Contratos en Favor de Terceros

THE LAW COMMISSION
PRIVITY OF CONTRACT:
CONTRACTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF
THIRD PARTIES
CONTENTS
Paragraph Page
SECTION A: BACKGROUND
PART I: INTRODUCTION 1
PART II: THE PRESENT LAW AND CALLS FOR

REFORM
1. The Present Law 2.1 6
(1) A Brief Statement of the Third Party Rule in Contract 2.1 6
(2) Development of the Third Party Rule 2.2 6
(3) Existing Exceptions to, or Circumventions of, the Third Party Rule 2.8 9
(a) Trust of the Promise 2.8 9
(b) Covenants Concerning Land 2.10 10
(c) Tort of Negligence 2.13 12
(d) Agency 2.15 14
(e) Assignment 2.16 15
(f) Collateral Contracts 2.18 16
(g) Techniques Used to Enable Third Parties to Take the
Benefit of Exclusion Clauses 2.19 16
(h) Promisee’s Remedies Assisting the Third Party 2.36 25
(i) Damages 2.37 25
(ii) Specific Performance and a Stay of Action 2.47 29
(i) Statutory Exceptions 2.52 31
(i) Life Insurance 2.53 31
(ii) Fire Insurance 2.54 31
(iii) Motor Insurance 2.55 31
(iv) Third Parties’ Rights Against Insurers 2.56 31
(v) Insurance by Those with Limited Interests 2.57 32
(vi) Bills of Exchange 2.58 32
(vii) Bills of Lading 2.59 32
(viii)Law of Property Act 1925, Section 56(1) 2.60 33
(ix) Companies Act 1985, Section 14 2.61 34
(x) Package Travel, Package Holidays and Package
Tours Regulations 1992 2.62 34
2. Calls for Reform 2.63 35
iii
Paragraph Page
SECTION B: PRELIMINARY ISSUES

PART III: ARGUMENTS FOR REFORM
1. The Intentions of the Original Contracting Parties are
Thwarted 3.1 39
2. The Injustice to the Third Party 3.2 39
3. The Person Who Has Suffered the Loss Cannot Sue, While the
Person Who Has Suffered No Loss Can Sue 3.3 40
4. Even if the Promisee Can Obtain a Satisfactory Remedy for
the Third Party, the Promisee May Not be Able to, or
Wish to, Sue 3.4 40
5. The Development of Non-Comprehensive Exceptions 3.5 41
6. Complexity, Artificiality and Uncertainty 3.6 41
7. Widespread Criticism Throughout the Common Law World 3.7 41
8. The Legal Systems of Most Member States of the European
Union Allow Third Parties to Enforce Contracts 3.8 41
9. The Third Party Rule Causes Difficulties in Commercial Life 3.9 43
(1) Construction Contracts 3.10 43
(2) Insurance Contracts 3.24 48
10. Conclusion 3.28 50
PART IV: PRECEDENTS FOR REFORM

1. The Law Revision Committee Report 4.2 53
2. Abrogation of Third Party Rule in Other Common Law
Jurisdictions 4.5 55
(1) Western Australia 4.5 55
(2) Queensland 4.8 56
(3) New Zealand 4.9 57
(4) United States 4.15 60
PART V: THE FORM OF THE LEGISLATION

1. A Detailed Legislative Scheme? 5.1 63
(1) Further Exceptions in Specific Instances 5.3 63
(2) Abolishing the Rule Preventing Recovery by the Promisee of Third
Party’s Loss 5.4 63
(3) Removal of the Bar to Third Party Enforcement 5.5 64
(4) Reform by Means of a Detailed Legislative Scheme 5.7 65
2. Judicial Development of Third Party Rights 5.10 65
3. Reform of the Promisee’s Remedies? 5.12 66
PART VI: THE THIRD PARTY RULE AND

CONSIDERATION
1. Introduction and Consultation 6.1 68
2. Consideration Must Move From the Promisee 6.3 68
3. The Joint Promisee Exception 6.9 704.
Reforming Privity Without Reforming Consideration: the
Deeper Policy Question 6.13 72
iv
Paragraph Page
SECTION C: CENTRAL REFORM ISSUES

PART VII: THE TEST OF ENFORCEABILITY
1. Consultation and Our Recommendation 7.1 74
2. The First Limb of the Test of Enforceability 7.10 77
3. The Second Limb of the Test of Enforceability 7.17 80
(1) General Aspects of the Second Limb 7.17 80
(2) Negligent Will-Drafting 7.19 81
(3) The Application of the Second Limb of the Test to Various
Hypothetical Situations 7.28 85
(4) The Application of the Second Limb of the Test to Some Past Cases 7.45 90
4. The Rejected Tests 7.52 92
5. A Special Test of Enforceability for Consumers? 7.54 93
PART VIII: DESIGNATION, EXISTENCE, AND

ASCERTAINABILITY OF THIRD PARTY
1. Designation 8.1 95
2. Existence of Third Party 8.5 96
3. Pre-Incorporation Contracts: A Special Case? 8.9 97
4. Ascertainability of Third Party and Certainty 8.17 100
PART IX: VARIATION AND CANCELLATION

1. Provisional Proposals and Consultation 9.1 101
2. The Two Extreme Positions 9.5 102
(1) Variation or Cancellation at Any Time 9.5 102
(2) No Variation or Cancellation 9.10 103
3. Possible “Crystallisation” Tests 9.11 104
(1) Awareness 9.12 104
(2) Reliance 9.14 104
(3) Detrimental Reliance 9.15 104
(4) Acceptance 9.16 105
(5) Adoption Expressly or by Conduct 9.17 105
4. Choice of Test 9.18 105
5. The Reliance Test: Further Details 9.27 108
(1) Need the Promisor Be Aware Of, or Forsee, the Reliance? 9.27 108
(2) Material Reliance 9.31 109
(3) Protection of the Third Party's Reliance or Expectation Interest? 9.32 109
(4) Burden of Proof 9.34 110
(5) Reliance by Someone Other Than the Third Party 9.35 110
6. Reservation of a Right to Vary or Cancel 9.37 111
7. Can the Relevant Crystallisation Test be Laid Down in the
Contract? 9.41 112
8. Crystallisation Where There Is More Than One Third Party 9.43 112
9. Creating Irrevocable Rights 9.45 113
10. Judicial Discretion to Authorise Variation or Cancellation 9.48 113
v
Paragraph Page
PART X: DEFENCES, SET-OFFS AND

COUNTERCLAIMS
1. Introduction 10.1 115
2. Precedents for Reform 10.5 116
(1) Law Revision Committee/Western Australia/Queensland 10.5 116
(2) United States 10.6 117
(3) New Zealand 10.7 117
3. Options for Reform 10.8 118
4. Defences, Set-Offs and Counterclaims Available Only Against
the Third Party 10.17 122
5. Third Party Enforcing an Exclusion or Limitation Clause 10.22 123
6. The Line Between Benefits and Burdens 10.24 124
PART XI: OVERLAPPING CLAIMS

1. More Than One Plaintiff: Claims by the Third Party and by the
Promisee 11.1 128
(1) Promisee’s Rights 11.1 128
(2) Promisee’s Rights Where Performance by Promisor to Third Party 11.5 128
(3) Promisee’s Rights Where Release of/Settlement with Promisor by
Third Party 11.7 129
(4) Releases Where More Than One Third Party 11.9 130
(5) Third Party’s Rights Where Performance by Promisor to Promisee
(Rather than to Third Party), or Release of/Settlement with Promisor
by Promisee 11.11 131
(6) Priority of Action? 11.14 131
(7) Avoidance of Double Liability 11.16 132
2. More Than One Defendant: Claims by the Third Party Against
the Promisor, and Against the Promisee on a Pre-Existing
Liability 11.23 135
PART XII: EXISTING EXCEPTIONS

1. Preserving Existing Exceptions 12.1 138
2. Should Existing Legislation Conferring Rights of Enforceability
on Third Parties Preclude a Third Party Taking Rights under
Our Proposed Legislation? 12.5 139
(1) Contracts for the Carriage of Goods by Sea 12.7 140
(2) Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods by Road, Rail
or Air 12.12 142
(3) Contracts Contained in Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes and
Other Negotiable Instruments 12.16 144
3. Should This Opportunity Be Taken to Reform the Third Parties
(Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 and the Married Women’s
Property Act 1882? 12.18 145
(1) Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 12.19 145
(2) Married Women’s Property Act 1882 12.22 146
vi
Paragraph Page
PART XIII: CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS

1. Our General Approach 13.1 149
2. The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 13.9 151
3. Limitation Act 1980 13.14 155
PART XIV: MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES

1. Joinder of Promisee 14.1 156
2. Assignment of the Third Party’s Right 14.6 157
3. Contracts for the Sale of Land 14.8 158
4. Choice of Law 14.12 160
5. Arbitration Agreements and Jurisdiction Agreements 14.14 160
6. Commencement of the Legislation 14.20 163
SECTION D: SUMMARY
PART XV: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 164
Appendix A: Draft Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Bill with

Explanatory Notes 173
Appendix B: Legislation From Some Other Jurisdictions 184
Appendix C: List of Persons and Organisations who Commented on
Consultation Paper No 121 191
Appendix D: Participants at the Conference on Reform of the Law of
Privity of Contract 194
vii
THE LAW COMMISSION
Item 1 of the Sixth Programme of Law Reform: The Law of Contract
PRIVITY OF CONTRACT: CONTRACTS FOR

THE BENEFIT OF THIRD PARTIES
To the Right Honourable the Lord Mackay of Clashfern, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain
SECTION A
BACKGROUND
PART I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 In 1995 in the Court of Appeal in Darlington Borough Council v Wiltshier Northern Ltd1
Steyn LJ, in criticising the present law, said the following:-
The case for recognising a contract for the benefit of a third party is simple and
straightforward. The autonomy of the will of the parties should be respected. The
law of contract should give effect to the reasonable expectations of contracting
parties. Principle certainly requires that a burden should not be imposed on a third
party without his consent. But there is no doctrinal, logical, or policy reason why
the law should deny effectiveness to a contract for the benefit of a third party where
that is the expressed intention of the parties. Moreover, often the parties, and
particularly third parties, organise their affairs on the faith of the contract. They rely
on the contract. It is therefore unjust to deny effectiveness to such a contract. I will
not struggle with the point further since nobody seriously asserts the contrary.2
1.2 In this Report we make recommendations for the reform of that part of the doctrine
of privity of contract which lays down that a contract does not confer rights on
someone who is not a party to the contract (hereinafter referred to as the “third party
rule”). Our proposals will mean, for example, that subsequent purchasers or tenants
of buildings can be given rights to enforce an architect’s or building contractor’s
contractual obligations without the cost, complexity and inconvenience of a large
number of separate contracts;3 that an employer can take out medical expenses
insurance for its employees without there being doubts as to whether the employees
can enforce the policy against the insurance company;4 that a life insurance policy
taken out for one’s stepchild or cohabitee is enforceable (subject to a term to the
1
[1995] 1 WLR 68.
2
Ibid, at p 76. For other calls for reform, see paras 2.63-2.69 below.
3
See paras 3.12-3.19 below.
4
See paras 3.25-3.26 and 7.32 below.
1
contrary) by that named beneficiary;5 and that a contractual clause limiting or
excluding one’s liability to a third party (for example, the promisee’s subsidiary
company or sub-contractor or employee) will be straightforwardly enforceable by that
third party.6
1.3 The Law Commission first became interested in this subject after the Commission’s
creation in 1965.7 Item 1 of the First Programme of Law Reform was the codification
of the law of contract. Item 3 included the topic of third party rights. A substantial
amount of work was done on this topic in conjunction with work on consideration. At
that time it was felt that reform of privity could not usefully be undertaken without
reform of the doctrine of consideration. The relationship between the doctrines of
privity and of consideration is discussed in Part VI below, where we explain why we
believe that reform of the third party rule can be profitably undertaken without
reassessing the entire doctrine of consideration.
1.4 In 1973 work was suspended on the production of a contract code8 which, in its draft
form, would have provided for the creation of rights in third parties.9 The Law
Commission’s strategy since then has been to tackle problems in the law of contract
as separate projects.10 In arriving at the view that a project on privity was justified, we
were influenced by, for example, the continued judicial and academic criticism of the
doctrine,11 by the work of Commonwealth law reform bodies,12 by insights gained
from our work on the rights of buyers of goods carried by sea,13 and by a more cautious
5
See paras 3.25-3.26 and 7.34 below. The Married Women’s Property Act 1882 extends only to
spouses and children.
6
See paras 2.19-2.35, 3.20, 7.10 and 7.43 below.
7
This project now comes within Item 1 of the Sixth Programme of Law Reform, Law Com No
234.
8
8th Annual Report 1972-1973, Law Com No 58, paras 3-4.
9
See H McGregor, Contract Code drawn up on behalf of the English Law Commission (1993) ss 641ff.
10
Exemption Clauses: Second Report (1975) Law Com No 69; Scot Law Com No 39 (see the
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977); Report on Contribution (1977) Law Com No 79 (see the
Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978); Implied Terms in Contracts for the Supply of Goods
(1979) Law Com No 95 (see the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982); Pecuniary Restitution
on Breach of Contract (1983) Law Com No 121; Minors’ Contracts (1984) Law Com No 134
(see the Minors’ Contracts Act 1987); The Parol Evidence Rule (1986) Law Com No 154;
Implied Terms in Contracts for the Supply of Services (1986) Law Com No 156; Sale and
Supply of Goods (1987) Law Com No 160; Scot Law Com No 104 (see the Sale and Supply of
Goods Act 1994); Rights of Suit in Respect of Carriage of Goods by Sea (1991) Law Com No
196; Scot Law Com No 130 (see the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992); Contributory
Negligence as a Defence in Contract (1993) Law Com No 219; Firm Offers (1975) Law Com
Working Paper No 60; Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid (1975) Law Com
Working Paper No 61.
11
12
13
Rights of Suit in Respect of Carriage of Goods by Sea (1991), Law Com No 196; Scot Law Com
No 130 (see the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992).
2
judicial approach in the late 1980s and early 1990s to tort liability for pure economic
loss.14 In short we had little doubt that the continued existence of the third party rule
represented a pressing problem for the English law of contract.
1.5 In Consultation Paper No 121,15 we set out the current law on the third party rule, the
case for its reform, and the main issues that would need to be dealt with in any reform.
In an Appendix, we gave an account of the way in which the problem has been dealt
with in other jurisdictions. Our provisional conclusion was that the law ought to be
reformed and that the reform should be embodied in a detailed legislative scheme. The
principal feature of that scheme (that is, the test of enforceability) would be that a third
party should be able to enforce a contract where the parties intended that the third
party should receive the benefit of the promised performance and also intended to
create a legal obligation enforceable by the third party.
1.6 The Consultation Paper attracted 102 replies. A clear majority accepted the validity
of our arguments in favour of reform. Our provisional proposals were particularly
welcomed by the legal profession and some other professional bodies, academic
lawyers, consumer organisations, and the insurance and banking industries. While it
was to be expected that the subject of the Consultation Paper would be of great interest
to academic lawyers, the wide range of responses from non-academic lawyers and non-
lawyers reflects the degree to which the third party rule still causes significant
difficulties in practice.
1.7 The minority who opposed the proposals outlined in the Consultation Paper did so in
reliance on four main general arguments.16 First, that reform was unnecessary because
the rule caused few problems in practice given that those who were affected by it could
use various devices, described below,17 to get round the third party rule. Secondly, that
no legislative reform could hope adequately to deal with all the diverse situations where
the third party rule is relevant. Thirdly, that the existing legal regime, while
complicated, achieved certainty, and that reform would only result in uncertainty and
litigation. Fourthly, that the proposals for reform might lead to contracting parties
being bound to third parties when this was not their true intention.
14
See, eg, Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; Murphy v Brentwood District Council
[1991] 1 AC 398.
15
Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties (1991) (hereinafter referred to as
Consultation Paper No 121).
16
The main opposition to the proposals in the Consultation Paper came from some, although by
no means all, of the twenty or so responses from the construction industry. Professor Burrows
presented a revised version of our proposals in a lecture to the Society of Construction Law on
4 April 1995; and a copy of that lecture was sent to members of that society inviting comments.
The response to that lecture, both at the time and subsequently, suggests that our final
recommendations will not be opposed by the construction industry.
17
3
1.8 We disagree with the view that the third party rule does not cause significant problems
in practice.18 We cannot ignore those who do not have access to (good) legal advice
and, in any event, our proposed reforms will provide a simpler way of affording a third
party the right to enforce a contract than the present convoluted techniques. This will
not only save the parties costs, it will also save the taxpayer the needless litigation costs
caused by the complexity of the present law. Nevertheless the response of the minority
who opposed the proposed reform was invaluable in requiring us to reassess whether
our proposals were too uncertain and would result in the imposition of unintended
liabilities. In certain respects - and especially as regards the test of enforceability - we
have modified our provisional recommendations in an attempt to allay those kinds of
fears. We should emphasise, at the outset, that our recommendations are not
concerned to override the allocation of liability within contracts but rather rest on an
underlying policy of effectuating the contracting parties’ intentions. At root our
recommendations would enable the parties to create enforceable third party rights in
contract without the complexities of the devices presently used to circumvent the
privity doctrine.
1.9 Our general approach has been to devise moderate reform proposals which can be
expected to gain wide support. Some more radical possibilities have been put to one
side for fear that the central reform would otherwise be endangered. For example, we
do not in this report recommend a special test of enforceability for third parties who
are consumers;19 we do not propose a reform of insurance contracts that goes as far as
section 48 of the Australian Insurance Contracts Act 1984;20 and we do not seek to
recast the decision of the House of Lords in White v Jones21 by bringing the claims of
disappointed beneficiaries under negligently drafted wills within our proposed Act.22
1.10 It has also been important in our thinking that, while we believe that a detailed
legislative scheme is the best means of reforming privity, we have no desire to hamper
judicial creativity in this area. For example, we have left to the developing common
law, what the rights of promisees should be in contracts for the benefit of third
parties;23 and we have left open for the judges to decide what the rights of a joint
promisee, who has not provided consideration, should be.24 In general terms, we see
our draft Bill as achieving at a stroke and with certainty and clarity what a progressive
House of Lords might well itself have brought about over the course of time. While the
18
See paras 3.5-3.6 and especially 3.9-3.27 below.
19
20
21
[1995] 2 AC 207.
22
23
24
4
draft Bill departs from a long-established common law rule, we hope that it will not be
seen as cutting across the underpinning principles of the common law.
1.11 The arrangement of this Report is as follows. In Part II we examine the present law
and calls for reform. In Part III we present the case for reform. Part IV looks at
precedents for reform. In Parts V and VI we examine the form of the legislation and
the relationship between our reform and the consideration doctrine. In Parts VII to
XIV we set out the important issues raised by any reform. In each of Parts VII to XIV,
we comment on the responses received to the provisional proposals in our Consultation
Paper, and then make detailed proposals for dealing with the issues raised. Part XV
contains a summary of our recommendations. A draft Bill to give effect to our
recommendations is to be found in Appendix A. Certain statutes from other
jurisdictions to which we commonly refer are reproduced in Appendix B. Appendix
C contains a list of those who responded to the Consultation Paper. Appendix D lists
those who participated at a conference examining Consultation Paper No 121 held at
the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies.
1.12 We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the following people, who helped us with
various aspects of this paper:-
Professor Jack Beatson, Rouse Ball Professor of English Law at Cambridge University,
who was the Law Commissioner in charge of this project until October 1994 and who
has subsequently continued to provide invaluable advice and assistance to us in
bringing this Report to fruition; Professor Hugh Beale, University of Warwick,
Professor Aubrey Diamond QC, Notre Dame University, and Professor Sally Wheeler,
University of Leeds, who together formed our advisory working party; Professor
Guenter Treitel QC, Vinerian Professor of English Law at Oxford University, who gave
generously of his time and expertise in the final stages of this project; Sir Wilfred
Bourne QC who carried out the analysis of consultation; Professor Roy Goode QC,
Norton Rose Professor of English Law at Oxford University; Lord Justice Saville; Mr
Justice Longmore; Mr Justice Rix; Michael Brindle QC; Stewart Boyd QC; V V Veeder
QC; David Foxton; Toby Landau; Frances Paterson; Michael Marks Cohen;
Alexander Green; Bruce Harris; Alex Maitland Hudson; Dr Malcolm Clarke, St John’s
College, Cambridge; Dr Gerhard Dannemann, Centre for the Advanced Study of
European and Comparative Law, University of Oxford; Professor Richard Sutton, New
Zealand Law Commission.
5
PART II
THE PRESENT LAW AND CALLS FOR
REFORM
1. The Present Law
(1) A Brief Statement of the Third Party Rule in Contract
2.1 A contract or its performance can affect a third party.1 However, the doctrine of privity
means that, as a general rule, a contract cannot confer rights or impose obligations
arising under it on any person except the parties to it.2 This Report is concerned with
the conferral of rights on third parties (including whether a third party should be able to
claim the benefit of an exclusion clause contained in a contract to which he is not a
party); and, as we have indicated above,3 references in it to the “third party rule” are
to this aspect of the privity doctrine. It was provisionally recommended in the
Consultation Paper4 that the present rule should be retained whereby, subject to a few
exceptions,5 parties to a contract cannot impose an obligation on a third party. There
was no dissent from this by consultees.6 It would be an unwarranted infringement of
a third party’s liberty if contracting parties were able, as a matter of course, to impose
burdens on a third party without his or her consent. Our proposed reforms do not,
therefore, seek to change the ‘burden’ aspect of the privity doctrine or the exceptions
to it.
(2) Development of the Third Party Rule

2.2 It is generally agreed that the modern third party rule was conclusively established in
1861 in Tweddle v Atkinson.7 In Drive Yourself Hire Co (London) Ltd v Strutt,8 Denning
LJ said:
1
As when C guarantees a debt owed by A to B and A pays, thus releasing C who thereby indirectly
gains a benefit. See Treitel, The Law of Contract (9th ed, 1995) p 551.
2
Before Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, the privity doctrine was seen as precluding actions
in tort by third parties arising from negligence by a party to a contract in carrying it out:
Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 10 M & W 109; 152 ER 402.
3
See para 1.2 above.
4
Consultation Paper No 121, paras 5.36-5.37, 6.17.
5
The exceptions include agency, restrictive covenants running with land, restrictive covenants
running with goods (see, eg, Lord Strathcona SS Co v Dominion Coal Co [1926] AC 108),
bailment (eg, Morris v CW Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 QB 716; Singer (UK) Ltd v Tees and
Hartlepool Port Authority [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 164, 167-168; The Captain Gregos (No 2) [1990]
2 Lloyd’s Rep 395, 405; KH Enterprise (cargo owners) v Pioneer Containers (owners), The Pioneer
Container [1994] 2 AC 324), and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, s 3.
6
Although a few consultees did suggest further exceptions that, at least at this stage, we consider
are better left to common law development (eg that the situations in which exclusion clauses bind
third parties should be extended).
7
(1861) 1 B & S 393; 121 ER 762.
8
[1954] 1 QB 250.
6
It is often said to be a fundamental principle of our law that only a person who
is a party to a contract can sue on it. I wish to assert, as distinctly as I can, that
the common law in its original setting knew no such principle. Indeed, it said
quite the contrary. For the 200 years before 1861 it was settled law that, if a
promise in a simple contract was made expressly for the benefit of a third person
in such circumstances that it was intended to be enforceable by him, then the
common law would enforce the promise at his instance, although he was not a
party to the contract.9
2.3 Denning LJ cited several cases to support his view. In Dutton v Poole,10 a son promised
his father that, in return for his father not selling a wood, he would pay £1000 to his
sister. The father refrained from selling the wood, but the son did not pay. It was held
that the sister could sue, on the ground that the consideration and promise to the
father may well have extended to her on account of the tie of blood between them.11
In Marchington v Vernon,12 Buller J said that, independently of the rules prevailing in
mercantile transactions,13 if one person makes a promise to another for the benefit of
a third, the third may maintain an action upon it. In Carnegie v Waugh,14 the tutors and
curators of an infant, C, executed an agreement for a lease with A, for an annual rent
to be paid to C. It was held that C could sue on the instrument, even though he was
not a party to it. In addition, there is a respectable line of 16th and 17th century
authority allowing an intended beneficiary a right of action.15 These cases often
involved similar facts. The fathers of a potential bride and groom would agree to pay
a sum of money to the groom if he married, the bride’s father subsequently reneging
on the agreement. In several of these cases it was held that, not only could the groom
9
[1954] 1 QB 250, 272.
10
(1678) 2 Lev 210; 83 ER 523. This decision was supported, obiter, by Lord Mansfield in Martyn
v Hind (1776) 2 Cowp 437, 443; 98 ER 1174, 1177.
11
The report discloses disagreement in the King’s Bench during the argument, on the grounds that
the daughter was privy neither to the promise nor the consideration. Nevertheless, the decision
was upheld in the Exchequer Chamber: (1679) T Raym 302; 83 ER 156.
12
(1797) 1 Bos & P 101, n (c); 126 ER 801, n (c). This case was described as “but a loose note
at Nisi Prius” by counsel in the interesting case of Phillips v Bateman (1812) 16 East 356, 371;
104 ER 1124, 1129, where A, in the face of a run on a banking house, promised to support the
bank with £30,000, whereupon note holders stopped withdrawing their money. When the bank
subsequently stopped paying out, A was held not liable to an action by individual holders of bank
notes.
13
The case itself involved a bill of exchange.
14
(1823) 1 LJ (OS) KB 89.
15
A Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract (1975), pp 477-478. See also V Palmer,
“The History of Privity - The Formative Period” (1500-1680) (1989) 33 Am J Leg Hist 3; D
Ibbetson; “Consideration and the Theory of Contract in Sixteenth Century Common Law” in
J Barton (ed), Towards a General Law of Contract (1990), 67, 96-99. Cf V Palmer, The Paths to
Privity - The History of Third Party Beneficiary Contracts at English Law (1992).
7
sue to recover the amount promised, but that his father, the promisee, could not sue
because he had no interest in performance.16
2.4 In spite of these cases favouring actions by third party beneficiaries, it is not accurate
to say that the third party rule was entirely a 19th century innovation. There were
other 16th and 17th century cases where a third party was denied an action on the
grounds that the promisee was the only person entitled to bring the action.17 There
were also cases where the reason given why the third party could not sue was because
he was a stranger to the consideration, that is, he had given nothing in return for the
promise.18 These cases typically involved the following facts. B owed money to C. A
would agree with B to pay C in return for B doing something for A, such as working
or conveying a house. A would not pay, and C would sue A. C would lose because he
or she had given nothing for A’s promise.
2.5 Thus, by the mid-19th century there appeared to be no firm rule either way in English
law. The position was to be clarified in Tweddle v Atkinson.19 The facts involved an
agreement by the fathers of a bride and groom to pay the groom a sum of money.
When the bride’s father failed to pay, the groom sued unsuccessfully. Wightman J said
that no stranger to the consideration could take advantage of a contract though made
for his benefit. Crompton J said that consideration must move from the promisee.20
2.6 The authority of Tweddle v Atkinson was soon generally acknowledged. In Gandy v
Gandy,21 Bowen LJ said that, in spite of earlier cases to the contrary, Tweddle v
Atkinson had laid down “the true common law doctrine”. In Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co
16
Lever v Heys Moo KB 550; 72 ER 751; also Levet v Hawes Cro Eliz 619, 652; 78 ER 860, 891;
Provender v Wood Het 30; 124 ER 318; Hadves v Levit Het 176; 124 ER 433. In an altogether
different scenario in Rippon v Norton Cro Eliz 849; 78 ER 1074, A promised B that his son would
keep the peace against B and B’s son (C). A’s son thereafter assaulted B’s son. B, alleging
medical expenses and loss of the services of his son, failed in his action against A, even though
he was the promisee. It was said that the son (C) was the person who should have sued, which
he later did successfully: Cro Eliz 881; 78 ER 1106.
17
Jordan v Jordan (1594) Cro Eliz 369; 78 ER 616 (C gave a warrant to B to arrest A for an
alleged debt. A promised B that, in return for not arresting him, he would pay the debt. C failed
in his action, on the ground, inter alia, that the promise had been made to B); Taylor v Foster
(1600) Cro Eliz 776; 78 ER 1034 (A, in return for B marrying his daughter, agreed to pay to C
an amount which B owed to C. In an action by B against A, it was held that B was the person
to sue, being the promisee).
18
Bourne v Mason (1669) 1 Ventr 6; 86 ER 5; Crow v Rogers (1724) 1 St 592; 93 ER 719; Price v
Easton (1833) 4 B & Ad 433; 110 ER 518. Although in the former two cases, the reason why C
failed was because he was a stranger to the consideration, Price v Easton contains seeds of more
modern doctrine: whereas Denman CJ said that no consideration for the promise moved from
C to A, Littledale J said that there was no privity between C and A.
19
(1861) 1 B & S 393; 121 ER 762.
20
The earlier cases allowing children to be considered a party to their father’s consideration were
considered obsolete. Dutton v Poole (1678) T Raym 302; 83 ER 156, being a decision of the
Exchequer Chamber could not be overruled by the Queen’s Bench, but was nonetheless not
followed.
21
(1885) 30 ChD 57, 69.
8
Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd,22 the House of Lords accepted that it was a fundamental
principle of English law that only a party to a contract who had provided consideration
could sue on it. Despite several attempts by Denning LJ to allow rights of suit by third
party beneficiaries,23 the House of Lords reaffirmed the general rule in Midland Silicones
Ltd v Scruttons Ltd.24 Viscount Simonds said:
[H]eterodoxy, or, as some might say, heresy, is not the more attractive because
it is dignified by the name of reform. ...If the principle of jus quaesitum tertio is to
be introduced into our law, it must be done by Parliament after a due
consideration of its merits and demerits.25
2.7 Although the House of Lords has subsequently strongly criticised the rule,26 it has
refrained from any judicial abrogation of it. Thus the general rule remains that a third
party cannot enforce a contract made for its benefit.
(3) Existing Exceptions to, or Circumventions of, the Third Party Rule27
(a) Trusts of the Promise28
2.8 A chose in action may be the subject matter of a trust. Hence a promise by A to B to
pay a sum of money to C may be construed as constituting B a trustee of the promise
by A for the benefit of C. If so, C (as beneficiary of the trust) can sue to enforce the
promise. Thus equity allows a third party to enforce a contract where this can be
construed as creating a completely constituted trust in his or her favour. The third
party is not then relying merely on a contract made by others. However, the cases
demonstrate that the notion of a trust of the promise is confined within narrow limits.
It has only been applied to promises to pay money or to transfer property, and attempts
22
[1915] AC 847.
23
Smith and Snipes Hall Farm Ltd v River Douglas Catchment Board [1949] 2 KB 500; Drive Yourself
Hire Co (London) Ltd v Strutt [1954] 1 QB 250.
24
[1962] AC 446 (Lord Denning dissenting).
25
At pp 467-468.
26
See Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58, 72; Woodar Investment Developments Ltd v Wimpey
Construction UK Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 277, 291, 297-298, 300. See also dicta of Lord Diplock in
Swain v Law Society [1983] 1 AC 598, 611; and of Lord Goff in The Pioneer Container [1994]
2 AC 324, 335 and White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207, 262-263. See generally paras 2.63-2.69
below.
27
Two consultees pointed out to us that deed polls (under which a person can undertake an
obligation to another person without that other person having to be a party to the document) are
quite frequently used in the commercial world as a means of evading privity, particularly where
the beneficiaries belong to a large and fluctuating class. Deed polls cannot be varied once
executed. See generally Sunderland Marine Insurance Co v Kearney (1851) 16 QB 925; 117 ER
1136; Norton on Deeds (2nd ed, 1928) p 27 ff.
28
See generally, J Hornby, “Covenants in Favour of Volunteers” (1962) 78 LQR 228; W Lee,
“The Public Policy of Re Cook’s Settlement Trusts” (1969) 85 LQR 213; J Barton, “Trusts and
Covenants” (1975) 91 LQR 236; R Meager and J Lehane, “Trusts of Voluntary Covenants”
(1976) 92 LQR 427; C Rickett, “The Constitution of Trusts: Contracts to Create Trusts”
(1979) 32 CLP 1; C Rickett, “Two Propositions in the Constitution of Trusts” (1981) 34 CLP
189.
9
to apply it to other forms of contractual obligation have failed.29 Most importantly, it
must be established that the promisee intended to create a trust. The courts were once
prepared to infer this from the simple intention to benefit a third party,30 an approach
which reached its high water mark in Les Affréteurs Réunis SA v Leopold Walford
(London) Ltd.31 But in the majority of cases since then they have refused to draw that
inference and have instead required a clear indication that a trust was intended.32 The
consequence has been that in recent times this exception has rarely been of assistance
to a third party.
2.9 We think it most unlikely that the reasoning of a majority of the Court of Appeal in
Darlington Borough Council v Wiltshier (Northern) Ltd33 will herald a swing back to the
old approach to trusts of a promise. In that case, A (Wiltshier) entered into a contract
with B (Morgan Grenfell) for the benefit of C (Darlington); and B had entered into a
contract with C to assign the benefit of its contract with A to C. The majority
considered that, by analogy to early trust cases like Lloyd’s v Harper,34 B was a
“constructive trustee” of the benefit of its rights against A for C. Hence B could have
recovered from A substantial damages as representing C’s loss; and, on assignment by
B to C, C was entitled to the substantial damages that B would itself have been entitled
to. It should be emphasised that this was an alternative ground for the decision. As we
explain below, the principal reasoning of the Court of Appeal was based on an
application of the rule in Dunlop v Lambert.35
(b) Covenants Concerning Land

2.10 The law allows certain covenants (whether positive or restrictive) to run with land so
as to benefit (or burden) people other than the original contracting parties. The
relevant covenant may relate to freehold land or leasehold land. The law relating to the
running of covenants is an illustration of where, for commercial and ethical reasons,
the privity of contract doctrine has been departed from through the development of a
29
See Southern Water Authority v Carey [1985] 2 All ER 1077, 1083; Norwich City Council v Harvey
[1989] 1 WLR 828; Chitty on Contracts (27th ed, 1994), paras 18-045-18-054.
30
Eg Tomlinson v Gill (1756) Amb 330, 27 ER 221; Fletcher v Fletcher (1844) 4 Hare 67, 67 ER
564; Lloyd’s v Harper (1880) 16 ChD 290; Re Flavell (1883) 25 ChD 89.
31
[1919] AC 801. See M MacIntyre, “Third Party Rights in Canadian and English Law” (1965)
2 UBCL Rev 103, 104-105.
32
See Re Engelbach [1924] 2 Ch 348; Vandepitte v Preferred Accident Insurance Corpn of New York
[1933] AC 70; Re Clay’s Policy [1937] 2 All ER 548; Re Foster [1938] 3 All ER 357; Re Sinclair’s
Life Policy [1938] Ch 799; Re Schebsman [1944] Ch 83 (see also Treitel, The Law of Contract (9th
ed, 1995) p 578 n 99).
33
[1995] 1 WLR 68, 75 per Dillon LJ (with whom Waite LJ agreed); Steyn LJ, at p 81, found it
unnecessary to consider this point. See paras 2.42-2.45, below.
34
(1880) 16 ChD 290. In Lloyd’s v Harper, however, both James LJ (at p 315) and Lush LJ (at p
321) seemed to regard as important the fact that this approach was necessary in order to permit
effective functioning of the common practice in existence in insurance transactions at Lloyd’s.
35
(1839) 6 Cl & F 600; 7 ER 824. See paras 2.39-2.46 below.
10
separate body of “non-contractual” principles (here the principles being categorised as
belonging to the law of real property).
2.11 The law on covenants relating to leasehold land has recently been reformed by the
Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995.36 The effect of the 1995 Act can be
briefly explained in the following four points:-
(i) The benefit and burden of covenants in a lease granted prior to 1996 would pass
on an assignment of the lease or reversion so as to benefit or bind the assignee of
the lease or the reversion, provided that the covenant “touched and concerned” the
land.37 As a result of the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995, in relation
to leases granted after 1995, the benefit and burden of all covenants in a lease
passes on an assignment of the lease or reversion unless the covenant is expressed
to be personal.38 It is now for the parties to decide whether a covenant is to be
regarded as personal. It is no longer for the court to try to decide it objectively
according to whether it is thought to “touch and concern” the land.
(ii) Where, prior to 1996, L granted a lease to T and T then sublet to S, the burden
of the covenants in the headlease did not bind S, the sublessee, because there was
no privity of estate39 between L and S. This was subject to an exception. If the
covenant was a restrictive covenant, it would bind S as an equitable property
right, provided that, where the title was unregistered, he had notice of the
covenant (as he would in practice)40 or, where the title was registered, in any
event.41 In leases granted after 1995, this rule is codified. A restrictive covenant
in the headlease binds any sublessee automatically.42
(iii) Where, prior to 1996, L granted a lease to T and T then sublet to S, S could
enforce the benefit of any landlord covenants which touched and concerned the
land against L, despite the absence of privity of contract. This is because the
benefit of such covenants was annexed under section 78 of the Law of Property
Act 1925 and could be enforced by a person with a derivative interest.43 In a
36
Based on the recommendations made in Landlord and Tenant Law: Privity of Contract and
Estate (1988) Law Com No 174.
37
Spencer’s Case (1583) 5 Co Rep 16a; 77 ER 72 (leases); Law of Property Act 1925, ss 141-142
(reversions).
38
Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995, s 3(6).
39
Which simply means the relationship of landlord and tenant.
40
See Law of Property Act 1925, s 44; White v Bijou Mansions Ltd [1937] Ch 610.
41
Land Registration Act 1925, s 23(1)(a).
42
Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995, s 3(5).
43
Smith v River Douglas Catchment Board [1949] 2 KB 500 (lessee able to enforce annexed freehold
covenant on the wording of s 78). As it is clear that s 78 applies to leases as well as to freeholds:
Caerns Motor Services Ltd v Texaco Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 1249, S must be able to enforce the
covenant against L.
11
lease granted after 1995, this is no longer possible.44 S cannot enforce any
covenant in the headlease against L.
(iv) For leases granted prior to 1996, the original tenant and landlord remained
liable for a breach of covenant in the lease despite assignment. For leases
granted after 1995 the original tenant45 will generally be released from covenants
in the lease once the lease has been assigned.46 This aspect of the reforms is
concerned to cut back a normal feature of privity of contract rather than being
concerned with the exception to privity of contract constituted by covenants
running with land.
2.12 As regards covenants relating to freehold land (which are unaffected by the 1995 Act)
any such covenants entered into after 1926 which touch and concern the land will in
most cases be automatically annexed to the land of the covenantee under section 78
of the Law of Property Act 1925.47 According to the wording of that section, where
the covenant in question is positive it may then be enforced by the covenantee, his
successors in title and those who derive title under him or them (such as mortgagees
and lessees). Squatters (who are not successors in title) or licensees (who have no title)
cannot enforce such an annexed covenant. Where the covenant is restrictive, any
owner or occupier for the time being can enforce the annexed covenant even though
he or she may be a squatter or licensee. There will be few covenants made after 1926
which are not annexed in this way.48
(c) Tort of Negligence

2.13 The tort of negligence can be viewed as an exception to the third party rule where the
negligence in question constitutes the breach of a contract to which the plaintiff is not
a party. For example, the classic case of negligence, Donoghue v Stevenson,49
established that where A supplies goods to B under a contract with B, A may owe a
duty to C in respect of personal injury or damage to property caused by defects in
those goods. But the right not to be injured or to have one’s property damaged by
another’s negligence exists independently of any contractual undertaking by A. It is
44
Law of Property Act 1925, s 78 does not apply to such leases (Landlord and Tenant (Covenants)
Act 1995, s 30(4)) and this effect of that section is not replicated: cf Landlord and Tenant
(Covenants) Act 1995, s 15.
45
Somewhat different provisions apply in respect of an assignment of the reversion by the landlord.
The landlord must apply to the tenant to be released from the landlord covenants. If the tenant
refuses to do so, the court may release the landlord if it considers it reasonable to do so. See
Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995, ss 6-8.
46
Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995, ss 3 and 5; although under s 16 a tenant may enter
into an “authorised guarantee agreement” to guarantee compliance with the covenants by the
assignee.
47
Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 594.
48
It is probably only those which are expressed to be capable of passing solely by express
assignment: Roake v Chadha [1984] 1 WLR 40.
49
[1932] AC 562.
12
only in a very wide sense, therefore, that standard examples of the tort of negligence
constitute exceptions to the third party rule.
2.14 Of more direct interest are cases of pure economic loss recovery in the tort of
negligence where the basis of the third party’s claim appears to be the failure by A
properly to perform a contract made with B.50 In other words, cases where the basis
of the third party’s tort claim appears not to be independent of the rights conferred by
the contract. For example, in Ross v Caunters,51 an improperly executed will deprived
a prospective beneficiary of an intended benefit, and the prospective beneficiary was
able to recover in tort against the negligent solicitor. It can be argued that the remedy
in tort effectively served to enforce a contract benefiting a third party at the suit of the
third party. The third party was awarded the expectation loss of the benefits that he
would have received under the will. This decision was confirmed by the House of
Lords in White v Jones,52 where solicitors were held to be negligent and liable to a
prospective beneficiary for the loss of the intended legacy (an expectation loss), when
they failed to draw up a will before the testator died. The decision was based on an
extension of the principle of assumption of responsibility in Hedley Byrne and Co Ltd
v Heller and Partners Ltd.53 Lord Goff54 was of the opinion that in allowing such liability
to be imposed, there had been “no unacceptable circumvention of established
principles of the law of contract”.55 But, whether acceptable or not,56 it does seem to
us that the decision is best analysed as allowing a third party to enforce a contract by
pursuing an action in tort.57 A further example is Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Ltd.58 Here
50
For discussion of the relationship between contract and tort in this type of situation, see: A Jaffey,
“Sub-Contractors - Privity and Negligence” [1983] CLJ 37; J Holyoak, “Tort and Contract after
Junior Books” (1983) 99 LQR 591; A Jaffey, “Contract in Tort’s Clothing” (1985) 5 LS 77; B
Markesinis, “An Expanding Tort Law - The Price of a Rigid Contract Law” (1987) 103 LQR
354; W Lorenz and B Markesinis, “Solicitors’ Liability Towards Third Parties: Back Into the
Troubled Waters of the Contract/Tort Divide” (1993) 56 MLR 558.
51
[1980] Ch 297.
52
[1995] 2 AC 207.
53
[1964] AC 465; see [1995] 2 AC 207, 268.
54
Who gave the most detailed of the majority speeches.
55
[1995] 2 AC 207, 268. Lord Goff saw the decision as giving effect to the considerations of
“practical justice”.
56
We discuss the decision further in paras 7.19-7.27, 7.36 and 7.48 below.
57
Lord Mustill (dissenting) was clearly of the opinion that the beneficiaries were effectively seeking
to enforce a contract to which they were not a party: “...the intended beneficiaries did not engage
the solicitor, undertake to pay his fees or tell him what to do. Having promised them nothing he
has broken no promise. They nevertheless fasten upon the circumstance that the solicitor broke
his promise to someone else...”; [1995] 2 AC 207, 278.
58
[1983] 1 AC 520. It should be noted that since it was decided, Junior Books has come to be seen
as unreliable authority and has consistently been confined to its facts: “The consensus of judicial
opinion, with which I concur, seems to be that the decision ... cannot be regarded as laying down
any principle of general application in the law of tort or delict”, D & F Estates Ltd v Church
Commissioners [1989] AC 177, 202, per Lord Bridge. Cf Murphy v Brentwood DC [1991] 1 AC
398; White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207.
13
the owners of a factory were allowed to recover expectation loss from a subcontractor,
in that they were allowed to recover the cost of either replacing or repairing a
negligently constructed factory floor. The owners’ claim can again be viewed as being
one by a third party beneficiary of a contract (here between the sub-contractor and the
head-contractor) to enforce the benefit which was contracted for.
(d) Agency
2.15 Many contracts are made through intermediaries and will be subject to the law of
agency. Agency is the relationship which exists between two persons, one of whom (the
principal) expressly or impliedly consents that the other should act on his behalf, and
the other of whom (the agent) similarly consents so to act or so acts.59 One
consequence of this relationship is that the principal acquires rights (and liabilities)
under contracts made by the agent on his behalf with third parties. Although one can
normally say, without undue fiction, that the principal is the real party to the contract
concluded by his agent, agency can also be viewed as an exception to the privity
doctrine in that the principal, albeit a third party to the contract concluded by his
agent, is able to sue (and be sued) on it. The doctrine of the undisclosed principal is
particularly controversial.60 If an agent within his authority contracts in his own name
and purportedly on his own behalf, the undisclosed principal may in certain
circumstances intervene to sue and be sued on the contract.61 The other party who has
no knowledge of the principal’s existence may thus find that he has made a contract
with a person of whom he has never heard, and with whom he never intended to
contract.62
59
Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (16th ed, 1996) para 1-001.
60
See, for example, Treitel The Law of Contract (9th ed, 1995) p 645 ff; Cheshire, Fifoot and
Furmston’s Law of Contract (12th ed, 1991) p 489; Chitty on Contracts (27th ed, 1994) para 31-
058.
61
Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (16th ed, 1996), para 8-069.
62
Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract (5th ed, 1995) p 366. Cf R Goode, Commercial Law
(2nd ed, 1995) p 181.
14
(e) Assignment
2.16 Except when personal considerations are at its foundation,63 the benefit of a contract
may be assigned (that is transferred) to a third party.64 The assignment is effected
through a contract between the promisee under the main contract (that is, the
assignor) and the third party (that is, the assignee). In addition to assignment by an act
of the parties, there exists assignment by operation of law.65 The assent of the promisor
is not necessary for an assignment. Assignment may therefore deprive promisors of
their chosen contracting party, although safeguards are imposed to protect promisors.
While an equitable assignment is usually fully effective even without notice,66 notice
is desirable and there are circumstances in which failure to give notice may leave the
equitable assignee unable to exercise rights enjoyed by the assignor.67 In addition, an
assignee takes “subject to equities”,68 that is, subject to any defences which the
promisor has and any defects in the assignor’s title. The effect of assignment is that the
promisor is faced with an action brought on the contract by a person whom he did not
regard as a party and whom he may not have intended to benefit. The practical
importance of assignment is considerable; the whole industry of debt collection and
credit factoring depends upon it.
2.17 In considering reform of the third party rule, assignment constitutes a particularly
significant exception. For if, immediately after a contract for a third party’s benefit is
made, the promisee assigns his rights under it to that third party, the third party can
enforce the contract and the promisee loses all right to enforce, vary or cancel the
contract. There is a thin divide between (i) making a contract for the benefit of a third
party; and (ii) making a contract for the benefit of a third party and, immediately
thereafter, assigning that benefit to the third party (especially where the third party
does not provide consideration). If an immediate assignment is valid, there can hardly
be fundamental objections to allowing the third party to sue without an assignment.
It also follows that in considering the details of reform it is instructive to consider the
rules of assignment dealing with, for example, the defences and counterclaims available
63
Farrow v Wilson (1869) LR 4 CP 744.
64
Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston’s Law of Contract (12th ed, 1991) ch 16; Treitel, The Law of
Contract (9th ed, 1995) ch 16; Chitty on Contracts (27th ed, 1994), ch 19.
65
For instance, when a party to a contract is declared bankrupt, rights of action forming part of his
estate are “deemed to have been assigned” to his trustee in bankruptcy: Insolvency Act 1986, s
311(4).
66
Gorringe v Irwell India Rubber and Gutta Percha Works (1887) 34 Ch D 128.
67
The failure to give notice of the equitable assignment of an option may mean that the option is
not exercisable by the assignee: Warner Bros Records Inc v Rollgreen Ltd [1976] QB 430: cf Three
Rivers DC v Bank of England [1995] 3 WLR 650. Notice of a statutory assignment must be in
writing: Law of Property Act 1925, s 136(1).
68
Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston’s Law of Contract (12th ed, 1991) pp 516-7; Treitel, The Law of
Contract (9th ed, 1995) p 605 ff; Chitty on Contracts (27th ed, 1994), paras 19-039-19-045.
15
to the promisor (the principle is that an assignee takes “subject to equities”), and
joinder of the original promisee (joinder of the assignor is sometimes necessary).69
(f) Collateral Contracts

2.18 A contract between two parties may be accompanied by a collateral contract between
one of them and a third party.70 A collateral contract may in effect allow a third party
to enforce the main contract (between A and B). For instance, where C buys goods
from B, there may be a collateral contract between C and the manufacturer in the form
of a guarantee. Collateral contracts have been used as a means of rendering exclusion
clauses enforceable by a third party;71 and are extensively used in the construction
industry as a way of extending to subsequent owners or tenants the benefits of a
builder’s or architect’s or engineer’s contractual obligations.72 Strictly speaking, of
course, a collateral contract is not an exception to the third party rule in that the ‘third
party’ is a party to the collateral contract albeit not a party to the main contract.
(g) Techniques Used to Enable Third Parties to Take the Benefit of Exclusion Clauses
2.19 A problematic issue, that has been raised in numerous cases, has been the extent to
which third parties to contracts may take the benefit of clauses in those contracts
excluding or limiting liability for loss or damage. The tangled case law in this area
provides an excellent illustration of the tension between, on the one hand, the formal
adherence by the judiciary to the privity doctrine, which would prevent third parties
taking the benefit of exclusion clauses, and the judiciary’s desire to find ways round the
doctrine so as to effect the contracting parties’ intentions.
2.20 In the first leading case of the twentieth century,73 Elder, Dempster & Co Ltd v Paterson,
Zochonis & Co Ltd,74 the question was whether, as a defence to a shipper’s action in tort
for negligently stowing cargo, shipowners could rely on an exclusion clause in the bills
of lading, despite the fact that the contract of carriage was between the shipper and the
69
See Chitty on Contracts (27th ed, 1994), paras 19-002, 19-022-19-023.
70
Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston’s Law of Contract (12th ed, 1991) pp 64-65; Treitel, The Law of
Contract (9th ed, 1995) pp 534-536; Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract (9th ed, 1995)
pp 97-100. Shanklin Pier Ltd v Detel Products Ltd [1951] 2 KB 854; Wells (Merstham) Ltd v
Buckland Sand and Silica Ltd [1965] 2 QB 170; Charnock v Liverpool Corpn [1968] 1 WLR 1498.
71
72
73
For 19th century cases, which normally involved carriage by rail, see eg, Hall v North Eastern
Railway Company (1875) 10 QB 437, a case where the reasoning has been described as artificial
but face-saving for privity. See Treitel, The Law of Contract (9th ed, 1995) p 568. See also Bristol
and Exeter Ry v Collins (1859) 7 HLC 194; 11 ER 78; Martin v Great Indian Peninsular Ry (1867)
LR 3 Ex 9; Foulkes v Metropolitan District Ry Co (1880) 5 CPD 157.
74
[1924] AC 522.
16
charterer. The House of Lords held that they could do so, although the reasoning on
which the result was based has proved very difficult to understand.75
2.21 Perhaps the most significant point76 is that some of their Lordships seemed to accept
a principle of vicarious immunity, according to which a servant or agent who performs
a contract is entitled to any immunity from liability which his employer or principal
would have had. Hence, although the shipowners may not have been privy to the
contract of carriage (between shipper and charterer) they took possession of the goods
on behalf of, and as agents for, the charterers and so could claim the same protection
as their principals.77
2.22 Although the principle of vicarious immunity was subsequently generally accepted by
the lower courts,78 it did not survive the decision of the House of Lords (Lord Denning
dissenting) in Midland Silicones Ltd v Scruttons Ltd.79 The defendant stevedores,
engaged by the carrier, negligently damaged a drum containing chemicals. When the
cargo-owners sued in tort, the stevedores unsuccessfully attempted to rely on a
limitation clause contained in the bill of lading between the carriers and the cargo-
owners. The majority of the House of Lords confirmed English law’s adherence to the
75
Lord Reid in Midland Silicones Ltd v Scruttons Ltd stated that the task of extracting a ratio from
the case was “unrewarding” [1962] AC 446, 479. See also Johnson Matthey & Co Ltd v
Constantine Terminals Ltd [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 215, 219 (per Donaldson J, “something of a
judicial nightmare”) and The Forum Craftsman [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 291, 295 (per Ackner LJ,
“heavily comatosed, if not long-interred”). See also Treitel, The Law of Contract (9th ed, 1995)
pp 568-569; N Palmer, Bailment (2nd ed, 1991) pp 1638-1640. Carver’s Carriage by Sea (13th
ed, 1982) p 529, refers to the case as a “mystery”. Scrutton on Charterparties (19th ed, 1984) p
251 n 36, contends that no general principle is to be extracted from the case.
76
For the alternative line of reasoning see Lord Sumner, [1924] AC 522, 564, with whom Lord
Dunedin and Lord Carson agreed. Lord Sumner talked of there being a “bailment on terms”
which appears to mean that by entrusting the goods to the shipowners, the shipper may be taken
to have impliedly agreed that the shipowner received the goods on the terms of the bill of lading
which included the exemption from liability for bad storage. Lord Goff has recently given some
support to this line of thinking in obiter dicta in The Pioneer Container [1994] 2 AC 324, 339-340
and, most importantly, in The Mahkutai [1996] 3 WLR 1 (see para 2.33 below).
77
This was the basis of Scrutton LJ’s judgment in the Court of Appeal: [1923] 1 KB 421, 441, and
was supported by Viscount Cave, at p 534, with whom Lord Carson agreed. See also Viscount
Finlay, at p 548.
78
See, for instance, Scrutton LJ in Mersey Shipping & Transport Co Ltd v Rea Ltd (1925) 21 Lloyd’s
Rep 375; Pyrene Co Ltd v Scindia Steam Navigation Co Ltd [1954] 2 QB 402. For a discussion
of the Pyrene case, see Consultation Paper No 121, para 5.37. But cf Cosgrove v Horsfall (1945)
62 TLR 140 (where Elder, Dempster was not cited) and Adler v Dickson [1955] 1 QB 158.
79
[1962] AC 446. It should be noted that Art IV bis rule 2 of the Hague-Visby Rules, enacted in
the UK by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971, provides that servants or agents of the carrier
(but not independent contractors, eg stevedores, employed by it) are to have the benefit of the
exceptions and limitations of liability given to the carrier under the Hague-Visby Rules
themselves. Similar provisions are contained in the Geneva Convention on the Contract for the
International Carriage of Goods By Road (CMR) (implemented in England by the Carriage of
Goods by Road Act 1965); in the Warsaw Convention (implemented in England by the Carriage
by Air Act 1961); and in the Berne Convention Concerning International Carriage by Rail 1980
(COTIF) (implemented in England by the International Transport Convention Act 1983): see
para 12.14, note 21, below.
17
privity of contract doctrine and was not prepared to hold that the principle of vicarious
immunity was the ratio of Elder, Dempster.80
2.23 However, the possibility of third party stevedores taking advantage of exemption
clauses was not entirely ruled out. Lord Reid said that there could exist a contract
between the shipper and the stevedore made through the agency of the carrier,
provided certain conditions were met:81 (i) the bill of lading makes it clear that the
stevedore is intended to be protected by the provisions therein;82 (ii) the bill of lading
makes it clear that the carrier, in addition to contracting on its own behalf, is also
contracting as agent for the stevedore; (iii) the carrier has authority from the stevedore
so to act, or perhaps later ratification by the stevedore would suffice; (iv) there is
consideration moving from the stevedore.
2.24 Lord Reid’s speech encouraged the use of “Himalaya” clauses,83 which purport to
extend the defences of the carrier to servants, agents and independent contractors
engaged in the loading and unloading process. In New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v A M
Satterthwaite & Co Ltd (The Eurymedon),84 the Privy Council considered the extent to
which such an exclusion clause contained in a bill of lading could be relied on by the
third party stevedore, an independent contractor employed by the carrier, who was
sued by the consignees of goods for negligently damaging the goods while unloading
them.
2.25 The majority of the Privy Council gave effect to the clause by regarding the shipper as
having made an offer of a unilateral contract to the stevedores to unload the goods on
terms incorporating the exclusion clause. This offer was accepted by the stevedores
by commencing work. In the words of Lord Wilberforce, the bill of lading:
80
Lord Denning, in his dissenting speech, [1962] AC 446, 487-488, argued that, if the buyer is
able to sue a sub-contractor (eg a stevedore) in tort for what was in truth a breach of the main
contract, and the stevedore is not allowed the benefit of the terms of that contract, there exists
an easy way for the buyer to avoid the terms of the main contract. He held that the stevedores
could take advantage of the exclusion clause, since the earlier decision of the House in Elder,
Dempster & Co Ltd v Paterson, Zochonis & Co Ltd [1924] AC 522 had determined this point in
favour of stevedores.
81
[1962] AC 446, 474.
82
The exclusion clause was expressed to exclude the liability of the “carrier”, and the stevedores
suggested that the word “carrier” could be read as including stevedores. This proposition was
rejected by a majority of their Lordships: see [1962] AC 446, 471 (per Viscount Simonds), 474
(per Lord Reid), 495 (per Lord Morris).
83
So called after the vessel in Adler v Dickson [1955] 1 QB 158.
84
[1975] AC 154. Although sometimes overlooked, the negligence claim in the case was being
brought by the buyers (consignees) not the shipper. The buyers were held to be bound by the
shipper’s contract with the stevedore by reason of a so-called Brandt v Liverpool [1924] 1 KB 575
contract which arose when the buyers presented the bill of lading and took delivery. See Treitel,
The Law of Contract, (9th ed 1995) p 570-571.
18
... brought into existence a bargain initially unilateral but capable of becoming
mutual, between the shipper and the [stevedores], made through the carrier as
agent. This became a full contract when the [stevedores] performed services by
discharging the goods. The performance of these services for the benefit of the
shipper was the consideration for the agreement by the shipper that the [stevedores]
should have the benefit of the exemptions and limitations contained in the bill of
lading.85
2.26 The exclusion clause in question was expressed to be entered into by the carrier as
agent for its servants, agents and independent contractors, and therefore “the
exemption is designed to cover the whole carriage from loading to discharge, by
whomsoever it is performed: the performance attracts the exemption or immunity in
favour of whoever the performer turns out to be”.86 Further,
In the opinion of their Lordships, to give the appellant the benefit of the
exemptions and limitations contained in the bill of lading is to give effect to the
clear intentions of a commercial document, and can be given within existing
principles. They see no reason to strain the law or the facts in order to defeat
these intentions. It should not be overlooked that the effect of denying validity
to the clause would be to encourage actions against servants, agents and
independent contractors in order to get round exemptions... .87
2.27 Nevertheless, the reasoning of Lord Wilberforce in The Eurymedon has been criticised
as artificial,88 primarily because it effectively rewrites the Himalaya clause, which was
85
[1975] AC 154, 167-8.
86
[1975] AC 154, 167.
87
[1975] AC 154, 169. Lord Wilberforce emphasised the difficulty of analysing many of the
common transactions of daily life within the classical “slots” of offer, acceptance and
consideration; [1975] AC 154, 167. In dissenting speeches, Viscount Dilhorne and Lord Simon
of Glaisdale emphasised that artificial reasoning should not be employed in contractual
interpretation with the effect of rewriting contractual provisions. Viscount Dilhorne stated that
“...clause 1 of the bill of lading was obviously not drafted by a layman but by a highly qualified
lawyer. It is a commercial document but the fact that it is of that description does not mean that
to give it efficacy, one is at liberty to disregard its language and read into it that which it does not
say and could have said or to construe the English words it contains as having a meaning which
is not expressed and which is not implied.” [1975] AC 154, 170. At p 172, he referred with
approval to the judgment of Fullagar J in Wilson v Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co
Ltd (1956) 95 CLR 43, 70, where Fullagar J decried the seeming anxiety of some courts and
judges to save grossly negligent people from the normal consequences of their negligence, despite
the established tendency of the law to construe exclusion clauses strictly.
88
See generally F Reynolds, ‘Himalaya Clause Resurgent’ (1974) 90 LQR 301; B Coote,
‘Vicarious Immunity by an Alternative Route - II’ (1974) 37 MLR 453; N Palmer, ‘The
Stevedore’s Dilemma: Exemption Clauses and Third Parties - I’ [1974] JBL 101; A Duggan,
‘Offloading the Eurymedon’ (1974) 9 Melbourne ULR 753; F Rose, ‘Return to Elder
Dempster?’ (1975) 4 Anglo-Am LR 7; G Battersby, ‘Exemption Clauses and Third Parties:
Recent Decisions’ (1978) 28 U of Toronto LJ 75; S Waddams, Comment (1977) 55 Can Bar
Rev 327; P Davies and N Palmer, ‘The Eurymedon Five Years On’ [1979] JBL 337. For
discussion of whether the better analysis is a unilateral or a bilateral contract, see N Palmer,
Bailment (2nd ed, 1991) pp 1610-1611. In The Mahkutai [1996] 3 WLR 1, Lord Goff referred
19
an agreement between the shipper and the carrier and from which it is difficult to
detect an offer of a unilateral contract made by the shipper to the stevedore.89
2.28 The Eurymedon was not received with enthusiasm in other jurisdictions,90 and in Port
Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond and Spraggon (Australia) Pty Ltd (The New York
Star),91 the High Court of Australia sought to restrict its application.92 Unloaded
goods were stolen from the stevedores’ possession, and the consignees sued the
stevedores in negligence. The stevedores unsuccessfully attempted to rely on a
Himalaya clause in the bill of lading. Stephen and Murphy JJ thought that, as a matter
of policy, a decision in favour of the consignees would encourage carriers to insist on
reasonable diligence on the part of their employees and contractors. Furthermore, a
policy of extending protection to stevedores would merely benefit shipowning nations
to the detriment of those countries, such as Australia, which relied on these fleets for
their import and export trade. The Privy Council unanimously reversed the High
Court of Australia. It warned against confining The Eurymedon to its facts, and stated
that in the normal course of events involving the employment of stevedores by carriers,
accepted principles enabled and required stevedores to enjoy the benefit of contractual
provisions in the bill of lading.93
2.29 In other contexts the courts have been less attracted by this unilateral contract device
though similar results have been achieved by other means. In Southern Water Authority
v Carey,94 engineering subcontractors, who were being sued in the tort of negligence,
sought to rely on an exclusion clause in the main contract between the employer and
to, and appeared to support, Barwick CJ’s description, in The New York Star [1979] 1 Lloyd’s
Rep 298, of the contract as bilateral.
89
Since the carrier desires the result that holders of the bill of lading should not sue his servants or
independent contractors, he can achieve this by procuring that they promise not to sue, by
contracting to indemnify the servants or agents against claims, and by making it clear to the
consignor and holder of the bill that he has done so. The carrier would then be able to obtain the
staying of any action against the third party in breach of this agreement. See F Reynolds (1974)
90 LQR 301, 304.
90
It was distinguished by the Supreme Court of British Columbia in The Suleyman Stalskiy [1976]
2 Lloyd’s Rep 609, and by the Kenyan High Court in Lummus Co Ltd v East African Harbours
Corpn [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 317, 322-323, because it was not shown that the carrier had
authority to contract on behalf of the stevedore. See also Herrick v Leonard and Dingley Ltd
[1975] 2 NZLR 566.
91
[1981] 1 WLR 138 (PC). See N Palmer, Bailment (2nd ed, 1991) pp 1600-1601, for the view
that the case might have been decided on the basis of bailment.
92
Even though they were considering a situation in which all four of Lord Reid’s conditions could
be said to have been satisfied.
93
At p 143. Treitel, The Law of Contract (9th ed, 1995) pp 571-572, submits that the principle of
The Eurymedon should not be confined to cases where carriers and stevedores are associated
companies or where there is some previous connection between them. He accepts that the
protection of Himalaya clauses does not cover acts wholly collateral to contractual performance,
see Raymond Burke Motors Ltd v The Mersey Docks and Harbour Co [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 155
(goods damaged while they were stored and not during any loading or unloading).
94
[1985] 2 All ER 1077.
20
the head-contractors which excluded liability on the part of all subcontractors, agents
and independent contractors. Judge David Smout QC, sitting as an Official Referee,
doubted that unilateral contract reasoning could be applied beyond the specialised
practice of carriers and stevedores and described it as “uncomfortably artificial”.95 In
particular, The Eurymedon was held inapplicable because it could not be said that the
head-contractors were agents for the subcontractors. Nevertheless, effect was given to
the exclusion clause in an alternative way by finding that it negatived the duty of care
which would otherwise have existed.96 A similar result was achieved in Norwich City
Council v Harvey,97 where a building was damaged by fire as a result of the negligence
of the sub-contractor. The main contract provided that the building owner was to bear
the risk of damage by fire, and the sub-contractor contracted on the same terms and
conditions as in the main contract. The owner sued the sub-contractor in tort. The
Court of Appeal held that, although there was no direct contractual relationship
between the owner and the subcontractor, nevertheless they had both contracted with
the main contractor on the basis that the owner had assumed the risk of damage by
fire. Hence, the subcontractor owed the owner no duty of care in respect of the damage
which occurred. May LJ said:
I do not think that the mere fact that there is no strict privity between the
employer and the subcontractor should prevent the latter from relying upon the
clear basis upon which all the parties contracted in relation to damage to the
employer’s building caused by fire, even when due to the negligence of the
contractors or subcontractors.98
The reasoning in both cases represents a controversial application of the normal

principles for ascertaining whether a duty of care in tort exists. This was particularly
95
At p 1084.
96
The judge applied the speech of Lord Wilberforce in Anns v Merton London Borough Council
[1978] AC 728, 751-752 to determine whether a duty of care in tort arose between the client and
the subcontractors. He found that sufficient proximity existed to render it reasonably foreseeable
by the subcontractors that a failure by them to exercise care would lead to loss or damage to the
client. He then asked whether there were any considerations which suggested that the scope of
that duty should be reduced, and said that the contractual exemption clause, which defined the
area of risk which the client was entitled to regard the contractors as undertaking responsibility
for, meant that no duty of care arose. Although this precise approach to the establishment of
duties of care in negligence is now out of favour, the courts will presumably employ similar
reasoning to determine whether it is “just and reasonable” to impose a duty of care: see Caparo
Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; Murphy v Brentwood DC [1991] 1 AC 398.
97
[1989] 1 WLR 828. See also Pacific Associates Inc v Baxter [1990] 1 QB 993 in which the Court
of Appeal held that if, contrary to its view, there would otherwise have been a duty of care owed
by the defendant engineer (C) to the plaintiff main contractor (A) for pure economic loss, it
would have been negatived by the exclusion clause in the contract between A and the employer
(B) excluding C’s liability to A: see on this case Chitty on Contracts (27th ed) para 14-044.
98
At p 837. This reasoning does not, however, explain the non-liability (at pp 833-834) of the
sub-contractor’s employee who was also sued. This may be the ghost of Elder, Dempster rising
from its watery grave, the reasoning being reminiscent of the now rejected doctrine of vicarious
immunity; N Palmer, Bailment (2nd 1991) pp 1609-1610; C Hopkins ‘Privity of Contract: The
Thin End of the Wedge?’ [1990] CLJ 21, 23.
21
so in respect of Norwich CC v Harvey, where the finding of a duty of care should have
been non-problematic because the harm in question was property damage and not pure
economic loss.
2.30 Thus there have been several ways in which third parties have taken the benefit of
exemption clauses limiting liability for negligence. These include the now rejected
doctrine of vicarious immunity, the unilateral contract device and the idea of a contract
limiting the scope of a duty of care in tort. By each of these rather artificial techniques,
the courts have striven to achieve commercially workable results, despite the privity
doctrine.
2.31 The Supreme Court of Canada has recently gone even further than the English courts
in enabling third parties to take the benefit of exclusion clauses by in effect accepting
the doctrine of vicarious immunity even where the employee has not been expressly
referred to in the exclusion clause. In London Drugs Ltd v Kuehne & Nagel International
Ltd,99 the plaintiff bailors entered into a contract of bailment with a warehouseman.
The contract contained a limitation clause as follows:
The warehouseman’s liability on any one package is limited to $40 unless the
holder has declared in writing a valuation in excess of $40 and paid the
additional charge specified to cover warehouse liability.
The bailed goods (an electrical transformer) were damaged through the negligent
handling of the warehouseman’s employees. In the plaintiffs’ claim against the
employees in the tort of negligence, the question at issue was whether the employees
could rely on the limitation clause in the contract. It should be emphasised that there
was no express mention of the employees in that limitation clause.
2.32 A majority of the Supreme Court100 held that employees could take the benefit of a
contractual limitation clause where (i) the limitation of liability clause, expressly or
impliedly, extends its benefit to the employees seeking to rely on it; and (ii) the
employees seeking the benefit of the limitation of liability clause have been acting in
the course of their employment and have been performing the very services provided
for in the contract between their employer and the plaintiff customer when the loss
occurred. On the facts of the case, the majority held that:
99
(1992) 97 DLR (4th) 261. Noted by J Adams and R Brownsword, ‘Privity of Contract - That
Pestilential Nuisance’ (1993) 56 MLR 722; S Waddams, ‘Privity of Contract in the Supreme
Court of Canada’ (1993) 109 LQR 349; J Fleming ‘Employee’s Tort in a Contractual Matrix:
New Approaches in Canada’ (1993) OLJS 430; C MacMillan, ‘Privity and the Third Party
Beneficiary: The Monstrous Proposition’ [1994] LMCLQ 22; R Wintemute, ‘Don’t look to me:
The Negligent Employee’s Liability to the Employer’s Customer’ (1994-95) 5 KCLJ 117. See
also para 2.67, note 178, below.
100
Iacobucci J with whom L’Heureux-Dube, Sopinka and Cory JJ concurred; McLachlin J
concurred on different grounds; La Forest J dissented in part.
22
[W]hen all the circumstances of this case are taken into account, including the
nature of the relationship between employees and their employer, the identity of
interest with respect to contractual obligations, the fact that the appellant knew
that employees would be involved in performing the contractual obligations, and
the absence of a clear indication in the contract to the contrary, the term
‘warehouseman’ in s 11(b) of the contract must be interpreted as meaning
‘warehousemen’. As such, the respondents are not complete strangers to the
limitation of liability clause. Rather, they are unexpressed or implicit third party
beneficiaries with respect to this clause.101
2.33 Finally, in the very recent case of The Mahkutai102 the question before the Privy
Council was whether shipowners, who were not parties to the bill of lading contract,
(which was between the charterers, who were carriers, and the cargo-owners, the bill
of lading being a charterers’ bill) could enforce against the cargo-owners an exclusive
jurisdiction clause contained in that contract. The Privy Council held that they could
not because the Himalaya clause in the bill of lading, which extended the benefit of all
“exceptions, limitations, provision, conditions and liberties herein benefiting the
carrier” to “servants, agents and subcontractors of the carrier” did not include the
exclusive jurisdiction clause because an exclusive jurisdiction clause is a mutual
agreement and does not benefit only one party. Rather the rights conferred entail
correlative obligations. Hence there was no question of the third party taking the
benefit of the exclusive jurisdiction clause whether by application of the Eurymedon
principle or under what Lord Goff referred to as the principle of “bailment on terms”
deriving from Lord Sumner’s speech in the Elder Dempster case.103
2.34 Of particular importance to this Report, however, was the Privy Council’s recognition
that, while the Eurymedon principle, or something like it, was commercially necessary,
the principle rested on technicalities that would continue to throw up difficulties unless
and until it was recognised that, in this area, there should be a fully-fledged exception
to the third party rule. Lord Goff said the following:
[T]here can be no doubt of the commercial need of some such principle as this, and
not only in cases concerned with stevedores; and the bold step taken by the Privy
Council in The Eurymedon, and later developed in The New York Star, has been
widely welcomed. But it is legitimate to wonder whether that development is yet
complete. Here their Lordships have in mind not only Lord Wilberforce’s
discouragement of fine distinctions, but also the fact that the law is now
approaching the position where, provided that the bill of lading contract clearly
provides that (for example) independent contractors such as stevedores are to have
the benefit of exceptions and limitations contained in that contract, they will be able
101
(1992) 97 DLR (4th) 261, 369.
102
[1996] 3 WLR 1.
103
See para 2.21, note 76, above.
23
to enjoy the protection of those terms as against the cargo owners. This is because
(1) the problem of consideration in these cases is regarded as having been solved on
the basis that a bilateral agreement between the stevedores and the cargo owners,
entered into through the agency of the shipowners may, though itself unsupported
by consideration, be rendered enforceable by consideration subsequently furnished
by the stevedores in the form of performance of their duties as stevedores for the
shipowners; (2) the problem of authority from the stevedores to the shipowners to
contract on their behalf can, in the majority of cases, be solved by recourse to the
principle of ratification; and (3) consignees of the cargo may be held to be bound
on the principle in Brandt v Liverpool Brazil and River Plate Steam Navigation Co
Ltd.104 Though these solutions are now perceived to be generally effective for their
purpose, their technical nature is all too apparent; and the time may well come
when, in an appropriate case, it will fall to be considered whether the courts should
take what may legitimately be perceived to be the final, and perhaps inevitable, step
in this development, and recognise in these cases a fully-fledged exception to the
doctrine of privity of contract, thus escaping from all the technicalities with which
courts are now faced in English law. It is not far from their Lordships’ minds that,
if the English courts were minded to take that step, they would be following in the
footsteps of the Supreme Court of Canada (see London Drugs Ltd v Kuehne & Nagel
International Ltd)105 and, in a different context, the High Court of Australia (see
Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd).106 Their Lordships have
given consideration to the question whether they should face up to this question in
the present appeal. However, they have come to the conclusion that it would not
be appropriate for them to do so, first, because they have not heard argument
specifically directed towards this fundamental question, and second because, as will
become clear in due course, they are satisfied that the appeal must in any event be
dismissed.107
2.35 While our proposed reform would reach the same result as in The Mahkutai (because,
as we shall explain in Part XIV below, exclusive jurisdiction clauses fall outside our
proposals), it would bring about at a stroke what Lord Goff regarded as a desirable
development in that it would sweep away the technicalities applying to the enforcement
by expressly designated third parties of exclusion clauses.
(h) Promisee’s Remedies Assisting the Third Party

2.36 Although not strictly an exception to the third party rule - since it is the promisee suing
- in certain circumstances the promisee may be able to assist the third party by
recovering substantial damages representing its own loss or, more controversially, loss
104
[1924] 1 KB 575.
105
(1992) 97 DLR (4th) 261.
106
(1988) 165 CLR 107.
107
[1996] 3 WLR 1, 11-12.
24
sustained by the third party; or by being granted specific enforcement of the obligation
owed to the third party.
(i) Damages
2.37 Subject to a few exceptions (such as The Albazero108 exception discussed below), the
promisee is entitled to damages representing its own loss and not that of the third
party.109 For example, in Forster v Silvermere Golf and Equestrian Centre Ltd, 110 the
plaintiff owned property which she and her two children occupied. She transferred the
property to the defendant, who undertook to construct a house for the plaintiff and her
children who could live there rent-free for life. When the defendant broke this
undertaking, the plaintiff recovered damages for her own loss. However, she could not
claim damages for the loss of rights of occupation after her death which her children
would have enjoyed. In Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd111 Lord Denning MR had
reasoned generally that a contracting party could recover the third party’s loss but this
approach was firmly rejected by the House of Lords in Woodar Investment Development
Ltd v Wimpey Construction UK Ltd.112 A, a buyer of land, had promised B, a seller of
land, to pay part of the purchase price to C. Although a majority of the House of Lords
(Lords Wilberforce, Keith and Scarman; Lords Salmon and Russell dissenting) held
that there had been no breach by A justifying termination by B, all their Lordships
indicated that, had B had an action for breach, it could have recovered only its own
loss and not C’s loss.
2.38 As a promisee will commonly suffer no loss, in a contract made for a third party’s
benefit, it follows that a promisee can often recover nominal damages only. But this
will certainly not always be so.113 In some circumstances, for example where the
promisee required the promisor to pay the third party in order to pay off a debt owed
by the promisee to the third party, the promisor’s failure to benefit the third party will
constitute a substantial pecuniary loss to the promisee.114 And in Woodar v Wimpey
one justification for the generous measure of damages given to a father for a ruined
108
[1977] AC 774. See para 2.40 below.
109
The traditional view is also that the promisee will normally be unable to bring an action in debt
to enforce payment to him or her of sums due to the third party under the contract, since those
sums were by definition not due to the promisee: see Chitty on Contracts (27th ed, 1994) para 18-
030 and Coulls v Bagot’s Executor and Trustee Co Ltd (1967) 119 CLR 460, 502. Quaere whether
the promisee can bring an action for sums due to the third party if the purpose of the claim is for
the sums to be paid direct to the third party rather than to the promisee; see A Burrows, Remedies
for Torts and Breach of Contract (2nd ed, 1994) p 317.
110
(1981) 125 SJ 397.
111
[1975] 1 WLR 1468.
112
[1980] 1 WLR 277.
113
See, generally, A Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (2nd ed, 1994) p 153.
114
See Coulls v Bagot’s Executor and Trustee Co Ltd (1967) 119 CLR 460, 501-502 (per Windeyer
J).
25
family holiday in Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd was that the father was being fully
compensated for his own mental distress.115
2.39 In two important recent cases, the House of Lords and Court of Appeal respectively
have confirmed and extended an exception to the rule that the promisee recovers its
own loss only. In Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd,116 the
question arose as to the damages which could be recovered by a company (the
‘employer’) which had contracted for work on its property (the removal of asbestos)
but had then, before breach of the works contract, sold the property to a third party (to
whom the employer had made an invalid assignment of its contractual rights). The
House of Lords held that the employer could recover substantial damages - the cost
of curing the defects in the work -despite the fact that it no longer had a proprietary
interest in the property by the time of the breach and despite the fact that the cost of
the repairs had been borne by the assignee and not by the employer.
2.40 The reasoning of the majority of their Lordships (Lords Keith, Bridge and Ackner
agreeing with Lord Browne-Wilkinson) was that the employer could recover the third
party’s (the assignee’s) loss on an application of the exceptional principle applicable to
a changed ownership of property established by Dunlop v Lambert117 and The
Albazero.118 In The Albazero Lord Diplock explained the principle as follows:
[I]n a commercial contract concerning goods where it is in the contemplation of the

parties that the proprietary interests in the goods may be transferred from one
owner to another after the contract has been entered into and before the breach
which causes loss or damage to the goods, an original party to the contract, if such
be the intention of them both, is to be treated in law as having entered into the
contract for the benefit of all persons who have or may acquire an interest in the
goods before they are lost or damaged, and is entitled to recover by way of damages
for breach of contract the actual loss sustained by those for whose benefit the
contract is entered into.119
115
Lords Wilberforce, Russell and Keith all relied on this justification. Lord Wilberforce’s alternative
explanation, [1980] 1 WLR 277, 283, was that a few types of contract - for example, persons
contracting for family holidays, ordering meals in restaurants for a party, hiring a taxi for a group
- call for special treatment.
116
[1994] 1 AC 85. For notes on this case see, eg, I Duncan Wallace, “Assignment of Rights to
Sue: Half a Loaf” (1994) 110 LQR 42; A Tettenborn, “Loss, Damage and the Meaning of
Assignment” [1994] CLJ 53; A Berg, “Assignment, Prohibitions and the Right to Recover
Damages for Another’s Loss” (1994) JBL 129.
117
(1839) 6 Cl & F 600; 7 ER 824. In this case, goods had been jettisoned from the defendants’
ship in a storm, and the appellant consignor sought to recover damages under the contract
notwithstanding the fact that title had passed to the consignee before the goods were lost. The
consignor was permitted to recover substantial damages for the carrier’s failure to deliver, even
though the consignor had parted with property in the goods before the breach occurred.
118
[1977] AC 774.
119
Ibid at 847.
26
The only modification required for the application of this principle to Linden Gardens
was that the property in question was land and buildings not goods. It should be noted,
however, that Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Linden Gardens confined the exception to
cases where the third party had no direct right of action.
2.41 Lord Griffiths decided Linden Gardens on a much wider basis. He took the
120
controversial view that the employer had itself suffered a loss (measured by the cost
of repairs) by reason of the breach of contract in that it did not receive the bargain for
which it had contracted: whether the employer did, or did not, have a proprietary
interest in the subject matter of the contract at the date of breach was irrelevant. He
said:
I cannot accept that in a contract of this nature, namely for work, labour and the
supply of materials, the recovery of more than nominal damages for breach of
contract is dependent upon the plaintiff having a proprietary interest in the subject
matter of the contract at the date of breach...the [promisee] has suffered loss
because he did not receive the bargain for which he had contracted...and the
measure of damages is the cost of securing the performance of that bargain...The
court will of course wish to be satisfied that the repairs have been or are likely to be
carried out but if they are carried out the cost of doing them must fall upon the
defendant who broke his contract.121
Nor did it matter to Lord Griffiths that it was the assignee, and not the employer, who
had ultimately borne the cost of repairs for, according to Lord Griffiths, “the law
regards who actually paid for the work necessary as a result of the defendant’s breach
of contract as a matter which is res inter alios acta so far as the defendant is
concerned”.122
2.42 In Darlington BC v Wiltshier Northern Ltd123 Darlington BC wished to build a

recreational centre on its land, but needed to avoid contravening restrictions on local
authority borrowing. Thus an arrangement was reached whereby Morgan Grenfell
(Local Authority Services) Ltd (“Morgan Grenfell”) contracted with Wiltshier
Northern Ltd (“Wiltshier”) for the latter to build the recreational centre on Darlington
BC’s land. Darlington BC then entered into a covenant agreement with Morgan
Grenfell which provided, inter alia, that Morgan Grenfell would pay Wiltshier all sums
falling due under the building contract, that the council would reimburse these monies,
and that Morgan Grenfell were not liable to the council for building defects. It also
provided that, on request, Morgan Grenfell would assign any rights against Wiltshier
120
Although it should be noted that the other Law Lords expressed some tentative support for his
view.
121
[1994] 1 AC 85, 96-97.
122
Ibid at 98.
123
[1995] 1 WLR 68.
27
to Darlington BC. The rights were duly assigned pursuant to the covenant agreement.
The council alleged that Wiltshier’s construction work was defective. The Court of
Appeal had to decide whether Darlington BC, as the assignee of Morgan Grenfell’s
rights under the construction contract, could recover substantial damages for the cost
of repairs that it had incurred. This in turn depended on whether Morgan Grenfell
could have claimed substantial damages. The Court of Appeal, by extending the
principle in Linden Gardens124 held that Morgan Grenfell, and hence Darlington BC,
were entitled to substantial damages.
2.43 The principle of Linden Gardens required extension because, in contrast to the facts of
Linden Gardens and Lord Diplock’s formulation of the principle in The Albazero, the
original contracting party (Morgan Grenfell) had never had a proprietary interest in the
property. It was not therefore a case of the owner at the time of contract transferring
ownership before breach. Nevertheless Steyn LJ was able to describe the extension
required as a “very conservative and limited” one.125 In effect the principle becomes
that wherever there is the breach of a contract for work on property causing loss to a
third party who is an owner of that property, and it was known or contemplated by the
parties that a third party was, or would become, owner of the property and that owner
has no direct right to sue for breach of contract, the original contracting party, who has
the right to sue, can recover substantial damages as representing the owner’s loss.
2.44 It should also be noted that Steyn LJ (but not Dillon LJ or Waite LJ) expressed support
for Lord Griffiths’ wider view in Linden Gardens, albeit that he did not agree with Lord
Griffiths that there was any need to show an intention to carry out the repairs by
someone. On this qualification, however, Steyn LJ’s view appears to have been
subsequently rejected (albeit without direct reference) by the approach of the House
of Lords in Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth126 in which a plaintiff ’s
intention to effect repairs was considered a crucial ingredient in deciding whether it
was reasonable to claim the cost of repairs when higher than the difference in value.
2.45 As an additional ground for allowing the council’s appeal, the majority of the Court in
Darlington (Dillon LJ, with whom Waite LJ agreed) considered that Morgan Grenfell
could be treated as a constructive trustee for Darlington BC of the benefit of its rights
under the contract against Wiltshier.127
2.46 The effect of these cases has been to enhance a promisee’s prospects of recovering
substantial damages in a contract made for a third party’s benefit. The decisions
themselves are confined to confirming and developing The Albazero exception; but in
124
[1994] 1 AC 85.
125
[1995] 1 WLR 68, 80.
126
[1996] 1 AC 344.
127
See para 2.9 above.
28
addition dicta in the cases controversially suggest that substantial damages may be an
appropriate measure of the promisee’s own loss in a wider range of situations than has
traditionally been thought to be the case.
(ii) Specific Performance and a Stay of Action

2.47 In Beswick v Beswick128 an uncle transferred his business to his nephew who, in return,
promised that, after his uncle’s death, he would pay £5 a week to his widow. The
uncle died and his widow brought an action for specific performance of the nephew’s
promise. The House of Lords, applying the third party rule, held that while the widow
could not maintain a successful action in her personal capacity, she could as
administratrix succeed in suing for the estate’s loss, though not her own personal third
party loss. Most importantly, the Lords held that as administratrix she should be
granted specific performance of the nephew’s promise rather than being confined to
damages. This was on the basis that the administratrix’s damages would be nominal129
and that nominal damages would here be inadequate given that the purpose of the
bargain was to benefit the widow. This reasoning opens the door to specific
performance being an appropriate remedy for promisees in many contracts for a third
party’s benefit, where the third party rule would otherwise produce an unjust result.
It should be noted, however that there are well-known additional restrictions on
specific performance (that is, over and beyond damages having to be inadequate) such
as that specific performance will not be ordered of a contract for personal service or
where the contract to be enforced is not supported by valuable consideration.
2.48 In the case of a promise not to sue a third party, the promisee may assist the third party
beneficiary by seeking a stay of any action by the promisor against the third party
under section 49(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981. This preserves the power of the
court to stay any proceedings before it, where it thinks fit to do so, whether on its own
motion or on the application of any person.
2.49 In Gore v Van der Lann,130 the question was whether Liverpool Corporation could
restrain the holder of a free bus pass from suing a bus conductor for negligence, given
that the free pass contained a clause excluding liability for personal injury on the part
of the Corporation or its servants. On the facts, the clause was void under section 151
of the Road Traffic Act 1960. However, the Court of Appeal said that the Corporation
could have obtained a stay, if: (i) the clause could have been construed as a promise
by Mrs Gore not to sue (which on the facts it was not); and (ii) if the Corporation had
a sufficient interest so as to entitle it to a stay, for instance if it had been required to
128
[1968] AC 58.
129
Lord Pearce alone considered that the damages would be substantial. And see generally para
2.38 above.
130
[1967] 2 QB 31. See P Davies, ‘Mrs Gore’s legacy to commerce’ (1981) 1 LS 287.
29
indemnify its servants in respect of torts committed by the latter.131 In Snelling v John
G Snelling Ltd,132 Ormrod J said that it did not follow from Gore that there had to be
an express promise not to sue. It was sufficient that it was a necessary implication of
the agreement that P would not sue.133
2.50 In The Elbe Maru,134 a bill of lading provided an undertaking that the holder would not
make any claim against the carriers’ sub-contractors. Whilst the goods were in the
custody of sub-contractors of the carriers, they were stolen. The indorsees of the bill
of lading claimed damages against the sub-contractors, the action against the original
carriers being time barred. The carriers applied for a stay, which was granted. Unlike
Gore, this was a clear case of a promise not to sue. However, the remedy being
discretionary, Ackner J said that it was not enough to show a clear promise not to sue.
But where an applicant could show a real possibility of prejudice if the action were not
stayed, as here by being exposed to an action by its agents, the discretion to stay would
be exercised in their favour.135
2.51 Since it is the promisee who obtains the stay rather than the third party, the above
cases are best seen as examples of promisees assisting the third party by enforcing the
contract in favour of the third party. They constitute the mirror image of Beswick v
Beswick, the difference being that the “specific” remedy in that case was concerned to
enforce a positive rather than a negative obligation.
(i) Statutory Exceptions
131
In European Asian Bank v Punjab and Sind Bank [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 356, 369, Ackner LJ said
that for the promisee to obtain a stay it would be necessary to establish an express or implied
promise not to sue and some legal or equitable right to protect, such as an obligation to
indemnify D. In these circumstances it would be a fraud on the promisee for the proceedings to
continue.
132
[1973] QB 87.
133
It has been argued that Snelling is difficult to reconcile with the requirement of sufficient interest
as explained in Gore, but is nonetheless consistent with the spirit of Beswick v Beswick: Chitty on
Contracts (27th ed, 1994) para 18-038.
134
[1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 206.
135
[1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 206, 210. In The Chevalier Roze [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 438, 443, Parker
J, having referred to The Elbe Maru, respectfully doubted whether it was correct that P had done
enough if he merely showed a possibility of prejudice. Where P was seeking to prevent D from
asserting a possibly good claim, and where D had raised a triable issue which could not be
determined without a further investigation of the facts, he found it difficult to see how it could
be a fraud on P to allow D’s action to proceed.
30
2.52 This section will outline some of the major legislative exceptions136 to the third party
rule.
(i) Life Insurance

2.53 By section 11 of the Married Women’s Property Act 1882, a life insurance policy taken
out by someone on his or her own life, and expressed to be for the benefit of his or her
spouse or children, creates a trust in favour of the objects named in the policy.137
(ii) Fire Insurance

2.54 Under section 83 of the Fire Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774, where an insured
house or building is destroyed by fire, the insurer may be required “upon the request
of any person or persons interested” to lay out the insurance money for the restoration
of the building.138 This means that a tenant can claim under its landlord’s insurance,
and a landlord under its tenant’s insurance.139
(iii) Motor Insurance

2.55 Under section 148(7) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a person issuing a policy under
section 145 of the Act shall be liable to indemnify the persons or classes of person
specified in the policy in respect of any liability which the policy purports to cover in
the cases of such persons.
(iv) Third Parties’ Rights Against Insurers

2.56 A contract of insurance may insure the policy-holder against liability to third parties.
By section 1 of the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930, where an insured
becomes, inter alia, bankrupt or wound up, and before or after that time he incurs
liability to a third party, the insured’s rights under the contract of insurance are
transferred to the third party. In other words, the third party has a direct action against
the insurer. However, the third party only has transferred to him the rights which the
136
For an analogous exception, see Swain v Law Society [1983] 1 AC 598 in which the House of
Lords interpreted s 37 of the Solicitors Act 1974 as empowering the Law Society to create a
contract for the benefit of third parties (its members). Lord Diplock said, at p 611, “[T]he
policy of insurance which the Society is empowered to take out and maintain by section 37(2)(b)
is a contract which creates a jus quaesitum tertio. It does so by virtue of public law, not the
ordinary English private law of contract. This makes it unnecessary in the instant case to have
recourse to any of those juristic subterfuges to which courts have, from time to time, felt driven
to resort in cases in which English private law is applicable, to mitigate the effect of the lacuna
resulting from the non-recognition of a jus quaesitum tertio - an anachronistic shortcoming that
has for many years been regarded as a reproach to English private law ....”
137
The Law Revision Committee recommended that section 11 of the 1882 Act should be extended
to all life, endowment and education policies in which a particular beneficiary is named: Sixth
Interim Report Statute of Frauds and the Doctrine of Consideration (1937) Cmd 5449, para 49. See
para 12.22 below.
138
See Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (ed Merkin) (6th ed, 1990) pp 194-195.
139
See Vural Ltd v Security Archives Ltd (1989) 60 P & CR 258, 271-272.
31
insured would have had. Difficulties have arisen with the Act which we discuss in Part
XII below.140
(v) Insurance by Those with Limited Interests

2.57 In general, a person with a limited interest in property can insure and recover its full
value, holding any amount above his own interest on account for others similarly
interested.141 Section 14(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 states that a “mortgagee,
consignee or other person having an interest in the subject-matter insured may insure
on behalf and for the benefit of other persons interested as well as for his own benefit”.
Likewise, section 47 of the Law of Property Act 1925 provides that any insurance
money received by the seller between contract and conveyance shall be held on behalf
of the buyer and be paid to him.
(vi) Bills of Exchange

2.58 In general, negotiable instruments (such as bills of exchange, cheques and promissory
notes), are transferable by delivery and give to the transferee for value, who acts in
good faith, ownership of, or a security interest in, the instrument free from equities.
Under the Bills of Exchange Act 1882,142 the holder of a bill of exchange may sue on
the bill in his own name. If a bill of exchange is dishonoured, the drawer, acceptor and
indorsers are all liable to compensate the holder in due course.143
(vii) Bills of Lading

2.59 Where goods are to be carried by sea, the shipper will typically enter into a contract of
carriage with a carrier, which is evidenced by a bill of lading. The goods are then
usually consigned to the buyer, to whom the bill will be endorsed. At common law the
buyer was not able to sue the carrier on the contract of carriage because there was no
privity between them.144 It was to remedy this defect that the Bills of Lading Act 1855
was passed. Under that Act, however, a buyer only had a right of action under the bill
of lading contract if the property in the goods passed by reason of, and at the same
time as, endorsement of the bill to him or if the endorsement of the bill played an
essential causal role in the chain of events by which the property passed to him.145 The
Act was replaced by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992146 which separates the
140
141
See Treitel, The Law of Contract (9th ed, 1995) p 584.
142
Section 38(1).
143
Sections 54-56.
144
Thompson v Dominy (1845) 14 M & W 403; 153 ER 532.
145
Sewell v Burdick (1884) 10 App Cas 74 (where an action against the bank by the carrier for
unpaid freight, the bank being pledgees of the bill of lading, failed as the bank had no property
in the bill and the goods); The San Nicholas [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 8; The Sevonia Team [1983]
2 Lloyd’s Rep 640; The Delfini [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 252.
146
See Rights of Suit in Respect of Carriage of Goods by Sea (1991) Law Com No 196; Scot Law
Com No 130, for the recommendations which led to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992.
32
right to sue the carrier from the passing of property in the goods under the sale
contract. This is achieved, under section 2, by a statutory assignment of the right to
sue the carrier. The right is assigned to a holder of a bill of lading or to a person to
whom delivery of goods is to be made under a sea waybill or ship’s delivery order. By
section 3, where those with a title to sue under the statute take or demand delivery of
the goods or make a claim against the carrier under the contract of carriage they
become subject to the liabilities147 under the contract but without affecting the
liabilities of the original shipper. Where a pledgee takes delivery of the goods and pays
any carriage charges such as freight or demurrage, there may come into existence an
implied contract between the pledgee and the carrier on the terms of the bill of lading.
Such a contract, known as a Brandt v Liverpool contract,148 is a further circumvention
of the third party rule.
(viii) Law of Property Act 1925, Section 56(1)

2.60 Whereas at common law, no person could sue on a deed inter partes unless a party to
that deed, section 56(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 states:
A person may take an immediate or other interest in land or other property, or

the benefit of any condition, right of entry, covenant or agreement over or
respecting land or other property, although he may not be named as a party to
the conveyance or other instrument.
Although Denning LJ, in Drive Yourself Hire Co (London) Ltd v Strutt,149 took the view
that this abolished the rule in Tweddle v Atkinson,150 it is clear from Beswick v Beswick151
that section 56(1) does not apply to a mere promise by A to B that money will be paid
to C. The exact scope of section 56(1) remains unclear. It may be confined (i) to real
property; (ii) to covenants running with the land; (iii) to cases in which the instrument
is not solely for the benefit of the third party but purports to contain a grant to or
covenant with it; (iv) to deeds strictly inter partes.152 It does appear, however, that a
person cannot take the benefit of a covenant under section 56(1) unless he or she or
his or her predecessor in title was in existence and identifiable when the covenant was
made.153
(ix) Companies Act 1985, Section 14
147
Most importantly in practice the obligation to pay the carrier freight in respect of the cargo.
148
Brandt v Liverpool, Brazil & River Plate Steam Navigation Co Ltd [1924] 1 KB 575; The Aramis
[1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 213; The Captain Gregos (No 2) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 395.
149
[1954] 1 QB 250, 274.
150
(1861) 1 B & S 393; 121 ER 762. See para 2.5 above.
151
[1968] AC 58.
152
Chitty on Contracts (27th ed, 1994) para 18-057.
153
Ibid; Megarry & Wade, The Law of Real Property (5th ed, 1984) p 764.
33
2.61 Under section 14 of the Companies Act 1985, the registered memorandum and articles
of association of a company bind the company and its members to the same extent as
if they respectively had been signed and sealed by each member.154
(x) Package Travel, Package Holidays and Package Tours Regulations 1992155
2.62 Where a contract for the provision of a package156 holiday is made between an
organiser or retailer and a consumer,157 the organiser or retailer is liable to the
consumer for the proper performance of the obligations under the contract, whether
those services are to be performed by the organiser or retailer or not.158 The
Regulations therefore, inter alia, circumvent the third party rule by giving the
beneficiaries of package tour contracts direct rights against the organiser and/or retailer
with whom the contract was made.159 The Regulations also require that contracts for
the provision of package holidays should comply with certain formalities and provide
certain information,160 provide for withdrawal from the contract where it is significantly
altered or cancelled,161 and make arrangements for bonding and insurance cover.162
2. Calls for Reform

2.63 Whilst it is self-evidently desirable that a complete stranger to a contract should not
normally have contractual obligations forced upon him or her, without consent, the
third party rule (by which a third party cannot take rights under a contract) has been
154
The Law Commission is currently considering section 14 in our work on Shareholders’
Remedies.
155
SI 1992/3288 implementing EEC Council Directive 90/314 on package travel, package holidays
and package tours.
156
Defined in Regulation 2(1) to mean “the pre-arranged combination of at least two of the
following components when sold or offered for sale at an inclusive price and when the service
covers a period of more than twenty-four hours or includes overnight accommodation:- (a)
transport; (b) accommodation; (c) other tourist services not ancillary to transport or
accommodation and accounting for a significant proportion of the package”. The definition does
not exclude tailor-made packages, and is not avoided by the submission of separate accounts
(Reg 2(1)(i) & (ii)).
157
Which means the person who takes or agrees to take the package, any person on whose behalf
that person agrees to purchase the package or any person to whom that person or any of the
beneficiaries transfer the package (Reg 2(2)).
158
Regulation 15.
159
Regulation 15(1) read in conjunction with the definition of “consumer” in Regulation 2. The
Regulations provide that the organiser or retailer is to be liable unless the damage suffered by the
consumer was due to his own fault, or to the unforeseeable failures of a third party or
circumstances beyond the control of the organiser or retailer: Regulation 15(2). Certain
limitations of liability are permitted: Regulation 15(3) & (4).
160
Regulations 4 to 12.
161
Regulations 12 and 13.
162
Regulations 16ff.
34
much criticised. This criticism has come from academics,163 law reform bodies
(including the Law Revision Committee in England164 and bodies in several
Commonwealth jurisdictions165) and the judiciary. In this section we focus our
attention on calls for reform made by the judiciary in past cases.
2.64 In 1967, in Beswick v Beswick,166 Lord Reid cited with approval the Law Revision
Committee’s proposals that when a contract by its express terms purports to confer a
benefit directly on a third party, it should be enforceable by the third party in its own
name. While implying that the way forward was by legislation, he stated that the House
of Lords might find it necessary to deal with the matter if there was a further long
period of Parliamentary procrastination. In Woodar Investment Development Ltd v
Wimpey Construction UK Ltd,167 Lord Salmon (dissenting) regarded the law concerning
damages for loss suffered by third parties as most unsatisfactory and hoped that, unless
it were altered by statute, the House of Lords would reconsider it.168 Lord Scarman
expressed “regret that [the] House has not yet found the opportunity to reconsider the
two rules which effectually prevent [the promisee] or [the third party] recovering that
which [the promisor], for value, has agreed to provide.”169 He reminded the House that
twelve years had passed since Lord Reid in Beswick v Beswick had called for a
reconsideration of the rule, and hoped that all the cases which “stand guard over this
unjust rule” might be reviewed.170 Lord Scarman concluded his judgment with an
unequivocal call for reform:
[T]he crude proposition...that the state of English law is such that neither [the
third party] for whom the benefit was intended nor [the promisee] who
163
See, eg, A Corbin, ‘Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons’ (1930) 46 LQR 12; F Dowrick,
‘A Jus Quaesitum Tertio By Way of Contract in English Law’ (1956) 19 MLR 374; M Furmston,
‘Return to Dunlop v Selfridge?’ (1960) 23 MLR 373; J Wylie ‘Contracts and Third Parties’ (1966)
17 NILQ 351; B Markesinis, ‘An Expanding Tort Law - The Price of a Rigid Contract Law’
(1987) 103 LQR 354; R Flannigan, ‘Privity - The End of an Era (Error)’ (1987) 103 LQR 564;
F Reynolds, ‘Privity of Contract, the Boundaries of Categories and the Limits of the Judicial
Function’ (1989) 105 LQR 1; P Kincaid, ‘Third parties : Rationalising a Right to Sue’ [1989]
CLJ 243; J Adams & R Brownsword, ‘Privity and the concept of a network contract’ (1990) 10
Legal Studies 12; D Beyleveld & R Brownsword, ‘Privity, Transitivity and Rationality’ (1991)
54 MLR 48; J Beatson, ‘Reforming the Law of Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties: A
Second Bite at the Cherry’ (1992) 45 CLP 1; H Beale, ‘Privity of Contract: Judicial and
Legislative Reform’ (1995) 9 JCL 103; J Wilson, ‘A Flexible Contract of Carriage - The Third
Dimension?’ [1996] LMCLQ 187; S Whittaker, ‘Privity of Contract and the Tort of Negligence:
Future Directions’ (1996) 16 OxJLS 191; E McKendrick, Contract Law (2nd ed, 1994) pp 127-
131; J Adams and R Brownsword, Key Issues in Contract (1995) ch 5.
164
Sixth Interim Report (1937) Cmd 5449, paras 41-49. See paras 4.2-4.4 below.
165
166
[1968] AC 58, 72.
167
[1980] 1 WLR 277.
168
At p 291.
169
At p 300.
170
At p 300. Lord Keith, at pp 297-298, also associated himself with Lord Scarman’s view.
35
contracted for it can recover it, if the contract is terminated by [the promisor’s]
refusal to perform, calls for review: and now, not forty years on.171
2.65 In Forster v Silvermere Golf and Equestrian Centre Ltd,172 Dillon J referred to the effects
of Woodar in the case before him as being a blot on the law and thoroughly unjust. In
Swain v Law Society,173 Lord Diplock referred to the general non-recognition of third
party rights as “an anachronistic shortcoming that has for many years been regarded
as a reproach to English private law”.
2.66 More recently, Lord Goff and Steyn LJ have added their influential voices to criticisms
of the third party rule. In The Pioneer Container174 Lord Goff called into question the
future of the rule, and in White v Jones175 his Lordship said, “[O]ur law of contract is
widely seen as deficient in the sense that it is perceived to be hampered by the presence
of an unnecessary doctrine of consideration and (through a strict doctrine of privity of
contract) stunted through a failure to recognise a jus quaesitum tertio”.176 Steyn LJ’s
dicta in Darlington Borough Council v Wiltshier Northern Ltd177 - with which we opened
this Report - are particularly notable for their forthright treatment of the third party
rule.
171
[1980] 1 WLR 277, 301.
172
(1981) 125 SJ 397.
173
[1983] 1 AC 598, 611. See para 2.52, note 136, above.
174
[1994] 2 AC 324, 335. See also para 2.34 above for Lord Goff’s comments, in a more specific
context, in The Mahkutai [1996] 3 WLR 1.
175
[1995] 2 AC 207.
176
[1995] 2 AC 207, 262-263.
177
[1995] 1 WLR 68, 76. See para 1.1 above. Steyn LJ later went on to say, after referring to our
Consultation Paper, that there is a respectable argument that reform is best achieved by the
courts working out sensible solutions on a case-by-case basis. “But that requires the door to be
opened by the House of Lords reviewing the major cases which are thought to have entrenched
the rule of privity of contract. Unfortunately, there will be few opportunities for the House of
Lords to do so.” [1995] 1 WLR 68, 78.
36
2.67 Of the criticisms of the third party rule made by the judiciary in other jurisdictions,178
the judgments in the High Court of Australia in Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v
McNiece Bros Pty Ltd179 are particularly clear and rigorous. A company which operated
a limestone crushing plant took out a liability insurance policy with the appellants
(Trident), which was expressed to cover all contractors at the plant. The respondent
contractor (McNiece) fell within the terms of the policy, but when it sought
indemnification for damages payable to one of its subcontractors, the appellant
insurance company refused to indemnify the respondent on the grounds that the latter
was not a party to the contract of insurance.
2.68 The respondent succeeded before the High Court of Australia,180 in a decision which
effectively reversed the decision of the legislature not to make the Insurance Contracts
Act 1984181 retrospective. In doing so, three of the Justices mounted an attack on the
doctrine of privity. Mason CJ and Wilson J were of the opinion that “[t]here is much
substance in the criticisms directed at the traditional common law rules [of
privity]...”,182 and they accepted that reform was needed in the area under
consideration, as it was an example of “common law rules which operate
unsatisfactorily and unjustly”.183 Toohey J was even more vociferous, stating that the
rule is “based on shaky foundations and, in its widest form, lacks support both in logic
or jurisprudence”.184 He was of the opinion that,
...when a rule of the common law harks back no further than the middle of the
last century, when it has been the subject of constant criticism and when, in its
178
See, eg, the judgment of Iacobucci J (with whom L’Heureux-Dube, Sopinka and Cory JJ
concurred) in London Drugs Ltd v Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd (1992) 97 DLR (4th) 261,
340-370. He spoke of the need for reform of the privity rule and, while he did not think it
appropriate for the courts to embark on major reform or abolition, he recognised an obligation
to ameliorate injustice by the incremental relaxation of the rule in limited circumstances. Having
said that, the approach that the majority ultimately advocated is, in our view, a radical one and
would appear to go beyond our proposed reform by allowing an employee, even if not expressly
identified in the exclusion clause, to rely on it. As Professor John Fleming pertinently observes
in ‘Employee’s Tort in a Contractual Matrix: New Approaches in Canada’ (1993) 13 OxJLS
430, 437, “[T]he step from express to implied intent to benefit third parties may not look far,
but long experience with ‘implication’ warns against the slide into fiction. Is the failure to
mention employees just an oversight, a drafting glitch, or does it signify that the parties never had
a mind to include employees? The most that one can say is that in all probability they would
have been included, if the need to do so had occurred to the parties. But this is certainly a long
way from the ‘necessary implication’ postulated by Lord Denning in Adler v Dickson”. See,
generally on the London Drugs case, paras 2.31-2.32 above.
179
(1988) 165 CLR 107. In Olsson v Dyson (1969) 120 CLR 365, 392 Windeyer J in the High
Court of Australia spoke of “...the rigidity of the obstacles the common law doctrine of privity
of contract places in the way of justice to third parties.”
180
Brennan and Dawson JJ dissenting.
181
See para 12.23 and Appendix B below.
182
(1988) 165 CLR 107, 118.
183
(1988) 165 CLR 107, 123,
184
(1988) 165 CLR 107, 168.
37
widest form, it lacks a sound foundation in jurisprudence and logic and further,
when that rule has been so affected by exceptions or qualifications, I see nothing
inimical to principled development in this Court now declaring the law to be
otherwise...185
2.69 In the event, Mason CJ and Toohey and Wilson JJ decided the case on the basis of a
specific abrogation of the third party rule in relation to insurance contracts. Two
reasons were advanced. First, it would be unjust not to give effect to the contracting
parties’ intentions. Secondly, it was likely that third party beneficiaries would rely on
an insurance policy covering them and not insure separately. Deane and Gaudron JJ
favoured the use of a trust and the principle of unjust enrichment186 respectively, in
order to avoid the injustice of the operation of the third party rule, and even the two
dissenting judges, Brennan and Dawson JJ, based their dissent on maintaining
coherent and gradual development of the common law rather than justifying their
decision on the appropriateness of the rule itself.
185
(1988) 165 CLR 107, 170-1.
186
This is a novel and controversial approach in that the principle against unjust enrichment is being
used to protect expectations rather than to reverse benefits acquired at the expense of the
plaintiff: see K Soh, “Privity of Contract and Restitution” (1989) 105 LQR 4; I Jackson (1989)
63 ALJ 368.
38
SECTION B
PRELIMINARY ISSUES
PART III
ARGUMENTS FOR REFORM1
1. The Intentions of the Original Contracting Parties are Thwarted
3.1 A first argument in favour of reform, as stated in the Consultation Paper, is that the
third party rule prevents effect being given to the intentions of the contracting parties.
If the theoretical justification for the enforcement of contracts is seen as the realisation
of the promises or the will or the bargain of the contracting parties, the failure of the
law to afford a remedy to the third party where the contracting parties intended that
it should have one frustrates their intentions, and undermines the general justifying
theory of contract.2
2. The Injustice to the Third Party

3.2 A second argument focuses on the injustice to the third party where a valid contract,
albeit between two other parties, has engendered in the third party reasonable
expectations of having the legal right to enforce the contract particularly where the
third party has relied on that contract to regulate his or her affairs. In most
circumstances this argument complements the above argument based on the intentions
of the contracting parties. For in most circumstances the intentions of the contracting
parties and the reasonable expectations of the third party are consistent with each
other. However, one of the most difficult issues that we face is the extent to which the
contracting parties can vary or discharge the contract. That issue can be presented as
raising the conflict between these two fundamental arguments for reform. In other
words, should the injustice to the third party trump the intentions of the parties where
those intentions change? As will become clear, we believe that where the injustice to the
third party is sufficiently “strong” (that is, where the third party has not merely had
expectations engendered by knowledge of the contract but has relied on the contract
or has accepted it by communicating its assent to the promisor) it should trump the
changed intentions of the contracting parties. That is, the original parties’ right to
1
Most of the arguments were canvassed in Consultation Paper No 121, paras 4.1-4.35. We do not
set out again here the discussion in paras 4.3-4.4 of the Consultation Paper in which possible
arguments for the third party rule were set out and then refuted one by one. See also paras 1.7-
1.8 above.
2
See, eg, F Dowrick “A Jus Quaesitum Tertio By Way of Contract in English Law” (1956) 19
MLR 374, 390-392; R Flannigan, “Privity - The End of an Era (Error)” (1987) 103 LQR 564,
582-587; C Fried, Contract as Promise (1981) pp 44-45 (although Fried argues that acceptance
by the third party is essential). Contra is P Kincaid, “The UK Law Commission’s Privity
Proposals and Contract Theory” (1994) 8 JCL 51 who argues that the promise theory
underpinning contract dictates that only the promisee can enforce the promise: in our view, this
is to take an unnecessarily narrow view of the morality of promise-keeping where a promise is
intended to benefit a third party.
39
change their minds and vary the contract should be overridden once the third party has
relied on, or accepted, the contractual promise.
3. The Person Who Has Suffered the Loss Cannot Sue, While the Person Who
Has Suffered No Loss Can Sue
3.3 In a standard situation, the third party rule produces the perverse, and unjust, result
that the person who has suffered the loss (of the intended benefit) cannot sue, while
the person who has suffered no loss can sue. This can be illustrated by reference to
Beswick v Beswick.3 In that case, as we have seen,4 the House of Lords held that the
widow could not enforce the promise in her personal capacity, since the contract was
one to which she was not privy. However, as administratrix of her husband’s estate, she
was able to sue as promisee, albeit that she could only recover nominal damages
because the uncle, and hence his estate, had suffered no loss from the nephew’s breach.
Hence we see that the widow in her personal capacity, who had suffered the loss of the
intended benefit, had no right to sue, while the estate, represented by the widow in her
capacity as administratrix, who had suffered no loss, had that right. As it was, a just
result was achieved by their Lordships’ decision that nominal damages were, in this
three party situation, inadequate so that specific performance of the nephew’s
obligation to pay the annuity to the widow should be ordered in respect of the claim
by the administratrix. But where specific performance is not available (for example,
where the contract is not one supported by valuable consideration or where the
contract is one for personal service) the standard result is both perverse and unjust.
4. Even if the Promisee Can Obtain a Satisfactory Remedy for the Third
Party, the Promisee May Not be Able to, or Wish to, Sue
3.4 In Beswick v Beswick, the promisee, as represented by the widow as administratrix,
clearly wanted to sue to enforce the contract made for her personal benefit. However,
in many other situations in which contracts are made for the benefit of third parties,
the promisee may not be able to, or wish to, sue, even if specific performance or
substantial damages could be obtained. Clearly the stress and strain of litigation and
its cost will deter many promisees who might fervently want their contract enforced for
the benefit of third parties. Or the contracting party may be ill or outside the
jurisdiction. And if the promisee has died, his or her personal representatives may
reasonably take the view that it is not in the interests of the estate to seek to enforce a
contract for the benefit of the third party.
3
[1968] AC 58.
4
See para 2.47 above.
40
5. The Development of Non-Comprehensive Exceptions
3.5 A number of statutory and common law5 exceptions to the third party rule exist. These
have been discussed at paragraphs 2.8 to 2.62 above. Where an exception to the third
party rule has been either recognised by case-law or created by statute, the rule may
now not cause difficulty. Self-evidently, this is not the case where the situation is a
novel one in which devices to overcome the third party rule have not yet been tested.
We believe that the existence of exceptions to the third party rule is a strong
justification for reform. This is for two reasons. First, the existence of so many
legislative and common law exceptions to the rule demonstrates its basic injustice.
Secondly, the fact that these exceptions continue to evolve and to be the subject of
extensive litigation demonstrates that the existing exceptions have not resolved all the
problems.
6. Complexity, Artificiality and Uncertainty

3.6 The existence of the rule, together with the exceptions to it, has given rise to a complex
body of law and to the use of elaborate and often artificial stratagems and structures
in order to give third parties enforceable rights.6 Reform would enable the artificiality
and some of the complexity to be avoided. The technical hurdles which must be
overcome if one is to circumvent the rule in individual cases also lead to uncertainty,
since it will often be possible for a defendant to raise arguments that a technical
requirement has not been fulfilled. Such uncertainty is commercially inconvenient.
7. Widespread Criticism Throughout the Common Law World

3.7 In Part II, we saw that there had been criticism of the third party rule and calls for its
reform from academics, law reform bodies and the judiciary. We shall see in Part IV
that the rule has been abrogated throughout much of the common law world, including
the United States, New Zealand, and parts of Australia. The extent of the criticism
and reform elsewhere is itself a strong indication that the privity doctrine is flawed.
8. The Legal Systems of Most Member States of the European Union Allow
Third Parties to Enforce Contracts
3.8 A further factor in support of reforming the third party rule in English law is the fact
that the legal systems of most of the member states of the European Union recognise
and enforce the rights of third party beneficiaries under contracts. In France, for
example, the general principle that contracts have effect only between the parties to
them7 is qualified by Art 1121 of the Code Civil, which permits a stipulation for the
benefit of a third party as a condition of a stipulation made for oneself or of a gift made
to another. The French courts interpreted this as permitting the creation of an
5
We use this phrase to mean ‘non-statutory’ or ‘judge-made’. Some of the exceptions are
equitable.
6
See, eg, paras 2.27 and 2.34 above.
7
Art 1165, Code Civil. See B Nicholas, The French Law of Contract, (2nd ed, 1992), p 169ff.
41
enforceable stipulation for a person in whose welfare the stipulator had a moral
interest. In so doing, they widened the scope of the Article so as to permit virtually any
stipulation for a third person to be enforced by him or her, where the agreement
between the stipulator and the promisor was intended to confer a benefit on the third
person.8 In Germany, contractual rights for third parties are created by Art 328 of the
Burgerliches Gesetzbuch permitting stipulations in contracts for performances to third
parties with the effect that the latter acquires the direct right to demand performance,
although the precise scope of these rights depends on the terms and circumstances of
the contract itself.9 Surveying the member states of the European Union, we are aware
that the laws of France, Germany, Italy,10 Austria,11 Spain,12 Portugal,13 Netherlands,14
Belgium,15 Luxembourg,16 and Greece,17 recognise such rights (as does Scotland);18
whereas only the laws of England and Wales (and Northern Ireland) and the Republic
of Ireland19 do not.20 With the growing recognition of the need for harmonisation of
the commercial law of the states of the European Union - illustrated most importantly
by the work being carried out by the Commission on European Contract Law under
the chairmanship of Professor Ole Lando21 - it seems likely that there will be ever
8
For further detailed discussion of the stipulation pour autrui in French law, see B Nicholas, The
French Law of Contract (2nd ed, 1992) p 181ff; Consultation Paper No 121, Appendix, paras 24-
27. See also, generally, S Whittaker, “Privity of Contract and the Law of Tort: the French
Experience” (1995) 15 OxJLS 327.
9
See Consultation Paper No 121, Appendix paras 28-29.
10
Art 1411, Italian Civil Code 1942.
11
Art 881, Austrian Civil Code 1811.
12
Art 1257 par 2, Spanish Civil Code 1889.
13
Art 443, Portuguese Civil Code 1966.
14
Book 6 art 253, Dutch Civil Code 1992.
15
Who apparently followed the French Civil Code model: see International Encyclopedia of
Comparative Law (ed Kötz), Vol VII, ch 13, para 13-12.
16
Again modelled on the French Civil Code: see n 15 above.
17
Art 411, Greek Civil Code 1941.
18
See W McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland (1987), ch 18. See also Consultation Paper No
121, Appendix paras 22-23.
19
See Consultation Paper No 121, Appendix para 21. Although in the Republic of Ireland, as in
England and Wales, exceptions to the doctrine permitting the creation of enforceable third party
benefits exist: see Married Women’s Status Act 1957, s 8(1).
20
We have obtained no conclusive information regarding the law in the Scandinavian member
states of the EU, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, although we understand that in Denmark third
party rights are enforced: see Principles of European Contract Law, Part I : Performance, Non-
performance and Remedies (ed O Lando and H Beale) (1995), Art 2.115 Notes.
21
The first part of the Commission’s work, Principles of European Contract Law, Part I: Performance,
Non-performance and Remedies (ed O Lando and H Beale) was published in 1995. Art 2.115
headed “Stipulation in favour of a Third Party” allows third parties to be given legally
enforceable rights. It should be noted that in 1989 the European Parliament passed a Resolution
requesting that a start be made on the preparatory work for drawing up a European Code of
Private Law. The preamble to the Resolution states that “...unification can be carried out in
42
increasing pressure on the UK to bring its law on privity of contract into line with that
predominantly adopted in Europe.
9. The Third Party Rule Causes Difficulties in Commercial Life

3.9 Lest it be erroneously thought that the third party rule nowadays causes no real
difficulties in commercial life, or that the case for reform is purely theoretical rather
than practical, we have chosen two types of contracts - construction contracts and
insurance contracts - to illustrate some of the difficulties caused by the rule.22
(1) Construction Contracts

3.10 Both simple construction contracts involving only an employer and a builder, and
complex construction contracts involving several main contractors, many
subcontractors and design professionals are affected by the third party rule.
3.11 Simple construction contracts illustrate the difficulties which can arise when one
contracting party agrees to pay for work to be done by another contracting party which
will benefit a third party to the contract. Say, for example, a client contracts with a
builder for work to be done on the home of an elderly relative. If the work is done
defectively, it is only the client who has a contractual right to sue the builder for its
failure to deliver the promised performance. On traditional principles, and subject to
23
the decisions in Linden Gardens Trust v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd and Darlington
24
BC v Wiltshier Northern Ltd, the client can often only recover nominal damages, since
he or she will have suffered no direct financial loss as a result of the builder’s failure to
perform.25 The elderly relative could not himself or herself sue for breach of contract,
and the tort of negligence does not normally allow the recovery of pure economic
loss.26 Therefore the elderly relative could not recover the cost of repairs in the tort of
negligence and, if forced to move to alternative accommodation while the repairs were
being carried out, could not recover consequent loss and expense either.
3.12 In complex construction projects, there will be a web of agreements between the
participants in the project, allocating responsibilities and liabilities between the client
(and sometimes its financiers), the main contractor, specialist sub-contractors and
consultants (architects, engineers and surveyors). Most significant construction
branches of private law which are highly important for the development of the single market,
such as contract law...” (Resolution of 26 May 1989, OJEC No C 158/401, 26 June 1989).
22
For practical difficulties in relation to shipping contracts (but see now the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act 1992), sale of goods contracts, contracts to pay money to a third party and contractual
licences, see Consultation Paper No 121, paras 4.8-4.11, 4.19-4.21, 4.23-4.24, 4.26.
23
[1994] AC 85.
24
[1995] 1 WLR 68. See paras 2.39-2.46 above.
25
26
Eg, Murphy v Brentwood DC [1991] 1 AC 398.
43
projects in the UK are carried out under one of three major contractual procurement
routes,27 and so the documentation used is very often highly standardised.
3.13 The third party rule means that only the parties within each contractual relationship
can sue each other. The unfortunate result is that one cannot in the ‘main’ contracts
simply extend the benefit of the architect’s and engineer’s duties of care and skill, and
the contractor’s duties to build according to the specifications, to subsequent
purchasers or tenants of the development, or to funding institutions who might suffer
loss as a result of the defective execution of the works. This cannot be achieved under
the present third party rule without either joining the third party in question into the
contract which contains these obligations, which in the case of a subsequent purchaser
or tenant is impractical, since their identity may be unknown at the commencement
of the works, or even for a long time afterwards, or executing a separate document -
a “collateral warranty” - extending the benefit of the duties in question. Were it not for
these collateral warranties, the third party rule would prevent contractual actions by
subsequent owners of completed buildings against the architect, engineer, main
contractor or subcontractor whose defective performance may have caused loss or
damage to them.28
3.14 In an effort to overcome the privity deficiency of the law of contract, attempts were
earlier made by subsequent owners of defective premises to sue in tort, and the
expansion of the categories of negligence following Hedley Byrne & Co v Heller &
Partners Ltd,29 and particularly Anns v Merton London Borough Council,30 initially
31
resulted in such claims being successful. However, the law is now set against the
recovery in negligence of economic loss caused by defective construction. In D & F
Estates Ltd v Church Commissioners for England,32 it was held that a builder was not
liable in tort to a subsequent purchaser in respect of the cost of repair of defects to a
building. The House of Lords then overruled Anns v Merton LBC in Murphy v
27
In 1987, 52% of work was undertaken on lump sum contracts with firm bills of quantities,
whether for private or public clients, such as the Joint Contracts Tribunal Standard Form of
Building Contract, 1980 edition (“JCT 80”) or the JCT Intermediate Form of Contract, 1984
edition (“IFC 84”). 12% of work was carried out on design and build contracts, such as the JCT
Standard Form of Building Contract with Contractor’s Design, 1981 edition (“CD 81”). 9%
was carried out under management works contracts, such as the JCT Management Works
Contract, 1987 edition (“MC 87”). The method of procurement will depend on factors such as
the design route chosen for the project, the client’s objectives and requirements, the funding
arrangements chosen, and external factors such as economic risk and demographic trends:
Ashworth, Contractual Procedures in the Construction Industry (2nd ed, 1991) pp 37-39, 47-48.
28
Similar problems apply when the third parties seeking rights of suit are tenants with full repairing
leases, and who are therefore under a contractual obligation to the landlord of the building to
maintain its fabric.
29
[1964] AC 465.
30
[1978] AC 728.
31
See Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Torts (eds Heuston and Buckley) (20th ed, 1992) p 288ff,
esp 295-296.
32
[1989] AC 177.
44
Brentwood District Council33 in holding that a local authority, which negligently failed
to ensure that the builder complied with relevant by-laws and building regulations,
owed no duty of care in tort as regards defects in the building causing pure economic
loss; and, in a decision handed down on the same day, confirmed the approach taken
in the D & F Estates Ltd case in relation to builders.34 As a result of these cases, a
subsequent owner or purchaser now has little protection in tort.
3.15 A typical collateral warranty given by an architect, engineer or main contractor

excludes consequential economic loss and limits the defendant’s liability, having regard
to other claims of the warrantee, to a just and equitable proportion of the third party’s
loss. A typical warranty in favour of a finance house will also contain provisions
permitting the finance house to take over the benefit of the contractor’s or architect’s
or engineer’s appointment contracts on condition of payment of liabilities, if the main
finance contract is determined for any breach on the part of the employer, so that the
finance house could ensure the continuance of work on the development
notwithstanding some breach of the loan agreement by which the original employer
was financed. There will also be provisions permitting the finance house, purchaser
or tenant a licence to copy and use for specified purposes any designs or documents
that are the property of the contractor or architect or engineer, and a clause
undertaking that the contractor, architect or engineer will maintain professional
indemnity insurance in a specified sum for a specified period. Finally, the warranty
will normally permit assignment by the finance house, purchaser or tenant without any
consent of the warrantor being required. These collateral warranties are generally
supported by separate nominal consideration or are made under deed and thus are not
tied to consideration in the main contract.
3.16 It is important to add that, where the benefit of the obligations undertaken by the
warranty are assigned to sub-financiers or further purchasers or tenants down the line,
this can give rise to further difficulties arising from the law of assignment. In
particular, there is the difficulty as to whether an assignee can recover full damages,
which was in issue in Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd35 and
Darlington Borough Council v Wiltshier Northern Ltd36 and which led to the application,
and extension, of an exception to the normal rule on quantification of damages.37
3.17 Our proposed reforms would enable contracting parties to avoid the need for collateral
warranties by simply laying down third party rights in the main contract. Moreover,
our proposed reforms would enable the contracting parties to mirror the terms in
33
[1991] 1 AC 398.
34
Department of the Environment v Thomas Bates and Son Ltd [1991] AC 499.
35
[1994] 1 AC 85.
36
[1995] 1 WLR 68.
37
See paras 2.39-2.46 above.
45
existing collateral warranties. Although this involves ‘jumping ahead’ to some details
of our proposed reforms, it is worth explaining this latter point in some detail.
Applying our conditional benefit approach discussed in Part X below, there is no
reason why the architects’ engineers’ and contractors’ liability to the third party could
not be limited, as it presently is under collateral warranty agreements, so as to exclude
consequential loss and so as to be limited to a specified share or a just and equitable
share of the third party’s loss.38 As regards defences, a claim by a third party under our
proposed legislation, as we examine in Part X below, will be subject to defences and
set-offs arising from, or in connection with, the contract and relevant to the particular
contractual provision being enforced by the third party and which would have been
available against the promisee. But this is a default rule only and the contracting
parties can provide for a wider or a narrower sphere of operation for defences and set-
offs, if they so wish. So the present position under collateral warranties, whereby the
claim is subject to defences arising under the main contract, is, or can be, replicated.
What about variation of the contract by the original contracting parties? A collateral
warranty, once executed, may not be varied without the consent of the benefited third
party purchaser, tenant or finance house. Our proposals are, on the face of it, more
flexible in that the contracting parties can vary the contract without the third party’s
consent until the third party has relied on the contract or has accepted it. In practice,
however, this ability to vary is not likely to be of any great advantage to the contracting
parties because, assuming that the promisor could reasonably be expected to have
foreseen that the third party would rely on the contract, they would only be certain that
it was safe to vary or cancel the original contract if they first communicated with the
third party to ensure that there has been no reliance. It should be stressed that when
we refer to variation, we are referring to variation of the contract. The work in
building contracts is commonly subject to variation and, if so, would obviously
continue to be variable irrespective of the third party’s reliance or acceptance.39
3.18 So, in our view, our proposals would enable the contracting parties to replicate the
advantages of collateral warranties without the inconvenience of actually drafting and
entering into separate contracts. Moreover, our proposals may carry a limited degree
of extra flexibility as regards variation.
3.19 A further advantage of our legislative reform, as against collateral warranty agreements,
is that it would not be necessary to assign the benefit of a provision extending the
contractor’s or architect’s duty of care to sub-financiers and other purchasers and
tenants down the line, since these persons could simply be named as potential
beneficiaries of the clause by class. Thus, the difficulties caused by quantification of
38
In contrast to limitations in collateral warranties, limitation clauses will not be subject to ss 2(2)
or 3 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 where an action is brought by a third party under
our proposed Act: see paras 13.9-13-13 below.
39
See para 9.37, note 30, below. Note also that, as explained at paras 9.37-9.42 below, our
proposals would allow the parties, expressly, to reserve the right to vary irrespective of reliance
or acceptance by the third party.
46
damages in claims under assigned collateral warranty agreements would be entirely
removed.
3.20 The main contract between the client and main contractor may also contain exclusion
clauses limiting the liability of the main contractor for certain types of defective
performance. The main contractor may have entered into these clauses on its own
behalf and on behalf of subcontractors, in an effort to enable subcontractors to take
advantage, in actions against them in the tort for negligence, of the limitations and
exemptions contained in such clauses. As we have seen, the exception to the third party
rule, developed in New Zealand Shipping Ltd v A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd,40 may not
necessarily work in this context albeit that the courts have sometimes allowed third
parties to take advantage of the exclusion clause by regarding it as negativing the duty
of care that would otherwise have arisen.41 A reform of the privity rule would permit
contractors and clients straightforwardly and uncontroversially to extend the benefit
of exclusion clauses in their contract to employees, sub-contractors and others.
3.21 Further problems may arise as regards payment obligations. At present, when a main
contractor fails to pay a subcontractor for work performed, the subcontractor will have
no right to sue the client directly for payment, although the client will be entitled to
take the benefit of the subcontractor’s work. It may be that the participants in a
construction project might wish to provide for payment direct by the client to the
subcontractor for work performed under a subcontract,42 and to give the subcontractor
a corresponding right to sue the client for the agreed sum once the work is performed.
Even if such a right were expressly provided for, the present third party rule would
prevent such an express term from being enforceable by the subcontractor against the
client, unless the subcontractor and client are in a contractual relationship.
3.22 Employers may make arrangements with contractors which are designed by both
parties to benefit neighbours with regard to issues such as noise, access and working
hours. The intended recipients of these benefits may be protected via the tort of
nuisance but reform of the third party rule would enable the parties to give the
neighbours the right to enforce the contract which would give them additional, and
often significantly better, protection than in tort.
3.23 Our attention has also recently been drawn to the difficulties caused by the third party
rule in the offshore oil and gas industry, which provide an excellent example of the
anomalies and inconsistencies generated by the rule in practice. We understand that
40
[1975] AC 154. See paras 2.24-2.26 above.
41
Southern Water Authority v Carey [1985] 2 All ER 1077; Norwich City Council v Harvey [1989]
1 WLR 828; Pacific Associates Inc v Baxter [1990] 1 QB 993. See para 2.29 above.
42
JCT 80 (clauses 35.13.3-35.13.5) and Form NSC (Employer/Nominated Subcontractor’s
Agreement) 2a, clause 6(1), create a duty on the part of the client to pay nominated
subcontractors direct.
47
for many years, major oil companies and their advisers have attempted to minimise
litigation arising from drilling contracts in the North Sea. This has largely been
achieved by the use of cross indemnities between oil companies and contractors, which
to be effective, must not only benefit the parties to the contracts in question but also
all other companies in their respective groups, their employees, agents, sub-contractors
and co-licensees. This is because, for example, it will often be unclear at the outset of
a project which member of a client company’s group will operate a platform and will
thus be caused loss by any failings on the part of the contractor. An indemnity should
therefore ideally benefit all companies likely to be affected. It is generally impractical
for more than a handful of the beneficiaries of the indemnities given to be made parties
to the contract. Moreover, careful drafting of the indemnity is necessary to ensure that
those made parties to the indemnity can recover losses actually sustained by other
group companies and beneficiaries. At present therefore, the third party rule is
circumvented by making the parties to the contract agents or trustees for the other
beneficiaries. Some devices used have become even more complex than those
commonly employed in the construction industry, with webs of mutual cross-
indemnities, back to back indemnity agreements, and incorporation of all main
contract provisions into sub-contracts. We understand that there is concern among
legal advisers as to the validity of these circumventions of privity. Our proposed reform
will permit contractors and employers straightforwardly to extend the benefit of
indemnity and exemption clauses contained in a contract to other companies in a
group, employees, sub-contractors and others.
(2) Insurance Contracts

3.24 There are several common situations where one party takes out an insurance policy for
the benefit of another. The third party rule would prevent the third party enforcing the
contract of insurance against the insurer. The inconvenience of this has led to a
number of statutory inroads. For example, by section 11 of the Married Women’s
Property Act 1882, a life insurance policy taken out by someone on his or her own life,
and expressed to be for the benefit of his or her spouse or children, creates a trust in
favour of the objects named in the policy. By section 148(7) of the Road Traffic Act
1988 a person covered by a liability insurance policy for motor accidents, even though
taken out by someone else (for example, by a spouse or employer) is able to enforce
that policy against the insurer. And under other legislation dealing, for example, with
fire insurance and situations where the insured party becomes insolvent, third parties
are given rights to enforce insurance contracts even though they are not expressly
designated in them.43
3.25 There are, however, still a number of insurance contracts where legislation has not
intervened to give third party beneficiaries a right to enforce the contract against the
insurer. For example, a life insurance policy taken out for the benefit of dependants
other than spouses and children, for example a co-habitee or a parent or a stepchild,
43
See paras 2.54 and 2.56 above.
48
falls outside the Married Women’s Property Act 1882 and appears, therefore, not to
be enforceable by those dependants. If a company takes out liability insurance covering
the liability of its subsidiary company, and its contractors and sub-contractors, only the
company itself would have the right to enforce the insurance contract.44 Again, if an
employer takes out private health insurance, to cover medical expenses, on behalf of
its employees, the employees would have no right to enforce the insurance contract so
as to ensure reimbursement of expenses incurred.45 If in these circumstances the
employer is insolvent or, because of a transfer of undertakings, has no interest in the
contract, the employee has no legal standing to force the insurance company to pay in
the event of a claim under the policy and the liquidator in the employer’s insolvency
may not wish to pursue such a claim. Even if the employer is solvent and wishes to sue,
the employer may have difficulty in securing an adequate remedy as, in an action for
damages, it can normally only recover its own loss which will usually be nil.46
3.26 In Australia, section 48 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 allows third parties to
enforce insurance contracts where they are named as beneficiaries or as “covered by
the policy”. We explain in Part XII why our recommendations for reform in this
project do not go quite so far as the Australian legislation.47 Nevertheless our reform
proposals will enable an insurer and assured, by an express term, to confer enforceable
rights on third parties (for example, employees): and contracts of insurance which
purport to confer a benefit on an expressly designated third party will be enforceable
by a third party subject to this being contrary to the parties’ intentions on a proper
construction of the contract.
3.27 We should add, finally, that, if renegotiated on the same terms after our proposals
come into force,48 the well-known agreement between the Motor Insurers’ Bureau and
the Secretary of State for the Environment, whereby the Bureau agrees to pay to a
victim of a road accident any unsatisfied judgment against an uninsured (or
untraceable) driver, would prima facie be enforceable by a victim (although of course,
in any renegotation, the MIB might decide to insert a term to the effect that the
44
Cf Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107. See paras
2.67-2.69 above.
45
Cf Green v Russell [1959] 2 QB 226; see para 7.51 below. A Which? report, April 1992, “Income
When You’re Ill” 224, 227 draws attention to the problem for employees of enforcing an
insurance policy taken out by an employer.
46
These types of situation are not within the strict ratio of Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge
Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85 or Darlington Borough Council v Wiltshier Northern Ltd [1995] 1
WLR 68 (discussed above in paras 2.39-2.46). However they might appear to fall within the
scope of these decisions, in that it was envisaged that the fruits of the contract would be enjoyed
by a third party, and “it could be foreseen that damage caused by a breach would cause loss to
a [non-contracting party] and not merely to the original contracting party”, [1994] 1 AC 85,
114, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
47
48
Our proposed Act will not apply to contracts made before the coming into operation of the Act:
see paras 14.20-14.21 below.
49
agreement is not to be enforceable by the third party). The third party rule means
that, at present, the agreement is unenforceable by the victims49 although the Bureau’s
practice is not to rely on the doctrine of privity as a defence.50
10. Conclusion
3.28 For the reasons articulated above, we believe that a reform of the third party rule is
necessary. Contracting parties may not, under the present law, create provisions in
their contracts which are enforceable directly by a third party unless they can take
advantage of one of the exceptions to the third party rule. Our basic philosophy for
reform is that it should be straightforwardly possible for contracting parties to confer
on third parties the right to enforce the contract.
3.29 We therefore recommend that:

(1) the rule of English law whereby a third party to a contract may not
enforce it should be reformed so as to enable contracting parties to
confer a right to enforce the contract on a third party.
3.30 Following on from this, we need to clarify at the outset what we mean by the “right to
enforce the contract”. In the Consultation Paper we provisionally recommended that
rights which may be created in favour of a third party should extend (a) both to the
right to receive the promised performance from the promisor where this is an
appropriate remedy and to the right to pursue any remedies for delayed or defective
performance, and (b) to the right to rely on any provisions in the contract restricting
or excluding the third party’s liability to a contracting party as if the third party were
a party to the contract.51 We explained that the first part of this recommendation
states the central point that the third party beneficiary is to be entitled to performance
of the promise, or damages for its non-performance. The second part of the
recommendation allows third parties to be able to take advantage of exemption clauses
agreed for their benefit, thus achieving the result reached in The Eurymedon52 and The
New York Star53 more directly.
3.31 Consultees generally agreed with this provisional recommendation, although a few
academic lawyers raised doubts as to whether this was the appropriate way to deal with
49
Although the agreement may be specifically enforced by the Minister: Gurtner v Circuit [1968]
2 QB 587.
50
See, eg, Hardy v Motor Insurers’ Bureau [1964] 2 QB 745; Albert v Motor Insurers’ Bureau [1972]
AC 301; Persson v London Country Buses [1974] 1 WLR 569. See, generally, Treitel, The Law
of Contract (9th ed, 1995) p 585.
51
See Consultation Paper No 121, paras 5.17-5.18, 6.6.
52
[1975] AC 154.
53
50
exclusion clauses. While we continue to agree with our provisional recommendation,
we would now formulate the recommendation in slightly different language.54

(2) a right to enforce the contract means (1) a right to all remedies given by
the courts for breach of contract (and with the standard rules applicable
to those remedies applying by analogy) that would have been available to
the third party had he been a party to the contract, including damages,
awards of an agreed sum, specific performance and injunctions; and (2)
a right to take advantage of a promised exclusion or restriction of the
promisor’s rights as if the third party were a party to the contract. (Draft
Bill, clause 1(4) and 1(5))
3.33 There are three points of clarification concerning this recommendation:

(i) By emphasising the remedies given by the courts for breach of contract we mean to
exclude termination (or discharge) of a contract for substantial breach by the
promisor. Termination is a self-help, not a judicial, remedy.55 We believe that the
third party should not be entitled to terminate the contract for breach as this may
be contrary to the promisee’s wishes or interests.
(ii) By emphasising the remedies for breach of contract, we mean to exclude

restitutionary remedies, such as the recovery of money had and received for total
failure of consideration, which an innocent party can claim once he has validly
terminated a contract for breach.56 We do not consider that the third party can
establish that the promisor has been unjustly enriched at his expense (where this
latter phrase means “by subtraction from the third party”).57
(iii) By treating the third party for the purposes of this recommendation as if he had
been a party to the contract, and by stressing that the rules as to the remedies are
to apply by analogy, we mean to make clear that, for example, the third party is
entitled to (substantial) damages for his own loss, that he cannot recover loss
54
The main equivalent provision in the New Zealand legislation is s 8 of the Contracts (Privity)
Act 1982 which reads as follows: “The obligation imposed on a promisor by section 4 of this Act
may be enforced at the suit of the beneficiary as if he were a party to the deed or contract, and
relief in respect of the promise, including relief by way of damages, specific performance, or
injunction, shall not be refused on the ground that the beneficiary is not a party to the deed or
contract in which the promise is contained or that, as against the promisor, the beneficiary is a
volunteer”. “Beneficiary” and “benefit” are defined in s 2. See Appendix B below
55
A Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (2nd ed, 1994) p 1.
56
Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution (4th ed, 1993) pp 407-409, 412-424; P Birks, An
Introduction of the Law of Restitution (revised ed, 1989) chapter 7; A Burrows, Remedies for Torts
and Breach of Contract (2nd ed, 1994) pp 307-308; A Burrows, The Law of Restitution (1993) pp
397-398.
57
P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (revised ed, 1989) pp 23-24, 40-44, 313-315;
A Burrows, The Law of Restitution (1993) pp 16-17, 376.
51
that is too remote, that he is under a duty to mitigate his loss, and that he may
be awarded specific performance (unless, for example, the contract is not
supported by valuable consideration or is a contract for personal service or the
third party has fallen foul of the doctrine of laches). It should also be noted,
although this is in any event the position in standard two-party contracts,58 that
it will of course be the defendant’s (the promisor’s) contemplation that will be
crucial for the purposes of the contractual remoteness of damage test.
58
This is made clear in cases subsequent to Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341, 156 ER 145,
such as Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1949] 2 KB 528 and Koufos v
Czarnikow Ltd, The Heron II [1969] 1 AC 350.
52
PART IV
PRECEDENTS FOR REFORM
4.1 In deciding on the form, and details of our proposals, we have derived great help from
the recommendations for abrogation of the third party rule made by the Law Revision
Committee in England, the legislative reforms enacted in New Zealand and in some
jurisdictions in Australia, and the departure from the traditional common law approach
brought about by the judiciary in the United States. In this Part, we examine some of
the illuminating central features of these ‘precedents’ for reform.1
1. The Law Revision Committee Report

4.2 In 1937, the Law Revision Committee, chaired by Lord Wright MR, presented its
Sixth Interim Report.2 Among the topics addressed by the Committee in this Report
was the common law’s rejection of a ius quaesitum tertio. The Committee’s Report
stated that England was almost alone among modern systems of law in its rigid
adherence to the application of the third party rule, and that experience had
demonstrated that the rule was apt to lead to hardship thus necessitating exceptions
from it.3 The Committee regarded the trust exception, illustrated by the line of cases
following Tomlinson v Gill,4 as the most important, and said that, if this doctrine had
been applied in all cases, it would be possible to say that English law did have a ius
quaesitum tertio. However the application of the exception had been limited by other
cases,5 and therefore “the law on this point is uncertain and confused. For the ordinary
lawyer it is difficult to determine when a contract right ‘may be conferred by way of
1
The relevant legislation in Western Australia, Queensland and New Zealand is set out in
Appendix B. The law on contracts for the benefit of third parties in several other jurisdictions
was set out in the Appendix to Consultation Paper No 121. We have also found of help and
interest the Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Amendment of the Law of Contract (1987)
ch 4 and, especially, the clear and elegant Report of the Manitoba Law Reform Commission
Report No 80, Privity of Contract (1993). The former concluded that a detailed legislative
scheme was not the appropriate method of reform; rather there should be a simple abrogation
of the third party rule by statute, with the details left to the courts. The latter proposed a draft
Bill based on the New Zealand Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, with some amendments. Neither
report has yet been implemented.
2
Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report, Statute of Frauds and the Doctrine of
Consideration, (1937) Cmd 5449.
3
Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report, para 41.
4
(1756) Ambler 330, 27 ER 221. See also Gregory and Parker v Williams (1817) 3 Mer 582; 36
ER 224; Lamb v Vice (1840) 6 M & W 467; 151 ER 495; Robertson v Wait (1853) 8 Exch 299,
155 ER 1360; Lloyd’s v Harper (1880) 16 Ch D 290; Les Affréteurs Réunis Société Anonyme v
Leopold Walford (London) Ltd [1919] AC 801. See Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim
Report, para 42.
5
In Re Empress Engineering Company (1880) 16 Ch D 125, 127 per Jessel MR “I know of no case
where, when A simply contracts with B to pay money to C, C has been held entitled to sue A in
equity”; Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge and Co Ltd [1915] AC 847, 853 per Viscount
Haldane LC; Vandepitte v Preferred Accident Insurance Corporation of New York [1933] AC 70
(PC). See Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report, para 43.
53
property’, in Viscount Haldane’s phrase, and when it may not”.6 The Report
concluded that “there is a strong argument for attempting to frame a rule which will
be more easily understandable”.7 A further practical reason for reform was that the
enforcement of a ius quaesitum tertio by way of trust involved the addition of the trustee
as a party to all legal proceedings to enforce the trust, which was wasteful and
unnecessary, as the third party’s position was more analogous to an assignee of a
contractual right than to a beneficiary of a trust.8
4.3 The Committee then went on to consider the circumstances in which third party rights
should arise, and considered that there should be three important limitations. First, no
third party right should be acquired unless given by the express terms of the contract.9
Secondly, the promisor should be able to raise any defences against the third party
which he or she would have been able to raise against the promisee. Thirdly, the right
of the promisor and promisee to vary or cancel the contract at any time should be
preserved unless the third party had received notice of the agreement and had adopted
it either expressly or by conduct. The Committee therefore recommended that:
where a contract by its express terms purports to confer a benefit directly on a

third party, the third party shall be entitled to enforce the provision in his own
name, provided that the promisor shall be entitled to raise as against the third
party any defence that would have been valid against the promisee. The rights
of the third party shall be subject to cancellation of the contract by the mutual
consent of the contracting parties at any time before the third party has adopted
it either expressly or by conduct.10
The Committee also recommended that the provisions of section 11 of the Married
Women’s Property Act, 1882, should be extended to all life, endowment and education
policies, in which a particular beneficiary is named.11
6
7
Ibid.
8
Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report, para 46. The Committee also thought that an
important practical reason for reform was the increasing role played by documentary letters of
credit in world trade. The Committee concluded that “it is very undesirable that the validity in
law of a commercial contract of such importance should remain in doubt”: Law Revision
Committee, Sixth Interim Report, para 45. Of course, the legal validity of documentary letters
of credit is now well-settled. Our Consultation Paper concluded that documentary letters of
credit were valid through an exception to the doctrine of consideration, and did not constitute
infringements of the third party rule: see Consultation Paper No 121, para 3.32; Hamzeh Malas
& Sons v British Imex Industries Ltd [1958] 2 QB 127.
9
The Law Revision Committee was adamant that no third party right should be acquired by
implication (eg, because the performance of the contract would benefit the third party). See Law
Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report, para 47.
10
11
Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report, para 49. In its section on consideration, the
Law Revision Committee included a recommendation that the rule that consideration must move
from the promisee should be abolished: see para 37.
54
4.4 As we shall see,12 the Report of the Law Revision Committee was directly influential
in promoting reform to the third party rule in Western Australia which, like
Queensland, did not have a separate Law Reform Commission Report on the third
party rule before introducing reform. However, its recommendations on the third party
rule (and on the doctrine of consideration) have, of course, not been implemented in
England.13
2. Abrogation of Third Party Rule in Other Common Law Jurisdictions

(1) Western Australia
4.5 Section 11 of the Western Australian Property Law Act 1969, in line with the proposal
of the English Law Revision Committee, amended the third party rule by providing
that:
...where a contract expressly in its terms purports to confer a benefit directly on

a person who is not named as a party to the contract, the contract
is...enforceable by that person in his own name... .14
All defences which would have been available to the promisor had the third party been
a party to the contract are available in an action by the third party,15 and in any action
on the contract by the third party, all parties to the contract must be joined.16 Further,
the legislation permits the enforcement of all terms of the contract against the third
party which are “in the terms of the contract...imposed on the [third party] for the
benefit of the [promisor]”.17 The legislation also permits variation or cancellation of the
contract by the contracting parties at any time until the third party adopts it either
expressly or by conduct.18
4.6 The New Zealand Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee19 made a
number of criticisms of the Western Australian legislation:
12
13
For possible reasons for inaction, see J Beatson, ‘Reforming the Law of Contracts for the Benefit
of Third Parties - A Second Bite at the Cherry’ (1992) 45(2) CLP 1, 14-15.
14
Western Australia Property Law Act 1969, s 11(2) (W Austl Acts 1969, No 32).
15
Western Australia Property Law Act 1969, s 11(2)(a).
16
Western Australia Property Law Act 1969, s 11(2)(b). This requirement was criticised by the
New Zealand Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, see para 4.6, below.
17
Western Australia Property Law Act 1969, s 11(2)(c).
18
Western Australia Property Law Act 1969, s 11(3).
19
New Zealand Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Privity of Contract (1981) pp
49-50.
55
(i) it does not appear to permit enforcement by third parties who are not in
existence or ascertained at the time of formation of the contract;20
(ii) it seems to require express naming of the third party;
(iii) it seems to exclude implied terms in favour of third parties;
(iv) it requires the joinder of each person named as a party to the contract in any
proceedings commenced by the third party;
(v) it does not clearly express the necessity for the promisor and promisee to have
intended to confer a legal right on the third party.
4.7 It should be noted that the Western Australian legislation does not provide for the
situation where, instead of paying the third party, the promisor pays the promisee. If
the third party is to be regarded as having an independent right under the contract, the
fact that the promisor has performed in favour of the promisee should not necessarily
eliminate the third party’s right to performance. In Westralian Farmers Co-Operative Ltd
v Southern Meat Packers Ltd,21 the Supreme Court of Western Australia found that,
where the plaintiff third party had established the existence of a contractual payment
term in its favour, and the defendant claimed that it had already made payment to the
original promisee, the plaintiff third party could nevertheless maintain its claim to
payment. We address the issue of overlapping claims by the third party and by the
promisee in Part XI below.
(2) Queensland
4.8 The third party rule was abrogated by statute in Queensland in 1974. Section 55 of the
Queensland Property Law Act 197422 provides that:
A promisor who, for a valuable consideration moving from the promisee,

promises to do or to refrain from doing an act or acts for the benefit of a
beneficiary shall, upon acceptance by the beneficiary, be subject to a duty
enforceable by the beneficiary to perform that promise.23
20
We are not entirely convinced that this and the following point are accurate criticisms of the
Western Australian legislation. The fact that the third party is “a person not named as a party”
does not necessarily mean that it is only where the third party is named that he can enforce the
contract.
21
[1981] WAR 241. See Consultation Paper No 121, Appendix, para 3. See also J Longo, ‘Privity
and the Property Law Act: Westralian Farmers Co-Operative Ltd v Southern Meat Packers Ltd’
(1983) 15 University of Western Aust LRev 411.
22
Queensland Stat No 76 of 1974, s 55.
23
Queensland Property Law Act 1974, s 55(1). The New Zealand Contracts and Commercial Law
Reform Committee, Privity of Contract (1981) p 52 regarded the Queensland legislation as
“deficient in not providing that the duty may be created by deed as well as by simple contract.”
56
Prior to acceptance, the promisor and promisee may vary or discharge the terms of the
promise without the beneficiary’s consent.24 After acceptance, the promisor’s duty to
perform in favour of and at the suit of the beneficiary becomes enforceable, and the
promise may only be varied with the consent of the promisor, promisee and
beneficiary.25 On acceptance, the beneficiary is bound to perform any acts that may be
required of him by the terms of the promise.26 Defences that can normally be raised
against an action to enforce a promissory duty can be raised by the promisor against
the beneficiary.27 The section defines what constitutes an “acceptance” so as to render
a promise enforceable by the beneficiary,28 and which “promises” will be capable of
giving rise to rights in third party beneficiaries.29 Unlike the Western Australian
legislation, discussed above, the Queensland legislation does not require that the
contract expressly purports to confer a benefit on the third party.30 And it imposes no
obligation to join all parties in any action by the third party.31
(3) New Zealand

4.9 In 1981, the New Zealand Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee
presented a Report on the third party rule, which appended draft legislation to
implement the recommended reforms.32 The Report gave a brief account of the existing
common law of New Zealand,33 which was virtually identical to that of England and
Wales. The Report then considered developments in other jurisdictions, including the
absence of a third party rule in most civilian systems34 and its abrogation, either by the
courts or by statute, in the United States, Israel, Western Australia and Queensland.
24
Queensland Property Law Act 1974, ss 55(2).
25
Queensland Property Law Act 1974, s 55(3)(a) and (d).
26
Queensland Property Law Act 1974, s 55(3)(b).
27
Queensland Property Law Act 1974, s 55(4).
28
Queensland Property Law Act 1974, s 55(6)(a):“‘acceptance’ means an assent by words or
conduct communicated by or on behalf of the beneficiary to the promisor, or to some person
authorized on his behalf, in the manner (if any), and within the time, specified in the promise or,
if no time is specified, within a reasonable time of the promise coming to the notice of the
beneficiary”.
29
Queensland Property Law Act 1974, s 55(6)(c): “‘promise’ means a promise - (i) which is or
appears to be intended to be legally binding; and (ii) which creates or appears to be intended to
create a duty enforceable by a beneficiary...”.
30
Although the promise must appear to be intended to confer a legal right enforceable by the third
party: see note 29 above.
31
If criticisms (i) and (ii) in paragraph 4.6 above are accurate, the Queensland legislation also
differs in that the beneficiary need not be named or in existence or identified at the time of the
contract: see s 55(6)(b). See Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Amendment of the Law
of Contract (1987) pp 62-64; Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Privity of Contract (1993)
Report No 80 pp 32-34.
32
New Zealand Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Privity of Contract (1981).
33
Ibid, paras 2.1-2.3.
34
The Report, at para 3.1, considered the law of France, Germany, South Africa, Denmark,
Norway and Scotland.
57
The Committee considered arguments that the practical difficulties caused by the rule,
and the devices adopted for avoiding its operation in particular circumstances, were
insufficient to justify a fundamental change in the law, but refuted the contention that
the intentions of the contracting parties could usually be achieved by the courts. The
Report said:35
We are not convinced by such arguments. We have looked in vain for a solid
basis of policy justifying the frustration of contractual intentions...[W]e are left
with a sense of irritation like that which, we suspect, motivated the majority of
the Privy Council in New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v Satterthwaite & Co Ltd,36 to
say, ‘...to give the appellant the benefit of the exemptions and limitations
contained in the bill of lading is to give effect to the clear intentions of a
commercial document...’ ...The case for reform is completed, in our opinion, by
the observations of Lord Scarman (sometime Chairman of the English Law
Commission) in Woodar Investment Development Ltd v Wimpey Construction (UK)
Limited.37
4.10 The New Zealand Committee therefore recommended that a third party should be
given a right to enforce a contract where a promise contained in a deed or contract
confers, or purports to confer, a benefit on that third party.38 The New Zealand
Committee’s recommendations were substantially implemented in the New Zealand
Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, although one of the changes is that the 1982 Act, in
contrast to the draft Contracts (Privity) Bill annexed to the Committee’s Report,
includes a requirement that the third party should be designated in the contract in
order to obtain an enforceable right.
4.11 The Act, in section 4, provides that:
Where a promise contained in a deed or contract confers, or purports to confer,

a benefit on a person, designated by name, description or reference to a class,
who is not a party to the deed or contract...the promisor shall be under an
obligation, enforceable at the suit of that person, to perform that promise.
Thus the section starts from the premise that all promises benefiting sufficiently
designated third parties are to be enforceable at the suit of that third party. The section
is not limited to express promises, and extends equally to implied promises. However
the section goes on to provide that it does not apply:
35
New Zealand Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Privity of Contract (1981),
paras 6.2-6.3.
36
[1975] AC 154, 169.
37
[1980] 1 WLR 277, 300-301. Lord Scarman’s observations are set out above at para 2.64.
38
Privity of Contract (1981) Appendix C, Draft Contracts (Privity) Act, clause 4.
58
to a promise which, on the proper construction of the deed or contract, is not
intended to create, in respect of the benefit, an obligation enforceable at the suit
of that person.
4.12 Section 4 thus creates a reverse onus of proof in respect of the contracting parties’
intention to create a legally enforceable obligation in favour of the third party. It is up
to them to establish that their promise was not intended to have this effect. The New
Zealand Act therefore controls liability by the requirement that the third party be
sufficiently designated in the contract and by resting liability on the intentions of the
contracting parties to confer a right of enforceability (albeit under a reversed burden
of proof).
4.13 The Act goes on to provide that promises benefiting third parties may not be varied or
cancelled without the third party’s consent once the third party has either (i) materially
altered his position in reliance on the promise;39 (ii) obtained judgment on the promise;
or (iii) obtained an arbitration award on the promise.40 However, where there is an
express provision permitting variation in other circumstances, which is known to the
third party, such variation is permitted.41
4.14 In 1993, the New Zealand Law Commission considered the operation of the Act,42 and
concluded that most of the problems which had arisen in its operation concerned the
scope of what became section 4, and particularly the requirement of designation. These
caused difficulties particularly in connection with pre-incorporation contracts and
contracts involving nominees. The New Zealand Law Commission examined the
decisions under the Act, but recommended no changes to it. The precise difficulties
identified by the Commission will be discussed in Part VIII of this Report when we
consider designation, and existence, of the third party.
39
Or his position has been materially altered by the reliance of any other person on the promise.
40
New Zealand Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, s 5.
41
New Zealand Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, s 6. For the New Zealand approach to defences, see
para 10.7 below.
42
New Zealand Law Commission, Contract Statutes Review, NZLC R 25, (1993), pp 217-218.
59
(4) United States
4.15 There is a vast literature on third party rights in the United States,43 which no short
account can adequately summarise. The following paragraphs merely highlight some
of the main difficulties revealed by the case law.
4.16 Since the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Lawrence v Fox,44 it has
become generally accepted that a third party is able to enforce a contractual obligation
made for his benefit. However, the problem of defining what is meant by a third party
beneficiary has never adequately been solved. Section 133 of the first Restatement of
Contracts published in 1932 distinguished donee beneficiaries, creditor beneficiaries,
and incidental beneficiaries: only donee and creditor beneficiaries could enforce
contracts made for their benefit. A person was a “donee beneficiary” if the purpose of
the promisee was to make a gift to him, or to confer upon him a right not due from the
promisee. A person was a “creditor beneficiary” if performance of the promise would
satisfy an actual or asserted duty of the promisee to him. A person was an “incidental
beneficiary” if the benefits to him were merely incidental to the performance of the
promise.
4.17 It became apparent that a number of third party beneficiaries did not fall within the
“donee” and “creditor” categories,45 such that some courts simply disregarded the
categorisation approach and allowed beneficiaries to recover who were neither creditors
nor donees.46 The inflexibility of the categorisation approach led to changes in the
second Restatement of Contracts published in 1981, under which intended
beneficiaries, who can enforce contracts, are contrasted with incidental beneficiaries,
who cannot. Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) provides:
“(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a

promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the
beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either
43
See the standard accounts in Corbin on Contracts, Vol 4, and Williston, A Treatise on the Law of
Contracts, Vol 2, which well illustrate the complexity of American law. See also, eg, D Summers,
‘Third Party Beneficiaries and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts’ (1982) 67 Cornell L Rev
880; S De Cruz, ‘Privity in America: A Study in Judicial and Statutory Innovation’ (1985) 14
Anglo-Am L Rev 265; H Prince, ‘Perfecting the Third Party Beneficiary Standing Rule under
Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts’ (1984) 25 Boston College L Rev 919;
A Waters, ‘The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule’ (1985)
98 Harvard L Rev 1109. See also the Ontario Law Reform Commission’s Report on Amendment
of the Law of Contract (1987), pp 55-58.
44
20 NY 268 (1859).
45
In a private construction context, subcontractors were neither donee nor creditor beneficiaries:
D Summers, ‘Third Party Beneficiaries and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts’ (1982) 67
Cornell L Rev 880, 884.
46
Ibid. For an example of a third party taking the benefit of an exclusion clause as a third party
beneficiary, see Carle & Montanari Inc v American Export Isbrandtsen Lines Inc 275 F Supp 76
(1967).
60
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee
to pay money to the beneficiary;47 or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary
the benefit of the promised performance.48
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended

beneficiary.”49
4.18 However, the Restatement (Second) fails properly to explain the distinction between
intended and incidental beneficiaries, given that “the parties, or more simply the
promisee, may intend a third party to receive a benefit but not intend that party to
have standing to enforce the promise”.50 The “intent to benefit” test has, in practice,
failed to achieve consistent results,51 in particular in the field of public service
contracts.52
4.19 Other difficult questions under the Restatement (Second) include the following.
Should reference be made to the contract alone, or to all the prevailing circumstances
when determining whether the appropriate intention exists?53 Some states have
adopted a requirement that the intent to benefit the third party be expressed within the
contract. However, even in the states that have adopted this strict test of intent, the
requirement has not been consistently applied.54
4.20 A further problem is the question of whose intent is relevant to establish a third party
right. Section 302(1) refers to the intention of the parties, although section 302(1)(b)
refers to the promisee’s intention. Different jurisdictions apply different tests:55 some
47
Eg where B promises A to discharge a debt owed by A to C.
48
Eg where B promises A to make a gift to C.
49
Eg where B promises A to build a structure which has the effect of enhancing the value of C’s
land.
50
H Prince, ‘Perfecting the Third Party Beneficiary Standing Rule under Section 302 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts’ (1984) 25 Boston College L Rev 919, 979.
51
There have been several varieties of the “intent to benefit” test: the contract must have been for
the “sole and exclusive” benefit of the third party; the “primary intention” of the promisee must
have been to benefit the third party; the contract must have been “necessarily” for the benefit of
the third party; the direct benefit must have been “express or unmistakeable” or “sufficiently
immediate”: Prince, ibid, pp 934-937.
52
A Waters, “The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule” (1985)
98 Harvard L Rev 1109, 1186-1188.
53
In Beckman Cotton Company v First National Bank of Atlanta 666 F 2d 181 (1982), by considering
the surrounding circumstances the court was able to confer a right of enforcement on a third
party beneficiary, although not named in the contract.
54
See H Prince, ‘Perfecting the Third Party Beneficiary Standing Rule under Section 302 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts’ (1982) Boston College L Rev 919, 926-931.
55
Ibid, p 931.
61
require proof only of the promisee’s intention; others focus upon the intent of both
parties, and some have adopted a midway position, requiring that the promisor should
have reason to know of the promisee’s intent to contract for a benefit to a third party.56
4.21 On the question whether the contracting parties may vary or revoke their promise,
section 311 of the Restatement (Second) provides that the contracting parties may
create rights that cannot be modified, but that otherwise they are free to modify unless
the beneficiary “materially changes his position in justifiable reliance on the promise
or brings suit on it or manifests assent to it at the request of the promisor or promisee”.
56
On one view, only the promisee’s intention should be relevant, since the promisor’s motivation
for entering into the contract will frequently be the consideration he receives from the promisee.
However, this is not invariably so: the promisor may have an interest in seeing that the third
party is benefited, as where he is a relative: Re Stapleton-Bretherton [1941] Ch 482.
62
PART V
THE FORM OF THE LEGISLATION
1. A Detailed Legislative Scheme?
5.1 The Consultation Paper1 included a consideration of four possible techniques 2 by
which reform of the third party rule could be effected:
(i) further exceptions to the third party rule could be made in specific instances;
(ii) the rule preventing the promisee from recovering the third party’s loss could
be reformed;
(iii) there could be a provision that no third party should be denied enforcement
of a contract made for its benefit on the grounds of lack of privity (an
enabling provision);
(iv) the law could be reformed by means of a detailed legislative scheme.
5.2 Our provisional recommendation was that reform should be by way of a detailed
legislative scheme (that is, option (iv) above). Almost all consultees were in favour of
this provisional conclusion.3 They believed that anything less than a detailed legislative
scheme would lead to unacceptable uncertainty. Before confirming our views on this
issue, we shall briefly consider the advantages and disadvantages of the various options.
(1) Further Exceptions in Specific Instances

5.3 The first suggestion, that reform might be effected by specific further exceptions to the
third party rule, has the advantage that particular needs in particular situations can be
directly addressed in detail. Another possible advantage is that exceptions in specific
circumstances should leave little room for debate about whether there is an intent to
give an enforceable right in particular cases. But to create further situation-specific
exceptions misses the point that the third party rule is generally flawed. Creating
further specific exceptions will merely serve to make the law more complex while still
leaving unacceptable gaps in a third party’s rights.
(2) Abolishing the Rule Preventing Recovery by the Promisee of Third Party’s Loss
5.4 In the Consultation Paper we accepted that the major advantage of this technique of
reform is that it avoids the need to address several difficult questions which arise if
third parties are given directly enforceable rights, such as: what is the test for
enforceability by a third party?; can the original parties vary or rescind the contract?;
1
Consultation Paper No 121, paras 5.1-5.7.
2
It was also envisaged that it would be possible to combine some of these possibilities, for instance
(i) and (iii).
3
Including some who did not favour reform.
63
can the promisee sue in addition to the third party?; is the promisor entitled to rely on
defences available against the promisee? However, in our view, this would not be an
adequate method of reform, most centrally because the promisee may be either
unwilling or unable to enforce a contract made for a third party.
(3) Removal of the Bar to Third Party Enforcement

5.5 The preferred method of reform advocated by the Ontario Law Reform Commission
was that “[t]here should be enacted a legislative provision to the effect that contracts
for the benefit of third parties should not be unenforceable for lack of consideration or
want of privity”.4 The Ontario Commission preferred this approach to a detailed
legislative scheme for several reasons:
(i) it was thought better that the courts should be permitted some flexibility in
dealing with the variety of issues which would undoubtedly arise under any
reform;
(ii) since third party beneficiary cases arise in widely different contexts (from
contracts to pay money to relatives to contracts involving the extension of
defences in bills of lading to stevedores), it was thought that legislation could
not satisfactorily deal with all such problems and that anomalies were likely
to arise if the same set of rules were to apply to such widely different
circumstances;
(iii) the problem of defining the class of beneficiaries entitled to sue and the
question of variation and rescission were regarded as particularly intractable.
5.6 We acknowledged in the Consultation Paper that this method of reform has the
attraction of making the change of principle a legislative matter while leaving
subsequent development to the courts. However, we also expressed the view that the
problems involved are too complex and numerous to lend themselves to an incremental
approach. We concluded that this approach would beg many important questions
about the detailed application of reform of the third party rule, and that to leave these
issues to the courts with no legislative guidance could be said to be an abdication of
responsibility when we are aware that they involve questions of principle which will at
some stage have to be faced. While this approach undoubtedly achieves flexibility it
does so at the expense of clarity and certainty. We felt that the development of the law
in the United States, even with the assistance of the Restatements, illustrates some of
the disadvantages of such an approach.5 We continue to find these arguments to be
convincing, and thus reject a simple abolition of the privity rule as a method of reform.
4
Report on Amendment of the Law of Contract (1987) p 71.
5
For the law in the United States, see paras 4.15-4.21 above.
64
(4) Reform by Means of a Detailed Legislative Scheme
5.7 This was the approach adopted in Western Australia,6 Queensland,7 New Zealand,8
and recommended in Manitoba.9 On this approach, policy would be determined and
provision made for such matters as the contractual provisions that are enforceable by
third parties, the rights of contracting parties to vary or discharge the contract, and
promisors’ defences. The crucial advantage of this approach is its certainty.
5.8 Although the House of Lords could, if a suitable opportunity arose, reconsider the third
party rule in English law,10 the House has on a number of occasions declined to do so.
Moreover, one may have to wait a very long time for a suitable case to reach the House
of Lords. In any event a legislative reform has the advantage that many of the
difficulties of detail identified in the Consultation Paper and in this Report can be
addressed and dealt with in a manner not open to the judiciary. In line with the
overwhelming view of consultees, we therefore believe that a detailed legislative scheme
is the best way to proceed.

(3) the third party rule should be reformed by means of a detailed legislative
scheme.
2. Judicial Development of Third Party Rights

5.10 We should emphasise that we do not wish our proposed legislation - which we believe
to be a relatively conservative and moderate measure - to hamper the judicial
development of third party rights. Should the House of Lords decide that in a
particular sphere our reform does not go far enough and that, for example, a measure
of imposed consumer protection is required or that employees (even though not
mentioned in the contract) should be able to rely on exclusion clauses that protect their
employers under a doctrine of vicarious immunity11, we would not wish our proposed
legislation to be construed as hampering that development.
6
Property Law Act 1969, s 11. See paras 4.5-4.7 above.
7
Property Law Act 1974, s 55. See para 4.8 above.
8
Contracts (Privity) Act 1982. See paras 4.9-4.14 above.
9
Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Report No 80, Privity of Contract (1993) p 57. See para 4.1,
note 1, above.
10
As shown by the inroads into the rule made by the courts in other jurisdictions. Eg, Australia
(Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107); Canada (London
Drugs Ltd v Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd (1992) 97 DLR (4th) 261); USA (Lawrence v Fox
20 NY 268 (1859)).
11
See London Drugs Ltd v Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd (1992) 97 DLR (4th) 261. See paras
2.31-2.32 above.
65
(4) the legislation should not be construed as preventing judicial
development of third party rights. (Draft Bill, clause 6(1))
3. Reform of The Promisee’s Remedies?

5.12 While it is our view that a reform of the rule preventing recovery by the promisee of the
third party’s loss is not the correct way to reform privity, this seems the most
appropriate point in this Report to consider whether, in any event, there should be
legislative reform of the promisee’s remedies in a contract for a third party’s benefit.
5.13 As we have seen in Part II,12 a promisee’s remedies can in some circumstances be of
benefit to the third party. The promisee may be able to obtain an order of specific
performance13 or, if the promisor’s breach causes loss to the promisee, may obtain
substantial damages. If, however, the breach does not cause the promisee any loss and
the case is not an appropriate one for specific performance, there will be a difficulty.
Normally, the promisee can recover only for his or her own loss and this may mean
that he or she will get only nominal damages even if there has been a substantial loss
to the third party. The traditional view is also that the promisee will normally be unable
to bring an action in debt to enforce payment to him or her of sums due to the third
party under the contract, since those sums were by definition not due to the
promisee.14
5.14 In our Consultation Paper, we did not raise as a specific issue the possibility of
reforming the promisee’s remedies, albeit that we did provisionally recommend that
reform of the rule preventing the promisee from recovering the third party’s loss in
damages would not be an adequate method of reforming the third party rule.15 The
question we now wish to address, however, is whether, in addition to our central
recommendations for reform of the third party rule, we should also recommend
reforms to the law on the promisee’s remedies.
5.15 We believe that to make specific recommendations in relation to the promisee’s

remedies in a contract for the benefit of a third party raises matters properly looked at
in a more specific review. As the issue was addressed in a rather peripheral manner in
our Consultation Paper, we do not believe that it would be appropriate in this Report
to make detailed recommendations for its reform. Moreover, in recent years the courts
have gone a considerable way towards developing rules which in many appropriate
cases do allow the promisee to recover damages on behalf of the third party. The
12
13
Or, if the promise was not to sue the third party, a stay of action.
14
15
Consultation Paper No 121, para 5.3.
66
Albazero16 and Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd17 are particularly
important in this respect. Our recommendation is that this is a matter at present better
left to the evolving common law. Certainly we would not wish to forestall further
judicial development of this area of the law of damages.
5.16 Indeed it is important to emphasise that, while our proposed reform will give some
third parties the right to enforce contracts, there will remain many contracts where a
third party stands to benefit and yet will not have a right of enforceability. Our
proposed statute carves out a general and wide-ranging exception to the third party
rule but it leaves that rule intact for cases not covered by the statute. On the facts of
Linden Gardens itself, there would be no question of the third party having a right of
enforcement under our proposed reform. The property in question had been sold to
the third party after the contract for work on the property had been entered into and
there was a clause in the works contract barring assignment of the rights under it. The
recognition in that case that the promisee could have recovered damages based on the
third party’s loss will be as important after the implementation of our proposed reform
as it is under the present law; and we would not wish our proposed reform to be
construed as casting any doubt on the decisions in The Albazero, Linden Gardens and
Darlington BC v Wiltshier Northern Ltd.18

(5) the remedies available to the promisee in a contract enforceable by a
third party should be left to the common law. (Draft Bill, clause 4)
5.18 The co-existence of an action by a third party to enforce a promised benefit, and the
potential ability of the promisee to recover substantial damages for a third party’s loss,
raise the question of how any overlap between these claims is to be dealt with. We
address this in Part XI below.19
16
[1977] AC 774. See para 2.40 above.
17
[1994] 1 AC 85. See paras 2.39-2.46 above.
18
19
See paras 11.1-11.4, 11.16-11.22 below.
67
PART VI
THE THIRD PARTY RULE AND
CONSIDERATION
1. Introduction and Consultation
6.1 The relationship between the doctrine of consideration and the third party rule has
long been debated. We argued in the Consultation Paper1 that a reform of the third
party rule did not require an associated review of the doctrine of consideration. Our
view was that the rule that only a party to a contract can enforce it and the rule that
consideration must move from the promisee could be distinguished in policy terms: the
third party rule determines who can enforce a contract; while the rule that
consideration must move from the promisee determines the types of promises that can
be enforced. We pointed out that the view that the rules are distinct is supported by
authority2 and by the Report of the Law Revision Committee3 although it has been
questioned by some academics.4
6.2 We now wish to address this difficult question again and, in the light of the response
of consultees,5 to discuss it in a little more detail than in the Consultation Paper. In
particular, it is now apparent to us that some of this debate has been bedeviled by the
ambiguity of the phrase “consideration must move from the promisee”. We are also
concerned to acknowledge that the belief of some that it is unacceptable to reform
privity without reforming consideration is not concerned to deny that it might, at a
formal level, be possible to do one without the other. Rather the belief is that, at a
deeper policy level, the reform of privity involves relaxing the importance attached to
consideration.
2. Consideration Must Move From the Promisee

6.3 This maxim is ambiguous. On the one hand, it can be taken to mean that to be binding
a promise must be supported by consideration. If A promises B £100, B cannot
enforce the promise (unless made under deed) because there is no consideration for
1
See Consultation Paper No 121, paras 2.5-2.10.
2
See, eg, Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 1 B & S 393; 121 ER 262; Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v
Selfridge and Co Ltd [1915] AC 847, 853. See also Kepong Prospecting Ltd v Schmidt [1968] AC
810, 826.
3
The Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report, (1937) para 37. See further above, paras
4.2-4.4.
4
M Furmston, “Return to Dunlop v Selfridge” (1960) 23 MLR 373, 382-384; B Coote,
“Consideration and the Joint Promisee” [1978] CLJ 301; R Flannigan “Privity - the End of an
Era (Error)” (1987) 103 LQR 564, 568-569. Cf H Collins, The Law of Contract (2nd ed, 1993)
pp 283-292 who supports the view that the third party rule is not inseparably linked with the
doctrine of consideration; Chitty on Contracts (27th ed, 1994) para 3-032 which accepts the view
that the rule that consideration must move from the promisee and the third party rule are not
inextricably linked; Anson’s Law of Contract (ed Guest) (26th ed, 1984) pp 86-87; Treitel, The
Law of Contract (9th ed, 1995) p 539 is less categorical but also on balance supports this view.
5
See also E McKendrick, Contract Law (2nd ed, 1994) pp 129-130.
68
A’s promise. The promise is a gratuitous one. This fundamental requirement of
consideration could be expressed by saying that B cannot succeed because, although
B is a promisee, it has not provided consideration and consideration must move from
the promisee.
6.4 In the Consultation Paper, the maxim “consideration must move from the promisee”
was essentially used in this first sense of consideration being a necessary requirement
for a valid contract. Hence the Paper included the following two passages: “[t]wo of
the central questions of policy in the law of contract are: (i) which promises are legally
enforceable; and (ii) who can enforce them? The first question is associated with the
doctrine of consideration; the second with the doctrine of privity....”;6 “we believe that
the third party rule, ie, that third parties cannot enforce contracts made for their
benefit, can be reformed without prejudicing the rule that consideration must move
from the promisee.”7 Certainly once one has interpreted the maxim that consideration
must move from the promisee as meaning merely that consideration is necessary, one
can see that, at a formal level, there is no difficulty in reforming privity without altering
the need for consideration. That is, one can insist that, provided there is a contract
supported by consideration (or made by deed), it may then be enforceable by a third
party beneficiary who has not provided consideration.
6.5 But the maxim “consideration must move from the promisee” can also be used to
mean, and is probably generally understood to mean, that, even though the promise
is supported by consideration, the consideration must move from the plaintiff. That is,
the party seeking to enforce the contract must have provided the consideration. Used
in this sense one cannot, even at a formal level, reform the privity doctrine while
leaving untouched the rule that consideration must move from the promisee. A reform
allowing a third party to sue would achieve nothing, or almost nothing, unless there
was also a departure from the rule that a plaintiff could not sue on a contract if it has
not provided consideration. Used in this sense, the rule that consideration must move
from the promisee and the rule of privity that only a party to a contract can enforce it
are so closely linked that the essential dispute is whether they are distinguishable at all;
whether, in other words, there are two rules or one.
6.6 That dispute ultimately turns on what one means by “a party” to a contract where the
contract is supported by consideration rather than being made under deed. It can best
be illustrated by reference to the situation of joint promisees. Say, for example, that A
promises B and C to pay C £100 if B will do certain work desired by A. If B does the
work, and A declines to pay the £100 to C, can C sue? On the face of it, C, not having
provided consideration, cannot sue. This can be expressed in one of two ways: either
(i) that C cannot sue because, although a party to the contract and privy to it, C falls
foul of the rule that consideration must move from the promisee; or (ii) that C cannot
6
Consultation Paper No 121 para 2.1.
7
Consultation Paper No 121 para 2.10.
69
sue because, not having provided consideration for A’s promise, C is not a party to the
contract and therefore falls foul of both the privity rule and the rule that consideration
must move from the promisee (which are merely two ways of expressing exactly the
same point).
6.7 Whichever of these two views is taken (and the practical significance of choosing
between them seems to relate only to how one deals with joint promisees, which we
discuss below) the central point is that the legislation must recognise that if, by
“consideration must move from the promisee” one means “consideration must move
from the plaintiff” one cannot sensibly reform privity without also departing from that
rule.

(6) the legislation should ensure that the rule that consideration must move
from the promisee is reformed to the extent necessary to avoid nullifying
our proposed reform of the doctrine of privity.8
3. The Joint Promisee Exception

6.9 A difficult linked issue is how we should deal with the question as to whether a joint
promisee can sue even though it has not provided consideration in a contract not made
by deed. In other words, how should we deal with the so-called ‘joint promisee
exception’?9 The present English law on joint promisees is not entirely clear. However,
it seems likely that an English court would apply the approach of the High Court of
Australia in Coulls v Bagot’s Executor & Trustee Co Ltd.10 In that case, four members
of the High Court suggested that a joint promisee could sue despite not having
provided consideration11 (although Windeyer J suggested that one could regard B as
having provided consideration on behalf of C).12 Barwick CJ explained that the
justification for this exception to the need for consideration to move from the promisee
was that the promise had been made to C and consideration for the promise had been
provided, albeit by B not C. This approach is reminiscent of the view of the Law
8
After discussions with the draftsman, we are satisfied that this recommendation will automatically
be met by the central clause of the legislation which gives a third party a right to enforce the
contract; such a clause can only be interpreted as also reforming the rule that consideration must
move from the promisee (where that rule means that consideration must move from the plaintiff).
9
This point is left unclear in the legislation enacted in, eg, New Zealand and Western Australia.
10
(1967) 119 CLR 461. For support in England see, for example, New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd
v A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd [1975] AC 154, 180 (per Lord Simon of Glaisdale). See also
McEvoy v Belfast Banking Co Ltd [1935] AC 24, 43 (per Lord Atkin). See, generally, Chitty on
Contracts (27th ed, 1994) paras 3-035-3-036 and Treitel, The Law of Contract (9th ed) pp 532-
533 which draw a distinction between joint, joint and several, and several promises.
11
On the facts the majority (McTiernan, Taylor and Owen JJ) considered that Mrs Coulls was not
a promisee so that this joint promisee exception did not come into play. Barwick CJ and
Windeyer J dissented taking the view that Mrs Coulls was a joint promisee.
12
In his powerful article, “Consideration and the Joint Promisee” [1978] CLJ 301, Coote argues
that, in a bilateral contract, C can only be regarded as having provided consideration if it has
undertaken an obligation to A.
70
Revision Committee in 1937. Having cited the joint promisee example given above,
the Committee continued, “[W]e can see no reason either of logic or of public policy
why A, who has got what he wanted from B in exchange for his promise, should not
be compelled by C to carry out that promise merely because C, a party to the contract,
did not furnish the consideration”.13
6.10 We agree that C should have the entitlement to sue A. Indeed, given our reform of the
privity doctrine, it would be absurd if this were not so: that is, it would be absurd if a
joint promisee had no right to enforce the contract whereas a third party (to whom the
promise has not been given or made) would have that right. The much more difficult
question, however, is what should be the precise rights of enforcement of the joint
promisee (who has not provided consideration)? And, in particular, should such a joint
promisee be regarded as a third party within our proposed reforms? The advantage of
treating such a joint promisee as a third party is that the absurdity referred to above
would be avoided. But there are at least two possible disadvantages of this approach.
The first is that it is arguable that a joint promisee should have a more secure
entitlement to sue than (other) third parties on the basis that the promise was directly
addressed, or given, to him. On this basis, the joint promisee should not have to satisfy
the test of enforceability laid down in our proposals (discussed in Part VII below) and
ought not to be caught by the provisions allowing variation or cancellation without his
consent (discussed in Part IX below). The second disadvantage, and in a sense cutting
the other way from the first disadvantage, is that precisely because the promisee is a
joint promisee - and is therefore closely connected with the other joint promisee vis-a-
vis the promise - it is arguable that traditional rules on joint creditors14 should apply
and some of these rules (for example, requiring joinder of the other joint creditor to
any action15 and allowing one joint creditor to release the promisor provided not in
fraud of the other)16 differ from our proposals for third parties.17
6.11 We have found these questions as to the precise rights of a joint promisee who has not
provided consideration difficult to resolve. As they were not put out to consultation,
and as the position of joint promisees is somewhat peripheral to the central focus of our
reform, we think it preferable to leave them to the courts to resolve if and when they
arise. In line with the implicit assumption of the Consultation Paper,18 we therefore
consider that a joint promisee who has not provided consideration should not count
as a third party within our proposed reforms. We adopt this approach in the confident
13
Sixth Interim Report (1937) para 37. See para 4.3, note 11 above.
14
Treitel, The Law of Contract (9th ed, 1995) pp 529-533.
15
Ibid, p 530.
16
Ibid, p 532. See also para 11.9, note 8, below.
17
For our proposals regarding joinder see paras 14.1-14.5 below. For our proposals regarding
releases, see paras 11.7-11.8 and 11.11-11.12 below.
18
It was implicit in the Consultation paper No 121, paras 2.7, 3.33, that a joint promisee should
not count as a third party for the purposes of our proposed reform.
71
expectation that, particularly in the light of our reforms, the English courts will avoid
the absurdity referred to above by accepting the ‘joint promisee exception’ so that a
joint promisee who has not provided consideration will not be left without a basic right
to enforce the contract.

(7) without prejudice to his rights and remedies at common law, a joint
promisee who has not provided consideration should not be regarded as
a third party for the purposes of our reform. (Draft Bill, clause 8)
4. Reforming Privity Without Reforming Consideration: The Deeper Policy

Question
6.13 We have said above that, while at a formal level, it is possible to reform privity without
reforming the need for consideration, the question must be addressed at a deeper
policy level as to whether this involves relaxing the importance attached to
consideration. The argument that a reform of privity does relax the importance of
consideration rests on the proposition that a third party who has not provided
consideration, and hence not “earned” the promise, should be afforded no better rights
than a gratuitous promisee. The fact that someone else has provided consideration for
the promise is an irrelevance vis-à-vis the claim by the third party. Yet our proposed
reform not only affords a third party better rights than a gratuitous promisee, it also
allows the claim of the third party, who has provided no consideration, to trump the
rights of the contracting parties, who have provided consideration and hence have
earned each other’s promise, to vary or cancel the contract.19
6.14 This argument can be illustrated by the following hypothetical example. A wants to
give a car to C that he is buying from B and also wants to assure C, in advance, that
the car will be his. In a first situation, in addition to its contract with B, A makes a
gratuitous promise to C. In a second situation A insists on a term of the contract with
B being that the car should be delivered, and title should pass, to C. A informs C of
that contract for his benefit. It is argued that the position of C, and the justice
underpinning whether C can sue A in the first situation or B in the second situation
for failure to deliver the car, is indistinguishable. But according to our proposed reform
C would be able to sue in the second situation, subject to satisfying the test of
enforceability, but not in the first situation.
6.15 At first blush one can resist this argument by emphasising that to allow a third party
to sue is to ensure that the intentions of the parties, who have provided consideration,
are upheld. That, in other words, there is a crucial difference between the situation
where a promise is supported by consideration, albeit enforced by a third party, and
the situation where the relevant promise is gratuitous. The overall coherent policy may
be presented as the enforcement of bargains, the upholding of the intentions of those
19
See Part IX below.
72
who have provided consideration, not the enforcement of gratuitous promises. But the
difficulty then lies in explaining why the third party’s right trumps the contracting
parties’ rights to vary or cancel the contract. True adherence to consideration would
appear to dictate that the contracting parties should be free to change their intentions
at any time. Yet, as we have argued in Part III and will argue in more detail in Part IX
below, our reform recognises that consideration should give way to the need to avoid
the injustice of disappointing the reasonable expectations of the third party, where that
third party has relied on the contract or has accepted it by communicating its assent
to the promisor.
6.16 One possible answer to that difficulty is to draw a distinction between the formation
of a contract and its variation or cancellation and to argue that consideration is less
important in relation to the latter than to the former. In other words, that in relation
to variation but not formation, the intentions of those providing consideration may be
overridden by the need not to disappoint the expectations of a gratuitous promisee or
a third party beneficiary.
6.17 Alternatively we see no objection to accepting that, while formally, our reform does not
affect the requirement of consideration, at a deeper policy level, and within the area of
third party rights, it may represent a relaxation of the importance attached to
consideration.20 After all, promises under deed are enforceable without the need for
consideration. And there are other established examples in the law of exceptions to the
need for consideration: for example, documentary letters of credit, compositions with
creditors, and the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The recognition of such exceptions,
allied to academic criticisms of the requirement of consideration (in its classic sense of
there needing to be a requested counter-performance or counter-promise), suggests
that the doctrine of consideration may be a suitable topic for a future separate review
by the Law Commission. But for the present we see no practical difficulty in taking the
limited step in this paper of recommending what may be regarded as a relaxation of the
requirement of consideration to the limited extent necessary to give third parties rights
to enforce valid contracts in accordance with the contracting parties’ intentions.
20
This is also openly recognised by the New Zealand Contracts and Commercial Law Reform
Committee in Privity of Contract (1981) para 8.2.4: “The benefit to the third party is, we think,
analogous to a gift to him. If the donee of that ‘gift’ is to be able to enforce it, this right must to
that extent relax the doctrine of consideration. We think the doctrine should be relaxed to that
extent. In other words, our view is that the consideration necessary to support the contract ought
not to have to be provided by the third party; it should be sufficient, we think, that the
consideration for the promise be supplied by a party to the contract.”
73
SECTION C
CENTRAL REFORM ISSUES
PART VII
THE TEST OF ENFORCEABILITY
1. Consultation and Our Recommendation
7.1 In the Consultation Paper the test of enforceability was identified as the central issue
involved in reform of the third party rule.1 The test of enforceability provides the
answer to the question, “When (ie in what circumstances) does a third party have the
right to enforce a contract or contractual provision to which he/she is not a party?”
The Consultation Paper set out six possible tests. These were as follows:
(i) a third party may enforce a contract which expressly in its terms purports to
confer a benefit directly on him;2
(ii) a third party may enforce a contract in which the parties intend that he
should receive the benefit of the promised performance, regardless of
whether they intend him to have an enforceable right of action or not;
(iii) a third party may enforce a contract in which the parties intend that he
should receive the benefit of the promised performance and also intend to
create a legal obligation enforceable by him (the “dual intention” test);
(iv) a third party may enforce a contract where to do so would effectuate the
intentions of the parties and either the performance of the promise satisfies
a monetary obligation of the promisee to him or it is the intention of the
promisee to confer a gift on him;
(v) a third party may enforce a contract on which he justifiably and reasonably
relies, regardless of the intentions of the parties;
(vi) a third party may enforce a contract which actually confers a benefit on
him, regardless of the purpose of the contract or the intention of the
parties.
1
See Consultation Paper No 121, para 5.8.
2
This was the test advocated by the Law Revision Committee’s Sixth Interim Report (1937), para
48. The Committee did not analyse its proposed test in detail so that it did not clarify whether
the contracting parties must have intended to confer a legal right of enforceability: on the face
of it there is no such requirement (so that the test is a wide one) but some of our consultees
construed the test as laying down that the parties must expressly confer a legal right of
enforceability (so that the test is a narrow one).
74
7.2 It was provisionally concluded in the Consultation Paper that the third party should
only be able to enforce a contract where the contracting parties intend that he should
receive the benefit of performance and intend to create a legal obligation enforceable
by him (the “dual intention” test set out in option (iii) above).3 It was also
provisionally recommended that reform should enable consideration of the
circumstances surrounding the making of the contract when deducing the parties’
intentions.4
7.3 The recommendation of a “dual intention” test drew the most comment from
consultees. There were roughly six strands of consultees’ opinions. First, the majority
of consultees accepted the proposed dual intention test without criticism. Secondly, a
substantial minority feared that the proposed dual intention test would lead to
unacceptable uncertainty in the law and might lead to unintended liabilities being
forced onto contracting parties. Such critics tended, therefore, to reject reform
altogether or, if there were to be reform, they tended to prefer the Law Revision
Committee’s proposal (that is, option (i) above) or something like it. Thirdly, some
consultees thought that the second, or “intention to create an enforceable right” limb
of the test, was artificial and preferred option (ii) or (vi) above. Fourthly, and
somewhat similarly, some consumer interests feared that the second limb would prove
difficult to apply to consumer transactions and argued that it should not apply in that
field.5 Fifthly, a few consultees saw the first limb of the test, requiring an intention to
benefit a third party, as unnecessary and redundant. Finally, a few consultees, while
approving the dual intention test, suggested that to avoid uncertainty in its application,
the implementing legislation should contain a series of presumptions for or against the
creation of legally enforceable rights in particular circumstances.
7.4 While we continue to believe (along with the majority of consultees) that, of the options
set out in the consultation paper, the “dual intention” test is the best approach, we also
consider, in the light of the views of some consultees, that it requires modification and
clarification in order to provide an acceptable statutory test. This is for two main
reasons.
7.5 First, where the parties have expressly conferred legal rights on the third party, we
agree with those consultees who suggested that it ought not to be necessary to show
additionally that the third party was an intended beneficiary of the contract. Secondly,
we agree with the strong view of many consultees that a test of effecting the parties’
intentions in the light of the contract and the surrounding circumstances produces
unacceptable uncertainty. In other words, while we continue to believe that one must
3
4
5
For example, one consultee feared that a strict application of the dual intention test would mean
that most consumer sale of goods transactions would not fall within the reform, and thus argued
that a looser test was required for such transactions.
75
seek to effect the parties’ intentions to confer legal rights on the third party, we also
consider that, to avoid unacceptable uncertainty, one needs a clearer and sharper test
for implementing that policy. We have therefore ultimately opted for a test of
enforceability which, like the recommendations of the Law Revision Committee in
1937, emphasises the express terms of the contract but also closely follows the New
Zealand Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 in relying on a rebuttable presumption of an
intention to confer legal rights on a third party.

(8) the test of enforceability should be as follows:
(a) a third party shall have the right to enforce a contractual provision
where that right is given to him - and he may be identified by name, class
or description - by an express term of the contract (the “first limb”);
(b) a third party shall also have the right to enforce a contractual
provision6 where that provision purports to confer a benefit on the third
party, who is expressly identified as a beneficiary of that provision, by
name, class or description (the “second limb”); but there shall be no
right of enforceability under the second limb where on the proper
construction of the contract it appears that the contracting parties did
not intend the third party to have that right (the “proviso”). (Draft Bill,
clause 1(1) and 1(3) (the first and second limbs), clause 1(2) (the proviso) and
clause 7(1) and 7(2)(a))
7.7 Before examining each of the two limbs of our recommended test of enforceability, it
is worth emphasising that our recommended test of enforceability rests on the belief
that the novel context of third party rights requires a novel approach to contractual
intention. In English contract law the intentions of the contracting parties are
important in two main areas; (i) intention to create legal relations; and (ii) establishing
and construing the terms, express and implied, of the contract. However, the existing
law on each of those aspects of contractual intention does not easily lend itself to
determining the contracting parties’ intentions as regards the legal rights of third
parties. The law on intention to create legal relations draws a distinction between
commercial and domestic agreements, with a presumption being made in favour of an
intention to create legal relations in respect of the former but not in respect of the
latter. Such an approach is inappropriate when one is considering the parties’
intentions as regards the legal rights of third parties; indeed, as the fear of unintended
liabilities has been most keenly impressed upon us in respect of commercial, as
opposed to domestic, contracts, a presumption of an intention to create legal rights in
third party beneficiaries in commercial but not domestic contracts, would directly
undermine our policy objectives.
6
The contractual provision could be implied, albeit that the third party must be expressly
identified: see examples 11 and 14 in paras 7.38 and 7.41 below.
76
7.8 At first sight the concept of an implied term might be thought more fruitful. Indeed
we were for some time attracted by the view that the appropriate method of reform was
to rely on existing tests for the implication of terms into contracts, namely the
“officious bystander” or “business efficacy” tests.7 The difficulty with the former,
however, is that if the test is strictly construed it leads to there being no right of
enforceability in even the plainest cases (see examples 1-3 below)8 where we consider
reform to be essential. In particular, on a strict construction of the “officious
bystander” test, a term can only be implied where it is clear that both parties would have
agreed to the term; and, again, the standard requirement that the parties must know
the facts upon which the implication is based would appear, analogously, to require the
parties to know of the legal difficulties in leaving it to the promisee to enforce the
contract. Similarly, it is far from clear that the “business efficacy” test for implying
terms can be sensibly applied to the question of whether a third party has the legal right
to enforce the contract because a contract will rarely be unworkable simply because a
third party has no right to enforce it: the promisee will always have that right. Of
course, one might leave the courts to loosen the traditional tests so as to render them
more workable in this new context. But this would defeat the whole point of relying on
existing tests and would seem to be a recipe for uncertainty and confusion. In any
event, to rely on implied terms is to rely on a body of law and tests that are notoriously
unclear in their application even in respect of standard two-party contracts. And even
analysed as a matter of theory, the implication of terms into contracts ranges from an
exercise in construing the true actual intention of the parties through to imposing
liabilities on parties subject to their contracting out with no very clear divide between
the extremes. Put another way, the line between implied terms in fact (based on the
parties’ actual intentions) and implied terms in law (based on considerations other than
the parties’ intentions) is a thin and slippery one.
7.9 Ultimately therefore we have come to the view that a novel approach to contractual
intention is required in respect of creating legal rights for third parties that rests neither
on the existing law relating to intention to create legal relations nor on implied terms.
2. The First Limb of the Test of Enforceability

7.10 This limb is largely self-explanatory. It is satisfied where the contract contains words
such as “and C shall have the right to enforce the contract” or “C shall have the right
to sue”. In our view, it would also cover an exclusion (or limitation) clause designating
third parties (eg “C shall be excluded from all liability to A for damage caused in
unloading the goods”) because an exclusion clause, as a legal concept, has no meaning
unless it is intended to affect legal rights and, where the third party is expressly
designated as a person whose liability is excluded, the plain meaning of the exclusion
clause is that the third party is to have the benefit of it without having to rely on
7
For these tests see, eg, Treitel, The Law of Contract (9th ed, 1995) pp 185-188; E McKendrick,
Contract Law (2nd ed, 1994) pp 152-155.
8
Paras 7.28-7.30 below.
77
enforcement by the promisee.9 We also tend to think that a clause such as “and the
obligation to build to a safe standard shall enure for the benefit of subsequent owners
and tenants for a period of ten years” falls within this first limb so as to be enforceable
by subsequent owners and tenants. Of course, even express words sometimes give rise
to questions of interpretation (as the last example shows) but the great merit of this
limb of the test is that it should give rise to very few disputes.
7.11 Although the Law Revision Committee’s test of a contract “expressly purporting to
confer a benefit directly on a third party” is ambiguous, one interpretation of it, and
the one favoured by several consultees, is that it accords with this first limb. Indeed
some consultees considered that this first limb should be the only test on the basis that
anything else is likely to give rise to uncertainty and to some risk of unintended
liability. However, in our view, to have a reform based just on this first limb would be
excessively narrow. For example, it would not cover the facts of problematic past
cases, such as Beswick v Beswick.10 Nor would it cover many other situations (see the
examples discussed in paras 7.28-7.34 and 7.39-7.41 below) in which we believe that
a third party should have the right of enforceability, consistently with the parties’
intentions to confer that right, and yet the parties have not expressly conferred that
right. It would also operate to the disadvantage of those who do not have the benefit
of (good) legal advice.
7.12 One issue that we have found difficult is whether this first limb should permit the
creation of rights of enforcement by third parties who are not intended to be beneficiaries.
While this question does not arise in respect of our recommended second limb -
because the third party must there be an intended beneficiary - it is conceivable that
the parties may expressly confer a right of enforceability on a third party who is not to
be a beneficiary.
7.13 A few consultees questioned the need for the third party to be a beneficiary. They
pointed out that it is not normally a condition for the validity of a contractual provision
that it benefits the person seeking to enforce it. And they thought that the meaning of
‘benefit’ might give rise to (unnecessary) difficulty. Two main examples were given
of where the parties might seek to contract to create obligations which would benefit
a range of persons not party to the contract but in the interests of simplicity and
certainty might wish to confine the ability to enforce the rights arising to a third party
who was not a beneficiary. First, A contracts with B to transfer £10,000 to C, which
C is to hold on trust for the benefit of D: and C is expressly given the right to enforce
A’s obligation to B. It was argued that, in that situation, C should have the right to
enforce the contract even though the performance of A’s obligation would be for the
9
This means that our reform provides a solution to the enforcement of ‘Himalaya’ clauses by third
parties that does not involve any of the complexity or artificiality that the courts have been forced
into in order to render such clauses enforceable: see paras 2.24-2.35 above.
10
[1968] AC 58. See para 7.46 below.
78
benefit of D and (although we do not agree with taking such a narrow interpretation
of ‘benefit’) C could perhaps be said not to “benefit” from the performance by being
made a trustee of the benefit. Secondly, A (a developer) and B (the client) might wish
to designate C (a management company) as having the right to sue to enforce
warranties in the construction contract for D-Z (the tenants). In the light of these sorts
of example it was therefore argued that a requirement of “benefit” provided a useful
means of identifying the most common category of contracts where third parties should
be permitted to enforce contracts, but should not be essential.
7.14 The contrary view was taken by the Scottish Law Commission, in a Memorandum
published in 1977 dealing with the ius quaesitum tertio in Scottish law.11 It said,
“Where there is merely title to sue without personal benefit, it may well be that an
altogether different legal relationship is established between the three parties involved
from that which arises when a contract is concluded with the intention of benefiting a
Tertius...[I]f a person has merely bare title to sue it is difficult (unless he acts in the
capacity of agent) to see what patrimonial loss he could establish if he sued for non-
performance...[T]he expression jus quaesitum tertio seems to have been stretched inaptly
to include the type of cases just mentioned...[U]nless the third party designated in a
contract as entitled to accept payment or performance is a beneficiary or an agent,
mandatory, or trustee, we do not think that he should have a right to sue at all”.
7.15 An argument in favour of the Scottish view is that to permit the creation of bare rights
to sue would recreate one of the difficulties of the present law, whereby a contracting
party in a contract for a third party’s benefit, while able to sue, will generally recover
no substantial damages because it has suffered no loss. Even if damages are substantial
there is some difficulty in deciding whether they can be retained by the contracting
party or must be paid over to the third party beneficiary. Our reform seeks to minimise
this problem of the contracting party having a bare right to sue by giving the third party
beneficiary a right to sue. But if the third party need not be a beneficiary, and yet has
the right to sue, those problems would be recreated as between third and fourth parties
rather than as between promisee and third party.
7.16 Ultimately, however, we do not consider this to be a strong enough reason for denying
giving effect to the expressed intention of the parties. A third party suing for the
benefit of a fourth party under our reform will be in no worse position than a
contracting party suing for a third party beneficiary under the present law. And while
the remedies available to that third party may be inadequate in many situations, in
others they will not (for example, specific performance or the award of an agreed sum
may be available even if substantial damages are not). In any event, the mere insistence
that the third party be a beneficiary does not erase the problem that the primary benefit
(and hence primary loss) may be that of a fourth party not the third party. It is our
11
Scottish Law Commission, Memorandum No 38, Constitution and Proof of Voluntary Obligations:
Stipulations in favour of Third Parties (1977) pp 18-24.
79
view, therefore, that under the first limb of the test the third party need not be an
intended beneficiary of the contractual provision in question.
3. The Second Limb of The Test of Enforceability

(1) General Aspects of the Second Limb
7.17 This limb is concerned to cover those situations where the parties do not expressly
contract to confer a legal right on the third party. In general terms it establishes a
rebuttable presumption in favour of there being a third party right where a contractual provision
purports to confer a benefit on an expressly designated third party. But that presumption is
rebutted where on the proper construction of the contract the parties did not intend to confer a
right of enforceability on the third party. In our view, this second limb achieves a
satisfactory compromise between the aims of effecting the intentions of the contracting
parties while not producing an unacceptable degree of uncertainty in the law. It is very
similar to (and would seem to reach the same results as) the sole test of enforceability
in the New Zealand Contracts (Privity) Act 1982. It may also be said to come close to
the Law Revision Committee’s proposals that the contract must expressly purport to
confer a benefit directly on a third party.
7.18 Three features of this second limb are noteworthy:
(i) Express designation by name, class or description is a necessary but not a

sufficient condition for raising the rebuttable presumption. Although rare, a
third party could be designated in the contractual provision that is sought to
be enforced even though no benefit is to be conferred on that third party. For
example, an employer may take out an insurance policy to cover loss that it
suffers where a key employee is injured or ill. Although the employee may be
mentioned in the relevant contractual obligation of the insurer to pay the
employer (“we promise to indemnify [the employer] against loss suffered
through the illness of [the employee]”) that contractual obligation does not
purport to benefit the third party. Again, if A contracts with B to pay him
£1000 on C’s death or when C attains the age of 21, it is clear that no benefit
is to be conferred on C even though C is expressly designated by name.
(ii) The contracting parties must intend the third party to be benefited by the
particular contractual provision (that is, the contractual provision sought to
be enforced) and not some other contractual provision. Say, for example, a
building contractor enters into a design and build contract. The fact that the
“build obligations” expressly purport to benefit subsequent owners does not
mean to suggest that the subsequent owners are intended to be beneficiaries
of the “design obligations”.
(iii) The presumption of enforceability is rebutted where the proper objective

construction of the contract is that the parties did not intend the third party
to have the right of enforceability. The onus of proof will be on the
80
contracting parties (usually in practice the promisor), so that doubts as to the
parties’ intentions will be resolved in the third party’s favour. A promisor who
wishes to put the position beyond doubt can exclude any liability to the third
party that he might otherwise have had. But to allay the fears of the
construction industry we should clarify that, even if there is no express
contracting out of our proposed reform, we do not see our second limb as
cutting across the chain of sub-contracts that have traditionally been a feature
of that industry. For example, we do not think that in normal circumstances
an owner would be able to sue a sub-contractor for breach of the latter’s
contract with the head-contractor. This is because, even if the sub-contractor
has promised to confer a benefit on the expressly designated owner, the
parties have deliberately set up a chain of contracts which are well understood
in the construction industry as ensuring that a party’s remedies lie against the
other contracting party only. In other words, for breach of the promisor’s
obligation, the owners’ remedies lie against the head-contractor who in turn
has the right to sue the sub-contractor. On the assumption that that
deliberately created chain of liability continues to thrive subsequent to our
reform, our reform would not cut across it because on a proper construction
of the contract - construed in the light of the surrounding circumstances (that
is, the existence of the connected head-contract and the background practice
and understanding of the construction industry) - the contracting parties (for
example, the sub-contractor and the head-contractor) did not intend the third
party to have the right of enforceability.12 Rather the third party’s rights of
enforcement in relation to the promised benefit were intended to lie against
the head-contractor only and not against the promisor. For similar reasons we
consider that the second limb of our test would not normally give a purchaser
of goods from a retailer a right to sue the manufacturer (rather than the
retailer) for breach of contract as regards the quality of the goods.
(2) Negligent Will-Drafting

7.19 In fixing the boundaries of our proposed reform, we have encountered most difficulty
with the situation where a solicitor negligently fails properly to draw up a will thereby
causing loss to the intended beneficiaries of the will. Should those beneficiaries have
the right to sue the solicitor under a reform of privity? While we can certainly see the
force in allowing those beneficiaries a cause of action, we do not think that this is best
rationalised as effecting the parties’ intentions to confer that right. Moreover, as the
12
In a classic statement of the law on the proper construction of a contract in Reardon Smith Line
Ltd v Yngvar Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989, 995-996 Lord Wilberforce said, “No contracts
are made in a vacuum; there is always a setting in which they have to be placed. The nature of
what it is legitimate to have regard to is usually described as ‘the surrounding circumstances’ but
this phrase is imprecise: it can be illustrated but hardly defined. In a commercial contract it is
certainly right that the court should know the commercial purpose of the contract and this in turn
presupposes knowledge of the genesis of the transaction, the background, the context, the market
in which the parties are operating”.
81
House of Lords in White v Jones13 has now held that the prospective beneficiaries have
an action in the tort of negligence against the solicitor, we see no pressing practical
need to stretch our facilitative reform in order to achieve what is widely perceived to
be the just solution.
7.20 The wording of our proposed reform is therefore not intended to include negligent will-
drafting (and analogous) situations. The crucial words are that the promise must be
one to confer a benefit on the third party. The solicitor’s express or implied promise to
use reasonable care is not one by which the solicitor is to confer a benefit on the third
party. Rather it is one by which the solicitor is to enable the client to confer a benefit
on the third party.14
7.21 In support of the line here being taken, it is significant that in White v Jones neither
Lord Goff, giving the leading speech of the majority, nor Lord Mustill, in his dissenting
speech, thought that the facts of White v Jones would naturally fall within a jus
quaesitum tertio. Lord Goff said, “It is true that our law of contract is widely seen as
deficient in the sense that it is perceived to be hampered by the presence of an
unnecessary doctrine of consideration and (through a strict doctrine of privity of
contract) stunted through a failure to recognise a jus quaesitum tertio. But even if we
lacked the former and possessed the latter, the ordinary law could not provide a simple
answer to the problems which arise in the present case, which appear at first sight to
require the imposition of something like a contractual liability which is beyond the
scope of the ordinary jus quaesitum tertio”.15 And Lord Mustill, dissenting, said: “But
even under a much expanded law of contract it is hard to see an answer to the
objection that what the testator intended to confer on the new beneficiaries was the
benefit of his assets after his death; not the benefit of the solicitor’s promise to draft the
will”.16
7.22 Similarly, in New Zealand it was accepted in Gartside v Sheffield, Young & Ellis17 that
section 4 of the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 does not give the disappointed beneficiary
under a will a right to sue the solicitor. In Cooke J’s words, “[O]n an ordinary and
natural reading of the key s 4 of that Act, a prospective beneficiary under a proposed
will could not invoke the Act. For the contract between the testator and the solicitor
would not itself contain a promise conferring or purporting to confer a benefit on the
13
[1995] 2 AC 207.
14
If one were to view the contracting parties as having given the third party the legal right to
enforce the contract, one would need to qualify that right by recognising the testator’s undoubted
power to change his will. That is, the right of enforceability could only come into play once the
testator had died without having changed his mind. Yet to regard such a qualification as having
been thought through by the contracting parties at the time of contracting seems fictional.
15
[1995] 2 AC 207, 262-263.
16
Ibid, at p 723.
17
[1983] NZLR 37.
82
prospective beneficiary. Putting the point in another way, the solicitor has not promised
to confer a benefit on him.”18
7.23 In the Consultation Paper, we invited comments on how best, if at all, to deal with the
question of improperly executed wills prejudicing prospective third party
beneficiaries.19 There was an overwhelming view (and this prior to White v Jones) that
this area should not be treated as an aspect of the law on contracts for the benefit of
third parties.20
7.24 The distinction that our second limb seeks to draw between a promise to confer a
benefit on a third party and a promise of potential benefit to a third party is also
strongly supported by Kit Barker in his illuminating article entitled, “Are We up to
Expectations? Solicitors, Beneficiaries and the Tort/Contract Divide”.21 He writes:
[T]he New Zealand model would provide no relief to the disappointed beneficiary
in [White v Jones].... This is because the action assumes that, for a third party to be
able to sue upon a contract, the contract must contain some promise to confer a
benefit upon (provide some performance to) her. No such promise, it has rightly
been said, is present here. The testator promises to pay the solicitor for his services.
The solicitor in the ordinary case promises that he will, in rendering those services,
take reasonable care to ensure that the testator is successful in effectuating his
beneficial intentions. Both are able to foresee, of course, that if the latter’s promise
is broken, the testamentary gift may not take effect and the third party may be
prejudiced, but neither actually promises to provide the third party with any primary
performance at all.
The case is therefore tangibly different from the classic contract for the benefit of
third parties, found in Beswick v Beswick, where A promises B that he will provide
primary performance to C. Here, A promises performance (professional advice) to
B, so that B can achieve his desired aim of conferring a benefit on C. The
difference between the two situations is not in the direction of the promise which
is made - in both cases it is made to B - but in its content. In the first instance, A
undertakes to transfer performance from himself to C. In the second, he only
promises performance to B. Whilst C is clearly an ‘intended beneficiary’ of A’s
promise in Beswick (because she is to secure from A some performance by virtue of
18
Ibid, at p 42. See also Richardson J at p 49.
19
Consultation Paper No 121 paras 5.40-5.44, 6.21.
20
It is noteworthy that a number of consultees thought that the appropriate solution lay in
amendments to the law of succession (see on this T Weir, ‘A Damnosa Hereditas’ (1995) 111
LQR 357 and, for a contrary view, S Cretney, “Negligent Solicitors and Wills: A Footnote”
(1996) 112 LQR 54) or in recognising a restitutionary action by the beneficiary against the
residuary legatee, rather than in contract or tort.
21
(1994) 14 OxJLS 137, 142 (emphasis in the original).
83
it) in [White v Jones]... she is an intended object of A’s promise only in the very
different sense that A knows that the standard of his performance to B will have
consequences for her.
7.25 It is our view, therefore, that the negligent will-drafting situation ought to lie, and does
lie, just outside our proposed reform. It is an example of the rare case where the third
party, albeit expressly designated “as a beneficiary” in the contract, has no presumed
right of enforcement. Indeed it is arguable that, by merely adjusting the wording of the
second limb to include promises that are “of benefit to” expressly designated third
parties, rather than those that “confer benefits on” third parties, we would have
brought the negligent will-drafting situation within our reform. But we believe that
those words draw the crucial distinction between the situation where it is natural to
presume that the contracting parties intended to confer legal rights on the third party
and the situation where that presumption is forced and artificial.22
7.26 It has also been important in our thinking that, if the negligent will-drafting situation
were brought within our reform, it would be impossible to exclude the inter vivos gift
situation. Say a solicitor negligently fails to draw up properly the documentation for
an inter vivos gift. The donor, believing it to be valid, executes the documents. The
mistake comes to light some time later during the lifetime of the donor but after the gift
to the intended donee should have taken effect. The donor, by then, having changed
his mind, declines to perfect the imperfect gift in favour of the intended donee. If the
negligent will-drafting case were within our reform, it is hard to see how this could not
be. Yet in this situation, even supporters of White v Jones may baulk at giving the third
party a right against the solicitor given that the donor can rectify the position should
he or she so wish. A duty of care to the third party was denied at first instance in an
analogous situation in Hemmens v Wilson Browne23 and certainly in White v Jones Lord
Goff did not think that the third party should have a claim in this type of inter vivos
situation. He said:
I for my part do not think that the intended donee could in these circumstances
have any claim against the solicitor. It is enough, as I see it, that the donor is able
to do what he wishes to put matters right. From this it would appear to follow that
the real reason for concern in cases such as [White v Jones] lies in the extraordinary
fact that, if a duty owed by the testator’s solicitor to the disappointed beneficiary is
22
In deference to the important arguments of Professor Markesinis, ‘An Expanding Tort Law - The
Price of a Rigid Contract Law’ (1987) 103 LQR 354, we should explain that our reform is based
on a model of a contract for the benefit of third parties and does not seek to embrace the wider
German concept of a contract with protective effects for third parties. We would be afraid of the
uncertainty that the generalised legislative introduction of that German concept would create:
see K Barker (1994) 14 OxJLS 137, 143-146. However we would not wish our reform to be
construed as preventing the House of Lords embracing that more radical approach in specific
situations: see para 5.10 above.
23
[1995] Ch 223.
84
not recognised, the only person who may have a valid claim has suffered no loss,
and the only person who has suffered a loss has no claim.24
7.27 However we must add that, while we consider that negligent will-drafting should fall
outside our proposed reform, at a theoretical level we prefer the view that the right of
the prospective beneficiaries more properly belongs within the realm of contract than
tort. It is very difficult to explain the basis of the claim, which deals with an omission
and pure economic loss, as being other than one to enforce the promise of the solicitor
(albeit by a party who was not intended to have that right). Had White v Jones been
decided against the potential beneficiaries, we would have seriously contemplated a
separate provision - outside our general reform - giving prospective beneficiaries a right
to sue the negligent solicitor for breach of contract. The primary basis of such a
provision would have been that a right of action for the beneficiaries is the only way to
ensure that the promisee’s expectations engendered by the solicitor’s binding promise
are fulfilled. But given the decision in White v Jones the practical need for such a
provision has been obviated.
(3) The Application of the Second Limb of the Test to Various Hypothetical Situations
7.28 1. A promises B, his father, that in return for the transfer of the family home, A will
pay C an annuity of £5,000 per annum for her life. B dies, and A refuses to
continue payments. The promise is one by which A is to confer a benefit (£5,000
per annum) on C, who is expressly identified by name. C will therefore have the
right to enforce A’s promise (subject to A rebutting the presumption by pointing
to a term, or other feature of the contractual matrix, showing that A and B did
not intend C to have that right).
7.29 2. B Ltd contracts with A Ltd for the sale of a plot of land. The consideration is to
be £100,000 paid to B Ltd and £50,000 paid to C Ltd, which is an associated
company of B Ltd. The land is transferred. B Ltd receives its payment but A
Ltd, experiencing financial difficulties, refuses to make the payment to C Ltd.
The promise is one by which A Ltd is to confer a benefit (£50,000) on C Ltd,
which is expressly identified by name. C Ltd could therefore sue A Ltd for
breach of the payment obligation (subject to rebuttal by A under the proviso to
the second limb).25
7.30 3. B owes £5,000 to C. To discharge this debt, B enters into a contract with A that
A will carve a sculpture for C. A fails to carve the sculpture. The promise is one
by which A is to confer a benefit (the sculpture) on C, who is expressly identified
by name. C will therefore have the right to sue A (subject to rebuttal by A under
the proviso to the second limb).
24
[1995] 2 AC 207, 262.
25
For a discussion of some other issues affecting contracts for the sale of land that are raised by our
reform, see paras 14.8-14.11 below.
85
7.31 4. B takes out a liability insurance policy with A whereby A agrees to indemnify B
and all B’s subsidiary companies, contractors and sub-contractors in respect of
liabilities incurred in carrying out B’s construction contracts. C, a sub-
contractor, is held liable in negligence for injuries suffered by a workman and
wishes to be indemnified by A under the insurance policy with B. Subject to
rebuttal by A under the proviso to the second limb, C would be able to enforce
A’s promise: A has promised to confer a benefit (indemnity payment) on C, who
is expressly identified by class.
7.32 5. B takes out a policy of insurance with A Ltd to cover her employees against
medical expenses. The policy provides that payments under it will be made
direct to ill employees or, at the discretion of A Ltd, to the provider of the
medical services in discharge of an employee’s liability to that provider. C, an
employee, suffers a disorder and requires hospitalisation. Meanwhile B
disappears. C seeks to sue as a beneficiary of B’s contract of insurance with A
Ltd. Subject to rebuttal by A Ltd under the proviso to the second limb, C would
be able to do so: A has promised to confer a benefit (direct payment or the
discharge of C’s liability to the provider of medical services) on C, who is
expressly identified by class.
7.33 6. B takes out a personal accident insurance policy with A Ltd to cover his
employees against accidents. By the terms of the policy, payments are to be
made to B, receipt by B alone is to be an effectual discharge of A Ltd’s liability,
and A Ltd is to be entitled to treat B as the absolute owner of the policy. C, an
employee, is injured and B is insolvent. C seeks to recover from A Ltd as a
beneficiary of B’s contract with A Ltd. This is a difficult example.26 On one
view, B retains an absolute discretion whether to hand on to C the payments
received from A Ltd and it is therefore difficult to say that under the contract of
insurance A purports to confer a benefit on C. Again, one might say that there
is a rebuttal by A under the proviso to the second limb. The alternative and, in
our opinion, preferable view is that, once received, the money is held by B on
trust for C. On that view, the contract does purport to confer a benefit on C
(who is expressly identified by class) and one can argue that there is no rebuttal
by A under the proviso to the second limb: the channelling of the payment
through B is a matter of administrative convenience and does not negate C’s
right to enforce payment by A to B.
7.34 7. B takes out a life insurance policy with A Ltd naming C as the beneficiary of the
policy. C has co-habited with B for fifteen years although they are not married.
B is killed in a car accident. Subject to rebuttal by A Ltd under the proviso to
the second limb, C would be able to enforce the policy on B’s death. A Ltd has
26
See para 7.51 below.
86
promised to confer a benefit (payment) on C in the event of B’s death, and C is
expressly identified by name.
7.35 8. A Ltd insure B & Co, a firm of solicitors, against professional negligence. C
Fund, an intended beneficiary of X’s will, has obtained judgment against the
firm for its failure to ensure that X’s will was drawn up properly and with
expedition. B & Co has no assets save its professional indemnity policy. C Fund
argues that it can sue A as beneficiary of the firm’s insurance cover. It cannot do
so. A has not promised to confer a benefit on C, and C has not been expressly
identified.
7.36 9. B is an elderly man with a substantial estate which he plans to leave to his
favourite charity, the C Fund. He approaches A & Co solicitors to prepare a will
which will achieve these intentions. D, a partner of the firm, negligently fails to
take any steps to prepare the will for several weeks, during which time B dies. C
Fund, on hearing of this, seeks to sue the solicitors. C cannot enforce A’s
promise to use reasonable care and expedition in drawing up the will because
that promise does not purport to confer a benefit on C. Rather it is a promise to
enable B to confer a benefit on C. C will therefore not be able to sue A for
breach of contract and will instead have to rely on its cause of action in the tort
of negligence as established in White v Jones.27
7.37 10. B & Co enters into a contract with A & Co, who are building contractors, to
construct a chemical plant. B & Co sell the plant to C & Co, who operate it for
a short period before defects in the building allow an escape of poisonous gases.
These cause substantial financial losses to farmers, whose livestock must be
destroyed. The farmers sue C & Co, who, close to bankruptcy, seek to sue on the
contract between A & Co and B & Co. C & Co cannot sue A & Co as A & Co
have not promised to confer a benefit on C & Co, who have not been expressly
identified. The position would be different if the building contract expressly
states that the rights as to the quality of the building work are to enure for the
benefit of subsequent owners and/or tenants of the plant. This would probably
satisfy the first limb of our test of enforceability but, even if it does not, C & Co
would have the right of enforceability under the second limb (subject to rebuttal
by A & Co under the proviso) as A & Co have promised to confer a benefit on
C & Co (that, as and when occupied by C & Co, the building will be of a
particular standard) who are expressly identified by class.
7.38 11. C Ltd engages B Ltd, a construction company, to construct a new plant for its
rapidly expanding publication operations. B Ltd engages A Ltd, a well known
subcontracting firm, to lay flooring in the plant. A Ltd fails to provide flooring
of an appropriate standard and, through consequent delay to the start of
27
[1995] 2 AC 207.
87
manufacturing operations at its new plant, C Ltd loses a valuable export order.
C Ltd could not sue A Ltd for failure to perform its obligations to provide
flooring of a suitable standard. Even if there were a promise by A Ltd to confer
a benefit (a floor of a particular standard) on C Ltd, who were expressly
identified, the right of enforceability is rebutted under the proviso to the second
limb. On a true construction of the sub-contract, construed in the light of the
head-contract and the understanding and practice of the construction industry,
C Ltd is not intended to have a right against A Ltd. Rather C Ltd’s right of
redress lies against B Ltd for A Ltd’s breach (and B Ltd’s right of redress lies
against A Ltd).28
7.39 12. B engages A to build a conservatory onto his daughter C’s house as a birthday
present. Through A’s failure to use proper care in constructing the conservatory,
C’s house suffers structural damage and her valuable collection of orchids is
ruined. If A has promised to confer the benefit (the building of a conservatory
using reasonable care) on C, who has been expressly identified, C will have the
right to sue A for breach of that contractual provision (subject to rebuttal by A
under the proviso to the second limb).
7.40 13. Mr B books two rooms in a luxury hotel owned by A Ltd in the Lake District for
a two week holiday for himself and his wife and children. On arrival, the hotel
has double booked and cannot offer alternative accommodation. Mr B’s party
are forced to stay in a hotel a long distance away, which, though more expensive,
has less celebrated cuisine and few facilities. Mr B’s wife and children, who will
have been expressly identified, will have a right to sue A Ltd (subject to rebuttal
by A Ltd under the proviso to the second limb) for any additional expenses
incurred as a result of the hotel’s breach of contract, and for the loss of
enjoyment resulting from the double booking.29
7.41 14. On Mr and Mrs C’s marriage, their wealthy relative B buys an expensive 3 piece
suite as a wedding gift from A Ltd, a well known Central London department
store with a reputation for quality. She makes it clear when purchasing the 3
piece suite that it is a gift for friends and indeed the delivery slip and instructions
show that it is to be sent to Mr and Mrs C’s home and should be left with the
housekeeper as it is a gift. After 2 weeks of wear the fabric on the suite wears thin
and frays, and after 3 weeks, two castors collapse. Subject to rebuttal by A Ltd
under the proviso to the second limb, Mr and Mrs C can sue A Ltd for breach
of an implied term in the contract that the goods be of a satisfactory quality.30
28
See para 7.18 point (iii) above.
29
This is not a package holiday within the Package Travel, Package Holidays and Package Tours
Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/3288): see para 2.62 above.
30
Our understanding is that, although delivery is to be made to a third party, the contract will
qualify as a contract for the sale of goods to the promisee for the purposes of the Sale of Goods
Act 1979 so that the relevant term will be implied by reason of ss 13-14 of the 1979 Act. But
88
A Ltd have promised to confer a benefit (the suite of satisfactory quality) on Mr
and Mrs C,31 who have been expressly identified by name.
7.42 15. Again, the above example, save that A Ltd are entirely unaware that the suite is
a gift for anyone, and it is delivered to B’s home. Mr and Mrs C could not sue
A Ltd, since the contract between B and A Ltd does not purport to confer a
benefit on Mr and Mrs C, who have not been expressly identified.
7.43 16. B & Co’s standard form of building contract contains an exclusion clause which
seeks to exclude the liability to its clients of “all agents, servants, employees and
subcontractors” engaged by B & Co in the performance of the contract works for
any loss and damage occasioned other than through wilful misconduct. A & Co,
a developer using B & Co’s services in constructing nuclear power plants,
discovers that one of these is built on dangerously unstable ground, and will have
to be decommissioned. The surveyor engaged by B & Co to carry out the site
survey, Mr C, has clearly been negligent. Mr C has extensive professional
indemnity cover. Mr C seeks to claim the benefit of the exclusion clause in A &
Co’s contract with B & Co to prevent A & Co from recovering against him in
tort for negligence. Mr C would succeed under the first limb of our test or, on
the basis that the exclusion clause is a promise to confer a benefit (the exclusion
of liability) on Mr C, who is expressly identified by class, under the second limb.
7.44 17. A contracts with B to carry A’s packages by road. It is a term of the contract that
the value of the packages is “deemed to be not over £100 unless otherwise
declared”. B sub-contracts with C to carry a package. C loses the package
which was worth £1000 and is sued by A in the tort of negligence. C has no
rights to enforce the ‘deemed value’ clause under our proposals because C has
not been expressly identified as a beneficiary of that clause. Nor has C been
expressly given the right to enforce that clause under the first limb of the test of
enforceability.
(4) The Application of the Second Limb of the Test to Some Past Cases.
7.45 How would the second limb of the test of enforceability apply to the facts of some of
the most celebrated cases where the third party rule has caused difficulty?
it should be noted that to qualify as a contract for the sale of goods within the definition in s 2(1)
of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (“A contract of sale of goods is a contract by which the seller
transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a money consideration, called
the price”) one must assume that, although delivery is to be made to the third party, there is a
moment in time at which property first passes to the promisee. Although not directly on the
point, we have found the following cases of assistance: E & S Ruben Ltd v Faire Brothers & Co
Ltd [1949] 1 KB 254; Jarvis v Williams [1955] 1 WLR 71. Even if we are wrong on this, one
can readily assume that, irrespective of the statute, the courts would normally imply a term that
the goods be of satisfactory quality.
31
If there is to be no delivery to a third party it will normally be difficult to argue that a contract
of sale purports to confer a benefit on a third party.
89
7.46 In Beswick v Beswick,32 the provision of old Mr Beswick’s contract with his nephew
providing for payment of an annuity to Mrs Beswick would give Mrs Beswick a
presumed right of enforceability under our second limb. The nephew promised to
confer the benefit (the annuity payments) on Mrs Beswick, who was expressly named.
This presumption could only be rebutted if the nephew could demonstrate that, on the
proper construction of the contract, he and old Mr Beswick had no intention at the
time of contracting that Mrs Beswick should have the right to enforce the provision.
In our view, the nephew would not be able to satisfy that onus of proof so that Mrs
Beswick would have the right of enforcement.
7.47 In Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi & Co Ltd,33 it may be that Veitchi’s sub-contractual
obligations, including the obligation to use reasonable care in laying the floor,
purported to benefit Junior Books, who were presumably expressly identified as
beneficiaries. However, since Veitchi’s sub-contract was part of a wider chain of
contracts, under which Junior Books’ rights for breach of Veitchi’s obligations, were
to lie against the head-contractor under the head-contract, we consider that the
presumption of an enforceable right would be rebutted. Junior Books would therefore
have no right to enforce Veitchi’s obligations to the head-contractor.
7.48 We have already explained why, in White v Jones,34 Mr Barratt’s daughters could not
use our reform to sue Mr Jones’ and Messrs Philip Baker-King & Co for the breach of
their contractual obligations to Mr Barratt to prepare his will with due care and
attention. This is because the solicitors’ implied promise did not purport to confer a
benefit on the daughters. Rather it was Mr Barratt who was to confer the benefit on
the daughters through his will.
7.49 In Woodar Investment Development Ltd v Wimpey Construction UK Ltd,35 the contract
between Wimpey Construction UK Ltd and Woodar Investment Development Ltd
provided for payment of part of the purchase price of a plot of land to Transworld
Trade Ltd. The purchasers sought to terminate, and the vendors sued for damages,
including the sum due to Transworld. Although a majority of the House of Lords held
that the purchasers were entitled to terminate, so that the vendors had no claim for
breach of contract, they also indicated that the vendors could not have obtained
substantial damages in respect of the purchasers’ failure to pay Transworld. Under our
proposals, Transworld could have brought proceedings for the due sum directly. The
contract purported to confer a benefit on Transworld, who was expressly identified
and, in our view, the purchasers could not have rebutted the presumption that
Transworld was intended to have the right to enforce the payment obligation.
32
[1968] AC 58. See para 2.47 above. See also para 7.28 (example 1) above.
33
[1983] 1 AC 520. See para 2.14 above. See also para 7.38 (example 11) above.
34
[1995] 2 AC 207. See paras 7.19-7.27 and para 7.36 (example 9) above.
35
[1980] 1 WLR 277. See para 7.29 (example 2) above.
90
7.50 In Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Proprietary Ltd,36 Trident had taken
out a liability insurance policy which, in its definition of “assured” purported to cover
McNiece, a principal contractor. When one of its employees was injured, McNiece
sought to rely on its rights under the policy. While there was no clear consensus as to
the basis on which the claim was upheld, the High Court of Australia by a majority
held that McNiece could enforce the contract. Under our proposals, McNiece would
have a right to enforce the contract. The contract purported to confer a benefit on
McNiece, who was identified in the contract by class (“all Contractors and Sub-
Contractors”) and there was nothing to rebut the presumption that it was intended
that McNiece should have a right to enforce the contract.
7.51 In Green v Russell,37 an employer took out a personal accident group insurance policy
which named the employer as the “insured” and certain of his employees as the
“insured persons”. The recital to the policy stated that, “Whereas the insured is
desirous of securing payment of benefits as hereinafter set forth to any insured person
in the event of his sustaining accidental bodily injury...”; and one of the clauses in the
policy stated that, “The company shall be entitled to treat the insured as the absolute
owner of this policy and shall not be bound to recognise any equitable or other claim
to or interest in the policy and the receipt of the insured or the insured’s legal
representative alone shall be an effectual discharge”. One of the employees named in
the policy died in a fire at the employer’s premises. The question at issue was whether
money paid, or about to be paid, by the insurers to the employee’s mother should not
be deducted from her claim under the Fatal Accidents Acts 1846-1908 on the basis
that, under section 1 of the 1908 Act, it was “paid or payable on the death of the
deceased under any contract of assurance or insurance”. The Court of Appeal decided
that the sum did fall within section 1 and should therefore not be deducted. But in
doing so, it decided that the deceased had had no right, legal or equitable, to payment
of the sum: there was no contractual claim because of the privity rule and there was no
trust as it was not the employer’s intention to constitute itself a trustee. On the face
of it, this reasoning means that the employer has an absolute discretion whether to
hand on to an employee the money paid by the insurance company on this sort of
policy. One impact of our reforms is that such group personal accident policies could
be reworded so as to give the third party employee the undoubted right to enforce the
policy (without having to create an immediate trust of the promise). More difficult is
the question whether a policy, such as that in the Green case, would give employees a
right of enforceability under the second limb of our test. It is our view that, once paid,
the sum is best regarded as being held on trust for the employee, or that the employer
is otherwise accountable to the employee for the sum, so that the insurance contract
does purport to confer a benefit on the employees (who, in the Green case were
expressly identified by name). The fact that the money is first channelled through the
employer, and that payment to the employer discharges the insurer, is a matter of
36
(1988) 165 CLR 107. See paras 2.67-2.69 and para 7.31 (example 4) above.
37
[1959] 2 QB 226. See para 7.33 (example 6) above.
91
administrative convenience and does not rebut the presumption that the third party is
intended to have a right of enforceability (so that it can enforce the insurer’s obligation
to pay the employer).38
4. The Rejected Tests

7.52 It is worth clarifying that our recommended test of enforceability does not conform
precisely to any of the six tests set out in the Consultation Paper,39 albeit that it comes
close to option (iii). We have rejected the other tests both because they did not
command majority support among consultees and because each is flawed in some way.
Option (i) is ambiguous and, on one interpretation, is too wide and, on another, too
narrow.40 Option (ii) contains no reference to the parties’ intentions to confer a legal
right on the third party. Option (iv) would potentially lead to too much uncertainty
and, in some respects, may be too narrow.41
7.53 Our recommended test is furthest away from options (v) (reliance by third party) and
(vi) (third party benefited). We think that it may be useful for us to clarify in a little
more detail the clear differences between our approach and those two options. Those
two options not only do not seek to effect the parties’ intentions to confer legal rights
on third parties, which we regard as crucial, but would also produce unacceptably wide
liability. Option (v) on the face of it would mean, for example, that a person who buys
a home on the faith of a new motorway being built would be able to sue the builder for
loss caused (eg extra petrol costs) if the motorway is not completed on time. Again if
a boxer cancels a fight in breach of his contract with the promoter, application of this
option would appear to mean that he could be sued by the television companies who
had arranged to televise the fight and by all those who have bought tickets to watch the
fight.42 Option (vi) would produce an even wider, and even more unacceptable,
38
This reasoning derives some support from the judgment of Pearce LJ (the other substantial
judgment being given by Romer LJ with whom Hodson LJ agreed). Pearce LJ said, at pp 246-
247, “It is true that the company are entitled (as a matter of convenient machinery) to deal direct
with the policy holder, and to treat him as if he alone were intended to get the benefits of all the
insured persons. But the terms of the agreement as a whole make it clear that (whatever may be
Green’s legal or equitable rights against the policy holder) the £1,000 payable on Green’s death
is intended by the parties to be a benefit to Green’s estate, and is not intended for the pocket of
Russell. Moreover, I think that the terms of the agreement as a whole show that the parties
envisage payment of the £1,000 direct to the policy holder and payment over by him to Green’s
estate. Thus the second payment, namely, by the defendant to the plaintiff, is a payment
envisaged by the contract, and is clearly in my view a sum paid under a policy of assurance within
the terms of the Fatal Accidents (Damages) Act, 1908”. Indeed if the employer were simply able
to keep the insurance payments for itself, it would seem that the insurance policy might be void
under the Life Assurance Act 1774, section 3. See, generally, Chitty on Contracts (27th ed, 1994)
paras 39-007-39-010.
39
See para 7.1 above.
40
See paras 4.6 and 7.11 above.
41
42
In Consultation Paper No 121, para 2.19, we gave the further example of a report prepared by
a firm of auditors under a contract with a company and put into more or less general circulation.
Such a report may foreseeably be relied on by third parties for any one of a variety of different
purposes but we do not think that all those parties should have the right to sue in contract for
their losses in the event of the report having been negligently prepared. Cf Caparo Industries plc
92
liability than option (v). That is, it would be sufficient for a third party to show that
it would have gained from due adherence to the contract and it would be irrelevant
that the third party had not relied on the contract. It would mean, for example, that
all those whose property would have been enhanced in value by the building of a new
road or a new shopping centre would be able to sue if, in breach of contract, the road
or shopping centre is not built on time (or at all).43 The fact that they have not bought
their properties on the faith of those developments (or have not otherwise relied on
those developments) would not matter.
5. A Special Test of Enforceability for Consumers?

7.54 Some consultees argued that a test of enforceability based on effecting parties’
intentions would not go far enough in protecting consumers. Rather they urged us to
go beyond effecting the contracting parties’ intentions and to impose a measure of
consumer protection. In effect, their suggestion was that, where the third party is a
consumer, reform should be based on options (v) and (vi). Clearly third party
consumers stand to gain from our proposals. For example, under our proposals a
manufacturer and retailer could expressly confer legal rights on the purchaser to
enforce the contract as regards the quality of the goods purchased, thereby affording
the purchaser a remedy if the retailer became insolvent.44 Again a retailer and a
purchaser could in their contract expressly confer a right of enforceability on a third
party for whom the goods are being bought. Indeed where a contractual provision in
the contract of sale purports to confer a benefit on a third party, who is expressly
identified, the third party will have a right of enforceability subject to the retailer
establishing that, on the proper construction of the contract, the retailer and purchaser
did not intend to confer that right.45 Similarly where a lead holiday-maker makes a
booking for a holiday for a number of persons on terms set out in a booking form, the
other members of the party will be able to sue in the event of a breach of contract
(subject to the proper construction of the contract being that the parties did not intend
to confer that legal right).46 Again in a construction contract between a head-
contractor and the owner a subsequent owner or tenant who is expressly given legal
rights to enforce the contract will be able to do so: as, subject to rebuttal, will the
v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (no tortious duty of care owed by auditor to potential investor).
43
It is to be noted that the US Second Restatement draws a distinction between such incidental
beneficiaries and intended beneficiaries, and that incidental beneficiaries are not permitted to
enforce purported benefits under contracts: United States Restatement (2d) - Contracts,
American Law Institute (1981) §§ 302 & 315. See paras 4.17-4.18 above.
44
Without such an express term, the purchaser would normally have no such right because even
if expressly identified as a beneficiary of the manufacturer’s contract with the retailer, the chain
of contracts giving the purchaser a remedy against the retailer for the manufacturer’s breach
means that on a proper construction of the contract, construed in the light of the surrounding
circumstances, the manufacturer and retailer do not intend to confer a legal right of enforceability
on the third party.
45
See example 14 in para 7.41 above. Contrast example 15.
46
See example 13 in para 7.40 above.
93
subsequent owner or tenant on whom the contract purports to confer a benefit and
who has been expressly identified.47
7.55 However, while our proposals will therefore mean that consumer third parties will have
rights that they do not at present have, our proposals do not automatically give
consumers such rights. We consider that the automatic conferring of contractual rights
on third parties who are consumers rests on policy considerations that need to be
tackled in relation to specific areas. We do not think that they can properly be
addressed through the kind of general reform with which we are here concerned.
Indeed we think that it would be dangerous - in terms of producing a potential conflict
of reform proposals - for us here to embark on specific measures of consumer
protection when there are other reform initiatives under discussion in specific areas,
based on protecting consumers. We have in mind particularly consumer guarantees48
and the rights of subsequent purchasers or tenants to sue for defective construction
work.49 Rather our strategy is to reform the general law of contract, based on effecting
contracting parties’ intentions, which then leaves the way free for more radical
consumer protection measures in future in specific areas.

(9) there should be no special test of enforceability for consumers in our
proposed legislation.
47
See example 10 in para 7.37 above.
48
See European Commission, Green Paper on Guarantees for Consumer Goods and After-Sales Services,
COM (93) 509 final, 1993. See also Consumer Guarantees, a Consultation Document issued by
the Department of Trade and Industry, February 1992.
49
See, eg, Latent Defects Liability and ‘Build’ Insurance, a Consultation Paper issued by the
Department of the Environment, April 1995, paras 33-39.
94
PART VIII
DESIGNATION, EXISTENCE AND
ASCERTAINABILITY OF THIRD PARTY
1. Designation
8.1 It is inherent in the test of enforceability that we have recommended in Part VII above
that the third party be expressly identified whether by name (for example, Joe Bloggs),
class (for example, “stevedores”, “subsequent owners”, “subsequent tenants”), or
description (for example, “person living at 36 Coronation Street” or “B’s nominee”).
So, in applying the first limb of our recommended test, one cannot expressly confer a
right of enforcement on a third party other than by expressly identifying that third
party by name, description or class. And the presumption in the second limb of our
recommended test of enforceability is only triggered where there is express
identification by name, description or class. It follows that, under our recommended
reforms, third party rights cannot be conferred on someone who is impliedly in mind.
We consider that the possibility of such an implication would give rise to unacceptable
uncertainty.
8.2 At the other extreme, we are also of course rejecting a requirement that the third party
be expressly identified by name. This was provisionally rejected in the Consultation
Paper1 and that rejection was supported by consultees. The objection to express
designation by name is that it would prevent the conferral of a legally enforceable right
upon a third party who was identified by class or description only (including those who
do not exist at the time of contract). This would mean, for example, that it would be
impossible for an employer and contractor to provide in a construction contract for the
conferral of rights on future occupiers of the premises under construction.
8.3 We should clarify that, in our view, it is a sufficient identification by description (or
class) if the third party is referred to in the contract as “B’s nominee”. In the New
Zealand first instance decision of Coldicutt v Webb & Keeys2 it was held that the
nominee could sue because he had been designated by description and the only
purpose of adding a reference to him was to give him the right to sue on the contract.
The contract was one for the sale of land to “Webb or his nominee”. Hillyer J said:-
the requisite ingredients of that section [section 4 of the Contracts (Privity) Act
1982] are present. There is a promise in the agreement for sale and purchase by Mr
Keeys to sell the land. The sale may be to a nominee. A benefit is thus conferred or
purported to be conferred. The first plaintiff is not designated by name, however he
is designated by description as a nominee and he is not a party to the deed or
contract. Turning to the proviso to the section, there is nothing in the contract itself
1
2
Unreported, High Court, Whangerei, 17 May 1985, A50/84.
95
to indicate that it was not intended to create an obligation enforceable at the suit
of the nominee.
8.4 While the approach in Coldicutt has been rejected by subsequent New Zealand cases,3
we see no valid objection to it.4 Indeed it is significant that the New Zealand Law
Commission in its Contracts Statutes Review5 preferred Coldicutt to the conflicting cases
as being “supportable in principle and satisfactory in its result”. The Commission
concluded, however, that the interpretation of section 4 should be left to the courts to
resolve and that the conflict in the cases did not merit an amendment of the Contracts
(Privity) Act 1982.
2. Existence of Third Party

8.5 In the Consultation Paper,6 the provisional view was expressed that it should be
possible to create rights in a third party who was not in existence (or ascertained)7 at
the time that the contract was made, since otherwise a remedy would be denied to
prospective beneficiaries such as an unborn child or a future spouse. However, whether
a third party was ascertained at the time of the contract might be relevant in
determining whether the contracting parties intended to confer on him a right to
enforce the contract. This provisional view was overwhelmingly supported by
consultees.
3
In McElwee v Beer (Unreported, High Court, Auckland, 19 February 1987, A 445/85, Wylie J)
it was held that (i) assuming a nomination results in a benefit to the nominee, it is the
nomination, not the contract (or the promise under the contract) that confers it; (ii) a nomination
does not in itself confer a benefit for mere nomination leaves all the benefits with the original
party to the contract; and (iii) a person designated by description connotes a person identifiable
at the time of the contract, not someone who by capricious choice of the contracting party may
subsequently be brought within the description. In Field v Fitton [1988] 1 NZLR 482, the New
Zealand Court of Appeal supported (iii) above, observing that whether or not a nominee is
sufficiently designated will depend on whether words of qualification are added to allow a bare
nominee to be sufficiently identified. In Karangahape Road International Village Ltd v Holloway
[1989] 1 NZLR 83, Chilwell J held that a benefit conferred on a nominee is not one conferred
by the promise, but by the independent act of the contracting party, and that, in any event,
section 4 could not apply because the nominee was not specified or particularised.
4
This is not to deny that, in the context of the particular contract, it may be that the nominee
cannot otherwise satisfy the test of enforceability. This was the alternative ground of reasoning
in Field v Fitton [1988] 1 NZLR 482. Bisson J said, at p 494, “The second difficulty is that the
proviso to s 4 is fatal to the first respondents as there is on the proper construction of this
contract no intention to create an obligation on the appellants enforceable at the suit of the first
respondents alone. The mere addition of the words ‘or nominee’ without more, is not sufficient
in this case... on the proper construction of the agreement to impute an intention to the parties
to create, in respect of the benefit to a named purchaser an obligation on the part of the vendor
enforceable at the suit of a bare nominee.”
5
Contract Statutes Review, Report No 25 (1993) p 224.
6
Consultation Paper No 121, paras 5.20, 6.8.
7
A third party is ‘ascertained’ if he or she both exists and can be named.
96
(10) there should be an “avoidance of doubt” provision to the effect that the
third party need not be in existence at the time of the contract. (Draft
Bill, clause 1(3))
8.7 The view was also expressed in the Consultation Paper8 that it should not be necessary
for the third party to be in existence (or ascertained) at the time of acceptance of the
benefit by another third party, as appears to be required by section 55(6)(b) of the
Queensland Property Law Act 1974.9 It was felt that this would have adverse
consequences for some members of a class of beneficiaries. For example, it would
appear to mean that, where an employer has agreed with union representatives to
review employees’ salaries at regular intervals, and has also expressly provided that the
agreement should be legally enforceable by the employees,10 the benefit of this
agreement would be enjoyed only by those members of the work-force who accepted
it at its inception and not those who subsequently joined the company. Although the
opinions of consultees were not specifically sought on this question, no consultee
disagreed with our provisional view.

(11) there should be no requirement that the third party be in existence at the
time of acceptance by another third party.
3. Pre-Incorporation Contracts: A Special Case?

8.9 The common law rule is that a company which is not incorporated at the time that a
contract is made on its behalf cannot enforce that contract, despite a purported later
ratification of it.11 Nor is the contract enforceable against the company. Section 36C
of the Companies Act 198512 provides that the purported agent for the unincorporated
company is liable on the contract. A pre-incorporation contract is therefore generally
enforceable as between the signatory parties and remains valid as between them.
8.10 It is clear that a reform which permits the conferral of rights on a third party not yet
in existence may extend to a third party which is a company that has not yet been
incorporated. Thus the interrelationship between our proposed reform and the rules
governing liability on pre-incorporation contracts needs to be considered. Under our
8
9
Section 55(6)(b) reads: “‘beneficiary’ means a person other than the promisor or promisee, and
includes a person who, at the time of acceptance is identified and in existence, although that
person may not have been identified or in existence at the time when the promise was given.”
10
A collective agreement is not legally enforceable unless it is in writing and there is an express
provision that it is legally enforceable: Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act
1992, s 179.
11
It is a contract made by an agent (the promoter) on behalf of a non-existent principal (the
company) and leads to personal liability of the agent: Kelner v Baxter (1866) LR 2 CP 174.
12
As inserted by the Companies Act 1989, s 130.
97
proposed reform, where a promoter/promisee contracts with a promisor to confer a
benefit on a non-existent company, the company, once it comes into existence, could
enforce the benefit if it could satisfy the test of enforceability. On the face of it, this
would seem to derogate from the pre-incorporation contracts rule.
8.11 However, we agree with the New Zealand Law Commission13 that a contract on behalf
of a third party is not the same thing as a contract for the benefit of a third party. The
former involves the third party becoming a party to the contract, and to all of its rights
and obligations, after its incorporation. The latter is the situation that we are dealing
with, where the third party is not, and will not become, a party to the contract, but will
simply acquire a right to sue to enforce provisions of the contract. The third party
company will not become subject to the obligations of the promoter under the contract,
and so, for example, the obligation to pay for goods or services supplied to a company
under a pre-incorporation contract would remain the promoter’s. Thus, our proposed
reform of the third party rule would not have the effect of rendering valid as against the
third party company contracts that would otherwise be invalid.
8.12 We should also mention at this stage - although the point is discussed fully in Part X
below14 - that, while our reform does not enable obligations to be imposed on third
parties, the third party’s entitlement may be subject to conditions so that a failure to
comply with the condition can give the promisor a defence or set-off. Our recognition
that a company’s right under a pre-incorporation contract may be conditional should
not be misconstrued as permitting obligations under a pre-incorporation contract to
be imposed on the company.15
8.13 Our general approach is supported by developments in New Zealand. The New
Zealand Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 contained no specific provision to deal with pre-
incorporation contracts. The law on pre-incorporation contracts in New Zealand was
amended by the New Zealand Companies Amendment Act (No 2) 1983, introducing
a new section 42A into the New Zealand Companies Act 1955, which permits the
ratification of contracts made in the name of or on behalf of a non-existent company
within a specified or reasonable time after the incorporation of the company. The
Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 has been held since its enactment to apply to pre-
incorporation contracts by the New Zealand courts,16 a conclusion which has not been
13
Contract Statutes Review (1993) para 5.18. It was stated that the special company law rules on
pre-incorporation contracts and the provisions of the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 could happily
co-exist and that no amendments were warranted.
14
15
It also follows from this that there is no question of our proposed legislation undermining s 36C
of the Companies Act 1985 which was designed to implement Article 7 of the First Company
Law Directive (Dir 68/151) which rests on the company not having assumed the obligations
arising under the pre-incorporation contract.
16
Palmer v Bellaney (1983) ANZ ConvR 467, holding that the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, s 4,
applied in the case of a contract made by X “as agent for a company to be formed” and that the
company could accordingly enforce the contract. Although criticised (Farrar and Russell,
98
affected by the specific legislation dealing with the matter in company law. The New
Zealand courts have maintained the distinction which we draw between a company
becoming a full party to a contract made for it or on its behalf prior to its
incorporation, and enforcing a contract as a third party whether made before its
incorporation or not.
8.14 Consequently, we do not believe that we need to qualify recommendation 10 in order

to preserve the rules governing pre-incorporation contracts.17 We accept however that
our proposals for reform may provide a route by which at least one of the effects of
those rules may be avoided. Given that the rules governing pre-incorporation contracts
have been described as “clearly unjust”,18 we believe that the accordance of a right of
suit to the newly incorporated company in circumstances where this clearly matches
the contracting parties’ intentions goes some way towards doing greater justice to those
involved than the present position.
8.15 In the Consultation Paper, we invited views on whether the issue of pre-incorporation
contracts should be addressed in any reform of the third party rule, or whether it would
be best left to specialist company legislation.19 The preponderance of consultees’
opinions was in favour of leaving general reform of pre-incorporation contract law to
specialist legislation while accepting that there should be no restriction on a corporate
third party’s right to enforce an otherwise enforceable contract simply because it was
entered into before the third party’s incorporation.

(12) the proposed legislation should contain no special provisions governing
pre-incorporation contracts.
4. Ascertainability of Third Party and Certainty
Company Law and Securities Regulation in New Zealand), this interpretation was supported in
Speedy v Nylex New Zealand Ltd (unreported, H Ct, Auckland, 3 February 1989, CL 29/87) by
Wylie J. Cf Cross v Aurora Group Ltd (1989) 4 NZCLC 64,909 where a contract had been
entered into on behalf of “Cross Property Management Ltd, a company currently being formed”.
In the event, Cross Property Management Ltd was not in the process of formation at the time
of contract, but instead the promoter’s solicitors had bought a shelf company and subsequently
changed its name to Cross Property Management Ltd. It was held that section 4 could not apply
to allow Cross to take the benefit of the contract, as there was no sufficient identification of the
shelf company as being Cross for these purposes. Wylie J (at p 64,913) held that “Designation
is a strong word, a positive word and means something more than a mere contemplation or
possibility”.
17
It is perhaps noteworthy that reform of this doctrine has itself been advocated: in 1962 the
Jenkins Committee recommended that companies should be given statutory power to adopt
contracts made in their names or on their behalf before incorporation (Report of the Company
Law Committee (Cmnd 1749), para 54(b)); and reform has been effected in New Zealand:
Companies Amendment Act (No 2) 1983, s 15, introducing a new s 42A into the Companies
Act 1955.
18
Pennington’s Company Law (7th ed, 1995) p 108.
19
99
8.17 A few consultees pointed out that it must be possible to ascertain who is the third party
at the time the right accrues. Thus, a third party who is to receive money or services
under a contract would need to be capable of being ascertained with certainty at the
time at which the promisor’s duty to perform arose. Where the third party is to receive
the benefit of an exclusion or limitation clause under the contract, the third party
should be ascertainable with certainty by the date at which the liability falling within
the exclusion or limitation clause was incurred. We agree, but it is hard to see that this
represents anything more than the straightforward application of the normal principle
that to be valid a contract, or contractual provision, must be sufficiently certain.

(13) although no legislative provision on this is necessary, a third party shall
have no right to enforce a contract or contractual provision unless he or
she is capable of being ascertained with certainty at the time when the
promisor’s duty to perform in the third party’s favour arises, or when a
liability against which the provision seeks to protect the third party is
incurred.
100
PART IX
VARIATION AND CANCELLATION
1. Provisional Proposals and Consultation
9.1 It was suggested in the Consultation Paper that a question central to reform of the
third party rule was that of when the parties, after having agreed to confer a right on
a third party, should be permitted to vary or cancel that right.1 To allow the
contracting parties an unlimited power to vary the contract would mean that the third
party would not have a right that he could confidently rely on; on the other hand, to
restrict the right to vary could be seen as an unacceptable fetter on the parties’ freedom
of contract. While most consultees favoured the ideas that (i) there should be some
opportunity for the original parties to cancel or vary the contract but that (ii) there
should be a cut-off point after which the contract could not be varied or cancelled
without the consent of the third party, no clear view emerged from consultation as to
what that cut-off point should be.
9.2 In the Consultation Paper, several tests for a cut-off point (or, as one might otherwise
phrase it, the time of crystallisation of the third party’s right) were outlined:2
(i) when the third party becomes aware of the contract;
(ii) when the third party adopts the contract either expressly or by conduct;3
(iii) when the third party accepts or assents to the contract;4
(iv) when the third party materially alters his position in reliance on the contract;5
(v) when the third party either materially changes his position in justifiable
reliance on the promise, or brings suit on it, or manifests assent to it at the
request of the promisor or promisee.
9.3 We suggested that the central choice lay between (ii), (iii) and (iv). Consultees were
divided between these. Options (ii) and (iii) were criticised on the grounds that the
meaning of adoption or acceptance was unclear. Some consultees argued that the
1
Consultation Paper No 121, para 5.28. Variation or cancellation by the parties must be
distinguished from a term (or statutory provision) which permits one of the parties unilaterally
to alter the contracted-for work. A third party’s rights are subject to such a term: see, eg, paras
9.37, note 30, and 10.31 below.
2
3
See section 11(3) of the Western Australia Property Law Act 1969.
4
Under section 55(6)(a) of the Queensland Property Law Act 1974, “‘acceptance’ means an
assent by words or conduct communicated by or on behalf of the beneficiary to the promisor ...”.
5
This is the primary test favoured in New Zealand: see Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, s 5(1).
101
concept of reliance in option (iv) was unclear, that its use could lead to artificial acts
of reliance, that a choice had to be made between mere “reasonable” reliance and
“detrimental” reliance, and that reliance could occur without the knowledge of either
of the contracting parties.
9.4 We also asked “whether modification should be permitted where the contract allows
it (either expressly or impliedly) regardless of adoption, acceptance or material reliance
or at least where the third party knows (or should reasonably have been aware) that the
contract permits modification even though he subsequently adopts, accepts or
materially relies on the contract.”6 A large majority of consultees were in favour of
permitting contractual provisions which preserve the right of the contracting parties to
vary or cancel the contract to prevail over the crystallisation of a third party’s rights.
2. The Two Extreme Positions

(1) Variation or Cancellation at Any Time
9.5 A number of consultees favoured allowing revocation at any time. Some others argued
that revocation should be permitted at any time unless the third party had in some
form provided payment for the benefit conferred upon it. These consultees were for the
most part among those who were opposed to any reform of the doctrine of privity of
contract, and therefore most likely saw this as a means of preserving the powers of the
original contracting parties to the fullest extent possible. This option would preserve
the ability of the contracting parties to agree between themselves to alter the contract
at any time, in the same manner as if there were no third party rights involved.
9.6 Similarly some consultees saw the imposition of any limit on the power of the
contracting parties to vary or cancel the contract as an attack on the doctrine of
consideration. They argued that, if a third party’s rights were allowed to crystallise so
as to become irrevocable by the contracting parties, this would effectively mean
enforcing gratuitous promises (or at best, promises supported only by reliance or
detrimental reliance) made to the third party. This is a fundamental and important
point. We have, however, dealt with it in Part VI above. We there explained that we
saw no objection to accepting that, while formally, our proposed reform does not affect
the requirement of consideration, at a deeper policy level, and within the area of third
party rights, it may represent a relaxation of the importance attached to consideration.7
9.7 If the contracting parties were able to vary or cancel the contract at any time the
impact of reforming the law, by giving a third party an entitlement to sue, would be
marginal. As the New Zealand Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee
pointed out, if reform of the third party rule is to have any substantial effect, there
must be some limit on the parties’ power to vary or cancel the third party beneficiary’s
rights without the third party’s consent, even if it is only to prevent them doing so once
6
7
102
judgment has been given in his or her favour.8 If this were not the case, the reform
would amount to little more than a procedural device to allow the third party to sue
in his or her own name when for some reason the promisee was not prepared to act,
and would not guarantee the third party any rights at all under the contract. The third
party would be left in much the same position as at present.9
9.8 At the core of this issue is a conflict between preserving the freedom of the contracting
parties to implement their intentions as they see fit at any particular time, and allowing
the creation of effective third party rights so that a third party can arrange its affairs
with some certainty.10 We consider that the former policy is outweighed by the latter.
9.9 We therefore reject the view that the contracting parties should be permitted to vary
or cancel at any time a contractual provision that is enforceable by a third party.
(2) No Variation or Cancellation

9.10 At the other extreme, a number of consultees favoured a rule which would not permit
any variation or cancellation of a contractual provision enforceable by a third party.11
But the majority agreed with our provisional view that to refuse to permit variation or
cancellation at all would be too restrictive.12 Where the third party is not even aware
of the promise it is hard to see any conceivable injustice to the third party in allowing
the contracting parties to vary or cancel the contract. We therefore reject this approach
as creating too great a fetter on the ability of the contracting parties to change their
original intentions.
8
Privity of Contract (1981) para 8.3.1.
9
That is, under the present law the third party will not get performance unless both parties decide
that they want to honour the terms of the original contract, whereas a reform allowing variation
or cancellation at any time would mean that the third party would not be able to secure
performance where both parties agree to vary the terms of the original contract.
10
See para 3.2 above.
11
This was also the approach provisionally favoured by the Scottish Law Commission subject to
there being a term in the contract providing for cancellation or variation: see Memorandum No
38 Constitution and Proof of Voluntary Obligations: Stipulations in Favour of Third Parties (1977)
para 33.
12
See Consultation Paper No 121 para 5.29. Indeed it was pointed out to us that the inability to
vary or cancel benefits subsequently is one of the disadvantages of using a deed poll to overcome
the doctrine of privity: see para 2.8, note 27, above.
103
3. Possible “Crystallisation” Tests
9.11 It is obvious from the above discussion that we consider that any reform will require
some degree of constraint on the contracting parties’ rights to vary the contract, but
that this should not amount to a total bar on variation. In other words, along with the
majority of consultees, we consider that there should be a ‘crystallisation’ test. We now
move to consider what that test should be.
(1) Awareness
9.12 We reject at the outset a test which requires merely that the third party is aware of the
terms of the contract, although it is the solution that was favoured by a few consultees.
It is the crystallisation point that is most favourable to third parties and comes close to
rejecting altogether a right to vary. However, we see variation or cancellation as
causing no injustice to a third party who, while aware of the terms of the contract, has
no wish to take advantage of them or who does not believe that the promise will be
performed or that he or she has an entitlement to performance. Indeed he or she may
even renounce the contract. Of course, it might be argued that such a third party is
most unlikely to object to a variation or cancellation by the contracting parties so that
no dispute would arise. But a dispute might arise where the third party changes its
mind about wanting the promise performed after the contracting parties have varied
or cancelled the contract. We therefore reject “awareness” as an appropriate
crystallisation test.
9.13 In our view, this leaves reliance, detrimental reliance, acceptance or adoption as the
major possible tests. In choosing between them, it is first necessary to clarify what each
means.
(2) Reliance
9.14 Reliance on a promise, in our view, means “conduct induced by the belief (or
expectation) that the promise will be performed or, at least, that one is legally entitled
to performance of the promise.” The reliance need not be detrimental: that is, the
conduct need not make the plaintiff worse off than before the promise was made. To
give two illustrations. Say A promises B to pay C £500. C then goes out and buys
some shares, which he would not have risked buying but for A’s promise of the £500.
The shares have now tripled in value. Here C has relied on A’s promise without being
worse off than he was before the promise was made. Or say A promises B to pay C
£500 and C, on hearing of this and because of it, immediately pays some outstanding
bills. By so doing C has relied on the promise. But there is no necessity in showing
reliance to go on to prove that, if A were to break the promise, C would be in a worse
position than if the promise had never been made.
(3) Detrimental Reliance

9.15 Detrimental reliance means that the third party’s conduct in reliance on the promise
renders him or her worse off than he or she would have been if the promise had never
been made. In the example of C buying shares in the previous paragraph, C would
104
have detrimentally relied if the shares had fallen in value. Again a person detrimentally
relies if he or she passes up profitable opportunities on the strength of the promise.
(4) Acceptance
9.16 Although a third party, unlike an offeree, is not normally being requested to respond,
we consider that in defining what is meant by acceptance, some help can be derived
from the well-known notion of “acceptance” of an offer in a standard bilateral contract.
In that context, acceptance means communication of one’s assent. This is supported
by the legislation in Queensland which uses “acceptance” by the third party as the test
for crystallisation of its rights, and defines “acceptance” as “an assent by words or
conduct communicated by the beneficiary to the promisor....”13 However, this
definition leaves open whether “communication of one’s assent” means that one’s
acceptance must be received by the promisor or whether it is sufficient that one
communicates one’s assent even though the promisor does not know of it (for example,
by posting a letter). We return to that issue below.14
(5) Adoption Expressly or by Conduct

9.17 This was the crystallisation test favoured by the Law Revision Committee in 1937 and
by the Western Australia Property Law Act 1969.15 However, the phrase does not
appear to have been defined in any case law and the difficulty is to know what it
means. One possibility is that it means the same as “acceptance” (as defined above).
Another is that it means either “acceptance” or “reliance”. We consider that the
ambiguity of the phrase means that it is best avoided.
4. Choice of Test
9.18 Having ruled out “adoption” as insufficiently clear in its meaning, we are left with
three main possible crystallisation tests: reliance, detrimental reliance, and acceptance.
After much deliberation, we have decided that the appropriate balance between
avoiding injustice to a third party and allowing the contracting parties to change their
minds is achieved by having a test whereby reliance or acceptance by the third party
crystallises his or her rights.
9.19 In arriving at that test we have first had to make a choice between reliance and
detrimental reliance. We have opted for the former. The essential injustice caused to
a third party by the privity rule is that that party’s reasonable expectations of the
promised performance are disappointed. Reliance serves to indicate that expectations
have been engendered in the third party. To require the reliance to be detrimental
tends to shift the focus away from protecting the plaintiff ’s expectation interest to
protecting the plaintiff ’s reliance interest. In other words, an insistence that reliance
be detrimental makes it very difficult (albeit not impossible) to explain why the third
13
Section 55(6)(a) Queensland Property Law Act 1974.
14
15
105
party is entitled to performance of the promise, or its monetary substitute in the form
of expectation damages, rather than damages for reliance loss (as, for example, for
tortious misrepresentation).16 A useful analogy is the doctrine of promissory estoppel,
which, like our reform is concerned with the enforcement of certain promises by those
who have not provided consideration. There the debate has raged for many years as
to whether the promisee needs to have merely relied, or must have detrimentally relied,
on the promise in order to fall within the doctrine. Although the matter cannot be
regarded as entirely settled, there seems to be an emerging consensus to the effect that
mere reliance is sufficient.17
9.20 But while we consider that reliance by the third party should be the primary test for the
crystallisation of the third party’s rights, we also think it necessary to have an
alternative test of acceptance. This is primarily because, in our view, a third party who
has (successfully) communicated its assent to the promisor ought to be secure in its
entitlement without also having to show reliance on the promise. Furthermore, an
acceptance enables the promisor to know exactly where it stands. In this respect, we
think that the standard posting rule (that acceptance of an offer takes place when the
letter is posted)18 is here inappropriate. To apply the rule that a valid acceptance takes
place on the posting of a letter (subject to exceptions) would mean that a third party
could crystallise his rights not only without the promisor knowing anything about it
but, more crucially, without the promisor even being able to foresee it (because, for
example, the promisor did not know that the third party had come into existence).
And in contrast to the reliance test (as discussed below)19 it would seem impracticable
and overelaborate to suggest that the posting rule should only apply where it was
reasonably foreseeable that a postal acceptance would be made.
9.21 It has been suggested to us that an alternative test of acceptance is unnecessary

because reliance encompasses acceptance (on the basis that reliance means “any
conduct induced by the promise”). We do not agree. Acceptance by communicating
one’s assent is conduct designed to secure performance of the promise; it is not
conduct induced by the belief that the promise will be performed or that one is legally
entitled to performance of the promise. A third party who writes to the promisor
16
See A Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (2nd ed, 1994) pp 171-178.
17
See, eg, Lord Denning in Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB
130; W J Alan & Co Ltd v El Nasr Export and Import Co [1972] 2 QB 189; Treitel, The Law of
Contract (9th ed, 1995) p 105; Chitty on Contracts (27th ed, 1994) paras 3-070-3-071; E
McKendrick, Contract Law (2nd ed, 1994) p 93.
18
See, eg, Household Fire Insurance Co Ltd v Grant (1879) 4 Ex D 216. The posting rule contrasts
with the standard rule for instantaneous means of communication (eg telex and telephone) that
the acceptance is valid only when received: see, eg, Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corp [1955] 2 QB
327; Brinkibon Ltd v Stahag Stahl and Stahlwarenhandels GmbH [1983] 2 AC 34. The position
in relation to fax and E-mail is, arguably, unclear: see Treitel, The Law of Contract (9th ed), pp
25-26.
19
106
saying “I do not want to take advantage of your promise” is not relying on the promise
even though his conduct is induced by the promise. Similarly a third party who writes
out of fear that the promise will otherwise be withdrawn saying “I want to take
advantage of your promise” is accepting the promise but is not relying on it.
9.22 On the other hand we do not see the need for an additional alternative test of the third
party “bringing suit on the promise”. In our view, a third party who brings suit on the
promise is relying on that promise in that it is embarking on conduct based on the
belief that it is legally entitled to performance of the promise.
9.23 We are supported in our view that the best crystallisation test is reliance or acceptance
by the fact that an approach of alternative tests was favoured by many consultees and
that the precise approach of reliance or acceptance was particularly popular.
9.24 Some consultees preferred a single test of acceptance. A merit of this would be that
the contracting parties would know where they stood before proceeding to vary or
cancel the contract. However, we consider that any problems caused by the ‘unilateral’
nature of reliance are sufficiently catered for by modifying the reliance test so as to
require that the promisor could reasonably have foreseen/anticipated that the third
party would rely on the promise. This is discussed further below.20 The obvious
objection to a single acceptance test is that many third parties will rely (and even
detrimentally rely) without having communicated their assent. As the contracting
parties will not normally ask for communication of assent (although if they do, this will
displace the reliance test as is explained below)21 only those third parties who know the
law can be expected to communicate assent. If acceptance alone were the test, one
could even have a situation where the third party is present when the contract is made
and is told of the beneficial promise, yet because he does not communicate his assent,
the parties would be free to revoke despite reliance (including detrimental reliance) by
the third party.
9.25 We should add the perhaps obvious point that where a contract contains more than
one provision that is enforceable by a third party, only those provisions which the third
party relies upon or accepts should become irrevocable (although, of course, the third
party could rely on or accept all the provisions).

(14) the contracting parties’ right to vary or cancel the contract or, as the
case may be, the contractual provision should be lost once the third party
has relied on it or has accepted it (“acceptance” meaning “an assent by
words or conduct communicated by the third party to the promisor”).
20
21
107
The posting rule, applicable to the acceptance of offers sent by post (and
possibly by some other means),22 should not apply. (Draft Bill, clause 2(1)
and (2))
5. The Reliance Test : Further Details

(1) Need the Promisor Be Aware Of, or Foresee, the Reliance?
9.27 A number of consultees considered that the third party’s reliance should only crystallise
its rights if the contracting parties, or one of them, was aware of the reliance. It was
also suggested by one consultee that reliance should only count if it was reasonably to
be anticipated. These suggestions stem from a fear about the consequences of the
unilateral nature of reliance. The contracting parties may purport to vary or cancel a
contract at a time when they do not know that the third party has relied; the promisor
may then go on to perform in favour of someone else (that is, a fourth party).
Although the promisor may have a claim in restitution against the party to whom
performance was rendered, this will not always be so and the promisor will in any event
normally have to bear the risk of the insolvency of that party.
9.28 In our view, the correct resolution of this difficulty rests on recognising that the
promisor generally ought to check with the third party before revoking or cancelling the
contract. In normal circumstances a promisor who has entered into a contract which,
under our recommendations, is enforceable by a third party (because the parties have
intended to confer legal rights on the third party) ought to realise that that third party
is likely to rely on the contract and that he is not free to resile from the contract simply
by obtaining the consent of the promisee. It follows from this that the unilateral nature
of reliance only causes difficulty where the promisor could not reasonably be expected
to check with the third party because the promisor did not realise that the third party
knew of the contract. Indeed in the case of a third party who was not in existence at
the time the contract was made, it may even be that the promisor did not realise that
the third party had come into existence. To deal with this sort of problem we consider
that the reliance test should be qualified so that reliance should only count where,
unless the promisor is actually aware that the third party has relied, the promisor could
reasonably have foreseen that the third party would rely on the promise.
9.29 It should be added that this qualification will create some incentive for a third party,
who knows the law, to ‘accept’ the promise by communicating its assent. For if the
third party goes ahead and relies without acceptance it runs some risk in certain
circumstances of falling foul of the qualification.
22
108
(15) the reliance test should be qualified so that reliance should only count
where (unless the promisor is aware that the third party has relied) the
promisor could reasonably have foreseen that the third party would rely
on the promise. (Draft Bill, clause 2(1)(b) and 2(1)(c))
(2) Material Reliance

9.31 It was suggested to us that the third party’s reliance should only count if it was
material. And in New Zealand the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, s 5(1)(a) requires that
“the position of a beneficiary has been materially altered by the reliance of that
beneficiary ... on the promise ...”.23 It is not entirely clear what the word ‘material’, in
the phrase ‘material reliance’, refers to. In particular it is ambiguous as between the
causal potency of the promise and the seriousness of the conduct induced by the
promise. Even if one confines it to the latter, with the aim being to rule out trivial acts
of reliance, we consider that it would be a recipe for litigation; for where is the line is
to be drawn between trivial and non-trivial reliance? This is especially so given that we
have clarified that the relevant test is reliance and not detrimental reliance. In our
view, the importance of reliance is in indicating that expectations have been
engendered in the third party, and the triviality of the reliance seems irrelevant to that.
(3) Protection of the Third Party’s Reliance or Expectation Interest?

9.32 Some consultees doubted whether a third party should be entitled to expectation
damages, where the promise for the third party has become irrevocable because of the
third party’s reliance and yet the parties have purported to vary or cancel the contract
so that the promisor does not perform. They argued that, in this situation, the third
party should be confined to recovering its reliance loss.
9.33 We have already touched on this question.24 We believe that there is no good reason
to restrict damages to the reliance measure. The reform that we are concerned to
introduce allows third parties to ‘enforce’ contracts and we see no reason why the
normal contractual measure of recovery (the expectation measure) should not apply.
Again the analogy of promissory estoppel may be thought helpful; for that doctrine is
not confined to protecting the plaintiff ’s reliance interest.25
23
There has been no judicial consideration of this provision: New Zealand Law Commission
Contract Statutes Review (1993) para 5.30. The New Zealand Contracts and Commercial Law
Reform Committee’s Report, Privity of Contract (1981); para 8.3.5 uses both the terms
“materially alter” and “injurious reliance” in a manner which suggests that the Committee did
not regard the two as coterminous.
24
25
See A Burrows, ‘Contract, Tort and Restitution - A Satisfactory Division or Not?’ (1983) 99
LQR 217, 239-244.
109
(4) Burden of Proof
9.34 As it can be difficult to prove reliance, it was suggested to us that the burden of proof
would be very important and that the burden should lie on the contracting parties to
show that the third party had not relied. Although we see the force in the argument,
there are great difficulties in proving a negative and, in view of the fact that our
proposals are concerned to confer rights upon a third party, we consider that the
burden of proving the existence of those rights should be laid at the door of the third
party. Again, this continues the analogy with promissory estoppel, as the party seeking
the protection of the estoppel has the burden of proving reliance.26
(5) Reliance by Someone Other Than the Third Party

9.35 The New Zealand legislation prevents variation or cancellation of the third party’s right
once the third party’s position has been materially altered by reliance on the promise
by either the third party or by any other person.27 In other words, the New Zealand
provision extends to situations where someone other than the third party (ie one of the
contracting parties or a fourth party) acts in reliance on the expected benefit to the
third party, and the third party suffers detriment because of this reliance. An example
of this may be where a parent or guardian of a child third party beneficiary has acted
on the assumption that the child will be provided for by the benefit under the contract
and has not therefore made any provisions for the child. The question was not raised
in the Consultation Paper of whether acts of reliance should only count if undertaken
by the third party, although we received one comment favouring the provisions of the
New Zealand legislation on this issue.
9.36 We have decided not to follow the New Zealand approach on this question. First, we
feel that that approach would make the reform unattractive to contracting parties, as
we do not believe that contracting parties envisage themselves as effectively becoming
insurers for any loss that the third party may suffer as a result of fourth party actions.
Secondly, to allow the actions of fourth parties to constitute reliance would not sit well
with the analogy we have been drawing with promissory estoppel. Thirdly, and perhaps
most importantly, we have acknowledged that, while there are arguments for requiring
the contracting parties to have knowledge of any reliance before their rights are
fettered, it is not unreasonable to expect them to check whether the third party has
actually relied. However, we think that it would be unreasonable to expect the
contracting parties to check whether any other party has relied in such a way as to alter
the third party’s position, particularly as the third party may not know that its position
has been so altered. To provide otherwise would be to place too heavy a burden on the
contracting parties, and could result in the situation where the contracting parties have
had their rights abrogated, yet neither they nor the third party know of this.
26
Although Lord Denning’s judgment in Brikom Investments v Carr [1979] QB 467 may be
interpreted as reversing the burden of proving reliance.
27
Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, s 5(1)(a).
110
6. Reservation of a Right to Vary or Cancel
9.37 It was provisionally recommended in the Consultation Paper that the parties should
be able to reserve the right to vary or cancel the third party’s right even after the latter
had adopted, accepted or relied on that right.28 There seemed to be broad agreement
among consultees that the parties should have power to reserve to themselves or even
to one of them29 such a right to vary or cancel. This view was particularly prevalent
among consultees involved in the construction industry, highlighting the fact that
collateral warranties often provide for variation.30
9.38 It could be argued that any attempt to preserve the contracting parties’ rights to vary
negates the value of the third party’s right: if the parties can vary the contract at any
stage, even after reliance on it or acceptance of it by the third party, it would seem that
the third party has few guaranteed rights. However, the third party’s rights may be
defined and limited by the terms of the contract,31 and it would seem inconsistent to
allow the contracting parties to make a contract that confers a benefit on a third party
which is conditional upon an external factor, but not one which is conditional upon
their own future intentions.
9.39 A number of consultees thought that the parties should only have such a right if the
third party was aware, or perhaps should have been aware, of the reservation:
otherwise, there might be a danger that the third party beneficiary could be misled.
The New Zealand Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, section 6 provides that the parties may
not operate such a clause unless the third party knew of it before it materially altered
its position in reliance on the promise. This gives the third party the opportunity to
consider the fact that it is not guaranteed the right of enforcement before it chooses to
rely on the promise. This is part of a wider issue relating to the extent to which, in this
legislation, one can fully deal with the possibility of the third party being misled as to
its entitlement.32 In line with our basic commitment to respecting the intentions of the
contracting parties, and not causing unnecessary uncertainty, we have concluded that
this legislation should only go so far as to require that the reservation of a right to vary
or cancel is expressly provided for.
28
29
Cf New Zealand Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, s 6(b).
30
Almost all construction contracts of any complexity contain a clause permitting the employer,
or the architect or engineer on behalf of the employer, to order variations to the work. Though
often called “variations”, such changes are not variations to the contract but only to the work,
since they are contemplated by the original contract. The third party’s rights, since they are
conferred by the contract, would clearly be subject to such variations.
31
32
See para 13.10 point (iv) below.
111
(16) the contracting parties may expressly reserve the right to vary or cancel
the third party’s right irrespective of reliance or acceptance by the third
party. (Draft Bill, clause 2(3)(a))
7. Can the Relevant Crystallisation Test be Laid Down in the Contract?

9.41 We consider that, by an express term, the parties should be able to lay down in the
contract a crystallisation test different from reliance or acceptance. That is, they
should be able to reserve a right to vary or cancel the contract until, for example, the
third party has accepted by writing (so that reliance would not count and nor would
an oral acceptance).

(17) the parties, by an express term, should be able to lay down a
crystallisation test different from reliance or acceptance. (Draft Bill,
clause 2(3)(b))
8. Crystallisation Where There Is More Than One Third Party

9.43 Although this was not put out to consultation, it is perhaps worth clarifying that, in our
view, where there is more than one third party, who can satisfy the test of
enforceability, reliance on or acceptance of the contract (or satisfaction of whatever
other crystallisation test is expressly laid down in the contract) by each third party
should be needed to crystallise that third party’s rights.33 The practical effect of this
will vary depending on whether the promise is intended to confer enforceable rights
that are to be separately, or jointly, enjoyed with other third parties. For example,
where A contracts with B to pay C £100 and D £150, it is clear that any crystallisation
of C’s rights or consent by C cannot affect D’s rights and vice versa. On the other
hand, a contract between A and B to benefit C and D jointly, where D has neither
accepted nor relied (indeed D may not yet be alive) but C has accepted or relied, could
not be varied to exclude D unless C consents: but it could be varied to exclude D if C
does consent.34
33
The issue of releases where there is more than one third party is dealt with at para 11.9 below.
34
The main two alternative approaches to this question of jointly entitled third parties would, in
our view, produce obviously unacceptable results. These two alternatives are: (i) requiring the
consent to variation of each jointly entitled third party (including the consent of those who may
not yet be alive) once the rights of one of them have crystallised; or (ii) allowing a variation or
cancellation of the rights of all of them (despite the known refusal to consent of a third party
whose rights have already crystallised) unless and until the rights of each of them have
crystallised.
112
(18) although no legislative provision on this is necessary,35 where there is
more than one third party who satisfies the test of enforceability, the
relevant crystallisation test would need to be satisfied by each third party
in order to crystallise that third party’s rights.
9. Creating Irrevocable Rights

9.45 We did not put forward any provisional view as to whether effect should be given to
a term in the contract (enforceable by the third party) that the contract is irrevocable
and, while we drew attention to the position under US law,36 we did not expressly seek
consultees’ views on this point.
9.46 We do not see the attraction, nor the justification, for holding the contracting parties
to a contract which the third party has neither relied upon nor accepted. In our view
this would be an unreasonable fetter on the contracting parties’ freedom of contract
which could not be justified by reference to any injustice to another party. In any
event, this would cut across the standard contractual principle that the parties are free
to vary any term of the contract, even a ‘no-variation’ term. We therefore consider that
any provision of a contract for the benefit of a third party which purports to render that
contract irrevocable should be as open to variation or discharge as any other
contractual term. Similarly if the parties have expressly laid down a crystallisation test
different from reliance or acceptance, they should be free to vary it prior to reliance or
acceptance by the third party.

(19) a contractual term to the effect that the contract is irrevocable should
be as open to variation or cancellation by the contracting parties as
any other term.
10. Judicial Discretion to Authorise Variation or Cancellation

9.48 The New Zealand Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, section 7, gives the court a discretion
to authorise a variation or discharge of the contract if “it is just and practicable to do
so”, despite a material reliance which would otherwise have crystallised a third party’s
rights. The legislation further provides that the court which orders a variation or
35
We have taken the view throughout this Report that legislative provisions dealing with where
there is more than one third party with a right of enforceability are unnecessary and that the law
to be applied follows directly, or by analogy, from the normal principles applicable to a plurality
of creditors. See also paras 11.9-11.10 below. See generally Treitel, The Law of Contract (9th
ed, 1995) pp 529-533. In leaving these matters to the courts to determine, we have also been
influenced by the facts that (i) these matters were not put out to consultation; and (ii) these
matters do not appear to have been dealt with in the legislation reforming privity in, eg, New
Zealand, Western Australia or Queensland.
36
Restatement (2d) Contracts, § 311(1) prevents discharge or modification by the contracting
parties if a term of the promise creating the duty so provides. See Consultation Paper No 121,
para 5.29.
113
discharge may also order that such sum as it considers just to compensate the third
party who has relied on the promise be paid by the promisor. In the Consultation
Paper we provisionally recommended that the courts should not have a residual
discretion to authorise variation or discharge for reasons of justice.37 Most consultees
agreed on grounds of certainty. However, there was a minority view that a measure
of judicial discretion to authorise variation or discharge was desirable. We have been
persuaded that that is a preferable approach.
9.49 We particularly have in mind situations where the contracting parties wish to vary or
cancel the contract but cannot reasonably ascertain whether the third party has relied
on the contract so that his consent is required. This may be, for example, because the
third party simply refuses to say whether it has relied or not or cannot reasonably be
contacted to ascertain whether it has relied or not. It is of course possible to seek a
declaration of rights under the contract without involving the court in authorising a
variation or cancellation, but such a declaration would not aid the parties if they
wished to vary and there was found to have been reliance. We also have in mind
situations where, although consent is known to be required, the contracting parties are
locked into the contract because the third party cannot reasonably be contacted in
order for consent to be obtained or because the third party is mentally incapable of
consenting to a variation.
9.50 Therefore we now consider that the courts should be given a limited discretion to
authorise variation or cancellation and on such terms (including as to the payment of
compensation to the third party) as seems appropriate. The discretion should extend
to where the third party is mentally incapable of consenting, or cannot reasonably be
contacted in order for consent to be obtained, or where the parties cannot reasonably
ascertain whether the third party’s consent is required. We would not expect such a
limited discretion to create any significant degree of uncertainty.

(20) there should be a judicial discretion to authorise a variation or
cancellation (and on such terms, including as to the payment of
compensation to the third party, as seems appropriate) in certain limited
circumstances irrespective of reliance or acceptance by the third party.
The discretion should extend to where the parties cannot reasonably
ascertain whether the third party’s consent is required for the
cancellation or variation of the contract; or where the third party’s
consent cannot be obtained because his whereabouts cannot reasonably
be discovered or because he is mentally incapable of giving his consent.
(Draft Bill, clauses 2(4) to 2(7))
37
114
PART X
DEFENCES, SET-OFFS AND
COUNTERCLAIMS
1. Introduction
10.1 In the Consultation Paper, we provisionally recommended that the rights of the third
party against the promisor should be subject to the promisor’s defences, set-offs and
counterclaims which would have been available to the promisor in an action by the
promisee.1 But we invited views on the scope of the defences, set-offs and
counterclaims that should be relevant and, in particular, on whether, in the case of a
set-off or counterclaim, a promisor may only rely on matters arising from the contract
in which the promise is contained or may also set up against the third party set-offs and
counterclaims arising out of other relations between the promisor and the promisee.2
10.2 There are always problems in the law of obligations in defining what constitutes a
defence. For these purposes, however, we use the term to refer essentially to matters
which affect the existence, validity and enforceability of the whole contract or of the
particular provision benefiting the third party. We therefore include as defences matters
which render the contract void (for example, fundamental mistake) or voidable (for
example, the promisee’s misrepresentation, duress or undue influence) or that have led
to the contract being discharged (for example, frustration or serious breach by the
promisee). Similarly we treat as a defence the failure of a condition which was the basis
for the promise to benefit the third party.3 In contrast, we do not include as defences
matters which bar a particular remedy such as that specific performance is not available
of a contract for personal service. The normal rules relating to remedies are applicable
to the third party’s action in line with recommendation 2 above and we do not think
that all restrictions on the promisee’s remedies (for example, that the promisee is guilty
of laches so as to rule out specific performance or that the promisee has failed in its
duty to mitigate its loss) should carry across to bar or restrict automatically the third
party’s remedy. Nor do we regard as defences, procedural restrictions on the
enforcement of the contract such as arbitration clauses (unless of the Scott v Avery4
type) or jurisdiction clauses. We also exclude from the notion of defences variation or
cancellation by the contracting parties: that form of “defence” has been discussed in
Part IX above and is subject to a separate regime which seeks to restrict the rights of
1
Consultation Paper No 121 paras 5.24 to 5.25, 6.10. We pointed out in para 5.24 that our
provisional recommendation is analogous to the rule that the assignee of a chose in action takes
the benefit of it “subject to equities”. See Chitty on Contracts (27th ed, 1994) paras 19-039 to
19-040. We also provisionally recommended, at paras 5.16 and 6.5, that rights created against
a contracting party should be governed by the contract and be valid only to the extent that it is
valid, and may be conditional upon the other contracting party performing its obligations under
it.
2
Ibid.
3
Alternatively one can say that the promised benefit is a conditional one, and where the condition
is not fulfilled, the promise does not apply: see paras 10.24-10.32 below.
4
(1856) 5 HL Cas 811; 10 ER 1121. See para 14.17, note 23, below.
115
the original contracting parties to change their minds once the third party has relied
on or accepted the promise.
10.3 There is also some difficulty in certain contexts in distinguishing set-offs and
counterclaims. Nowadays both constitute cross-claims for monetary remedies, whether
the cross-claim is for a debt or liquidated damages or unliquidated damages. However,
a set-off may be narrower in that it appears that sometimes the set-off must arise out
of the same transaction as the plaintiff’s claim, whereas the only limitation on pleading
a counterclaim is that trial of both the claim and counterclaim will not “embarrass or
delay the trial or [be] otherwise inconvenient.”5 A set-off is also narrower in that it
cannot exceed the amount of the plaintiff ’s claim and, in effect therefore, operates as
a defence.
10.4 There can be little doubt that defences going to the existence, validity and
enforceability of the whole contract, or of the particular contractual provision being
enforced by the third party, should be of equal relevance whether the promisee or the
third party is suing. If the promise was induced by the fraud or undue influence of the
promisee, or has been discharged by reason of the promisee’s repudiatory breach or by
reason of the doctrine of frustration, or was given subject to a condition that has not
been fulfilled, the third party should have no greater rights to enforce it than would the
promisee. The third party would otherwise clearly be getting something that it was
never truly intended to have. Not surprisingly, there was little dissent from this on
consultation.6 However, the position in respect of set-offs and counterclaims is less
straightforward.
2. Precedents for Reform

(1) Law Revision Committee/Western Australia/Queensland
10.5 The Law Revision Committee’s Report accepted the proposition that the third party’s
right should be subject to all defences which would have been available against the
promisee.7 This consequently formed part of the amendments to the law effected in
Western Australia8 and in Queensland.9 It is noteworthy that neither the Law Revision
5
RSC, O 15, r 5. See also 0 15, rr 2-5 and Commentary; O 18, r 17.
6
The contrary argument was put by some consultees who argued that the third party’s right was
a direct, not a derivative, one, so that only defences relevant to the third party’s own conduct
should be available to the promisor.
7
Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report (1937) para 47: “...the promisor should be
entitled to raise against the third party any defence, such as fraud or mistake, that would have
been valid against the promisee”.
8
Western Australian Property Law Act 1969, s 11(2)(a): “...all defences that would have been
available to the defendant in an action or proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction to
enforce the contract had the plaintiff in the action or proceeding been named as a party to the
contract shall be so available”.
9
Queensland Property Law Act 1974, s 55(4): “...any matter which would in proceedings not
brought in reliance on this section render a promise void, voidable or unenforceable, whether
wholly or in part, or which in proceedings (not brought in reliance on this section) to enforce a
116
Committee, nor the Western Australian nor Queensland draftsmen, specifically
mentioned set-offs or counterclaims within their recommendations or provisions.10
While it may be that the term “defences” was intended to include set-offs, it cannot be
taken to include counterclaims.
(2) United States

10.6 The Second Restatement11 provides that a contract which is voidable or unenforceable
at the time of its formation can create no superior right in a third party, and that where
a contract “ceases to be binding in whole or in part because of impracticability, public
policy, non-occurrence of a condition, or present or prospective failure of performance,
the right of any beneficiary is to that extent discharged or modified”. Thus, the third
party’s claim is subject to such factors as lack of formation or of consideration, lack of
capacity on the part of the contracting parties, fraud or mistake, as tending to vitiate
the contract itself; and to any limitations or conditions imposed on the third party’s
right by the terms of the contract or by the general law.12 However, it appears that
matters arising from other transactions between the promisor and the promisee are not
relevant to the third party’s claim unless the contract says so.
(3) New Zealand

10.7 The New Zealand Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, section 9(2),13 provides that,
[T]he promisor shall have available to him, by way of defence, counterclaim, set-
off, or otherwise, any matter which would have been available to him...(b) If (i)
The beneficiary were the promisee; and (ii) The promise to which the
proceedings relate had been made for the benefit of the promisee; and (iii) The
proceedings had been brought by the promisee.
The formulation is, however, limited by section 9(3) of the Act, which permits a set-off
or counterclaim only where this “arises out of or in connection with14 the deed or
contract in which the promise is contained”.
promissory duty arising from a promise is available by way of defence shall, in like manner and
to the like extent, render void, voidable or unenforceable or be available by way of defence in
proceedings for the enforcement of a duty to which this section gives effect”.
10
See similarly, H McGregor, Contract Code drawn up on behalf of the English Law Commission,
(1993) s 641, pp 286-7.
11
Restatement (2d) Contracts, § 309.
12
Corbin on Contracts, (1951 with supplements) vol 4 para 818. Vol 4 pp 266-273 instances lack
of consideration, illegality, lack of capacity, fraud, mistake, lack of formality and non compliance
with any requisite condition as “facts that affect the contract in its formation, operating to
determine the primary legal relations of the parties”. A third party’s rights would be limited by
such facts.
13
See New Zealand Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Privity of Contract (1981)
para 8.2.6. and Appendix, p 75.
14
We understand that the words “in connection with” were added in order to safeguard the
promisor’s remedies in respect of misrepresentation inducing the contract.
3. Options for Reform
10.8 Although we did not specifically address the matter in this way in the Consultation
Paper, we now believe that it is helpful to recognise that there are three main possible
options as to the scope of the relevant defences, set-offs or counterclaims. First, a third
party’s claim could be subject only to defences affecting the existence or validity of the
contract or the particular contractual provision purporting to benefit the third party.
Other defences, set-offs and counterclaims available against the promisee would not
be available against the third party. Secondly, the third party’s claim could be subject
to defences, set-offs or counterclaims, which arise from or in connection with the
contract and which would have been available in an action brought by the promisee.
This is the option that was essentially favoured in New Zealand.15 Thirdly, the third
party’s claim could be subject to all defences, set-offs or counterclaims which would
have been available in an action brought by the promisee.
10.9 We believe that, of these, the first and third are respectively too narrow and too wide.
The third is too wide given that the third party is not simply stepping into the shoes of
the promisee. Moreover, it would be extremely difficult for the third party to discover
the whole range of counterclaims that the promisor had against the promisee. The first
seems too narrow given that the third party’s right derives from the contract. It would
prevent the promisor raising any set-off or analogous defence. If B sells goods to A and
the contract price is to be paid to C, and B in breach of warranty delivers goods that
are not of the standard contracted for, it would seem that, just as in an action for the
price by B, so in an action by C, A should be entitled to set up the damages for breach
of warranty in diminution or extinction of the price.16 Again if B induces A to make the
promise to benefit C by a fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation, and yet A cannot,
or does not wish to, rescind the contract, it would seem that A ought to be able to set
off damages for the misrepresentation against a claim by C. Admittedly, to ignore set-
offs would still enable the promisor to bring a claim against the promisee. But bringing
a claim may be less advantageous than being able to rely on a set-off; apart from the
costs the promisor would be seriously prejudiced if the promisee became insolvent.
10.10 In substance, we therefore prefer the second of the three options (that is, the New
Zealand approach), which was also the option favoured by the majority of consultees.
However, we consider it misleading and unnecessarily complex to include a reference
to counterclaims as well as to set-offs. In New Zealand, the inclusion of counterclaims
was thought to necessitate section 9(4) of the New Zealand Contracts (Privity) Act
1982, which lays down that: “(a) The beneficiary shall not be liable on the
15
See also Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Privity of Contract (1993) pp 63-64 and 77.
Having stated that “[t]hird party rights are essentially derivative and not independent and direct”
the Commission recommended following the approach in the New Zealand Contracts (Privity)
Act 1982 (but without the equivalent of s 9(4)(b): see para 10.10 note 17 below).
16
Strictly speaking, the right to set up damages in diminution or extinction of the price is not a set-
off (see Mondel v Steel (1841) 8 M & W 858; 151 ER 1288) although it is a defence.
118
counterclaim, unless the beneficiary elects, with full knowledge of the counterclaim,
to proceed with his claim against the promisor; and (b) If the beneficiary so elects to
proceed, his liability on the counterclaim shall not in any event exceed the value of the
benefit conferred on him by the promise”. While we would not have thought section
9(4)(a) to be necessary, a clause along the lines of section 9(4)(b) seems essential if
counterclaims are included.17 In other words, if one includes counterclaims, one needs
a separate clause clarifying that there is no question of the third party being liable to the
extent that the counterclaim exceeds the value of the benefit received by the third party
under his claim. There would otherwise be an infringement of the principle that reform
of the third party rule is intended to enable the enforcement of benefits by third parties,
not to impose burdens. A reference to set-offs only would avoid the need for such an
additional clause. Moreover, as one is concerned only with set-offs or counterclaims
that arise out of or in connection with the contract, it is difficult to see that the wider
scope of counterclaims as opposed to set-offs would be relevant. We are also concerned
that the reference to counterclaims - even if of lower value than the third party’s claim -
implies that the third party can be sued by the promisor for breach of an obligation
under the contract. In other words, it is not obvious to us that one can allow the
promisor to raise counterclaims while at the same time denying that the promisor can
raise the same issues in a separate action against the third party. While it has been
suggested to us that to exclude counterclaims might encourage an argument (even
though fallacious) by a third party that he or she is not caught by a cross-claim of the
promisor’s because the cross-claim is a counterclaim and not a set-off, we think that
the risks of a misunderstanding of our proposed reform are far greater if one includes
counterclaims than if one excludes them.
10.11 We have further departed slightly from the New Zealand approach18 to the extent that
we think it casts the net too wide to include all defences and set-offs “arising out of or
in connection with the contract”. For where the third party is seeking to enforce a
particular contractual provision, rather than the whole contract, it would seem that the
defence or set-off should have to be relevant to the particular contractual provision.
Otherwise a defence or set-off relating to an entirely separate clause, having no direct
relevance to the particular contractual provision being enforced, could be used as a
defence or set-off to the third party’s claim. For example, if C seeks to enforce a
17
The draft Bill attached to the Report of the New Zealand Contracts and Commercial Law
Reform Committee had no equivalent to s 9(4)(b). In a mirror image to our thinking, the
Manitoban Law Reform Commission, Privity of Contract (1993) p 63 recommended the
equivalent of s 9(4)(a) without s 9(4)(b).
18
Note also that s 9(3) of the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 applies the restriction “arising out of
or in connection with the contract” to set-offs and counterclaims but not to defences. While it
would seem to be the case that a defence which could be raised by the promisor against the
promisee must inevitably ‘arise out of or in connection with the contract’ we have decided that
it is marginally preferable to apply that restriction to both defences and set-offs. In particular,
we would not wish to leave any room for an argument that what one may loosely call a ‘set-off’
is, strictly speaking, a defence not a set-off and therefore falls outside the restriction. For a case
in which technical distinctions between defences and set-offs were raised, see Henriksens Rederi
A/S v THZ Rolimpex, The Brede [1974] QB 233.
119
payment obligation to him contained in, say, clause 20 of a construction contract
between A and B, C’s right should not be limited by a defence or set-off that A has
against B in respect of, say, clause 5 which has nothing to do with clause 20.

(21) the third party’s claim should be subject to all defences and set-offs that
would have been available to the promisor in an action by the promisee
and which arise out of or in connection with the contract or, insofar as
a particular contractual provision is being enforced by the third party,
which arise out of or in connection with the contract and are relevant to
that contractual provision. (Draft Bill, clause 3(2) and 7(2)(b))
10.13 It was pointed out that allowing the promisor to raise defences (or set-offs or
counterclaims) might have serious implications for the third party. For example, one
of the advantages of reforming the third party rule is said to be to enable the original
parties to a construction contract to grant subsequent owners or occupiers of the
building contractual rights to repair of the premises, without the need for collateral
warranties to be given to each owner or occupier. But the rights of, say, a subsequent
owner, would be diminished if they could be met by a defence that the contractor had
against the employer. The defence might be quite unknown to the subsequent owner.
10.14 A similar problem might arise in the context of insurance. A head-contractor might
take out a policy to cover itself and all sub-contractors working on a project. If the
insurance company could use a defence available against the head-contractor as a
defence to an action brought by the sub-contractor, the sub-contractor’s claim might
be defeated on the ground of, for example, misrepresentation or non-disclosure by the
contractor (perhaps even in relation to a quite different aspect of the contract). This
would make the insurance cover conferred on the sub-contractor unreliable.
10.15 We accept that the third party’s rights may be limited in this way. At root this is the
consequence of the third party’s rights deriving from the contract between the promisor
and the promisee; and, in our view, to require, for example, the promisor to notify the
third party of defences and set-offs would place an unfair burden on the promisor.19
Our preference for the second of the above options reduces the risk for the third party,
as against the third option. Moreover, if the contracting parties so wish, they can
reduce the potential uncertainty for the third party, by including an express term in
the contract to the effect that the promisor may not raise any defence or set-off that
would be available against the promisee.20 Conversely, and following the same logic of
19
This is supported by the fact that the third party, as a volunteer, cannot be a bona fide purchaser
without notice.
20
A hypothetical illustration may here be useful. Say B agrees with A, who is an art dealer, to
purchase a painting as a gift for C, his niece. A and B expressly confer a right of enforceability
on C for non-delivery. B owes A considerable sums for other art works purchased. B wishes to
ensure that the transaction in C’s favour is not affected by this fact. A and B expressly agree that
A may only raise against C defences and set-offs that would have been available independently
120
affording primacy to the contracting parties’ intentions, we would also accept that the
parties should be able to limit the value of the benefit to the third party by agreeing
expressly that the third party’s benefit is to be subject to all defences and set-offs that
the promisor would have had against the promisee (that is, not just those that arise out
of or in connection with the contract or, where a particular contractual provision is
being enforced, that are relevant to that contractual provision).21 The third party can
only be entitled to what the contracting parties have agreed it should be entitled to.

(22) the contracting parties may include an express provision to the effect
that the promisor may not raise any defence or set-off that would have
been available against the promisee; conversely, the parties may include
an express provision to the effect that the third party’s claim is subject
to all defences and set-offs that the promisor would have had against the
promisee. (Draft Bill, clause 3(3))
against her. We also here have in mind where A excludes his liability to B but expressly indicates
that the exclusion is not to apply to C. Clearly we do not want recommendation 21 to mean that
A can ignore the express indication and raise the exclusion against C.
21
The following hypothetical illustration may be helpful. Say A and B agree that A will pay C if
B transfers his car to A. B owes A substantial sums of money from the collapse of B’s business.
A’s claims against B do not arise from or in connection with the contract for the transfer of the
car. Nevertheless A procures B’s agreement to an express clause which entitles A to raise against
a claim by C any matter which would have given him a defence or set-off to a claim by B.
121
4. Defences, Set-Offs and Counterclaims Available Only Against the Third
Party
10.17 In the above discussion, as in the Consultation Paper, it has been assumed that the
question at issue is whether a defence, set-off or counterclaim, that was available to the
promisor against the promisee, should also be made available in an action by the third
party. However, a number of consultees pointed out that a question also arises as to
whether the promisor can raise any defences, set-offs or counterclaims that are specific
to the third party alone and would not have been available to the promisor in an action
by the promisee. For example, a tenant who is entitled to the benefit of a promise by
the contractor to repair the premises might already owe the same firm money for
alterations previously carried out to the premises. Similarly the contract between the
promisor and the promisee may have been induced by a misrepresentation to the
promisor, or undue influence exerted against the promisor, by the third party of which
the promisee had no notice.22 Consultees suggested that the promisor should be
entitled to rely on such defences, set-offs and counterclaims. We agree and, although
we have had some doubts as to whether a specific legislative provision on this is
necessary - or whether, on the contrary, the standard rules on defences, set-offs and
counterclaims would inevitably be applied to the third party’s action in any event - we
have ultimately decided that a clarificatory provision would be preferable.23
10.18 We should also emphasise that there is no objection here to including counterclaims.
To include counterclaims would not infringe the principle that contractual burdens
should not be imposed on the third party because what one here has in mind are
independent claims that the promisor would, in any event, have had against the third
party (for example, tort damages for a fraudulent or negligent misstatement by the
third party inducing the contract). However, to avoid any possibility of our reform
leading to a contractual burden being imposed on the third party, one must confine the
counterclaims to those that do not arise from the contract.

(23) it should be made clear that, in addition to the third party’s claim being
subject to defences and set-offs that the promisor would have had
available in an action by the promisee, the third party’s claim is also to
be subject to the defences, counterclaims (not arising from the contract)
and set-offs that would have been available to the promisor had the third
party been a party to the contract.24 (Draft Bill, clause 3(4))
22
Cf Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180 which establishes that a contracting party (A)
will only be able to set aside a contract that he has been induced to enter into by the undue
influence or misrepresentation of a third party (C) if the other contracting party (B) had actual
or constructive notice of the undue influence or misrepresentation or if the third party was acting
as agent for B.
23
Section 9(2)(a) of the New Zealand Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 is directed to this point.
24
We have had some concern as to whether this recommendation achieves our desired result of
preventing the third party enforcing the contract in the situation where the contract between the
promisor and the promisee has been induced by a misrepresentation to the promisor, or undue
122
10.20 Similarly to recommendation (22), we consider that recommendation (23) should be
subject to an express provision in the contract by which the contracting parties lay
down that the third party’s claim shall not be subject to defences, counterclaims (not
arising from the contract), and set-offs that would otherwise have been available
against the third party.25 But we would not wish to allow the contracting parties to
widen the range of counterclaims available against the third party as this might lead to
the imposition of burdens. And in this context there can be no question of the
contracting parties expanding the range of defences or set-offs because the promisor is
already entitled to all the defences or set-offs that would independently have been
available against the third party.

(24) the contracting parties may include an express provision to the effect
that the promisor may not raise any defence, set-off or counterclaim that
would have been available to the promisor had the third party been a
party to the contract. (Draft Bill, clause 3(5))
5. Thirty Party Enforcing an Exclusion or Limitation Clause

10.22 An analogous approach to that put forward in recommendations 21 and 23 above
should apply where the third party seeks to enforce an exclusion or limitation clause
in a claim (for example, in tort) that is brought against him by the promisor. That is,
the third party should not be able to rely on an exclusion or limitation clause if it was
invalid as between the contracting parties (for example, because induced by the
promisee’s fraud, duress or undue influence or because it falls foul of the Unfair
Contract Terms Act 1977); or where the third party’s own conduct (for example, fraud
by the third party not known about by the promisee) renders the clause unenforceable
by the third party. Yet in respect of exclusion and limitation clauses (and conceivably
analogous types of clause) it is inappropriate to talk of defences available to the
promisor. It seems preferable, therefore, to have a separate provision to the effect that
the third party can only rely on the exclusion or limitation clause to the extent that he
influence exerted against the promisor, by the third party, of which the promisee had no notice.
Had the third party been a party to the contract, would the promisor have been able to rescind the
contract so as to have had a defence to his claim? We have been unable to find any authority on
the question whether in multi-party contracts, the misrepresentation or undue influence of any
of the parties to the contract entitles the promisor to rescind the contract so as not to be bound
to perform the promise: cf Treitel, The Law of Contract (9th ed, 1995) p 531. But we tend to
think that, even if the whole contract cannot be rescinded, (and note that TSB Bank plc v
Camfield [1995] 1 WLR 430 rules out rescission on terms) the promisor does have a defence to
a claim brought by a misrepresentor or a person who has exerted undue influence: see Treitel,
The Law of Contract (9th ed, 1995) pp 342, 344-345.
25
The following hypothetical illustration may be helpful. A agrees with B to pay £5000 to C if B
will transfer a number of cases of vintage wine to A. C is a creditor of B’s. C is also the local
garage owner and B is aware that A and C have recently had a disagreement about the quality
of repairs done to A’s car by C. B is concerned that A may seek to withhold part of the benefit
destined for C by raising a counterclaim against C for the damage to his car. Consequently A and
B include an express provision that A may raise no defences, set-offs or counterclaims of any
nature whatever against a claim by C to enforce A’s contractual obligation to pay the £5000.
123
could have done so had he been a party to the contract (where this phrase means to
include matters that affect the validity of the exclusion clause as between the
contracting parties as well as matters affecting validity or enforceability that relate only
to the third party).26

(25) where the third party seeks to rely on the test of enforceability to enforce
an exclusion or limitation clause (or conceivably an analogous type of
clause) he may do so only to the extent that he could have done so had he
been a party to the contract (where the phrase ‘had he been a party to the
contract’ means to refer to matters that affect the validity of the clause
as between the contracting parties as well as matters affecting validity or
enforceability that relate only to the third party). (Draft Bill, clause 3(6))
6. The Line Between Benefits and Burdens

10.24 As was explained in paragraph 2.1 above, our recommended reforms, in line with the
provisional view in the Consultation Paper,27 do not seek to change the present rule,
or the exceptions to it, whereby parties cannot impose an obligation upon a third party.
However, we went on in the Consultation Paper to explain that it was also our
provisional view - and there was no dissent from this by consultees - that the
contracting parties may impose conditions upon the enjoyment of any benefit by the
third party.28 If the third party took a benefit that was qualified or conditional but
could ignore the qualification or condition, it would be getting something it was never
intended to have. Although we wish to confirm our provisional view, this issue of
conditional benefits is not entirely straightforward.
10.25 There is a distinction between imposing a burden on the third party and conferring a
conditional benefit upon him. The distinction is an easy one to draw where the
condition does not require performance by the third party. For example, a benefit
which is made conditional on the third party reaching a certain age clearly imposes no
burden on the third party. If the third party sued for breach of contract before reaching
the specified age, its claim would fail on the basis that there had been no breach
because the condition for the promisor’s performance had not occurred. Alternatively,
one can say that the promisor would have a defence in line with recommendations (21)
or (23) above.
26
One cannot simply use the formulation that ‘the third party may rely on the clause only to the
extent that the promisee could have done so’ because, for example, this would render
unenforceable by the third party an exclusion clause in A’s contract with B which excludes C’s
(but not B’s) liability in tort to A.
27
Consultation Paper No 121, paras 5.36 and 6.17.
28
Ibid.
124
10.26 Drawing the distinction is, perhaps, more difficult where the condition requires
performance by the third party.29 Take, for example, a contract between A and B in
which A agrees to grant a right of way over its land to C on condition that C keeps it
in repair. If C satisfies the test of enforceability, to what extent, if at all, is C bound by
the repairing obligation?30
10.27 Our view is that C is ‘bound’ by the condition (the repairing obligation) in the very
limited sense that A can use that condition as the basis of a defence or set-off to a claim
by C to enforce the contract. In contrast, C would not be bound by the condition (the
repairing obligation) in the sense that C can be sued for breach of that repairing
obligation: that is, A cannot bring a claim or counterclaim against C for breach of
contract. So where C fails to keep the right of way in repair, A would be entitled to
withdraw that right (for example, by blocking it off) and would have a defence to any
action by C for withdrawal of the right of way. In contrast if A sued C for breach of the
repairing obligation that claim would fail because a third party cannot have burdens
imposed on it by a contract to which it is not a party.
10.28 We recognise that the approach we are here taking constitutes a narrow view of the
extent to which a person who takes a benefit must also take the burden. But our
narrow approach is based on avoiding the possibility of the third party being overall
worse off (unless bound by, for example, a contract or trust) by being given the right
to enforce, and enforcing, a contract to which he was not a party. If conditions
attached to the benefit are to be independently enforceable against the third party,
rather than merely providing a defence or set-off to an action by him, it would be
necessary for the third party to have undertaken to abide by those conditions: that is,
it would be necessary for the ‘third party’ to be in a contractual relationship with the
promisor.31
29
We are here assuming that there is no contract between the third party and the promisor. The
courts may find that terms conferring a conditional benefit on a third party actually give rise to
a collateral contract between the third party and the promisor. For this to be the case, the term
conferring the benefit would have to be construed as an offer made by the promisor to the third
party, and the third party would have to accept this. So, for example, if A promises B to loan C
£1000 provided C repays £1000 to A after a year, we would regard C’s right of enforceability
as normally being subject to C undertaking to repay the £1000 to A: that is, there would
normally need to be a contract between A and C before C has rights (and duties). But if there
is no contract between A and C, A would, in any event, normally have a restitutionary claim
against C to recover the money paid on the basis of failure of consideration: see P Birks, An
Introduction to the Law of Restitution (revised ed, 1989) chapter 7, esp pp 222-226; A Burrows,
The Law of Restitution (1993) chapter 9, esp pp 251-253, 320-321.
30
Another useful example is where a warranty, given by a construction company to a subsequent
owner of the building, is subject to conditions as to inspection and maintenance by the occupier
or to the payment of an annual fee to the construction company. A further example is a bank’s
undertaking to pay under a letter of credit against presentation of shipping documents. The
beneficiary owes no duty to the bank to present anything but unless he does so he will not get
paid.
31
We are here assuming that none of the standard exceptions to the ‘burden’ aspect of privity is
applicable: see para 2.1, note 5, above.
125
10.29 A useful, if not exact, analogy can be drawn between our willingness to permit the
conferral of conditional benefits but not the imposition of burdens, and the law of
assignment. One contracting party may not assign the burden of a contract to a third
party.32 Where, however, rights are assigned, the extent of the rights assigned are
defined by the contract. Thus an exemption clause which is construed as defining the
limits of the assignor’s rights will be binding on an assignee.33 Similarly, the assignment
of a conditional benefit may require satisfaction of the condition if the remainder of the
right assigned is to be enjoyed: the restrictions or qualifications may be an integral part
of the right which the assignee must take as it stands.34 However, it should be noted
that a difference between our reform and assignment is that the assignor would
normally be liable for breach of the conditions attached to the benefit assigned. In
contrast, where a conditional benefit is conferred on a third party it is unlikely that the
promisee will have guaranteed or contracted to procure the third party’s performance
of the condition.
10.30 A very important example of a condition being attached to the benefit enforceable by
the third party (C) is where in the contract between A and B benefiting C, there is a
clause excluding or limiting A’s liability to C. C’s right to enforce A’s promise under
our proposed Act must be subject to the exclusion or limitation clause.
10.31 We also think it important to clarify that the relevant condition may be that the
promisee does not choose to exercise a discretion given to him to divert the benefit
from the third party. Say, for example, A contracts with B to deliver goods to C or as
B shall direct.35 Assuming that C can satisfy the test of enforceability, it is plain that
C’s right is conditional on B not choosing to divert the goods to someone else. If B
directs A to deliver to D instead of to C, C cannot sue A for non-delivery: that is, A
can raise against C the defence that A would have had against an action by B for non-
delivery to C.
10.32 Therefore we recommend that:

(26) the present general rule whereby parties to a contract cannot impose
burdens upon third parties should be retained, although they may
impose conditions upon the enjoyment of any benefits by them. The
distinction between imposing burdens and conditional benefits (and
hence the line between what falls outside our reform and what falls
32
Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd [1902] 2 KB 660, 668; Pan Ocean
Shipping Co Ltd v Creditcorp Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 161. See also Chitty on Contracts (27th ed 1994)
paras 19-043ff.
33
Britain & Overseas Trading (Bristles) Ltd v Brooks Wharf & Bull Wharf Ltd [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep
51. See also Chitty on Contracts (27th ed 1994) para 19-044.
34
Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] Ch 106, 290, 302 per Megarry VC. It should be noted that after
Rhone v Stephens [1994] 2 AC 310, the types of conditions which will be enforced will be strictly
limited to those which are “relevant to the exercise of the right” (per Lord Templeman at p 322).
35
For this sort of contract see, eg, Mitchell v Ede (1840) 11 Ad & El 888; 113 ER 651.
126
within it) depends on whether the condition is the basis merely of a
defence or set-off to the third party’s claim or whether, on the contrary,
the condition is the basis of a claim or counterclaim by the promisor
against the third party. This recommendation therefore ties in with
recommendations (21) and (23) above and no further legislative
provision is required.
127
PART XI
OVERLAPPING CLAIMS
1. More Than One Plaintiff: Claims by the Third Party and by the Promisee
(1) Promisee’s Rights
11.1 If our principal proposed reform is accepted, so that where the test of enforceability is
satisfied a third party will have the right to enforce the contract, the question arises as
to the promisee’s rights. Does the recognition of the third party’s rights mean that the
promisee has no right to sue on the contract?
11.2 In the Consultation Paper,1 the provisional recommendation was made that the
promisor’s duty to perform should be owed both to the third party and to the promisee:
that is, the third party’s rights should be additional to, and not at the expense of, the
promisee’s rights. This was supported by the vast majority of consultees. It also appears
to be the position in the other common law jurisdictions that have departed from the
third party rule.2
11.3 We are convinced that permitting a double action is the correct approach. There is no
reason to remove a contractual right from the promisee (for which, in a contract
supported by consideration, he or she has bargained) merely because the contract gives
rights of enforcement to a third party.

(27) the promisor’s duty to perform should be owed to both the promisee and
the third party and, consequently, unless otherwise agreed between the
contracting parties, the promisee should retain the right to enforce a
contract even if the contract is also enforceable at the suit of the third
party. (Draft Bill, clause 4)
(2) Promisee’s Rights Where Performance by Promisor to Third Party

11.5 It was provisionally proposed in the Consultation Paper that a promisor who performs
his obligation to the third party should be discharged from any further obligation to the
1
2
See, eg, the New Zealand Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, s 14(1)(a); Queensland Property Law
Act 1974 s 55(7) (although those provisions are probably primarily concerned with preserving
the third party’s existing rights). See also Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Privity of Contract
(1993) pp 64-5. The United States Restatement (2d) Contracts § 305(1) allows the promisee
to enforce the promise; it speaks of the promise creating duties to both promisee and third party.
Corbin states, “...several actions on one promise are not necessarily regarded as unjust...[this]
is witnessed by the law of joint and several contracts”. Corbin on Contracts (1951 with
supplements) vol 4 para 824 cites Baurer v Devenis, 121 A 566, 570 (1923) per Wheeler CJ:
“Nor can the injustice of possibly permitting two actions against a promisor be allowed the
consideration heretofore given it. It was optional with the promisor whether he should engage
in this performance for the third party. Having voluntarily so agreed, it is no hardship to require
him to fulfil his agreement”.
128
promisee.3 This seems self-evident and there was no dissent from it on consultation.
This is also in accordance with section 305(2) of the United States Second
Restatement which lays down that, “Whole or partial satisfaction of the promisor’s
duty to the beneficiary satisfies to that extent the promisor’s duty to the promisee.”

(28) although no legislative provision on this is necessary, a promisor who
has fulfilled its duty to the third party, whether wholly or partly, should
to that extent be discharged from its duty to the promisee.
(3) Promisee’s Rights Where Release of/Settlement with Promisor by Third Party
11.7 It was provisionally proposed in the Consultation Paper that a promisor who has been
released by the third party should be discharged from any further obligation to the
promisee.4 However, it was pointed out to us on consultation that the performance of
a single promise might benefit both promisee and third party, rather than being for the
exclusive benefit of the third party. In that situation, at the very least, the promisee
should not be deprived of his right of action by the third party’s release of the promisor
from further obligations to him. Our initial reaction to this was to think in terms of a
provision which drew a distinction between releases where the contract was for the
exclusive benefit of the third party and releases where the contract was for the benefit
of both promisee and third party: only the former type of release given by the third
party would operate to release the promisor’s obligation to the promisee. But such a
provision would not only be very complex but would run the danger of creating
litigation on the issue of whether the contract was for the exclusive benefit of the third
party or not. We have therefore ultimately opted for the simpler clearer solution that
a third party cannot release the promisor’s obligation to the promisee (unless otherwise
agreed in the original contract). This seems to us to accord with the fact that the
promisee is, after all, the contracting party and we think it right that the promisor
should seek a release from him as well as from the third party. Moreover this approach
follows from a standard principle, relating to a release given by a ‘several creditor’,
namely that a several creditor can only give an effective release of an obligation owed
to himself and not to someone else.5 Of course, it would be a very odd situation where
a third party wishes to release the promisor and the promisee does not wish to do so
and yet the promisee has nothing to gain from performance.

(29) although no legislative provision on this is necessary, a release given to
the promisor by the third party should not discharge the promisor’s
3
4
5
See Treitel, Law of Contract (9th ed, 1995) p 532.
129
obligation to the promisee (unless otherwise agreed in the original
contract).
(4) Releases Where More Than One Third Party

11.9 Although not relating to a promisee’s rights or to overlapping claims, this seems the
most convenient place to mention releases where there is more than one third party,
who has the right to enforce the contract. What is the impact of a release by one third
party on the promisor’s obligation to the others?6 In our view, (and unless otherwise
agreed in the original contract) this turns on whether the promise is intended to confer
enforceable rights that are to be separately, or jointly, enjoyed with other third parties.
If the promised benefit is to be enjoyed separately or independently, the release by one
third party should not discharge the promisor’s obligation to the other third parties.
Say, for example, A contracts with B to pay C £100 and D £150. A release by C
should not operate to discharge A’s liability to D.7 The promises of payment are
independent of each other. The same would apply if terms in a construction contract
are to be for the benefit of each subsequent occupier of the building. In contrast, if A
contractually promises B to pay £100 to C and D jointly or to transfer land into the
joint ownership of C and D, the promise is for the benefit of C and D jointly. A release
given by either C or D should normally release A’s obligations to C and D.8 All these
consequences follow directly, or by analogy, from standard principles relating to
releases where there is a plurality of creditors.9

(30) although no legislative provision on this is necessary,10 the effect of a
release of the promisor by one third party on the promisor’s obligations
to another third party is dependent (unless otherwise agreed in the
original contract) on whether the promise is for the benefit of the third
parties independently of each other, or whether it is for the benefit of the
third parties jointly. If the promised benefit is to be enjoyed
independently, the release by one third party should not discharge the
promisor’s obligation to the other third parties. But if the promise is for
6
An analogous issue is whether a variation or cancellation made by the contracting parties with
the consent of one party (whose rights have crystallised) is valid vis-a-vis another non-consenting
third party (whose rights have crystallised). For the somewhat similar question as to when there
is a crystallisation of a third party’s rights, where there is more than one third party, see para 9.43
above.
7
In support of this see, eg, Wilson & Co Inc v Hartford Fire Insurance Co, 254 SW 266 (1923).
8
This is to apply the standard law on releases given by joint creditors: a well-recognised exception
is that, if the release is given by one joint creditor in clear fraud of another, the latter can have
it set aside. See, eg, Jones v Herbert (1817) 7 Taunt 421; 129 ER 168; Innell v Newman (1821)
4 B & Ald 419; 106 ER 990; Barker v Richardson (1827) 1 Y & J 362; 148 ER 710; Wallace v
Kelsall (1840) 7 M & W 264; 151 ER 765; Phillips v Clagett (1843) 11 M & W 84; 152 ER 725.
9
See Treitel, The Law of Contract (9th ed, 1995) p 532.
10
130
the joint benefit of the third parties, the release by one third party should
normally discharge the promisor’s obligation to the other third parties.
(5) Third Party’s Rights Where Performance by Promisor to Promisee (Rather than to Third
Party), or Release of/Settlement with Promisor by Promisee
11.11 This issue is closely linked with that of variation or cancellation of the third party’s
right by the contracting parties. The vast majority of consultees accepted our
suggestion that, “[s]o long as the contract can still be varied, performance in favour of
the promisee should arguably discharge the promisor and the third party would have
no rights. Once the contract cannot be varied, the promisor should arguably have to
perform in favour of his creditor, ie the third party.”11 We therefore now adopt this
approach and consider that it should be extended to where the promisee releases or
settles with the promisor.
11.12 Hence we recommend that:

(31) performance by the promisor to the promisee (rather than to the third
party) and accepted by the promisee, or the release of the promisor by
the promisee, should be straightforwardly regarded as a variation or
cancellation of the contract and should therefore be governed by the
recommendations in Part IX above.
11.13 A number of respondents suggested that this solution might be unfair if the promisor
was not aware that the contract could not be varied when he rendered performance to
the promisee. We do not agree. First, the promisor should take steps to discover
whether the contract can still be varied before performing in a way that does not
conform to his original obligation. Secondly, it would presumably be possible in most
cases12 for the promisor to recover money paid or the value of services rendered to the
promisee by mistake via an action in restitution. Of course, there is the danger that in
the meantime the promisee will have become insolvent, but that is a risk the promisor
must take if he chooses unilaterally to vary the contract.
(6) Priority of Action?

11.14 If the promisee is to have a right of action, it must be asked whether he or she should
be able to exercise that right at any time. It could be argued that some order of priority
of actions should be developed; for if both the promisee and the third party sue in
separate actions, the promisor would be confronted with the costs and inconvenience
of two actions for enforcement of the same duty. It might be argued, for example, that
the third party should have the first option to sue, and that it should only be open to
the promisee to sue if the third party does not take the opportunity to sue. However,
11
12
Where the money was paid or the services rendered under a mistake of fact. The dividing line
between mistakes of fact and of law is difficult to draw. We have recommended that the
distinction should be abolished: Restitution: Mistakes of Law and Ultra Vires Public Authority
Receipts and Payments (1994) Law Com No 227.
131
we regard the promisee and the third party as having separate rights so that it would
seem wrong in principle to bar the promisee’s claim by such a rule of priority of action.
Rather the appropriate procedural approach in many cases (although we do not think
that this should be a requirement) is for the third party to be joined as a party where
the promisee sues.13

(32) there should be no order of priority between promisee and third party.
(7) Avoidance of Double Liability

11.16 The above recommendations (especially recommendation 27) may be thought to raise
the problem of double liability: that is, of the promisor being liable to pay substantial
damages to both the promisee and the third party for essentially the same loss. This
problem will not arise if the promisee is entitled merely to nominal damages or if he or
she is granted specific performance of the promisor’s obligation to benefit the third
party. Nor will there be a problem if the third party first recovered damages because
then the promisee would be left with no corresponding loss outstanding.
11.17 We also do not think that there is a risk of double liability where the promisee recovers
the third party’s loss under one of the exceptions to the standard rule that the promisee
is entitled to damages for its own loss only. Our understanding of the relevant law is
that, in that situation, the third party could not subsequently recover substantial
damages from the promisor under our proposals. In The Albazero14, in which the
House of Lords drew together the exceptions where the promisee can recover the third
party’s loss (for example, a consignee suing a carrier for damage to the owners’ goods;
and a bailee suing a tortfeasor for damage to his bailor’s goods), Lord Diplock
appeared to regard the promisee as being accountable for the damages received, in an
action for money had and received, to the third party.15 The duty to account means
that the third party has no loss to recover from the promisor. And although the
question of there being a duty to account was not specifically addressed in Linden
Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd16 it is important to note that Lord
Browne-Wilkinson said that, where the third party itself had a direct cause of action,
the rationale for allowing the promisee to recover the third party’s loss was
13
We discuss in paras 14.1-14.5 below the rules as to joinder, in the context of whether the
promisee should be joined in an action by the third party. Those rules are equally applicable in
the context of whether the third party should be joined in an action by the promisee. Note also
that under RSC, O 4, r 9 the court has the power to order consolidation of actions where “some
common question of law or fact arises in both...of them, or...the rights to relief claimed therein
are in respect of or arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions, or ... for some other
reason it is desirable to make an order”.
14
[1977] AC 774.
15
[1977] AC 774, 845-846. See also Treitel, The Law of Contract (9th ed, 1995) p 550.
16
[1994] 1 AC 85. See above paras 2.39-2.46.
132
inapplicable.17 If so, the promisee would be unable to recover damages for the third
party’s loss where our Act gives the third party a right of enforceability.
11.18 The position is more difficult where the promisee recovers substantial damages for its
own loss in circumstances where that loss is assessed on the basis that the promisee will
“cure” the breach and yet the promisee does not then do so.18 Say, for example, B has
contracted for A to build a wall on C’s land and C has been expressly given the right
of enforceability. On a failure by A to build the wall, B recovers substantial damages
on the basis that it will now pay for another builder to construct the wall. If the wall
is not then built and C subsequently sues A, it would appear that C too has a claim
against A for substantial damages. Or, let us assume that the promisee has a pre-
existing liability to pay the third party £1000 and hence renders it a term of its contract
with the promisor, in return for services rendered by the promisee, that the promisor
pays £1000 to the third party. If the promisor fails to pay £1000 and if the third party
can satisfy the test of enforceability, it would appear that both the promisee (because
he will now have to find another £1000 to pay the third party) and the third party (in
a subsequent action where the promisee has not paid him) have a claim against the
promisor for damages (or the award of the agreed sum) of £1000.19
11.19 One possible answer to the risk of double liability in this situation is that, where the
third party sues, the promisor could require the promisee to account to the third party
for the damages recovered. In Corbin on Contracts there is the following illuminating
passage: “The possibility of injustice to the promisor in allowing double recovery in
separate actions appears to be slight. It is true that the third party may get judgment
for the full value of the promised performance; also, that the promisee may get
judgment for an equally large amount, being the amount of the debt owed by him to
the third party - a debt that would have been satisfied by the promised performance.
In neither suit does the jury have to consider the possibility that the promisor may later
be compelled to perform under another judgment. But if the promisor does so perform,
he is not without remedy. If he satisfies the judgment of the promisee he has an equitable
right that the promisee shall use the proceeds, other than costs, in satisfaction of the judgment
obtained by the third party. If he satisfies the judgment of the third party, this would
operate to satisfy pro tanto the debt of the promisee to the third party and should also
be provable in a supplementary proceeding to reduce the judgment of the promisee
17
[1994] 1 AC 85, 115. See para 2.40 above.
18
A possible analogous problem is where the promisee recovers substantial damages representing
the cost of cure and then the third party sues for specific performance. However, it would seem
that in that situation the flexibility of the principles governing specific performance would enable
the courts straightforwardly to avoid the promisor’s double liability (eg, by refusing specific
performance on the ground that damages are adequate or, possibly, by making the order
conditional on the promisor being repaid its damages by the promisee).
19
Quaere whether the appropriate remedy for the third party lies in an action for the agreed sum.
Note that, as is discussed below, the third party also has a claim against the promisee on the pre-
existing liability. See paras 11.23-11.27, below.
133
against the promisor”.20 For the equitable right referred to, Corbin relies on the case
of Joseph W North & Son Inc v North.21 Here the plaintiff bought the defendant’s
business and agreed to fulfil all outstanding orders to existing customers. The plaintiff
also agreed to indemnify the defendant against existing liabilities. The plaintiff
committed a breach, and the defendant sued on the indemnity, obtaining judgment.
This did not discharge the plaintiff ’s duty to the existing customers, but it was held
that he had an equity to avoid double liability for the same harm, and that the amount
of the judgment should be so applied as to prevent such double liability.22 Some
support for such a proposition in English law may be deduced from Loosemore v
Radford,23 which was cited in Joseph W North & Son v North. In that case, the plaintiff
was surety for the defendant’s liability to X. Fearful that the defendant would default
and that he would be left with inadequate remedies against him, the plaintiff obtained
from the defendant a separate covenant to pay him the amount of the principal debt.
The plaintiff then sued on this and recovered judgment for the full amount. The
defendant appealed, pointing out that the plaintiff had not been called upon to pay
under the guarantee. Parke B said that the defendant might have an equity that any
sums he might pay to the plaintiff should be applied in discharge of his debt to X, but
since the action was one at law, the plaintiff was entitled to recover full damages under
his separate covenant with the defendant. Although not precisely on the point, the case
seems to suggest that equity would prevent a debtor from being forced to pay twice for
what was in substance the same loss. Such a principle, applied by analogy to our third
party beneficiary situation, would prevent double liability of the promisor to both the
promisee and the third party.24
11.20 It must be recognised, however, that the basis of this equitable right, if it exists at all,
is unclear. Although one may be tempted to think that the principle against unjust
enrichment is involved, it is not easy to see on what conventional ground the promisee
is thought to be unjustly enriched at the expense of the promisor (or the third party).
In our view, therefore, it is preferable to ensure the protection of the promisor by a
20
(1951, with supplements) vol 4, para 824 (emphasis added). See also Restatement (2d)
Contracts § 305.
21
110 A 581 (1920).
22
Backes VC of New Jersey said, at p 582, “[T]he proposition that the complainant ought not to
be twice mulcted (sic) in damages for breaches of covenants involving the same subject matter
and resulting in a single injury, and that equity will protect against such evil consequences, is
sound in principle and supported by authority”. However he refused to find a trust in the
complainant’s favour of sums paid over under the first judgment, and instead held that a bare
equity of appropriation of the proceeds of judgment existed, to the extinguishment of the
defendant’s dual liability so far as they might be necessary for that purpose and no more.
23
(1842) 9 M & W 655; 152 ER 277.
24
It must be noted, however, that there are cases which, arguably, cast doubt on the suggestion
made in Loosemore v Radford. See Re Law Guarantee Trust & Accident Society Ltd [1914] 2 Ch
617; Carr v Roberts (1833) 5 B & Ad 78; 110 ER 721; Re Walker, Sheffield Banking Co v Clayton
[1892] 1 Ch 621. See also Philips & O’Donovan, The Modern Contract of Guarantee (2nd ed,
1992) p 479.
134
statutory provision designed to avoid double liability.25 And if the legislation is to
include a provision to deal with this situation (where the promisee has recovered
damages for its own loss) it would be prudent, so as to avoid confusion, to incorporate
the exceptional situations where the promisee has recovered the third party’s loss
(although, as we have explained above,26 we believe that, in any event, there would be
no realistic prospect of double liability in those situations).

(33) where the promisee has recovered substantial damages (or an agreed
sum) representing the third party’s loss or assessed on the basis that the
promisee will “cure” the breach for the third party, the third party will
not be entitled under our proposed Act to an award which duplicates that
sum and thereby imposes double liability on the promisor. (Draft Bill,
clause 5)
11.22 We should add that our concern here is to protect the promisor against double liability.
We consider that it is best left to the courts to determine precisely when the promisee
may be under a duty to account to the third party for the sum that the promisee has
recovered. In the event of the promisee’s insolvency, it will also be necessary for the
courts to determine whether the third party has a proprietary remedy (through a trust
or lien) or a personal remedy against the promisee.27
2. More Than One Defendant: Claims by the Third Party Against the
Promisor, and Against the Promisee on a Pre-Existing Liability
11.23 A situation discussed in the consultation paper was that of where the contractual
benefit to the third party comprises the performance by the promisor of a pre-existing
liability that the promisee owed to the third party. We provisionally recommended
that, “where the promisor’s performance is designed to discharge an existing obligation
of the promisee to the third party, the third party should be able to pursue claims
against either the promisor or the promisee, and his acceptance of benefits under the
contract should discharge his rights against the promisee only to the extent that such
obligation is thereby fulfilled”.28 Through that provisional recommendation, we were
concerned to clarify that the giving of rights to the third party against the promisor
does not automatically lead to it losing its rights against the promisee. While we
adhere to that position, we believe that the position is so plain that no legislative
provision to that effect is required.
25
See, analogously, s 7 of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977. Cf O’Sullivan v Williams
[1992] 3 All ER 385.
26
27
See, analogously, Lord Napier and Ettrick v Hunter [1993] AC 713; Hunt v Severs [1994] 2 AC
350.
28
Consultation Paper No 121, para 6.16. See also para 5.35.
135
11.24 Of course this does not mean that the third party can recover twice over. Performance
by the promisor will operate to discharge the promisee’s pre-existing liability to the
third party. Similarly, if the third party chooses to pursue the promisee, performance
by the promisee will operate to discharge the promisor’s contractual liability to the
third party. In the latter situation, the promisee will be able to obtain an indemnity or
reimbursement from the promisor: even if that is not provided for in the contract
between the promisor and the promisee, this would be imposed by the law of
restitution on the basis that, under legal compulsion, the promisee has discharged the
promisor’s liability where, as between the promisor and the promisee (according to
their contract), the promisor is the primary debtor.29 In the Consultation Paper30 we
also briefly questioned whether the third party should be required to pursue the
promisor first before pursuing the promisee. We now confirm that, as is the standard
position where a person has several separate rights against the same person, we do not
believe that there should be any order of priority for enforcement of the third party’s
right.
11.25 However, several consultees drew attention to the need to ensure that, where the third
party had agreed that the promisor’s promise to perform will constitute a settlement
or discharge of the promisee’s obligation to him, the third party would not be permitted
to resile from this by suing the promisee on the pre-existing obligation. We agree that
this should be the legal position but we do not think that any legislative provision is
needed to ensure this; the application of standard contractual principles is sufficient.
11.26 Therefore we recommend that:

(34) while no legislative provision to this effect is required, where a third
party has pre-existing legal rights against the promisee, he should not
lose those rights because the promisor and promisee enter into a
contract whereby the promisor agrees to discharge the promisee’s
liability to the third party, but should acquire an additional right against
the promisor;
(35) while it is unnecessary for there to be a legislative provision on this, no
compromise or settlement of the promisee’s liability to the third party
by the conferral of enforceable contractual rights against the promisor
should be disturbed.
11.27 The operation of those two recommendations can be illustrated as follows. Say, B
owes C a sum of money. If B contracts with A that A will pay the sum to C then,
under our proposals, C will have a third party action against A, provided C can satisfy
the test of enforceability. Alternatively, C could sue B (recommendation 34).
However, if C agrees with B that B’s liability should be discharged by B securing A’s
promise to pay C, then B should be discharged and C’s only right of action would lie
29
See Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution (4th ed, 1993) chapter 14; A Burrows The Law of
Restitution (1993), chapter 7.
30
Consultation Paper No 121, para. 5.35.
136
against A (recommendation 35). It should be emphasised that, for recommendation
35 to operate, B and C must have contracted to discharge B’s liability; B would still
remain liable if, for example, the true construction of the agreement was that C agreed
not to sue B unless A defaulted on the obligation and A then does default.
137
PART XII
EXISTING EXCEPTIONS
1. Preserving Existing Exceptions
12.1 In the Consultation Paper, it was provisionally recommended that existing statutory
exceptions to the third party rule should be preserved.1 We made no provisional
recommendations in relation to existing common law exceptions.2 Some consultees
suggested that the existing exceptions to the privity rule could best be preserved by
statutory listing. We remain of the opinion that current statutory exceptions should
be preserved, but we have concluded that this can be achieved by a general provision
(to the effect that our proposed Act is to be without prejudice to any right or remedy
of a third party which exists apart from the Act) rather than a more elaborate statutory
listing. We also see no merit in attempting to abolish the common law exceptions,
some of which give third parties more secure rights than will be given by our proposed
reform. Others have developed through somewhat artificial and forced use of existing
concepts, and we would expect that such exceptions would wither away as a
consequence of our reform, which will render such artificiality unnecessary. Nor do
we think that the common law exceptions should be listed or codified. Many of the
common law exceptions are vague and shifting3 and to codify or even list them might
deprive the judges of flexibility in the development of the law in future. We would
therefore recommend a general provision (as above) preserving the third party’s rights
at common law.

(36) the statutory and common law exceptions to the third party rule should
be preserved by a statutory provision to the effect that our reform of the
third party rule is to be without prejudice to any right or remedy of a
third party which exists apart from our proposed Act; (Draft Bill, clause
6(1))
(37) there should be no statutory listing or codification of the existing

statutory and common law exceptions.
12.3 In so far as one has in mind claims in the tort of negligence for pure economic loss as
exceptions to the third party rule,4 this seems an appropriate point to mention
concurrent liability. In the Consultation Paper, we provisionally recommended that
implementing legislation should not deal with the question of concurrent actions in
1
2
See para 3.5 note 5 above.
3
For example, the scope of the tort of negligence for pure economic loss has ‘ebbed and flowed’
over the last twenty years. See paras 1.4, 2.14 and 3.14 above.
4
138
contract and tort.5 Most consultees accepted this and, since the publication of the
Consultation Paper, the House of Lords in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd6 has
authoritatively ruled on the question by laying down that there is no automatic
objection to allowing concurrent liability between tort and contract. We envisage that,
analogously to the two-party situation, a third party’s right under our proposed Act will
be concurrent with, and will not knock out, a third party’s rights in tort; and, in the
light of Henderson v Merrett, we certainly do not believe that there is anything to be
gained by dealing with this question in our proposed legislation.

(38) there should be no legislative provision in our proposed legislation
dealing with the issue of concurrent liability in tort and contract.
2. Should Existing Legislation Conferring Rights of Enforceability on Third

Parties Preclude a Third Party Taking Rights under Our Proposed
Legislation?
12.5 We have found very difficult the question of the interrelationship between our reform
and the existing preserved statutory exceptions. At first blush, one might have thought
that our proposed legislation and existing statutory exceptions could easily sit alongside
each other. That is, one might have thought that, where the third party has a right of
enforceability under another enactment and under our proposed Act, he could simply
choose which statute to invoke;7 and that where the third party does not have a right
of enforceability under another Act, but would have under our proposals, our proposed
Act should plainly apply. Moreover, we do not accept as a general proposition that, just
because a statute has in the past conferred rights of enforceability on some third
parties, that represents a deliberate legislative choice that in no circumstances shall
other third parties have the right to enforce the type of contract in question. We would
emphasise that the basic policy of our reform - that the intentions of the contracting
parties to confer legal rights on third parties should be upheld - is a compelling one and
should not lightly be displaced by arguments that this would clash with the policies
underlying other statutes.
12.6 Nevertheless it has been persuasively suggested to us that in three areas to permit third
parties to claim a right of enforceability under our proposed Act would both contradict
the policy underlying the relevant legislation and would cause unacceptable
5
Consultation Paper No 121, paras 5.39 and 6.20.
6
[1995] 2 AC 145. See generally, A Burrows, “Solving the Problem of Concurrent Liability”
(1995) 48(2) CLP 103.
7
However, the very existence of a right of enforceability under another statute may sometimes
mean that, as regards the second limb of our proposed test of enforceability, the parties do not
have an intention to confer rights on a third party other than under the other statute. One should
also note that some restrictions on a third party’s right (eg monetary or time limits) under
another statute would also operate as restrictions under our Act by reason of our proposals on
defences or remedies (see recommendation 2 in Part III above, and recommendations 21 and 23
in Part X above).
139
commercial uncertainty.8 The three areas are first, contracts for the carriage of goods
by sea; secondly, contracts for the international carriage of goods by road, rail or air;
and thirdly, contracts contained in a bill of exchange, promissory note or other
negotiable instrument.
(1) Contracts for the Carriage of Goods by Sea

12.7 The relevant statute in mind here is the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 and the
problems drawn to our attention relate both to third parties who have rights of action
under that Act (that is, who on the facts in question have the right to enforce the
contract), and to those who do not (whom for convenience we label “new third
parties”).
12.8 Under the 1992 Act a third party (a consignee or sub-buyer) takes the rights and,
where he exercises his rights, incurs the liabilities (of the original consignor) under the
contract of carriage: that is, the Act permits the enforcement by subsequent holders of
a bill of lading, or by persons entitled to delivery under ship’s delivery orders or sea
waybills, of the terms of the contract of carriage only on terms that such a person also
becomes subject to the liabilities of the contract of carriage.9 Thus, a holder of a bill
of lading who seeks to take advantage of the terms of the contract of carriage in order
to sue the carrier for short delivery, say, or for damage to the cargo while in transit, will
also become liable to the carrier for claims for unpaid freight or for demurrage charges.
Furthermore, the basic model for the 1992 Act is one of assignment so that the third
party’s rights are transferred from the promisee leaving the promisee with no rights of
enforcement. In both these respects, the promisor is better off under the 1992 Act
than it would be under our proposed Act; that is, under our scheme, a third party takes
the benefits but not the burdens of a contract (except to the extent that the benefits are
conditional); and the promisor is liable to the promisee as well as to the third party.
It would be unacceptable if the provisions of the 1992 Act - specifically tailored, as they
are, to the demands of the shipping industry - could be undermined to the detriment
8
But the objection of creating uncertainty, if thought a problem, could be solved by confining the
operation of our reform in respect of certain types of contract to the first limb of the test of
enforceability.
9
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, s 2(1), “... a person who becomes - (a) the lawful holder of
a bill of lading; (b) the person who ... is the person to whom delivery of the goods to which a sea
waybill relates is to be made by the carrier in accordance with that contract; or (c) the person to
whom delivery of the goods to which a ship’s delivery order relates is to be made in accordance
with the undertaking contained in the order, shall (by virtue of becoming the holder of the bill
or, as the case may be, the person to whom delivery is to be made) have transferred to and vested
in him all rights of suit under the contract of carriage as if he had been a party to that contract”;
s 3(1), “Where ... the person in whom rights are vested [by virtue of the foregoing] - (a) takes or
demands delivery from the carrier of any of the goods to which the document relates; (b) makes
a claim under the contract of carriage against the carrier in respect of any of those goods; or (c)
is a person who, at a time before those rights were vested in him, took or demanded delivery from
the carrier of any of those goods, that person shall (by virtue of taking or demanding delivery or
making the claim or, in a case falling within paragraph (c) above, of having the rights vested in
him) become subject to the same liabilities under that contract as if he had been a party to that
contract”.
140
of a promisor by a third party (who falls within the 1992 Act) choosing to sue under
the provisions of our proposed reform rather than under the 1992 Act.10
12.9 Turning to “new third parties” it is clear that the policy of the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act 1992 was to confine the enforcement of contracts of carriage covered by the
Act to certain third parties only (namely, subsequent holders of a bill of lading or
persons entitled to delivery under a sea waybill or a ship’s delivery order). Yet under
our proposals other third parties could be given rights to enforce such a contract. That
the Act was intended to exclude enforcement by other third parties clearly emerges
from the following passage in the Law Commission’s Report11 which led to the Act:-
Consultants suggested several different ways of extending the 1855 [Bills of Lading]
Act beyond bills of lading. One suggestion was to adopt an agreed definition of the
type of document to be covered in legislation, without naming any documents
specifically. The holder of such a document would be able to assert rights of action
against the carrier. By defining the class of document to which the Act applies, it
would be easier to construe into the Act a wider range of documents including those
currently in use and others as yet unthought of, thus ensuring that the Act would
have a lengthy shelf-life. Another solution eschews any sort of documentary
approach and instead would allow any third party to vindicate rights against a
carrier who had become obliged to deliver goods to him. However, on balance, we
recommend that legislation should enumerate a number of specified documents.
We prefer the certainty of an approach which makes it clear which documents are
covered by the Act and which are not. Since we have adopted an evolutionary
approach to reform, we have built on the foundations of the 1855 Act, retaining
those features of the Act which have worked well... Those shipowners, cargo
interests and their legal advisers whom we have consulted want to know which
documents are included in legislation and which are not. They do not want the
certainty of the 1855 regime overthrown in favour of an untried technique which
makes no mention of any sort of document with which they are familiar, but rather
makes everything depend on the concept of legal obligation, which is seen as too
imprecise and uncertain.
12.10 It is our view, therefore, that, at least as regards new third parties, it would indeed in
general contradict the policy of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 if a third party
were able to rely on our proposed Act to enforce contracts covered by the 1992 Act;
10
We are not convinced, however, that such a third party could so outflank the 1992 Act by suing
under our proposed Act. As regards the promisee’s rights, the effect of the 1992 Act would
surely be that under clause 4 of our draft Bill (implementing recommendation 27) the promisee
would have no greater right to enforce the contract under our proposals than under the 1992 Act.
And where another statute automatically attaches burdens to the third party’s rights, nothing in
our proposed Act removes those burdens.
11
Rights of Suit in Respect of Carriage of Goods By Sea (1991) Law Com No 196; Scot Law Com
No 130, para 5.2.
141
and we therefore consider that our proposed Act should not apply to contracts covered
by the 1992 Act.12 Having said that, we are most anxious to preserve the operation of
our Act as regards exclusion and limitation clauses in such contracts.13 Nothing in the
1992 Act was directly concerned with the problem of the enforceability of such clauses
and there is therefore, in this respect, no clash of policy between our proposals and the
1992 Act.

(39) a third party shall have no right of enforceability under our proposed Act
in the case of a contract for the carriage of goods by sea governed by the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 except that a third party can enforce
an exclusion or limitation of liability in such a contract if he satisfies the
test of enforceability. (Draft Bill, clause 6(2)(a) and 6(3)(a))
(2) Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods by Road, Rail or Air
12.12 Contracts for the international carriage of goods14 by road or rail, or cargo by air, are
governed by international conventions that are given force in England by various
statutes.15 One possible problem posed for our proposals by the conventions is that in
some situations, where third parties are given rights to enforce international contracts
of carriage, they also take some or all of the burdens under the contracts.16 To allow
12
A “contract of carriage”, for the purposes of the 1992 Act, is defined in s 5(1) of the Act.
13
14
Although the international carriage of passengers and their baggage is also governed by
international conventions, it will be rare for a third party who has been injured or whose baggage
has been lost or damaged to assert rights under our proposed Act (rather than, eg, in tort) and,
even if he or she does, we do not think that this would clash with the policy of the conventions.
We therefore confine ourselves to considering the carriage of goods and cargo.
15
International carriage of goods by road is governed by the Geneva Convention on the Contract
for the International Carriage of Goods by Road 1956 (CMR) given statutory force by the
Carriage of Goods by Road Act 1965, as amended by the Carriage by Air and Road Act 1979.
International carriage of goods by rail is governed by Appendix B (CIM) of the Berne
Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail 1980 (COTIF) given statutory force by
the International Transport Conventions Act 1983. International carriage of cargo by air is
governed by the Warsaw Convention 1929, as amended by the Hague Protocol 1955, and by the
Guadalajara Convention 1961 (dealing with the rights and liabilities of the “actual carrier”)
given statutory force by the Carriage by Air Act 1961 and by the Carriage by Air (Supplementary
Provisions) Act 1962. Also relevant is Part B of Schedule 2 to the Carriage by Air (Application
of Provisions) Order 1967, SI 1967 No 480 made under s 10 of the Carriage by Air Act 1961,
which sets out (with amendments) the original Warsaw Convention and the Guadalajara
Convention: by reason of article 5 of the 1967 Order those Conventions continue to apply in
respect of international carriage that is not subject to the amended Warsaw Convention
(presumably because the place of departure or destination of the carriage by air is within a State
which ratified the Warsaw Convention in 1929 but did not ratify the Hague Protocol in 1955).
The Montreal Protocol 1975, amending the Warsaw Convention, has been given statutory force
by the Carriage of Goods by Air and Road Act 1979 but the relevant provisions of that Act are
not yet in force.
16
See, eg, Article 14 of the Warsaw Convention 1929, as amended by The Hague Protocol 1955,
given statutory force by the Carriage by Air Act 1961; Article 13(2) of the Geneva Convention
on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road 1956 (CMR) given statutory
force by the Carriage of Goods by Road Act 1965; Article 28(1) of Appendix B (CIM) the Berne
Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail 1980 (COTIF) given statutory force by
142
such third parties to have rights under our proposed Act might conflict with the
conventions in that our proposals enable the creation of rights, which may be
conditional, but do not enable burdens to be imposed on a third party.17
12.13 What about “new third parties”? It is arguable that the general philosophy of the air,
road and rail conventions is to leave it to national law to determine precisely which
third parties should have rights of enforceability, while subjecting all those who bring
actions in respect of international conventions to particular restrictions and
limitations.18 Yet Article 54 of the COTIF (CIM) Convention on carriage of goods by
rail appears to lay down definitively when consignors, consignees, and persons
designated by consignees can bring actions against the railway arising from the contract
of carriage; and if the consignor has rights of suit, the consignee does not, and vice
versa.19 If this is a correct interpretation of the Convention, our proposals could
undermine it by allowing other third parties rights of action. It is also noteworthy that,
whatever the policy of the Convention on carriage by road, section 14(2) of the
Carriage by Road Act 1965 (giving the force of law in the United Kingdom to the
CMR Convention) defines as “persons concerned” to whom the Convention applies:
“(a) the sender, (b) the consignee, (c) any carrier who... is a party to the contract of
carriage, (d) any person for whom such a carrier is responsible..., (e) any person to
whom the rights and liabilities of any of the persons referred to in paragraphs (a) to (d)
to this subsection have passed (whether by assignment or assignation of operation of
law).” This would appear to rule out other third parties and, given that the Act is
applicable to Scotland, it might be regarded as having deliberately ruled out claims by
a third party under a ius quaesitum tertio.
12.14 For these reasons, we are satisfied that there is at least a danger that our proposed Act
might be used to undermine the conventions (or implementing statutes) on the
international carriage of goods. We therefore consider that our proposed Act should
not apply to a contract for the international carriage of goods by road, rail or air to
which the international conventions apply.20 Again, however, we see no such danger
the International Transport Conventions Act 1983.

17
But as we point out in para 12.8, note 10, above where another statute automatically attaches
burdens to the third party’s rights, nothing in our proposed Act removes those burdens.
18
“[I]t is widely assumed that the CMR contains no general or definitive rule governing the identity
of the person or persons entitled to sue the carrier”. M Clarke, International Carriage of Goods by
Road: CMR (2nd ed, 1991) p 178 and, generally, pp 178-198. This is also the position under
the Warsaw Convention Art 24(1) if Gatewhite v Iberia Airlines [1990] 1 QB 326 is correct. The
ambiguity is removed by Art 24 Montreal Protocol 1975, which will be given statutory force by
the Carriage by Air and Road Act 1979 (relevant provisions not yet in force). See, generally, D
Glass and C Cashmore, Introduction to the Law of Carriage of Goods (1989) para 3.32 (road), para
4.20 (rail), paras 6.33 and 6.36 (air); Chitty on Contracts (27th ed, 1994) para 34-052 (air), para
35-114 (rail), paras 35-150 to 35-151 (road).
19
Although less clear, see also Arts 12(4), 13 and 14 of the Warsaw Convention on carriage by air.
20
Although there are some provisions dealing with carriage of goods by more than one mode of
transport (see, eg, Art 2(1) of CMR and Art 31 of the Warsaw Convention) we are aware that
there can be difficulties in deciding on the extent to which, if at all, the international conventions
143
in respect of a third party being given the right to rely on an exclusion or limitation
clause in the carriage contract.21
12.15 We therefore recommend that:-

in the case of a contract for the international carriage of goods by road
or rail, or cargo by air, governed by the relevant international
conventions,22 except that a third party can enforce an exclusion or
limitation of liability in such a contract if he satisfies the test of
enforceability. (Draft Bill, clause 6(2)(b) and 6(3)(b))
(3) Contracts Contained in Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes and Other Negotiable
Instruments
12.16 As regards bills of exchange, promissory notes and (most) negotiable instruments,23 the
Bills of Exchange Act 1882 gives third party rights of enforceability only to those who
are holders. Yet under our proposed Act it is conceivable that other third parties to a
contract contained in a bill of exchange promissory note or other negotiable instrument
would have rights to enforce that contract. We accept the force of the argument that
it would both undermine the policy of the Act and cause unacceptable uncertainty24
to open up the possibility of third parties who are not holders being able to sue on such
contracts, and we therefore consider that our proposals should not apply to such
contracts.
(and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992) apply to the “multimodal” carriage of goods.
Insofar as none of the relevant international conventions applies to the contract of carriage in
question, and nor does the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, we see no objection to a third
party who can satisfy the test of enforceability being given rights under our proposed Act.
21
Although the road and rail conventions already appear to protect even independent contractors
engaged by the carrier to perform the carriage : see Arts 3 and 28 of CMR ; Arts 50-51 of
COTIF (CIM). For a useful discussion of Art 28 of CMR, see Hill and Messent, CMR: Contracts
for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (1984) pp 149-152. In contrast, Art 25A of the
Warsaw Convention (like the Hague-Visby Rules, see para 2.22, note 79, above) refers only to
servants and agents. It should be emphasised that specific restrictions in the conventions on the
rights of servants, agents or other third parties to rely on exclusions (in particular where the loss
or damage has been caused by wilful misconduct) could not be outflanked by the third party
relying on our Act because of recommendation 25 and draft bill clause 3(6).
22
The reference in clause 6(3)(b)(iii) of our draft Bill to “the Convention which has force of law
in the United Kingdom by virtue of section 1 of the Carriage of Air Act 1961” is sufficiently wide
to include - and we intend should be read as including - the carriage of cargo by air provisions
of the Carriage by Air and Road Act 1979 as and when those provisions are brought into force.
The 1979 Act is concerned to amend the Carriage by Air Act 1961 and to give force of law in
the United Kingdom to the Montreal Protocol, amending the Warsaw Convention.
23
Those negotiable instruments falling outside the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 (eg, Eurodollar
bonds, negotiable certificates of deposit, floating rate notes) are enforceable by third parties who
are analogous to those with rights of enforceability under the Act. It would contradict
commercial understanding and practice if our proposed Act were to treat differently negotiable
instruments falling with the 1882 Act and those falling outside the 1882 Act. See R Goode,
Commercial Law (2nd ed, 1995) pp 519-520, 627-631.
24
Although the objection of uncertainty, if thought a problem, could be solved by confining the
operation of our reform to the first limb of the test of enforceability: see para 12.6, note 8, above.
144
in respect of a contract contained in a bill of exchange, promissory note
or other negotiable instrument. (Draft Bill, clause 6(2)(c))
3. Should This Opportunity Be Taken to Reform the Third Parties (Rights

Against Insurers) Act 1930 and the Married Women’s Property Act 1882?
12.18 Two statutory exceptions to the third party rule are the Third Parties (Rights Against
Insurers) Act 1930 (“the Third Parties Act”) and the Married Women’s Property Act
1882 (“the MWPA 1882”). In the Consultation Paper, views were specifically sought
as to whether those two Acts should be reformed.25
(1) Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930

12.19 The operation of the Third Parties Act26 has been the subject of criticism for some time
and a number of consultees argued that it needed amendment. One problem, for
example, is that third parties cannot prevent the insurer and insured compromising the
insured’s claim to the detriment of the third party’s, even though both may be well
aware of his claims. Similarly, since the rights which the Act confers on third parties
are only those which the insured would have enjoyed, an obligation to “pay to be paid”
will frustrate the right of the third party where the insured has become insolvent and
therefore failed to pay. Again, a provision which renders the benefit under the
insurance contract subject to a discretion on the part of the company to pay27 may lead
to the conclusion that since the insured had no “right” to an indemnity, the third party
can have no such right transferred to it in the event of the assured’s insolvency. The
assured will have no right against the insurer until judgment is obtained by the third
party.
12.20 We consider that the issues involved in a reform of the 1930 Act are different than
those involved in any general reform of the third party rule. They involve a balancing
of rights between insurance companies, insolvent insureds and third party claimants
which we cannot properly address in this project. Nevertheless, the response of
consultees confirms that the operation of the Third Parties Act should be looked at in
the near future. We have therefore pressed for a separate Law Commission project to
25
Consultation Paper No 121, para 5.38. See also paras 6.18-6.19.
26
See, eg, Firma C-Trade SA v Newcastle Protection and Indemnity Association; Socony Mobil Oil Inc
v West of England Shipowners Mutual Insurance Association (London) Ltd (The “Fanti” and The
“Padre Island”) (No 1) [1991] 2 AC 1 (HL); Post Office v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society
Ltd [1967] 2 QB 363; CVG Siderurgicia del Orinoco SA v London Steamship Owners’ Mutual
Insurance Association Ltd [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 557; Bradley v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [1989]
AC 957; Normid Housing Association Ltd v Ralphs and Mansell and Assicurazioni Generali [1989]
1 Lloyd’s Rep 265; Nigel Upchurch Associates v Aldridge Estates Investments Co Ltd [1993] 1
Lloyd’s Rep 535; Woolwich Building Society v Taylor, The Times, 17 May 1994; Cox v Bankside
Members Agency Ltd [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 437.
27
As is the case under the Rules of many shipowners’ Protection & Indemnity Associations for
certain types of benefits.
145
be undertaken on the Third Parties Act and we are delighted that this project was
approved (in June 1995) as an item on the Law Commission’s Sixth Programme of
Law Reform.28

(42) reform of the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 should
not be covered in our general reform of the third party rule.
(2) Married Women’s Property Act 1882

12.22 In the Consultation Paper,29 views were invited on the proposal of the Law Revision
Committee that section 11 of the MWPA 1882 should be extended to all life,
endowment and education policies in which a particular beneficiary is named.30
Section 11 of the 1882 Act presently provides that where a person takes out a policy
of insurance on his or her own life expressed to be for the benefit of his or her spouse
and/or children, a trust is created in favour of those purported beneficiaries.
Consultees who addressed this issue were in favour of the proposed extension of the
1882 Act, and some suggested further extensions, such as enacting a provision similar
to section 48 of the Australian Insurance Contracts Act 1984.
12.23 It is instructive to begin by considering the Australian provision. Section 48 permits

a person who is not a party to a contract of insurance, but who is “specified or referred
to in the contract... as a person to whom the insurance cover provided by the contract
extends”, to recover the amount of his or her loss from the insurer in accordance with
the contract.31 Thus, for example, the Australian legislation would permit the
subsidiary of an assured company to bring a direct right of action against an insurer,
where the policy was expressed to indemnify “the assured, all subsidiary, associated
and related companies, all contractors, sub-contractors and suppliers” against a
specified liability to another party, although the subsidiary company would not be in
privity of contract with the insurer.32 Similarly, it would permit an employee who was
specified as an insured under a corporate health insurance programme taken out by his
or her employer to maintain a direct action against the insurance company.33
28
See Law Commission Sixth Programme of Law Reform (1995), Law Com No 234, Item 10.
29
30
Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report, para 49. See para 4.3 above.
31
Section 48 is set out in Appendix B below. Note that s 48 does not subsume the issue dealt with
in England by the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930. The Third Parties Act 1930
applies so as to permit a person who obtains a judgment or award against another person (who
is insured against that claim but is insolvent) to enforce the judgment or award directly against
the insurer. In contrast the Australian legislation would apply generally to permit a person who
is specified or referred to in a contract of insurance as a potential beneficiary of that contract to
bring a direct claim against the insurer.
32
Cf Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107. See paras
2.67-2.69 above.
33
Cf Green v Russell [1959] 2 QB 226. See paras 3.25 and 7.51 above.
146
12.24 In respect of many insurance contracts, our reforms will have much the same effect as
is achieved by the Australian Act. In particular, a liability insurance policy where an
insurer is to indemnify specified third parties against legal liability will be enforceable
under our reforms (whether under the first or second limb of the test of enforceability).
Similarly most medical expenses insurance policies, taken out on behalf of employees,
will be enforceable by employees under our reforms. The differences relate to the fact
that the third party’s right is more secure and automatic under the 1984 Act than
under our reforms. In particular, our reforms leave open the possibility that even
though a third party is expressed to be covered by the policy the contracting parties
may intend that only the promisee and not that third party should have the right of
enforcement. So, for example, some standard group personal accident insurance
policies may fall outside our reform whereas they would fall within the 1984 Act. It
would also appear that, once made, an insurance contract in Australia cannot be varied
or cancelled by the original contracting parties: under our reforms variation or
cancellation is possible before reliance or acceptance by the third party.
12.25 Accepting then, that the Insurance Contracts Act 1984, section 48, goes beyond our
general reform, we face the question as to whether we should recommend an
equivalent reform in this country. We have found this difficult. On the one hand, the
Australian provision may be thought to reflect the expectations of assureds and third
parties to whom the insurance is expressed to extend that such policies are enforceable
by the third parties. It may also be argued that it reflects the standard good practice
of insurers and assureds in ensuring that such third parties are paid. On the other
hand, it is not obvious why the intentions of an assured and insurer to give the assured
alone the right to enforce the policy should be overridden. It is also not obvious to us
that the contracting parties should have no right to vary or cancel the contract prior to
reliance or acceptance by the third party. Furthermore we are somewhat concerned
that we did not put out to consultation the possibility of such a provision and we have
therefore not had the benefit of a wide-range of views in relation to such a proposal.
We note in this respect that the Australian legislation was introduced as a result of a
specific review of the law governing insurance contracts by the Law Reform
Commission of Australia.34 One can add that there may be something to be gained by
assessing the impact in practice of our general reform of privity before deciding
whether such an “industry-specific” reform is required. On balance, therefore, we have
decided that it would be inappropriate in this project to recommend following Australia
in affording automatic rights to third parties covered by insurance.
12.26 We also consider that it would not be sensible in this project to recommend the
extension of the Married Women’s Property Act 1882 in the manner proposed by the
Law Revision Committee. In particular it is far from clear why a “trust” solution is
more appropriate than one permitting variation or cancellation of the contract by the
contracting parties prior to crystallisation of the third party’s rights. It is also not clear
34
Australian Law Reform Commission, Insurance Contracts, Report No 20, 1982.
147
what precisely the Law Revision Committee meant when using the term “endowment
and education policies”. Moreover, to extend the 1882 Act would, ideally, require
more than its mere amendment and would instead require its repeal and replacement.
This is because the Law Revision Committee’s suggested amendment would take one
outside the purpose of the Act which, in the long title, is specified as being “to
consolidate and amend the Acts relating to the Property of Married Women”. Again
we consider that it would be preferable to wait to see how far our general reforms
overcome perceived problems caused by the privity doctrine in relation to insurance
contracts before giving non-parties to insurance contracts automatic rights of
enforceability. And viewed against the wider Australian reform, we would be
concerned that the Law Revision Committee’s recommendations may be justifiably
criticised as being an outdated and inadequate “half-way house”.

(43) there should not be an extension of section 11 of the MWPA 1882 at this
stage.
148
PART XIII
CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS
1. Our General Approach
13.1 In this Part, we address the question of whether any of the many statutes passed on the
basis of the third party rule (including statutory exceptions to it)1 require amendment
in the light of our reform.
13.2 It is important at the outset to clarify that we regard our proposed statute as carving
out a general and wide-ranging exception to the third party rule, while leaving that rule
intact for cases not covered by the statute.2 Moreover, it is not intended that the
statute should give the third party full “contractual rights” nor that the third party
should simply be deemed to be a party to the contract. So, for example, if the third
party were simply treated as having the same rights as a contracting party, the
contracting parties could not vary or cancel the contract without the third party’s
consent, thus undermining our approach in Part IX. Nor would we wish to give the
third party the right to terminate the contract (that is, to wipe away the contract for the
future) for the promisor’s substantial breach.3
13.3 It follows that, in our view, where statute has prescribed a particular regime to apply
to “contracts”, “deeds” and “agreements”, and to “parties” to contracts, deeds and
agreements on the understanding that only parties could enforce the rights and
obligations created by those contracts, deeds and agreements, that understanding
should continue to govern the interpretation of that particular statute, unless the
contrary is specifically provided in the statute.

(44) our proposed statute should not be interpreted as giving the third party
full “contractual rights” nor as deeming the third party to be a party to
the contract. It follows that, although no general legislative provision on
this seems necessary, “contracts”, “parties” to contracts, and
“contractual rights and obligations” should be construed as they would
have been prior to the enactment of our proposed reform. However, to
avoid contradiction, a legislative provision is required to make clear that
the references to treating the third party as if a party to the contract for
the purposes of recommendations (2), (23) and (25) above should not be
1
Part XII (Existing Exceptions) did not consider “consequential amendments” to other statutes.
2
3
149
interpreted as treating the third party as if he were a party to the
contract for the purposes of any other enactment.4 (Draft Bill, clause 6(6))
13.5 The above recommendation clarifies that our proposed Act is not to undermine or,
indeed, render uncertain the operation of other statutes affecting contracts. A much
more difficult question is whether we ought, by consequential amendment, to extend
a policy, that on the face of it has been worked out legislatively in respect of contracting
parties only, to claims by third parties under our Act. Our general answer to that
question is that it would be foolish to attempt such an exercise across the whole range
of statutes. In effect it would require detailed consideration of every statute that has
an impact on contracts,5 and would involve proposing amendments on a statute by
statute basis. To attempt this without specialist knowledge of each area and without
the views of informed consultees would be a herculean task that would be likely to miss
its mark. We should also emphasise that, given that statutes have been passed against
the background of a large number of common law and statutory exceptions to the third
party rule, we think it most unlikely that glaring policy problems will be left if we do
not make consequential amendments reflecting our new statutory exception.
13.6 Having said that, we have considered in detail the interrelationship between our reform
and a limited number of, what one may term, “core contract” statutes. These are
statutes which are either central to one’s thinking about contract or have been drawn
to our attention as statutes which merit consideration in the light of our proposed
reform. In addition to the main statutory exceptions to the third party rule6 the
enactments which we have looked at are as follows:- Gaming Acts 1845, 1892; Law
Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943; Law Reform (Husband and Wife) Act 1964
(NI); Misrepresentation Act 1967; Defective Premises Act 1972; Supply of Goods
(Implied Terms) Act 1973; Consumer Credit Act 1974; Unfair Contract Terms Act
1977; Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978; Arbitration Acts 1950, 1975 and 1979;
Sale of Goods Act 1979; Limitation Act 1980; Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982:
Building Act 1984; Companies Act 1985; Insolvency Act 1986;7 Financial Services Act
4
An obvious example is section 3 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 which applies “as
between contracting parties where one of them deals as a consumer or on the other’s written
standard terms of business”.
5
A LEXIS search of statutes performed by us using the search terms ‘contract’ or ‘deed’ or
‘agreement’ with ‘party’ or ‘promisor/ee’ or ‘covenantor/ee’ revealed over 800 entries.
6
These are listed in paras 2.52-2.62 above.
7
Although we have satisfied ourselves that any difficulties raised by the effect of our reform on the
Insolvency Act 1986 are surmountable without amendment to the 1986 Act, we have had most
concern about the impact of our proposals on company and individual voluntary arrangements
(see ss 1-7 and 252-254 of the Insolvency Act 1986). We understand that the non-binding effect
of voluntary arrangements on creditors who were not given notice of the voluntary arrangement
meeting is considered to be a general defect in the insolvency legislation. As far as our Act is
concerned, a particular difficulty concerns non-existent third parties (see para 8.6 above). While
we consider that a non-existent third party who satisfies the test of enforceability would class as
a ‘creditor’ under the 1986 Act, this will not be so where the third party’s right has been validly
cancelled. It follows that, provided the debtor obtains the promisee’s consent to cancel the third
party’s right, voluntary arrangements will not be hindered by our reform’s recognition that rights
150
1986; Minors’ Contracts Act 1987; Consumer Protection Act 1987; Consumer
Arbitration Agreements Act 1988; Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990; Civil
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, 1991; Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts
Regulations 1994.
13.7 Our conclusion is that, even in relation to that limited range of enactments - and
subject to two provisions on limitation periods and section 2(2) of the Unfair Contract
Terms Act 1977 respectively - no consequential amendments are required. This is for
one of two reasons; either the enactments are already sufficiently widely worded to
apply to claims by third parties under our proposed statute and it is appropriate that
they should so apply; or, if that is not so, amendment to render the enactments
applicable to claims by third parties under our proposed statute is unjustified in terms
of policy at least in this project. While we do not propose to set out the details of those
two reasons in respect of each of the core contract statutes, we would like to set out our
thinking on UCTA 1977 in some detail (because we have agonised most about it). We
must also explain the amendment recommended to the Limitation Act 1980.

(45) subject to recommendations (46) and (47) below, no consequential
amendment to other legislation is required by our proposals.
2. The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977

13.9 We here set out why we believe that an extension of UCTA 1977 so as to restrict the
ability of promisors to exclude liability to third parties should not be pursued in this
project. The essential situation in mind is where there is an exclusion clause contained
in the contract which, as a matter of construction, excludes or restricts the promisor’s
liability for breach of his obligations to the third party. Analogous to that is where the
benefit to the third party is qualified by a condition. The third party may wish to argue
that the exclusion or restriction (or condition) is unreasonable under section 3 of
UCTA 1977. The difficulty for the third party is that, as it stands, section 3 of UCTA
1977 does not appear to apply to claims by third parties under our proposed Act. It
can be argued that, as a matter of policy, UCTA ought to be extended to cover such
a situation. If this were not so, third parties would be left exposed to unreasonable
exclusion clauses; third parties might be ‘deceived’ as to their entitlement; and one
would be producing an ‘uneven’ law whereby, in an action by the promisee to enforce
the promise for the third party, section 3 of UCTA 1977 would apply whereas, in our
proposed direct action by the third party, UCTA 1977 would not apply.
of enforceability may be conferred on non-existent third parties. To avoid the need for the
promisee’s consent, it would appear that an amendment to the Insolvency Act 1986 would be
needed to ensure that non-existent third parties who satisfy the test of enforceability do not class
as creditors under the 1986 Act.
151
13.10 Despite the force of these arguments, we consider the following counter-arguments to
be compelling:-
(i) Our test of enforceability rests on effecting the intentions of the contracting parties
to confer legal rights on the third party. To apply UCTA 1977 - much of which is
concerned to protect consumers irrespective of the true construction of a contract - to
claims by third parties would cut across that essential basis of our reform.
(ii) Linked to (i) is the argument that the intentions of the contracting parties in
respect of the legal entitlement of the third party have a more important active role
under our reform than does the concept of ‘intention to create legal relations’ in
determining whether the original contract is valid.8 It follows that an exclusion of
liability may merit greater respect as regards third party rights under our reform then
it does in determining the legal entitlement of the contracting parties inter se.
(iii) Our approach is not to give a third party exactly the same rights as if he had been
a contracting party.9 There is therefore no inconsistency in giving the promisee more
secure rights than the third party.
(iv) In applying the test of enforceability the common law rules as to the
incorporation and construction of exclusion clauses10 can go much of the way to
stopping, for example, promisors relying on exclusion clauses hidden away in small
print. And misrepresentation by the contracting parties to the third party as to the
contents of the contract would potentially give the third party the right to recover its
reliance loss for the tort of deceit or negligent misstatement.
(v) While third parties will not be as well protected as they would be if we went
ahead and amended UCTA 1977, they will of course have better rights under our
proposals than they have under the present law.
(vi) Under our proposals, UCTA 1977 will continue to operate to control exclusion
clauses in respect of claims by the promisee to enforce the promise for the third party’s
benefit. So, for example, if the promisor has undertaken responsibility but has then
limited it in the small print, UCTA 1977 s 3(2)(a) would apply: the promisor, when
in breach of contract, would be limiting his liability by reference to the term in the
small print. The limitation would only be valid if it were reasonable. If the problem
was that the promisee was somehow misled into thinking that a third party would get
enforceable rights when this was not what the contract provided, the promisee could
8
See para 7.7 above.
9
10
See Treitel, The Law of Contract (9th ed, 1995) pp 197-224. Bingham LJ’s judgment in Interfoto
Ltd v Stiletto Ltd [1989] QB 433 is particularly interesting in its references to a contractual
principle of dealing in good faith.
152
rely on the present s 3(2)(b)(i): the promisor would be claiming to rely on the small
print to ‘render a contractual performance substantially different from that which was
reasonably expected’.
(vii) If we were to recommend reform of UCTA 1977, some difficult questions of

policy would be raised as to the precise extent and form of the amendments. In
particular, we would have to decide whether reasonableness should be judged as
between the promisor and the promisee or as between the promisor and the third party.
And we would have to decide whether one can sensibly apply to third parties the
notion of ‘dealing as a consumer’ in UCTA 1977. We might also be forced to deal, in
respect of sections 6-7 of UCTA 1977, with tricky problems relating to the exclusion
of implied terms in contracts for the sale of goods: for example, it is not absolutely clear
that all contracts in which goods are bought for the benefit of third parties are classified
as contracts of sale.11 Without the benefit of consultees’ views, we would prefer not to
tamper with the definition of a contract of sale but this might be unavoidable if sections
6-7 were extended to cover claims by third parties under our proposed reform.
Furthermore, it is possible that full protection of third parties against being ‘misled’ as
to their entitlement would need to go much further than the control of exclusion or
limitation clauses to include, for example, defences and variation or cancellation
clauses that the third party did not know about. It would appear that such wide
protection raises policy issues that go well beyond those underpinning UCTA 1977.
We should emphasise, however, that we would not wish anything in our proposed
legislation to be construed as hampering the protection of third parties by the judiciary
through the application or extension of common law techniques.12
(viii) We believe that, as a matter of practical politics, one step should be taken at a
time. To reform the privity doctrine to reflect the contracting parties’ intentions is to
take a relatively uncontroversial step. To combine that with an amendment which
would in certain circumstances prevent promisors contracting out of conferring legal
rights on third parties is much more controversial and might jeopardise the acceptance
of our central reform.
(ix) Given that we are, in effect, departing from a long-established common law
doctrine we think that there is much to be said for allowing a period of time for the
effect of our reform to ‘settle down’ before pursuing consumer protection measures in
relation to claims by third parties. Indeed it would be tantamount to ‘shooting in the
dark’ to attempt such measures in advance of seeing what, if any, problems are thrown
up in practice.
(x) Although we venture this argument with some diffidence, as the correct
interpretation is far from clear, it appears that the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts
11
12
153
Regulations 1994, implementing EEC Council Directive 93/13, are inapplicable to
conditions on, or exclusions of, a third party’s rights.13 If this is correct, the treatment
of contracting parties and third parties in respect of “unfair terms” will be significantly
different whatever one does about UCTA 1977.14
13.11 There are two final points to make in respect of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.
First, in the reverse situation, where the third party seeks to enforce an exclusion clause
(A excluding C’s liability to A in the tort of negligence) and it is the promisor who
wishes to invoke UCTA 1977, there appears to be no difficulty. UCTA 1977 applies
so as to render the clause void under section 2(1) (as regards negligently caused
personal injury or death) or valid only in so far as reasonable as between the
contracting parties under sections 2(2) and 11(1). No amendment to UCTA 1977 is
required and, indeed, the situation is covered by recommendation 25 above.15
13.12 Secondly, we have been troubled by section 2(2) of UCTA 1977. Applying our policy
that UCTA 1977 should not restrict a promisor excluding its liability to the third party,
the promisor ought to be able to exclude its liability to the third party for the breach
of a contractual duty of care. Yet, as it stands, section 2(2) (in contrast to, for
example, section 3) would apply to a claim by a third party under our proposed Act for
breach of a contractual duty of care. That is, the breach of the obligation to the third
party would constitute the breach “of any obligation, arising from the express or
implied terms of a contract, to take reasonable care or exercise reasonable skill in the
performance of the contract”.16 We therefore consider that section 2(2) of UCTA
1977 should be amended so as to ensure that it does not apply in respect of a third
party bringing an action under our proposed Act for the breach of a contractual duty
of care. This amendment would not, of course, affect the operation of exclusion
clauses in relation to claims by third parties in tort. Nor would it affect the operation
of section 2(1) of UCTA 1977, which renders void the exclusion or limitation of
negligently caused personal injury or death (assuming business liability). Admittedly,
to leave section 2(1) unamended, and therefore applicable to claims by third parties
under our proposed Act, may be regarded as a contradiction of our wish to effect the
parties’ intentions. But the exclusion or limitation of liability for negligently caused
personal injury or death is an extreme case as is reflected by such a clause being
rendered automatically void. In our view, section 2(1) should apply to claims by third
13
See, for example, reg 5(1) “An unfair term in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller
or supplier shall not be binding on the consumer”. See generally on the Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994, Treitel, The Law of Contract (9th ed, 1995) pp 245-259.
14
Again, if this interpretation is correct, and given that in other EC countries third party rights to
enforce contracts are well established, one can only assume that the Directive rests on a policy
decision either that third parties do not merit the same protection as contracting parties or that,
if they do, this should be a matter for the individual member states.
15
16
Section 1(1)(a) UCTA 1977. In our view, this interpretation of s 1(1)(a) and s 2(2), as
encompassing a claim by a third party under our proposed Act, is a valid one despite
recommendation 44 (see para 13.4) above.
154
parties under our proposed Act for personal injury or death (albeit that such a claim
will, presumably, be rare).

(46) section 2(2) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 shall not apply in
respect of a claim by a third party under our proposed Act for the breach
of a contractual duty of care. (Draft Bill, clause 6(4))
3. Limitation Act 1980

13.14 In our view, the limitation period for actions brought by third parties to enforce a
contract should be the same as the limitation period which would have applied if the
third party had been a party to the contract. We therefore recommend an amendment
to the Limitation Act 1980 making it clear that actions brought by third parties under
our Act are to be treated as ‘actions founded on simple contract’ or as ‘actions upon
a specialty’ for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1980.17 We do not think that any
other amendment of the 1980 Act is necessary (for example, sections 11 and 12 do
not, in our view, require amendment).

(47) actions brought by third parties under our proposed Act are to be
treated as “actions founded on simple contract” or as “actions upon a
specialty” (depending on the nature of the contract) for the purposes of
the Limitation Act 1980. (Draft Bill, clause 6(5))
17
See sections 5 and 8 of the Limitation Act 1980.
155
PART XIV
MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
1. Joinder of Promisee
14.1 In the Consultation Paper, we dealt with the issue of whether a third party, seeking to
enforce a contract for his or her benefit, should be required to join the promisee as a
party to that action.1 This may be thought important given our recommendation that
defences and set-offs that the promisor would have had in an action by the promisee
should also be available in an action by the third party. There may also be questions
as to whether the promisor and promisee have varied or cancelled the contract.
Furthermore, in a situation where the promisee itself wishes to sue, joinder may be
thought important as a means of saving the costs and inconvenience to the promisor
of being exposed to two separate actions. Section 11(2)(b) of the Western Australia
Property Law Act 1969 has a requirement that the promisee, as well as the promisor,
be joined as a party to the litigation when a third party sues to enforce a contract made
for his benefit. But such a requirement was rejected by the New Zealand Contracts and
Commercial Law Reform Committee on the grounds that it could lead to unnecessary
expense and possible problems as to service of the proceedings.2
14.2 A clear majority of consultees were against a requirement that the promisee be joined.
They argued that it will often be unnecessary to join the promisee and to do so would
then serve only to increase costs: and that it may be impracticable to join the promisee
because of death, dissolution or absence abroad.
14.3 We agree and therefore recommend that:

(48) there should be no requirement that the promisee be joined as a party to
the litigation when a third party sues to enforce a contract.
14.4 On the other hand, it was widely recognised by consultees that it will often be desirable
for the promisee to be joined. We agree. The question at issue therefore is whether the
existing Rules of the Supreme Court (and the equivalent County Court Rules) are
adequate to enable or ensure the joinder of the promisee in circumstances where this
is desirable. We believe that they are.3 Under the present Rules of the Supreme Court:
1
Consultation Paper No 121, para 5.26, 6.11. Note that it is a requirement for the enforcement
of an equitable assignment that the assignor be joined in any action by the assignee against the
debtor: see Chitty on Contracts (27th ed, 1994) paras 19-022-19-023.
2
New Zealand Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Privity of Contract (1981)
para 7.1.
3
It should also be noted that we do not think that any amendment to the rules as to the award of
costs are required as a result of our proposed reforms.
156
(i) By Order 15, rule 4,4 if both the third party and the promisee wish it, the
promisee can be joined as of right.
(ii) By Order 15, rule 6(2)(b),5 the court (on its own motion or on application)
can order the promisee to be joined as a plaintiff or as a defendant, albeit that
no person can be added as a plaintiff without his consent.
(iii) By Order 16, rule 1,6 the promisor can make the promisee a third party to the
action.

(49) the existing Rules of Court are adequate to deal with joinder of the
promisee in an action brought by a third party under our proposed
reform.
2. Assignment of the Third Party’s Right

14.6 Although we do not regard a third party under our proposed Act as having a “full”
contractual right, his right under our proposals is clearly closely analogous to a
contractual right and standard common law contractual principles should in general
apply to it. We therefore see no good reason, and none was suggested to us, why the
third party’s right should not be assignable in the same way as a contracting party’s
rights under the contract.
4
By O 15, r 4(1), “[T]wo or more persons may be joined together in one action as plaintiffs or
as defendants with the leave of the Court or where - (a) if separate actions were brought by or
against each of them, as the case may be, some common question of law or fact would arise in
all the actions, and (b) all rights to relief claimed in the action (whether they are joint, several or
alternative) are in respect of or arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions.”
5
By O 15, r 6(2), “[A]t any stage of the proceedings in any cause or matter the Court may on such
terms as it thinks just and either of its own motion or on application -... (b) order any of the
following persons to be added as a party, namely - (i) any person who ought to have been joined
as a party or whose presence before the Court is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute
in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon, or
(ii) any person between whom and any party to the cause or matter there may exist a question
or issue arising out of or relating to or connected with any relief or remedy claimed in the cause
or matter which in the opinion of the Court it would be just and convenient to determine as
between him and that party as well as between the parties to the cause or matter.”
6
By O 16, r 1(1), “Where in any action a defendant who has given notice of intention to defend
-... (c) requires that any question or issue relating to or connected with the original subject-matter
of the action should be determined not only as between the plaintiff and the defendant but also
as between either or both of them and a person not already a party to the action; then ... the
defendant may issue a notice... containing a statement of the nature of the claim made against
him and, as the case may be, either of the nature and grounds of the claim made by him or of the
question or issue required to be determined.”
157
(50) although no legislative provision on this is necessary, a third party
should be able to assign its rights under our proposed Act in an
analogous way to that in which a contracting party can assign its rights.
3. Contracts for the Sale of Land

14.8 One consultee raised a number of points regarding the impact of our proposals on
contracts for the sale of land. Such a contract may be regarded as having a number
of unusual features. For example, it is a specifically enforceable contract and transfers
equitable title to the land. There is generally a period of time between the contract and
the conveyance, by which latter method legal title passes. The contract usually
provides for the payment of a deposit, which may nonetheless be repayable in certain
instances where the contract is breached.7 Since equitable title passes to the purchaser,
the vendor becomes a trustee for the purchaser under the doctrine of conversion from
the time of contract, with the vendor retaining certain rights over the land to protect
his interest.8 The most important of these is the unpaid vendor’s lien.9
14.9 If B contracts with A to purchase land from A, conveyance to be made to C, and A

defaults, who recovers the deposit paid by B? Is it B, or, assuming that C has a right
to enforce the contract under our proposed reform, could it be C? In our view, the
answer is clearly that B and not C is entitled to recover the deposit. It is trite law that
an innocent party faced with a breach of a contract for the sale of land may recover his
deposit, although a party in breach sometimes cannot.10 In addition to the common
law jurisdiction to permit recovery of deposits by a purchaser who is not in breach,
section 49(2) of the Law of Property Act 192511 confers a wide discretion on the court
to order “repayment” of any deposit even where it is the purchaser who is in breach of
contract. The recovery of a deposit cannot be regarded as an “enforcement” of the
contract so as to be one of the remedies available to a third party under our proposed
7
See Cheshire and Burn’s Modern Law of Real Property (15th ed, 1994) pp 137-138; Law of
Property Act 1925, s 49(2).
8
See Cheshire and Burn’s Modern Law of Real Property (15th ed, 1994) pp 124-127. It has been said
that “although the vendor because of his duties to the purchaser is called a trustee, it is wrong
to argue that because he is so called he has all the duties of or holds the land on a trust which has
all the incidents associated with the relationship of a trustee and his cestui que trust”: Berkley v
Poulett [1977] 1 EGLR 86, 93, per Stamp LJ. See also Gray, Elements of Land Law (2nd ed,
1993), pp 268-270.
9
10
This will depend on whether the sum paid is regarded by the courts as a genuine deposit or a part
payment, in which latter case it is always recoverable provided that there has been a sufficient
failure of consideration.
11
See Universal Corporation v Five Ways Properties Ltd [1979] 1 All ER 552; Dimsdale Developments
(South East) Ltd v De Haan (1983) 47 P & CR 1.
158
reform.12 The recovery of a deposit is a restitutionary remedy,13 and is concerned to
prevent the unjust enrichment of A at the expense of B (the payer).
14.10 We believe that the doctrine of conversion will operate to make A, as vendor, a trustee
for C to whom the conveyance should be made.14 The unpaid vendor’s lien presents
a different type of problem. If A contracts with B to purchase B’s property, the
purchase price to be paid partly to B and partly to C, does the lien benefit B as to the
entire purchase price, or B as to his portion and C as to his, or B alone as to his
portion? The answer to this appears to turn on whether one regards the security
constituted by the unpaid vendor’s equitable lien15 as being designed to ensure that the
purchaser performs its contract or rather as being designed to ensure restitution for the
vendor.16 If the former, B and C should each be entitled to an equitable lien for their
respective portions of the purchase price. If the latter, B would be entitled to an
equitable lien for the whole price (as representing the value of the land conveyed).
Although this must be a matter for the courts to resolve, we would tentatively suggest
that, in most circumstances, the former solution would be the most appropriate.
14.11 Finally, we were asked whether a third party with a right to enforce a contract for the
sale of land would be a “purchaser” so as to fall within section 47 of the Law of
Property Act 1925. If this were to be the case, the third party could insist on payment
over to him by the vendor of the proceeds of any insurance maintained on property
destroyed between contract and conveyance. We do not regard it as likely that, in a
contract between A and B for the sale of land with conveyance to C, C would fall
within the definition of “purchaser” in section 205(1)(xxi) of the Law of Property Act
1925, since he will not provide value, and does not actively take steps to acquire the
property, being a mere passive recipient of a benefit.17 Although this might seem to
lead to inconvenient results, section 47 is rarely used in practice, and purchasers of
property generally maintain their own insurance. We would expect third parties with
rights to enforce contracts for the sale of land to do the same.
12
See para 3.33 point (ii) above.
13
See Goff & Jones, The Law of Restitution (4th ed, 1993) p 428ff.
14
Using the maxim “Equity looks on as done that which ought to be done” (ie conveyance to C).
15
The unpaid vendor’s legal lien will be ignored for our purposes: it depends on possession and
thus could not benefit a third party to whom payment of part of the purchase price was to be
made.
16
In a standard two-party contract, one need not choose between these two aims. See generally S
Worthington, “Equitable Liens in Commercial Transactions” [1994] CLJ 263. Where title to
land is unregistered, an unpaid vendor’s lien is registrable as a Class C (iii) land charge under
the Land Charges Act 1972. Where title is registered, the lien should be protected by lodging
a caution or registering a notice, unless the vendor remains in actual occupation. In such
circumstances, the lien can be protected under Land Registration Act 1925, s 70(1)(g) as an
overriding interest: Nationwide Anglia Building Society v Ahmed and Balakrishnan (1995) 70 P &
CR 381.
17
Section 205(1)(xxi) defines “purchaser” as “a purchaser in good faith” for valuable consideration
and includes a lessee, mortgagee or other person who for valuable consideration acquires an
interest in property.
159
4. Choice of Law
14.12 Our proposed statute, as part of English law, will not apply if the contract or (insofar
as different choice of law rules can be applied to particular provisions of a contract)18
the contractual provision alleged to be enforceable by the third party is governed by a
foreign law. Whether a foreign law governs the contract (or contractual provision) is
a matter for standard choice of law rules applicable to contract (including the Rome
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, given force in the
United Kingdom by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990).19 Where the third
party is sued in tort but seeks to rely on our proposed Act to enforce an exclusion
clause in a contract to which he is not a party, the standard choice of law rules may
require that the exclusion clause is valid according to not only the choice of law rule
for contract but also the choice of law rules for tort.20

(51) although no legislative provision on this is necessary, the standard choice
of law rules applicable to contract (or, where the third party seeks to rely
on an exclusion clause, the standard choice of law rules applicable to an
exclusion clause operating as a defence to an action in tort) should
determine whether our proposed Act applies in respect of facts involving
a foreign element.
5. Arbitration Agreements and Jurisdiction Agreements

14.14 Many contracts in common use in commerce and industry contain provisions obliging
the reference of disputes to arbitration: or there may be a separate agreement to
arbitrate. As was pointed out by various consultees, the Consultation Paper did not
specifically consider the implications for arbitration of a reform of the third party rule.
We seek to rectify that omission now. We have found this one of the most difficult
issues that we have faced in this project.
14.15 Ultimately our recommendation is that arbitration agreements and jurisdiction

agreements should fall outside our proposed reforms because such agreements cannot
operate satisfactorily unless any entitlement of the third party to enforce the arbitration
agreement carries with it a duty on the third party to submit to arbitration (or to
comply with the jurisdiction agreement). Yet our reform is concerned only with the
conferring of rights and benefits on third parties and not with the imposition of duties
18
See Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of Laws (12th ed, 1993) pp 1205-1208.
19
Ibid, ch 32.
20
Ibid, pp 1429-1430. Choice of law in tort is now largely governed by the Private International
Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, Part III.
160
and burdens. In our view, a third party should in general21 only be bound by an
arbitration or jurisdiction agreement if it has agreed to be so bound in which case it
becomes a true contracting party to the agreement and is no longer a third party to it.22
14.16 We were for a long time attracted by the idea that an arbitration agreement (or,
analogously, a jurisdiction agreement) could operate as a procedural benefit to the
third party and could also constitute a procedural condition on the third party’s right
to enforce the substantive promise. That is, if the third party wished to enforce its
substantive right, it would be bound by the procedural condition to proceed via
arbitration. So if A contracted with B to pay C £1000 for work done by B and there
was an arbitration agreement referring to arbitration disputes relating to C’s right to
the £1000 our idea was that: (i) the arbitration agreement would be enforceable by C
so that C could compel A and/or B to arbitrate as regards C’s right to the £1000
notwithstanding that they did not wish to do so; and (ii) the arbitration agreement
qualified C’s right to the £1000, so that A and/or B would be entitled to a stay of
litigation if C brought an action in the courts to enforce the promise of £1000.
14.17 We are now persuaded, however, that this approach is unacceptable for several reasons:
(i) Our approach to conditional or qualified benefits rests on the condition or

qualification operating as a defence that could be raised against the third party
under recommendation 21 or 23. Yet it is clear law that an arbitration
agreement (or a jurisdiction agreement) cannot be regarded as a defence to an
action (unless an arbitration clause is of the Scott v Avery23 type).24 Rather the
agreement is simply enforceable by and against the parties to it through a stay
of litigation.
21
Ie subject to the possible application of the normal exceptions to the rule that a person who is
not a party to the contract is not bound by it: see para 2.1 note 5 above. For example, a bailor
may be bound by an arbitration or jurisdiction agreement in a contract of sub-bailment to which
it is not a party.
22
For a possible analogy see the example of A contracting with B to loan £1000 to C to be repaid
by C after a year, mentioned in para 10.26, note 29, above. In the event that the third party does
bind itself to arbitrate by becoming a contracting party, procedural difficulties may arise
involving, for example, the appointment of arbitrators. These difficulties would have to be solved
by the application of the standard principles applying to multiparty arbitration agreements.
23
(1865) 5 HL Cas 811; 10 ER 1121. Although our recommendation is that arbitration
agreements shall not confer a right of enforceability on a third party, we see no difficulty in
allowing a Scott v Avery clause to operate as a defence under recommendation 21 above.
Although C could not force A to arbitrate, if A refused to do so, A could no longer rely on the
Scott v Avery defence. See Mustill and Boyd, Commercial Arbitration (2nd ed, 1989) p 164: “The
second situation where a Scott v Avery clause is not available as a defence exists where the
conduct of the defendant disentitles him from relying on it. [For example,] where the defendant
has ... deprived the claimant of a proper opportunity to fulfil the condition precedent”. See, eg,
Toronto Railway Co v National British and Irish Millers Insurance Co Ltd (1914) 20 Com Cas 1: at
p 23 Scrutton J said, “Conditions precedent may be waived by a course of conduct inconsistent
with their continued validity....”
24
See Mustill and Boyd, Commercial Arbitration (2nd ed, 1989), ch 13.
161
(ii) The qualification of the benefit approach cannot work where the third party
is being sued in, for example, tort because there is then no substantive benefit
to the third party that can be qualified. Say, for example, the third party is
being sued by A in tort and there is an arbitration agreement between A and
B that refers to arbitration all disputes arising out of the performance of the
contract, including tort claims against B’s sub-contractor (C). C can in no
sense here be ‘bound’ to arbitrate. Yet it would plainly be unsatisfactory for
C to be able to take the benefit of the arbitration clause without being so
bound: C would otherwise be entitled to a stay of litigation of the tort action
against him, while not being bound to arbitrate, hence leaving A without a
forum for enforcing its tort claim against C. Even if one confined the
operation of our proposed Act to arbitration (or jurisdiction) clauses relating
to disputes as to the third party’s right to enforcement under our Act - which
in itself would constitute an unprincipled restriction - the same problem
would apply if the third party were being sued in tort but was seeking to
enforce an exclusion clause in the contract between A and B; that is, a
conditional benefit approach cannot work where the enforceable benefit
under our proposed Act is negative rather than positive.
(iii) It would seem that the qualification of the right approach could only, in any
event, operate where the third party seeks to enforce the substantive promise.
Yet A may wish to seek a declaration of its rights (for example, as to A’s
obligations to C) or may seek rescission of the contract on the basis of the
promisee’s fraud, even though C is not yet seeking to enforce the substantive
promise. If the third party were not bound by the arbitrator’s award, the
declaration or rescission would be of little value to A. Yet it is hard to see
how the qualification of the right approach can bind C to such an award of
an arbitrator.
(iv) If the third party were entitled to, or bound to, arbitrate there would be
difficulty in some situations in choosing the arbitrator. For example, what
would be the position if the arbitrator is left to be agreed by the contracting
parties or, as commonly happens, each party is to appoint an arbitrator and
the two arbitrators are to choose an umpire? It is not at all clear that that sort
of approach would be appropriate where a third party is involved in the
arbitration.
14.18 We have therefore reluctantly come to the view that arbitration and jurisdiction clauses
must be seen as both conferring rights and imposing duties and do not lend themselves
to a splitting of the benefit and the burden.25 Following on from that, one radical
25
This derives support from the Privy Council’s reasoning in The Mahkutai [1996] 3 WLR 1. Lord
Goff said, at p13, that an exclusive jurisdiction clause “can be distinguished from terms such as
exceptions and limitations in that it does not benefit only one party, but embodies a mutual
agreement under which both parties agree with each other as to the relevant jurisdiction for the
162
approach would be to bind the third party to those agreements in respect of a dispute
affecting the third party’s rights as if he were a party to them. While we have
considered this possibility at length, we have ultimately rejected it essentially because
it would contradict a central philosophy of our reform in that we are concerned only
with the conferring of rights, and not the imposition of duties on third parties.26 Our
preferred approach therefore is that arbitration agreements and jurisdiction agreements
should fall outside our reform and can neither be enforced by, nor are enforceable
against, a third party.27

(52) a third party shall have no rights of enforceability under our proposed
reform in respect of an arbitration agreement or a jurisdiction
agreement. (Draft Bill, clause 6(2)(d) and (e))
6. Commencement of the Legislation

14.20 We do not intend that our reform should affect contracts entered into prior to the
enactment of legislation based on our proposals. We further believe that any legislation
should not commence its application until a reasonable time has been given for the
professions and the public to become familiar with it and to redraft standard form
contracts should they consider this to be desirable. We believe six months to be an
appropriate time period.

(53) the proposed legislation should not affect contracts entered into prior to
its commencement date, which should be six months after receiving the
Royal Assent. (Draft Bill, clause 9(2))
resolution of disputes. It is therefore a clause which creates mutual rights and obligations”.
26
If the third party were bound to arbitrate, without having agreed to do so, there is also some risk
of there being a contravention of Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights,
unless the arbitrator was “independent” as well as “impartial”. And what is not clear, and raises
concerns as regards English arbitrations, is whether an arbitrator, who is a member of the
chambers to which one of the party’s barristers belongs, would be regarded as ‘independent’.
27
We understand that the approach that we here recommend is supported by French law. In
France, arbitration clauses are generally void, unless they are included in contracts made between
certain commercial parties: see Code Civil, art 2061; Code Commercial, art 631. Subject to this,
as against a third party beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui, (see Consultation Paper No 121,
Appendix, p 158), we understand that an arbitration clause is res inter alios acta, and the third
party can neither be bound by it, nor take the benefit of it. However the third party beneficiary
can independently bind himself by the arbitration clause, whether expressly or impliedly, and if
he does so, is bound by it: Code Civil, art 1134.
163
SECTION D
SUMMARY
PART XV
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
We recommend that:-
Arguments for Reform

(1) The rule of English law whereby a third party to a contract may not
enforce it should be reformed so as to enable contracting parties to
confer a right to enforce the contract on a third party. (Paragraph 3.29)
(2) A right to enforce the contract means (1) a right to all remedies given
by the courts for breach of contract (and with the standard rules
applicable to those remedies applying by analogy) that would have
been available to the third party had he been a party to the contract,
including damages, awards of an agreed sum, specific performance
and injunctions; and (2) a right to take advantage of a promised
exclusion or restriction of the promisor’s rights as if the third party
were a party to the contract. (Paragraph 3.32 and draft Bill, clause 1(4)
and 1(5))
The Form of the Legislation

(3) The third party rule should be reformed by means of a detailed
legislative scheme. (Paragraph 5.9)
(4) The legislation should not be construed as preventing judicial

development of third party rights. (Paragraph 5.11 and draft Bill, clause
6(1))
(5) The remedies available to the promisee in a contract enforceable by

a third party should be left to the common law. (Paragraph 5.17 and
draft Bill, clause 4)
The Third Party Rule and Consideration

(6) The legislation should ensure that the rule that consideration must
move from the promisee is reformed to the extent necessary to avoid
nullifying our proposed reform of the doctrine of privity. (Paragraph
6.8)
(7) Without prejudice to his rights and remedies at common law, a joint
promisee who has not provided consideration should not be regarded
164
as a third party for the purposes of our reform. (Paragraph 6.12 and
draft Bill, clause 8)
The Test of Enforceability

(8) The test of enforceability should be as follows:
(a) a third party shall have the right to enforce a contractual provision
where that right is given to him - and he may be identified by name,
class or description - by an express term of the contract (the “first
limb”);
(b) a third party shall also have the right to enforce a contractual
provision where that provision purports to confer a benefit on the
third party, who is expressly identified as a beneficiary of that
provision, by name, class or description (the “second limb”); but
there shall be no right of enforceability under the second limb where
on the proper construction of the contract it appears that the
contracting parties did not intend the third party to have that right
(the “proviso”). (Paragraph 7.6 and draft Bill, clause 1(1) and 1(3) (the
first and second limbs), clause 1(2) (the proviso) and clause 7(1) and 7(2)(a))
(9) There should be no special test of enforceability for consumers in our

proposed legislation. (Paragraph 7.56)
Designation, Existence and Ascertainability of the Third Party

(10) There should be an “avoidance of doubt” provision to the effect that
the third party need not be in existence at the time of the contract.
(Paragraph 8.6 and draft Bill, clause 1(3))
(11) There should be no requirement that the third party be in existence

at the time of acceptance by another third party. (Paragraph 8.8)
(12) The proposed legislation should contain no special provisions

governing pre-incorporation contracts. (Paragraph 8.16)
(13) Although no legislative provision on this is necessary, a third party

shall have no right to enforce a contract or contractual provision
unless he or she is capable of being ascertained with certainty at the
time when the promisor’s duty to perform in the third party’s favour
arises, or when a liability against which the provision seeks to protect
the third party is incurred. (Paragraph 8.18)
Variation and Cancellation

(14) The contracting parties’ right to vary or cancel the contract or, as the
case may be, the contractual provision should be lost once the third
party has relied on it or has accepted it (“acceptance” meaning “an
165
assent by words or conduct communicated by the third party to the
promisor”). The posting rule, applicable to the acceptance of offers
sent by post (and possibly by some other means), should not apply.
(Paragraph 9.26 and draft Bill, clause 2(1) and (2))
(15) The reliance test should be qualified so that reliance should only count
where (unless the promisor is aware that the third party has relied)
the promisor could reasonably have foreseen that the third party
would rely on the promise. (Paragraph 9.30 and draft Bill, clause 2(1)(b)
and 2(1)(c))
(16) The contracting parties may expressly reserve the right to vary or
cancel the third party’s right irrespective of reliance or acceptance by
the third party. (Paragraph 9.40 and draft Bill, clause 2(3)(a))
(17) The parties, by an express term, should be able to lay down a

crystallisation test different from reliance or acceptance. (Paragraph
9.42 and draft Bill, clause 2(3)(b))
(18) Although no legislative provision on this is necessary, where there is

more than one third party who satisfies the test of enforceability, the
relevant crystallisation test would need to be satisfied by each third
party in order to crystallise that third party’s rights. (Paragraph 9.44)
(19) A contractual term to the effect that the contract is irrevocable should
be as open to variation or cancellation by the contracting parties as
any other term. (Paragraph 9.47)
(20) There should be a judicial discretion to authorise a variation or

cancellation (and on such terms, including as to the payment of
compensation to the third party, as seems appropriate) in certain
limited circumstances irrespective of reliance or acceptance by the
third party. The discretion should extend to where the parties cannot
reasonably ascertain whether the third party’s consent is required for
the cancellation or variation of the contract; or where the third party’s
consent cannot be obtained because his whereabouts cannot
reasonably be discovered or because he is mentally incapable of giving
his consent. (Paragraph 9.51 and draft Bill, clauses 2(4) to 2(7))
Defences, Set-Offs and Counterclaims

(21) The third party’s claim should be subject to all defences and set-offs
that would have been available to the promisor in an action by the
promisee and which arise out of or in connection with the contract or,
insofar as a particular contractual provision is being enforced by the
166
third party, which arise out of or in connection with the contract and
are relevant to that contractual provision. (Paragraph 10.12, draft Bill,
clause 3(2) and 7(2)(b))
(22) The contracting parties may include an express provision to the effect
that the promisor may not raise any defence or set-off that would have
been available against the promisee; conversely, the parties may
include an express provision to the effect that the third party’s claim
is subject to all defences and set-offs that the promisor would have
had against the promisee. (Paragraph 10.16 and draft Bill, clause 3(3))
(23) It should be made clear that, in addition to the third party’s claim
being subject to defences and set-offs that the promisor would have
had available in an action by the promisee, the third party’s claim is
also to be subject to the defences, counterclaims (not arising from the
contract) and set-offs that would have been available to the promisor
had the third party been a party to the contract. (Paragraph 10.19 and
draft Bill, clause 3(4))
(24) The contracting parties may include an express provision to the effect
that the promisor may not raise any defence, set-off or counterclaim
that would have been available to the promisor had the third party
been a party to the contract. (Paragraph 10.21, draft Bill clause 3(5))
(25) Where the third party seeks to rely on the test of enforceability to
enforce an exclusion or limitation clause (or conceivably an analogous
type of clause) he may do so only to the extent that he could have done
so had he been a party to the contract (where the phrase ‘had he been
a party to the contract’ means to refer to matters that affect the
validity of the clause as between the contracting parties as well as
matters affecting validity or enforceability that relate only to the third
party). (Paragraph 10.23, draft Bill clause 3(6))
(26) The present general rule whereby parties to a contract cannot impose
burdens upon third parties should be retained, although they may
impose conditions upon the enjoyment of any benefits by them. The
distinction between imposing burdens and conditional benefits (and
hence the line between what falls outside our reform and what falls
within it) depends on whether the condition is the basis merely of a
defence or set-off to the third party’s claim or whether, on the
contrary, the condition is the basis of a claim or counterclaim by the
promisor against the third party. This recommendation therefore ties
in with recommendations (21) and (23) above and no further
legislative provision is required. (Paragraph 10.32)
167
Overlapping Claims
(27) The promisor’s duty to perform should be owed to both the promisee
and the third party and, consequently, unless otherwise agreed
between the contracting parties, the promisee should retain the right
to enforce a contract even if the contract is also enforceable at the suit
of the third party. (Paragraph 11.4 and draft Bill, clause 4)
(28) Although no legislative provision on this is necessary, a promisor who

has fulfilled its duty to the third party, whether wholly or partly,
should to that extent be discharged from its duty to the promisee.
(Paragraph 11.6)
(29) Although no legislative provision on this is necessary, a release given

to the promisor by the third party should not discharge the
promisor’s obligation to the promisee (unless otherwise agreed in the
original contract). (Paragraph 11.8)
(30) Although no legislative provision on this is necessary, the effect of a

release of the promisor by one third party on the promisor’s
obligations to another third party is dependent (unless otherwise
agreed in the original contract) on whether the promise is for the
benefit of the third parties independently of each other, or whether it
is for the benefit of the third parties jointly. If the promised benefit
is to be enjoyed independently, the release by one third party should
not discharge the promisor’s obligation to the other third parties. But
if the promise is for the joint benefit of the third parties, the release
by one third party should normally discharge the promisor’s
obligation to the other third parties. (Paragraph 11.10)
(31) Performance by the promisor to the promisee (rather than to the

third party) and accepted by the promisee, or the release of the
promisor by the promisee, should be straightforwardly regarded as a
variation or cancellation of the contract and should therefore be
governed by the recommendations in Part IX. (Paragraph 11.12)
(32) There should be no order of priority between promisee and third

party. (Paragraph 11.15)
(33) Where the promisee has recovered substantial damages (or an agreed
sum) representing the third party’s loss or assessed on the basis that
the promisee will “cure” the breach for the third party, the third
party will not be entitled under our proposed Act to an award which
duplicates that sum and thereby imposes double liability on the
promisor. (Paragraph 11.21 and draft Bill, clause 5)
168
(34) While no legislative provision to this effect is required, where a third
party has pre-existing legal rights against the promisee, he should not
lose those rights because the promisor and promisee enter into a
contract whereby the promisor agrees to discharge the promisee’s
liability to the third party, but should acquire an additional right
against the promisor. (Paragraph 11.26)
(35) While it is unnecessary for there to be a legislative provision on this,

no compromise or settlement of the promisee’s liability to the third
party by the conferral of enforceable contractual rights against the
promisor should be disturbed. (Paragraph 11.26)
Existing Exceptions
(36) The statutory and common law exceptions to the third party rule
should be preserved by a statutory provision to the effect that our
reform of the third party rule is to be without prejudice to any right
or remedy of a third party which exists apart from our proposed Act.
(Paragraph 12.2 and draft Bill, clause 6(1))
(37) There should be no statutory listing or codification of the existing

statutory and common law exceptions. (Paragraph 12.2)
(38) There should be no legislative provision in our proposed legislation

dealing with the issue of concurrent liability in tort and contract.
(Paragraph 12.4)
(39) A third party shall have no right of enforceability under our proposed
Act in the case of a contract for the carriage of goods by sea governed
by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 except that a third party can
enforce an exclusion or limitation of liability in such a contract if he
satisfies the test of enforceability. (Paragraph 12.11 and draft Bill, clause
6(2)(a) and 6(3)(a))
Act in the case of a contract for the international carriage of goods by
road or rail, or cargo by air, governed by the relevant international
conventions, except that a third party can enforce an exclusion or
limitation of liability in such a contract if he satisfies the test of
enforceability. (Paragraph 12.15 and draft Bill, clause 6(2)(b) and 6(3)(b))
Act in respect of a contract contained in a bill of exchange,
promissory note or other negotiable instrument. (Paragraph 12.17 and
draft Bill, clause 6(2)(c))
169
(42) Reform of the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 should
not be covered in our general reform of the third party rule.
(Paragraph 12.21)
(43) There should not be an extension of section 11 of the Married

Womens’ Property Act 1882 at this stage. (Paragraph 12.27)
Consequential Amendments
(44) Our proposed reform should not be interpreted as giving the third
party full “contractual rights” nor as deeming the third party to be a
party to the contract. It follows that, although no general legislative
provision on this seems necessary, “contracts”, “parties” to
contracts, and “contractual rights and obligations” should be
construed as they would have been prior to the enactment of our
proposed reform. However, to avoid contradiction, a legislative
provision is required to make clear that the references to treating the
third party as if a party to the contract for the purposes of
recommendations (2), (23) and (25) above should not be interpreted
as treating the third party as if he were a party to the contract for the
purposes of any other enactment. (Paragraph 13.4 and draft Bill, clause
6(6))
(45) Subject to recommendations (46) and (47), no consequential

amendment to other legislation is required by our proposals.
(Paragraph 13.8)
(46) Section 2(2) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 shall not apply in
respect of a claim by a third party under our proposed Act for the
breach of a contractual duty of care. (Paragraph 13.13 and draft Bill,
clause 6(4))
(47) Actions brought by third parties under our proposed Act are to be
treated as “actions founded on simple contract” or as “actions upon
a specialty” (depending on the nature of the contract) for the
purposes of the Limitation Act 1980. (Paragraph 13.15 and draft Bill,
clause 6(5))
170
Miscellaneous Issues
(48) There should be no requirement that the promisee be joined as a
party to the litigation when a third party sues to enforce a contract.
(Paragraph 14.3)
(49) The existing Rules of Court are adequate to deal with joinder of the
promisee in an action brought by a third party under our proposed
reform. (Paragraph 14.5)
(50) Although no legislative provision on this is necessary, a third party

should be able to assign its rights under our proposed Act in an
analogous way to that in which a contracting party can assign its
rights. (Paragraph 14.7)
(51) Although no legislative provision on this is necessary, the standard

choice of law rules applicable to contract (or, where the third party
seeks to rely on an exclusion clause, the standard choice of law rules
applicable to an exclusion clause operating as a defence to an action
in tort) should determine whether our proposed Act applies in respect
of facts involving a foreign element. (Paragraph 14.13)
(52) A third party shall have no rights of enforceability under our

proposed reform in respect of an arbitration agreement or a
jurisdiction agreement. (Paragraph 14.19 and draft Bill, clause 6(2)(d) and
(e))
(53) The proposed legislation should not affect contracts entered into prior
to its commencement date, which should be six months after receiving
the Royal Assent. (Paragraph 14.21 and draft Bill, clause 9(2))
(Signed) MARY ARDEN, Chairman

ANDREW BURROWS
DIANA FABER
CHARLES HARPUM
STEPHEN SILBER
MICHAEL SAYERS, Secretary

19 June 1996
171
APPENDIX A
Draft
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Bill
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
ARRANGEMENT OF CLAUSES
Clause
1. Right of third party to enforce contract.
2. Variation and cancellation of contract.
3. Defences etc. available to promisor.
4. Enforcement of contract by promisee.
5. Protection of promisor from double liability.
6. Supplementary provisions relating to third party.
7. Enforcement limited to particular provisions of contract.
8. Joint promisee not providing consideration.
9. Short title, commencement and extent.
173
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 1
B I L L
INTITULED
An Act to make provision for the enforcement of a contract in A.D. 1996.

certain circumstances by a person who is not a party to the
contract; and for connected purposes.
B
E IT ENACTED by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with
the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and
Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority
of the same, as follows:-—
5 1.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a person who is not a party to a Right of third party
contract (in this Act referred to as a third party) may in his own right enforce to enforce
the contract if— contract.
(a) the contract contains an express term to that effect; or

(b) subject to subsection (2) below, the contract purports to confer a
10 benefit on the third party.
(2) Subsection (1)(b) above does not apply if on a proper construction of
the contract it appears that the parties did not intend the contract to be
enforceable by the third party.
(3) The third party must be expressly identified in the contract by name, as a
15 member of a class or as answering a particular description but need not be in
existence when the contract is entered into.
(4) For the purpose of exercising the rights conferred on him by this
section there shall be available to the third party all such remedies as would
have been available to him in an action for breach of the contract if he had
20 been a party to it, and the rules relating to damages, injunctions, specific
performance and other relief shall apply accordingly.
(5) Where the contract excludes or limits the third party’s liability in
relation to any matter references in this Act to his enforcing it shall be
construed as references to his availing himself of the exclusion or limitation.
25 (6) In this Act “the promisor” means the party to the contract against
whom it is enforceable by the third party by virtue of this section and “the
promisee” means the party to the contract by whom it is enforceable against
the promisor.
2 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties)
Variation and 2.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, where a contract is
cancellation of enforceable by a third party by virtue of section 1 above the parties to the
contract. contract may not without his consent vary or cancel the contract if—
(a) the third party has communicated his assent to the contract to the
promisor; 5
(b) the promisor is aware that the third party has relied on the contract; or
(c) the promisor can reasonably be expected to have foreseen that the
third party would rely on the contract and the third party has in fact
relied on it.
(2) The assent referred to in subsection (1)(a) above— 10
(a) may be by words or conduct; and
(b) if sent to the promisor by post or other means, shall not be regarded as
communicated to the promisor until received by him.
(3) A contract which is enforceable by a third party by virtue of section 1
above may expressly provide— 15
(a) that it shall be capable of cancellation or variation without the
consent of the third party; or
(b) that his consent is to be required in circumstances specified in the
contract instead of those specified in subsection (1) above.
(4) Where by virtue of the foregoing provisions of this section the consent 20
of a third party is required for the cancellation or variation of a contract the
court may, on the application of the parties to the contract, dispense with that
consent if satisfied—
(a) that the third party’s consent cannot be obtained because his
whereabouts cannot reasonably be ascertained; or 25
(b) that he is mentally incapable of giving his consent.
(5) The court may, on the application of the parties to a contract, dispense
with any consent to a variation or cancellation of the contract that may be
required by virtue of subsection (l)(c) above if satisfied that it cannot
reasonably be ascertained whether or not the third party has in fact relied on 30
the contract.
(6) Where the court dispenses with a third party’s consent it may impose
such conditions as it thinks fit, including a condition requiring the payment
of compensation to the third party.
(7) The jurisdiction conferred by subsections (4) to (6) above shall be 35
exercisable both by the High Count and a county court.
Defences etc. 3.—(1) Subsections (2) to (5) below apply where in reliance on section 1
available to above proceedings for the enforcement of a contract are brought by a third
promisor. party.
(2) The promisor shall have available to him by way of defence or set-off 40
any matter that—
(a) arises from or in connection with the contract; and
(b) would have been available to him by way of defence or set-off in
proceedings for the enforcement of the contract if those
proceedings had been brought by the promisee. 45
(3) Subsection (2) above is subject to any express term of the contract as to
the matters that are not to be available to the promisor by way of defence or
set-off, and is without prejudice to any express term of the contract which
makes available to the promisor by way of defence or set-off any other
5 matter which would have been so available in proceedings for the
enforcement of the contract had they been brought by the promisee.
(4) The promisor shall also have available to him—
(a) by way of defence or set-off any matter, and
(b) by way of counterclaim any matter not arising from the contract,
10 that would have been available to him by way of defence or set-off or, as the
case may be, by way of counterclaim against the third party if the third party
had been a party to the contract.
(5) Subsection (4) above is subject to any express term of the contract as to
the matters that are not to be available to the promisor by way of defence,
15 set-off or counterclaim.
(6) Where in any proceedings brought against him a third party seeks in
reliance on section 1 above to enforce a contract (including, in particular, a
contract purporting to exclude or limit any liability of his), he may not do so to
the extent that he could not have done so (whether by reason of any
20 particular circumstances relating to him or otherwise) if he had been a party to
the contract.
4. Section 1 above is without prejudice to any right of the promisee to Enforcement of

enforce the contract. contract by
promisee.
5. Where by virtue of section 1 above a contract is enforceable by a third Protection of

25 party, and the promisee has recovered from the promisor a sum in respect promisor from
of— double liability.
(a) the third party’s loss in respect of the contract, or

(b) the expense to the promisee of making good to the third party the
default of the promisor,
30 then, in any proceedings brought by virtue of that section by the third party,
the court shall reduce any award to the third party to such extent as it thinks
appropriate to take account of the sum recovered by the promisee.
6.—(1) Section 1 above is without prejudice to any right or remedy of a Supplementary

third party which exists or is available apart from this Act. provisions relating
to third party.
35 (2) Section 1 above confers no rights on a third party in the case of—
(a) a contract for the carriage of goods by sea, except that a third party
may by virtue of that section avail himself of an exclusion of
limitation or liability in such a contract;
(b) a contract for the carriage of goods by rail or road, or for the carriage of
40 cargo by air, which is subject to the rules of the appropriate
international transport convention, except that a third party may by
virtue of that section avail himself of an exclusion or limitation of
liability in such a contract;
4 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties)
(c) a contract contained in a bill of exchange, promissory note or other

negotiable instrument;
(d) an agreement to submit to arbitration present or future disputes; or
(e) an agreement as to the court, or courts, which are to have jurisdiction to
settle present or future disputes or are not to have such jurisdiction. 5
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) above—
(a) “contract for the carriage of goods by sea” means a contract of
carriage—
(i) which is contained in or evidenced by a bill of lading or
1992 c. 50. sea waybill to which the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 10
applies; or
(ii) under, or for the purposes of, which there is given an
undertaking which is contained in a ship’s delivery order to
which that Act applies;
(b) “the appropriate international transport convention”— 15
(i) in relation to a contract for the carriage of goods by rail,
means the Convention which has force of law in the United
1983 c. 14. Kingdom by virtue of section 1 of the International Transport
Conventions Act 1983;
(ii) in relation to a contract for the carriage of goods by road, 20
means the Convention which has force of law in the United
1965 c. 37. Kingdom by virtue of section 1 of the Carriage of Goods by
Road Act 1965; and
(iii) in relation to a contract for the carriage of cargo by air,
means the Convention which has force of law in the United 25
1961 c. 27. Kingdom by virtue of section 1 of the Carriage by Air Act 1961 or
the Convention which has such force by virtue of section 1 of
1962 c. 43. the Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962 (or
either of the amended Conventions set out in Part B of Schedule 2
S.I. 1967/480. to the Carriage by Air Acts (Application of Provisions) Order 30
1967).
1977 c. 50. (4) Section 2(2) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (restriction on
exclusion etc. of liability for negligence) shall not apply where the
negligence consists of the breach of an obligation arising from the terms of a
contract and the person seeking to enforce them is a third party acting by 35
virtue of section 1 above.
1980 c. 58. (5) In sections 5 and 8 of the Limitation Act 1980 the references to an
action founded on a simple contract and an action upon a specialty shall
respectively include references to an action brought by virtue of section 1
above relating to a simple contract and an action brought by virtue of that 40
section relating to a specialty.
(6) A third party shall not by virtue of section 1(4) or 3(4) or (6) above be
treated, for the purposes of any other Act (or any instrument made under any
Act), as a party to the contract.
Enforcement 7.—(1) Section 1 above applies also where— 45

limited to
particular
(a) the express term referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) applies
provisions of only to a particular provision of the contract; or
contract. (b) it is only a particular provision of the contract that purports to confer a
benefit as mentioned in paragraph (b) of that subsection.
(2) In any such case—

(a) references in this Act to the enforcement of the contract, or to a
contract being enforceable, by a third party shall be construed as
references to the enforcement of the particular provision in
5 question, or to its being enforceable, by a third party; and
(b) the reference in section 3(2)(a) above to the contract shall be
construed as a reference to the contract so far as relevant to that
particular provision.
8.—(1) Where the persons to whom a contractual promise is made include a Joint promisee not
10 person who does not provide consideration for the promise, that person shall providing
not be treated as a third party for the purposes of this Act. consideration.
(2) Subsection (1) above is without prejudice to any right or remedy of

such a person in relation to the contract which exists or is available apart
from this Act.
15 9.—(1) This Act may be cited as the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Short title,
Act 1996. commencement
and extent.
(2) This Act comes into force at the end of the period of six months
beginning with the day on which it is passed and does not apply in relation to
contracts entered into before the end of that period.
20 (3) This Act extends to England and Wales only.
APPENDIX B
Legislation From Some Other Jurisdictions 1
1. Western Australia
Property Law Act 1969, section 11:
“(2) Except in the case of a conveyance or other instrument to which subsection (1)
of this section applies, where a contract expressly in its terms purports to confer a
benefit directly on a person who is not named as a party to the contract, the contract
is, subject to subsection (3) of this section, enforceable by that person in his own name
but -
(a) all defences that would have been available to the defendant in an action
or proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction to enforce the contract had
the plaintiff in the action or proceeding been named as a party to the contract,
shall be so available;
(b) each person named as a party to the contract shall be joined as a party to
the action or proceeding; and
(c) such defendant in the action or proceeding shall be entitled to enforce as

against such plaintiff, all the obligations that in the terms of the contract are
imposed on the plaintiff for the benefit of the defendant.
(3) Unless the contract referred to in subsection (2) of this section otherwise provides,
the contract may be cancelled or modified by the mutual consent of the persons named
as parties thereto at any time before the person referred to in that subsection has
adopted it either expressly or by conduct.”
2. Queensland
Property Law Act 1974, section 55:
“(1) A promisor who, for a valuable consideration moving from the promisee, promises
to do or refrain from doing an act or acts for the benefit of a beneficiary shall, upon
acceptance by the beneficiary, be subject to a duty enforceable by the beneficiary to
perform that promise.
(2) Prior to acceptance the promisor and promisee may without the consent of the
beneficiary vary or discharge the terms of the promise and any duty arising therefrom.
(3) Upon acceptance -

(a) the beneficiary shall be entitled in his own name to such remedies and relief
as may be just and convenient for the enforcement of the duty of the promisor;
1
The legislation produced in this publication is reproduced by permission but does not purport to be the
official authorised version. We have been requested to advise readers that the authorised version of the
Queensland legislation is available from GOPRINT Publications Division, PO Box 364,
Woolloongabba Qld 4102, Australia. Telephone (07) 3246 3399.
184
and relief by way of specific performance, injunction or otherwise shall not be
refused solely on the ground that, as against the promisor, the beneficiary may
be a volunteer;
(b) the beneficiary shall be bound by the promise and subject to a duty
enforceable against him in his own name to do or refrain from doing such act
or acts (if any) as may by the terms of the promise be required of him;
(c) the promisor shall be entitled to such remedies and relief as may be just and
convenient for the enforcement of the duty of the beneficiary;
(d) the terms of the promise and the duty of the promisor or the beneficiary
may be varied or discharged with the consent of the promisor, the promisee
and the beneficiary.
(4) Subject to subsection (1), any matter which would in proceedings not brought in
reliance on this section render a promise void, voidable or unenforceable, whether
wholly or in part, or which in proceedings (not brought in reliance on this section) to
enforce a promissory duty arising from a promise is available by way of defence shall,
in like manner and to the like extent, render void, voidable or unenforceable or be
available by way of defence in proceedings for the enforcement of a duty to which this
section gives effect.
(5) In so far as a duty to which this section gives effect may be capable of creating and
creates an interest in land, such interest shall, subject to section 12, be capable of being
created and of subsisting in land under the provisions of any Act but subject to the
provisions of that Act.
(6) In this section-
(a) “acceptance” means an assent by words or conduct communicated by or

on behalf of the beneficiary to the promisor, or to some person authorised on
his behalf, in the manner (if any), and within the time, specified in the promise
or, if no time is specified, within a reasonable time of the promise coming to
the notice of the beneficiary.
(b) “ beneficiary” means a person other than the promisor or promisee, and
includes a person who, at the time of acceptance is identified and in existence,
although that person may not have been identified or in existence at the time
when the promise was given;
(c) “ promise” means a promise-
(i) which is or appears to be intended to be legally binding; and
(ii) which creates or appears to be intended to create a duty

enforceable by a beneficiary,
and includes a promise whether made by deed, or in writing, or, subject to this
Act, orally, or partly in writing and partly orally;
185
(d) “ promisee” means a person to whom a promise is made or given;
(e) “ promisor” means a person by whom a promise is made or given.
(7) Nothing in this section affects any right or remedy which exists or is available apart
from this section.
(8) This section applies only to promises made after the commencement of this Act.”
3. The Commonwealth of Australia
Insurance Contracts Act 1984, section 48 :
“(1) Where a person who is not a party to a contract of general insurance is specified
or referred to in the contract, whether by name or otherwise, as a person to whom the
insurance cover provided by the contract extends, that person has a right to recover the
amount of his loss from the insurer in accordance with the contract notwithstanding
that he is not a party to the contract.
(2) Subject to the contract, a person who has such a right:
(a) has, in relation to his claim, the same obligations to the insurer as he would have
if he were the insured; and
(b) may discharge the insured’s obligation in relation to the loss.
(3) The insurer has the same defences to an action under this section as he would have
in an action by the insured.
(4) Where a contract of life insurance effected by a person upon his own life is
expressed to be for the benefit of a person specified or referred to in the contract,
whether by name or otherwise, that second-mentioned person has a right to recover the
moneys payable under the contract from the insurer in accordance with the contract
notwithstanding that the second-mentioned person is not a party to the contract, and
the moneys payable under the contract do not form part of the estate of the person
whose life is insured and are not subject to his debts.
(5) Section 94 of the Life Insurance Act 1945 does not apply in relation to a policy
within the meaning of that Act that is entered into after the commencement of this
Act.”
4. New Zealand
Contracts (Privity) Act 1982:

“ 1. Short Title and commencement- (1) This Act may be cited as the Contracts (Privity)
Act 1982.
(2) This Act shall come into force on the first day of April 1983.
186
2. Interpretation- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
“ Benefit” includes-
(a) any advantage; and
(b) any immunity; and
(c) any limitation or other qualification of-
(i) An obligation to which a person (other than a party to the deed or
contract) is or may be subject; or
(ii) A right to which a person (other than a party to the deed or
contract) is or may be entitled; and
(d) Any extension or other improvement of a right or rights to which a person
(other than a party to the deed or contract) is or may be entitled:
“Beneficiary”, in relation to a promise to which section 4 of this Act apples, means a
person (other than the promisor or promisee) on whom the promise confers, or
purports to confer, a benefit:
“Contract” includes a contract made by deed or in writing, or orally, or partly in
writing and partly orally or implied by law:
“Court” means-
(a) The High Court; or
(b) A District Court that has jurisdiction under section 10 of this Act; or
(c) A Small Claims Tribunal that has jurisdiction under section 11 of this Act:
“Promisee”, in relation to a promise to which section 4 of this Act applies, means a
person who is both-
(a) A party to the deed or contract; and
(b) A person to whom the promise is made or given:
“Promisor”, in relation to a promise to which section 4 of this Act applies, means a
person who is both-
(a) A party to the deed or contract; and
(b) A person by whom the promise is made or given.
3. Act to bind the Crown- This Act shall bind the Crown.
4. Deeds or contracts for the benefit of third parties- Where a promise contained in a
deed or contract confers, or purports to confer, a benefit on a person, designated by name,
description, or reference to a class, who is not a party to the deed or contract (whether or not
the person is in existence at the time when the deed or contract is made), the promisor shall
be under an obligation, enforceable at the suit of that person, to perform that promise:
Provided that this section shall not apply to a promise which, on the proper construction of
the deed or contract, is not intended to create, in respect of the benefit, an obligation
enforceable at the suit of that person.
5. Limitation on variation or discharge of promise- (1) Subject to sections 6 and 7 of

this Act, where, in respect of a promise to which section 4 of this Act applies,-
(a) The position of a beneficiary has been materially altered by the reliance of
that beneficiary or any other person on the promise (whether or not that
beneficiary or that other person has knowledge of the precise terms of the
promise); or
(b) A beneficiary has obtained against the promisor judgment upon the
promise; or
(c) A beneficiary has obtained against the promisor the award of an arbitrator
upon a submission relating to the promise,-
187
the promise and the obligation imposed by that section may not be varied or discharged
without the consent of that beneficiary.
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (b) or paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section,-
(a) An award of an arbitrator or a judgment shall be deemed to be obtained when it
is pronounced notwithstanding that some act, matter, or thing needs to be done to
record or perfect it or that, on application to a court or on appeal, it is varied:
(b) An award of an arbitrator or a judgment set aside on application to a Court or on
appeal shall be deemed never to have been obtained.
6. Variation or discharge of promise by agreement or in accordance with express

provision for variation or discharge- Nothing in this Act prevents a promise to which
section 4 of this Act applies or any obligation imposed by that section from being varied or
discharged at any time -
(a) By agreement between the parties to the deed or contract and the
beneficiary; or
(b) By any party or parties to the deed or contract if -
(i) The deed or contract contained, when the promise was made, an
express provision to that effect; and
(ii) The provision is known to the beneficiary (whether or not the
beneficiary has knowledge of the precise terms of the provision); and
(iii) The beneficiary had not materially altered his position in reliance
on the promise before the provision became known to him; and
(iv) The variation or discharge is in accordance with the provision.
7. Power of Court to authorise variation or discharge-(1) Where, in the case of a

promise to which section 4 of this Act applies or of an obligation imposed by that section,-
(a) The variation or discharge of that promise or obligation is precluded by
section 5(1)(a) of this Act; or
(b) It is uncertain whether the variation or discharge of that promise is so
precluded,-
a Court, on application by the promisor or promisee, may, if it is just and practicable to do
so, make an order authorising the variation or discharge of the promise or obligation or both
on such terms and conditions as the Court thinks fit.
(2) If a Court-
(a) Makes an order under subsection (1) of this section; and
(b) Is satisfied that the beneficiary has been injuriously affected by the reliance of the
beneficiary or any other person on the promise or obligation,-
the Court shall make it a condition of the variation or discharge that the promisor pay to the
beneficiary, by way of compensation, such sum as the Court thinks just.
8. Enforcement by beneficiary-The obligation imposed on a promisor by section 4 of this

Act may be enforced at the suit of the beneficiary as if he were a party to the deed or
contract, and relief in respect of the promise, including relief by way of damages, specific
performance, or injunction, shall not be refused on the ground that the beneficiary is not a
party to the deed or contract in which the promise is contained or that, as against the
promisor, the beneficiary is a volunteer.
9. Availability of defences-(1) This section applies only where, in proceedings brought in

a Court or an arbitration, a claim is made in reliance on this Act by a beneficiary against a
promisor.
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4) of this section, the promisor shall have available to him,
188
by way of defence, counterclaim, set-off or otherwise, any matter which would have been
available to him-
(a) If the beneficiary had been a party to the deed or contract in which the promise is
contained; or
(b) If -
(i) The beneficiary were the promisee; and
(ii) The promise to which the proceedings relate had been made for the benefit
of the promisee; and
(iii) The proceedings had been brought by the promisee.
(3) The promisor may, in the case of a set-off or counterclaim arising by virtue of subsection
(2) of this section against the promisee, avail himself of that set-off or counterclaim against
the beneficiary only if the subject-matter of that set-off or counterclaim arises out of or in
connection with the deed or contract in which the promise is contained.
(4) Notwithstanding subsections (2) and (3) of this section, in the case of a counterclaim
brought under either of those subsections against a beneficiary,-
(a) The beneficiary shall not be liable on the counterclaim, unless the beneficiary
elects, with full knowledge of the counterclaim, to proceed with his claim against the
promisor; and
(b) If the beneficiary so elects to proceed, his liability on the counterclaim shall not in
any event exceed the value of the benefit conferred on him by the promise.
10. Jurisdiction of District Courts- (1) A District Court shall have jurisdiction to exercise
any power conferred by section 7 of this Act in any case where-
(a) The occasion for the exercise of the power arises in the course of civil proceedings
properly before the court; or
(b) The value of the consideration for the promise of the promisor is not more than
$12,000; or
(c) The parties agree, in accordance with section 37 of the District Courts Act 1947,
that a District Court shall have jurisdiction to determine the application.
(2) For the purposes of section 43 of the District Courts Act 1947, an application made to
a District Court under section 7 of this Act shall be deemed to be an action.
11. Jurisdiction of Small Claims Tribunal- (1) A Small Claims Tribunal established
under the Small Claims Tribunals Act 1976 shall have jurisdiction to exercise any power
conferred by section 7 of this Act in any case where-
(a) The occasion for the exercise of the power arises in the course of proceedings
properly before that Tribunal; and
(b) The value of the consideration for the promise of the promisor is not more than
$500.
(2) A condition imposed by the Small Claims Tribunal under section 7(2) of this Act shall
not require the promisor to pay a sum exceeding $500 and an order of a Tribunal that
exceeds any such restriction shall be entirely of no effect.
12. Amendments of Arbitration Act 1908- The Second Schedule to the Arbitration Act
1908 is hereby amended by inserting, after clause 10B (as inserted by section 14(2) of the
Contractual Remedies Act 1979), the following clause:
“10C. The arbitrators or umpire shall have the same power as the Court to exercise any of
the powers conferred by section 7 of the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982.”
13. Repeal-Section 7 of the Property Law Act 1952 is hereby repealed.
189
14. Savings-(1) Subject to section 13 of this Act, nothing in this Act limits or affects-
(a) Any right or remedy which exists or is available apart from this Act; or
(b) The Contracts Enforcement Act 1956 or any other enactment that requires any
contract to be in writing or to be evidenced by writing; or
(c) Section 49A of the Property Law Act 1952; or
(d) The law of agency; or
(e) The law of trusts.
(2) Notwithstanding the repeal effected by section 13 of this Act, section 7 of the Property
Law Act 1952 shall continue to apply in respect of any deed made before the commencement
of this Act.
15. Application of Act-Except as provided in section 14(2) of this Act, this Act does not
apply to any promise, contract, or deed made before the commencement of this Act.”
190
APPENDIX C
List of Persons and Organisations who Commented on
Consultation Paper No 121
Consultation took place in 1991 and closed on 30 June 1992. The descriptions of consultees
may have altered since then.
GOVERNMENT BODIES
Local Authorities Associations
Lord Chancellor’s Department
JUDICIARY AND PRACTITIONERS
(i) Judiciary
His Honour Judge Bowsher QC
Council of H M Circuit Judges
The Hon Mr Justice May
The Hon Mr Justice Millett
The Rt Hon The Lord Mustill
His Honour Judge John Newey QC
Rt Hon Lord Justice Parker
The Hon Mr Justice Phillips
The Rt Hon Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle
(ii) Barristers
Walter Aylen QC
Sir Wilfred Bourne KCB QC
R O Havery
G F Hawker
Chambers of Donald Keating QC
John Lindsay QC
Andrew Longmore QC
Robert Nelson QC
Christopher Thomas QC
(iii) Solicitors
Allen & Overy
A G J Berg
Clifford Chance
Cyril Sweett & Partners
D M E Evans
Freshfields
J H L Leckie
G L Leigh
Lovell White Durrant
Masons
McKenna & Co
Norton Rose
R A Shadbolt
Simmons & Simmons
W H Thomas
191
LEGAL ORGANISATIONS
Family Law Bar Association
General Council of the Bar
Holborn Law Society
Institute of Legal Executives
The Law Society
Society of Public Teachers of Law
ACADEMIC LAWYERS
Professor John Adams, University of Kent
Professor Dr Christian V Bar, Universität Osnabrück
Professor Hugh Beale, University of Warwick
Andrew Bell, Manchester University
Professor Joost Blom, University of British Columbia
Professor Roger Brownsword, Sheffield University
Andrew Burrows, Lady Margaret Hall
Professor Hugh Collins, London School of Economics
Professor Brian Coote, University of Auckland
R O'Dair, University College London
Professor Aubrey Diamond, Notre Dame University
Professor Brice Dickson, University of Ulster
Professor M A Eisenberg, University of California
J D Feltham, Magdalen College Oxford
Professor Robert Flannigan, University of British Columbia
John G Fleming, University of California
Simon Gardner, Lincoln College Oxford
Roger Halson, University College London
Charles Harpum, Downing College Cambridge
Professor D J Hayton, King’s College London
Peter Kincaid, MacQuarrie University
Professor Dr Werner Lorenz, Universität München
Professor Robert Merkin, Exeter University
Professor J R Midgley, Rhodes University
Professor Anthony Ogus, Manchester University
Dr F M B Reynolds, Worcester College Oxford
Colin Scott, London School of Economics
W J Swadling, Queen Mary and Westfield College London
Andrew Tettenborn, Pembroke College Cambridge
Professor G H Treitel, All Souls College Oxford
Professor A J Waters, University of Maryland
Dr Simon Whittaker, St John's College Oxford
OTHER ORGANISATIONS
Architects & Surveyors Institute
Association of British Insurers
British Bankers’ Association
Building Employers Confederation
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators
Confederation of British Industry
Confederation of Construction Specialists
Construction Industry Council
Consumers’ Association
Country Landowners Association
Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors
Finance and Leasing Association
Institute of Actuaries
Institute of Chartered Accountants
192
Institute of Civil Engineers
London Maritime Arbitrators Association
Motor Insurers’ Bureau
National Federation of Consumer Groups
National Association of Estate Agents
National Consumer Council
Royal Institute of British Architects
Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors
Securities and Futures Authority
Society of Construction Arbitrators
Wren Insurance Association Limited
OTHERS
John Barber
G M Beresford Hartwell
J M Kilby
Ove Arup Partnership
193
APPENDIX D
Participants at the Conference on Reform of the Law of Privity of
Contract, held at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Russell
Square on 2-3 April 1992, which examined the Law Commission’s
Consultation Paper No 121
The descriptions of consultees may have altered since the date of the conference.
Jack Beatson, Law Commissioner

Andrew Bell, Manchester University
Andrew Burrows, Lady Margaret Hall
Professor Roger Brownsword, Sheffield University
Professor Hugh Collins, London School of Economics
R O'Dair, University College London
Professor Aubrey Diamond, Notre Dame University
Professor R Goode, St John’s College Oxford
Roger Halson, University College London
Charles Harpum, Downing College Cambridge
Professor Robert Merkin, Exeter University
H McLean, Trinity College Cambridge
Professor Anthony Ogus, Manchester University
F Rose, St John’s College Cambridge
Dr F M B Reynolds, Worcester College Oxford
Colin Scott, London School of Economics
W J Swadling, Queen Mary and Westfield College London
Andrew Tettenborn, Pembroke College Cambridge
Dr Simon Whittaker, St John’s College Oxford
194

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THE LAW COMMISSION

PART II: THE PRESENT LAW AND CALLS FOR

SECTION B: PRELIMINARY ISSUES

PART IV: PRECEDENTS FOR REFORM

PART V: THE FORM OF THE LEGISLATION

PART VI: THE THIRD PARTY RULE AND

SECTION C: CENTRAL REFORM ISSUES

PART VIII: DESIGNATION, EXISTENCE, AND

PART IX: VARIATION AND CANCELLATION

PART X: DEFENCES, SET-OFFS AND

PART XI: OVERLAPPING CLAIMS

PART XII: EXISTING EXCEPTIONS

PART XIII: CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS

PART XIV: MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES

Appendix A: Draft Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Bill with

PRIVITY OF CONTRACT: CONTRACTS FOR

(2) Development of the Third Party Rule

(b) Covenants Concerning Land

(c) Tort of Negligence

(f) Collateral Contracts

The reasoning in both cases represents a controversial application of the normal

(h) Promisee’s Remedies Assisting the Third Party

[I]n a commercial contract concerning goods where it is in the contemplation of the

2.42 In Darlington BC v Wiltshier Northern Ltd123 Darlington BC wished to build a

(ii) Specific Performance and a Stay of Action

(i) Statutory Exceptions

(i) Life Insurance

(ii) Fire Insurance

(iii) Motor Insurance

(iv) Third Parties’ Rights Against Insurers

(v) Insurance by Those with Limited Interests

(vi) Bills of Exchange

(vii) Bills of Lading

(viii) Law of Property Act 1925, Section 56(1)

A person may take an immediate or other interest in land or other property, or

(ix) Companies Act 1985, Section 14

2. Calls for Reform

2. The Injustice to the Third Party

6. Complexity, Artificiality and Uncertainty

7. Widespread Criticism Throughout the Common Law World

9. The Third Party Rule Causes Difficulties in Commercial Life

(1) Construction Contracts

3.15 A typical collateral warranty given by an architect, engineer or main contractor

(2) Insurance Contracts

3.29 We therefore recommend that:

3.32 We therefore recommend that:

3.33 There are three points of clarification concerning this recommendation:

(ii) By emphasising the remedies for breach of contract, we mean to exclude

1. The Law Revision Committee Report

where a contract by its express terms purports to confer a benefit directly on a

2. Abrogation of Third Party Rule in Other Common Law Jurisdictions

...where a contract expressly in its terms purports to confer a benefit directly on

(ii) it seems to require express naming of the third party;

(iii) it seems to exclude implied terms in favour of third parties;

A promisor who, for a valuable consideration moving from the promisee,

(3) New Zealand

4.11 The Act, in section 4, provides that:

Where a promise contained in a deed or contract confers, or purports to confer,

“(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a