Title Seven

CRIMES COMMITTED BY
PUBLIC OFFICERS

Art. 2 0 3 . Who are public officers

- Requisites:
To be a public officer, one must be —
(1) Taking part in the performance of public functions in the
Government, or
Performing in said Government or in any of its branches
public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of
any rank or class; and
(2) That his authority to take part in the performance of public
functions or to perform public duties must be —
a. by direct provision of the law, or
b. by popular election, or
c. by appointment by competent authority.

- One appointed as laborer in the government is not a public officer

A mere emergency helper of the Bureau of Treasury on a daily wage
basis, without any appointment as janitor or messenger, is a public
officer
having been entrusted with the custody of official document

Art. 210. Direct bribery.

Acts punishable in direct bribery:
A public officer commits direct bribery —
1. By agreeing to perform, or by performing, in consideration of any offer,
promise, gift or present — an act constituting a crime, in connection
with the performance of his official duties.
2. By accepting a gift in consideration of the execution of an act which
does not constitute a crime, in connection with the performance of his
official duty.
3. By agreeing to refrain, or by refraining, from doing something which
it is his official duty to do, in consideration of gift or promise.

- Elements of direct bribery:

a. That the offender be a public officer within the scope of Art. 203.
b. That the offender accepts an offer or a promise or receives a gift or
present by himself or through another.
c. That such offer or promise be accepted, or gift or present received by
the public officer —
(1) with a view to committing some crime; or
(2) in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime, but the act must be unjust; or
(3) to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do.
d. That the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he
executes
be connected with the performance of his official duties.

- First element. — The offender is a public officer.

"Or any other persons performing public duties."
Does this phrase cover a private individual who, in consideration of a
sum of money given to him, released a person under arrest and
entrusted
to his custody? It is believed that it is not applicable, because the
additional
penalty of special temporary disqualification for bribery has no practical
application to a private person.

- Second element. — Gift is received personally or thru intermediary.

Gift is either (1) voluntarily offered by a private person, or (2)
 solicited by a public officer.

Bribery exists, not only (1) when the gift is offered voluntarily by a
private person, or (2) when the gift is solicited by a public officer and
the
private person voluntarily delivers it to the public officer, but also (3)
when
the gift is solicited by a public officer, as the consideration for his
refraining
from the performance of an official duty and the private person gives
the gift
for fear of the consequences which would result if the officer performs
his
functions.

- Gift or present need not be actually received by the public officer,as an

accepted offer or promise of gift is sufficient.

- The offer of gift or promise must be accepted by the public officer

- If the offer is not accepted by the public officer, only the person offering
the gift or present is criminally liable for attempted corruption of public
officer under Art. 212 in relation to Art. 6. The public officer is not liable.

- The act which the public officer agrees to perform must be connected
with the performance of official duties.

- Direct bribery under the 2nd par. of Art. 210 has the same elements
as those of direct bribery under the 1st par., but the act intended
by the public officer does not amount to a crime.
 Example
The treasurer who, in consideration of money or present, awards
certain stalls in the public market to a Chinaman, in spite of the
fact that there are Filipinos who have better rights. This act of the
treasurer is not a crime but it is unjust.

- In direct bribery under the 2nd paragraph, the mere promise to

give a gift and a mere promise to execute an act not constituting
a crime IS sufficient.

- Example of the third form of direct bribery.

A sanitary inspector who accepts a gift from the tenant of an unsanitary
building and in consideration thereof refrains from performing his duty
to
report its condition to his superiors, is guilty under the third paragraph
of Art. 210.

- Prevaricacion distinguished from bribery.

The third form of direct bribery (Art. 210) is committed by refraining
from doing something which pertains to the official duty of the officer.
Prevaricacion (Art. 208) is committed in the same way.
In this regard, the two felonies are similar.
But they differ in that in bribery, the offender refrained from doing
his official duty in consideration of a gift received or promised. This
element
is not necessary in the crime of prevaricacion.

Art. 211. Indirect bribery.

- Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer.
2. That he accepts gifts.
 3. That the said gifts are offered to him by reason of his office.

- Gift is usually given to the public officer in anticipation of future

favor from the public officer.

Example of indirect bribery.

A veterinarian of the Board of Health, entrusted with the duty of
examining mules which were offered for sale to the Government,
received
a certain amount of money from the vendor of mules after the latter had
received from the Government the purchase price of the mules sold.
There
was no evidence to the effect that the money was given for the purpose
of
preventing the veterinarian from doing or inducing him to do something
pertaining to his officer. (U.S. vs. Richards, 6 Phil. 545) He accepted the
gift
offered to him by reason of his office.

- "Who shall accept gifts offered to him."

Will there be indirect bribery, if a public officer accepts a promise of
gifts made to him by reason of his office?
Art. 211 does not use the word "promise," but the phrase "shall accept
Gifts

- There is no attempted or frustrated indirect bribery.

Indirect bribery has no attempted or frustrated stage of execution,
because it is committed by accepting gifts offered to the public officer
by
reason of his office. If he does not accept the gifts; he does not commit
the
 - Direct bribery distinguished from indirect bribery.
1. In both crimes, the public officer receives gift.
2. While in direct bribery there is an agreement between the public
officer and the giver of the gift or present, in indirect bribery, usually,
no such agreement exists.
3. In direct bribery, the offender agrees to perform or performs an act
or refrains from doing something, because of the gift or promise; in
indirect bribery, it is not necessary that the officer should do any
particular act or even promise to do an act, as it is enough that he
accepts gifts offered to him by reason of his office,
crime. If he accepts the gifts, it is consummated.

- Considered indirect bribery, even if there was a sort of an agreement

between public officer and giver of gift

- Receiving of gifts by public officials and employees, and giving of

gifts by private persons, on any occasion, including Christmas is
punishable.

A r t . 211 -A. Qualified Bribery(PANG PULIS NA KASO)

- Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer entrusted with LAW
ENFORCEMENT;
2. That the offender refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender
who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or
death;
3. That the offender refrains from arresting or prosecuting the offender
in consideration of any promise, gift or present.

Art. 212. Corruption of public officials.

- Elements:
 1. That the offender makes offers or promises or gives gifts or presents
to
a public officer.
2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents given to
a public officer, under circumstances that will make the public officer
liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.

- The offender in corruption of public officer is the giver of gift or

offeror of promise.

- Bribery is usually proved by evidence acquired in entrapment.

Title Eight
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS

(1) Parricide. (Art. 246)

(2) Murder. (Art. 248)
(3) Homicide. (Art. 249)
(4) Death caused in a tumultuous affray. (Art. 251)
(5) Physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray. (Art. 252)
(6) Giving assistance to suicide. (Art. 253)
(7) Discharge of firearms. (Art. 254)
(8) Infanticide. (Art. 255)
(9) Intentional abortion. (Art. 256)
(10) Unintentional abortion. (Art. 257)
(11) Abortion practiced by the woman herself or by her parents. (Art. 258)
(12) Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and dispensing of abortives. (Art. 259)
(13) Duel. (Art. 260)
(14) Challenging to a duel. (Art. 261)
(15) Mutilation. (Art. 262)
(16) Serious physical injuries. (Art. 263)
(17) Administering injurious substances or beverages. (Art. 264)
(18) Less serious physical injuries. (Art. 265)
(19) Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. (Art. 266)
(20) Rape. (Art. 266-A)

Chapter One
DESTRUCTION OF LIFE
SectionOne.—Parricide,murder,homicide

Art. 246. PARRICIDE

- Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.

- ELEMENTS:
1. That a person is killed.
2. That the deceased is killed by the accused.
3. That the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or
the legitimate spouse, of the accused.

- Essential element: RELATIONSHIP of the offender with the victim.

- The ascendants and descendants referred to in this article EXCLUDE parents

and children.

- The other ASCENDANT or DESCENDANT must be LEGITIMATE.

He who kills an illegitimate grandfather or an illegitimate grandson is not
guilty of parricide, but of simple HOMICIDE or MURDER as the case may be.
Example:
A is the NATURAL SON (out of wedlock; illegitimate) of B. C is the
legitimate father of B. A killed C. Is A guilty of parricide?
No, because C is an illegitimate grandfather of A. The crime
committed is only HOMICIDE.
- Born out of wedlock (Illegitimate): (a) adulterine, (b) incestuous, and (c)
sacrilegious children.

- The FATHER, MOTHER or CHILD may be LEGITIMATE or ILLEGITIMATE.

"Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate” as provided under Article 246.
If the deceased is either the father, mother or the child, of the accused,
PROOF OF LEGITIMACY IS NOT REQUIRED.

- The CHILD should NOT be LESS THAN THREE DAYS OLD.

If the child killed by his parent is less than three (3) days old, the crime is
INFANTICIDE. (Art. 255)

- Only RELATIVES BY BLOOD AND IN DIRECT LINE, except SPOUSE, are

considered in PARRICIDE.
Only relatives by blood may be legitimate or illegitimate. On the other
hand, the "ascendants or descendants" must be legitimate. They, too, must
be relatives by blood
Therefore, an ADOPTED FATHER OR ADOPTED SON, OR FATHER-IN-
LAW OR SON-IN-LAW is NOT INCLUDED in this provision for parricide.

- The SPOUSE must be LEGITIMATE.

Thus, when a Moro has three wives, and he killed his third wife, he cannot
be held liable for parricide. (People vs. Subano, 73 Phil. 692) His marriages
with his second and third wives are null and void.
In a case of parricide of spouse, the best proof of the relationship between
the accused and the deceased is the MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE. If,
however, the oral evidence presented to prove the fact of marriage is NOT
OBJECTED to, the said evidence may be considered by the court.

- Killing illegitimate spouse and illegitimate daughter.

 The accused killed the woman with whom he lived martially and their
daughter. It was held that there being NO CLEAR EVIDENCE OF
MARRIAGE between the accused and the woman, he was liable for
HOMICIDE only and for PARRICIDE for killing his DAUGHTER. (People vs.
Berang, 69 Phil. 83)

- Parricide through RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE.

The husband, who, while struggling for the possession of the gun with his
children, WITHOUT INTENT TO KILL anyone, pulled the trigger of the gun
which exploded and hit his wife who was approaching them, is guilty of
PARRICIDE THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE.
- Parricide by MISTAKE.
If a person wanted to kill a stranger but by mistake killed his own father,
will it be parricide? YES, but ART. 49 APPLIES as regards the proper penalty
to be imposed.
If a person killed another, not knowing that the latter was his son, will he
be guilty of parricide? YES, because the law DOES NOT REQUIRE
KNOWLEDGE of relationship between them.

- Liability of STRANGER cooperating in parricide.

A STRANGER who cooperates and takes part in the commission of the
crime of parricide, is NOT GUILTY OF PARRICIDE BUT ONLY HOMICIDE
OR MURDER, as the case may be. (People vs. Patricio, 46 Phil. 875; People
vs. Echaluce, 66 SCRA 2221)

ART. 247. DEATH OR PHYSICAL INJURIES INFLICTED UNDER EXCEPTIONAL

CIRCUMSTANCES.
- Any LEGALLY MARRIED person who,having sur
p r i s e d h i s s p o u s e i n t h e a c t o f c o m m i t t i ng sexua
l intercourse with another person,shall kill any
of t h e m o r b o t h o f t h e m i n t h e a c t o r i m m e d i a t e l
 y t h e r e a f t e r, o r s h a l l i n f l i c t u p o n t h e m a n y s e r i o
us physical injury, s h a ll suffer the penalty of
DESTIERRO.

If he shall INFLICT UPON THEM PHYSICAL IN

J U R I E S o f a ny o t h e r k i n d , h e s h a l l b e E X E M P T F
R OM P U N I S H M E N T .

T h e s e r u l e s shall be a p p l i c a b l e , u n d e r the same c i

rcumstances, to parents with respect to their dau
g h t e rs u n d e r e i g h t e e n y e a r s o f a g e , a n d t h e i r s e
d u c e r , w h i l e t he d a u g h t e r s a r e l i v i n g with theirp
arents.

Any p e r s o n w h o s h a l l p r o m o t e o r f a c i l i t a t e t h e
p r os t i t u t i o n of h i s w i f e or d a u g h t e r , or s h a l l o t h e r
w i s e h a ve c o n s e n t e d t o t h e i n f i d e l i t y o f t h e o t h e
r s p o u s e s h a l l n o t be e n t i t l e d t o t h e b e n e f i t s o f t
h i s a r t i c l e.

- REQUISITES for the application:

1. That a LEGALLY MARRIED PERSON OR A PARENT surprises his
spouse or his daughter, the latter under 18 years of age and living with him, in
the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person.

2. That he or she kills any or both, of them or inflicts upon any or both of them
any serious physical injury IN THE ACT OR IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER.

3. That he has NOT PROMOTED OR FACILITATED THE PROSTITUTION

OF HIS WIFE OR DAUGHTER, or that he or she has not consented to the
infidelity of the other spouse.
- Art. 247 DOES NOT DEFINE AND PENALIZE A FELONY.
This article DOES NOT DEFINE A FELONY, for if the killing of, or the
inflicting of the serious physical injuries on, the spouse and/or the paramour is
done under the circumstances mentioned in this article, the accused shall be
sentenced to DESTIERRO, instead of the severe penalty for parricide,
homicide, or serious physical injuries provided for in Arts. 246, 249, or 263.
(People vs. Araquel, 57 O.G. 6229)

The requisites of Art. 247 must be established by the EVIDENCE OF THE

DEFENSE, because the prosecution will have to charge the defendant with
parricide and/or homicide, in case death results; or serious physical injuries in
the other case.

Since Art. 247 DOES NOT CHARGE A DISTINCT CRIME, the accused
charged with killing his wife's paramour, CANNOT ENTER INTO A
CONDITIONAL PLEA OF GUILTY and be sentenced immediately to
destierro. The court must receive evidence on the circumstances surrounding
the killing. (People vs. Sabilul, 49 O.G. 2743)

- Must the parent be LEGITIMATE?

This article DOES NOT SEEM TO REQUIRE IT. It requires only: (1) THAT
THE DAUGHTER BE UNDER 18 YEARS OLD, and (2) THAT SHE IS
LIVING WITH HER PARENTS. If those circumstances concur and her parent
surprises her in the act of sexual intercourse with a man and kills or inflicts
serious physical injuries on her or both of them, ART. 247 APPLIES.

- Does NOT apply if the DAUGHTER IS MARRIED.

- Indispensable requisite: SURPRISING the SPOUSE or YOUNG DAUGHTER

IN THE ACT OF SEXUAL INTERCOURSE.
 Therefore, a husband who, upon arriving home one night and seeing a
man JUMP OUT OF THE WINDOW, killed his wife who was begging him to
pardon her, is GUILTY OF PARRICIDE and the penalty to be imposed is
reclusion perpetua to death, NOT DESTIERRO as prescribed in this article.
(People vs. Marquez, 53 Phil. 260)

BUT, it is enough that the circumstances show reasonably that the carnal
act is being committed or has just been committed.

- Does "sexual intercourse" include PREPARATORY ACTS?

The majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court in the case of People
vs. Gonzales, 69 Phil. 66, believed that THERE MUST BE ACTUAL SEXUAL
INTERCOURSE.

- The killing or inflicting of serious physical injuries must be: (1) IN THE ACT
OF SEXUAL INTERCOURSE; or (2) IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER.

U.S. vs. Alano

(32 Phil. 383-384)
FACTS: Accused Alano, feeling tired, went to bed, while his wife Teresa
Marcelo remained at the window looking out and a little while afterward told
her husband that she would go down for a moment to the Chinese store
nearby, which she did. As Teresa Marcelo was slow in returning and her sick
child was crying, Eufrasio Alano left the house to look for her in the Chinese
store situated on the corner of Calles Dakota and Tennessee, and, not finding
her there, went to look for her in another Chinese store nearby, with the same
result. He therefore started to return home through an alley where he tripped
on a wire lying across the way. He then observed as he stopped that among
some grass near a clump of thick bamboo, a man was lying upon a woman in
a position to hold sexual intercourse with her, but they both hurriedly arose
from the ground, startled by the noise made by the defendant in stumbling.
 Alano at once recognized the woman as his wife, for whom he was looking,
and the man as Martin Gonzales, who immediately started to run. He was
wearing an undershirt and a pair of drawers, which lower garment he held
and pulled up as he ran. Enraged by what he had seen, the defendant drew a
fan knife he had in his pocket and pursued Martin Gonzales, although he did
not succeed in overtaking him, and not knowing where he had fled, returned
to his house, where he found his wife Teresa in the act of climbing the stairs.
He then stabbed her several times. She died as a result of the stabbing by the
accused.

HELD: The unfaithful wife was not killed in the very place where she was
caught, for the reason that the wronged husband preferred first to attack the
despoiler of his honor and afterwards the adulterous wife who succeeded in
getting away from the place where she was caught with her paramour. The
assault upon the woman must be understood to be a continuation of the act of
the wronged husband's pursuit of her paramour, who had the good fortune to
escape and immediately get away from the place of the crime.
Consequently, although the deceased did not fall dead in the place where
she was caught, but in another place nearby, logically it must be understood
that the case at bar comes within the provisions of the said article. The
DISCOVERY, the ESCAPE, the PURSUIT and the KILLING MUST ALL
FORM PART OF ONE CONTINUOUS ACT. (U.S. vs. Vargas, et al., 2 Phil.
194)

- The KILLING of his spouse by the accused must be BY REASON OF

HAVING SURPRISED her in the act of sexual intercourse with another
person.

- When a husband caught a man having sexual intercourse with the former's
wife AGAINST HER WILL, as she was then shouting for help, an attack upon
that man by the husband may be a DEFENSE OF RELATIVE UNDER ART.
 11, PAR. 2, but not a case falling under Art. 247. (People vs. Ammalun, C.A.,
51 O.G. 6250)

NOTE: The wife was NOT committing adultery, as she was NOT
VOLUNTARILY HAVING SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITH THE MAN.

- If the physical injuries inflicted are LESS SERIOUS OR SLIGHT, there is NO

CRIMINAL LIABILITY. It is an ABSOLUTORY CAUSE. The second
paragraph of Art. 247 states that "IF HE SHALL INFLICT UPON THEM
PHYSICAL INJURIES OF ANY OTHER KIND, HE SHALL BE EXEMPT
FROM PUNISHMENT."
- Cases where person who committed parricide NOT TO BE PUNISHED WITH
RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH:
1. When parricide is committed through NEGLIGENCE. (ART. 365)
2. When it is committed by MISTAKE. (ART. 249)
3. When it is committed UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES. (ART.
247)

A R T . 2 4 8 . MURDER
- Any person who,not falling within the provision
s of A r t i c l e 246, s h a l l k i l l a n o t h e r if committed wit
h a n y o f t h e f o l l o w i n g a t t e n d a nt circumstances:

1 . With t r e a c h e r y , t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of s u p e r i or s t r e
ngth,with the aid of armed men,or employing me
ans to weaken the defense,or of means or pers
o n s t o i n s u r e or a f f o r d i m p u n i t y;

2 . In c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a P R I C E , R E W A R D , O R P R O
MISE;
 3 . By m e a n s of i n u n d a t i o n, fire, p o i s o n , e x p l o s i o n, s h
ipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or as
sault upon a railroad,fall of an airship, by mean
s o f m o t o r v e h i c l e s , or w i t h t h e u s e o f a n y o t h e r
m e a n s i n v o l v i n g g r e a t w a s t e a nd r u i n ;

4 . On o c c a s i o n o f a n y o f t h e c a l a m i t i e s e n u m e r a t
e d in t h e p r e c e d i n g p a r a g r a p h , o r o f a n e a r t h q u a
ke, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, e
p i d e m i c , o r o t h e r p u b l i c c a l a mi t y ;

5 . With e v i d e n t p r e m e d i t a t i o n;

6 . With c r u e l t y , by d e l i b e r a t e l y a n d i n h u m a n l y a u g
me n t i n g t h e s u f f e r i n g o f t h e v i c t i m , o r o u t r a g i n g
or s c o f f i ng at h i s p e r s o n or c o r p s e . (As amended by RA. No.
7659)

- Murder, DEFINED.
MURDER is the unlawful killing of any person which is NOT PARRICIDE
OR INFANTICIDE, provided that any of the following circumstances is
present:

1. With TREACHERY, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of

armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of mean or
persons to insure or afford impunity;

2. In consideration of a PRICE, REWARD OR PROMISE;

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a

vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means
 of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great
waste and ruin;

4. On occasion of any of the CALAMITIES enumerated in the preceding

paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone,
epidemic, or any other public calamity;

5. With EVIDENT PREMEDITATION;

6. With CRUELTY, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering

of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. (As
amended by R.A. No. 7659)

- ELEMENTS OF MURDER:
1. That a person was killed.

2. That the accused killed him.

3. That the KILLING was attended by any of the QUALIFYING

CIRCUMSTANCES MENTIONED IN ART. 248.

4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.

- In murder, the victim must be KILLED TO CONSUMMATE the crime. If the

victim is NOT killed, it is either ATTEMPTED or FRUSTRATED MURDER.

- BUT, killing a person with TREACHERY is murder EVEN IF THERE IS NO

INTENT TO KILL.
If the defendant had NOT COMMITTED THE ASSAULT IN A
TREACHEROUS MANNER, he would nevertheless have been guilty of
HOMICIDE, although he did not intend to kill the deceased; and since the
 defendant did COMMIT THE CRIME WITH TREACHERY, he is guilty of
MURDER, because of the voluntary presence of the qualifying circumstance
of treachery. (People vs. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 530) This ruling may be applicable
to all the other circumstances in pars. Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of Art. 248.

NOTE: The ruling is based on Art. 4, par. 1, of the Code.

- RULES for the application of the circumstances which QUALIFY THE

KILLING TO MURDER.
(a) That murder will EXIST WITH ONLY ONE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
DESCRIBED in Art. 248. (U.S. vs. Labai, 17 Phil. 240)
When MORE THAN ONE of said circumstances are present, the
OTHERS must be considered as GENERIC AGGRAVATING. Thus, when
in killing the victim, the commission of the crime is attended by: (1)
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION, (2) TREACHERY, and (3) PRICE,
REWARD or PROMISE, ONLY ONE of them shall qualify the killing to
murder and the other shall be considered as generic aggravating
circumstances. (See People vs. Dueno, 90 SCRA 23, where the rule was
applied.)

(b) That when the other circumstances are ABSORBED OR INCLUDED in

one qualifying circumstance, they CANNOT be considered as GENERIC
AGGRAVATING.

Thus, WHEN THERE WERE TEN OR MORE ARMED CAPTORS

of the female victim, and one or some of them shot her at the back, the
qualifying circumstance of murder is either treachery, abuse of superior
strength, or with the aid of armed men (People vs. Remalante, 92 Phil.
48); but if treachery is chosen to qualify the crime, the others are not
generic aggravating circumstances, because they are included in the
 qualifying circumstance of treachery. (People vs. Sespene, et al., 102 Phil.
199)

(c) That any of the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Art. 248 must be
ALLEGED in the information. (U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil. 369)

Thus, even if during the trial the prosecution proves that the accused
killed the deceased with treachery, but treachery is NOT alleged in the
information, treachery CANNOT qualify the killing to murder, the crime
charged being only homicide. It is only a generic aggravating
circumstance.

- The QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF MURDER, are among those

defined in ART. 14 (Aggravating Circumstances), EXCEPT "outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse,"
Except the last qualifying circumstance, that of "outraging or scoffing at his
person or corpse," those mentioned in the six paragraphs of Art. 248 are fully
discussed under Art. 14 which defines all aggravating circumstances in
general.

- With treachery/alevosia (BETRAYAL OF TRUST).

Treachery, whenever present and alleged in the information, qualifies the
killing of the victim and raises it to the category of murder. (People vs.
Limaco, 88 Phil. 35)

But TO CONSTITUTE TREACHERY, the MEANS, METHODS or FORMS

of attack must be CONSCIOUSLY ADOPTED by the offender. (People vs.
Tumaob, 83 Phil. 742)

- The KILLING OF A CHILD IS MURDER even if the manner of attack was

NOT shown. The qualifying circumstance of treachery or "alevosia" exists in
 the commission of the crime of murder when an ADULT PERSON
ILLEGALLY ATTACKS A CHILD OF TENDER YEARS and causes his
death. (People vs. Valerio, 112 SCRA 231)

- Taking advantage of SUPERIOR STRENGTH constitute MURDER.

- With the AID OF ARMED MEN constitute MURDER.

- Employing means TO WEAKEN THE DEFENSE (E.g: casts sand or dirt upon
the eyes of the victim and then kills him)

- Employing means or persons to insure or AFFORD IMPUNITY.

When means or persons are employed by the accused who killed the
deceased TO PREVENT HIS BEING RECOGNIZED, or to secure himself
against detection and punishment, he may be held liable for murder.
It seems that one who COVERED HIS FACE WITH HANDKERCHIEF
BEFORE KILLING his victim is liable for murder, because he employed
means to insure or afford impunity.

- In consideration of a PRICE, REWARD OR PROMISE.

The person who received the price or reward or who accepted a promise
of price or reward would not have killed the victim were it not for that price,
reward or promise. Such person is a PRINCIPAL BY DIRECT
PARTICIPATION. The one who gave the price or reward or who made the
promise is a PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION.
When this circumstance is alleged in the information for murder and
proved by the prosecution, BOTH ARE GUILTY OF MURDER. (U.S. vs.
Parro, 36 Phil. 923; U.S. vs. Alim, 38 Phil. 1)

- By means of FIRE, POISON, EXPLOSION, etc.

 When the Code declares that homicide committed by means of fire shall
be deemed to be murder, it is intended that there SHOULD BE AN ACTUAL
DESIGN TO KILL and that the use of fire should be purposely adopted as a
means to that end.

Thus, setting fire to an automobile in the basement of an inhabited house,

resulting in the burning of the house also and the killing of one of its inmates,
is NOT MURDER with respect to the death of the person, but ONLY
HOMICIDE. (U.S. vs. Burns, 41 Phil. 418)

- TREACHERY and EVIDENT PREMEDITATION are INHERENT in MURDER

by means of poison and, as such, they CANNOT be considered as
AGGRAVATING (Viada, 3 Cod. Pen. 29).

- With EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.

This circumstance is present and it qualifies the killing of a person to
murder, when the prosecution proves:
(1) the time when the offender determined (conceived) to kill his victim;

(2) an act of the offender manifestly indicating that he clung to his

determination to kill his victim; and

(3) sufficient lapse of time (at least three hours) between the determination
and the execution of the killing. (People vs. Leano, C.A., 36 O.G. 1120;
People vs. Causi, G.R. No. L-16498, June 29, 1963)

- With CRUELTY.
There is CRUELTY WHEN other injuries or wounds are INFLICTED
DELIBERATELY by the offender, which are not necessary for the killing of
the victim. The victim must be alive when the other injuries or wounds are
 inflicted. But there is no cruelty, when the offender in inflicting several other
wounds on the victim has only a decided purpose to kill him.

- OUTRAGING OR SCOFFING AT THE PERSON OR CORPSE OF THE

VICTIM.
A person is found dead with wounds in the back, neck and other parts of
the body. What is the crime committed?
Murder. This is either cruelty if the victim was still alive when other wounds
were inflicted or, otherwise, outraging or scoffing at his corpse. (People vs.
Lozada, G.R. No. L-47692, June 4, 1943)
The word "OUTRAGING" means to commit an extremely vicious or
deeply
insulting act.

The word "SCOFFING" means to jeer, and implies a showing of

irreverence.
Illustration of outraging at the corpse of the victim.
1. The act of an accused in HAVING ANAL INTERCOURSE with the
woman after killing her is an outrage at her corpse. (People vs. Butler,
120 SCRa 281)

2. Weighing the victims' bodies with a cement boulder and hub cap and
tying their wrists and ankles with nylon card and wire constitute an
outrage on their corpse. (People vs. Maguddatu, 124 SCRA 594)

3. The corpse was outraged when it was dismembered with the cutting off
of the head and limbs and the opening up of the body to remove them
intestines, lungs and liver. (People vs. Carmina, 193 SCRA 429)
 4. The mere decapitation of the victim's head constitutes outraging at the
corpse of the victim. (People vs. Whisenhunt, G.R. No. 123819, Nov.
14, 2001)

- Illustration of scoffing at the dead.

The killer scoffed at the dead when the intestines were removed and hung
around the neck of the victim's brother "as a necklace" and the lungs and liver
were facetiously described as "pulutan." (People vs. Carmina, supra)

ART. 2 4 9 . HOMICIDE
- Anypersonwho,notfallingwithintheprovis ionsofart
i c l e 2 4 6 , s h a l l k i l l a n o t h e r , w i t h o u t t he a t t e n d a n c e o f a
n y o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s e n u m e r a t e d i n t he next preceding
article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide

- HOMICIDE is the unlawful killing of any person, which is NEITHER parricide,

murder, nor infanticide.

- ELEMENTS:
(1) That a person was killed;

(2) That the accused killed him WITHOUT ANY JUSTIFYING

CIRCUMSTANCE;

(3) That the accused had the intention to kill, which is PRESUMED;

(4) That the killing was NOT ATTENDED BY ANY OF THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF MURDER, or by that of parricide or infanticide.
- In homicide, the victim MUST BE KILLED to consummate the crime. If the
victim is NOT KILLED, it is either ATTEMPTED or FRUSTRATED homicide.

- Intent to kill is CONCLUSIVELY PRESUMED when DEATH RESULTED.

When death resulted, EVEN IF THERE IS NO INTENT TO KILL, the
crime is HOMICIDE, not merely physical injuries, because with respect to
crimes of personal violence, the PENAL LAW LOOKS PARTICULARLY TO
THE MATERIAL RESULTS following the unlawful act and holds the
aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof. (U.S. vs. Gloria, 3
Phil. 333)

- In ATTEMPTED OR FRUSTRATED homicide, the offender MUST HAVE

THE INTENT TO KILL the victim. If there is NO INTENT TO KILL on the part
of the offender, he is liable for PHYSICAL INJURIES. (Arts. 263-266) only.

Usually, the INTENT TO KILL is shown by the KIND OF WEAPON USED by

the offender and the parts of the victim's body at which the weapon was
aimed, as shown by the wounds inflicted. Hence, when a deadly weapon, like
a bolo, is used to stab the victim in the latter's abdomen, the intent to kill can
be presumed.

EXCEPTION:
But if the accused went to his wife, who was living separately from him, to
entreat her to live with him again, but a cousin of his wife provoked him then
and there and caused him to assault him (wife's cousin) and her son by first
marriage, with a bolo, inflicting physical injuries, caused indiscriminately and
not deliberately, the purpose of the accused in going to the house, and not
the kind of weapon he carried nor the parts of the bodies of the victims on
which the wounds were inflicted, is INDICATIVE AND DETERMINATIVE OF
HIS INTENTION (hindi na man sya pumunta sa bahay ng asawa para
patayin sya. Gusto lang pauwiin sa bahay talaga nila. So, no criminal
 intent). The accused is liable only for physical injuries. (People vs. Penesa,
81 Phil. 398)

NOTE: The bolo which the accused carried with him is one ordinarily used by
farm laborers and the accused was such a farm laborer.

- If the accused killed the deceased in SELF-DEFENSE, DEFENSE OF A

RELATIVE, DEFENSE OF A STRANGER, or UNDER ANY OF THE OTHER
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES (Art. 11), the accused is NOT LIABLE FOR
HOMICIDE or any other crime.

- NO offense of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE THROUGH IMPRUDENCE.

The accused pharmacist compounded and prepared the medicine on
prescription by a doctor. The accused erroneously used a highly poisonous
substance. When taken by the patient, the latter nearly died. The accused
was charged with frustrated homicide thru reckless imprudence.

HELD: It is ERROR to convict the accused of frustrated homicide through

reckless imprudence. He is guilty of PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE. The element of intent to kill in frustrated
homicide is incompatible with negligence or imprudence. Intent in felonies by
means of dolo is replaced with lack of foresight or skill in felonies by culpa.
(People vs. Castillo, et al., 76 Phil. 72)

- Use of UNLICENSED FIREARM is an AGGRAVATING circumstance in

homicide.
Where murder or homicide results from the use of an unlicensed firearm,
the crime is NO LONGER QUALIFIED ILLEGAL POSSESSION, but murder
or homicide, as the case may be. In such a case, THE USE OF THE
UNLICENSED FIREARM IS NOT CONSIDERED AS A SEPARATE CRIME
BUT SHALL BE APPRECIATED AS A MERE AGGRAVATING
 CIRCUMSTANCE. In view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act
8294 to Presidential Decree No. 1866, separate prosecutions for homicide
and illegal possession are no longer in order. Instead, illegal possession of
firearms is merely to be taken as an aggravating circumstance in the
homicide case. (People vs. Avecilla, G.R. No. 117033, Feb. 15, 2001)

- ACCIDENTAL HOMICIDE.
ACCIDENTAL HOMICIDE is the death of a person brought about by a
lawful act performed with proper care and skill, and WITHOUT HOMICIDAL
INTENT. Thus, in a boxing bout where the game is freely permitted by law or
local ordinance, and all the rules of the game have been observed, the
resulting death or injuries cannot be deemed felonious, since the playing of
the game is a lawful act.
But if the RULES HAVE BEEN VIOLATED, as a foul blow, and death
resulted, the crime would be HOMICIDE THROUGH NEGLIGENCE.
And if the FOUL BLOW IS INTENDED for the purpose of killing the
opponent, the crime of INTENTIONAL HOMICIDE is committed.

- CORPUS DELICTI
The actual commission of the crime charged.
The crime was ACTUALLY PERPETRATED, and DOES NOT REFER TO
THE BODY OF THE MURDERED PERSON. In all crimes against persons in
which the death of the victim is an element of the offense, there must be
satisfactory evidence of (1) THE FACT OF DEATH and (2) the IDENTITY OF
THE VICTIM.
Thus, when the body of the supposed victim who was unknown, could not
be located on the bank of the river, the place indicated by the witness, and
there was a possibility that the victim might have been borne away by the
current and might have survived, the fact of death is not sufficiently
established.
 But if the victim is known and could not have survived, because the
evidence shows that his arms and legs had been tied with a rope and
thereafter he had been stuck on the head with a piece of wood, before he was
thrown into the sea, even if his body was never found, the corpus delicti is
established.

ART. 250. PENALTY FOR FRUSTRATED PARRICIDE, MURDER, OR HOMICIDE.

ART. 2 51. DEATH CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY

- ELEMENTS:
1. That there be SEVERAL PERSONS.

2. That they did NOT COMPOSE GROUPS ORGANIZED for the common
purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally.

3. That these several persons quarreled and ASSAULTED ONE ANOTHER

IN A CONFUSED AND TUMULTUOUS MANNER.

4. That SOMEONE WAS KILLED in the course of the affray (hindi kasama
sa affray, nadamay lang).

5. That it CANNOT BE ASCERTAINED WHO ACTUALLY KILLED THE

DECEASED.
6. That the person or persons who INFLICTED SERIOUS PHYSICAL
INJURIES or who used violence can be IDENTIFIED.

- Tumultuous affray EXISTS WHEN AT LEAST FOUR PERSONS took part.

- When there are TWO IDENTIFIED GROUPS of men who assaulted each
other, then there is NO TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY.
- There is NO CRIME OF DEATH IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY if the quarrel
is between TWO (2) WELL-KNOWN GROUPS.

- When there was CONFUSION IN THE FIGHT and the PERSON WHO
INFLICTED THE WOUNDS COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED, the crime is
DEATH CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY.
Four accused, on one hand, fought against three other persons, on the
other; one of whom was mortally wounded, but it DID NOT APPEAR WHO
INFLICTED the wounds. THERE WAS CONFUSION in the fight. The four
accused did not help one another in attacking the injured person.

HELD: The accused were guilty of death caused in a tumultuous affray,

and as the person who inflicted the wounds could not be identified, they were
all liable under the 2nd paragraph of Art. 251, because they all used violence.

NOTE: In this case, although the four persons, on one hand and the three
persons, on the other, seem to form two groups, such is not the case because
there was NO UNITY OF PURPOSE AND INTENTION AMONG THE
PERSONS WHO USED VIOLENCE.

- CANNOT BE ASCERTAINED who actually killed the deceased.

If the one who inflicted the fatal wound is KNOWN, the crime is NOT
HOMICIDE IN TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY. It is a case of HOMICIDE under Art.
249 against the one who inflicted the fatal wound.

- LIABLE for death in a tumultuous affray:

1. The person or persons who inflicted the serious physical injuries are liable.
(Art. 251, par. 1)
 2. IF IT IS NOT KNOWN who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the
deceased, ALL THE PERSONS WHO USED VIOLENCE upon the person
of the victim are liable, but with lesser liability. (Art. 251, par. 2)

- Those who used violence upon the person of the victim are liable for death
caused in a tumultuous affray only "if it CANNOT be determined who inflicted
the serious physical injuries on the deceased." (Art. 2 5 1 , par. 2)

ART. 252. PHYSICAL INJURIES INFLICTED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY

- ELEMENTS:
1. That there is a tumultuous affray as referred to in the preceding article.

2. That a PARTICIPANT (kasama sa affray) or some participants thereof

suffer serious physical injuries or physical injuries of a less serious nature
only.

3. That the PERSON RESPONSIBLE therefor CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED.

4. That all those who appear to have used violence upon the person of the
offended party are KNOWN.

- Inflicted upon the PARTICIPANTS thereof

- ONLY THE ONE WHO USED VIOLENCE IS LIABLE. Note that only those
who used violence are punished, because IF THE ONE WHO CAUSED THE
PHYSICAL INJURIES IS KNOWN, he will be liable for the physical injuries
actually committed (Arts. 263, 265 and 266), and NOT UNDER THIS
ARTICLE.

ART. 253. GIVING ASSISTANCE TO SUICIDE.

- ACTS PUNISHABLE as giving assistance to suicide.
 1. By ASSISTING ANOTHER TO COMMIT SUICIDE, whether the suicide is
consummated or not.

2. By LENDING HIS ASSISTANCE TO ANOTHER TO COMMIT SUICIDE to

the extent of doing the killing himself.

- A person who attempts to commit suicide is NOT CRIMINALLY LIABLE.

A person who attempts to commit suicide is not criminally liable, because
SOCIETY HAS ALWAYS CONSIDERED A PERSON WHO ATTEMPTS TO
KILL HIMSELF AS AN UNFORTUNATE BEING, a wretched person more
deserving of pity rather than of penalty

- ASSISTANCE TO SUICIDE IS DIFFERENT FROM MERCY-KILLING.

Euthanasia — commonly known as mercy-killing — is the practice of
painlessly putting to death a person suffering from some incurable disease.
Euthanasia is not lending assistance to suicide. In euthanasia, the person
killed does not want to die. A DOCTOR WHO RESORTS TO MERCY-
KILLING OF HIS PATIENT MAY BE LIABLE FOR MURDER. (ART. 248)

ART. 2 5 4 . DISCHARGE OF FIREARMS

- ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender DISCHARGES A FIREARM AGAINST OR AT
ANOTHER PERSON (Dapat pointing sa offended party)
2. That the offender has NO INTENTION TO KILL THAT PERSON.

- "SHALL SHOOT AT ANOTHER."

The act constituting the offense is SHOOTING AT ANOTHER with any
firearm, WITHOUT INTENT TO KILL him. IF the firearm is NOT
DISCHARGED AT A PERSON, there is NO CRIME OF DISCHARGE OF
FIREARM.
- DISCHARGE TOWARDS THE HOUSE of victim is NOT illegal discharge of
firearm.

- Firing a gun against the house of the offended party at random, not knowing
in what part of the house the people inside were, is ONLY ALARM UNDER
ART. 155.

- There must be NO INTENTION TO KILL.

If the discharge of the firearm at the offended party is coupled WITH
INTENT TO KILL him, THE FELONY SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS
FRUSTRATED OR ATTEMPTED PARRICIDE, MURDER OR HOMICIDE,
and NOT MERELY ILLEGAL DISCHARGE OF FIREARM. This is so,
because Art. 254 states, "unless the facts of the case are such that the act
can be held to constitute frustrated or attempted parricide, murder or
homicide."

- In discharge of firearm under Art. 254, the PURPOSE of the offender is only
to INTIMIDATE OR TO FRIGHTEN THE OFFENDED PARTY.

- Complex crime of illegal discharge of firearm with serious or less serious

physical injuries.
If in the illegal discharge of firearm the offended party is hit and wounded,
there is a COMPLEX CRIME OF DISCHARGE OF FIREARM WITH
PHYSICAL INJURIES WHEN THE PHYSICAL INJURIES ARE SERIOUS
OR LESS SERIOUS.
Note: When ONLY SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES ARE INFLICTED,
there is NO COMPLEX CRIME, because such physical injuries constitute a
light felony.
 - The crime is discharge of firearm, even if the gun was not pointed at the
offended party when it fired, as long as IT WAS INITIALLY AIMED BY THE
ACCUSED AT OR AGAINST THE OFFENDED PARTY.

S e c t i o n T w o . — I n f a n t i c i d e a n d a b o r t i on

ART. 255. INFANTICIDE

- Infanticide, DEFINED.
Infanticide may be denned as the KILLING OF ANY CHILD LESS THAN
THREE DAYS OF AGE, whether the KILLER IS THE PARENT OR
GRANDPARENT, ANY OTHER RELATIVE OF THE CHILD, OR A
STRANGER.

- Elements:
1. That a child was killed.
2. That the deceased child was LESS THAN THREE DAYS (72 hours) of
age.
3. That the accused killed the said child.

- Art. 255 does not provide a penalty for infanticide. The penalty must be taken
from Art. 246 or from Art. 248 (PARRICIDE OR MURDER).

- Father or mother or legitimate other ascendant who kills a child less than
three days old, to suffer penalty for PARRICIDE.

- If the offender is NOT SO RELATED TO THE CHILD, the penalty

corresponding to MURDER shall be imposed. (Art. 255)

Since the person who killed the child less than 3 days old was the
BROTHER-IN-LAW OF ITS MOTHER (not so related), he incurred the
penalty for MURDER.
- CONCEALING DISHONOR IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF INFANTICIDE. It
merely MITIGATES the liability of the mother or maternal grandparents who
committed the crime.

- A STRANGER WHO COOPERATES IN THE PERPETRATION OF

INFANTICIDE COMMITTED BY THE MOTHER OR GRANDPARENT on the
mother's side, is LIABLE FOR INFANTICIDE, but he must suffer the penalty
prescribed for murder.

- NO CRIME OF INFANTICIDE IS COMMITTED where the child was born

dead, or although born alive, it could not sustain an independent life when it
was killed.

Title Nine
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY
AND SECURITY
Crimes against liberty
(1) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. (Art. 267)
(2) Slight illegal detention. (Art. 268)
(3) Unlawful arrest. (Art. 269)
(4) Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. (Art. 270)
(5) Inducing a minor to abandon his home. (Art. 271)
(6) Slavery. (Art. 272)
(7) Exploitation of child labor. (Art. 273)
(8) Services rendered under compulsion in payment of debt. (Art. 274)

Crimes against security:

(1) Abandonment of persons in danger and abandonment of one's own victim. (Art. 275)
(2) Abandoning a minor. (Art. 276)
(3) Abandonment of minor by person entrusted with his custody; indifference of parents.
(Art. 277)
(4) Exploitation of minors. (Art. 278)
(5) Trespass to dwelling. (Art. 280)
(6) Other forms of trespass. (Art. 281)
(7) Grave threats. (Art. 282)
(8) Light threats. (Art. 283)
(9) Other light threats. (Art. 285)

CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY

(10) Grave coercions. (Art. 286)
(11) Light coercions. (Art. 287)
(12) Other similar coercions — (Compulsory purchase of merchandise and payment of
wages by means of tokens). (Art. 288)
(13) Formation, maintenance and prohibition of combination of capital or labor through
violence or threats. (Art. 289)
(14) Discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence. (Art. 290)
(15) Revealing secrets with abuse of office. (Art. 291)
(16) Revealing of industrial secrets. (Art. 292)

Chapter One
CRIMES AGAINST LIBERTY
S e c t i o n O n e . — I l l e g a l d e t e n t i on

Crimes classified as illegal detention:

1. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. (Art. 267)

2. Slight illegal detention. (Art. 268)
3. Unlawful arrest. (Art. 269)

ART. 267. KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION

- ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender is a PRIVATE individual.
2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the
latter of his liberty.
3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.
4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances
is present:
(a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for MORE THAN 3 DAYS;
(b) That it is committed SIMULATING PUBLIC AUTHORITY;
(c) That ANY SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES ARE INFLICTED upon the
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or
(d) That the person kidnapped or detained is a MINOR, FEMALE, or a
PUBLIC OFFICER, (cited in People vs. Mercado, 131 SCRA 501)

- If the offender is a PUBLIC OFFICER, the crime is ARBITRARY

DETENTION.
THIS ARTICLE REQUIRES that the offender is a PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL,
because when the offender is a public officer, it will be arbitrary detention.
 But the public officer must have a duty under the law to detain a person,
such as a policeman or Constabulary soldier. If he has NO such duty, like a
SANITARY INSPECTOR OR A CLERK IN A GOVERNMENT OFFICE, and
he detains a person, he is LIABLE UNDER THIS ARTICLE.

- Essential in the crime of kidnapping: Intention to deprive the liberty FOR

PURPOSE OF EXTORTING RANSOM on the part of the accused.
The accused approached, took hold of, and dragged M, striking the latter
with the butt of his rifle. The companions of M were told to continue on their
way. Hardly had they walked one kilometer when they heard gun reports. The
following day, M was found dead with gunshot wounds.

HELD: There is no sufficient evidence of intention to kidnap because from

the moment M was held and dragged to the time when the gun reports were
heard, NOTHING WAS DONE OR SAID BY THE ACCUSED TO SHOW OR
INDICATE THAT THEY INTENDED TO DEPRIVE M OF HER LIBERTY for
sometime and for some purpose. THE INTERVAL WAS SO SHORT as to
negative the idea implied in kidnapping. HER SHORT DETENTION FORMS
PART OF THE PERPETRATION OF THE CRIME OF MURDER. (People vs.
Remalante, 92 Phil. 48; People vs. Sacayanan, G.R. Nos. L-15024-25, Dec.
31, 1960)

- As long as the KIDNAPPING OR DETENTION WAS COMMITTED "for the

purpose of extorting ransom," ACTUAL DEMAND FOR RANSOM IS NOT
NECESSARY.

- The accused is NOT LIABLE when there is LACK OF MOTIVE to resort to

kidnapping.
Where the agents of the Constabulary took the supposed victim from his
house to make him answer for the murder of those persons who had
 disappeared, THERE WAS LACK OF MOTIVE TO RESORT TO
KIDNAPPING. Such agents are not liable for kidnapping.

- DETENTION OR LOCKING UP of victim is ESSENTIAL.

The offended party testified that the accused had ordered her not to go out
of the agency or to peep out of the window. But there is no evidence that the
doors of the agency or of its rooms were locked or closed in such a way as to
prevent the offended party from going out had she wanted to go out. Neither
did she ever feel she wanted to go out of the building and was prevented from
doing so. On the contrary, she went to the agency on August 28 voluntarily as
there was an offer for her to work as a maid but she rejected it. There is no
evidence that the three accused conspired to instill fear into her mind in order
to compel and force her to remain in the agency.
The acts of the accused prohibiting her from peeping out of the window or
going out were made that she might not be seen by the police.

HELD: There is NO ILLEGAL DETENTION, BECAUSE THE ELEMENT OF

DETENTION OR LOCKING UP IS LACKING. It is essential in the crime of
illegal detention that there be actual confinement or restriction of the person
of the offended party.

- It is NOT NECESSARY that the victim be placed in an INCLOSURE.

- Restraint need NOT BE PERMANENT

- The DETENTION MUST BE ILLEGAL (although NOT expressed).

There are cases where it is lawful to detain another.

The fact that the owners of a sugarcane plantation locked up in the lobby
of their house a boy who had stolen some sugar canes from the plantation,
from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., without giving him anything to eat, does not
 constitute the crime of illegal detention. (People vs. Tamorro, G.R. No. 25373,
June 11, 1925)

REASONS FOR THIS DECISION:

(1) That no injury or disturbance of a right was intended by, or resulted from,
the act of the accused.

(2) That the act of the accused was to a certain extent justified.

NOTE: The detention here is legal to a certain extent, because

even a private person can arrest one who commits a crime in his
presence. The Supreme Court, however, found the accused guilty of light
coercion under paragraph 2, Art. 287.

- DETENTION IS ILLEGAL WHEN NOT ORDERED BY COMPETENT

AUTHORITY or not permitted by law. The illegality of the detention punished
by Art. 267 consists in such detention not ordered by a competent authority or
not permitted by law. For that reason, the fact that a boy was apprehended
and detained for over eight hours, with his hands and feet bound to a post,
WITHOUT JUST CAUSE, on suspicion that he was an incendiarist, has been
held to constitute illegal detention.

- ESSENTIAL ELEMENT of kidnapping: DEPRIVATION OF AN OFFENDED

PARTY'S LIBERTY under any of the four instances enumerated in Article
267, paragraph 1.
But when the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom, it is NOT NECESSARY that one or any of such
circumstances enumerated in the first paragraph of Art. 267 be present.
- DETENTION FOR MORE THAN 3 DAYS IS NOT NECESSARY when any of
the other circumstances is present. Thus, when the offender simulated public
authority, or when serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim, or
 when threats to kill him were made, or when the person kidnapped or
detained was a minor, female, or public officer, EVEN IF THE PERIOD OF
DETENTION WAS LESS THAN THREE DAYS, THE CRIME COMMITTED
IS SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION.

- RESTRAINT BY ROBBERS NOT illegal detention.

- The PURPOSE IS IMMATERIAL when any of the CIRCUMSTANCES IN

THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ART. 267 IS PRESENT.

- SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF KIDNAPPING WITH MURDER.

Where the accused kidnapped the victim FOR THE PURPOSE OF
KILLING HIM, and he was in fact killed by his abductor, the crime committed
was the COMPLEX CRIME OF KIDNAPPING WITH MURDER UNDER ART.
48 (as the kidnapping of the victim was a necessary means of committing the
murder). Where the victim was kidnapped NOT FOR THE PURPOSE OF
KILLING HIM but was subsequently slain as an afterthought, TWO (2)
SEPARATE CRIMES OF KIDNAPPING AND MURDER WERE
COMMITTED. (OBSOLETE, AMENDED BY RA 7659)

THE RULE NOW IS: "Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course
of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or
was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no
longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but
SHALL BE PUNISHED AS A SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME UNDER THE
LAST PARAGRAPH OF ART. 267, AS AMENDED BY R.A. NO. 7659."

- Where the victim is taken from one place to another SOLELY for the purpose
of killing him, THE CRIME COMMITTED IS MURDER.

- When Murder, and Not Kidnapping

 If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, THE
INCIDENTAL DEPRIVATION OF THE VICTIM'S LIBERTY DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE THE FELONY OF KIDNAPPING BUT IS MERELY A
PREPARATORY ACT TO THE KILLING, and hence, is merged into, or
absorbed by, the killing of the victim. The crime committed would either be
HOMICIDE OR MURDER.

- SPECIFIC INTENT, determinative of whether crime committed is murder or

kidnapping.

- Conspiracy to extort ransom MAKES ALL THE CONSPIRATORS LIABLE

under the second paragraph of Art. 267, INCLUDING THOSE WHO DID NOT
TAKE ANY PART OF THE MONEY.

- When MAXIMUM OF THE PENALTY is imposed (DEATH).

1) if the purpose of kidnapping or detention is TO EXTORT RANSOM;

2) when the victim is KILLED OR DIES as a consequence of the detention;

2) when the victim is RAPED;

3) when the victim is SUBJECTED TO TORTURE OR DEHUMANIZING

ACTS.

NOTE: In view of the enactment of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9346 WHICH

PROHIBITS THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY, the maximum
penalty is now RECLUSION PERPETUA.
- NO COMPLEX CRIME OF ILLEGAL DETENTION WITH RAPE UNDER
ART. 48 (because there is no single act which results in two or more grave or
less grave felonies)
- Voluntary is not applicable.
A R T . 2 6 8 . SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION
- The p e n a l t y of reclusion temporal s h a l l b e i m p o s e d u
p o n a n y p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u al w h o s h a l l c o m m i t t h
e crimes described in the next preceding artic
le without the attendance of any of the circum
s t a n c es e n u m e r a t e d t h e r e i n.
The same penalty shall be incurred by any o
n e w h o s h a ll f u r n i s h t h e p l a c e f o r t h e p e r p e t r a
t i o n o f t h e c r im e .
If the offender shall voluntarily release the
p e r s on s o k i d n a p p e d or detained within three
days f r om the c o m m e n c e m e n t o f t h e detention,w
i t h o u t h a v i n g a t t a i n ed t h e p u r p o s e i n t e n d e d , a
nd before the institution of criminal proceedi
ngs against him, the penalty shall be prision
mayor i n i t s m i n i m u m a n d m e d i u m p e r i o d s a n d a
fine not e x c e e d i n g s e v e n h u n d r e d p e s o s . (As
amended by Republic Act No. 18)

- ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender is a PRIVATE individual.

2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives him of

his liberty.

3. That the act of kidnapping or detention is illegal.

4. That the crime is committed WITHOUT THE ATTENDANCE OF ANY OF

THE CIRCUMSTANCES ENUMERATED IN ART. 267.
 - The liability of accomplice in slight illegal detention is THE SAME PENALTY
by anyone who furnished the place for the perpetration of the crime, (Art. 268,
par. 2). HIS PARTICIPATION IS RAISED TO THAT OF A REAL CO-
PRINCIPAL.

- REQUISITES in Privileged Mitigating Circumstance in slight illegal detention.

If the offender (ALL MUST CONCUR):
(a) VOLUNTARILY RELEASES the person so kidnapped or detained
WITHIN THREE DAYS from the commencement of the detention;

(b) WITHOUT having attained the purpose intended; and

(c) BEFORE THE INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST

HIM, HIS LIABILITY IS MITIGATED. In effect, it is a privileged mitigating
circumstance because the penalty is lower by one degree.

But TO IMPOSE THE LESSER PENALTY, it must be shown by the

offender that he was in a position to prolong the detention for more than three
days and YET HE RELEASED THE PERSON DETAINED WITHIN THAT
TIME.
NO MITIGATION of the penalty is allowed when the PROCEEDINGS
HAVE ALREADY BEEN INSTITUTED, for the simple reason that in this
case, the accused acted through fear rather than through repentance.

- THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF ART. 268 APPLIES TO SLIGHT ILLEGAL

DETENTION ONLY, not to Art. 267. Arts. 267 and 268 are independent of
each other.

ART. 2 6 9. UNLAWFUL ARREST

- ELEMENTS:
1 That the offender arrests or detains another person.
 2. That the PURPOSE OF THE OFFENDER IS TO DELIVER HIM TO THE
PROPER AUTHORITIES.

3. That the ARREST OR DETENTION IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY LAW or

there is no reasonable ground therefor.

- The OFFENDER IS ANY PERSON, whether a public officer or a private

individual.

- UNLAWFUL ARREST DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER ILLEGAL

DETENTION.
If the PURPOSE OF LOCKING UP OR DETAINING THE VICTIM IS TO
DELIVER HIM TO THE PROPER AUTHORITIES, and it develops that the
DETENTION IS UNLAWFUL, then the offense committed is UNLAWFUL
ARREST.
In any other case, the detention will render the culprit liable for other illegal
detention.

- NO PERIOD OF DETENTION is fixed by law in Art. 269, but the MOTIVE OF

THE OFFENDER IS CONTROLLING.
Suppose the detention is more or less than three days, will the case fall
under Art. 267 or Art. 269?
The motive of the offender is controlling; if his purpose is to deliver him to
the proper authorities, it is still unlawful arrest. But ABSENCE of this motive
may be shown by the length of time the victim is detained.

S e c t i o n Two. — K i d n a p p i n g o f m i n o r s
(1) Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. (Art. 270)
(2) Inducing a minor to abandon his home. (Art. 271)
A R T . 270. KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR
- ELEMENTS:
1. That the OFFENDER IS ENTRUSTED WITH THE CUSTODY OF A
MINOR PERSON (whether over or under 7 years but less than 21 years of
age).

2. That he deliberately FAILS TO RESTORE THE SAID MINOR TO HIS

PARENTS or guardians.

- What is punished is the DELIBERATE FAILURE OF THE CUSTODIAN OF

THE MINOR TO RESTORE the latter to his parents or guardian.

- Is there a conflict between Art. 267 and Art. 270?

Under Art. 270, the offender is ENTRUSTED with the custody of the minor.
Under Art. 267, the offender is NOT ENTRUSTED with the custody of the
victim.

- Kidnapping and FAILURE to return a minor under Art. 270 is necessarily

included in KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION OF MINOR
UNDER PAR. 4 OF ART. 267.

- What is punished in kidnapping a minor under ART. 270 is THE

DELIBERATE FAILURE OF THE OFFENDER HAVING THE CUSTODY OF
THE MINOR TO RESTORE HIM TO HIS PARENTS or guardian.

A R T . 2 7 1 . INDUCING A MINOR TO ABANDON HIS HOME

- ELEMENTS:
1. That a minor (whether over or under seven years of age) is living in the
home of his parents or guardian or the person entrusted with his custody.
 2. That the offender INDUCES SAID MINOR TO ABANDON SUCH HOME.

- Age of the minor is UNDER 21 YEARS.

- The INDUCEMENT MUST BE ACTUAL, committed with criminal intent, and

determined by a will to cause damage.

- SHALL INDUCE A MINOR to abandon the home (Pigpapalayas sa harong).

- The MINOR SHOULD NOT LEAVE HIS HOME OF HIS OWN FREE WILL.

SectionThree.—Slaveryandservitude
Crimes called slavery and servitude:
1. Slavery. (Art. 272)
2. Exploitation of child labor. (Art. 273)
3. Services rendered under compulsion in payment of debt. (Art.
274)

ART. 272. SLAVERY

- ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender PURCHASES, SELLS, KIDNAPS OR DETAINS a
human being.

2. That the purpose of the offender is to ENSLAVE such human being.

- Circumstance qualifying the offense.

If the purpose of the offender is to assign the offended party to some
IMMORAL TRAFFIC (PROSTITUTION), the PENALTY IS HIGHER.
- Distinguished from kidnapping or illegal detention.
The purpose must be determined. IF THE PURPOSE IS TO ENSLAVE
THE VICTIM, it is SLAVERY; otherwise, it is kidnapping or illegal detention.
 - The employment or custody of a minor WITH THE CONSENT OF THE
PARENT or guardian although against the child's own will CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
But where it is proven that the defendant was obliged to render service in
plaintiffs house as a servant WITHOUT REMUNERATION whatever and to
remain there so long as she has not paid her debt, THERE IS SLAVERY.

ART. 273. EXPLOITATION OF CHILD LABOR

- ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender RETAINS A MINOR IN HIS SERVICE.

2. That it is AGAINST THE WILL of the minor.

3. That IT IS UNDER THE PRETEXT OF REIMBURSING HIMSELF OF A

DEBT incurred by an ascendant, guardian or person ENTRUSTED WITH
THE CUSTODY OF SUCH MINOR.

- The service of the minor must be AGAINST HIS WILL.

Hence, if the minor consents to the offender's retaining his services, there
is NO VIOLATION OF THIS ARTICLE.

- INDEBTEDNESS, NOT a ground for detention (Slavery pa rin, kahit may

utang pa sila).
In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, it appears that the respondent
refused to permit a girl to go until the amount advanced for her fare and
subsistence was repaid to an employment agency.
HELD: The EXISTENCE OF AN INDEBTEDNESS CONSTITUTES NO
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR HOLDING A PERSON AND DEPRIVING HIM
OF HIS FREEDOM TO LIVE WHERE HE WILLS.
 Title Ten
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
(1) Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. (Art. 294)
(2) Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain circumstances. (Art. 297)
(3) Execution of deeds by means of violence or intimidation. (Art. 298)
(4) Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship. (Art.
299)
(5) Robbery in an uninhabited place or in a private building. (Art. 302)
(6) Possession of picklocks or similar tools. (Art. 304)
(7) Brigandage. (Art. 306)
(8) Aiding and abetting a band of brigands. (Art. 307)
(9) Theft. (Art. 308)
(10) Qualified theft. (Art. 310)
(11) Theft of the property of the National Library and National Museum. (Art. 311)
(12) Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property. (Art. 312)
(13) Altering boundaries or landmarks. (Art. 313)
(14) Fraudulent insolvency. (Art. 314)
(15) Swindling. (Art. 315)
(16) Other forms of swindling. (Art. 316)
(17) Swindling a minor. (Art. 317)
(18) Other deceits. (Art. 318)
(19) Removal, sale or pledge of mortgaged property. (Art. 319)
(20) Destructive arson. (Art. 320)
(21) Other forms of arson. (Art. 321)
(22) Arson of property of small value. (Art. 323)
(23) Crimes involving destruction. (Art. 324)
(24) Burning one's own property as means to commit arson. (Art. 325)
(25) Setting fire to property exclusively owned by the offender. (Art. 326)
(26) Malicious mischief. (Art. 327)
(27) Special cases of malicious mischief. (Art. 328)
(28) Damage and obstruction to means of communication. (Art. 330)
(29) Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or paintings. (Art. 331)

Chapter One
ROBBERY IN GENERAL

ART. 293. WHO ARE GUILTY OF ROBBERY

- Robbery, DEFINED.
Robbery is the taking of personal property, belonging to another, with
intent to gain, by means of VIOLENCE against, or INTIMIDATION of any
person, or using FORCE upon anything.

- Classification:
1. Robbery with VIOLENCE AGAINST, OR INTIMIDATION of persons.
(Arts. 294, 297 and 298)

2. Robbery by the USE OF FORCE UPON THINGS. (Arts. 299 and 302)

- ELEMENTS OF ROBBERY IN GENERAL.

a. That there be (1) PERSONAL PROPERTY; (2) BELONGING TO
ANOTHER;

b. That there is UNLAWFUL TAKING OF THAT PROPERTY;

c. That the taking must be WITH INTENT TO GAIN; and

d. That there is VIOLENCE AGAINST OR INTIMIDATION OF ANY

PERSON, OR FORCE UPON ANYTHING.

- The property taken MUST BE PERSONAL PROPERTY, for IF REAL

PROPERTY IS OCCUPIED OR REAL RIGHT IS USURPED by means of
 violence against or intimidation of person, the crime is USURPATION. (ART.
312)

- BELONGING TO ANOTHER.
Thus, one who, by means of violence or intimidation, took his own
property from the depositary is NOT GUILTY OF ROBBERY.
Since the personal property must belong to another, a co-owner or a
partner CANNOT commit robbery or theft with regard to the co-ownership or
partnership property.
Art. 293 uses the phrase "belonging to another" which means that the
property taken does not belong to the offender. The person from whom the
personal property is taken need not be the owner. POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY IS SUFFICIENT.

- Is the phrase "BELONGING TO ANOTHER," in relation to the property taken,

mean that the naming of the owner is a matter of essential description of
the crime?
YES, if the crime charged is ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE in view of the
capital punishment attached to the crime.
BUT when the accused is prosecuted for ROBBERY WITH
INTIMIDATION OR VIOLENCE RESULTING ONLY IN PHYSICAL
INJURIES, or FOR ROBBERY BY THE USE OF FORCE upon things, THE
NAME OF THE REAL OWNER IS NOT ESSENTIAL so long as the personal
property taken does not belong to the accused.

- In robbery, the personal property of another is TAKEN by the offender against

the will of the owner.

- Essential part in Robbery: The taking of personal property must be

UNLAWFUL.
 Where the taking was lawful and the unlawful misappropriation was
subsequent to such taking, the crime is ESTAFA or MALVERSATION.

The fact that the agents of the authorities, apparently acting in compliance
with the law, but really with intent to obtain unlawful gain, did, with
intimidation, seize a forbidden article, constitutes robbery.

- Unlawful taking, when COMPLETE.

1. As to robbery WITH VIOLENCE AGAINST OR INTIMIDATION of persons.
From the moment the OFFENDER GAINS POSSESSION OF THE
THING, even if the culprit has had no opportunity to dispose of the same,
the unlawful taking is complete. The fact that the defendant in his flight
threw away the property stolen or that it fell without his knowledge, does
not affect the nature of the crime.
EXAMPLE:
Defendant saw his victim put money into his coat pocket. The next day
defendant held him up and deprived him of the coat, but finding the money
was not there, defendant threw away the coat.
HELD: Guilty of robbery of the coat, the offense having been complete
when defendant forcibly deprived his victim thereof.

2. As to robbery WITH FORCE UPON THINGS.

When the culprit had already broken the floor of the bodega, had
entered it, and had removed one sack of sugar from the pile, but was
caught in the act of taking out the sack of sugar through the opening on
the floor, it was frustrated robbery only. (People vs. Del Rosario, C.A., 46
O.G. 4332)
Note: It would seem that in this kind of robbery, the THING MUST BE
TAKEN OUT OF THE BUILDING TO CONSUMMATE THE CRIME.
- "TAKING," as an element of robbery, MEANS DEPRIVING THE OFFENDED
PARTY OF OWNERSHIP of the thing taken with the character of
permanency.

EXAMPLE:
A was the owner of a gun kept in a drawer which was locked. B, A's son,
destroyed the drawer's lock and obtained the gun in order to threaten A with
it, as in fact B threatened A with said gun.

HELD: B HAD NO INTENTION OF DEPRIVING A OF THE OWNERSHIP

of the gun with any character of permanency, negativing therefore the
essential element of "taking" in the crime of robbery. (People vs. Kho Choc,
C.A., 50 O.G. 1667)

NOTE: The accused in this case was convicted of grave threats (Art. 282),
for threatening the offended party with the said gun, demanding money, but
without attaining his purpose, because the offended party reported the matter
to the police.

- INTENT TO GAIN.
One who takes property OPENLY and AVOWEDLY under claim of title
proffered in good faith is NOT GUILTY OF ROBBERY even though the claim
of ownership is untenable.

- ABSENCE OF INTENT TO GAIN will make the taking of personal property

GRAVE COERCION if there is violence used. (Art. 286)

- The element of "personal property belonging to another" and that of "intent to

gain" MUST CONCUR.
 1. If the accused, with intent to gain, took from another, personal property
which turned out to be his OWN PROPERTY, the property not belonging
to another, he cannot be held liable for robbery, even if in taking it, the
accused used violence against or intimidation of person, or force upon
anything.

2. If he took personal property from another, BELIEVING THAT IT WAS HIS

OWN PROPERTY, BUT IN REALITY IT BELONGED TO THE
OFFENDED PARTY, there being NO INTENT TO GAIN, he CANNOT be
held liable for ROBBERY, even if the accused used violence against or
intimidation of person, or force upon anything.

- Violence or intimidation, as an element of robbery.

The violence must be against the person of the offended party, NOT
upon the thing taken.
Theft, NOT robbery, was committed in a case where the accused cut
with a bolo the strings tying the opening of a sack containing palay and
then took the palay.

- The violence or intimidation must be present BEFORE the taking of

personal property is complete.
If there is violence or intimidation at any time before asportation is
complete, the taking of personal property is QUALIFIED TO ROBBERY. It is
not necessary that violence or intimidation should be present from the very
beginning.
But if A picked the pocket of B and ran away with the latter's wallet,
containing money bills, and when B chased and overtook him, A turned
around and boxed the face of B, inflicting slight physical injuries, or
intimidated B with a knife, the crime committed is not robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons. A committed two crimes:
(1) THEFT (ART. 308); and
 (2) SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES (ART. 266), OR GRAVE THREATS
(ART. 282, PAR. 2) FOR INTIMIDATING B WITH A KNIFE.

EXCEPTION:
But when the violence results in: (1) homicide, (2) rape, (3)
intentional mutilation, or (4) any of the serious physical injuries
penalized in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Art. 263, the taking of personal
property is ROBBERY COMPLEXED WITH ANY OF THOSE CRIMES
UNDER ART. 294, even if the taking was already complete when the
violence was used by the offender.

- USING FORCE UPON ANYTHING.

If the USE OF FORCE UPON THINGS will NOT make the taking of
personal property robbery, if the culprit never entered a house or building.
Thus, removing by force the tires of an automobile while parked on the
street and taking them away is NOT ROBBERY, because the culprit did
not use force to enter a house or building.

Breaking the glass of the show-window of a bazar and thereafter taking

forty watches of various makes valued at P627.50, is NOT ROBBERY, it
appearing that the accused did not enter the building but merely
introduced his hand through the broken glass in order to remove the
watches from the show-window

- DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN EFFECTS OF EMPLOYMENT OF VIOLENCE

AGAINST OR INTIMIDATION OF PERSON AND THOSE OF USE OF
FORCE UPON THINGS.
(1) Whenever VIOLENCE AGAINST OR INTIMIDATION OF ANY PERSON
IS USED, the taking of personal property belonging to another is
ALWAYS ROBBERY.
 If there is no violence or intimidation, but ONLY FORCE UPON
THINGS, the taking is robbery only if the force is used either to ENTER
the building or to break doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind
of locked or sealed furniture or receptacle inside the building or to
force them open outside after taking the same from the building.
(Arts. 299 and 302)

(2) In robbery with violence against or intimidation of any person, the

value of the personal property taken is IMMATERIAL. The penalty
depends:

(a) on the result of the violence used, as when homicide, rape, intentional
mutilation or any of the serious physical injuries resulted, or when less
serious or slight physical injuries were inflicted, which are only
evidence of simple violence, and

(b) on the existence of intimidation only.

But in ROBBERY WITH FORCE UPON THINGS, committed in an

inhabited house, public building, or edifice devoted to religious worship,
the penalty is based:

(a) On the VALUE OF THE PROPERTY TAKEN and;

(c) On whether or not the offenders carry arms; and in robbery with force
upon things, committed in an uninhabited building, the penalty is based
only on the value of the property taken.

- Classification of robbery when both violence or intimidation and force upon

things are present.
 When the offender, in taking personal property belonging to another with
intent to gain, employs violence against or intimidation on any person, the
crime is ROBBERY WITH VIOLENCE AGAINST OR INTIMIDATION OF
PERSONS, even if the robbery was committed in a dwelling house after
the offender had entered the same through a window, or after breaking its
door or wall. The offender cannot be held liable for robbery with force upon
things under Art. 299.

- REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6539, defining CARNAPPING, approved August 26,

1972, is the law applicable when the property taken in robbery is a MOTOR
VEHICLE.

Section One. — Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons

ART294. ROBBERY WITH VIOLENCE AGAINST OR INTIMIDATION OF PERSONS

- PENALTIES:
1. The penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH, when by reason or
on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed; or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation or arson;

2. The penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL IN ITS MEDIUM PERIOD TO

RECLUSION PERPETUA, when by reason or on occasion of such
robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of
Article 263 shall have been inflicted;

3. The penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL, when by reason or on occasion

of the robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2
of the article mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, shall have been
inflicted;
 4. The penalty of PRISION MAYOR IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD TO
RECLUSION TEMPORAL IN ITS MEDIUM PERIOD, if the violence or
intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery shall have been
carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission of the crime,
or when in the course of its execution, the offender shall have inflicted
upon any person not responsible for its commission any of the physical
injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263;

5. The penalty OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD

TO PRISION MAYOR IN ITS MEDIUM PERIOD in other cases. (As
amended by Republic Act No. 7659)

- ACTS PUNISHED
1. When by reason or on occasion of the robbery (taking of personal property
belonging to another with intent to gain), the crime of HOMICIDE IS
COMMITTED;

2. When the robbery is accompanied by RAPE or INTENTIONAL

MUTILATION or ARSON;

3. When by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the PHYSICAL

INJURIES resulting in insanity, imbecility, impotency or blindness is
inflicted;

4. When by reason or on occasion of robbery, any of the PHYSICAL

INJURIES resulting in the loss of the use of speech or the power to
hear or to smell, or the loss of an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg
or the loss of the use of any such member or incapacity for the work
in which the injured person is theretofore habitually engaged is inflicted;
 5. If the violence or intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery
is carried to a degree CLEARLY UNNECESSARY for the commission
of the crime;

6. When in the course of its execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon
any person not responsible for the commission of the robbery any of the
physical injuries in consequence of which the person injured becomes
deformed or loses any other member of his body or loses the use thereof
or becomes ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in which he
is habitually engaged for more than 90 days or the person injured
becomes ill or incapacitated for labor for more than 30 days;

7. If the violence employed by the offender does not cause any of the
serious physical injuries defined in Art. 263, or if the offender
employs intimidation only.

- The crime defined in this article is a SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME.

Art. 48, defining complex crime, DOES NOT APPLY to the crimes
covered by Art. 294. Art. 294 already provides a specific penalty for each
kind of robbery with violence against persons in the first, second, third and
fourth paragraphs thereof. There is only one penalty prescribed, even if two
crimes are committed. ART. 48 APPLIES ONLY WHEN A COMPLEX
CRIME IS NOT PUNISHED WITH A SPECIFIC PENALTY.

- Note the phrases "ON THE OCCASION" and "BY REASON" of the robbery.
These phrases mean that the homicide or serious physical injuries defined in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Art. 263 must be COMMITTED IN THE COURSE or
because of the robbery.
EXAMPLE:
 Where the victim was killed on the occasion when the four accused were
taking the chickens under the house of the victim, THE OFFENSE IS
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, NOT THEFT AND HOMICIDE.

- Where the original design comprehends robbery, and homicide is

perpetrated by reason or on occasion of the consummation of the former,
THE CRIME COMMITTED IS ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE.

- Rule:
1. Where the original design comprehends ROBBERY in a dwelling (or
elsewhere), and HOMICIDE IS PERPETRATED with a view to the
consummation of the robbery, the offense committed is the SPECIAL
COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, even though
homicide precedes robbery by an appreciable time.

2. If the original design is NOT to commit robbery, BUT ROBBERY IS

COMMITTED AFTER THE HOMICIDE as an afterthought and a minor
incident in the homicide, the criminal acts should be viewed as TWO
DISTINCT OFFENSES. Robbery with homicide arises only when there
is a direct relation, an intimate connection, between the robbery and
the killing, even if the killing is prior to, concurrent with, or
subsequent to the robbery.

- There is NO SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY IN BAND WITH

DOUBLE HOMICIDE and/or serious, less serious or slight physical injuries
under the present Code.
If robbery with homicide (or with the other crimes enumerated above)
is committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be robbery
with homicide under Art. 294(1), but the circumstance that it was committed
by a band is not an element of the crime BUT IS MERELY A GENERIC
 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE which may be offset by mitigating
circumstances.

- There is NO such crime as robbery with murder.

Treachery CANNOT be considered as a qualifying circumstance of murder,
because the crime charged is the SPECIAL CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE. The treachery which attended the commission of the crime must
be considered not qualifying but merely as a generic aggravating
circumstance.

- Robbery with homicide in a dwelling does not require that robbery with force
upon things is FIRST committed.
What makes the crime of robbery with violence against person, is the
injuring or killing of a person on the occasion or by reason of the taking of
personal property belonging to another, WITH INTENT TO GAIN.
Robbery with homicide need NOT BE COMMITTED INSIDE A
BUILDING. Thus, the culprits who killed the victim on the street to get, as in
fact they got, the latter's personal belongings are guilty of robbery with
homicide.

- An intent to take personal property belonging to another with intent to gain

must PRECEDE THE KILLING.

- An intent to take personal property belonging to another with intent to gain

must precede the killing.
If the idea of taking the personal property of another with intent to gain
came to the mind of the offender AFTER HE HAD KILLED THE VICTIM, he
is guilty of TWO SEPARATE CRIMES OF HOMICIDE OR MURDER, as the
case may be, and THEFT.
 - The crime is robbery with homicide, even if the motive of the offenders was
that of robbery as well as vengeance.
But when the INTENT TO COMMIT ROBBERY PRECEDED THE
TAKING OF HUMAN LIFE, it is immaterial that the offenders had also a
desire to avenge grievances against the person killed. They are liable for the
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE.

- Homicide may precede robbery or may occur after robbery.

KILLING FIRST the victim and THEN AFTERWARDS TAKING THE
MONEY from the body of the deceased is ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE. But
the offender must have the intent to take personal property before the killing.
Killing the victim after taking him out to sea several hours after the
robbery was committed in another place, is still ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE. (U.S. vs. Ibanez, et al., 19 Phil. 463)

Note: The phrase "BY REASON" covers homicide committed before or

after the taking of personal property of another, as long as the motive of the
offender (in killing a person before the robbery) is to deprive the victim of his
personal property which is sought to be accomplished by eliminating an
obstacle or opposition, or (in killing a person after robbery) to do away with a
witness or to defend the possession of the stolen property.

Title Eleven
CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

(1) Adultery. (Art. 333)

(2) Concubinage. (Art. 334)
(3) Acts of lasciviousness. (Art. 336)
(4) Qualified seduction. (Art. 337)
(5) Simple seduction. (Art. 338)
(6) Acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party.
(Art. 339)
(7) Corruption of minors. (Art. 340)
(8) White slave trade. (Art. 341)
(9) Forcible abduction. (Art. 342)
(10) Consented abduction. (Art. 343)

Art. 333. Who are guilty of adultery.

- Elements of adultery:
(1) That the woman is married;
(2) That she has sexual intercourse with a man not her husband;
(3) That as regards the man with whom she has sexual intercourse, he
must know her to be married.

- The woman must be married.( necessarily attend the crime of adultery.)

Once it is shown that a man and a woman lived as husband and
wife, and none of the parties denied and contradicted the allegation in the
complaint, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a
fact.

- "Even if the marriage be subsequently declared void."

In view of this phrase used in Art. 333, it is not necessary that there
be a valid marriage between the offended husband and the guilty woman.
There is adultery, even if the marriage of the guilty woman with the
offended husband is subsequently declared void. (Art. 333)

- The evidence which was considered sufficient: (1) photograph showing

the intimate relations of the two accused; and (2) testimony of a witness to
the effect that the two accused were in scant apparel and sleeping together.