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DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITY

VISAKHAPATNAM, A.P., INDIA

PROJECT ON: SITABHAI VS RAMACHANDRAN

SUBJECT: FAMILY

FACULTY: Mr. RADHA KRISHNA

By

Name: Revathi

Semester/Roll No.:18LLB093
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

We wish to express our sincere gratitude to our Mr. Radha Krishna for not only providing us
with an opportunity to do this project but also for providing her indispensable guidance and
support in conducting a detailed study on this topic.

We are also grateful towards everyone who has helped, in one way or the other, to complete
the project. A lot of effort has been put into this study to make it as factually error free as
possible and we thank everyone for ensuring the same.

We also thank our parents for their kind cooperation and encouragement without which this
project would not have been possible.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract

Objectives & Scope of the Study

Significance of the Study

Research Methodology
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OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY:: The main objective of the study is to gain
knowledge on the Hindu adoption and maintainance act of 1956.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY: The significance of the study is to look into the hindu
adoption and maintainance act of 1956 , to know whether an adopted son can get thge share
in the ancestor property.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: The researcher conducted a doctrinal method of research.

Researcher will have a look at the diverse unique works, files on the case Sitabai and ors vs
Rachandra.
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SYNOPSIS

COURT NAME: SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CASE NAME: Sitabai & Anr vs Ram Chandra on 20 August, 1969

Equivalent citations: 1970 AIR 343, 1970 SCR (2) 1

PETITIONER: SITABAI & ANR.

Vs.

RESPONDENT : RAM CHANDRA

DATE OF JUDGMENT:
20/08/1969

BENCH:
RAMASWAMI, V.
BENCH:
RAMASWAMI, V.
SHAH, J.C. (CJ)
GROVER, A.N.
CITATION:
1970 AIR 343 , 1970 SCR (2)
1969 SCC (2) 544
CITATOR INFO :
R 1985 SC 716 (7)
R 1988 SC 845 (7)
ACTS:
Hindu Law-Joint family properties in the hands of sole surviving coparcener-If properties
lose their character of joint family property
Hindu Adoption and Maintainance act (78 of 1956)
SECTION 5 to adoption by the widow of a joint family
SECTION 7 says about the adoption by male member of the joint family
SECTION 8 says about the adoption of the child by consent of all familyembers
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HEADNOTE: Civil Appeal No. 856 of 1966. Appeal by special leave from the judgment
and decree dated September 7, 1965 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench in
Second Appeal No. 275 of 1962. M.C. Chagla and A. K. Nag, for the appellants. K. A.
Chitale and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought by special leave from the judgment of the Madhya

Pradesh High Court dated September 7, 1965 in Second Appeal No. 275 of 1962.
FACTS:
Two brothers were in possession of ancestral properties consisting of a house and
tenancy rights of an ordinary tenant in agricultural lands. The elder brother died in 1930
leaving a widow, the first appellant.The first appellant continued to live with the younger
brother and had an illegitimate son by him, the respondent. In March 1958, she adopted
the second appellant, and some time later, the surviving brother died. After his putative
father died the respondent took possession of all the joint family properties. The two
appellants thereupon filed a suit for ejectment. The trial court decreed the suit. The first
appellate court found that a will executed by the respondents father (the younger brother)
was valid in so far as his half share in the house was concerned and therefore modified the
decree by granting a half-share of the house to the respondent. In second appeal, the High
Court held that the appellants were: not entitled to any relief and that there suit should be
dismissed, on the grounds that: (1) the joint family properties ceased to have that character in
the hands of the surviving brother when he became the sole surviving coparcener.
(2) The second appellant did not become, on his adoption, a coparcener with his uncle in the
joint family properties. In appeal to this Court.
QUESTION OF LAW:
1. Whether the High Court was right in holding that plaintiff no. 2 Suresh Chandra at
the time of his adoption by plaintiff no. 1 did not become a coparcener of Dulichand
in the joint family properties.
2. Whether Suresh Chandra, plaintiff no. 2, when he was adopted by Bhagirath's widow
became a coparcener of Dulichand in the Hindu joint family properties.

CASES REFFERED: Gowli Buddanna vs C.I.T Mysore

Ceylon vs A.R.Arunachalam Chattiyar (1957) A.C. 540
1. CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT: It is the admitted case of both the parties that the
properties consisted of agricultural land and a house jointly held by Bhagirath and
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Dulichand. After the death of Bhagirath, Dulichand became the sole surviving
coparcener of the joint family. At the time when plaintiff no. 2 Suresh Chandra was
adopted the joint family still continued to exist and the disputed properties retained their
character of coparcenary properties.

CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENT: The District Judge took the view that the will
executed by Dulichand was valid so far as half of his share in the house was concerned and,
therefore, defendant was entitled to claim half the share of the house in dispute
HELD:
LOWER COURT :The District Judge took the view that the will executed by Dulichand was
valid so far as half of his share in the house was concerned and, therefore, defendant was
entitled to claim half the share of the house in dispute.
HIGH COURT: Dssefendant was entitled to claim half the share of the house in dispute
Judgment and decree of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated September 7, 1965 in
Second Appeal no. 275 of 1962 should be set aside and the judgment and decree of the
Additional District Judge, Indore dated April 21, 1962 in First Appeal No. 26 of 1961 should
be restored.
SUPREME COURT: The Supreme Court has restored the decision heldby the high court.
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CASES ANALYSIS:
COURT: Supreme Court of India

CASE NAME : Smt. Sitabai And Anr. vs Ramchandra on 20 August, 1969

CITATION: AIR 1970 SC 343, (1969) 2 SCC 544, 1970 2 SCR 1

BENCH : J Shah, A Grover, V Ramaswami

HEAD NOTE: . This appeal is brought by special leave from the judgment of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court dated September 7, 1965 in Second Appeal No. 275 of 1962.

FACTS:

1. Dulichand and Bhagirath were brothers and the properties concerned are, according to
the written statement of the defendant himself, ancestral. Plaintiff Sitabai is the widow of
Bhagirath, who pre-deceased Dulichand, his elder brother sometime in 1930. It is the
admitted case of both the parties that after Bhagirath died, the plaintiff Sitabai was living
with Dulichand as a result of which connection an illegitimate child defendant
Ramchandra was born in 1935. Dulichand died on March 13, 1958. Sometime before his
death Sitabai adopted plaintiff no. 2 Suresh Chandra and an adoption deed was executed
on March 4, 1958. After the death of Dulichand Ramchandra took possession of the joint
family properties. The plaintiff therefore brought the present suit for ejectment of the
defendant Ramchandra, the illegitimate son of Dulichand from the disputed properties.
The suit was contested by the defendant on the ground that Dulichand had in his lifetime
surrendered the lands to the Jagirdar who made re-settlement of the same with the
defendant. As regards the house the contention of the defendant was that Dulichand had
executed a will before his death making a bequest of his house entirely to him. The trial
court decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and A granted the plaintiffs a decree
for possession with regard to the land and the house. The defendant took the matter in
appeal to the District Judge who modified the decree. The District Judge took the view
that the will executed by Dulichand was valid so far as half of his share in the house was
concerned and, therefore, defendant was entitled to claim half the share of the house in
dispute. The defendant preferred a second appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court
which reversed the decree of the lower courts and held that the plaintiff was not entitled
to any relief and the suit should be dismissed in its entirety. The High. Court held that
plaintiff no. 2 became the son of plaintiff no. 1 in 1958 from the date of adoption and did
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not obtain any coparcenary interest in the joint family properties. The High Court
thought that on the date of adoption Dulichand was the sole coparcener and there was
nobody else to take a share of his property and plaintiff no. 2 had no concern with the
coparcenary property in the hands of Dulichand.
2. The plaintiff therefore brought the present suit for ejectment of the defendant
Ramchandra, the illegitimate son of Dulichand from the disputed properties. The suit was
contested by the defendant on the ground that Dulichand had in his lifetime surrendered
the lands to the Jagirdar who made resettlement of the same with the defendant. As
regards the house the contention of the defendant was that Dulichand had executed a will
before his death making a bequest of his house entirely to him. The trial court decided all
the issues in favour of the plaintiff and granted the plaintiffs a decree for possession with
regard to the land and the house. The defendant took the matter in appeal to the District
Judge who modified the decree. The District Judge took the view that the will executed
by Dulichand was valid so far as half of his share in the house was concerned and,
therefore, defendant was entitled to claim half the share of the house in dispute. The
defendant preferred a second appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court which
reversed the decree of the lower courts and held that the plaintiff was not entitled to any
relief and the suit should be dismissed in its entirety. The High Court held that plaintiff
no. 2 became the son of plaintiff no. 1 in 1958 from the date of adoption and did not
obtain any coparcenary interest in the joint family properties. The High Court thought
that on the date of adoption Dulichand was the sole coparcener and there was nobody
else to take a share of his property and plaintiff no. 2 had no concern with the
coparcenary property in the hands of Dulichand.

ISSUES:

3. Whether the High Court was right in holding that plaintiff no. 2 Suresh Chandra at
the time of his adoption by plaintiff no. 1 did not become a coparcener of Dulichand
in the joint family properties.
4. Whether Suresh Chandra, plaintiff no. 2, when he was adopted by Bhagirath's widow
became a coparcener of Dulichand in the Hindu joint family properties.
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CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT:

2. It is the admitted case of both the parties that the properties consisted of agricultural land
and a house jointly held by Bhagirath and Dulichand. After the death of Bhagirath,
Dulichand became the sole surviving coparcener of the joint family. At the time when
plaintiff no. 2 Suresh Chandra was adopted the joint family still continued to exist and
the disputed properties retained their character of coparcenary properties.
3. Under the Hindu system of law a joint family may consist of a single male member and
widows of deceased male members and that the property of a joint family did not cease
to belong to a joint family merely because the family is represented by a single
coparcener who possesses rights which an absolute owner of property may possess.
4. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was in error in holding that
the necessary consequence of a widow adopting a son under the provisions of Act 78 of
1956 was that the adopted would be the adopted son of the widow and not of her
deceased husband. In our view the argument put forward on behalf of the appellant is
well-founded and must be accepted as correct.

CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENTS:

1. The District Judge took the view that the will executed by Dulichand was valid so far
as half of his share in the house was concerned and, therefore, defendant was entitled
to claim half the share of the house in dispute. The defendant preferred a second
appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court which reversed the decree of the lower
courts and held that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief and the suit should be
dismissed in its entirety. The High Court held that plaintiff no. 2 became the son of
plaintiff no. 1 in 1958 from the date of adoption and did not obtain any coparcenary
interest in the joint family properties. The High Court thought that on the date of
adoption Dulichand was the sole coparcener and there was nobody else to take a share
of his property and plaintiff no. 2 had no concern with the coparcenary property in the
hands of Dulichand.
2. It is contended on behalf of the respondent that the rights of the Inamdar's tenants
were not heritable under the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950
(Act no. 66 of 1950) and therefore the plaintiffs could not claim to become the
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Inamdar's tenants after the death of Dulichand in the absence of a contract between
the Inamdar and themselves

ACTS REFFERED:

HINDU ADOPTION AND MAINTAINENCE ACT 1956:

SECTIONS REFFERED:

 Section 5(1) of Act 78 of 1956 states:

"(1) No. adoption shall be made after the commencement of this Act by or to a Hindu except
in accordance with the provisions contained in this chapter " Section 6 deals with the
requisites of a valid adoption and provides:

"No adoption shall be valid unless--

(i) the person adopting has the capacity, and also the right, to take in adoption.

(ii) the person giving in adoption has the capacity to do so;

(iii) the person adopted is capable of being taken in adoption; and

(iv) the adoption is made in compliance with the other conditions mentioned in this Chapter."

Sections 7 and 8 relate to the capacity of a male Hindu and a female Hindu to take in
adoption Under s. 7 any male Hindu who is of sound mind and is not a minor has the capacity
to take a son or a daughter in adoption. If he is married, requires the consent of his wife in
connection with the adoption. A person having more than one wife is required to have the
consent of all his wives. Under s. 8 any female Hindu, who is of sound mind and not a minor
is stated to have capacity to take a son or a daughter in adoption. The language of this section
shows that all females except a wife have capacity to adopt a son or a daughter Thus,, an
unmarried female or a divorcee or a widow has the legal capacity to take a son or a daughter
in adoption. Section 11 relates to "other conditions for a valid adoption".

Clause (vi) of s. 11 states:

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"(vi) the child to be adopted must be actually given and taken in adoption by the parents or
guardian concerned or under their authority with intent to transfer the child from the family
of its birth to the family of its adoption."

Section 12 enacts:

"An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for
all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the
child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those
created by the adoption in the adoptive family; Provided that--the adopted child shall not
divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption."

Section 14 provides:

"(1) Where a Hindu who has a wife living adopts a child, she shall be deemed to be the
adoptive mother.

(2) Where an adoption has been made with the consent of more than one wife', the senior-
most in marriage among them shall be deemed to be the adoptive mother and the others to be
step-mothers.

(3) Where a widower or a bachelor adopts a child any wife whom he subsequently marries
shall be deemed to be the step-mother of the adopted child.

(4) Where a widow or an unmarried woman adopts a child, any husband whom she marries
subsequently shall be deemed to be the step-father of the adopted child."

It is clear on a reading of the main part of s. 12 and sub-s. (vi) of s. 11 that the effect of
adoption under the Act is that it brings about severance of all ties of the child given in
adoption in the family of his or her birth. The child altogether ceases to have any ties with the
family of his birth. Correspondingly, these very ties are automatically replaced by those
created by the adoption in the adoptive family. The legal effect of giving the child in adoption
must therefore be to transfer the child from the family of its birth to the family of its
adoption. The result is, as mentioned in s. 14(1) namely where a wife is living, adoption by
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the husband results in the adoption of the child by both these spouses; the child is not only the
child of the adoptive father but also of the adoptive mother. In case of there lying two wives,
the child becomes the adoptive child of the senior-most wife in marriage, the junior wife
becoming the step-mother of the adopted child. Even when a widower or a bachelor adopts a
child, and he gets married subsequent to the adoption, his wife becomes the step-mother of
the adopted child. When a widow or an unmarried woman adopts a child, any husband she
marries subsequent to adoption becomes the step-father of the adopted child. The scheme
of ss. 11 and 12, therefore, is that in the case of adoption by a widow' the adopted child
becomes absorbed in the adoptive family to which the widow belonged. In other words the
child adopted is tied with the relationship of sonship with the deceased husband of the
widow. The other collateral relations of the husband would be connected with the child
through that deceased husband of the widow. For instance, the husband's brother would
necessarily be the uncle of the adopted child. The daughter of the adoptive mother (and
father) would necessarily be the sister of the adopted son, and in this way, the adopted son
would become a member of the widow's family, with the ties of relationship with the
deceased husband of the widow as his adoptive father. It is true that s. 14 of the Act does not
expressly state that the child adopted by the widow becomes the adopted son of the husband
of the widow. But it is a necessary implication of ss. 12 and 14 of the Act that a son adopted
by the widow becomes a son not only of the widow but also of the deceased husband. It is for
this reason that we find in sub-s. (4) of s. 14 a provision that where a widow adopts a child
and subsequently marries a husband, the husband becomes the "step-father" of the adopted
child. The true effect and interpretation of ss. 11 and 12 of Act No. 78 of 1956 therefore is
that when either of the spouses adopts a child, all the ties of the child in the family of his or
her birth become completely severed and these are all replaced by those created by the
adoption in the adoptive family. In other words the result of adoption by either spouse is that
the adoptive child becomes the child of both the spouses. 
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CASES REFFERED:

When either of the spouses adopts a child, all the ties of the child in the family of his or her
birth become completely severed and these are all replaced by those created by the adoption
in the adoptive family. In other words the result of adoption by either spouse is that
the adoptive child becomes the child of both the spouses. This view is borne out by the
decision of the Bombay High Court in Arukushi Narayan v. Janabai Sama Sawat

Attorney General of Ceylon v.A.R. Arunachalam Chettiar(2) it is only by analysing (1) 60

I.T.R. 293 (S.C.). (2) [1957] A.C.

the nature of the rights of the members of the undivided family, both those in being and those
yet to be born, that it can be determined whether the family property can properly be
described as 'joint property' of the undivided family. In that case one Arunachalam Chettiar
and his son constituted a joint family governed by the Mitakshara school of Hindu law. The
father and son were domiciled in India and had trading and other interests in India, Ceylon
and Far Eastern countries. The undivided son died in 1934 and Arunachalam became the sole
surviving coparcener in the Hindu undivided family to which a number of female members
belonged. Arunachalam died in 1938, shortly after the Estate Ordinance no. 1 of 1938 came
into operation in Ceylon. By s. 73 of the Ordinance it was provided that property passing on
the death of a member of the Hindu undivided family was exempt from payment of estate
duty. On a claim to estate duty in respect of Arunachalam's estate in Ceylon, the Judicial
Committee held that Arunachalam was at his death a member of the Hindu undivided family,
the same undivided family of which his son, when alive, was a member and of which the
continuity was preserved after Arunachalam's death by adoption made by the widows of the
family and since the undivided family continued to persist, the property in the hands of
Arunachalam as a single coparcener was the property of the Hindu undivided family. The
Judicial Committee observed at p. 543 of the report.

Though it may be correct to speak of him as the 'owner', yet it is still correct to describe that
which he owns as the joint family property. For his ownership is such that upon the adoption
of a son it assumes a different quality; it is such, too, that female members of the family
(whose members may increase) have a right to maintenance out of it and in some
circumstances to a charge for maintenance upon it. And these are incidents which arise,
notwithstanding his so-called ownership, just because the property has been and has not
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ceased to be joint family property. Once again their Lordships quote from the judgment of
Gratiaen, J. To my mind it would make a mockery of the undivided family system if this
temporary reduction of the coparcenary unit to a single individual were to convert what was
previously joint property belonging to an undivided family into the separate property of the
surviving coparcener. To this it may be added that it would not appear reasonable to impart to
the legislature the intention to discriminate, so long as the family itself subsists, between
property in the hands of a single coparcener and that in the hands of two or more
coparceners."

The basis of the decision was that the property which was the joint family property of the
Hindu undivided family did not cease to be so because of the "temporary reduction of the
coparcenary unit to a single individual". The character of the property, viz. that it was the
joint property of a Hindu undivided family, remained the same.

JUDGEMENT:

1. TRAIL COURT:

The trial court decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and granted the plaintiffs a
decree for possession with regard to the land and the house. The defendant took the matter in
appeal to the District Judge who modified the decree. The District Judge took the view that
the will executed by Dulichand was valid so far as half of his share in the house was
concerned and, therefore, defendant was entitled to claim half the share of the house in
dispute.

2. HIGH COURT OF MAHARASTRA:

The defendant preferred a second appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court which
reversed the decree of the lower courts and held that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief
and the suit should be dismissed in its entirety. The District Judge took the view that the will
executed by Dulichand was valid so far as half of his share in the house was concerned and,
therefore, defendant was entitled to claim half the share of the house in dispute Judgment and
decree of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated September 7, 1965 in Second Appeal no.
275 of 1962 should be set aside and the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge,

indore dated April 21, 1962 in First Appeal No. 26 of 1961 should be restored. 
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