and target audience analysis. These elements will
normally be tasked by brigade or divisional staff.
g. Military Working Dogs (MWDs). MWD teams can reinforce the search capability of
the force. During stability operations, units are also likely to be based in static locations
creating a greater guarding responsibility. MWDs can become a significant force
multiplier both as a sensor but also by deterring intruders.
h. The battlegroup HQ could also expect to receive an increase in CIS capability with
which to manage stability operations. This may include Mission Secret CIS and
specialist CIS provided by CJIIM agencies such as FIRECREST (an FCO CIS system).
They are also likely to find themselves in static locations operating from buildings of
opportunity where available, until more permanent accommodation is provided.
a. Security and Control. The military tasks associated with security and control at the
battlegroup level are described in detail in the Handbook to this AFM. These tasks are:
(1) Patrolling. Patrolling is conducted to dominate ground, gather information,

protect key infrastructure, reassure and gain the trust of the population, and
support other operations or deployed troops.
(2) Strike Operations. The purpose of strike operations should be to provide greater
overall security for the population by removing undesirable elements from it. This
can be: to search a building or site to remove illegal weapons, sensitive material
or munitions; to search a building to gain evidence with which to enable an
internment or successful prosecution through the appropriate justice system; to
detain an individual for subsequent questioning, internment and prosecution;
the exploitation of action taken or information gained for information activities
purposes.
(3) Convoy Protection. Convoys either manoeuvre employing organic recce

elements and can control organic and joint fires, or they conduct moves
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controlled and coordinated by the in place force or battlespace owner. Convoys

consist of five elements: Command, Vanguard, Close Protection Group, Logistic
Elements and the In Place Force.
(4) Public Order Operations. The battlegroup may need to conduct public order
operations to maintain law and order where the civilian police are unable to deal
with the situation.
(5) Cordon and Search. Cordon operations are usually mounted to obtain evidence
or deny weapons and equipment to an enemy. They can be deliberate or hasty
operations in response to an enemy attack, where preservation of the scene and
control of the incident is required.
(6) Route Protection. The protection of routes may be required as an own-force

protection measure, to enable local populations to go about their business or to
deny freedom of movement to an enemy. Route protection operations include
vehicle check points and route checks.
(7) Separation of Hostile Forces. Interposition or the separation of hostile forces

may be required. Detail on interposition tactics, negotiation and mediation,
delineation procedures and observation and monitoring is given in AJP-3.4.1.
Peace Support Operations.
(8) Enforcement of Out of Bounds Areas. Key infrastructure, vulnerable

communities, food storage depots, weapons cantonments etc. may need to be
kept out of bounds or protected. The intelligence preparation of the environment
should highlight such areas.
(9) Curfews. Curfews provide a means by which the movement of personnel can be
controlled during specific periods of time.
(10) Prisoner and Detainee Handling. The mandate under which the force is
operating will articulate the specific powers of arrest and detention available to
members of the force. JDP 1-10 Captured Persons must be followed throughout
in conjunction with theatre-specific Standard Operating Instructions. In general,
the procedures adopted should ensure that human rights are not infringed and
that any evidence relevant to a potential prosecution is gathered, preserved and
recorded correctly.
(11) Management of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP). Every

effort should be made to prevent the local population becoming displaced
through measures such as ensuring their security and provision of essential
services. Support to IDPs and refugees is usually conducted by specialist agencies
such as IOs and NGOs. Depending on the scale and location of the problem land
forces may be required to help with the movement and management of IDPs and
refugees.
(12) Stability Policing. Elements of the Battlegroup may need to conduct stability
policing activity in order to maintain initial law and order in the absence of a
viable indigenous police force.
b. Support to SSR. The battlegroup contribution is described under capacity building

within Part 5 to this AFM. Note that support to SSR includes the provision of short-
term training teams within Army International Activity, part of the UK’s DE plan.
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c. Support to Initial Restoration of Essential Services. The battlegroup contribution

to the initial restoration of essential services should address immediate requirements
where local or international civilian agencies are unable to do so. Such activities should
be handed to a civilian agency lead as soon they can take over. The repair of complex
infrastructure will be the remit of specialists, and beyond the scope of battlegroup
engineers. This may well be identified by the battlegroup, but work will probably be
tasked and controlled centrally by the division as troops able to carry out work will be
limited in number. Possible tasks include:
(1) Clearing Debris and Improving Key Routes. Battlegroups may need to employ
engineer plant, EOD and search teams to clear and repair arterial routes and
infrastructure damaged by our own or enemy force activity.
(2) Fixing Power Supplies. Maintaining a supply of power to local populations will
assist in maintaining local consent. The repair of electricity sub stations, power
cables or enabling the delivery of fuel are examples of activities to consider.
(3) Supplying Clean Water. The provision of emergency supplies of potable water
to the local population may be necessary where supplies have been damaged
or contaminated by combat operations. Quick impact projects to establish a
sustainable supply by, for example, digging bore holes should also be considered.
(4) Erecting Temporary Shelters. Depending on the severity of major combat

operations or crisis, many displaced persons may be expected to reside within
the battlegroup area of operations, or to gravitate towards battlegroup locations.
Although the battlegroup must avoid becoming fixed by the presence of displaced
persons, due consideration should be given to the provision of suitable shelter.
Where possible, local buildings should be used rather than committing limited
battlegroup resources.
(5) Delivering Humanitarian Aid. Land forces should consider all requests to
support the delivery of humanitarian aid where required. Consideration should be
given to whether military vehicles and manpower deliver the aid or if they act in
support of the international or NGOs providing the aid. Advice should be sought
through the policy advisor before agreeing requests from outside the military
chain of command.
d. Support to Interim Governance Tasks. While a major part of stability operations,

Support to Interim Governance is likely to be a relatively minor battlegroup activity
within transition. Plans for elections, the reconstitution of a judicial system and the
long-term economic development and reconstruction plan are unlikely to have been
formulated or enacted at this stage of the campaign. The battlegroup should be
prepared to assist where directed by its chain of command.
Annexes:
A. Women Peace and Security and Gender Mainstreaming.
B. Children and Armed Conflict.
C. Human Trafficking.
D. Cultural Property Protection.

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Annex A to Chapter 10:
Women, Peace and Security and

Gender Mainstreaming
Introduction
10A-01. This annex deals with three related issues:
a. Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) and responses to it.
b. Promoting a gender perspective to improve operational effectiveness.
c. The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) on operations in general and
UN missions in particular.
“…Sexual violence was our big weapon…we did it as a way of provoking the
Congolese Government. Sexual violence has led to the Government wanting to
negotiate with us.”
Commander Taylor, National Congress for the Defence of the People,

in 2009 documentary ‘Weapon of War: Confessions of Rape in Congo’.
Taylor was subsequently prosecuted and convicted for his involvement in these crimes.
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Context
10A-02. The UK, NATO, and the UN recognise the different vulnerabilities to conflict
experienced by men, women, boys and girls. This includes the impact on a society’s
prospects for post-conflict recovery and long-term stability caused by all forms
of sexual and gender based violence, and the positive role women can play in
building sustainable peace. This was articulated in 2000 through the UN’s Security
Council Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security, and has subsequently been
strengthened through many additional resolutions. The UK’s National Action Plan for
implementing our commitments related to this agenda includes many commitments
specific to the military. But in addition, there is a growing recognition across NATO, the
UN, and the British military that mainstreaming gender across all aspects of how we
conduct stability operations can directly improve our operational effectiveness. It can
improve our understanding of the context, our intelligence and our force protection,
and impacts directly on how we interpret our mandate and translate this into action at
the strategic, operational and tactical levels.
Definitions and Descriptions

10A-03. The following definitions apply to the role of gender in conflict and the development of
a gender perspective:115
a. Gender and Sex. Sex refers to biological and physiological characteristics. Gender
refers to learned behaviours, roles, expectations, and activities in society. These
societal norms can vary from society to society and can change in the lifetime of a
mission. Sex refers to male or female, while gender refers to masculine or feminine.
The differences in the sexes do not vary throughout the world, but differences in
gender do.
b. Sexual and Gender-Based Violence. The term “gender-based violence” refers to

violence that targets individuals or groups based on their gender. Sexual violence
includes sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. It refers to any act, attempt, or threat
of a sexual nature that result, or is likely to result in, physical, psychological and
emotional harm.
c. Sexual Exploitation. Any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability,

differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to,
profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another
(UN).
d. Gender Analysis. A method used to understand the relationships between men

and women in the context of a society.116
e. Gender Advisor (GENAD). A dedicated gender expert who operates at strategic

and operational levels providing internal advice and subject matter expertise.
Gender advisors are needed to ensure that gender is an integrated part of planning
operations (derived from NATO Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1).
f. Gender Focal Point (GFP). The Gender Focal Point can be an officer or senior
non-commissioned officer who supports the commander in ensuring a gender
perspective. The Gender Focal Point remains within the chain of command and
ensures that a gender perspective is fully integrated into the daily tasks of the
115 Doctrine Note 16/02: Human Security: the Military Contribution.

116 Derived from NATO Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1.
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operation. He/she is likely to hold the GFP role as a secondary responsibility (derived
from NATO Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1).
g. Gender Perspective. Gender perspective considers the impact of gender on

people’s opportunities, social roles and interactions (Doctrine Note 16/02: Human
Security – The Military Contribution).
h. Gender Mainstreaming. The systematic implementation of a gender perspective

within an organisation or unit (derived from NATO Bi-Strategic Command Directive
40-1).
Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV)

10A-04. Impact on Society. Sexual violence is prevalent in conflict and may be used as a
method of warfare to humiliate enemies and undermine their morale, terrorise and
control civilians, force communities out of their homes and affect ethnic balance.
The longer-term impact of widespread CRSV on societies is also increasingly
understood; it perpetuates grievances and drives further conflict; undermines the
transition to peace and stabilisation, increases hostility to the state (which is seen
as unable to protect its citizens or provide justice), and has long-term economic and
development consequences. Practices of CRSV are forbidden under the Law of Armed
Conflict and the national criminal law of the UK as well as most other nations.
10A-05. Sexual violence affects men, women, boys and girls differently. Women and girls are at
particular risk of violence in conflict, whether in the home, during flight or in camps
to which they have fled for safety. Children affected by sexual violence also include
those who have witnessed the rape of a family member, male and female, and those
who are ostracised because of an assault on their mother. Nonetheless, it is not always
the case that women are the victims and men the perpetrators. Both men and women
can be victims and perpetrators of violence, and combatants and agents of peace.
Villagers fleeing fighting in Kibati, Democratic Republic of Congo in 2008. The country was described as the “rape
capital of the world” by a UN spokesman in 2010. Photo: © Julien Harneis
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Male sexual abuse survivors living on the margins: Integrated Regional

Information Networks (IRIN) news report, dated 2 August 2011.
Two brothers, Charles* and Jacques*, set off for Uganda in search of safety after the
murder of their parents in January in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), only
to be waylaid along the border by six men carrying machetes, sticks and guns, who took
them into the forest and raped them, leaving them unconscious.
Months after eventually finding their way to Kampala, the Ugandan capital, the brothers
are physically and psychologically traumatized. “There is no hope, and sometimes it leads
us to hate life,” Charles, the elder, told IRIN.
Jacques is visibly in pain as he leans on his chair. “It hurts here where I got raped.
Sometimes when I go to the bathroom, I suffer for hours. Before, blood flowed [from
the anus], now it’s getting better but the pain is very strong,” he said, adding that he
undergoes a lot of mental torment. “I can go for days without speaking to anyone.”
Jacques requires surgery but a shortage of money even to purchase essential food items
means he is unlikely to be able to afford the operation.
An estimated 23.6 per cent of men from the eastern DRC regions of Ituri, North Kivu and
South Kivu have been exposed to sexual violence during their lifetime, according to an
August 2010 study titled, The Association of Sexual Violence and Human Rights Violations
with Physical and Mental Health in Territories of the Eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo, in the Journal of the American Medical Association.
*Not their real names
10A-06. Systematic rape is often practised with the intent of ethnic cleansing through deliberate
impregnation. This was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Rwanda and
Democratic Republic of Congo. Wartime rape often has a tragic ripple effect that
extends far beyond the pain and degradation of the rape itself. Rape victims who
become pregnant are often ostracised by their families and communities and abandon
their babies. The text box above illustrates that men and boys can also become victims.
“…when 276 schoolgirls were kidnapped by Boko Haram in the town of Chibok,
the abductions shocked the world. Abductions, enslavement, sexual abuse
and forced marriage of women and girls are central to Boko Haram’s methods
of operations…If we are to end sexual violence in conflict, we must tackle its
root causes as well as its symptoms. We all have a responsibility to end gender
inequality and discrimination in our societies…by doing that, we will give women
and girls around the world a future that those at Chibok were denied.”
Ambassador Peter Wilson, Deputy Permanent Representative of the UK Mission to the UN, to the Security Council
Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security, 15 April, 2015.
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The International Response

10A-07. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and Other Relevant Resolutions.
In 2000, the UN Security Council recognised the unique and disproportionate
threats to women in conflict and the positive role women can play in building
peace through Resolution 1325. The resolution, under the banner of Women,
Peace and Security (WPS), also set out a blueprint for understanding and tackling
gender-specific issues. Subsequent resolutions (see Table 10A-1) follow similar
themes and reflect the impact of conflict on men, women, boys and girls.
UNSCR Date Overview
Focuses on the protection of women, girls, men and boys from sexual and
gender-based violence in armed conflict. Links sexual violence as a tactic
1820 2008 of war with women, peace and security issues. Demands parties to armed
conflict to take appropriate measures to protect civilians from sexual violence,
including training troops and enforcing discipline.
Mandates peacekeeping missions to protect women and children from sexual

violence during armed conflict, and requests that the Secretary-General
1888 2009
establish the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on
Sexual Violence in Conflict.
Calls for further strengthening of women’s participation in peace processes

and the development of indicators to measure progress on Resolution 1325.
1889 2009
National Action Plans (NAPs) introduced as a tool to demonstrate how member
nations were implementing Resolution 1325.
Focuses on the mechanisms to monitor the enforcement of protection from

1960 2010 sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict. Introduced a “name and
shame” policy within the Security Council.
2106 2013 Promotes participation of local women in post-conflict negotiation.
Strengthens broader Women, Peace and Security agenda on participation

2122 2013
(leadership) and gender mainstreaming at the highest-levels.
Commits member states to integrate gender analysis into the understanding of

2242 2015 drivers of conflict. Promotes increased consultation with women’s groups. Set
new targets for participation of women in peacekeeping operations.
Recommends specific measures to address allegations of Sexual Exploitation

and Abuse (SEA) by UN peacekeepers, including robust pre-deployment
2272 2016
training for police and troop contributing nations and quick, thorough
investigations of allegations and prosecution of offenders.
Table 10A-1. UN Security Council Resolutions relating to gender and sexual and gender-based violence
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This photo is caught from video recorded in August 2001 by the Revolutionary Association of Women in Kabul using
a hidden camera. It shows a member of the Taliban from the department of Amr bil Ma-roof (Promotion of Virtue and
Prevention of Vice, Taliban religious police) beating a woman because she dared to remove her burqa in public.
10A-08. Four-Pillar Approach. The UN’s plan to tackle sexual and gender-based violence and to
promote awareness of the role of gender in conflict is set out in a four-pillar approach
under Resolution 1325:
a. Participation. The participation and inclusion of women (including servicewomen

and civil society actors) in decision-making related to peacemaking, post-conflict
reconstruction and the prevention of conflict.
b. Protection. The protection of women and girls in armed conflict.
c. Prevention. Prevention of conflict-related sexual violence, and effective reporting

and protection of victims.
d. Gender Mainstreaming. The systematic implementation of a gender perspective

in peacekeeping and peace building, as per Resolution 1325, by all member states,
especially in the context of peace missions led by the UN.117
117 Note that subsequent resolutions emphasise the impact of conflict on men and boys more than Resolution 1325.
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Integrated planning:. UN Civilian Gender Unit and Military Planning Officer working for the UN Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo © Grimes/DRC/2014.
10A-09. UN Action against CRSV (UN Action). UN Action unites the work of 13 UN
entities with the goal of ending sexual violence in conflict. It is a concerted effort
by the UN system to improve coordination and accountability, amplify programming
and advocacy, and support national efforts to prevent sexual violence and respond
effectively to the needs of survivors. UK commanders serving with or alongside
the UN should identify local representatives of the scheme to establish actions
on and reporting requirements relating to sexual and gender-based violence.
10A-10. UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2014-2017. The
UK National Action Plan (NAP), established in 2006, emphasises that women’s
participation is needed to make and build peace and prevent conflict breaking out.
The NAP is jointly owned by the MOD, DFID and the FCO and follows the framework
of Resolution 1325. The UK therefore recognises that sometimes women and girls
suffer specific forms of violence in conflict which need to be addressed as part of
any stabilisation effort, not just Peace Support. Building on the NAP, the UK agreed
to review the doctrine and training provided to military personnel on Women, Peace
and Security and sexual and gender-based violence at the 2013 G8 Summit. This
includes training provided by the UK to other nations through capacity building.
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The UK’s National Action Plan for Women Peace and Security
10A-11. Linked to the above, HMG has placed emphasis on its Preventing Sexual Violence
Initiative (PSVI) which seeks to eradicate sexual and gender-based violence within
conflicts. The aim of the PSVI is the eradication of rape as a weapon of war, through a
global campaign to end impunity for perpetrators, to deter and prevent sexual violence,
to support and recognise survivors, and to change global attitudes that fuel these
crimes. Further to the NAP, the UK (and the MOD specifically) also made commitments
on Women, Peace and Security at the High Level Review of UNSCR 1325 and at the
2016 UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial.
Improving Operational Effectiveness by Mainstreaming a

Gender Perspective
10A-12. Gender perspective is a tool used to better understand societies. Adopting a gender
perspective and mainstreaming it into all dimensions of our operations can have a
positive impact on our operational effectiveness. It can improve our understanding of
the operating context, our intelligence and force protection, our influence amongst
the host population and over our adversaries, our choices of what tactical actions
we undertake and how we undertake them. To achieve mission success, land forces
must fully understand the operating environment. Without a gender perspective, 50
per cent of the population might be missing from the estimate/analysis process. This
is of particular importance in relation to establishing stability and security. The MOD’s
intention is to deliver this capability through a cadre of land gender advisors using the
NATO model as a guide.
10A-13. The MOD’s intention is to deliver this capability through a cadre of land gender advisors
using the NATO model as a guide. The Field Army’s Training Needs Analysis, presented
in August 2016, includes recommendations for the training of 50 Gender Advisors,
who will sit at command level within the tri-Services, and Gender Focal Points, who will
sit within each unit and advise on incorporating gender into the unit’s ordinary task.
These recommendations will be implemented during 2017.
10A-14. Interacting and communicating with women and girls results in improvements to
our understanding of the local society, improved situational awareness, additional
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intelligence and increased mission influence. But in many of the societies we operate
in, accessing women and girls through our KLE programmes and daily force interaction
can be challenging. Women are frequently excluded from formal positions of
leadership, and conservative social norms can make it culturally unacceptable for our
predominantly male land forces to interact directly with women and girls. Extra effort
and creative approaches therefore need to be found to overcome these challenges and
maximise the benefits of these gender perspectives into our planning and operations.
Gender Balance on Operations

10A-15. The experiences and skills of both men and women are essential to the success of
land operations. Specifically, a gender-mixed force aids communication with a broad
cross-section of society within the operating environment. Notably, Integrated Action
requires the identification and understanding of the key actors, male and female, in a
conflict situation prior to designing operations to change or maintain actors’ behaviour
as required. Appropriately trained and experienced female soldiers are essential
for engagement with women and children. This should not be a narrow specialist
activity; gender engagement activities include, but are not limited to: CIMIC, HUMINT,
Information Activities, investigations, medical services, public affairs and support to SSR.
10A-16. NATO Approach: Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1. In Aug 2012, NATO
members, including the UK, subscribed to a command directive integrating Resolution
1325 and its strands into the NATO command structure and operational practices.118
This focuses on enhancing operational performance by adopting gender mainstreaming
across all functions. It also emphasises the effect servicewomen can have through
their ability to engage with both women and men in conservative societies.
10A-17. NATO’s direction to its members:
a. Incorporate Resolutions relating to gender into military planning and the conduct of
operations.
b. Establish Gender Advisors into military HQ to provide specific advice and operational
support on gender dimensions to the Commander and NATO personnel.
c. Educate and train soldiers on gender mainstreaming and the theory of Resolution
1325 and Women, Peace and Security.
Operational Planning and Preparation

10A-18. Thorough planning and preparation are crucial to the success of the mission.
Integrating a gender perspective at all levels of planning is imperative when developing
strategies to address the full spectrum of crisis management scenarios in which
land forces are involved. Gender analysis is not a standalone function but must be
integrated into every line of operation/staff function to contribute to a comprehensive
understanding of the whole operating environment.
10A-19. Gender perspective should be considered while conducting the intelligence preparation
of the environment (IPE), for example during PMESI, ASCOPE and stakeholder analysis.
Appendix 2 provides a list of gender-specific considerations for inclusion within the
intelligence preparation of the environment. Their significance will vary per the mission
although all will support a better understanding of the operating environment. The
nature of the information requirements will also vary between formation and unit
118 See NATO Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 dated 8 Aug 2012.
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levels. Where the protection of civilians forms a central element within the mission,
Neutral/Environmental Information Requirements may replace enemy-focused Priority
Intelligence Requirements.
10A-20. The Full Spectrum Approach must be applied to ensure that expertise is fully exploited.
Commanders must also understand, via the G2 Branch and cultural advisor, the cultural
context within which they are operating and not simply apply their own norms, law
and behaviour. The distinction between international and local law, human rights
and culture must be analysed and addressed. Note that, wherever possible, cultural
expertise should also be made available to junior commanders to support tactical level
cultural understanding.
10A-21. Measures to Achieve or Enhance a Gender Perspective.
a. Specify the requirement for gender advisors during the force generation processes.
Consider the participation of women in the force to engage with the entire
population at all times.
b. Seek early advice from the cadre of gender advisors throughout the planning
process to ensure the full integration of gender perspective. Their knowledge
should be based on a gender analysis specific to areas of operation, integrated with
broader intelligence preparation of the environment.
c. Gender advisors should provide subject matter expertise on procedures to protect

civilians, with specific consideration given to men, women, girls and boys, from
violence, rape and other forms of sexual abuse, including human trafficking. This
follows Resolutions 1325, 1820 and related resolutions. If the gender advisor
does not hold expertise on sexual and gender-based violence an appropriate
representative within the CJIIM environment should be consulted. Note that it is
preferable for a gender advisor to hold these skills. Deployable Stabilisation Unit
experts can also provide guidance.
d. Ensure a gender perspective in all capacity building efforts supporting, training and
mentoring local security forces.
e. Consider how a gender perspective can be integrated into operational staff work.
Note that NATO has directed that its operational plans must contain an annex on
gender.
More detail on Tactical and Operational measures that can be taken to incorporate
gender perspectives into operations is provided in ‘How can gender make a difference
to security in operations - Indicators’, NATO, 2011, p37-38.
Disrupting and Reporting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence

10A-22. Reporting. Strong and effective monitoring and reporting mechanisms should always
be in place, making sure that criminal acts including human rights violations, sexual and
gender-based violence and indications of domestic or international trafficking of human
beings are reported, addressed and correctly processed. This includes the requirement
to understand who the interlocutors are within police forces, OGDs, NGOs and IOs.
This will vary from theatre to theatre and will be briefed within Mission Specific
Training. Taking early advice from the legal advisor or the military police is essential.
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10A-23. Tactical considerations. In many societies, women and girls often bear responsibility
for collecting water, purchasing food and firewood. In conflict areas, these gendered
activities may expose them to significant security risks, such as rape, assault, and
kidnapping. Therefore, consultation with women and women’s organisations is
essential in the planning of patrol routes and schedules when trying to improve security.
Such consultation is crucial, as measures taken to protect women and girls without
consultation often result in ineffective or counterproductive effects.119
UK officer attached to the UN providing female engagement with Eringetti women’s groups, Democratic Republic of
Congo. Courtesy of Cavanagh @MONUSCO.un 2014
10A-24. Protecting and engaging with women and girls can also have significant security
and intelligence benefits for the force. While they conduct their outdoor activities,
women and girls may be the first to observe actions that might affect the security
environment. Their perspectives can enhance the mission’s understanding of the
security environment daily. They may be aware of the activity of male fighters from or
around their household, black market economic activity, and informal power structures
that are having a destabilising effect at the local level. Specific consideration should
be paid to protecting female sources and their households from identification.
119 UN Women’s Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (2010) provides examples of successful tactics, techniques and
procedures implemented within UN peacekeeping missions. These will be subsumed into the Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures handbook accompanying this publication.
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Major (UK) Rachel Grimes, Gender Advisor to the UN comments on her

experiences:
“In the Democratic Republic of Congo the use of servicewomen to engage with local
Congolese women was ground breaking. The Swahili speaking Tanzanian soldiers were
able to engage with Congolese women who told them when and where the combatants
were most likely to attack. This improved the Force’s situational awareness. Survivors of
rape – be they male or female, prefer to talk to women. They are a Force multiplier, yet
not enough of them deploy.
In Erbil, the UK led the way when members of 77 Brigade deployed a Protection of
Civilians training team. The team of two designed and taught European and Peshmerga
soldiers how they should respond to survivors of rape. It was highly likely that the
Peshmerga would be the first people escapees from Mosul or Sinjar would meet. Due to
a dominance of male soldiers in the Peshmerga patrols it was important for them to be
taught a list of Do’s and Don’ts when responding to survivors of sexual violence. The list
was drafted by 77 Brigade staff in collaboration with UN civilian agencies and Kurdish civil
society groups.
Today the MOD is working to provide soldiers with specialised pre-deployment training to
provide them with the necessary awareness and understanding of gender issues within
conflict. In addition, some military personnel in 77 Brigade are being trained to become
Gender Advisors. This is an indication that sexual violence is no longer viewed as a by-
product of war but something the military should be aware of and be able to respond to.
If a military can’t protect the civilians it is mandated to protect then why is it there?”
10A-25. Handling of Female Captured Persons (CPERS). The captivity of female captured
persons may be very culturally sensitive and personnel should follow the guidance
in JDP 1-10 Captured Persons throughout. Due regard must be given to females’
physical strength, the need to protect them against rape, forced prostitution and
other forms of sexual violence or abuse, and the special demands of biological factors
such as menstruation, pregnancy and childbirth as well as meeting culturally specific
requirements. Pregnant women and mothers of dependants must have their cases
considered with the utmost priority. Female captured persons shall in all cases benefit
from treatment as favourable as that granted to male captured persons. Advice and
guidance on the handling of female detainees should always be sought from attached
Military Police assets.
10A-26. Female captured persons must be kept in separate accommodation from male captured
persons. Female captured persons should be under the immediate supervision of female
Service personnel where possible. In cases where families are detained or interned, if
possible, and unless there is an urgent operational requirement to segregate specific
family members, they should be kept together as family groups and away from other
captured persons.120
120 See JDP 1-10: Captured Persons for further details.

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Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

10A-27. Legitimacy. Some members of the force may be tempted to engage in sexual
exploitation and abuse. This includes using prostitutes and trading assistance for sex.
Sexual exploitation and abuse is forbidden on all multinational operations on the basis
that it undermines campaign authority and is most likely illegal. The additional risk that
sexual exploitation links military personnel to human trafficking is explored in Annex C.
10A-28. UN Missions. In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile cases
of alleged abuse by peacekeepers within communities they were responsible for
protecting. This has led to considerable reputational damage to the UN and the troop-
contributing nations. Consequently, the UN has adopted a zero tolerance approach
to sexual exploitation, expressed in its Sexual Exploitation and Abuse policy.121 The
policy forbids all UN personnel from engaging in sexual relations with sex workers and
with any persons under 18, and strongly discourages relations with beneficiaries of
assistance (those that are receiving assistance food, housing, aid, etc... as a result of
a conflict, natural disaster or other humanitarian crisis, or in a development setting).
10A-29. Note that efforts to prevent the perpetration of sexual exploitation and abuse
by our own troops will differ from those targeting sexual violence amongst the
population of the partner nation, not least because the jurisdictions will differ. In
the context of sexual exploitation and abuse, commanders must seek legal advice
early so as not to contaminate evidence which may endanger future prosecutions.
10A-30. Reporting. UK personnel should be aware of the following procedures for

reporting sexual exploitation and abuse when serving within a UN mission:
a. In the first instance, report to the chain of command. Alternatively, reports can be
made to the mission Conduct and Discipline Team (CDT).
b. All complaints and information on misconduct (for all categories of personnel)

are to be channelled to the CDT. The Team reviews and assesses information to
determine if allegations of misconduct are credible. The Team then recommends
notification and investigation in accordance with applicable procedures.
c. In some cases, it may be necessary to report directly to the Office of Internal

Oversight. Most missions have a structure with sexual exploitation and abuse focal
points. Reports are confidential and personnel are protected from retaliation.
d. The CDT informs the Head of Mission through Chief of Staff (heads of component
informed as appropriate).
e. The CDT is responsible for tracking and follow up of allegations.
121 UNSCR 2272, passed in Mar 16, provides further direction on standards expected of peacekeepers and allows the
Secretary General to repatriate units involved in Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.
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UN Peacekeepers Face New Sex Abuse Claims in Central African Republic:

Al Jazeera Report, Dated 24 June 2015
The UN said it had received 480 allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse relating to its
peacekeeping and special political missions between 2008 and 2013. In the most recent
case, MINUSCA* received allegations on June 19 [2015] that two girls under age 16 had
been sexually abused in Bangui, a UN official said.
The girls, who have been offered medical assistance, told a local rights group that they
received food and goods in exchange for sex and that the abuse started in 2014.
*UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
10A-31. Standards of Partner-Nations’ Armed Forces. Where UK forces are deployed

alongside other troop-contributing nations suspected of abuse in a UN context,
commanders should follow the guidance above. When operating outside of the UN
but in a multinational context, UK personnel identifying sexual exploitation and abuse
should inform their own chain of command so that appropriate national representatives
can be notified. Concerns regarding conduct may not be limited to sexual exploitation
and abuse. Partner nations may not be as capable or as disciplined as UK forces in
other areas, such as in the provision security and control. While land forces cannot
cover the failings of others throughout a mission, UK standards must not drop to those
they must work with, even if this creates reputational issues for other contingents.
Appendix:
1. Reporting with a gender perspective.

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Appendix 1 to Annex A to Chapter 10
Reporting with a Gender

Perspective
Introduction
10A1-01. The following is a list (not exhaustive) of questions that should be considered
when reporting or contributing to Intelligence Preparation of the Environment:
a. How does the security situation affect women, men, girls and boys?
b. What risks, similar and/or different do men, women, girls and boys face?
c. What are the differences in vulnerabilities between these groups (women, men,
girls and boys)?
d. Are women’s and men’s security issues known, and are their concerns being met?
e. What role do women play in the military, armed groups, police or any other
security institutions such as intelligence services, border, customs, immigration, or
other law enforcement services (per cent of forces/groups, by grade and category)?
f. What role do women play in the different parts of and social groups in the society?
g. Does the selection and interaction between local power holders and the operation
affect women’s ability to participate in society - such as legal, political or economic
spheres?
h. Gender disaggregated data on for example: political participation, education,

refugees, prisoners, health-related issues, refugees, sexual and gender-based
violence etc.
i. Assessment of the current situation and planned actions.
j. Report on who in the operational theatre is responsible for gender issues/WPS and
UN Security Council 1325 agendas. Who are the UN Humanitarian officers and
Women’s Protection Advisors (WPAs)?
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Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations | 10B-1
Annex B to Chapter 10:
Children and Armed Conflict

Introduction
10B-01. Conflict has a disproportionate effect on children and land forces can play an important
role in safeguarding them from violence and exploitation during operations. The
nature of that role is dependent on the mission and whether humanitarian and law
enforcement agencies are present within the area of operations.
10B-02. The Law of Armed Conflict and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) provide
overarching direction on the protection of children from unnecessary suffering and the
safeguarding of their fundamental human rights in conflict. Other laws may apply too,
such as local, military or UK law.
10B-03. The UN identifies six grave violations of children’s rights:
a. Killing or maiming.
b. Recruitment or use as soldiers.

c. Sexual violence.
d. Attacks against schools or hospitals.
e. Denial of humanitarian access.
f. Abduction of children.
10B-04. This annex focuses on child soldiers and attacks against schools; remaining violations
are covered in detail in JSP 383 or elsewhere in this AFM.
A young girl in a village in Helmand Province, Afghanistan meets a soldier of A Company, 3 MERCIAN (2011).
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10B-2 | Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations
Definitions
10B-05. Child. A person below the age of 18, unless the laws of a particular country set the
legal age for adulthood younger (UN Convention on the Rights of a Child). Note that
UK doctrine (JDP 1-10, Edition 3), in a CPERS context, classes people aged 15,16 or 17
as juveniles. This distinction is explained in detail in paragraphs 10B-22 to 10B-23.
10B-06. Child Soldiers. Children who have been conscripted or enlisted into armed forces
or groups or who have been used to participate actively in hostilities (Law of Armed
Conflict).
Note that the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) applies a broader interpretation:
“…a child associated with an armed force or armed group refers to any person
below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed
force in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as
fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only
refer to a child who is taking part or has taken a direct part in hostilities.”
Child Soldiers
10B-07. Recruitment and Vulnerabilities. There are many complex factors (push and pull)
which result in a child’s vulnerability to being recruited or used by armed groups.
Possible factors include:
a. Potential for income, food, or security through service with armed groups or
through the “spoils of war”.
b. Ideology of the child or their family as a motivation for fighting.
c. Abduction.
d. Being offered by their community in exchange for staying safe from attack.
e. Being offered by their family due to extreme poverty and hunger.
f. Emotional and physical immaturity.
10B-08. The UK is a party to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),
which defines a child as “every human being below the age of 18 years
unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”.
The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflict - to which the UK is a party - requires States Parties to “take
all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who have
not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities”.
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The Lord’s Resistance Army: Uganda

Joseph Kony started abducting children to fill the ranks of his army after his rebellion
(that originally claimed to be seeking liberation for the northern region of Uganda) lost
regional support. The Lord’s Resistance Army has both militaristic and spiritual elements,
and Kony commands the group with cult-like beliefs – the most important being his
absolute authority. Abducted girls are repeatedly raped as ‘wives’ of Lord’s Resistance
Army officers and the boys are forced to become brutal soldiers. Kony inducts these
children by making them witness and perpetrate terrible acts, such as murdering family
members. This is one of the tactics he uses to convince his captives that there is nothing
for them to return home to.
Invisible Children: http://invisiblechildren.com/our-story/
10B-09. Impact. Children employed or used by armed groups will have an array of experiences.
Some become desensitised to violence – often at a very formative time in their
development which can psychologically damage them for life. This experience may
make them more likely to commit violent acts themselves and can contribute to their
break with society. The association of children with armed forces and groups can
lead to:
a. Deterioration in their physical and mental health.
b. Reduced opportunities for education and social development.
c. Poor relationships with families and communities.
d. A reduction in their physical safety and the risk of reprisals and re-recruitment.
10B-10. Even when child soldiers are set free or escape, many cannot go back home to
their families and communities because they have been ostracised by them. They
may have been forced to kill a family member or neighbour to prevent them from
returning to their homes. Many girls have babies from their time spent with non-
state armed groups and their communities do not accept them home. Most have
missed out on school – sometimes for many years. Without an education, they have
few prospects and sometimes return to their armed groups as they have simply no
other way of feeding themselves. The challenge for civil society is to channel the
energy, ideas and experience of demobilised child soldiers into contributing in positive
ways to the creation of their new, post-conflict society. This task is nothing new
with the Second World War providing many examples of the use of child soldiers.
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Polish Resistance boy soldiers from the “Radosław Regiment” taking part in the Warsaw Uprising, 2 Sep 1944. Jerzy
Tomaszewski (1979) Epizody Powstania Warszawskiego, Warsaw: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza.
10B-11. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. Effective child-sensitive and

specific DDR is vital to long-term stability and is usually part of a national programme
that is led by the host government, with support from international donors, the UN
and NGOs. UNICEF and the relevant host nation ministry usually takes charge of the
aspect of DDR programmes that relates to child combatants, with support from child
protection NGOs such as Save the Children and the International Rescue Committee.
Land forces may be directed to assist in the disarmament and demobilisation stages of
the programme.
10B-12. UN Security Council Resolutions. There have been 10 resolutions relating to children
and armed conflict:
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UNSCR Date Overview
Condemned the targeting of children in armed conflict and the recruitment of child
soldiers in violation of international law. This included the “Worst Forms of Child
1261 1999 Labour Convention” and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which
prohibits forced conscription of children under the age of fifteen in armed forces or the
participation in war crimes.
Expressed concern at the impact of conflict upon children and the use of child soldiers.
Expressed willingness to consider more targeted measures to protect children during and
1314 2000 after conflict. Called for provisions to protect children including during the demobilisation,
disarmament, reintegration of child soldiers and inclusion of child protection advisors in
operations.
1998 2001 Declared schools and hospitals off limits for both armed groups and military activities.
Considered provisions to protect children during peacekeeping operations and requested

1379 2001
the Secretary General to identify parties to conflict that used or recruited child soldiers.
Called for the immediate end to the use of child soldiers and endorsed an “era of
1460 2003 application” of international norms and standards for the protection of war-affected
children.
Condemned the use and recruitment of child soldiers, the killing and maiming of
children, rape, sexual violence, abduction, forced displacement, denial of humanitarian
1539 2004
access, attacks against schools and hospitals, child trafficking, forced labour and slavery.
Implemented monitoring schemes.
Established a mechanism to monitor and report on the most serious violations that
are committed against children in conflict. This mechanism, referred to as the 1612
1612 2005
Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism, reports on six grave violations which ultimately can
result in sanctions.
Directed that parties to armed conflict engaging in patterns of killing and maiming of
1882 2009 children and/or rape and other sexual violence against children should be ‘named and
shamed’.
Declared the readiness of the UN to impose sanctions on armed groups persistently

2068 2012
violating the human rights of children.
Called for children’s continued access to health care, condemns attacks on health facilities
2143 2014
and health workers and affirms children’s right to access services.
2225 2015 Called for increased monitoring of the abduction of children in conflict.
Resolution on youth, peace and security recognising the contribution of youth in the
2250 2015 prevention and resolution of conflicts. Warned against the rise of radicalisation to violence
and violent extremism amongst youth.
Table 10B-1. Resolutions relating to children in conflict
Schools in Conflict
10B-13. Opening. Schools and other educational establishments must be permitted
to continue their ordinary activities. Any occupying power must, with the
cooperation of the national and local education authorities, facilitate the proper
working of schools and other institutions devoted to the care and education of
children. In certain circumstances an occupying power may be within its rights
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in temporarily closing educational institutions, but only when there are very
strong reasons for doing so, these reasons are made public, and there is a serious
prospect that the closure will achieve important and worthwhile results.
10B-14. Targeting. There is no definition of civilian objects within the Law of Armed Conflict
nor is the term used in the treaties dealing with internal armed conflicts, but the
principles of military necessity and humanity require attacks to be limited to military
objectives. Thus, attacks on schools are prohibited unless they are being used by
the enemy for military purposes. If an attack is deemed necessary, all feasible means
must be taken to minimise injury to civilians and damage of civilian property.
Tactical Responses
10B-15. The role of land forces in safeguarding children will be dependent on the nature of the
mission and the type of operation being conducted. Beyond the demands of the Law of
Armed Conflict, commanders may be required to support the work of child protection
agents operating within their area of operations by means of the stability activities.
10B-16. UN Country Task Force (CTF). Where the UN is present, mechanisms to monitor and
report on grave violations will be established via the CTF on Monitoring and Reporting.
This body is generally co-chaired by UNICEF and the senior UN representative in-country
but will receive input from others including IOs and NGOs. The CTF also has established
protocols for verification of information, ensuring confidentiality and security of victims/
witnesses and information.
UN Monitoring and reporting mechanism: Child protection
Security Council
Secretary General
Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict
Head of Mission
CTF
Civilian Components
Military and Police (Child Protection Advisors),
UNICEF, UN Partners, UN County Team
EYES AND EARS ON THE GROUND
Figure 10B-1. UN monitoring and reporting mechanism for child protection (UN Child Protection Manual)
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10B-17. Child Protection Advisors (CPAs). Child Protection Advisors are specialist staff sent
to UN missions to help fulfil the child protection mandate. Their work includes:
a. Ensuring that child protection is integrated into the mission.
b. Training newly-deployed peacekeepers on child protection.
c. Monitoring and reporting the most serious violations against children to UN HQ.
10B-18. Land forces can be crucial in identifying grave violations against children to child
protection staff, helping to identify and release children from armed groups.
For land forces to respond correctly, education and training must include:
a. Briefing on the details of child protection actors within the mission.
b. Briefing on SOPs for monitoring and reporting of grave violations against

children.122
c. How to identify vulnerable children and gather information on the recruitment of

child soldiers and abuse of children.
d. How to report sightings of child soldiers.
e. How to treat detained child soldiers (see JDP 1-10 Captured Persons).
f. ROE relating to child soldiers.
10B-19. Occasionally, child protection advisors will be told that partner nation military units are
holding child soldiers from rival factions. Land forces may be asked to work with them
to secure the freedom of these children from the partner nation who may be using
the children as servants or worse. Using the Force Commander to speak with a partner
nation military commander sends a strong message to that military and may deter them
from holding children in future.
10B-20. Responding to Child Soldiers. The use of child soldiers puts professional forces at a
disadvantage. Not only is it demoralising to fight and kill children, the shock of having
to do so can increase reaction times. Commanders should consider the following when
issuing direction to their subordinates:
a. External Perceptions. The killing and wounding of child soldiers is likely to be

perceived differently to the killing and wounding of adults and could be used in
propaganda against land forces. This is a key consideration for commanders at
all levels. Actions could be perceived as excessive, and could bring into question
consent from home, irrespective of the freedoms to tackle threats as expressed
within the Law of Armed Conflict. There could also be scrutiny by government,
parliament and the media after the event. The possibility of combat with child
soldiers must be anticipated and guidance given to the force.
b. Child Behaviour. The immaturity of child soldiers may result in a reduced

understanding of the consequences of their actions. Human Rights Watch, an
NGO, identifies the following characteristics of child soldiers which may make them
behave differently to adult soldiers:
122 Note that UNICEF has created templates for this based on the direction given in UN Security Council Resolution 1612.
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“Because children are often physically vulnerable, easily intimidated, and

susceptible to psychological manipulation, they typically make obedient soldiers.
As part of their training for violence, child recruits are often subject to gruelling
physical tasks as well as ideological indoctrination. Children accused of the slightest
infractions may be subject to extreme physical punishments including beating,
whipping, caning, and being chained or tied up with rope for days at a time. In
some conflicts, commanders supply child soldiers with marijuana and opiates to
make them “brave” and lessen their fear of combat. Furthermore, commanders may
initiate child recruits by forcing them to witness or commit abuses and killings in
order to desensitize them to violence.” 123
10B-21. Reaction to Child Soldiers. The following actions should be considered where child
soldiers are encountered:
a. Response to Threat. Commanders should ensure that theatre-specific ROE are

understood by their subordinates allowing rapid and decisive action to be taken.
b. Post Incident Report. The killing or wounding of child soldiers is likely to draw
the attention of many audiences, including the media. All personnel involved in
incidents must record the details of the incident at the earliest opportunity using
the Post Incident Report format. Regardless of the legality of the act, the killing of
child soldiers can be used to undermine campaign authority. Personnel involved
in incidents must report them quickly so that land forces can be “first with the
accurate facts and message”. This will avoid the local population being subject to
misleading propaganda by armed groups operating in the area.
c. Trauma Risk Management (TRIM). Commanders should ensure that all personnel
involved in incidents concerning child soldiers receive adequate support through
TRIM.124
10B-22. Captured Persons. For each operation, the MOD will establish a policy for handling
juveniles, which will conform with human rights law and the humanitarian principles
of the Geneva Conventions. In the first instance, commanders should seek advice
from the Force Provost Marshal and force legal advisors on managing juveniles and
children and should refer to JDP 1-10: Captured Persons. The Force Provost Marshal
should seek assistance from and engage with the International Committee of the
Red Cross. Medical staff, padres and potentially some appropriate NGOs could also
provide advice and assistance if appropriate in the circumstances. Medical support
can be especially helpful in efforts to ascertain the age of captured persons.
10B-23. Captured Juveniles. For this publication, captured juveniles are defined as captured
persons aged 15, 16 or 17. The following guidance reflects the basic legal position
regarding the treatment of juveniles:
a. Captured persons who are, or are judged to be, juveniles shall be processed through
the same administrative and induction arrangements as adult captured persons.
Where possible, juveniles will be separated from other captured persons during these
processes.
123 See https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/04/16/coercion-and-intimidation-child-soldiers-participate-violence.

124 For further guidance see Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative (2014), Child Soldiers: A Handbook for Security Sector Actors.
Halifax, Canada: Dalhousie University.
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b. Juveniles should be accommodated separately from all adult and child captured
persons except where they are part of a family group. Male and female juveniles
shall be accommodated separately. Juveniles could suffer from isolation and
therefore careful consideration should be given for them to associate with adult
captured persons at certain times, for example, communal prayer time, exercise and
feeding. Such association must always be planned and supervised closely.
c. The International Committee of the Red Cross will assist with repatriating juvenile
prisoners of war and early liaison is essential. All other juvenile captured persons
can be held by land forces. They can also be transferred to the partner nation
authorities or to another nation’s authorities, but such transfers will be governed by
MOD policy and human rights considerations.
d. Initial questioning of juveniles can be carried out to establish the identity and age of
the individual. Subsequent tactical questioning and interrogation of juveniles is not
prohibited in law; however, MOD will issue operation-specific guidance on whether
this is permitted as a matter of policy. Such policy will have due regard to the
juvenile’s age, any special condition and vulnerability, as well as the military benefit
to be derived.
10B-24. Captured Children. For this publication, captured children are defined as all captured
persons under the age of 15. The following guidance reflects the legal position for the
treatment of children:
a. Children should not be held in captivity unless captured to prevent imminent danger
to our Armed Forces. If they are detained, this should be for the shortest possible
period. Children must be housed in separate quarters from adults and juveniles,
unless they are part of a family group. In certain circumstances those under the age
of 15 may be removed from a location to be protected from danger.
b. Children must be guarded by a minimum of two UK personnel specially selected for

this task. One of them (at least), where possible, should be of the same sex as the
captured children.
c. Children are not to be tactically questioned or interrogated. The International

Committee of the Red Cross can assist in gaining neutral information.
d. For each operation, the MOD will issue specific guidance regarding transferring or
releasing children who have been captured.
10B-25. There may be instances where captured persons do not know, are unwilling to
reveal, or mislead land forces about their date of birth to avoid tactical questioning
or interrogation. It may be extremely difficult to ascertain the age of young captured
persons. Such a captured person will be considered to be a child until more detailed
checks can be made. Assessment of age will be made by, or on behalf of, the detention
authority, considering all relevant evidence, particularly medical and dental officers’
assessments. If an individual reasonably claims or is assessed to be less than 15 years of
age, they should be treated as a child.
10B-26. All officers responsible for captured persons facilities must pay particular care and
attention when holding juveniles, children or vulnerable people. They have an
obligation to care for them in a manner that takes account of their age and particular
needs. Juveniles and children are more vulnerable than adults and need to be protected
Contents
from violence or abuse, including to, and amongst, themselves. They are to be treated
with special respect and shall be protected from any form of assault. In addition, they
will be provided with the care and assistance they need whether due to their age or for
any other reason.
Proprty of buzzkenya.com/child-soldiers-uganda/ illustration purpose only

Contents
Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations | 10C-1
Annex C to Chapter 10
Human Trafficking
Introduction
10C-01. Human trafficking occurs within and between countries. Trafficking
may take place for a range of exploitative purposes and victimises women,
men, boys and girls. While land forces are unlikely to lead in disrupting
trafficking networks and supporting victims, they may be required to support
other agencies facing such tasks within their area of operations.
10C-02. Elements of Human Trafficking. Figure 10-C-1 below illustrates the

elements involved in human trafficking. The purpose of trafficking can be
varied including prostitution, slavery and organ removal. Trafficking can
occur through a variety of means ranging from deception to coercion and
is enabled by recruiters, drivers and agents who harbour people.
ACT MEANS PURPOSE

• Recruitment • Threat or use of force • Prostitution
• Transport • Coercion • Sexual exploitation
• Transfer • Abduction • Forced labour
• Harbouring • Fraud • Slavery
+ + = TRAFFICKING
• Receipt of persons • Deception • Removal of organs
• Abuse of power or • Other types of
vulnerability exploitation
• Giving payments or
benefits
Figure 10C-1. Elements in human trafficking
10C-03. UN Response to Human Trafficking. The adoption in 2000 by the UN General

Assembly of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children marked a milestone in international efforts to stop the
trade in people. As the guardian of the Protocol, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) addresses human trafficking issues through its Global Programme against
Trafficking in Persons. Most states have ratified the Protocol but translating it into
reality remains problematic. Few criminals are convicted and most victims are probably
never identified or assisted.
10C-04. UN Departments Seeking to Prevent and Combat Trafficking. UNODC has issued
various strategies to address trafficking including the Thematic Programme Against
Transnational Organized Crime and Illicit Trafficking (2011-2013). Interagency-
Contents
10C-2 | Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations
Coordination Group Against Trafficking, aims to improve coordination and cooperation

between UN agencies and other IOs to facilitate a holistic approach to prevent and
combat trafficking in persons, including protection of, and support for, victims of
trafficking. The International Organization for Migration, an intergovernmental
organisation, is also a major contributor to international efforts to reduce human
trafficking.
Definitions
10C-05. Trafficking in Persons. UNODC defines Trafficking in Persons as “…recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use
of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse
of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the
purpose of exploitation.”
10C-06. Exploitation. There is no universally agreed definition regarding the exploitation of

people. UNODC considers exploitation in the context of the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices like
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
Case study: Trafficking of a 16 year old Kosovar girl.
“I used to be a very good student in primary school but in secondary school

everything went upside down. We were having lots of problems, my father was
frustrated, we were in a very bad economic condition and my father didn’t let me
to go out with friends. He was beating me to death. I was ill-treated and this was
happening every single day. I couldn’t go to school as I had bruises all over my
body and my face. I was very much frustrated and I wanted to kill myself; I tried
and nearly died. Later, I decided to go away from home. I got to know a lot of
people. Then a friend accommodated us in a motel. We were out all the day, just
going back to overnight in the motel. I met so many people, a lot. I was going out
a lot, in coffee bars, with different people, whom I got to know through friends.
We were going and having fun with them in the bars. There are lots of young
girls working in these bars. They are from Moldova and Bulgaria; they were older
than us. I was nicely dressed as my boyfriends were buying me lots of clothes and
make-up. I fell in love with a boy, he was nice with me; we were together for a
short period. I was introduced to him through a friend and I thought that he loved
me too, but later I got to know from him and from another friend of mine that he
gave money to be with me. I was shocked; this made me feel very scared. I was so
scared to go back home and also so scared to continue such a life. But I decided
that whatever happens I will do anything just to stay in Kosovo and not to go out.”
UNICEF, Kosovo, Trafficking in Children, June 2004

Contents
Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations | 10C-3
Tactical Response
10C-07. Stability Activities. The role of land forces in disrupting trafficking networks
and supporting victims will vary per the mission and military activity. In most
cases, land forces will serve in a supporting role, enabling police primacy, assisting
IOs and NGOs by means of the stabilising actions. For example, when providing
security and control, land forces will gain an understanding of the movement of
people throughout the area of operations. At the same time, when engaging in
SSR and capacity building it may be possible to provide training to partner nation
forces on the impact of trafficking and exploitation. In this context, commanders
should ensure that effective liaison and reporting networks are established
with partner nation law enforcement agencies as well as NGOs and IOs.
10C-08. Legitimacy. As stated in Chapter 8, commanders must ensure that they, and their
soldiers, are beyond reproach in their personal conduct to maintain mission legitimacy.
This means considering out of bounds areas and the level of personal relationships
permitted within the area of operations. For example, strip clubs are out of bounds
to all British personnel serving with the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).
Part of the aim of these measures is to reduce the likelihood that British troops.
Contents
Contents
Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations | 10D-1
Annex D to Chapter 10:
Cultural Property Protection

Definition
10D-01. Cultural property is defined in Article 27 of the 1907 Hague Regulations as including
buildings dedicated to religion, art, science or charitable purposes and historic monuments.
Introduction
10D-02. Sites of cultural and historic importance are areas where inappropriate behaviour by
land forces can undermine campaign legitimacy and wider influence efforts. Enemy
forces may use such sites as firing points, bases or depots in the belief that they will
not be targeted. They may also use them to prompt inappropriate action by land
forces to provide opportunities for their own information activities. The dilemma
posed in such circumstances is the need to avoid alienation of the population,
and any perceived desecration of these sites, while confronting the enemy.
10D-03. Damage to cultural property may be detrimental to the cultural heritage of a nation
or even mankind and is often irreversible. Harm to cultural property will most likely
attract negative publicity to the operation, and may therefore give rise to tactical
problems or even result in conflict escalation. Damage to cultural property can thus
complicate the attainment of the ends of stability and thereby undermine mission
success. Conversely, if land forces demonstrate care for cultural property, they have
the potential to gain and maintain popular support. See Figure 10D-1 below.
Engaging in
protective activities
with local actors
Actively and visibly preventing

damage, theft, looting,
misappropriation
- Legal
+
Failure to prevent
looting, theft or
misappropriation
Inadvertent destruction
of cultural property
Appropriately justified
destruction of CP
Intentional destruction of due to military neccessity
Emotional
cultural property
-
Figure 10D-1. Cultural property in conflict in legal and emotional contexts (NATO)
Contents
10D-2 | Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations
10D-04. At the time of writing the UK is on the verge of signing up to the 1954 Hague
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.
While provision has been made for cultural property protection through The Law
of Armed Conflict historically, ratification will make commanders liable under law.
Exact guidelines will be issued in a doctrine note in late 2017. Land forces are also
likely to be supported by a designated unit of cultural property protection experts.
Objectives
10D-05. For the purpose of CPP, HQs at all levels should develop:
a. Measures for identifying and protecting cultural property in the Operations Process
from its early planning stage and throughout the operation.
b. Systems for identifying and protecting cultural property throughout operations.
c. Procedures for mitigating the risks and consequences of damage to cultural

property caused by accidents or lawful collateral damage, through public diplomacy
and information campaigns.
d. Contingency plans for urgent restitution if necessary.
Responsibilities
10D-06. As part of pre-deployment training land forces should receive appropriate training,
education and instructions to fulfil their CPP responsibilities under international law.
10D-07. In support of the commander, and in coordination with CIMIC staff and LEGADs, the
CPP officer should:
a. Provide or seek advice on CPP, including the applicability of and responsibility

under the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols (upon ratification of the
convention in 2017).
b. Ensure that CPP aspects are considered during the completion of the environmental
baseline study (EBS).
c. Obtain lists of cultural sites and repositories to be used in locating of camps,

installations, infrastructure, and preparation of areas for on-the-ground military
activity; post off-limit areas; avoid/minimise damage due to mission requirements.
d. Account for the mission capability to address local concerns about cultural property
and the impact the construction of bases and other installations and infrastructure
will have on the area.
10D-08. Understanding. It is essential that the location and reasons for significance of cultural
sites within an area of operations are understood. Sacred sites should be routinely
considered in the intelligence preparation of the environment process. As a guideline,
the following should be considered:
a. Location. In addition to the location of the site the importance of the area as a
whole should be understood.
Contents
b. Reason for Significance. There is a need to understand the unique aspects of

sites. For example, whether a site is significant at a local, national, or global level.
c. Behaviour. Rules and practices regulating entry and behaviour (for example
carrying weapons, using force and shedding blood are strictly prohibited within
a mosque).
d. The impact of desecration. Acts of desecration may be seen as a violation of

the sanctity of a site. This may prompt the use of force to defend it or to avenge
the desecration.
e. Calendar. There may be religious festivals, times of the month etc, which would
impact on military activity near the site (e.g. large numbers of pilgrims present or
auspicious dates).
10D-09. Consultation with Custodians of Cultural Property and Religious Leaders.

Custodians and religious leaders may not be willing collaborators with security forces
but they are likely to help with providing information that will avoid damage to sacred
sites. They should be consulted to gain a detailed understanding of the significance
of property and the implications of military operations in or around it. They will
understand rules of behaviour and may be able to determine acceptable compromises.
They will have an influence on public opinion and, if not consulted or involved, may
hamper the efforts of military forces.
10D-10. Conduct of Operations. The following guidelines may assist with planning
and conducting operations in and around cultural and historic sites:
a. Where possible, avoid significant religious festivals and time operations to avoid
unnecessary offence to religious sensitivities (prayer times, holy periods etc.).
b. Balance the anticipated gains of lethal operations against the wider effect on public
opinion.
c. Consider the use of partner nation security forces to enter sacred sites with foreign
troops providing external security.
d. Involve cultural custodians and local religious leaders as far as practicable. This
should include the application of the gender perspective to achieve a broad
understanding of cultural interests.
e. Consider cordon operations and negotiation to facilitate a peaceful solution when

the enemy is known to be in a culturally significant site.
f. Support all activity concerning cultural sites with a campaign to shape perceptions
prior to, during and after operations.
g. Conduct remedial action post-operation. Restoration work or some means of

compensation for damage may be required. In extremis, repair may become a
military responsibility. Information activities may also be required.
Contents
10D-4 | Army Field Manual I Tactics for Stability Operations
Military Infrastructure and Cultural Property125

10D-11. Military activities including the construction and management of military
camps and installations and other infrastructure have a propensity for
damaging cultural and historic resources in a number of ways, including:
a. Damage resulting from acts of hostility or use for military purposes, including
combat related collateral damage.
b. Damage caused by camp construction, expansion, and other construction activities,

including roads and infrastructure improvement.
c. Deliberate destruction, plundering and looting by civilians and combatants of sacred

structures, museums, archaeological sites, and other forms of cultural property.
d. Inadvertent damage resulting from military-supported projects like engagement

exercises, training activities, and/or CIMIC sponsored construction or infrastructure
improvements.
10D-12. Paying attention to and, when necessary, protecting cultural property provides an
opportunity for land forces to demonstrate respect for local customs and traditions.
10D-13. In sum, cultural property protection (CPP) is a mission requirement and involves
strategic to tactical level considerations.
10D-14. CPP is a cross-cutting activity during stability operations, involving functions with
expertise in environmental protection (EP), intelligence gathering and analysis, CIMIC,
Geospatial Imaging, LEGAD, combat support (targeting and fire support, engineers) and
combat service support.
Best Practice
10D-15. Environmental Baseline Study (EBS). For the purpose of identifying cultural property
during operations, the definition of cultural property in the 1954 Hague Convention
is applicable. As part of the operational planning, the best possible geo-spatial data
information should be sought regarding the presence of cultural property within the
proposed operational area.126
10D-16. Specialist support is required for detailed baseline characterisation of cultural property.
To ensure best practice, including compliance with international law, EP officers are to
coordinate on CPP-related activities with J9 CIMIC staff for verification and reporting.
To the greatest extent possible, information about cultural property should be collected
from partner nation experts and/or locals.
10D-17. The baseline characterisation of cultural property should include, but not necessarily be
limited to, the following considerations:
a. Is the camp/installation/infrastructure located in an area which is known for cultural

property? Do operational maps identify cultural property in the designated area?
b. In addition to clearly visible cultural property – included but not limited to places
of worship, like churches, mosques, cemeteries, and burial grounds; collections of
cultural property, such as museums; ancient buildings and structures; memorials and
sites of trauma – the baseline characterisation needs to also consider indications of
125 Adapted from NATO doctrine: Allied Joint Environmental Protection Publication - 2 (AJEPP-2).
126 Formation geographic cells can obtain data from the Defence Geographic Centre.
Contents
less visible cultural property, such as archaeological sites, ancient infrastructure, and
underground features.
Damage to Babylon during Operation TELIC

Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Coalition established Camp Alpha on the
site of the Hanging Gardens of Babylon. This involved the bulldozing of hilltops and the
destruction of fragile paving. Barriers and embankments were built to protect the base,
pulverizing ancient pottery and bricks that were engraved with cuneiform characters.
Trenches were dug to store fuel tanks for helicopters, which landed near an ancient
theatre. Among the structures that suffered the most damage were the Ishtar Gate and
a processional thoroughfare. Press reporting from the time suggested that this greatly
reduced the standing of the Coalition among locals.
The deliberately destroyed Temple of Bel at the UNESCO World Heritage Site of Palmyra in Syria
Contents
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What are some of the considerations for cultural property protection during stability operations?

What are some of the considerations for cultural property protection during stability operations?

What is an environmental baseline study and why is it important?

What is an environmental baseline study and why is it important?

Contents

Page 2 Page 3 Page 4

Army Field Manual

TE SUPTIAL ENTI NTER

R-I PO RES AL -TE

UR O RAT VIC ORI

Land Warfare Development Centre AC 72063

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS & Conditions of Release

Commander Field Army

AFM Warfighting AFM Tactics for Stability

Part 1 - Corps Part 1 - Counter Irregular Activity

Stability Tactics Handbook (TTPs)

Warfare Branch, HQ Field Army

Chapter 3 examines the UK military approach to stability operations.

Chapter 4 summarises the relationship between combat and stability operations.

Part B describes the fundamentals of land doctrine for stability operations.

Chapter 5 covers the ten principles of stability operations.

Chapter 9 provides a detailed description of the stability activities.

Peace Support NEO Counter Insurgency CIMIC

Stability Operations Doctrine Hierarchy iv

PART A - Stability Operations: Context

Chapter 1 - Delivering Stability 1-1

Political Settlement 1-7

Chapter 2 - The Government Approach 2-1

Chapter 3 - The UK Military Approach 3-1

Chapter 4 - Combat and Stability Operations 4-1

pART B - Fundamentals of Stability Operations

Chapter 5 - Principles of Stability Operations 5-1

Chapter 6 - Operations Themes and Stability 6-1

ANNEX A - The Land Contribution to Defence Engagement 6A-1

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A - Supporting the Prosperity Agenda:

Chapter 7 - Types of Stability Operations 7-1

Chapter 8 - The Operating Environment 8-1

Chapter 9 - Stability Activities 9-1

ANNEX A - Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration 9A-1

Chapter 10 - Orchestrating and Executing Stability Operations 10-1

ANNEX A - Women, Peace and Security and Gender Mainstreaming 10A-1

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A - Reporting with a Gender Perspective 10A1-1

ANNEX B - Children and Armed Conflict 10B-1

ANNEX C - Human Trafficking 10C-1

ANNEX D - Cultural Property Protection 10D-1

General Richard Dannatt

Introduction Delivering Stability

Social & Governance

Figure 1-1. The stable state model (JDP 05)

3 Building Stability Overseas Strategy, dated 2011, page 5.

Human security is characterised by: Human security is threatened by:

The availability of essential commodities such

Broader environmental security* Environmental events

Protection of cultural values Poverty, inequality, criminality and injustice

Responsible, representative and transparent

Corrupt and inept governance

Table 1-1. Human security: characteristics and threats

Defining State and Non-state Actors9

Governance and the Rule of Law