SUMMARY: 1.1788/251.

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03-07-2001 - 19/12/2010

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2001-07-03
Tuesday, 03 July 2001, 12:03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 VATICAN 003507
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/WE, PD/ECA (SEXTON), WHITE HOUSE FOR JOSEPH
HAGIN, BRADLEY BLAKEMAN AND MARY HAINES, PLEASE PASS TO
NSC FOR AMB. FREID
EMBASSY VATICAN MESSAGE NO. 107/01
EO 12958 DECL: 07/02/11
TAGS PREL, PHUM, IS, EG, CH, ID, PHUM, IS, EG, CH, ID, PHUM, IS, EG, CH, ID,
PHUM, IS, EG, CH, ID, VT, VTPREL, VTPREL, VTPREL
SUBJECT: THE VATICAN-- THE SUPRANATIONAL POWER
REF: 00 ROME 0988
¶1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CDA JOSEPH MERANTE FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 VATICAN 03507 01 OF 04 031719Z

BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

¶2. (U) THIS CABLE PROVIDES ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR THE PLANNED
PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH THE POPE. IT UPDATES REFTEL, OUTLINING ASPECTS OF THE
USG- HOLY SEE RELATIONSHIP THAT WE BELIEVE WILL REQUIRE U.S. ATTENTION IN THE
NEAR AND MIDTERM. THE MIDDLE EAST WILL FEATURE PROMINENTLY. IN ASIA, VATICAN
PRIORITIES WILL REMAIN FOCUSED ON CHINA, TAIWAN, VIETNAM AND INDONESIA/EAST
TIMOR. THE VATICAN IS INVOLVED IN MEDIATING AFRICA’S GREAT LAKES CONFLICT, WHILE
CUBA LOOMS LARGE AMONG VATICAN INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA. THIS CABLE IDENTIFIES
AREAS IN WHICH THE U.S. AND THE VATICAN SHARE INTERESTS, AND AREAS IN WHICH
THERE ARE POLICY DIFFERENCES.

# 2 Forniamo ulteriori informazioni per il pianificato incontro del Presidemte

col Papa. Questo aggiorna e sottolinea alcuni aspetti delle relazioni USA-
Vaticano, che richiederanno attenzione da parte degli USA a breve e medio
termine. Si tratterò prevalentemente del Medio Oriente. In Asia, le priorità del
Vaticano rimarranno concentrate su Cina, Vietnam, Taiwan, Indonesia/Timor Est-
Il Vaticano è coinvolto nella mediazione sui conflitti africani nell’area dei
grandi laghi, mentre Cuba rappresenta la maggior parte degli interessi del
Vaticano in America Latina. Questo documento identifica le aree nelle quali USA
e Vaticano hanno interessi condivisi, e aree nelle quali ci sono differenze
politiche.

¶3. (U) BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION (CONT’D): THE HOLY SEE IS A SUPRANATIONAL
ENTITY THAT HAS ITS CAPITAL AND TERRITORIAL MANIFESTATION IN THE STATE OF
VATICAN CITY. THE UNITED STATES BASED ITS 1984 RECOGNITION OF THE HOLY SEE IN
PART ON THE FACT THAT THE HOLY SEE EXERCISES SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE 109 ACRES OF
THE VATICAN CITY STATE. HOWEER ALL AMBASSADORS TO THE HOLY SEE, INCLUDING THE
U.S. AMBASSADOR, ARE ACCREDITED TO THE HOLY SEE AN NOT/NOT TO THE STATE OF
VATICAN CITY. THE VATIAN INSISTS ON THIS POINT TO REMIND THAT ITS REAC AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY IS GLOBAL. FOR PRPOSES OF THIS CABLE, THE TERMS HOLY
SEE AND VATICAN WILL BE USED INTERCHANGEABLY. CONFIDENTIAL

non merita traduzione

¶4. (U) BACKGOUND AND INTRODUCTION (CONT’D): THE HOLY SEE ISONE OF THE OLDEST
CONTINUALLY EXISTING INTERNATINAL ENTITIES. IT EXERCISED TEMPORAL CONTROL OF TE
ITAIAN PENINSULA DURING THE MIDDLE AGES, BUT WAS COMPLETELY BEREFT OF TERRITORY
BETWEEN 1870 AND 1929. NEVERTHELESS, EVEN DURING THIS PERIOD, MOST NATIONS
CONTINUED TO RECOGNIZE THE IT AS AN INTERNATIONAL ENTITY AND MAINTAINED FULL
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

non merita traduzione

¶5. (U) BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION (CONT’D): THE VATICAN IS ONE OF VERY FEW
SOVEREIGN ENTITIES THAT HAVE PRESENCE AND REACH IN VIRTUALLY EVERY COUNTRY OF
THE WORLD. ALTHOUGH ITS SOVEREIGNTY IS OVER LIMITED TERRITORY, VATICAN TEACHING
AND POLICIES CAN INFLUENCE THE OVER ONE BILLION ADHERENTS OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
CHURCH. END BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION.

Il Vaticano è uno dei pochissimi stati che esercita la propria influenza in

praticamente tutti i paesi del mondo. Anche se la sua sovranità si esercita su
un territorio limitato, gli insegnamenti e le politiche del vaticano possono
influenzare oltre un miliardo di aderenti alla chiesa cattolica romana.

DEVELOPING POLICY TOWARD THE HOLY SEE

¶6. (C) IN DEVELOPING U.S. POLICY VIS-A-VIS THIS UNIQUE ENTITY, POLICYMAKERS
SHOULD THINK OF THE HOLY SEE AS SIMILAR TO A TRADITIONAL NATION-STATE, WITH A
VARIETY OF FACTORS INFORMING ITS FOREIGN POLICY. THE MOST IMPORTANT
CONSIDERATIONS IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING INCLUDE:
-- RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLES/HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS: THE VATICAN STRIVES TO TRANSLATE
ITS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND ITS HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS INTO CONCRETE POLICIES.
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 VATICA 03507 01 OF 04 031719Z FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES BASED ON THESE
PRINCIPLES INCLUDE: SUPPORT FOR THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT AND DEBT RELIEF FOR
POORER COUNTRIES, OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, OPPOSITION TO ABORTION AND
CONTRACEPTION, AND OPPOSITION (ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS) TO EMBARGOES;

 “NATIONAL” SELF-INTEREST: THE HOLY SEE SEEKS TO PROTECT CATHOLICS AROUND

THE WORLD, ITS OWN POSITION OF INFLUENCE, AND ITS VAST WEALTH. THE
VATICAN’S SUPPORT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN RESULTS FROM ITS DESIRE TO PROTECT
600,000 IRAQI CATHOLICS FROM ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM; ITS REFUSAL TO
PUBLICLY CRITICIZE CROAT NATIONALIST CLERGY IN BOSNIA STEMS IN PART FROM
THE CROAT CHURCH’S STAUNCH DEFENSE OF THE FAITH DURING THE COLD WAR;

L’egoistico interesse nazionale: la santa sede tenta di proteggere i cattolici

in giro per io mondo- Il supporto del vaticano a Saddam Hussein risulta dal loro
desiserio di proteggere i 600.000 cattolici iraniani dal fondamentalismo
islamico. Il loro rifiuto di criticare pubblicamente il clero nazionalista
croato in Bosnia deriva in parte dalla forte difesa della fede cattolica dei
croati durante la guerra fredda.

-- HISTORY/TRADITION: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HOLY SEE AND SPAIN, PORTUGAL, AND
OTHER LATIN COUNTRIES GO BACK OVER 500 YEARS. THE VATICAN’S HISTORICAL
RELATIONSHIP WITH THESE COUNTRIES FREQUENTLY DEMANDS AN ACTIVE FOREIGN POLICY
ROLE;
-- PROSELYTISM: THE VATICAN KNOWS THAT IT MUST
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8384
PAGE 01 VATICA 03507 02 OF 04 031715Z ACTION ECA-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AMAD-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 DS-00 EUR-00 FBIE-00
VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 VCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02
SAS-00 /002W ------------------00B3A7 031716Z /38 O 031203Z JUL 01 FM AMEMBASSY
VATICAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000 WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 VATICAN 003507
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/WE, PD/ECA (SEXTON), WHITE HOUSE FOR JOSEPH HAGIN, BRADLEY
BLAKEMAN AND MARY HAINES, PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR AMB. FREID
EMBASSY VATICAN MESSAGE NO. 107/01
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/11
TAGS: PREL PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID
VT VTPREL VTPREL VTPREL
SUBJECT: THE VATICAN-- THE SUPRANATIONAL POWER
CONTINUALLY REFRESH ITS MESSAGE FOR CHANGING TIMES. VATICAN II IN THE 1960S WAS
AN EXAMPLE. INTERFAITH AND ECUMENICAL OUTREACH IS AN IMPORTANT FOCUS OF THE
CURRENT PAPACY, AND PROSELYTISM/POPULATION GROWTH IN THE THIRD CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 VATICA 03507 02 OF 04 031715Z WORLD ACCOUNTS FOR MUCH OF THE GROWTH OF
THE CHURCH IN RECENT YEARS.

¶7. (C) PAPAL HEALTH/SUCCESSION AND WHAT IT MIGHT MEAN FOR U.S. POLICY: POPE
JOHN PAUL II IS SURELY THE MOST WIDELY RECOGNIZED WORLD LEADER. ALONG WITH THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, HE ENJOYS THE HIGHEST STATURE AND PROFILE AMONG
WORLD LEADERS. IN EARLY 2000, PRESS MISREPRESENTATION OF A GERMAN BISHOP’S
REMARKS IN THE POPE JOHN PAUL II’S ABILITY TO CONTINUE IN OFFICE, SPARKED A
SERIES OF SPECULATIONS AROUND THE WORLD ABOUT SUCCESSION. THE POPE AND THE
VATICAN STRONGLY DENIED THAT HIS CONDITION WAS SERIOUS ENOUGH TO WARRANT
ABDICATION. THERE IS LITTLE SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA THAT THE POPE WOULD IN FACT
RESIGN EVEN IF HIS HEALTH WERE TO DECLINE PRECIPITOUSLY. THE LIST OF CARDINALS
WIDELY PERCEIVED AS POTENTIAL SUCCESSORS DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY AMERICANS, AND
ONLY ONE ANGLOPHONE. AN ELECTION OF A EUROPEAN CARDINAL (MOST LIKELY AN ITALIAN)
WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN ONLY MINOR CHANGES IN VATICAN POLICY AND ITS CURRENT
STANCE ON ISSUES VIS A VIS THE UNITED STATES. IF THE NEXT POPE IS FROM LATIN
AMERICA, ASIA, OR AFRICA, WE SHOULD EXPECT THE VATICAN TO TAKE POSITIONS FURTHER
TO THE “LEFT OF CURRENT U.S. POSITIONS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, BUT FURTHER “RIGHT”
ON SOCIAL ISSUES.

La salute del papa, la successione, e cosa questo potrebbe significare per la

politica USA. Giovanni Paolo II è certamente il leader mondiale più largamente
riconosciuto. Insieme al presidente degli USA, gode della più alta immagine e
profilo fra i leaders mondiali. Nei primi anni 2000, la disinformazione di
stampa sulle dichiarazioni di un vescovo tedesco, circa la capacità di Giovanni
Paolo II a continuare nel suo mandato, hanno acceso speculazioni in tutto il
mondo circa la successione al papa. Il papa e il vaticano hanno smentito
fortemente che esistano le condizioni per l’abdicazione. Non ci sono prove che
il papa si dimetterebbe anche se le sue condizioni fisiche dovessero declinare
rapidamente. La lista dei cardinali percepiti come potenziali successori non
include nessun americano, ed un solo anglofono. L’elezione di un cardinale
europeo (molto probabilmente un italiano) probabilmente porterebbe a cambi
marginali della politica del vaticano nei confronti degli USA. Se il prossimo
papa dovesse essere un latino-americano, un asiatico o un africano, dovremmo
aspettarci una sterzata a sinistra della politica vaticana verso gli USA, su
argomenti come i temi sociali e i diritti umani

MIDDLE EAST
-----------

¶8. (C) MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS (MEPP): THE HOLY SEE DENIES WANTING TO BECOME
INVOLVED IN THE POLITICAL CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 VATICA 03507 02 OF 04 031715Z ASPECTS OF THE MEPP, ALTHOUGH IT REMAINS
KEENLY INTERESTED IN WHAT IT TERMS THE “CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS” ASPECTS OF THE
HOLY SITES IN THE REGION (SPECIFICALLY JERUSALEM). THE VATICAN MAINTAINS THAT
ITS CONCERNS HAVE BEEN LARGELY IGNORED BY THE USG AND THE ISRAELIS, AND IN 1999
WORKED WITH THE FRENCH AND SEVERAL OTHER EU COUNTRIES IN THE “JERUSALEM WORKING
GROUP” (JWG -- SINCE INACTIVE).

¶9. (C) THE VATICAN WAS CLEARLY DISAPPOINTED WHEN THE USG AND GOI DECLINED TO
ASSOCIATE WITH THE JWG INITIATIVE. THE GOI’S DECISION TO ALLOW CONSTRUCTION OF
THE NAZARETH MOSQUE CREATED ALARM (AND IN SOME CASES, RESENTMENT) AT THE
VATICAN. THE GOI FOR ITS PART WAS CONCERNED THAT THE POPE LEFT UNANSWERED BASHIR
ASSAD’S ANTI-SEMITIC INVECTIVE DURING THE POPE’S MAY 2001 SYRIA VISIT. WE CAN
EXPECT CONTINUED TENSION IN THESE AREAS. THE HOLY SEE WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK TO
PLAY A ROLE IN THE MEPP, WHILE DENYING THIS INTENTION. EMBASSY VATICAN CONTINUES
TO RECOMMEND A HIGH LEVEL VISIT TO ENCOURAGE THE VATICAN TO PLAY A MORE
CONSTRUCTIVE, OR AT LEAST LESS UNHELPFUL, ROLE IN THE PROCESS.

ASIA
----

¶10. (C) THE VATICAN AND THE U.S. SHARE INTERESTS IN MANY OF THE SAME COUNTRIES
(E.G. INDONESIA, CHINA, TAIWAN, VIETNAM), BUT NOT ALWAYS FOR THE SAME REASONS.
IN ADDITION TO THE FORMAL CHURCH NETWORK NUMEROUS, OFTEN SEMI-AUTONOMOUS,
CATHOLIC MISSIONARY ORGANIZATIONS CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 VATICA 03507 02 OF 04 031715Z OPERATING THROUGHOUT ASIA HAVE A
SOPHISTICATED UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THEIR AREA. CONTACT WITH
THESE MISSIONARY ORGANIZATIONS PROVIDES UNIQUE INSIGHTS INTO CONDITIONS IN THESE
COUNTRIES. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CATHOLIC FAITH IN ASIA IS AN EXPRESS GOAL OF
THE CHURCH. THE VATICAN AND ITS CONSTITUENT EPISCOPATES ARE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN
DIALOGUES WITH POLITICALLY POWERFUL MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN ORTHODOX FAITHS. THE
RESULTS OF THESE DIALOGUES WILL IMPACT PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, STABILITY,
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES.

¶11. (C) CHINA: WITH ITS OWN NETWORK OF CONTACTS AMONG CHINA’S UNDERGROUND AND
PATRIOTIC CHURCHES, THE HOLY SEE HAS EXCELLENT SOURCES OF INFORMATION REGARDING
DISSIDENTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER THE
POPULATION. THERE IS A CONSTANT CONTROVERSY AROUND THE EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THIS ISSUE INVOLVES THE
VATICAN’S RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN AND CHINESE GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF RELIGIOUS
PRACTICE. BEIJING’S REGULATION AND OFTEN OPPRESSION OF THE CATHOLIC
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8394
PAGE 01 VATICA 03507 03 OF 04 031721Z ACTION ECA-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AMAD-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 DS-00 EUR-00 FBIE-00
VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 VCE-00 DCP-01 NSAE-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00
DSCC-00 DRL-02 SAS-00 /003W ------------------00B442 031721Z /38 O 031203Z JUL
01 FM AMEMBASSY VATICAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000 WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 VATICAN 003507
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/WE, PD/ECA (SEXTON), WHITE HOUSE FOR JOSEPH HAGIN, BRADLEY
BLAKEMAN AND MARY HAINES, PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR AMB. FREID
EMBASSY VATICAN MESSAGE NO. 107/01
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/11
TAGS: PREL PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID
VT VTPREL VTPREL VTPREL
SUBJECT: THE VATICAN-- THE SUPRANATIONAL POWER
CHURCH IS PARALLEL TO AND THEREFORE A WINDOW ON PROBLEMS IN CHINA WITH U.S.-
BASED PROTESTANT CHURCHES AS WELL AS ISLAM AND BUDDHISM. THE CENTRALIZED
STRUCTURE OF THE CHURCH AND THE REPORTING SYSTEM WITH THE NUNCIOS AND
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 VATICA 03507 03 OF 04 031721Z BISHOPS, NOT TO MENTION INDEPENDENT
MISSIONARY GROUPS, GIVES EMBASSY VATICAN A UNIQUE VIEW OF EVENTS INSIDE CHINA.

¶12. (C) VIETNAM: UNOFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS CONTINUE BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE
VATICAN ON ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THE GOV’S ATTEMPT TO CONTROL
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IS ONE OF THE MAIN STUMBLING BLOCKS FROM A VATICAN
PERSPECTIVE. THE VATICAN’S ATTEMPTS TO APPOINT BISHOPS WITH MINIMAL GOVERNMENT
INTERFERENCE AND THE REPORTING PROVIDED BY ITS NUNCIO ON THESE EFFORTS CAN BE
USED AS A GAUGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ISSUES IN VIETNAM.

¶13. (C) INDIA: INDIA HAS SEEN SIGNIFICANT SECTARIAN VIOLENCE OVER THE PAST FEW
YEARS, AS MUCH AGAINST MUSLIMS AS CHRISTIANS. RESOLUTION OF THIS VIOLENCE IS A
KEY TO DEMOCRACY, STABILITY AND THE GUARANTEE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE VATICAN,
LOCAL BISHOPS WHO REPORT TO THE VATICAN, AND VARIOUS MISSIONARY ORGANIZATIONS
WILL ALL CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE OBSERVERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND
DEVELOPMENTS.

¶14. (C) INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR IS POISED TO BECOME THE SECOND CATHOLIC COUNTRY
IN ASIA (THE OTHER IS THE PHILIPPINES). THE VATICAN, THROUGH ITS BISHOPS, HAS
BEEN DEEPLY INVOLVED IN RECONCILIATION EFFORTS FOR YEARS. THE VATICAN IS
INVOLVED IN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN EAST TIMOR. IN OTHER PARTS OF INDONESIA
WRACKED BY SECTARIAN VIOLENCE, THE CATHOLIC PRESENCE IS LESS PRONOUNCED, BUT
CATHOLIC MISSIONARIES PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION. CATHOLIC PRELATES
HAVE ALSO ACTED AS CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 VATICA 03507 03 OF 04 031721Z MEDIATORS BETWEEN OTHER CHRISTIAN
COMMUNITIES AND MUSLIM GROUPS. VISITS OF THE INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND
PRESIDENT TO THE VATICAN UNDERSCORE THE INFLUENCE THE VATICAN HAS ON A COUNTRY
OF SIGNIFICANT POLICY INTEREST TO THE USG.

¶15. (C) NORTH KOREA: VATICAN OFFICIALS, AND CATHOLIC RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS
PERIODICALLY VISIT NORTH KOREA. WE LEARN FROM THEIR VISITS AND WE CAN GIVE
SUGGESTIONS TO OUR CONTACTS FOR POINTS TO RAISE WITH NORTH KOREAN OFFICIALS.

AFRICA
------

¶16. (C) GREAT LAKES: VATICAN CONTACTS ADMIT PRIVATELY THAT CHURCH RELATIONS
WITH LATE DROC PRESIDENT LAURENT KABILA BEGAN ON THE WRONG FOOT BECAUSE OF
KABILA’S MINDSET AND THE CHURCH’S PREVIOUS ASSOCIATION WITH THE MOBUTU REGIME.
REAL HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS AND RELIGIOUS (EVANGELIZATION) CONSIDERATIONS PUT
AFRICA ON THE SCREEN AT THE VATICAN. THE VATICAN AFFILIATED SANT’EGIDIO
COMMUNITY PLAYS AN IMPORTANT SUPPORTING ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO MEDIATE
THE CRISIS, KEEPING THE VATICAN INFORMED OF THEIR EFFORTS.

LATIN AMERICA
-------------

¶17. (C) CUBA: THE POPE’S 1998 VISIT TO CUBA HAS NOT BROUGHT THE KIND OF
PROGRESS ON CHURCH FREEDOM SOUGHT BY CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 VATICA 03507 03 OF 04 031721Z THE POPE. THAT SAID, VATICAN-GOC DIALOGUE
HAS CONTINUED WITH FOLLOW-UP VISITS TO CUBA BY SENIOR VATICAN OFFICIALS -- AND
TO THE VATICAN BY CUBAN COUNTERPARTS. AMONG THE TOPICS OF DISCUSSION: THE GOC’S
TREATMENT OF THE CUBAN CHURCH, THE STATUS OF DISSIDENTS, AND THE EFFECTS OF THE
U.S. EMBARGO, ABOUT WHICH THE HOLY SEE SHARES CASTRO’S CRITICISM. THE VATICAN IS
QUIETLY LOOKING AHEAD TO THE DAY WHEN FIDEL CASTRO DEPARTS THE SCENE. IT IS
CONCERNED HOWEVER, THAT HIS REPLACEMENT CAN ACTUALLY BE WORSE.

EUROPE
------

¶18. (C) THE VATICAN WOULD LIKE TO SEE A UNIFIED, CHRISTIAN (IE. CATHOLIC)
EUROPE. AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO INTENSIFY ITS DIALOG WITH THE
LEADING PROTESTANT GROUPS IN GERMANY AND SCANDINAVIA. THE VATICAN WILL ALSO
CONTINUE ATTEMPTS TO ENGAGE THE RUSSIAN CHURCH AND THE ECUMENICAL PATRIARCH IN
ISTANBUL IN AN ATTEMPT TO HEAL THE LATIN/ORTHODOX RIFT. VATICAN INVOLVEMENT IN
THE BALKANS CAN BE USEFUL TO U.S. POLICY IF IT IS DIRECTED AT PROMOTING
CATHOLIC/ORTHODOX
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8397
PAGE 01 VATICA 03507 04 OF 04 031723Z ACTION ECA-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AMAD-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 DS-00 EUR-00 FBIE-00
VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 VCE-00 DCP-01 NSAE-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00
DSCC-00 DRL-02 SAS-00 /003W ------------------00B486 031723Z /38 O 031203Z JUL
01 FM AMEMBASSY VATICAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000 WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 VATICAN 003507
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/WE, PD/ECA (SEXTON), WHITE HOUSE FOR JOSEPH HAGIN, BRADLEY
BLAKEMAN AND MARY HAINES, PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR AMB. FREID
EMBASSY VATICAN MESSAGE NO. 107/01
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/11
TAGS: PREL PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID
VT VTPREL VTPREL VTPREL
SUBJECT: THE VATICAN-- THE SUPRANATIONAL POWER
COEXISTENCE. CONTINUED VATICAN CRITICISM OF “U.S. MATERIALISM AND COMMERCIALISM”
COULD BE USED BY MANY IN EUROPE TO SUPPORT ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF LIMITING U.S.
INFLUENCE AND ACTIVITY ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 VATICA 03507 04 OF 04 031723Z

¶19. (C) AREAS IN WHICH WE CAN WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE VATICAN DURING THE
NEXT 12 MONTHS:
-- ETHNIC RECONCILIATION AND CIVIL CULTURE - IN JUNE, PD/ECA DAS BRIAN SEXTON
MET WITH VATICAN AND SANT’EGIDIO OFFICIALS DURING A PD/ECA SPONSORED INTER-
RELIGIOUS CONFERENCE ON BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA. EMBASSY VATICAN, WITH DEPARTMENT
GUIDANCE, IS SEEKING TO DEVELOP FOLLOW-UP PROJECTS;
-- ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS -- POST HAS DEVELOPED TWO PROJECTS IN CONJUNCTION
WITH CARITAS (THE VATICAN RELIEF NGO) AND WITH THE ARCHBISHOP OF PESCARA. THESE
PROJECTS WILL OFFER EDUCATION, RESCUE, REHABILITATION, AND REPATRIATION TO
VICTIMS AND POTENTIAL VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKERS. WORKING WITH THE CURIA AND
CARITAS THERE IS MUCH MORE GROUND TO BE COVERED IN THIS AREA IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
-- BIOTECHNOLOGY AND AGRICULTURAL TRADE -- EMBASSY VATICAN HAS SPONSORED TWO
DISCUSSIONS OF THIS THEME INVOLVING SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS ATTACHED TO THE VATICAN.
PROMOTING A MORE POSITIVE VATICAN APPROACH TO APPROPRIATE USE OF GMOS IN THIRD
WORLD AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT COULD HELP MAKE GMOS MORE WIDELY ACCEPTED EVEN IN
THE DEVELOPED WORLD.
¶20. (C) AREAS IN WHICH WE SHOULD EXPECT CONTINUED DIFFICULTIES DURING THE NEXT
12 MONTHS:
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 VATICA 03507 04 OF 04 031723Z -- THE MIDDLE EAST - THE VATICAN WILL
CONTINUE TO OPPOSE U.S. EFFORTS TO ISOLATE SADDAM HUSSEIN. WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE
THAT THE VATICAN WILL NOT SUPPORT OUR EFFORTS IN IRAQ, AND INVESTIGATE WAYS TO
LIMIT VATICAN INTERFERENCE WITH OUR OBJECTIVES. IN ISRAEL, THE VATICAN WILL
CONTINUE EFFORTS TO INSERT ITSELF ON THE QUESTION OF THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM;
-- DEATH PENALTY - THE VATICAN WILL CONTINUE ITS CONDEMNATION OF THE DEATH
PENALTY. STATEMENTS BY THE POPE ARE LIKELY TO BE USED BY MANY AROUND THE WORLD
TO CONDEMN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD
CONSIDER IF IT WANTS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE, AND IF SO, WHAT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
AVENUES TO USE. MMERANTE
CONFIDENTIAL
>
2001VATICA03507 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002-03-07

Thursday, 07 March 2002, 10:13

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 001196
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED INFO ADDEES)
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE, EUR/PPD AND DRL
EO 12958 DECL: 03/05/2007
TAGS PHUM, OPRC, OPRC, OPRC, OPRC, IT, ITPHUM, ITPHUM, ITPHUM, HUMAN RIGHTS
SUBJECT: AS PREDICTED, ITALY’S HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
GENERATES FODDER FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL MILLS
REF: A. STATE 40721
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 01196 01 OF 02 082030Z B. ROME 1098 C. ROME 894 D. MYRIAD POST-
DEPARTMENT E-MAILS FROM 10/01-02/02 E. ROME 348
CLASSIFIED BY: POL MINCOUNS THOMAS COUNTRYMAN, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: AS POST PREDICTED, THE U.S. COUNTRY REPORT FOR ITALY PROVIDED
IMMEDIATE GRIST FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL MILLS. PAPERS POUNCED ON THE REPORT TO
TRUMPET “HUMAN RIGHTS: U.S. ‘FLUNKS’ ITALY;” “POLICE ABUSES IN ITALY;” AND
ESPECIALLY “MISTREATMENT OF DETAINEES” BY THE ITALIAN POLICE DURING G-8 MEETINGS
LAST JULY, WITH THE ONGOING STORY THAT “THE FIFTEEN PAGES THAT THE REPORT
DEVOTES TO ITALY LOOK LIKE A FULL-FLEDGED INDICTMENT OF THE BEHAVIOR OF THE
GOVERNMENT DURING THE G-8 IN GENOA.” ABSENT THE GUIDANCE REQUESTED FROM THE
DEPARTMENT (REFS B AND C), WE HAD TO IMPROVISE IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY, WHICH WAS NOTICEABLY IRRITATED BY THE REPORT. INTERIOR
MINISTER SCAJOLA EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT IN A MARCH 5 MEETING WITH THE
AMBASSADOR. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (SBU) POLOFF DELIVERED THE ITALY HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT TO MFA NORTH AMERICA
OFFICE DIRECTOR GERI SCHIAVONI AND HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE COUNSELOR ALBERTO
CECCARELLI MARCH 5. (MUTUAL SCHEDULING CONFLICTS HAD PREVENTED DELIVERY THE
AFTERNOON OF MARCH 4, PRIOR TO WASHINGTON PUBLICATION, BUT THE MFA WAS AWARE
THAT THE REPORT WAS TO BE RELEASED AND THAT WE WERE SEEKING TO DELIVER IT IN
ADVANCE OF ITS PUBLIC RELEASE.)
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ROME 01196 01 OF 02 082030Z 3. (SBU) AS WE HAD PREDICTED (REFS B, C, AND
D), THE ITALIAN PRESS HAD A FIELD DAY WITH THE REPORT. SOME OF THE CHOICER
HEADLINES INCLUDED: “’NO-GLOBALS’ WERE MISTREATED. THE U.S. CRITICIZES ITALY”
(CENTRIST CORRIERE DELLA SERA); “POLICE ABUSES IN ITALY” (LEFTIST LA
REPUBBLICA); “HUMAN RIGHTS: U.S. FLUNKS ITALY” (CENTRIST LA STAMPA); “HUMAN
RIGHTS: DEPARTMENT OF STATE - THE U.S. TO BERLUSCONI: ‘LEGALITY IN DANGER’”
(LEFTIST L’UNITA). LA REPUBBLICA CONTINUED THAT “THE FIFTEEN FULL PAGES THAT THE
REPORT DEVOTES TO ITALY LOOK LIKE A FULL-FLEDGED INDICTMENT OF THE BEHAVIOR OF
THE GOVERNMENT DURING THE G-8 IN GENOA. THERE ARE ALSO EMBARRASSING REFERENCES
TO SILVIO BERLUSCONI, WHO IS MENTIONED REGARDING FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND THE
LEGAL SYSTEM.”

¶4. (C) OUR MFA INTERLOCUTORS MADE CLEAR THEIR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE REPORT.
“THE ITALY REPORT IS THAT LONG?” SCHIAVONI ASKED IN AMAZEMENT. “WHY WOULD YOU
WRITE SO MUCH ON ANOTHER DEMOCRACY?” SCHIAVONI, NORMALLY AMONG OUR MOST GRACIOUS
AND GOOD-NATURED OF CONTACTS, CHASTISED POLOFF AT LENGTH ABOUT THE NEED FOR POST
TO ENSURE THAT WHAT WAS REPORTED ABOUT ITALY WAS CONVEYED IN THE PROPER CONTEXT
AND PROVIDED WITH SUFFICIENT NUANCE. “THAT’S WHAT AN EMBASSY’S RESPONSIBILITY
IS,” HE INSISTED. (COMMENT: WE AGREE. END COMMENT.)
¶5. (C) IN THE ABSENCE OF THE GUIDANCE REPEATEDLY (REFS B AND C) REQUESTED, WE
WERE FORCED TO “WING IT” IN OUR CONVERSATION AT THE MFA. (FOR BETTER OR WORSE,
PRESS REPORTS WERE WRITTEN BY WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENTS. ROME-BASED MEDIA HAVE
NOT CONTACTED US FOR CLARIFICATION OR COMMENT.) WE CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 ROME 01196 01 OF 02 082030Z EMPHASIZED THAT THE ITALIAN REPORT WAS
WRITTEN UNDER THE SAME GUIDELINES AS THOSE FOR ALL COUNTRIES, AND URGED OUR
INTERLOCUTORS TO COMPARE THE ITALIAN REPORT WITH THE ONES FOR GERMANY OR FRANCE,
FOR EXAMPLE. (SCHIAVONI AND CECCARELLI WERE NOT IMPRESSED.) WE URGED THEM TO
READ THE REPORT ITSELF AND NOT PRESS ARTICLES “INTERPRETING” IT. WE ESPECIALLY
CLARIFIED THAT THE REPORT DRAWS NO CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE GUILT OR INNOCENCE OF
THOSE CONNECTED WITH EVENTS SURROUNDING THE JULY G-8 SUMMIT, NOTES ACCURATELY
THE CONTEXT OF THE EVENTS, AND EXPLAINS THAT A GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE
EVENTS IS ON-GOING. WE URGED THE GOI ALSO TO REFRAIN FROM DRAWING INFERENCES ON
THE BASIS OF THE REPORT.

¶6. (C) IN A MARCH 5 MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR, INTERIOR MINISTER SCAJOLA --
WHO REMAINS UNDER FIRE FROM THE OPPOSITION FOR LAST JULY’S EVENTS LARGELY, AS WE
HAVE REPORTED, BECAUSE THE CENTER-LEFT HAS SO FEW ISSUES THAT RESONATE AMONG THE
ITALIAN PUBLIC -- EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE REPORT, BASED ON PRESS
REPORTING. THE AMBASSADOR URGED SCAJOLA TO READ THE REPORT ITSELF, NOT MEDIA
ACCOUNTS OF IT. DCM CLARIFIED THAT THE REPORT WAS WRITTEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH
DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE AND THE ITALIAN REPORT WAS SIMILAR TO THAT FOR CANADA,
GERMANY, FRANCE OR ANY WESTERN COUNTRY. SCAJOLA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SECTIONS
OF THE REPORT HE HAD TRANSLATED INTO ITALIAN DID NOT ENTIRELY MATCH PRESS
STORIES ABOUT IT, BUT REMAINED DISAPPOINTED THAT THE REPORT HAD PROVIDED
AMMUNITION TO THE OPPOSITION.

¶7. (C) COMMENT: POST WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THE LINE

CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 05 ROME 01196 01 OF 02 082030Z
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7827
PAGE 01 ROME 01196 02 OF 02 082031Z ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 COR-01 NP-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 SRPP-00 EB-00
VC-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 LAB-01 L-00 VCE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02
OPIC-01 PC-01 PM-00 PRS-00 P-00 SP-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 IIP-00 SNIS-00
NISC-00 PMB-00 PRM-00 DRL-02 G-00 SAS-00 /009W ------------------71B573
082032Z /38 O 071013Z MAR 02 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
2621 INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE AMCONSUL MILAN AMCONSUL FLORENCE
AMCONSUL NAPLES
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 001196
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED INFO ADDEES)
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE, EUR/PPD AND DRL E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2007 TAGS: PHUM
OPRC OPRC OPRC OPRC IT ITPHUM ITPHUM ITPHUM HUMAN RIGHTS
ESTABLISHED IN THESE MEETINGS, URGING ALL TO AVOID INFERENCES, PARTICULARLY
CONCERNING EVENTS ASSOCIATED WITH CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 01196 02 OF 02 082031Z G-8 DEMONSTRATIONS OR PM BERLUSCONI’S
JUDICIAL PROCESSES. IN PARTICULAR, STATEMENTS OF FACT IN THE REPORT SHOULD NOT
BE READ AS JUDGMENTS OR AS A SCORECARD. WE REMAIN DISSATISFIED WITH THE
ITERATIVE PROCESS OF DRAFTING THIS YEAR’S REPORT. ALTHOUGH SEVERAL OF OUR
CONCERNS WERE ADDRESSED AT THE END, THE FINAL PRODUCT IS NOT AS CONSISTENT OR
DEFENSIBLE AS IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN.

¶8. (C) COMMENT, CONTINUED: WE DO NOT WANT TO SEE AN ALREADY DELICATE SITUATION
-- WHERE THE USG HAS BEEN DRAWN INTO THE CENTER-LEFT OPPOSITION’S PREVIOUSLY
LARGELY UNHEARD ACCUSATIONS AGAINST A RELATIVELY POPULAR GOVERNMENT -- MADE
WORSE. ABSENT ANY OTHER ATTRACTIVE ISSUE, OPPOSITION PARLIAMENTARIANS AND THEIR
PRESS COUNTERPARTS WILL CONTINUE TO RESURRECT THE GOVERNMENT’S HANDLING OF THE
G-8 AND BERLUSCONI’S JUDICIAL CASES. AND FROM NOW ON, THEY WILL -- RIGHTLY OR
WRONGLY -- PROCLAIM USG “SUPPORT” FOR THEIR POINT OF VIEW. WE HOPE THAT OUR MFA
CONTACTS, LIKE MINISTER SCAJOLA, WILL READ THE REPORT AND MOVE ON -- ALTHOUGH WE
EXPECT TO HAVE AT LEAST ONE FURTHER EXCHANGE ONCE THEY HAVE HAD TIME TO READ THE
REPORT CAREFULLY. UNFORTUNATELY, WE ARE NOT ABLE TO CONTROL THE TENOR OF MEDIA
REPORTS, AND AS WE NOTED REF E, MEDIA WARS ARE A CONTINUATION OF POLITICS BY
OTHER MEANS. ITALY’S OPPOSITION WILL CONTINUE TO HURL THE STONES THAT COME TO
HAND IN THEIR EFFORTS TO UNSEAT A POPULAR PRIME MINISTER, AND WE JUST HANDED
THEM SOME NEW ONES. POPE
CONFIDENTIAL
> @@@OASYS@@@
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2121
PAGE 01 ROME 01196 01 OF 02 071049Z ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 SRPP-00 EB-00 VC-00 H-
01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 LAB-01 L-00 VCE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OPIC-01 PC-
01 PM-00 PRS-00 P-00 SP-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 IIP-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 PMB-00
PRM-00 DRL-02 G-00 SAS-00 /008W ------------------70C954 071049Z /38 O 071013Z
MAR 02 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2620 INFO EUROPEAN
POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 001196

SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE, EUR/PPD AND DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2007 TAGS: PHUM OPRC OPRC OPRC OPRC IT ITPHUM ITPHUM
ITPHUM HUMAN RIGHTS
REF: A. STATE 40721 B. ROME 1098 C. ROME 894 D. MYRIAD POST-DEPARTMENT E-
MAILS FROM 10/01-02/02 E. ROME 348
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 01196 01 OF 02 071049Z CLASSIFIED BY: POL MINCOUNS THOMAS
COUNTRYMAN, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: AS POST PREDICTED, THE U.S. COUNTRY REPORT FOR ITALY PROVIDED
IMMEDIATE GRIST FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL MILLS. PAPERS POUNCED ON THE REPORT TO
TRUMPET “HUMAN RIGHTS: U.S. ‘FLUNKS’ ITALY;” “POLICE ABUSES IN ITALY;” AND
ESPECIALLY “MISTREATMENT OF DETAINEES” BY THE ITALIAN POLICE DURING G-8 MEETINGS
LAST JULY, WITH THE ONGOING STORY THAT “THE FIFTEEN PAGES THAT THE REPORT
DEVOTES TO ITALY LOOK LIKE A FULL-FLEDGED INDICTMENT OF THE BEHAVIOR OF THE
GOVERNMENT DURING THE G-8 IN GENOA.” ABSENT THE GUIDANCE REQUESTED FROM THE
DEPARTMENT (REFS B AND C), WE HAD TO IMPROVISE IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY, WHICH WAS NOTICEABLY IRRITATED BY THE REPORT. INTERIOR
MINISTER SCAJOLA EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT IN A MARCH 5 MEETING WITH THE
AMBASSADOR. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (SBU) POLOFF DELIVERED THE ITALY HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT TO MFA NORTH AMERICA
OFFICE DIRECTOR GERI SCHIAVONI AND HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE COUNSELOR ALBERTO
CECCARELLI MARCH 5. (MUTUAL SCHEDULING CONFLICTS HAD PREVENTED DELIVERY THE
AFTERNOON OF MARCH 4, PRIOR TO WASHINGTON PUBLICATION, BUT THE MFA WAS AWARE
THAT THE REPORT WAS TO BE RELEASED AND THAT WE WERE SEEKING TO DELIVER IT IN
ADVANCE OF ITS PUBLIC RELEASE.)

¶3. (SBU) AS WE HAD PREDICTED (REFS B, C, AND D), THE ITALIAN PRESS HAD A FIELD
DAY WITH THE REPORT. SOME OF THE CHOICER HEADLINES INCLUDED: “’NO-GLOBALS’ WERE
MISTREATED. THE U.S. CRITICIZES ITALY” (CENTRIST CORRIERE DELLA SERA); “POLICE
ABUSES IN ITALY” (LEFTIST LA REPUBBLICA); “HUMAN RIGHTS: U.S. FLUNKS ITALY”
(CENTRIST LA STAMPA); “HUMAN CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ROME 01196 01 OF 02 071049Z RIGHTS: DEPARTMENT OF STATE - THE U.S. TO
BERLUSCONI: ‘LEGALITY IN DANGER’” (LEFTIST L’UNITA). LA REPUBBLICA CONTINUED
THAT “THE FIFTEEN FULL PAGES THAT THE REPORT DEVOTES TO ITALY LOOK LIKE A FULL-
FLEDGED INDICTMENT OF THE BEHAVIOR OF THE GOVERNMENT DURING THE G-8 IN GENOA.
THERE ARE ALSO EMBARRASSING REFERENCES TO SILVIO BERLUSCONI, WHO IS MENTIONED
REGARDING FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM.”

¶4. (C) OUR MFA INTERLOCUTORS MADE CLEAR THEIR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE REPORT.
“THE ITALY REPORT IS THAT LONG?” SCHIAVONI ASKED IN AMAZEMENT. “WHY WOLD YOU
WRITE SO MUCH ON ANOTHER DEMOCRACY?” SCHIVONI, NORMALLY AMONG OUR MOST GRACIOUS
AND GOOD-ATURED OF CONTACTS, CHASTISED POLOFF AT LENGTH AOUT THE NEED FOR POST
TO ENSURE THAT WHAT WAS REORTED ABOUT ITALY WAS CONVEYEDIN THE PROPER CONTEXT
AND PROVIDED WITH SUFFICIENT NUANCE. “THAT’S WHAT AN EMBASSY’S RESPONSIBILITY
IS,” HE INSISTED. (COMMENT: WE AGREE. END COMMENT.)

¶5. (C) IN THE ABSENCE OF THE GUIDANCE REPEATEDLY (REFS B AND C) REQUESTED, WE
WERE FORCED TO “WING IT” IN OUR CONVERSATION AT THE MFA. (FOR BETTER OR WORSE,
PRESS REPORTS WERE WRITTEN BY WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENTS. ROME-BASED MEDIA HAVE
NOT CONTACTED US FOR CLARIFICATION OR COMMENT.) WE EMPHASIZED THAT THE ITALIAN
REPORT WAS WRITTEN UNDER THE SAME GUIDELINES AS THOSE FOR ALL COUNTRIES, AND
URGED OUR INTERLOCUTORS TO COMPARE THE ITALIAN REPORT WITH THE ONES FOR GERMANY
OR FRANCE, FOR EXAMPLE. (SCHIAVONI AND CECCARELLI WERE NOT IMPRESSED.) WE URGED
THEM TO READ THE REPORT ITSELF AND NOT PRESS ARTICLES “INTERPRETING” IT. WE
ESPECIALLY CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 ROME 01196 01 OF 02 071049Z CLARIFIED THAT THE REPORT DRAWS NO
CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE GUILT OR INNOCENCE OF THOSE CONNECTED WITH EVENTS
SURROUNDING THE JULY G-8 SUMMIT, NOTES ACCURATELY THE CONTEXT OF THE EVENTS, AND
EXPLAINS THAT A GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS IS ON-GOING. WE URGED
THE GOI ALSO TO REFRAIN FROM DRAWING INFERENCES ON THE BASIS OF THE REPORT.

¶6. (C) IN A MARCH 5 MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR, INTERIOR MINISTER SCAJOLA --
WHO REMAINS UNDER FIRE FROM THE OPPOSITION FOR LAST JULY’S EVENTS LARGELY, AS WE
HAVE REPORTED, BECAUSE THE CENTER-LEFT HAS SO FEW ISSUES THAT RESONATE AMONG THE
ITALIAN PUBLIC -- EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE REPORT, BASED ON PRESS
REPORTING. THE AMBASSADOR URGED SCAJOLA TO READ THE REPORT ITSELF, NOT MEDIA
ACCOUNTS OF IT. DCM CLARIFIED THAT THE REPORT WAS WRITTEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH
DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE AND THE ITALIAN REPORT WAS SIMILAR TO THAT FOR CANADA,
GERMANY, FRANCE OR ANY WESTERN COUNTRY. SCAJOLA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SECTIONS
OF THE REPORT HE HAD TRANSLATED INTO ITALIAN DID NOT ENTIRELY MATCH PRESS
STORIES ABOUT IT, BUT REMAINED DISAPPOINTED THAT THE REPORT HAD PROVIDED
AMMUNITION TO THE OPPOSITION.

¶7. (C) COMMENT: POST WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THE LINE

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2122
PAGE 01 ROME 01196 02 OF 02 071049Z ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 SRPP-00 EB-00 VC-00 H-
01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 LAB-01 L-00 VCE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OPIC-01 PC-
01 PM-00 PRS-00 P-00 SP-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 IIP-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 PMB-00
PRM-00 DRL-02 G-00 SAS-00 /008W ------------------70C958 071050Z /38 O 071013Z
MAR 02 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2621 INFO EUROPEAN
POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 001196
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE, EUR/PPD AND DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2007 TAGS: PHUM OPRC OPRC OPRC OPRC IT ITPHUM ITPHUM
ITPHUM HUMAN RIGHTS
ESTABLISHED IN THESE MEETINGS, URGING ALL TO AVOID INFERENCES, PARTICULARLY
CONCERNING EVENTS ASSOCIATED WITH G-8 DEMONSTRATIONS OR PM BERLUSCONI’S JUDICIAL
PROCESSES. IN PARTICULAR, STATEMENTS OF FACT IN THE REPORT SHOULD NOT BE READ AS
JUDGMENTS OR AS A SCORECARD. WE REMAIN DISSATISFIED WITH THE ITERATIVE PROCESS
OF DRAFTING THIS YEAR’S REPORT. CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 01196 02 OF 02 071049Z ALTHOUGH SEVERAL OF OUR CONCERNS WERE
ADDRESSED AT THE END, THE FINAL PRODUCT IS NOT AS CONSISTENT OR DEFENSIBLE AS IT
SHOULD HAVE BEEN.

¶8. (C) COMMENT, CONTINUED: WE DO NOT WANT TO SEE AN ALREADY DELICATE SITUATION
-- WHERE THE USG HAS BEEN DRAWN INTO THE CENTER-LEFT OPPOSITION’S PREVIOUSLY
LARGELY UNHEARD ACCUSATIONS AGAINST A RELATIVELY POPULAR GOVERNMENT -- MADE
WORSE. ABSENT ANY OTHER ATTRACTIVE ISSUE, OPPOSITION PARLIAMENTARIANS AND THEIR
PRESS COUNTERPARTS WILL CONTINUE TO RESURRECT THE GOVERNMENT’S HANDLING OF THE
G-8 AND BERLUSCONI’S JUDICIAL CASES. AND FROM NOW ON, THEY WILL -- RIGHTLY OR
WRONGLY -- PROCLAIM USG “SUPPORT” FOR THEIR POINT OF VIEW. WE HOPE THAT OUR MFA
CONTACTS, LIKE MINISTER SCAJOLA, WILL READ THE REPORT AND MOVE ON -- ALTHOUGH WE
EXPECT TO HAVE AT LEAST ONE FURTHER EXCHANGE ONCE THEY HAVE HAD TIME TO READ THE
REPORT CAREFULLY. UNFORTUNATELY, WE ARE NOT ABLE TO CONTROL THE TENOR OF MEDIA
REPORTS, AND AS WE NOTED REF E, MEDIA WARS ARE A CONTINUATION OF POLITICS BY
OTHER MEANS. ITALY’S OPPOSITION WILL CONTINUE TO HURL THE STONES THAT COME TO
HAND IN THEIR EFFORTS TO UNSEAT A POPULAR PRIME MINISTER, AND WE JUST HANDED
THEM SOME NEW ONES. POPE
CONFIDENTIAL
 2002ROME01196 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2005-10-26
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the
original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 003585

SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2015

¶1. (C) Summary. PM Berlusconi specifically requested this meeting, and a spring
address to a joint session of Congress,to bolster his prospects in Italy's April
elections. Behind in the polls and facing his toughest campaign, Berlusconi
will juxtapose his proactive and pro-U.S.foreign policy with that of his likely
center-left opponent, Romano Prodi, who prefers to follow an EU foreign policy
lead and has called for a timetable to withdraw Italian troops from Iraq. GOI
officials are concerned about a potential terrorist attack, either during the
Turin Winter Olympics or the spring elections.

Berlusconi ha richiesto espressamente questo incontro [con Obama], ed ha

sollecitato un suo discorso al Congresso in primavera, per rafforzare le sue
chances alle elezioni in Aprile. In ritardo nei sondaggi, e costretto a far
fronte ad una campagna difficile, B. vuole contrapporre la sua politica pro-US a
quella del suo probabile oppositore di centro-sinistra, Romano Prodi, che
preferisce seguire una politica estera targata UE, ed ha chiesto una time-table
per l’uscita dell’Italia dall’Iraq. Il governo italiano è preoccupato per
possibili attentati durante le olimpiadi invernali di Torino, o durante le
elezioni in primavera.

¶2. (C) Berlusconi will seek: (a) presidential statements of support on shared
values; (b) support for extending in 2005 the UN mandate on Iraq; (c) tangible
progress on a plan to enhance Iraqi security capabilities and allow a
coordinated drawdown of Italian forces; and (d) the President's possible
intervention to waive or delay new passport requirements for continued Italian
participation in the Visa Waiver Program. We should: (a) offer appropriate
praise for Italy's foreign policy support without jeopardizing our relationship
with Prodi; and (b) engage Berlusconi on Russia and Iran. End Summary Italian
Elections

Berlusconi chiederò: -a) una dichiarazione del presidente di sostegno sui valori
condivisi (?); -b) sostegno per estendere nel 2005 il mandato dell’ONU in Iraq;
-c) tangibili progressi del piano per migliorare le capacitù irachebe circa la
sicurezza, onde consentire il ritiro coordinato delle forze italiane; -d) il
possibile intervento presidenziale per cancellare o far slittare il
proseguimento della partecipazione italiana al Visa Waiver Program. Dovremmo:
-a) fornire apprezzamenti appropriati circa l’azione italiana in politica
estera, senza mettere a rischio i nostri rapporti con Prodi; e –b) coinvolgere
Berlusconi sulla Russia e l’Iran...

¶3. (C) PM Silvio Berlusconi prides himself on his warm relationship with the
President and has carefully planned this meeting and a spring address to a joint
session of Congress (he meets Speaker Hastert before going to the White House)
to bolster his prospects in Italy's national elections, tentatively scheduled
for April 9. Berlusconi's center-right coalition is down eight points in the
polls, undermined by internal leadership spats and continued economic
stagnation. The center-left also is plagued by internal disputes but former
European Commission President Romano Prodi just won a triumphant electoral
victory in the primaries. Pending electoral law changes may slightly increase
the odds for the center-right, and it is too early to deal Berlusconi out.
However, most political observers predict Prodi's center-left coalition will win
in April. Iraq: Seeking a Way Forward

Silvio Berlusconi si inorgoglisce per il suo caloroso rapporto col presidente,

ed ha accuratamente pianificato questo incontro ed un intervento primaverile al
Congresso (incontra lo speaker Hastert prima di andare alla Casa Bianca)per
supportare le sue chances alle elezioni nazionali, che si terranno probabilmente
il 9 Aprile. La coalizione di Berlusconi è sotto di 8 punti nei sondaggi,
minacciata da dissidi interni e dalla crisi economica. Anche il centro-sinistra
è dilaniato da lotte interne, ma l’ex presidente della UE Romano Prodi ha appena
riportato una grande vittoria alle primarie. La strana legge elettorale potrebbe
lievemente incrementare le possibilità per il centro-destra, ed è prematuro
dichiarare Berlusconi già sconfitto. Tuttavia, molti osservatori politici danno
per vincente il centro-sinistra in aprile. Iraq: alla ricerca di un modo per
andare avanti.

¶4. (C) We expect Berlusconi will juxtapose his proactive,pro-U.S. foreign

policy with that of Prodi, who prefers to follow an EU foreign policy lead and
has publicly called for a timetable to withdraw Italian troops from Iraq.
Berlusconi has remained adamant that Italian troops will stay in Iraq until the
security situation warrants, and the Iraqi government requests, a drawdown of
Italian troops. The center-right has already accused Prodi of encouraging
terrorist attacks on Italy through reckless calls for withdrawal. However,
Italian public opinion remains overwhelmingly opposed to the war in Iraq and
Berlusconi will be under increasing pressure to make public statements about
plans to withdraw troops. He will be reassured by commitments of continued high-
level consultations but would better appreciate progress in enhancing Iraqi
security capabilities in a way that allows measured Italian drawdowns by April.
Italy is also seeking an extension of the UN Iraq mandate by the end of the
year; the Italian presence is premised on the UN mandate, and Parliament will
vote in January on the next six-months of funding for thier troops. Italy also
feels that the mandate extension should specifically reference political
progress in Iraq.

Ci aspettiamo che Berlusconi vorrà contrapporre la sua iperattiva politica pro-

USA a quella di Prodi, che preferisce seguire una politica estera più orientata
sewcondo la UE, ed ha pubblicamente richiesto una time-table per il ritiro delle
truppe italiane dall’Iraq. Berlusconi ha dichiarato che le truppe italiane
resteranno in Iraq finchè non sarà garantita la sicurezza, e finchè l’Iraq non
ne farà richiesta. Il centro-destra ha già accusato Prodi di incoraggiare il
terrorismo con le sue richieste di ritiro delle truppe dall’Iraq.
Tuttavia l’opimione pubblica italiana rimane nettamente contrario alla
permanenza delle truppe, e Berlusconi sarà sottoposto a pressione crescente sul
problema del ritiro delle truppe. B. sarà rassicurato da impegni di continui
miglioramenti nella security, in misura tale da consentire un progressivo ritiro
a partire da Aprile. L’italia sta anche tentando di ottenere una estensione del
mandato ONU in Iraq entro la fine dell’anno; la presenza italiana sarà
subordinata ad un mandato ONU, e il parlamento voterà entro gennaio circa il
rifinanziamento, per sei mesi, della missione italiana. L’Italia ritiene anche
che l’estensione del mandato dovrebbe fare specifici riferimenti ai progressi
politici in Iraq.

¶5. (C) We can and will work with a Prodi-led government should the center-left
win next year. Despite Prodi's calls for a withdrawal timetable, other elements
of his center-left coalition have assured us that Italy will not make any
dramatic Zapatero-style actions and will coordinate changes in troop levels with
both us and the Iraqi government. Prodi himself has hinted at a compromise
formula involving continued Italian involvement in Iraq for reconstruction
initiatives. Strongest Ally in Continental Europe

Noi vogliamo e possiamo lavorare con un governo guidato da Prodi, se l’anno

prossimo il centro-sinistra dovesse vincere. Nonostante Prodi chieda il ritiro
delle truppe, altri elementi ci fanno pensare che non ci sarà nessuna azione
drammatica in stile Zapatero. Prodi concorderà vbariazioni nel livello delle
truppe con noi e col governo iracheno. Prodi stesso ha ipotizzato formule di
compromesso che coinvolgano l’Italia nelle iniziative di ricostruzione. L’italia
di Prodi è il più forte alleato nell’Europa continentale.

¶6. (C) Berlusconi will be seeking Presidential statements of support on shared

values for our freedom agenda and praise for Italy's substantial commitment of
resources overseas. In addition to being the third largest contributor of troops
to MFN-I, Italy also funds reconstruction and justice projects in Iraq, leads
ISAF, a PRT and a justice initiative in Afghanistan, just took over KFOR
command, pledged $3 million to the UN Fund for Democracy, indicated it will fund
the new Foundation for the Future, co-hosts Democracy Assistance Dialogue
initiatives with Turkey and Yemen, and provided earthquake and hurricane relief
for Pakistan and New Orleans. We want to provide appropriate praise without
jeopardizing a potential future relationship with a center-left government.

Berlusconi è alla busca di affermazioni presidenziali di sostegno sui “valori

condivisi” sulla libertà, e di apprezzamento degli sforzi italiani all’estero.
Oltre ad essere il terzo paese in termini di apporto di truppe, l’Italia
finanzia anche la ricostruzione ed il progetto “giustizia” in Iraq, guida
l’ISAF, un progetto di ricostruzione e di giustizia in Afghanistan, ha preso il
comando delle forze in Kossovo, si è impegnato per una fondazione da 3 milioni
di $ nel futuro, coopera al Dialogo per l’Assistenza della Democrazia in Turchia
e nello Yemen, e provvede anche ad aiutare per i danni del terremoto e degli
uragani in Pakistan e a New Orleans. (...azz... solo all’Aquila non è riuscito a
fare un cazzo!) Noi forniremo “Appropriato apprezzamento”, senza peraltro
mettere a rischio potenziali future relazioni cou un governo di centro-sinistra.

¶7. (C) High public debt, rising social welfare costs and a
stagnant economy are limiting Berlusconi's ability to
maneuver in the face of growing domestic economic discontent.
Pocketbook issues will drive the campaign and be
Berlusconi's biggest challenge, although Prodi has yet to
offer any credible alternative economic policy. The draft
budget now being debated by the Italian Parliament must be
approved by the end of the year, and it appears it will
include painful cuts in many sectors. This includes
potentially dramatic (to about .85% of GDP) cuts in the
defense budget and a 20% reduction in the overseas deployment
budget that could undermined Italy's ability to sustain its
overseas commitments.

Terrorist Threat Looms Large

----------------------------

¶8. (C) Following the London bombings, the GOI approved a

strong anti-terrorism law and began a crackdown of arrests
and deportations of illegal immigrants and suspected
terrorists. However, Italy continues to be targeted in
fundamentalist websites, and many Italian officials expect
Italy will be attacked in the near future. They are worried
specifically about a potential attack during either the
February Turin Olympics or the spring elections. We continue
to work closely with the GOI on security preparations and
intelligence sharing for the Olympics as well as on
increasing readiness for possible attacks on USG facilities
or London/Madrid scenarios.

UN Reform/Iran/Russia/Balkans
-----------------------------

¶9. (C) Berlusconi is likely to thank you for U.S. support

in opposing the G-4 plan for UNSC reform; while Italy's
specific concern is blocking Germany from obtaining a seat,
they support our view that any changes to the Security
Council should be based on a wide consensus of support within
the UN. As Iran's largest European trading partner, Italy
remains concerned that it has been excluded from the EU-3
negotiations and complains that the EU-3 has not sufficiently
consulted other EU member states. Italy shares our concern
about proliferation and supports moving the issue to the
UNSC. Overall, however, Italy favors engagement over
confrontation and will be concerned about the economic losses
associated with potential sanctions. Berlusconi and Putin
remain good friends, and Berlusconi continues to insist he
has delivered our messages of concern about Putin's
increasingly anti-democratic actions. Another nudge from the
President would strengthen our message. Italy remains fully
engaged on the Balkans and supports a continued international
presence in Bosnia and Kosovo until there is international
consensus that both entities have made sufficient progress on
democratic reforms. The candidacy of Amb. Laura Mirachian
for the post of the High Representative in Bosnia is of key
interest to the Italians. They have lobbied strongly for USG
support, arguing that Italy's high military profile deserves
an equally strong policy voice. Department and Embassy
officers who have met with Mirachian believe she shares our
outlook for the future of the region. While she has not
received official USG support at this point, the USG does not
want to be seen as opposing her candidacy, since she could
emerge as the front-runner.

Visa Waiver Program

-------------------

¶10. (SBU) DHS has confirmed that there will be no blanket

waiver, no official policy favoring parole, and no exceptions
to the October 26, 2005 requirement for digitized photos in
passports for any beneficiary of the Visa Waiver Program
(VWP). The GOI plans to issue machine readable passports
with digitized photographs in five Italian Prefectures: Rome,
Milan, Naples, Palermo and Cagliari, with the possibility of
successive extension to other Prefectures. Italians who
obtain passports after October 26 from Prefectures other than
these five offices, or who obtain passports from an Italian
Consulate abroad, will require a U.S. visa. U.S. consular
sections in Italy are working with airlines and travel
agencies to ensure that Italian passengers caught unaware of
the change in visa requirements are directed to the closest
Embassy or Consulate for expeditious visa processing.

¶11. (C) President Ciampi, FM Fini and senior aides to PM

Berlusconi have all raised the VWP issue with the Ambassador,
insisting that the new requirements will be a major
embarrassment to Berlusconi just when he is trying to use his
U.S. connections to improve his election prospects.
Berlusconi may ask the President to intervene to fix the
problem, arguing that Italy is a staunch partner in the war
on terror and is in the process of implementing previously
announced U.S. requirements for biometric passports.
SPOGLI

2008-02-10

Classified By: Ronald P. Spogli, Ambassador, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

1. (C/NF) Summary. Mr. President, Silvio Berlusconi's October

13 visit to Washington provides an opportunity to strengthen
our close ties with a valuable ally in Europe. Since your
June 11-13 visit, Berlusconi has consolidated the standing of
his government in Italian public opinion through a series of
domestic reforms designed to stave off economic crisis and
political malaise. His preoccupation with domestic
challenges has limited his ability to contribute as fully to
our shared international goals as he has in the past, but
under his guidance the Italian government has become more
vocal in its support of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and
mustered the courage to push for a tougher public line on
Iran. However, fear of casualties in Afghanistan may be
preventing Berlusconi from making good on his commitment to
you to assume a stronger military role in ISAF. In addition,
Berlusconi's friendship with Putin and Italy's growing
dependence on Russian energy supplies has led him too often
to stray into apologetics for Russian behavior in Georgia.
His visit provides us an opportunity to shape Berlusconi's
thinking as Italy prepares for Italy's G8 presidency next
year. End Summary.

Domestic Politics: Berlusconi Firmly in Control

------------------------

2. (C) Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is in an enviable

position domestically, enjoying so comfortable a majority in
parliament he can pass virtually any legislation without the
support of the opposition. You will find him upbeat and
self-confident, having successfully mediated a high-stakes
deal to bring Alitalia back from the brink of bankruptcy.
Berlusconi used his first five months back in government to
deliver results on election promises, though long-term
solutions to most problems are still needed. The trash
problem in Naples is not yet permanently solved, but the
streets are cleared and troops are keeping dumps and
incinerators open. Public worries about street crime have
been addressed by a sweeping new security law. A public
finance law has overhauled the annual budget process, which
traditionally has eaten up months of Parliament's time, but
Italy's faltering economy casts doubt on whether budget
targets will be met. Berlusconi's government drafted and
passed these laws mostly without consulting the center-left
opposition, which has grown more fragmented and less
effective.

3. (C) This fall's almost entirely domestic agenda leads with

fiscal federalism (a priority for Berlusconi's allies in the
Northern League) and justice reform, which is a combination
of personal safeguards for Berlusconi and long-needed reform
for a justice sector that is overly politicized and
ineffective. Planned budget cuts in Defense may weaken
Italy's contribution to NATO and UN operations over the long
term, but funding for key areas such as ISAF should remain
untouched. Most foreign policy initiatives will be directed
by Berlusconi personally without the need of any legislation.
Given Berlusconi's personal popularity, his coalition's
strength, and the center-left's state of disarray, most of
our interlocutors agree that Berlusconi has a largely clear
path ahead.

Sluggish Economic Growth

-------------

4. (SBU) Although Italy ranks as the world's seventh largest

market economy, its influence and stature as a G8 member is
threatened by perennially sluggish economic growth. Its
economy has grown a full percentage point slower than the EU

ROME 00001226 002.2 OF 006

average this decade. A burdensome bureaucracy, corruption,

organized crime, a low birth rate, severe labor market
rigidity, a weak educational system, and a business culture
that rewards connections instead of merit are all factors
contributing to stagnation. Italy's slow economic growth
rate limits its ability to be the kind of "boots on the
ground" ally that we want it to be. For example, Italy will
this year cut its foreign assistance budget by 60 percent.
Italy is also becoming increasingly concerned about the
impact of the U.S. financial crisis on its economy.
Berlusconi will join other EU leaders this weekend in a Paris
summit called by President Sarkozy to discuss the financial
crisis. Ironically, however, because of its relatively low
level of integration into world
financial markets, Italy may actually be spared some of the
economic challenges confronting some of its EU colleagues.

5. (SBU) To address this economic threat to our alliance, in

2006 the Embassy launched the Partnership for Growth, an
ambitious, multi-faceted effort to spur economic dynamism by
helping move research to market, grow risk capital markets,
support innovation by strengthening intellectual property
rights, and create Italian entrepreneurial role models.

6. (SBU) We have made tremendous progress. As you saw first

hand when you participated in the Partnership for Growth
event at the American Academy of Rome in June, we have
strengthened the hands of those Italians who want to move
their country forward, and in doing so we have greatly
improved Italian perceptions of the United States. I am happy
to report that because of our Partnership for Growth, in
Italy, the words "innovation" "growth" and "entrepreneurship"
are now usually associated with the United States of America.
We want to move this program to the next level to ensure
that it is rooted and has strong Italian ownership. We call
this our "Partnership for the Future." We are seeking to
identify USG funding of USD 400,000 in FY 2009 to support
this effort.
Not Seeing Eye-To-Eye on Russia - At All
--------------------

7. (S/NF) Italy's stance vis-a-vis Russia has become a point

of friction in what is otherwise an almost friction-free
relationship. Berlusconi directly manages Italy's
relationship with Moscow and since the August Russia-Georgia
crisis he has criticized Georgia, apologized for Russia and
gone so far as to claim credit for dissuading Putin from
occupying Tbilisi. His desire to see Russian actions in
Georgia as "an isolated incident," as he told Vice President
Cheney recently, has been unswayed by facts. Berlusconi's
self-styled role as "mediator" between Moscow and Washington
has been supported here by the full political spectrum; even
the center left has had little critical to say of Italy's
Russia policy. Italian officials continue to insist that
Russia's demands on Kosovo, Georgia, Ukraine and Missile
Defense get a fair hearing in transatlantic and international
fora.

8. (S/NF) GOI officials were already cautious on the prospect

of a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Georgia and
Ukraine before the Russia-Georgia crisis this summer: now, it
is clear from official commentary and body language that
there is a high degree of anxiety in GOI circles over the MAP
question. While the GOI has criticized Russia's recognition
of South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence, it continues to
insist that Russia not be isolated because it is an
"essential player." We have advised the Italians that taking
a soft line on Russian actions against Georgia could damage
their credibility, as well as substantively impact our
collective prospects for gaining cooperation from Moscow. We

ROME 00001226 003.2 OF 006

are also concerned by a growing sympathy for Medvedev's calls

for a new security framework to supersede NATO, OSCE, and
CFE. It would be useful for Berlusconi to hear from you
directly and candidly that public endorsement of Russia's
activities threaten to sow discord in transatlantic relations.

9. (S/NF) The presence of a strong communist party and a

history of leftist governments in Italy gave Russia a degree
of influence not seen in any other Western European country.
More recently, a commercial dependence on Russia,
particularly in the energy sector, and a close personal
relationship between Putin and Berlusconi based on mutual
commercial interests and Berlusconi's preference for dealing
with assertive world leaders appear to be greater motivating
factors in Italy's relations with Russia.

Russia and Energy Security

-------------

10. (C/NF) Italy's dependence on energy from Russia also

remains a cause for concern, although Italy is less dependent
on Russia for energy than many of its EU partners. Its
location gives Italy easier access to a more diverse range of
energy resources than other EU countries. There are already
natural gas pipelines from Libya and Algeria to Italy. An
Algeria-Sardinia-Italy pipeline is being planned. Italy hopes
to make increased use of Liquid Natural Gas (LNG); a recently
completed LNG terminal will bring new gas from Qatar starting
in early 2009. Italy also supports the Turkey-Greece-Italy
(TGI) pipeline projects intended to bring Caspian basin
natural gas to Western Europe. Connections to other sources
of energy notwithstanding, Italy's overall dependence on
Russia for 30 percent of its energy needs will likely
continue for the foreseeable future.

11. (C/NF) Italy's energy company ENI (30 percent owned by

the Italian government) is now a major partner of Russia's
GAZPROM and is building pipelines under the Baltic and Black
Seas that many fear will increase Europe's dependence on
Russian energy. ENI has also given Gazprom access to North
African energy resources (in exchange for increased access to
Siberian gas fields). The GOI claims to share our concerns
about overdependence on Russian energy supplies, but in fact
it seems to take comfort in what it perceives to be its
special relationship with Russia.

Encouraging Nuclear Energy, Opportunities for U.S. Firms

-----------------------------

12. (C/NF) The Berlusconi Government tells us it is serious

about following through on its election promise to re-launch
the Italian nuclear energy sector within five years, with a
goal of eventually obtaining up to 25 percent of its energy
from nuclear power. Italy plans to begin construction of new
nuclear plants by 2013; actual construction would take at
least an additional 5-7 years. If the GOI follows through on
this plan, it will result in tens of billions of dollars in
commercial contracts. We have already seen high-level
lobbying by British, French and Russian government leaders,
all of whom are apparently seeking to ensure that their firms
participate in this enormous project. There is still time for
the U.S. to weigh in on Italy's choice of nuclear technology
partners. We should engage at the highest levels if we want
to ensure favorable consideration of U.S. companies and
protection of U.S. energy security interests. Your meeting
provides an opportunity to urge Berlusconi to 1) give U.S.
firms fair consideration and 2) take strategic energy
security concerns (i.e. Italy's worrisome dependence on
Russian energy) into consideration when selecting sources of
nuclear power technology.

ROME 00001226 004.2 OF 006

Addressing Italian Behavior in Afghanistan

----------------------

13. (S//NF) The Italians dropped from fourth to sixth largest

contributor to ISAF in August when they relinquished Regional
Command -- Capital (RC(C)) to the French. Italy is now
consolidating its 2,200 troops in RC-West, which it commands
and where it has a PRT (Herat), and has sent 34 Carabinieri
police trainers to Afghanistan at our request.
Unfortunately, the significance of this contribution has been
undermined by Italy's growing reputation for avoiding combat
and paying ransom and protection money. This reputation is
based in part on rumors, in part on intelligence which we
have not been fully able to corroborate. True or not, the
fact remains that Italy has lost twelve soldiers in
Afghanistan -- fewer than most allies with comparable
responsibilities. Most of the major combat engagements in
the Italian command area (RC-West) have been conducted by
U.S. and Afghan forces. Indications that we have received
from COMISAF suggest that Italy's alleged behavior may be
contributing to strains within ISAF.

14. (S//NF) I have raised this issue with PM Berlusconi in

the past. He assured me that he was unaware of any such
activity and would put a stop to it if he found evidence of
it. Although less casualty-averse than his predecessor
Romano Prodi, Berlusconi is sensitive to the public opinion
fallout that might result were Italy to incur serious losses
in Afghanistan. You should make it clear to him that, while
we appreciate his willingness to lift geographic caveats and
to send Carabinieri police trainers, Italy's shaky
reputation, even if unearned, is undermining its credibility
within ISAF. More troublingly, if there is any basis to the
allegations, Italian actions are endangering allied troops.

Iran
---

15. (C) Berlusconi has brought a new level of rhetorical

support from Rome for P5 1 efforts. You will want to thank
him for Italy's support on recently adopted UNSC Resolution
1835 and encourage Rome's active engagement within the EU for
more robust EU sanctions. Beyond implementation of 1803, the
EU needs to reach consensus on the broadest possible package
of additional measures. Italy claims that its trade
relationship with Iran makes sanctions costly domestically,
but nevertheless the government now supports a firmer line on
Iran. In spite of differences at the policy level, Italian
cooperation in efforts to prevent Iranian exploitation of the
banking system has been good. Italy continues to express
interest in more frequent and high-level consultations
regarding the P5 1 and Quint.

16. (C) FM Frattini's recently announced proposal of the

"coalition of the willing" -- in which EU member states would
impose selective sanctions based on their trading patterns
with Iran -- presents additional opportunities for Italy to
press the EU for more aggressive action. Examples Frattini
discussed: the Netherlands could apply sanctions in the
insurance sector, Austria in the engineering sector, Germany
and Italy in the natural gas sector.

Lebanon/Syria
-------

17. (C) You will want to thank Italy for its leadership in
UNIFIL as the single largest troop contributor with 2,300
troops. We have been pleased with Italy's leadership in
UNIFIL and the performance of General Graziano as commander.
We would like to see more assertive work to address
provisions of UNSCR 1701, including interdicting arms

ROME 00001226 005.4 OF 006

smuggling from Syria and enforcement of the weapons-free zone
in south Lebanon. Both the U.S. and Italians are concerned
by the findings of the recent Lebanon International Border
Assessment Team, which makes it clear that no progress has
been made in interdicting arms smuggling from Syria over the
past two years. We must continue to encourage Italy to
explore ways to strengthen UNIFIL, without an expanded
mandate.

18. (C) Italy recently offered Syria a high-level platform

when FMs Frattini and al-Moallem met in Rome on September 11
and Frattini agreed to travel to Damascus in the near future.
Italy has not deployed conditions in engaging Damascus (the
GOI continued to meet at high levels with the SARG even as
other EU members reduced contacts in the aftermath of the
Hariri assassination), and has not achieved tangible
achievements in return. Berlusconi's visit offers an
opportunity to stress that Italian engagement needs to be
conditioned by expectations that Syria meet the benchmarks
already laid out by Italy and other EU members, namely:
clearly delineating the Syria-Lebanon border, interdicting
weapons smugglers entering Lebanon via Syria, and instituting
full diplomatic relations with Lebanon.

Basing and Security Cooperation

----------------

19. (C/NF) Italy remains our most important European ally for
projecting military power into the Mediterranean, Middle East
and North Africa. We have 15,000 U.S. military and DOD
civilian personnel and 17,000 of their family members on five
Italian bases. The GOI has approved the expansion of the
base at Vicenza to consolidate the 173rd Airborne Brigade,
the deployment of the USAF Global Hawk UAV in Sicily, and we
are working with the Italians to stand up the AFRICOM Army
and Navy Component Commands in Italy. COESPU (Center of
Excellence for Stability Police Units), the Carabinieri-led
peacekeeping training center that you initiated with
Berlusconi at the G8 Sea Island Summit, has graduated over
1,600 officers from 14 countries, including police
peacekeeping units headed to Darfur. In addition to its
2,200 troops in Afghanistan, Italy currently has 2,400 in the
Balkans, 2,300 in Lebanon, and is the leading contributor to
the NATO Training Mission in Iraq. Italy has provided USD
360 million in aid to Iraq since 2003, and has agreed to
reduce $3 billion in Iraqi Paris Club debt by eighty percent.

Abu Omar Trial Resumes

------------

20. (S) Berlusconi has continued to stand with us as best he

can in the trial of twenty-six Americans and seven Italians,
including the former chief of Italian military intelligence,
charged with kidnapping suspected terrorist Mustafa Osama
Nasr, a/k/a Abu Omar in February 2003. The Italian
Government asked the Constitutional Court to annul the
indictment as it was based on evidence covered by state
secrecy. A hearing before the Constitutional Court has been
postponed until late 2008 or early 2009, but the criminal
trial is proceeding in Milan. The 26 Americans are being
tried in absentia and are being defended by Italian court
appointed attorneys, with one exception: the Air Force
retained an Italian attorney to represent the lone U.S.
serviceman charged in the case, Colonel Romano.

Looking Ahead toward the Italian G8 Presidency

------------------------

21. (C/NF) The Berlusconi government is still in the early

stages of planning for the G8 summit, with site selection
still something of an issue. We are working with our Italian

ROME 00001226 006.2 OF 006

contacts to determine GOI priorities. We expect Berlusconi

to try to use the summit to ease tensions with Russia. Italy
is also considering using the G8 to focus attention on
Afghanistan and Pakistan, which have risen recently on the
GOI's radar as priority issues, and to emphasize achievements
and goals in the area of peacekeeper training, particularly
given the success of COESPU. The Italians have also
indicated that Non-Proliferation may also be a priority.
With recently announced cuts in Italian foreign assistance,
we suspect that the Berlusconi government may seek to
de-emphasize assistance to Africa.

Climate Change
--------

22. (SBU) Although constrained by EU policy and by its Kyoto

commitments, Italy usually sees more eye-to-eye with the U.S.
on climate change than other EU countries. For example, on
October 15 Berlusconi will make his case to other EU heads of
state for changes in the EU's post-Kyoto climate package that
would ease the burden on Italian industry. Italy will be
hosting the second Major Economies (ME) leaders' meeting on
the margins of the 2009 G8 summit. You could ask Berlusconi
to use the Italian G8 Presidency and ME summit to move us
toward a global climate agreement that the U.S. could sign,
one that includes commitments for countries like India and
China.

Conclusion
------

23. (C) This will likely be Berlusconi's last official visit

to Washington during your administration. It presents an
opportunity to strengthen the roots of the many projects that
you have worked on or launched together -- Iraq, Afghanistan,
COESPU -- and to obtain his commitment to behave more
responsibly toward Russia. It also presents an opportunity
to stress our continued commitment to Italian prosperity
through the Partnership for Growth and through possible U.S.
investment in Italian nuclear power. Berlusconi sees this
government, his fourth, as the one that will define his place
in Italian history. His partnership with the U.S., and with
you personally, will be a cornerstone of that legacy.
SPOGLI

2008-07.23
VZCZCXRO4117
RR RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRO #0905 2051314
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 231314Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0630
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE 3133
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN 9477
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES 3279
Wednesday, 23 July 2008, 13:14
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000905
SIPDIS
AF/EPS CAMILLE JACKSON
EO 12958 DECL: 07/23/2018
TAGS ECON, IT
SUBJECT: ITALY: GOI PROGRESS ON AID TO AFRICA FOR G8
PRESIDENCY
Classified By: Econ Counselor William R. Meara for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (U) Summary: The Director of Italy’s Sub-Saharan African Assistance Office
said assistance levels are not expected to change with the newly installed
Berlusconi government. Italy will continue to focus its funding on Ethiopia and
Mozambique, with an emphasis on health and education. Development officials hope
assistance issues will continue to be a priority for Italy during its 2009 G-8
presidency. End Summary.
¶2. (U) On June 19 Econoff met with Fabrizio Nava, Director of the Office of
Sub-Saharan Africa Assistance, to discuss GOI assistance to Africa. The 2008 GOI
budget allocates 4.1 billion Euros for foreign assistance, or .27 percent of
GDP, slightly above the percentage of GDP in 2007. The MFA disperses roughly 750
million of the 4.1 billion Euros through the foreign aid office; Africa receives
around 140 to 200 million for bilateral and multilateral humanitarian
assistance. The Ministry of Finance controls the remaining foreign assistance
account which covers Italy’s contributions to the United Nations, EU, World Bank
and Italy’s debt-forgiveness program. Despite the recent arrival of the center-
right government and budget cuts, Nava believed African assistance levels would
be maintained.
¶3. (U) Italy supplies aid to 36 of the countries in Africa. Of these 36, the
GOI gives three countries priority: Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Eritrea. Eritrea
is now, however, only given emergency aid due to EU restrictions. Nava said that
the GOI recently initiated a pilot program focused on budget support to
Mozambique. Should GOI deem the program a success, Nava said similar budget
support will be given to other African countries starting with Cape Verde.
¶4. (U) According to Nava, Sudan, Egypt, and Mauritania are lower priorities,
but also receive assistance from the GOI. Nava pointed to a recent memorandum of
understanding pledging 12 million Euros over the next three years to Mauritania.
The funds have been earmarked for poverty alleviation, the improvement of living
conditions, cultural programs and training for judges. (Note: Mauritania is a
personal concern of Alain Economides, Head of Minister Frattini’s Private Office
and former Ambassador to the region. End Note.) In Mauritania and Egypt, Nava
noted that most GOI aid focuses on agricultural, medical, and educational
development. Nava expects work on gender issues, an initiative started by the
previous Foreign Minister, to continue to be a priority as well, although he did
not provide specifics.
¶5. (U) Econoff brought up criticism voiced by NGOs such as Bono’s “Debt AIDS
Trade Africa” (D.A.T.A.) and Action Aid Italy that Italy’s aid apparatus is out-
of-date and overly focused on infrastructure projects. Nava explained that
donating to NGOs is rather difficult due to the small number of them; there are
roughly 300 “recognized” NGOs in Italy. In order to be recognized by the GOI,
NGOs must go through a three-year vetting process. Nava observed that over the
past two years, the Foreign Ministry has made improvements in disbursing
assistance through NGOs and said he believed the trend would continue. In
closing, Nava said he expected African assistance be a focus during Italy’s 2009
G-8 presidency.
¶6. (C) Comment: With its 2009 G8 presidency looming, the GOI may decide to
maintain funding levels simply to avoid an embarrassing tongue-lashing from Bono
et al. End comment. SPOGLI
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008-08-14

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001046

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2018

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GG, RU, IT
SUBJECT: AMB URGES ITALY TO PUSH FOR RUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL

REF: STATE 87254

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli for reasons 1.4 b and d

1. (C) Ambassador Spogli delivered reftel points requesting

the GOI's engagement with Russia to PM Berlusconi's principal
adviser, U/S Gianni Letta on August 14. Letta told the
Ambassador that he would convey the points to PM Berlusconi
who was in the next room.

2. (C) The Ambassador told Letta we had heard reports of a

continued Russian military presence around Gori and the port
city of Poti which included attacks on Georgian military
positions and destruction of property. The Ambassador said
it was essential that all Russian troops withdraw from
Georgia and return to South Ossetia as soon as possible.
Letta agreed. The Ambassador also encouraged the GOI to push
Russia to permit free and unimpeded access to both
international observes and providers of humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance.

3. (C) The Ambassador told Letta that Washington was "not

happy" with the Italian response thus far and that we had
been particularly perplexed by FM Frattini's statements. The
Ambassador encouraged the GOI to evaluate the facts on the
ground and act accordingly. The Ambassador noted that the
current policy of "equidistance" (between U.S. and Russia)
will seem inappropriate once the facts have been fully
examined. Letta indicated he had anticipated the U.S.
displeasure with the Italian position and that he would
convey the message to the PM soonest.
SPOGLI

2008-09-12

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C/NF) Summary. Mr. Vice President, Silvio Berlusconi'sgovernment has worked hard over its first months
in office toregain its position as our best ally in continental Europe.Your September 4-10 visit comes as the
Berlusconi governmentreconvenes for what promises to be an important legislativesession. Although it has a
strong electoral mandate, thegovernment needs to take decisive steps to revitalize theeconomy and reduce
budget deficits. Your visit presents anopportunity to build upon the President's June visit byencouraging the
Berlusconi government to remain focused onmuch-needed economic and institutional reforms,
whilemaintaining the defense capabilities and commitments that areessential to bilateral and NATO interests.
2. (C/NF) Berlusconi's government has taken pains to workwith us, but mandatory budget cuts mean we will
need tocoordinate on the specifics. Berlusconi relaxed geographiccaveats for Italian ISAF forces, but we are
monitoringprogress on bringing promised police and border guardtrainers into the field. Berlusconi and
Foreign MinisterFrattini have been extremely cooperative on Iran, even ifItaly has not been invited to join the
P5 1 as they hoped.Coordination has been very good on Lebanon and Israel, thoughwe have not yet made
the same type of progress ontrans-Atlantic relations with Russia. You will also bemeeting President Giorgio
Napolitano, who continues toexercise his authority with conscientiousness and to be astabilizing force in the
government -- even when it makes himunpopular among his colleagues on the center-left. EndSummary.

Berlusconi Government Embarks on Challenging Autumn

--------------------------

3. (C/NF) Over his first hundred days in office, Berlusconidelivered concrete results on election promises.
Hiscoalition's solid majorities in both chambers of parliamentallowed the swift adoption of wide-ranging laws
on domesticsecurity and the budget. Berlusconi intends to passsignificant judicial reforms and devolve more
fiscal powersto the regions between now and the end of the year.Politicians of all stripes agree that deep
institutionalreform is essential. But initial hopes of cross-aislecooperation have faded, as the weakened
opposition hassignaled its intent to protest budget cuts and changes to thedysfunctional and deeply
politicized judicial system.

An Ally in Economic Decline -- We Can Help Change This

----------------------------

4. (SBU) A G8 member and one of the world's largesteconomies, Italy's influence is threatened by
perenniallyslow economic growth. Its economy has grown a full percentagepoint slower than the EU average
this decade. A burdensomebureaucracy, corruption, organized crime, a low birth rate,severe labor market
rigidity, a weak educational system, anda business culture that rewards connections instead of meritare all
factors contributing to stagnation - a condition thatbedeviled both the Prodi government and the
Berlusconigovernment that preceded it. The slow growth that resultsfrom this mess seriously threatens Italy's
ability to be thekind of "boots on the ground" ally that we want it to be.

5. (U) To address this economic threat to our alliance, in2006 the Embassy launched the Partnership for
Growth, anambitious, multi-faceted effort to spur economic dynamism byhelping move research to market,
grow risk capital markets,support innovation by strengthening intellectual property

ROME 00001021 002.2 OF 005

rights, and create Italian entrepreneurial role models.Through our Fulbright Business Exchange and Student
Training(BEST) scholarship program we send young Italianscientist-entrepreneurs to Silicon Valley for six
months oftotal immersion in the U.S. entrepreneurial environment. Theycome back energized, ready to do in
their country what wehave done in ours. Of particular note, almost all costs arecovered by donations from
Italian companies. We have alsobrought many of the top minds in U.S. innovation to Italy, toshare their ideas
on how countries can make progress. We havecreated dozens of new, web-based avenues for
communicationand idea-sharing between the U.S. and Italy. And through morethan 200 events over the last
two years, we have made theItalian elite understand what needs to be done to put theircountry on the path to
prosperity.

6. (U) We have made tremendous progress. We have strengthenedthe hands of those Italians who want to
move their countryforward, and in doing so we have greatly improved Italianperceptions of the United States.
I am happy to report thatbecause of our Partnership for Growth, in Italy, the words"innovation" "growth" and
"entrepreneurship" are now usuallyassociated with the United States of America.

Maintaining a Common Stand on Iran

------------------

7. (S/NF) We have made great advances in moving Italy solidlyinto our camp on Iran. The Berlusconi
government hascooperated fully on EU efforts to apply additional financialmeasures against Tehran, despite
Italy's disappointment withnot being included in the P5-plus-1. Their concerns havebeen eased somewhat by
Quint pre-meeting consultations, butthey worry that this mechanism is too informal and ad hoc tokeep them
properly informed. Italian adherence to sanctionshas always been complicated by their substantial
commercialinterests in Iran, but we will continue to monitor theireconomic activities and discourage further
energy sectorinvestments. Sustaining Italian support for sanctions and theP5-plus-1 negotiations may
depend on keeping up early andhigh-level dialogue.

Not Seeing Eye-To-Eye on Russia

----------------

8. (S/NF) Italy's relationship with Russia could become apoint of friction if Italy continues to insist that
Russia'sdemands on Kosovo, Georgia, Ukraine and Missile Defense get afair hearing in transatlantic and
international fora. Wehave advised them that taking a soft line on Russian actionsagainst Georgia could
damage their credibility. We have alsobecome concerned by a growing sympathy for Medvedev's callsfor a
new security framework to supersede NATO, OSCE, andCFE. You can let Berlusconi know that public
endorsement ofRussia's plans only serves to weaken the alliance.

9. (S/NF) The presence of a strong communist party and ahistory of leftist governments in Italy gave Russia
a degreeof influence not seen in any other Western European country.More recently, a commercial
dependence on Russia,particularly in the energy sector, and a close personalrelationship between Putin and
Berlusconi based on mutualcommercial interests and Berlusconi's preference for dealingwith assertive world
leaders appear to be greater motivatingfactors in Italy's relations with Russia.

Need for Energy Diversification

----------------

10. (C/NF) Compared to EU countries further north, Italy is

ROME 00001021 003.2 OF 005

less dependent on Russia for energy, especially natural gas.Geography gives Italy access to more resources
than other EUcountries, including North African energy. There are alreadynatural gas pipelines from Libya
and Algeria to Italy. AnAlgeria-Sardinia-Italy pipeline is being planned. WhileItaly's North African connections
seem to be good news interms of energy security, ENI has recently given Gazpromaccess to North African
energy resources, in exchange forincreased access to Siberian gas fields. Italy hopes to makeincreased use
of Liquid Natural Gas, but local environmentalconcerns have slowed the construction of regasificationplants.
The GOI claims to share our concerns, but in facttakes comfort in what it perceives to be its
specialrelationship with Russia. Italy's largest energy company(ENI -- one-third owned by the GOI) is now a
major partner ofRussia's Gazprom, and is building strategically importantpipelines for Gazprom in both the
Black Sea and the Baltic.Many believe that ENI actions in furtherance of its owncommercial goals are also
helping Russia tighten its grip onWestern Europe's energy supply.

11. (C/NF) At the same time, Italy is taking steps todiversify its sources of energy. Italy, through the
EdisonCompany, is a key player in the Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI)pipeline. The availability of Azeri natural
gas is a keyconcern, and the EU's Nabbucco pipeline is sometimes seen bythe Italians as a competitor for
this gas. Reports thatRussia is courting Azerbaijan in an attempt to buy all oftheir gas is a major concern for
Italy, since it would meanthe end of TGI.

Basing and Security Cooperation:

A Cornerstone of the Relationship
-----------------

12. (C/NF) Italy remains our most important European ally forprojecting military power into the
Mediterranean, Middle Eastand North Africa. We have 14,000 U.S. military and DODcivilian personnel and
16,000 of their family members on fiveItalian bases. The GOI has approved the expansion of the baseat
Vicenza to consolidate the 173rd Airborne and thedeployment of the USAF Global Hawk UAV in Sicily.
Legalchallenges to the Vicenza expansion have been dismissed, andboth projects are on track. COESPU
(Center of Excellence forStability Police Units), the peacekeeping training center,has graduated over 1,600
officers from 14 countries and hasjust finished training peacekeepers headed to Darfur. We arenow in
discussions on locating component commands for AFRICOMand Italy has signaled that it would like to host
the overallHQ.

Seeking Follow-Through in Afghanistan

-------------------
13. (C/NF) During the President's June visit, Berlusconiagreed to loosen geographic caveats on Italian ISAF
troopsand to send approximately 30 additional Carabinieri trainersto support the ANCOP program. Control of
Kabul has passedfrom Italy to France, and Italy intends to transfer a portionof their 1,200 Kabul-based troops
to the Herat district.Because of budget constraints and large troop commitments inLebanon and the Balkans,
Italy is likely to reduce the numberof troops stationed in Afghanistan. We would like to seeItaly maintain as
many troops as possible in Afghanistan andto provide more security training and military hardware.

Stronger Support for Israel

--------------

14. (C/NF) Berlusconi and Frattini proudly and publicly

ROME 00001021 004.2 OF 005

declare their support for Israel, refuse to consider Hamas apotentially constructive partner, and support the
formationof an independent, democratic Palestinian state. Frattinipledged additional aid to train and equip
Palestinian police,but was unable to do so due to budgetary constraints.

Lebanon and Syria: Consultation and Cooperation

------------------------

15. (C) Italy has consistently offered political, financialand military support to Lebanon, and is the single
largestcontributor of troops to UNIFIL (over 2,500), which iscurrently under the command of an Italian
general.Berlusconi pledged to maintain and strengthen UNIFIL and FMFrattini joined his Spanish and
German counterparts incalling for Syria to halt its uncooperative approach toLebanon. You can encourage
Italy to maintain thisengagement, and to join in our efforts to improve securityalong the Lebanon-Syria
border.

Expanding Military Cooperation In the Face of Budget Cuts

-----------------------------

16. (C/NF) The Italian MOD signaled that because of budgetconstraints, it may not meet its commitment to
pay for 300flight hours in the NATO SAC C-17 program. Afterconsiderable pressure from SECDEF, the
NATO SYG and myself,Italy agreed to postpone their decision until December. Weare, however,
encouraging them to confirm their participationby mid-September. Your visit is an excellent opportunity
toremind them of the importance of this program to the Alliance.

17. (C) Berlusconi is likely to ask for your help onFinmeccanica's acquisition of U.S. defense contractor
DRSTechnologies, a deal worth $5.2 billion. The Italiangovernment would like to see DRS obtain a Special
SecurityAgreement from DOD, and will encourage a favorable decisionby the CFIUS. A recent
announcement of intentions byFinmeccanica and Russian Technologies, a Russian para-statalindustrial and
defense conglomerate, to enter into acooperation agreement has raised some red flags by CFIUS.Berlusconi
may mention Italy's contributions (2 billioneuros) to the Joint Strike Fighter program. He may alsoexpress
interest in the USAF Tanker program rebid; theItalian firm Alenia Aeronautica has partnered with Boeing
onthe KC767.

President Napolitano Has Limited Power,

Considerable Influence
--------------------

18. (C) You will also be meeting with President GiorgioNapolitano. Although his constitutional powers are
limited,Napolitano exercises his authority evenhandedly, evidenced bythe praise and criticism he receives
from both the politicalleft and right. During the collapse of the Prodi governmentin January 2008, Napolitano
was a calming presence in themidst of a political maelstrom. Since Berlusconi tookoffice, Napolitano --
whose roots are in the former CommunistParty -- has been careful to tread a legally sound middleground. He
signed the controversial immunity law because itavoids the problems in earlier similar legislation, but
alsowarned the Berlusconi government not to abuse its decreepowers and instead to hold full debates on
new legislation inParliament. President Napolitano's seven-year term expiresin 2013.

Comment
----
ROME 00001021 005.2 OF 005

19. (C/NF) Mr. Vice President, Italy has great potential tobecome an even closer partner and ally in
addressing some ofour most important global interests. But the country is at acritical juncture, and could be
faced with institutional andeconomic failure if difficult domestic choices are not made.Italy's ability to partner
with the U.S. will depend aboveall on the revival of its economy. Your discussions withBerlusconi and key
leaders can help this administration tomaintain focus and direction on international issues at apoint when
their interests could be completely absorbed bydomestic concerns.

20. (U) We are pleased that you are coming to Italy at thistime. I am certain that your visit will make an
alreadyrobust relationship even stronger.
SPOGLI

2008-11-13

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 001386

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 11/15/2018

TAGS PREL, PGOV, NATO, RS, IT
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI’S COMMENTS ON MISSILE DEFENSE AND
KOSOVO CREATE FIRESTORM IN ITALY

ROME 00001386 001.2 OF 002

Classified By: Barbara A. Leaf, Acting Deputy Chief of Mission, for rea sons 1.4
(b) and (d).

¶1. (C) During a press conference on the margins of the Italy-Turkey summit in
Izmir on November 12, Italian PM Berlusconi said that the U.S. had “provoked”
Russia by unilaterally recognizing Kosovo’s independence, pressing forward on
Missile Defense, and inviting Ukraine and Georgia to have a closer relationship
with NATO. While Berlusconi’s latest comments are a culmination of a string of
inflammatory and unhelpful comments in support of Putin that began shortly after
Berlusconi took office this year, these latest statements went considerably
further in attempting to place the blame for Russia’s paranoia on the U.S.
Additionally, Berlusconi appears to be encouraging his own government and Russia
to disregard the current administration and lobby the incoming U.S. President to
take a softer line on Russia. At the same time, he has attempted to portray
himself as the primary interlocutor between Putin and the West, and particularly
with the U.S. As a result of Berlusconi’s latest comments, post reached out to
interlocutors at all levels to register our dismay at the latest barrage of
Berlusconisms. Our contacts universally responded with a combination of dismay,
dismissal or shoulder-shrugging. In an effort at damage-control, FM Frattini
dispatched a senior MFA official the following morning to see the A/DCM and
‘clarify’ the GOI,s stance. Instead, he took back a terse message to the FM that
such comments risk substantial and lasting damage to Italy,s credibility in
Washington. End summary.

¶2. (C) During a press conference with Turkish PM Erdogan on November 12 in

Izmir, PM Berlusconi said the U.S. had “provoked” Russia by unilaterally
recognizing Kosovo’s independence, pressing forward with Missile Defense and
encouraging Ukraine and Georgia to have a closer relationship with NATO.
Berlusconi’s latest comments represent a continuation of a long campaign of
support for Putin since the Italian PM returned to power this year. In addition
to his latest comments, Berlusconi has supported Russian initiatives to create a
new security architecture in Europe to supersede NATO and OSCE, has insisted
that Putin acted appropriately during the Georgia-Russia conflict, and has
opposed NATO expansion on the basis that it presents a threat to Russia. He has
even called for Russia to be a full member of the EU - a comment he made at a
time when the EU was considering whether to continue business as usual with
Russia in the aftermath of the Georgia-Russia conflict.

¶3. (C) Most disturbingly, Berlusconi has attempted to portray himself to Russia
and the EU as the principal interlocutor between the transatlantic community,
and in particular the U.S., and Russia. He has repeatedly called on the U.S. to
take a softer line with Russia on virtually all democratic and security issues
and has even called on his government and Russia to look beyond the current
administration to the incoming U.S. President in order to achieve these goals.

¶4. (C) Following this latest set of remarks, we reached out to virtually every
senior interlocutor on Russia within the GOI and in Berlusconi,s own center-
right coalition. The Ambassador called DPM Letta. A/DCM called FM Frattini’s
chief of staff, the MFA Director General for Europe, the National Security
Advisor, and a member of parliament from Berlusconi’s party. Poloff reached out
to the Acting Director of the MFA Russia Office, the Director of the Security
Planning Department, the diplomatic advisors to Berlusconi, and members of
Berlusconi’s party. We expressed our concern that Berlusconi’s attempts at
‘creating dialogue’ with Russia were, in fact, creating greater tension and
undermining common efforts to bring stability to the Balkans, and portraying the
successful and peaceful expansion of the Euro-Atlantic space as a threat to
Russia. In an apparent effort at damage-control, FM Frattini sent a senior
member of his staff, Policy Planning Director Maurizio Massari, the day after
Berlusconi,s remarks to call on A/DCM to ‘clarify’ GOI policy.

¶5. (C) Massari (as did virtually all of our interlocutors) told A/DCM that the
PM was accustomed to making off-the-cuff remarks that should not be interpreted
as policy statements per se. Massari said that Frattini was urging the U.S. to
ROME 00001386 002.2 OF 002
look to Italy’s strong bilateral cooperation rather than Berlusconi’s comments
as an indication of the strength of the relationship and the direction of
Italian policy. Italy’s foreign policy remained strongly Atlanticist;
Berlusconi, according to Massari, had meant to be constructive and wanted to
take a positive role in creating understanding between its key strategic
partners, the U.S. and Russia. The comments had not been meant to criticize the
U.S.

¶6. (C) A/DCM countered that the PM’s statements risked damaging to our efforts
to bring stability to the Balkans by calling into question the basis for
Kosovo’s independence - a process that Italy had been a part of from the
beginning. Additionally, Berlusconi,s comments ran headlong into sensitive
negotiations with Russia on confidence building measures, as well as Czech and
Polish internal deliberations on ratification of Missile Defense. By
characterizing Ukrainian and Georgian NATO aspirations as inherently threatening
to Russia, Berlusconi was casting doubt on a process which had produced
significant reforms in aspirant countries that are looking to join the community
of democratic nations.

¶7. (C) A/DCM told Massari that the GOI gave every appearance that the U.S. was
experiencing a power vacuum. The current administration was still in charge, and
the incoming one had made that abundantly clear. By encouraging his own
government and Russia to speak past the current administration and offer
‘advice’ to the President-Elect, Berlusconi was losing credibility for Italy as
a reliable partner, which he could ill afford to do, given the challenges ahead
of us in Afghanistan and elsewhere. A/DCM added that the new administration
would conduct its own diplomacy and would not need Berlusconi as ‘a bridge’ to
engage in a dialogue with Russia on either a bilateral or multilateral basis.

¶8. (C) Massari, in obvious discomfort, said he ‘fully understood’ the U.S.
perspective on Berlusconi,s recent stream of commentary, said he would take this
message back to FM Frattini in detail. He also asked for our thoughts on how to
avoid any further ‘misunderstandings’ of this nature. He said he would recommend
that the FM make a statement clarifying Italy’s support for Kosovo and NATO
expansion. He also said he would advise the FM to talk to Berlusconi about the
degree to which his comments on the US/Russia relationship, Georgia, MD and
other issues had irritated Washington. A/DCM ended the conversation by
suggesting that PM refrain from making any further offers to guide the new U.S.
administration in its relationship with Russia.

¶9. (C) Comment. All of our interlocutors were at visible pains to underscore
that they understood the PM’s comments in Izmir had crossed the line. All,
however, particularly party officials, reiterated that Berlusconi does not
listen to the advice of his own experts in crafting his approach with other
states. On Russia, Berlusconi takes this to an extreme, not only conducting his
own brand of foreign policy, but on a tactical basis, as a way of gaining favor
with his Russian interlocutors - with whom many (including his own party
officials) suspect he has a personally and financially enriching relationship.
All of our contacts stated that it might be difficult to reign him in and,
somewhat fatalistically, encouraged us to ignore his comments. One senior MFA
official went so far as to suggest Ambassador take up the issue directly with
Berlusconi and asked us to let her know what Berlusconi offered as his
justification for his remarks, since, she said, she had no insight whatsoever as
to what had animated his remarks on Kosovo and MD.

¶10. (C) It will be all the more important that Berlusconi and his advisors hear
a similarly blunt warning about the direction of Italy,s Russia policy during in
any bilats or pull-asides on the margins of the upcoming G-20 summit. SPOGLI

2008-11-19

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 001406

SIPDIS

FROM THE AMBASSADOR TO THE SECRETARY

EO 12958 DECL: 11/15/2018

TAGS PREL, PGOV, NATO, IT
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR YOUR DECEMBER 3 VISIT TO ROME

REF: A) ROME 1386 B) ROME 1320

ROME 00001406 001.2 OF 003

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary. 1. (C) Summary. The political conditions in Italy are
dramatically different from the conditions that existed when you last visited in
July 2006. Silvio Berlusconi has returned to power after two years of a divided
and ineffectual Prodi government. Berlusconi enjoys unparalleled levels of
public support and his broad base of power has allowed us to make good progress
in advancing our agenda, including successfully pressing for significant
reductions on caveats imposed on Italian troops in Afghanistan by the previous
government and approval of a major and crucial base expansion at Vicenza. During
your visit, I hope you can publicly announce the establishment of AFRICOM,s Army
and Navy subcomponent commands in Italy, an important symbol of the strength of
our close bilateral security relationship.

¶2. (C) Our reenergized cooperation with Berlusconi, however, does not extend to
all issues. Berlusconi’s close, personal relationship with Putin has translated
into Italian support for nearly every Russian initiative intended to weaken
transatlantic support for NATO expansion and our efforts to curb the Kremlin’s
worst instincts. On Iran, after a period of Italian support for U.S. and EU
efforts to resolve the nuclear issue, Italy’s policy has become unfocused and
even critical of the international process. I hope you can let Berlusconi know
that Italy’s renegade initiatives to soften international and transatlantic
positions on Russia and Iran can only serve to create confusion and reduce
collective security. On the economic front, Italy’s banks have avoided the worst
of the financial meltdown, but the broader economy will suffer from the ensuing
global economic slow-down. End Summary.

Domestic Politics: Berlusconi Firmly in Control

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶3. (C) Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is in an enviable position

domestically, enjoying so comfortable a majority in Parliament that he can pass
virtually any legislation without the support of the opposition. He used his
first months back in government to deliver results on election promises, though
long-term solutions to most problems are still needed. The trash problem in
Naples is not yet permanently solved, but the streets are cleared and troops are
keeping dumps and incinerators open. Public worries about street crime have been
addressed by a sweeping new security law. A public finance law has overhauled
the annual budget process, which traditionally has eaten up months of
Parliament’s time, but Italy’s faltering economy casts doubt on whether budget
targets will be met. Berlusconi’s government drafted and passed these laws
mostly without consulting the center-left opposition, which has grown more
fragmented and less effective. Most foreign policy initiatives will be directed
by Berlusconi personally without the need of any legislation.

¶4. (C) Berlusconi has made a few missteps, such as his awkward attempt at a
joke, in referring to President-Elect Obama as “suntanned”, and center-left
contacts argue that the honeymoon period may end soon. Clearly Berlusconi’s
current level of popularity is unsustainable over the long run, but predictions
that the wind is changing already are premature. The center right’s first major
electoral test will be the European elections in June, which will be a critical
moment for the center left to evaluate whether it needs new leadership and for
the center right to see if it continues to enjoy such high levels of approval
from the Italian people.

Transatlantic Relationship: All Russia All the Time

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶5. (C) Berlusconi’s close personal (and, some suspect, financial) relationship
with Putin has led him to champion unquestioningly every initiative the Kremlin
has rolled out. Italy’s Russia policy is his personal game, one which he
conducts on a tactical basis to gain the trust and favor of his Russian
interlocutors. He consistently rejects the strategic advice of his demoralized,
resource-starved, and increasingly irrelevant Foreign Ministry in favor of his
business cronies, many of whom are deeply dug into Russia’s
ROME 00001406 002.2 OF 003
European energy strategy. As a result of his short-sighted obsession with
Russia, Berlusconi has thrown his support behind Medvedev’s calls for a new
security architecture in Europe to supersede NATO and OSCE, has publicly called
for Ukrainian and Georgian NATO aspirations to be put on hold in deference to
Russian sensitivities, has called on President-Elect Obama to withdraw support
for Missile Defense, and continues to insist that Russia acted properly during
the Georgia-Russia conflict. He has even called on the EU to admit Russia as a
member. Most disturbingly, Berlusconi has attempted to portray himself inside
the EU as the bridge between the U.S. and Russia. In practice, this has meant
that the GOI has consistently worked to water down EU stances on Russia, and
tried to derail U.S.-led efforts to contain Moscow’s worst instincts. His
efforts to encourage greater “dialogue” have created more confusion between
Russia and the transatlantic community, not less. We have pushed back forcefully
on this (ref a) but you can provide a sense of realism to Berlusconi by letting
him know that his efforts are working against U.S. and transatlantic efforts.
Muddying the Waters on Iran
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶6. (C) Berlusconi came into power with a tough public stance on Iran and showed
himself eager to support the P5-plus-1. This initial clarity has given way to an
unfocused, even critical policy with respect to building international consensus
for further sanctions. FM Frattini recently questioned the efficacy of the P5 1
approach in public comments, and reached out to Iran,s nuclear negotiator, Saeed
Jalili, to invite him to Rome for consultations. Even while working within the
EU framework to discuss further national measures, working-level GOI officials
continue to question the efficacy of further sanctions.

Economic Crisis: Banks OK, but economy suffers

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶7. (C) Stodgy, old fashioned banking practices allowed Italy to avoid being
directly hit by the global financial melt-down. Italian banks simply did not
engage in the kind of sub-prime lending that got others in trouble, and Italian
banks did not buy significant amounts of the toxic derivatives that are causing
so much trouble around the globe. But Italy is being affected by the results of
the financial crisis: Italian stock prices have plummeted, stirring fears of
possible foreign buy-outs of Italian firms, and Italy’s already shaky economy
will be hard-hit by the global recession that was sparked by the financial
crisis. As for Italy’s preferred response to the crisis, the Italians seem to be
following Sarkozy’s lead, and seem to share his enthusiasm for major reform of
the international finance institutions. As is the case in many other countries,
Italy is also looking at the possibility of government support for industries
hurt by the recession.

¶8. (C) Italy’s Finance Minister, Giulio Tremonti, often supports protectionist,
anti-globalization positions, but in the ongoing discussion of the financial
crisis we expect Italy to adhere to the more moderate consensus policies
hammered out by the EU.

Little Room for Expanding Presence in Afghanistan

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶9. (C) Italy is the sixth-largest contributor to ISAF with 2,200 troops, a PRT
in Herat, and command of RC-West. Berlusconi has made good on his pledge to
President Bush last June to remove geographic caveats and send 34 Carabinieri to
train Afghan police, and he has promised to address allegations of Italian
protection payments to insurgent leaders. Additionally, FM Frattini has
announced his intention to host a G8 Ministerial on Afghanistan with a special
focus on providing a regional solution to the Afghan-Pakistan border region. But
the Italians now say that new troop deployments above the Parliamentary-approved
cap of 2,300 troops will be impossible for budgetary reasons, and that its only
new contribution to ISAF this fall will be in the form of four Tornado jet
fighters. Italy has also been cool toward our requests to provide donor support
to ANA expansion and election preparation, citing budgetary
ROME 00001406 003.4 OF 003
concerns. You should stress that Italy’s decision to reduce defense expenditures
(which will put them even further below the NATO-recommended threshold of 1% of
GDP) is of major concern to us, and it risks making Italy a less reliable
partner in international security operations, just at a point when the need for
greater contributions from partners may grow in Afghanistan.

Rolling out AFRICOM

- - - - - - - - - -

¶10. (C) Your visit will provide an opportunity to highlight our cooperation on
Africa through Italy’s hosting of portions of AFRICOM. GOI officials were
initially hesitant to sign off, due to concerns over how and under what
circumstances U.S. forces in Italy might deploy to potential conflict zones in
Africa. The GoI eventually agreed to the establishment of AFRICOM’s Army and
Navy subcomponent commands in existing facilities in Italy on October 1, but
asked us to delay announcing the move (ref b). The South East Europe Task Force
(SETAF) in Vicenza has assumed the Army component functions and a component of
NAVEUR in Naples is now fulfilling the naval functions. Italian concerns focused
on SETAF and hinged on two issues -- one legal and the other local and
political. The classified 1954 Bilateral Infrastructure Agreement (BIA) limits
U.S. basing in Italy exclusively to troops deployed for NATO purposes. After
long negotiations, the GOI accepted our broad interpretation of the BIA and the
NATO SOFA as applicable to the AFRICOM subcomponents due to their role in
supporting NATO Operations in Africa and their availability for other NATO
missions as required. But the GOI asked for us to delay public announcement of
the shift due to local controversy over the expansion of the base in Vicenza to
the Dal Molin airfield.

¶11. (C) The GOI responded positively to our proposal for a joint announcement
of the shift during your visit to Italy. A joint statement acknowledging the
establishment of the two entities would allow us to highlight the security
assistance and humanitarian aspects of AFRICOM’s mission and also divorce the
issue as much as possible from base expansion controversy in Vicenza. It will
also provide an opportunity to showcase the synergies between AFRICOM and the
GOI’s own efforts to encourage stability in Africa and also their excellent work
at training primarily African peacekeepers through its Center of Excellence for
Stability Police Units (COESPU), a joint U.S.-Italian G8 initiative which is
also located in Vicenza.

When Will the Honeymoon End?

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶12. (C) Most of our contacts within Berlusconi’s own party as well as in the
center left expect this government’s honeymoon period to end in the first half
of 2009, as Italians focus on the nation’s systemic problems that have no easy
solution, most importantly the economy. Democratic Party officials tell us that
they see the declining standard of living among the middle class as the greatest
opportunity to gain strength before the European elections in June. Should the
rescue efforts for Alitalia remain unresolved in the face of continued strikes
or should the protests against education reform gain traction with a broader
segment of the electorate, Berlusconi’s popularity will suffer.

Conclusion
- - - - - -

¶13. (C) Berlusconi’s shoot-from-the-hip style and frequent gaffes frequently

create bumps in the relationship with the U.S. Nevertheless, he staunchly
supports and admires the U.S. and its people. Despite its economic malaise,
Italy remains a close and influential partner and will continue to be an
important ally for the U.S. in NATO, the region and the world. Your visit will
be an important sign of the strength and closeness of the bilateral relationship
and I am delighted that you are taking the opportunity to visit Rome. SPOGLI

2009-01-26
SECRET SECTION 01 of 05 ROME 000097

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR INR/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG EPET RS IT
SUBJECT: ITALY-RUSSIA RELATIONS: THE VIEW FROM ROME
(C-RE8-02675)

REF: a) 08 STATE 134386 b) ROME 451

CLASSIFIED BY: Ronald P. Spogli, Ambassador, for reasons 1.4 (b), (d).

¶1. (U) This is a joint Political and Economic Section cable.

¶2. (C/NF) Summary. Italy's relationship with Russia is

complex, encompassing historical ideological sympathies,
geostrategic calculations, commercial pressure, energy
dependence, and personal relationships between top leaders.
The combination of these factors creates a strong tendency
for Italy's foreign policy to be highly receptive to Russian
efforts to gain greater political influence in the EU and
to support Russia's efforts to dilute American security
interests in Europe. In its relationship with Russia, energy
is the most important bilateral issue and the quest for
stable energy supplies from Russia frequently forces
Italy to compromise on security and political issues.
A not insignificant concomitant factor is PM
Berlusconi's desire to be seen as an important
European player on foreign policy, leading him to
go where others dare not. End summary.

Roots of Italian Russophilia: Ideology on the Left, a

Long-Standing Market Opportunity on the Right
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶3. (C/NF) Until the 2008 parliamentary elections, the Italian

Communist party and various leftist splinter groups were a
permanent fixture of the Italian political scene. Throughout the Cold
War members of the Italian communist movement maintained close
ties with the Soviet Union, other communist countries, and many
communist revolutionary movements. Unlike many other communist parties
around the world, the Italian communist movement remained
unapologetic in its continued belief in Marxism-Leninism as a viable
economic alternative to capitalism. While many European leftist
intellectuals recognize that -- aside from an authoritarian approach to
governing - - Putin's Russia bears little resemblance to Communist
ideals, this fact has not deterred Italian communists and other radical
left politicians from being openly pro-Russia on the basis of
ideological solidarity. This, combined with the advanced average age o
most high-level Italian politicians (65-70), prevents many in the
far left of Italy's political spectrum from moving beyond a worldview
developed (and apparently frozen) during the Cold War.

¶4. (C/NF) Throughout the Cold War, Italian business interests

frequently skirted the line of what was appropriate in their
pursuit of the Soviet market. After the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the explosion of consumer wealth in Russia created massive deman
for high-end and luxury Italian exports. From 1998 to 2007
Italian exports to Russia grew by 230 percent, from 2.7 billion Euros
to 9.5 Billion. Many of Italy's leading businessmen began to see
Russia as a limitless market that could substitute for loss of export
revenue from other parts of the world. These businessmen maintain
strong ties to the pro-business, free-market-oriented politicians on
the right, including the most visible patron of Italy's business
elite: PM Silvio Berlusconi.

Putin Most Influential Figure in Italy's Russia Policy

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - -

¶5. (C/NF) While Italy's political parties, the MFA and ENI
exert some influence on Italy's Russia policy, by far the most importan
factor is the personal attention Putin devotes to the relationship.
By our reckoning, Putin has held more bilateral meetings with
sitting Italian PMs in the recent past than any other world leader.
He was the first world leader to meet with Berlusconi after the 2008
elections, arriving in Sardegna to visit the PM designate
before the latter had even been sworn in. Berlusconi believes that
Putin is his close and personal friend and continues to have more
contact with Putin than with any other world leader. During the Georgi
crisis, Berlusconi spoke to Putin on a daily basis for a period of
almost a week. The basis of the friendship is hard to determine, but
many interlocutors have told us that Berlusconi believes that
Putin, a fellow 'tycoon', trusts Berlusconi more than other European
leader. (A contact in the PM's office told us that their frequent
meetings are accompanied by exchanges of lavish gifts). Berlusconi
admires Putin's macho, decisive, and authoritarian governing style,
which the Italian PM believes matches his own. From the Russian side,
it appears that Putin has devoted much energy to developing
Berlusconi's trust.

¶6. (S/NF) Contacts in both the opposition center-left PD

Rome 00000097 002 of 005

party and Berlusconi's own PdL party, however, have hinted at a more
nefarious connection. They believe that Berlusconi and his cronies are
profiting personally and handsomely from many of the energy
deals between Italy and Russia. The Georgian ambassador in Rome
has told us that the GOG believes Putin has promised Berlusconi a
percentage of profits from any pipelines developed by Gazprom in
coordination with ENI. Whenever we raise the issue of Russia and the P
with our contacts in PdL, Berlusconi's own party, they have usually
pointed us to Valentino Valentini, a member of parliament and somewhat
shadowy figure who operates as Berluscon's key man on Russia, albeit
with no staff or even a secretary. Valentini, a Russian-speaker who
travels to Russia several times per month, frequently appears at
Berlusconi's side when he meets other world leaders. What he does in
Moscow during his frequent visits is unclear but he is widely
rumored to be looking after Berlusconi's business interests in Russia.
Our contacts uniformly deem Valentini, a multilingual former
interpreter, close to Berlusconi with regard to Russia, but not a polic
person.

¶7. (C/NF) All of our interlocutors - xxxxxxxxxxxx - report that Berlusconi

determines
Italy's policy on Russia single-handedly, neither seeking nor
accepting counsel. Virtually all are reluctant to confront the PM even
when he is at his worst on Russia. In November 2008, after a
disastrous press conference in which, inter alia, the PM described NATO
expansion, recognition of Kosovo's independence, and missile
defense as "U.S. provocations" of Russia, GOI officials did a classic
duck- and-cover. In response to our objections, MFA and PM staff
sheepishly directed us to the PM himself, rather than deliver
the unpleasant news to him that he had angered not only the
Americans but other members of the Contact Group for the Balkans, not t
mention the Czechs and Poles. Even FM Frattini admits to wielding no
influence on Berlusconi on Russia. During an early September
visit to Italy, former VP Cheney confronted Frattini on Italy's
very public and unhelpful stance on the Georgia conflict. A subdued
Frattini noted that, while he had strong opinions on the issue, he
nevertheless received his marching orders from the PM.

¶8. (C/NF) Distressingly, Berlusconi treats Russia policy as

he does his domestic political affairs - tactically and day-to-day.
His overwhelming desire is to remain in Putin's good graces, and
he has frequently voiced opinions and declarations that have been
passed to him directly by Putin. One such example: in the aftermath of
the Georgia crisis, Berlusconi began (and continues) to insist
that Georgia was the aggressor and that the GOG was responsible
for several hundred civilian deaths in South Ossetia.

No Institutional Leadership on Russia

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶9. (C/NF) Trying to determine who might have some influence

on Berlusconi's Russia policy is not an easy task. One thing is
certain, however - it is not the foreign policy institutions
of the GOI. FM Frattini is widely seen as only the messenger for PM
Berlusconi's Russia policy - indeed he termed himself as much
to VP Cheney during the latter's September 2008 visit to Rome.
Within the professional ranks, resources and expertise are scant.
Italy's MFA contains only one full-time diplomat assigned to cover
Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union: the Office
Director. The Deputy Office Director position and single Desk Officer
position assigned to cover all the countries of the FSU are vacant.
Italy's dire budget situation is likely to prevent the hiring of
additional staff at the MFA for at least two years, according to one MF
source. The Office Director's direct supervisor - the A/S equivalent
- is also responsible for the Balkans and the rest of Europe, but
she, like Frattini, appears to have little or no input to GOI
Russia policy. The PM's staff does not fare much better. The
Office of the Diplomatic Advisor is thinly staffed - with only one
officer assigned to each geographic region. The position covering
Russia is staffed by a midlevel diplomat who is in the process of being
transferred. No replacement is likely to be named. As a result, the
officer covering the Middle East (also the deputy for the office)
will be forced to take on those duties in addition to his already
overwhelming portfolio and management duties.

¶10. (C/NF) In 2008 the MFA undertook an effort to produce a

long-term foreign policy strategy for the GOI. In a paper entitled
"Rapporto 2020" the MFA outlined its strategic vision for the next
decade and a half. The document notes that geostrategic realities have
created the need for Italy to adapt its foreign policy with regard to
Russia and calls for Italy to seek 'a privileged relationship' with
Moscow in order to press its overwhelmingly preeminent bilateral
concern: energy.

Rome 00000097 003 of 005

Energy Becomes Key Bilateral Issue

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶11. (C/NF) With virtually no domestic energy reserves, no

domestic nuclear power, and an ambitious parastatal energy company,
Italy's key bilateral concern with Russia has become the quest for
long-term guarantees of energy supplies. The GOI has supported ENI and
other energy giants' efforts to create a unique partnership with
Russia and Gazprom for long-term cooperation. ENI, Italy's most
prominent energy parastatal, wields immense political power; its
business strategy has focused on complicated geopolitical environments
generally perceived as overly risky by many of its international
competitors. ENI's lobbying efforts vis-(-vis the GOI are better
funded than most government offices. It hosts one diplomatic
advisor assigned from the MFA. Going by press reports alone, we
would judge that PM Berlusconi grants its director, Paolo Scaroni, as
much access as he does his own FM.xxxxxxxxxxxx. Members of political
parties on both sides of the aisle have told us that ENI is
one of the leading financial contributors to Italy's many
think-tanks - many of which produce public diplomacy discussions and
events on the importance of Italy-Russia relations. At one such event
in 2007, a conference on Central Asia, representatives from ENI and
Edison were given 30 minutes each to speak, while the four Foreign
Ministers and Deputy Foreign Minister of five Central Asian former
Soviet states were all crammed into a single hour. There is even
suspicion that ENI maintains journalists on its payroll.

¶12. (C/NF) Members of political parties from both sides of

the aisle have told us that ENI does not limit its dialogue with the
government to energy issues. One member of the opposition center-left
PD party told poloffs that ENI's presence in Russia exceeds that of
Italy's understaffed embassy. While it is unclear how much policy
coordination occurs between ENI and the Russian political
structure, the same PD party members noted that ENI had as much contact
with Russian political and economic leaders as the embassy, if not
more, and political messages were frequently passed through such
commercial/economic channels. Back in Rome, ENI maintains
strong contacts with members of the Italian parliament - something
the MFA does not do (apart from requested briefings to members of the
foreign affairs committees).

An Energy Policy without the Policy

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶13. (C/NF) ENI and other energy giants have managed to press
their case quite effectively within the highest ranks of the GOI.
Italian leaders on both sides of the aisle seem strangely unconcerned
about dependence on Russian energy. They point out that Italy
depended on Russian coal during the darkest days of the Cold War with n
dire consequence. Italians are also lulled into complacency by
the fact that geographic proximity to North African resources means
that they are far less dependent on Russia than are the Germans or the
former Eastern bloc countries.

¶14. (C/NF) During a March 2008 visit to ENI Headquarters

embassy staff were given a briefing on ENI's Russian energy
operations (available on Embassy Rome's Classified web site). ENI's
view of the European energy situation was disturbingly similar to that
of GAZPROM and the Kremlin, and at times laced with rhetorical
flourishes reminiscent of Soviet-era double-speak: according to ENI,
the real threat to Western Europe's energy security is not \ Russia --
it is Ukraine. The real solution to Europe's energy insecurity,
according to ENI, lies in more direct pipeline connections to Russian
gas fields and a need for pipelines that do not go through
Ukraine - the rationale for the South Stream and Nord Stream pipelines
(ref b).
ENI's engineering arm hopes to construct both pipelines using
experience gained in the construction of the Blue Stream
pipeline that connects Russia and Turkey under the Eastern portion of
the Black Sea. Additionally, ENI seeks full partnership with
Russia on the South Stream project. GOI and ENI contacts have reported
that the company was having trouble getting a firm Russian
commitment to this South Stream partnership. The plummeting price of
hydrocarbons may have reduced the economic incentives for this project,
but many analysts believe that Russian geo-strategic concerns will
trump business considerations on this project. The most recent
Russia- Ukraine gas dispute seems to have revived interest in the
Nord Stream and South Stream projects, especially among those who see
Ukraine as the problem.

Rome 00000097 004 of 005

¶15. (C/NF) Italy is not totally blind to the dangers of its

dependence on Russia, however, and it is taking some steps
that may prevent an increase in the percentage of their energy that
they get from Russia. Upon returning to power, Berlusconi announced
that he would return the country to nuclear power. While the GOI
seems serious, this project will require eye-popping expenditures,
long- term commitment, and the resolution of thorny environmental
problems. Some fear that the nuclear project was launched in response
to an oil price of $140 per barrel, and wonder if the Italian
commitment to nuclear power will recede if oil prices stay low. Italy
is also increasing its use of Liquid Natural Gas and is finishing
work on a new terminal in the Northern Adriatic. While
less-than-enthusiastic about the EU's complex Nabucco pipeline, the GOI
seems to be supporting the smaller-scale Turkey-Greece-Italy pipeline
project designed to bring Caspian gas to Western Europe. Edison, a
French company with Italian roots, is trying to determine if it
should commit to this project. While Azeri gas supplies and
Turkey's willingness to allow the gas to flow West are unresolved
issues, Edison believes its project has a chance of succeeding
because unlike Nabucco, it is small enough -- it believes -- not to
provoke opposition from Russia. The GOI -- especially powerful
Minister for Economic Development Scajola -- supports the TGI project
(in fact GOI officials complain if the U.S. sometimes seems to imply
that Nabucco should have priority). There is fear that a successful
launch of South Stream would -- by promising to meet demand -- doom
both South Stream and Nabucco.

A Foreign Policy Designed to Deny Russia Nothing

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶16. (C/NF) The combination of historical ideological

sympathy, energy dependence, lack of institutional influence, and a
close personal relationship between Berlusconi and Putin serve to
provide Russia with an apparently trusted ally, overtly willing to work
overtime within the EU on Moscow's behalf. Russia can count on Italy
to support its efforts to remove irritants in its relations with
the West, including:

- pressure on/within OSCE to overlook Russia's lack of

compliance with its legally binding Istanbul commitments on frozen
conflicts,
- weak support or even opposition to NATO efforts to build
closer ties to Georgia and Ukraine,
- weak initial support for international efforts to recognize
Kosovo's independence,
- unhelpful comments on U.S. bilateral Missile Defense plans
with Poland and Czech Republic,
- support for Russian President Medvedev's plans to redefine
European security architecture to undermine OSCE and NATO.
- support for Russian efforts to undermine EU and US energy
security initiatives for Europe.

¶17. (C/NF) In the past, Berlusconi's highly-prized personal

relationship with U.S. President Bush was an important
counterweight to Russian influence, but many pro-U.S. Italian party
officials on both sides of the aisle have worried to us that Bush's
departure could tempt Berlusconi to move closer to Russia. For his
part, Berlusconi has publicly stated that he would like to become a
bridge between the U.S. and Russia and to "educate a young and
inexperienced new American president" on how to deal with the Russians.
If the past is any guide, this will likely mean an intensified
effort to press the Russian agenda with the U.S.

Mitigating the Problem: Pushing Back on a Corrosive Influence

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶18. (C/NF) To tackle the problem head-on, Post has deployed

a robust diplomatic and public affairs strategy targeting key figures
inside and outside government. Our aim is two-fold: educate our
interlocutors more profoundly on Russian activities and thus
the context for U.S. policy, as well as build a counter- weight
of dissenting opinion on Russia policy, especially within
Berlusconi's political party. . Since the beginning of the summer, wit
Berlusconi's return to power and the Georgia crisis, we have
been engaging with GOI leaders aggressively at all levels. Pol,
PA and Econoffs have engaged party members, GOI contacts, think
tanks and even press to provide an alternative narrative to the
Berlusconi insistence that Russia is a democratic and stable country
that has been provoked by the West. The effort seems to be paying
off. The opposition has begun taking jabs at Berlusconi by portraying
him as choosing the wrong side of the debate. Some in the PdL have
begun to approach us privately to say that they would like greater
dialogue with us on the Russia issue, and have indicated their

Rome 00000097 005 of 005

interest in challenging Berlusconi's giddiness about Putin. While we

have a long way to go in changing the narrative, unfortunately, we have
help - in the form of a PM who appears increasingly to be the
mouthpiece of Putin.

Comment
- - - -

¶19. (C/NF) The bilateral relationship between the U.S. and

Italy is excellent and encompasses tremendous cooperation
on many levels and on many fronts.
Unfortunately, Berlusconi efforts to "repair" the relationship
between the West and Russia (which as he told the Ambassador in their
farewell meeting on February 23, "sticks in my gut as a large
undigested mass") are threatening his credibility and
becoming a real irritant in our relationship. We can help
get him back on the right track by sending him a clear signal
that the U.S. does not need an interlocutor for its important bilateral
relationship with Russia and that his insistence on undermining existin
structures and channels based on common interests and shared values
within the alliance in exchange for short term stability is not a
strategy Washington wishes to pursue.
Spogli

2009-05-20

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001273

NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR INR/I

EO 12958 DECL: 05/19/2019

TAGS PREL, PGOV, ENRG, EPET, IT, RS">RS
SUBJECT: ITALIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS (C-RE8-02675)
REF: A. 08 STATE 134386 B. MOSCOW 572

Classified By: DCM Eric Rubin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary

-------

1. (S/NF) Economic ties, especially long-term gas contracts, are a pillar of Russia-Italy relations and affect
Italy's policies toward Russia. Italian gas company ENI and Russian Gazprom have supply commitments in
place until 2035, as well as a joint-construction agreement for the South Stream pipeline. ENI's company
representative is often called Italy's second ambassador to Russia. The personal relationship between Prime
Ministers Vladimir Putin and Silvio Berlusconi is the other key element of Russia-Italy relations, with Putin's
family spending long visits at the Berlusconi family mansion in Sardinia at Berlusconi's expense. Italian
diplomats enjoy excellent access to Russian officials. Should Italy stop seeking to moderate European
states' Russian policies, the GOR would likely need to alter its political calculus. End Summary.

Economics affects politics

--------------------------

2. (C) Russia obtains significant economic benefits from Italy, gaining access to its equipment and
technology, its stable market for gas and oil, and its highly desired consumer goods. In return, Russia
provides Italy good offices for access to Central Asian supplies of gas and consumer markets. Italian
companies have also looked to invest in Russia's aviation sector and electricity generation, although the
economic crisis put many of these efforts on hold.

3. (C) However, the economic interdependency does not come without other costs. Italian Embassy First
Secretary Lorenzo Fanara told us that the countries' economic ties were strong enough to affect Itally's
political stance toward Russia. He said Italian leaders, politicians, and businessmen would always be
"careful" in dealing with Russia, as Italy exported to Russia over 10 billion Euros worth of goods annually,
most of it produced by small and medium-sized companies. "Russia is simply too important of an economic
partner for us," Fanara explained. While the GOI understood the shortcomings of the Russian government
(read: adherence to democratic values and freedoms), it could not afford to be too harsh in its criticism.

Deep ties on gas

----------------

4. (C) The crown jewels of Italy's business interests with Russia are ENI's gas contracts with Gazprom
through 2035 and its 50-50 partnership with Gazprom in the South Stream pipeline project. The mo...

2009-06-09
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 000649

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE CHARGE D’AFFAIRES

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ITALIAN PM BERLUSCONI’S JUNE 15 VISIT TO WASHINGTON
REF: A) ROME 97 B) MOSCOW 1273
ROME 00000649 001.6 OF 004

Classified By: Elizabeth L. Dibble, Charge d’Affaires, for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)

¶1. (C/NF) Mr. President, your meeting with Italian PM Silvio Berlusconi comes
at a time when his closest advisors fear Italy is losing the credibility and
influence that it enjoyed in Washington under the previous U.S. administration.
In fact, while Italy has been a stalwart partner and participant in nearly every
U.S.-led security operation around the world since the end of the Cold War,
domestic political foibles and economic malaise are diluting its international
influence. Italy continues to support our efforts in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq,
and the Balkans, but its diplomatic, economic and military institutions, which
the Berlusconi government and its predecessors have starved for resources, are
sorely stretched. Berlusconi and his government have tried to compensate for
Italy’s failure to invest in its instruments of national power by presenting
Italy as a mediator and interlocutor with difficult actors on major
international issues. This self-appointed role has sometimes complicated
international efforts. On Iran, for example, Italy’s role under the previous
government gave Tehran the impression that the international community was
divided. More recently, GOI actions have provided a European platform for
Russia’s efforts to challenge NATO security interests in Europe. Berlusconi will
certainly present himself as the best hope for moderating Russian behavior and
will seek a signal from you that he has a mandate to speak on the West’s behalf.
He will also seek to use Italy’s G8 presidency to address issues far beyond the
scope and effectiveness of the organization. We should discourage both
instincts. Italy has an important voice in the Euro-Atlantic community, but its
efforts have proven constructive only when undertaken in coordination with the
U.S. and other key allies.

Signor Presidente, il suo incontro col Primo Ministro italiano Silvio Berlusconi
cade in un momento in cui i suoi consiglieri più vicini temono che l’Italia stia
perdendo la credibilità e influenza di cui ha goduto a Washington sotto la
precedente amministrazione. In effetti, mentre l’Italia è stata un solido
partner e alleato in quasi tutte le operazioni guidate dagli Stati Uniti nel
mondo dalla fine della Guerra Fredda, le debolezze politiche interne e i guai
economici stanno affievolendo la sua influenza internazionale. L’Italia continua
ad appoggiare il nostro impegno in Afghanistan, Libano, Iraq e nei Balcani, ma
le sue istituzioni diplomatiche, militari ed economiche, a cui il governo
Berlusconi e i suoi predecessori hanno sottratto risorse, sono molto affaticate.
Berlusconi e il suo governo hanno cercato di compensare la povertà di
investimenti nei suoi strumenti di forza nazionale presentando l’Italia come un
mediatore e interlocutore con i protagonisti difficili delle maggiori tensioni
internazionali. Questo ruolo autonominato qualche volta ha complicato le
iniziative internazionali. Sull’Iran, per esempio, il ruolo italiano durante il
precedente governo aveva dato a Teheran l’impressione che la comunità
internazionale fosse divisa. Più di recente le azioni del governo hanno dato
alla Russia un palcoscenico europeo per sfidare gli interessi della Nato sulla
sicurezza in Europa.

Berlusconi si presenterà certamente come la migliore speranza per moderare i

comportamenti russi e cercherà da lei dei segnali che gli diano il mandato di
parlare a nome dell’Occidente. Cercherà anche di usare la presidenza italiana
del G8 per affrontare temi ben al di là degli obiettivi e capacità
dell’organizzazione. Dobbiamo scoraggiare entrambe le tentazioni. L’Italia ha
una voce importante nella comunità euroatlantica, ma i suoi sforzi si sono
mostrati costruttivi solo quando intrapresi in coordinamento con gli Stati Uniti
egli altri alleati maggiori.

Berlusconi the Politician

-------------------------

¶2. (C/NF) Our relationship with Berlusconi is complex. He is vocally pro-

American and has helped address our interests on many levels in a manner and to
a degree that the previous government was unwilling or unable to do, since his
return to power last spring as well as in his previous turns in government. In
his first 90 days in office, he approved a controversial U.S. base expansion
that had been halted by bureaucratic inaction and anti-American political
opposition; eliminated caveats on Italian troops in Afghanistan; and allowed us
to base two of three AFRICOM component commands in Italy. At the same time, he
has criticized Missile Defense, NATO enlargement and support for Kosovo’s
independence as American provocations of Russia. He claimed Russian PM Putin’s
military push into Georgia in August 2008 was necessary to end the bloodshed of
innocents caused by Georgian President Saakashvili. He displays an overweening
self-confidence born of stable and strong political popularity that has made him
deaf to dissenting opinion. The strict control he exercises over his government
and party inhibits his staff from giving him unpleasant messages. His unorthodox
governing style, coupled with his frequent verbal gaffes and high-profile
scandals (including public bickering with his wife about his alleged
philandering), have caused many, including some inside the U.S. government, to
dismiss him as feckless, vain, and ineffective as a modern European leader.

La nostra relazione con Berlusconi è complessa. A parole è filoamericano e ci ha

aiutato a sviluppare i nostri interessi su molti piani in un modo e una
dimensione che il governo precedente non era intenzionato o capace di
perseguire, sia dal suo ritorno al potere la scorsa primavera che nei suoi
precedenti governi. Nei suoi primi 90 giorni ha approvato la creazione di una
controversa base statunitense che era stata bloccata da un’inerzia diplomatica e
un’opposizione politica antiamericana; ha eliminato le opposizioni alla presenza
di truppe italiane in Afghanistan; e ci ha permesso di installare due o tre
comandi Africom in Italia. Allo stesso tempo, ha criticato la difesa
missilistica, l’allargamento ella Nato e il sostegno all’indipendenza del Kosovo
definendole provocazioni americane nei confronti della Russia. Ha sostenuto che
il colpo militare di Putin in Georgia fosse necessario per porre fine allo
sterminio di innocenti causato dal presidente georgiano Saakashvili. Mostra
un’esagerata sicurezza di sé basata su una solida e stabile popolarità politica
che lo ha reso sordo a ogni dissenso. Lo stretto controllo che esercita sul suo
governo e sul suo partito impedisce al suo staff di dargli informazioni
spiacevoli. Il suo stile di governo non ortodosso, assieme alle sue frequenti
gaffe verbali e agli scandali da prima pagina (comprese le liti pubbliche sui
suoi pretesi dongiovannismi) hanno portato molti, anche nel governo degli USA, a
ritenerlo inetto, vacuo e inefficace come leader europeo moderno.

¶3. (C/NF) His shortcomings notwithstanding, marginalizing Berlusconi would

limit important cooperation with a key ally. Berlusconi is one of Europe’s most
enduring politicians whose popularity in Italy will guarantee that he will
influence Italian politics for many years still to come. He has arrested the
trend of weak, short-lived Italian governments that has plagued this country
since the end of the Second World War. When successfully engaged, he has shown
the willingness to adopt policies, however unpopular, in line with ours --
including support for an expanded NATO role in Afghanistan and Turkey’s
membership in the EU. When ignored, he seeks to carve out a visible,
international, and
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frequently unhelpful role for himself. Dealing with Berlusconi, therefore,
requires a careful balance of close coordination with him and his key advisors
while avoiding giving the impression that he can speak on our behalf with many
of the world’s difficult actors.

Nonostante i suoi difetti personali, emarginare Berlusconi limiterebbe i livelli

di cooperazione con un alleato importante. Berlusconi è uno dei politici che
dura da più tempo in Europa e la sua popolarità in Italia garantisce la sua
influenza del panorama politico italiano dei prossimi anni. Ha fatto terminare
il periodo dei governi italiani inefficienti e deboli che hanno afflitto questo
paese dalla fine della Seconda guerra mondiale. Quando è stato coinvolto con
efficacia, ha dimostrato la volontà di assumere provvedimenti, anche impopolari,
in linea con i nostri, incluso il sostegno all’espansione del ruolo della NATO
in Afghanistan e all’entrata della Turchia nell’Unione Europea. Quando viene
ignorato, tende a ritagliarsi un ruolo visibile e spesso poco utile per sé nel
quadro internazionale. Avere a che fare con Berlusconi, comunque, richiede un
buon equilibrio e una buona coordinazione con lui e con i suoi principali
consiglieri e al tempo stesso occorre evitare di dare l’impressione che egli
possa parlare a nome nostro con i leader più difficili del mondo.

¶4. (C/NF) Italy held elections for the European Parliament on June 6 and 7,
which reaffirmed Berlusconi’s People of Liberty (PDL) party as Italy’s largest
party, reaching 35 percent, well ahead of the main opposition Democratic Party’s
26 percent. While Berlusconi does not have a competitive rival in the center
left, his party missed the 40 percent mark that it was aiming for, and witnessed
the growth of xenophobic coalition ally Northern League (LN). PDL is a
personality-driven party, whose members tell us that the ideology is little more
than “Berlusconismo.” The missed target of 40 percent can be attributed to an
over-ambitious Berlusconi, as well as the turnout-depressing effects of weeks of
personal attacks by the center left in the runup to the election that included
allegations of fiscal and sexual impropriety. An enduring result of the election
will be the heightened competition between PDL and LN, who now dominate Italian
politics. LN’s tough stands on security and against immigration have won broad
approval, even as Berlusconi has tried to stem the flow of PDL voters to LN by
descending to the anti-immigrant rhetoric usually favored by the Northern
League. Additionally, after this mild electoral setback, we can expect
Berlusconi to use his White House meeting and his hosting of the G8 to
underscore to Italians the important figure he cuts on the world stage.

In Italia ci sono state le elezioni per il Parlamento Europeo nei giorni del 6 e
del 7 giugno, che hanno confermato il Popolo della Libertà, il partito di
Berlusconi, come il principale partito dell’Italia con il 35% dei consensi,
molto avanti rispetto al principale partito dell’opposizione, il Partito
Democratico al 26%. Anche se Berlusconi non ha un rivale competitivo nel
centrosinistra, il suo partito ha mancato l’obiettivo del 40%, e ha dovuto
registrare la crescita del partito xenofobo della sua coalizione, la Lega Nord.
Il PdL è un partito basato sulla personalizzazione del suo leader, l’ideologia
del partito è riassumibile nel “Berlusconismo”. Il mancato obiettivo del 40% può
essere attribuito alle velleità di Berlusconi, così come agli effetti di
settimane di attacchi personali da parte del centrosinistra durante la campagna
elettorale che hanno anche compreso illazioni su illeciti fiscali e scandali
sessuali. Un effetto destinato a durare nel tempo delle elezioni sarà la
crescente competizione tra PdL e Lega Nord, che ora dominano il quadro politico
italiano. Le posizioni intransigenti della Lega Nord sulla sicurezza e contro
l’immigrazione hanno ottenuto molta approvazione, anche se Berlusconi ha cercato
di deviare il flusso di voti dalla Lega al PdL utilizzando la medesima retorica
contro l’immigrazione. Inoltre, dopo questo lieve ribasso elettorale, possiamo
aspettarci che Berlusconi utilizzi l’incontro alla Casa Bianca e il fatto di
ospitare il G8 per mostrare agli italiani la sua importanza su scala
internazionale.

Economic Crisis
---------------

¶5. (C) Prudent (some would say stodgy) banking practices allowed Italy to avoid
the global financial sector meltdown. Italy’s banks simply did not engage in
sub-prime lending, and they did not buy the toxic assets that caused so much
trouble in the U.S. and elsewhere. But Italy has not been able to avoid the pain
of the worldwide recession that has followed the financial crisis. Italy’s
economic growth rate -- which was relatively low even before the crisis -- has
dropped precipitously owing to sharp contractions in its export markets and
falling domestic demand. Unemployment is expected to exceed eight percent this
year and to rise further in 2010. Government tax revenues are, not unexpectedly,
off sharply. Italy’s already high level of government debt and the debt ceilings
that come with EU membership significantly limit the government’s ability to
provide fiscal stimulus for the economy.

Crisi economica
Le pratiche bancarie prudenti (qualcuno direbbe noiose) hanno consentito
all’Italia di evitare il tracollo del settore finanziario. Le banche dell’Italia
non si sono semplicemente impegnate sul fronte dei sub-prime, e non hanno
acquistato titoli tossici che hanno causato così tanti problemi negli Stati
Uniti e altrove. Ma l’Italia non è stata in grado di evitare i dolorosi effetti
della recessione economica che ha seguito la crisi finanziaria. Il tasso di
crescita dell’Italia, che era relativamente basso anche prima della crisi, è
precipitato a causa del netto calo delle esportazioni e della ridotta domanda
interna. La disoccupazione dovrebbe superare l’otto percento quest’anno e salire
ancora nel 2010. Gli introiti dovuti alle imposte sono – non inaspettatamente –
molto bassi. L’alto livello del debito pubblico dell’Italia e i limiti imposti
dall’Unione Europea impediscono al governo di realizzare stimoli fiscali per
smuovere l’economia.

¶6. (C/NF) Berlusconi’s stewardship of his G8 Presidency has been marked by a

proliferation of Ministerial and sub-ministerial meetings coupled with a last-
minute change of summit venue from Sardinia to the earthquake-stricken city of
L’Aquila that took even his Sherpa by surprise. He and his cabinet tend to
regard Italy’s G8 year more as an opportunity to curry favor with G8 outsiders
such as Egypt, Spain, and Libya than as a tool to address the world’s problems.
However, his desire to prevent the G8 from taking a back seat to the G20 on his
watch has driven an ambitious agenda that may make useful contributions on
climate change, Africa, development, and food security. He will be eager to work
with you to build a legacy of G8 deliverables that will bear the Italian label.
The Major Economies Forum meeting during the G8 summit, which will include the
leaders of 17-plus countries that emit over 80 percent of global emissions, will
be an important chance to mobilize high-level consensus in the run-up to the
December UN climate change talks in Copenhagen.

6. G8
Il G8 organizzato da Berlusconi è stato segnato da un alto numero di incontri
con ministri e sottosegretari insieme alla decisione dell’ultimo minuto di
spostare il summit dalla Sardegna alla città dell’Aquila devastata da un
terremoto, una decisione che ha sorpreso anche i suoi assistenti più fedeli.
Egli e il suo cabinetto vedono nel G8 italiano più una opportunità di
accattivarsi l’Egitto, la Spagna e la Libia rispetto alla possibilità di
affrontare i problemi del mondo. Tuttavia, il suo desiderio di evitare che il G8
diventi secondario rispetto al G20, a suo modo di vedere, ha fatto sì che vi sia
un’agenda ambiziosa che potrebbe portare a importanti contributi per il
riscaldamento globale, l’Africa e lo sviluppo. Sarà desideroso di collaborare
con lei per costruire una eredità di iniziative del G8 che porteranno
l’etichetta dell’Italia. L’incontro del Major Economies Forum nel corso del G8,
che comprenderà i leader di oltre 17 paesi che creano l’80 percento delle
emissioni inquinanti su scala globale, sarà un’importante occasione per trovare
un ampio consento in vista della riunione di Copenhagen a Dicembre dell’ONU sul
cambiamento climatico.

Guantanamo Detainees
¶7. (C/NF) Berlusconi welcomed your decision to close Guantanamo, and has
publicly and repeatedly underscored Italy’s desire to support the move by taking
detainees. FM Frattini recently outlined for AG Holder the efforts Italian
officials have been making within the EU to negotiate a
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common EU framework that will open the door to individual country agreements
with the U.S. While the junior partner in Berlusconi’s coalition opposes taking
any detainees, Berlusconi has made it clear that he views this as a moral
commitment to support the U.S.

7. Detenuti di Guantanamo
Berlusconi ha accolto la sua decisione di chiudere Guantanamo, e ha
pubblicamente e ripetutamente sottolineato il desiderio dell’Italia di sostenere
questa mossa accogliendo alcuni detenuti. Il ministro degli esteri Frattini ha
confermato al ministro della giustizia statunitense Eric Holder le offerte dei
funzionari italiani presso l’Unione Europea per negoziare un progetto di azione
comune che aiuterà i diversi paesi a stringere degli accordi con gli Stati
Uniti. Anche se la minoranza interna alla coalizione di Berlusconi si oppone a
prendere questi detenuti, Berlusconi ha detto chiaramente che vede questo come
un impegno morale nei confronti degli Stati Uniti.

Russia
¶8. (C/NF) Dependence on Russian energy, lucrative and frequently nontransparent
business dealings between Italy and Russia, and a close, personal relationship
between Berlusconi and Putin have distorted the PM’s view to the point that he
believes much of the friction between the West and Russia has been caused by the
U.S. and NATO. Berlusconi believes he, acting as a mediator, can restore a
spirit of dialogue and cooperation between Europe, the U.S. and Russia, but
largely on Russia’s terms, through indefinitely postponing NATO’s outreach to
Ukraine and Georgia, diluting the EU’s efforts to promote democracy in Belarus,
and undermining OSCE’s important role in promoting human and democratic values
across the whole of Europe. Berlusconi has publicly proposed to mediate your
relationship with Russian President Medvedev and is hoping you will give him a
signal, however small, that he has your blessing to do so. Instead, you can let
him know that we believe that issues of security that affect the transatlantic
community should be addressed by the Alliance at large, and that the U.S. is not
prepared to sacrifice values in exchange for short-term stability predicated on
Russian promises of good behavior. And we will react -- and expect others who
share these values to do so as well -- when Russia crosses a red-line, for
instance in threatening the sovereignty of neighboring states.

8. La dipendenza dalle fonti energetiche della Russia, gli accordi poco

trasparenti e molto vantaggiosi tra Italia e Russia, e un rapporto personale
molto stretto tra Berlusconi e Putin hanno distorto le visioni del primo
ministro a tal punto da convincerlo che buona parte delle frizioni tra Occidente
e Russia siano causate dagli Stati Uniti e dalla NATO. Agendo da mediatore,
Berlusconi pensa di poter riaprire il dialogo e la cooperazione tra l’Europa,
gli Stati Uniti e la Russia, ma concentrandosi soprattutto sulla Russia,
ritardando l’influenza della NATO sull’Ucraina e sulla Georgia, diluendo gli
sforzi dell’Unione Europea per promotore la democrazia in Bielorussia, e minando
l’importante ruolo dell’OSCE nel promuovere valori umani e democratici
attraverso l’Europa. Berlusconi ha pubblicamente proposto di mediare le sue
relazioni con il presidente russo Medvedev e confida che lei gli darà un
segnale, anche piccolo, per dimostrare il suo consenso. Invece, lei potrebbe
dire a Berlusconi che noi pensiamo che i problemi di sicurezza che interessano
la comunità occidentale dovrebbero essere affrontati dall’Alleanza nel pieno
delle sue forze, e che gli Stati Uniti non sono preparati per scarificare alcuni
valori in cambio di una stabilità nel breve periodo sulla base delle promesse
della Russia di comportarsi bene. E che reagiremo – e lo stesso confidiamo farà
chi condivide i nostri valori – quando la Russia oltrepassa il limite, per
esempio minacciando la sovranità degli stati vicini.

Energy
¶9. (C/NF) Berlusconi’s close personal ties with Putin and the very strong
corporate ties between Italian energy parastatal ENI and Russia’s Gazprom often
put Italy squarely at odds with USG efforts to reduce Europe’s dependence on
Russian energy. For example, the Italian government is deeply ambivalent about
energy projects that would help Europe diversify its energy imports, while at
the same time it is supportive of other projects that would increase Europe’s
Russian energy dependency. ENI, 30-percent owned by the Italian Government,
often dictates GOI energy policy and uses its influence, through the GOI, to
block EU energy market liberalization plans. Italy is taking some steps,
however, in the right direction, by supporting energy projects that will
diversify its own energy sources. It would be helpful if you could raise with
Berlusconi long-standing USG concerns about European energy security,
emphasizing that increasing the flow of Russian gas around Ukraine is not the
same as a policy seeking a true diversity of energy sources, routes and
technologies.

9. Energia
I rapporti personali stretti tra Berlusconi e Putin e i rapporti ancora più
stretti tra la società parastatale italiana ENI e quella russa Gazprom mettono
spesso l’Italia in una posizione nettamente in contrasto con gli sforzi del
governo statunitense di ridurre la dipendenza dell’Europa dalle fonti
energetiche russe. Per esempio, il governo italiano è sostanzialmente
ambivalente sui progetti che dovrebbero aiutare l’Europa a diversificare le sue
importazioni energetiche, ma al tempo stesso sostiene altri progetti che
aumenterebbero la presenza dell’energia dalla Russia in Europa. L’ENI, posseduta
al 30% dal governo italiano, spesso condizionale le politiche energetiche del
governo e utilizza la sua influenza, attraverso il governo italiano, per
bloccare i piani di liberalizzazione del mercato energetico in Europa. Tuttavia,
l’Italia sta compiendo alcuni passi nella giusta direzione sostenemmo progetti
che diversificheranno le sue fonti energetiche. Sarebbe utile se lei potesse
portare all’attenzione di Berlusconi le preoccupazioni del governo statunitense
sulla sicurezza energetica europea, enfatizzando il fatto che aumentando i
flussi di gas russo superando l’Ucraina non è la stessa cosa rispetto a
ricercare diverse nuove fonti energetiche e nuove tecnologie.

¶10. (C) The Berlusconi Government is pursuing plans to bring back nuclear power
to Italy. U.S.-based companies Westinghouse and GE face stiff competition from
foreign rivals, particularly France, whose governments are heavily lobbying the
GOI. A word to Berlusconi that the U.S. expects this to be a fair and
transparent competition is critical if U.S. firms are to have a fair chance to
bid for Italian nuclear energy projects.

10. L’amministrazione Berlusconi sta cercando di riportare l’energia nucleare in

Italia. Le aziende statunitensi Westinghouse e GE stanno affrontano la
competizione dei rivali stranieri, in particolare della Francia, che stanno
facendo pressioni sul governo italiano. È cruciale che gli Stati Uniti chiedano
a Berlusconi una competizione corretta e trasparente se le aziende americane
vogliono avere le giuste possibilità di puntare ai progetti nucleari dell’Italia
Iran

¶11. (C/NF) With Italy frustrated by its exclusion from the P5-plus-1
negotiating circle, Berlusconi will highlight Italy’s would-be role as an
interlocutor between the West, Israel and Iran, claiming excellent relations
with all parties involved. He may also push for the U.S. to drop the P5 1
framework altogether. Italian officials were thrilled by your commitment to
embark upon direct diplomatic engagement with Iran, but cannot resist the
impulse to try to be “present at the creation.” FM Frattini has worked
strenuously to lock in high-level Iranian attendance at the June 26-27
Afghanistan-Pakistan Outreach meeting, hoping thereby to play host to the first
U.S.-Iranian ministerial encounter in decades.
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11. Iran
Con un’Italia delusa dall’esclusione dal P5 più 1 [i cinque paesi membri del
consiglio di sicurezza dell'ONU più la Germania, ndr], Berlusconi sottolineerà
la volontà dell’Italia di essere un interlocutore tra Occidente, Israele e Iran,
rivendicando le eccellenti relazioni con tutte le parti coinvolte. Potrebbe
anche spingere per ottenere una revisione complessiva del modello P5 più 1. Le
autorità italiane sono rimaste entusiaste dal suo impegno di avviare rapporti
diplomatici diretti con l’Iran, ma non riescono a resistere alla tentazione di
essere parti attive nella creazione dell’evento. Il ministro degli esteri
Frattini ha lavorato a lungo per garantire una presenza iraniana all’incontro
tra Afghanistan e Pakistan del 26 e 27 giugno, sperando di rivestire un ruolo
nel primo incontro tra delegati statunitensi e iraniani degli ultimi decenni.

Libya
¶12. (C/NF) Berlusconi has continued Italy’s policy of developing an expanded
relationship with Libya, largely in order to stem the tide of irregular
migration from Libyan shores, but also to gain advantageous access to Libya’s
oil reserves for Italian firms, mainly ENI. As follow-up to the 2008 Libya-Italy
Friendship Treaty -- which committed Libya to sterner measures to deter
irregular migrants from entering Italy from its shores, but also offered 5
billion USD in development assistance -- Libyan leader Qadhafi will pay an
historic first official visit to Rome June 10-12, just before Berlusconi’s
Washington visit. As the current African Union President, Qadhafi will be at the
G8 Summit in L’Aquila and we anticipate Berlusconi may lobby you to meet with
the Libyan leader during your visit.

12. Libia
Berlusconi ha proseguito nella sua politica per sviluppare ed espandere le
relazioni tra Italia e Libia, principalmente per arrestare il flusso di
immigrati irregolari provenienti dalle coste libiche, ma anche per trarre un
accesso più vantaggioso alle riserve di petrolio libico per le società italiane,
come l’ENI. Come conseguenza del Trattato di amicizia tra Libia e Italia del
2008 – che ha impegnato la Libia a intensificare le misure per trattenere gli
immigrati irregolari ed evitare che dalle proprie coste arrivino in Italia, e
che ha anche portato a cinque miliardi di dollari di investimenti per lo
sviluppo del paese – il leader libico Gheddafi andrà per la prima volta in
visita ufficiale a Roma tra il 10 e il 12 giugno, poco prima della visita di
Berlusconi a Washington. Come attuale presidente dell’Unione Africana, Gheddafi
sarà presente al summit del G8 all’Aquila e le anticipo che Berlusconi potrebbe
fare pressioni per farla incontrare con il leader libico durante la visita.

A Partner in Security
¶13. (C/NF) Berlusconi has maintained a significant military commitment in
Afghanistan (2,600 troops, mostly in Italy’s Regional-Command West), but has
dropped from fourth- to sixth-largest ISAF contributor as other countries like
France and Canada have augmented their troop levels. At Stasbourg-Kehl, his
government pledged modest increases to cover election security which, if made
permanent, would put Italy back in the top tier of ISAF contributors. He has
also supported the creation of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan,
doubling the number of Carabinieri police trainers to over 100. Italy has been
an anemic contributor to international aid efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan
and has cut overall foreign assistance by more than 60 percent in this year’s
budget. However, Berlusconi knows this is a priority area for the U.S. and will
likely respond positively if you press him to do more in the region.

13. Un alleato per la sicurezza

Berlusconi ha mantenuto un impegno militare significativo per l’Afghanistan
(2.600 uomini, perlopiù provenienti dai comandi occidentali italiani), ma è
passato da quarto a sesto più importante partecipante nella missione ISAF
(International Security Assistance Force) quando la Francia e il Canada hanno
deciso di aumentare i loro contingenti. All’incontro di Strasburgo – Kehl, il
suo governo si è impegnato per un modesto aumento per coprire la sicurezza nel
periodo elettorale che, se reso permanente, porterebbe nuovamente l’Italia nel
novero dei principali partecipanti alla missione ISAF. Berlusconi ha anche
sostenuto la creazione di una missione per inviare formatori della NATO in
Afghanistan, raddoppiando il numero di Carabinieri per la formazione e
portandolo oltre cento unità. L’Italia è stato un partecipante privo di vitalità
negli sforzi internazionali sui fronti dell’Afghanistan e del Pakistan e ha
tagliato i fondi per le missioni all’estero del 60 percento nel budget di
quest’anno. Tuttavia, Berlusconi sa che questa è una priorità per gli Stati
Uniti e probabilmente sarà collaborativo se lei lo spingerà a fare di più per
l’area.

¶14. (C) Our shared security interests with Italy go beyond Afghanistan. U.S.
facilities in Italy provide unmatched freedom of action and are critical to our
ability to project stability into the Mediterranean, Middle East and North
Africa. We have 15,000 U.S. military on six Italian bases and these
installations host some of our most advanced capabilities deployed outside the
U.S. Our bases and activities out of Italy are not uniformly popular, but PM
Berlusconi, in this government as in his last, has made preserving this security
relationship a priority, and the GOI has invariably come through on our top
requests, despite domestic political risks. The GOI has approved the expansion
of our base at Vicenza to consolidate the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the deployment
of the USAF Global Hawk UAV in Sicily, and the establishment of AFRICOM Army and
Navy Component Commands on Italian soil. Italy’s leadership in other overseas
missions helps us concentrate our forces on our top priorities. In addition to
its troops in Afghanistan, Italy currently has 2,300 in the Balkans, 2,400 in
Lebanon, and is the leading contributor to the NATO Training Mission in Iraq.

14. I nostri interessi comuni con l’Italia vanno oltre l’Afghanistan. Le

strutture statunitensi in Italia consentono una libertà d’azione incomparabile e
sono critiche per la nostra capacità di mantenere stabili le aree del
Mediterraneo, del Medio Oriente e del Nord Africa. Abbiamo quindicimila uomini
nelle sei basi italiane e queste installazioni militari ospitano alcune delle
nostre più avanzate risorse sviluppate fuori dagli Stati Uniti. Le nostre basi e
le nostre attività fuori dall’Italia non sono molto popolari, ma il primo
ministro Berlusconi, in questo governo, ha deciso di rendere prioritari i
rapporti legati alla sicurezza, e il governo italiano ha sempre accettato le
nostre richieste, nonostante i rischi per la politica interna. Il governo
italiano ha approvato l’espansione della base di Vicenza per consolidare la 173
brigata dell’aviazione, lo sviluppo della USAF Global Hawk UAV in Sicilia e la
possibilità di far stabilire sul territorio italiano l’AFRICO e i comandi della
Marina. La leadership dell’Italia in altre missioni oltreoceano ci consente di
concentrare i nostri sforzi sulle nostre priorità. In aggiunta alle sue truppe
in Afghanistan, l’Italia ha al momento 2.300 uomini impegnati nei Balcani, 2.400
in Libano ed è uno dei principali partner nella NATO Trading Mission in Iraq.

Conclusion
¶15. (C/NF) The robust U.S.-Italian relationship provides us with major national
security benefits in our military missions overseas, our own power projection,
and on a broad law enforcement agenda, but the Prime Minister is an erratic
steward. It might be tempting to dismiss Berlusconi as a frivolous interlocutor,
with his personal foibles, public gaffes and sometimes unpredictable policy
judgment, but we believe this would be a mistake. Despite his faults, Berlusconi
has been the touchstone of Italian politics for the last 15 years, and every
indication is that he will be around for years to come. When we are able to
successfully engage him in pursuit of our common objectives, he has proved an
ally and friend to the United States. He respects and admires the U.S., and is
eager to build a strong and successful relationship with you. DIBBLE

15. Conclusioni
Le forti relazioni tra Stati Uniti e Italia ci consentono di avere maggiori
garanzie per la sicurezza per le nostre missioni militari oltreoceano, sulla
nostra area di influenza e sulla nostra agenda sul diritto internazionale, ma il
primo ministro è una guida imprevedibile. Quella di liquidare Berlusconi come un
interlocutore poco serio, con le sue fissazioni personali, le sue gaffe e
talvolta il suo modo di agire spregiudicato in politica, potrebbe essere una
tentazione, ma pensiamo si tratterebbe di un errore. Nonostante i suoi difetti,
Berlusconi è stato la pietra di paragone della politica italiana per gli ultimi
15 anni, e tutto sembra indicare che lo sarà ancora per gli anni a venire.
Quando siamo stati in grado di coinvolgerlo per ottenere obiettivi comuni, egli
si è dimostrato un alleato e un amico degli Stati Uniti. Rispetta e ammira gli
Stati Uniti, ed è desideroso di costruire una relazione forte e di successo con
lei.

2009-06-27

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000755

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2019

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, IT
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PARTICIPATION IN
THE G8 L'AQUILA SUMMIT, JULY 8-10

ROME 00000755 001.2 OF 003

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Elizabeth Dibble for Reason 1.4 (b)
and (d)

Mr. President, welcome to L'Aquila.

1. (C) BEGIN SUMMARY: This G8 Summit in L'Aquila is the

culmination of a busy year for the Italian G8 Presidency.
Prime Minister Berlusconi is very pleased to host this event,
to host you, and to demonstrate his role as elder statesman
of the G8 "club." In Italy, all eyes will be on Berlusconi
and how he handles this summit, which comes while the Italian
and foreign press are full of lurid allegations involving his
personal life. With members of Berlusconi's party fearing
that new allegations will come out before or during the
summit, the Prime Minister is hoping to use the event to
demonstrate that he is respected internationally.

2. (C) Italy has fielded an overly-ambitious G8 agenda in

2009, addressing global financial stability (while
acknowledging G20 primacy in this area), sustainable
development (particularly with regard to Africa), climate,
energy security, Afghanistan/Pakistan, non-proliferation,
piracy, food security and global trade. Forging a consensus
on these issues has been a painstaking process but Italy has
done its best to channel its unwieldy ambitions into an
outcome that is acceptable to its G8 partners and which lays
the groundwork for effective future action. That said, a
proliferation of issues and an ever-expanding roster of
invitees has characterized the Italian effort, detracting
from the cohesiveness of the event, and perhaps from the
Italians' ultimate goal of ensuring that the G8 remain
relevant. END SUMMARY.

3. (C) Mr. President, welcome to the G8 Summit in L'Aquila.

PM Berlusconi has been looking forward for months to playing
host to his third G8 Summit. He is also looking forward to
seeing you again after your very positive June 15 meeting in
Washington. The Summit was originally scheduled to take
place on the island of La Maddalena, off the coast of
Sardinia, and construction on the Summit venue was well
underway when in April 2009 Berlusconi announced that the
Summit would be moved to L'Aquila, site of the April 6, 2009
earthquake that killed 298 and left 65,000 displaced.
Berlusconi's rationale was that the event would bring
much-needed revenue to the stricken area and impart to the
Summit a "sober" tone more in tune with the current austere
economic times than the resort-studded coastline of Sardinia.
L'Aquila, a beautiful medieval city nestled in the heart of
the Appenine Mountains, is still recovering from the April 6
quake. Many residents are still living in tents and historic
buildings in the downtown core are held together by steel
bands as crews work around the clock to rebuild.

-----------------------------------------
President Berlusconi's Political Fortunes
-----------------------------------------

4. (C) PM Silvio Berlusconi is currently embroiled in

scandals concerning his private life, including allegations
of improper sexual relationships. In turn, Berlusconi has
aggressively gone on the offensive, blaming this situation on
a plot orchestrated by international and domestic enemies in
an effort to smear his name prior to the G8 Summit.
Historically, Berlusconi's many domestic opponents have
chosen to launch their "attacks" during high-profile
international conferences being held in Italy: in 1994, at

ROME 00000755 002.2 OF 003

the Naples UN ministerial on transnational crime, Berlusconi

was charged with corrupting the Italian financial police; in
2001, Milan judges charged him with tax fraud shortly before
he hosted the G8 in Genoa (he was not convicted of either
charge). Now press and political circles in Rome are buzzing
with potential new dramatic revelations. Traditionally the
Italian electorate has been disinterested in international
attitudes towards Italy's leaders, and has been unmoved by
peccadilloes in the personal lives of its politicians.
However, the salaciousness of the charges against Berlusconi,
and the growing impression that he is not taken seriously
abroad has heightened the importance of this summit for the
Prime Minister. He almost certainly sees it as an opportunity
to recover his public persona abroad, while dramatically
demonstrating his role as an international statesman at home.
Given the intense importance that this G8 summit has now
taken for domestic politics, any Berlusconi gaffes or
perceived snubs by other world leaders will receive
tremendous attention by the Italian media.

-----------
The Economy
-----------

5. (C) Berlusconi is vulnerable to being seen by the public

as failing to step up to the real economic problems
confronting Italy. The global economic crisis may be getting
ready to bite harder here - some observers are predicting a
"double dip" recession. Savings are already being run down,
credit is both more expensive and increasingly harder to
obtain and unemployment continues to tick upward. Italy's
economic growth rate -- which was relatively low even before
the crisis -- has dropped precipitously owing to sharp
contractions in its export markets and falling domestic
demand. Unemployment is expected to exceed eight percent
this year and to rise further in 2010. Government tax
revenues are, not unexpectedly, off sharply. Italy's already
high level of government debt and the debt ceilings that come
with euro membership significantly limit the government's
ability to provide fiscal stimulus for the economy.

----------
The Summit
----------

6. (C) This G8 Summit is the culmination of a busy year for

the Italian G8 Presidency. Italy will host a record nine G8
Ministerial Meetings this year throughout Italy, and will
have hosted over 80 G8 Sherpa, Sous-Sherpa, Political
Director and Working Group meetings by the time the L'Aquila
Summit begins.

7. (C) While as of June 26, the final agenda was still being
worked out, Italian G8 Sherpa, MFA Secretary General
Giampiero Massolo, publicly touted the G8's main priorities
this week as "promoting the global agenda" (defined as the
"global standard" and a "detax proposal") and "demonstrating
that the G8 still makes sense." The reality is that efforts
to refine the agenda and offer a clear focus are coming late:
Italy's Presidency has been characterized by a proliferation
of themes, the sheer number of which has diluted the clarity
of any eventual G8 message. This failure to focus their G8
message may have been due in part to Italy's internal
disorganization throughout the process, and desire to cover
the waterfront on possible issues of global relevance. While
the Italians had earlier hopes of "deliverables" (e.g.,

ROME 00000755 003.2 OF 003

anti-piracy) that have run into immovable objections, it

seems they do not at this point have substantial objectives
on G8 issues, and have viewed their role as principally to
shepherd discussions to agreement.

8. (C) The proliferation of themes has been matched by an

ever-expanding number of invitees. In keeping with recent G8
practice, in addition to the G8 and the EU, Italy is inviting
to the Summit the "Outreach 5" countries of the "Heiligendamm
Process" (China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa), the
countries participating in the Major Economies Forum (MEF) on
Energy and Climate (G8 Outreach 5 South Korea, Australia
and Indonesia) and the African countries of the NEPAD group
(New Partnership for African Development -- Libya, Egypt,
Algeria, Senegal, Nigeria and Ethiopia). In addition, Italy
has invited Egypt to the Outreach 5 session, Denmark to the
MEF Session (in its capacity as host of the December 2009 UN
Climate Change Conference) as well as Spain and the
Netherlands, making this the biggest G8 Summit ever and
surpassing the G20 in size.

9. (C) Many G8 partners have been critical of the size and

scope of this G8, as well as of Italy's occasional preference
for form over substance and its at times lackadaisical
approach to crafting G8 statements. Italy's ambitious agenda
may have been driven in part by its fear that the G8 would
become irrelevant on Italy's watch. French President
Sarkozy's public questioning of the G8's relevance and UK PM
Gordon Brown's successful bid to make the G20 the premier
leaders' forum for addressing the global economic crisis have
contributed to this concern, and have spurred Italy to expand
G8 "outreach" to make it more inclusive and thematically
wide-ranging. This tendency has its drawbacks and its
benefits -- Italy has been very open to U.S. efforts to
highlight the importance of the Major Economies Forum this
year, for instance, even though to do so may steal the
spotlight from the G8 sessions.

-------
Comment
-------

10. (C) This year's G8 Summit has evolved via something of a

"bottom up" approach due to lack of focused leadership from
the top. The chaotic development of various themes has
resulted from the at-times competing interest of key
political players and Ministers, each seeking to make a
splash via an important, but often ill-prepared, initiative.
As the event approaches, PM Berlusconi is fully engaged,
viewing the summit as an opportunity to show himself a
statesman and showcase Italy. Italian officials from the
outset and throughout planning for the event have been eager
to accommodate and support USG priorities, wishing to be in
lockstep with our policies wherever possible. PM Berlusconi
returned elated from his meeting with you in Washington, and
there was a collective sigh of relief across the board that
warm relations with the US were intact despite the change of
administration. Your visit has special meaning to the
Italian government and public, and Italian officials will
work with you and your staff to make this event a success.

11. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

DIBBLE

2009-09-21

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001077

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2019

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, NATO, IT, AF, RU, IR
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI REAFFIRMS AFGHAN COMMITMENT DURING
AMBASSADOR'S COURTESY CALL

Classified By: Ambassador David H. Thorne for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

1. (C) Summary: During Ambassador Thorne's first call on PM

Berlusconi, the PM appeared elated by President Obama's
decision on missile defense; reaffirmed Italy's commitment to
the Afghanistan mission, despite the fatal September 17
attack on an Italian convoy, while noting the need for a
"transition strategy"; agreed on the need for firm allied
unity in the face of Iranian intransigence; and said Italy
would support Chicago's bid to host the Olympic Games in
2016. End Summary.

2. (C) Amb. Thorne, accompanied by DCM Dibble, paid his first

call on PM Berlusconi on September 18. The PM, accompanied
by U/S Gianni Letta, Russia advisor Valentino Valentini, and
NSA-equivalent Bruno Archi, thanked the Ambassador for U.S.
condolences over the previous day's lethal VBIED attack on an
Italian military convoy in Kabul. Berlusconi noted that he
had been up almost the entire night in Council of Ministers
deliberations dealing with the aftermath of the incident
(note: the deaths have provoked a huge emotional reaction in
the Italian public and press, and September 21 has been
declared a day of national mourning in honor of the 6 killed
and four wounded). He reiterated the themes he has sounded
publicly in the past 24 hours about the need for Italy and
other allies to stay committed to the mission despite this
and other attacks, thus his public call for a "transition
strategy," not an "exit strategy," as some politicians (most
notably the leader of the Lega Nord, the junior partner in
Berlusconi's own governing coalition) had demanded since the
attack.

3. (C) Berlusconi appeared elated over the President's

September 17 announcement that the U.S. would substantially
revise missile defense plans for Europe. Saying he had
considered former Secretary of State Rice a friend, the PM
said he had nonetheless told her he disagreed strongly with
her over U.S. plans to deploy missile defense installations
to Poland and the Czech Republic; Berlusconi termed it a
return to the Cold War. The PM offered a long and familiar
discourse on (in his eyes) Putin's many fine qualities as a
leader, terming President Medvedev somewhat dismissively
Putin's "apprentice." He asserted that under former
President Bush and now with President Obama he had managed to
play a useful, mediating role in U.S.-Russian relations, due
to his exceptionally close relationship with Putin, the real
center of power in Russia.

4. (C) On Iran, Berlusconi agreed with Amb. Thorne's call for

close U.S.-Italian coordination, citing the most recent IAEA
report on Iran's apparent readiness to build a nuclear weapon
and saying that stronger efforts by the international
community would be needed in the coming months. The
Ambassador briefed the PM on an undertaking by Paolo Scaroni,
CEO of Italian Energy Parastatal ENI, to U/S Burns to convey
formally to the USG all current ENI projects in Iran, as well
as those ENI has suspended (at GOI/USG request) for the time
being. Amb. noted that the Italian power company Edison, on
the other hand, had recently told us that, GOI urgings to the
contrary, it was proceeding with a major project in Iran.
Berlusconi expressed surprise, and dismissed the notion that
Edison would proceed (note: DCM followed up separately with
Letta and Archi to relay details of recent exchanges with
Edison).

5. (SBU) Responding to the Ambassador's request that Italy

support the city of Chicago's bid to host the 2016 Olympics,
Berlusconi indicated that Italy was prepared to support
Chicago. Since Rome is considering a bid for the 2020 games,
Berlusconi said, Italy would want to see a non-European city
win the 2016 competition, since the OIC would not support
back-to-back hosting of the Olympics by London, Madrid and
Rome.
THORNE

2009-09-29

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000771

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND INR.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/29/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV LY PINR
SUBJECT: A GLIMPSE INTO LIBYAN LEADER QADHAFI’S ECCENTRICITIES

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,

Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (S/NF) Summary: Recent first-hand experiences with Libyan

Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi and his staff, primarily in
preparation for his UNGA trip, provided rare insights into
Qadhafi’s inner circle and personal proclivities. Qadhafi
appears to rely heavily XXXXXXXXXXXXX reportedly cannot travel with his senior Ukrainian nurse, Galyna
Kolotnytska. He also appears to have an intense dislike or fear
of staying on upper floors, reportedly prefers not to fly over
water, and seems to enjoy horse racing and flamenco dancing.
His recent travel may also suggest a diminished dependence on
his legendary female guard force, as only one woman bodyguard
accompanied him to New York. End Summary.

QADHAFI’S PERSONALITY REFLECTED IN HIS PHOBIAS

2. (S/NF) Muammar al-Qadhafi has been described as both

mercurial and eccentric, and our recent first-hand experiences
with him and his office, primarily in preparation for his UNGA
trip, demonstrated the truth of both characterizations. From
the moment Qadhafi’s staff began to prepare for his travel to
the United States, XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX of
his 40-year rule, various proclivities and phobias began to
reveal themselves in every logistical detail. When applying for
Qadhafi’s visa, XXXXXXX asked whether it was necessary
for the Leader to submit a portrait of himself that fit consular
application regulations, noting that his photo was displayed
throughout the city and that anyone of hundreds of billboards
could be photographed and shrunken to fit the application’s
criteria. When the rule was enforced, XXXXXXXXX
reluctantly conceded to take a portrait of the Leader
specifically for the visa application.

3. (S/NF) When XXXXXXX began to search for proper

accommodations for Qadhafi, XXXXXXXX informed us that the Leader
must stay on the first floor of any facility that was rented for
him. (XXXXXXXXXX separately told U.S. officials in Washington that
Qadhafi could not climb more than 35 steps.) XXXXXXXX cited this
requirement as the primary reason that the Libyan residence in
New Jersey was selected as the preferred accommodation site
rather than the Libyan PermRep’s residence in New York City. XXXXXX also sought to find accommodations
with room to pitch
Qadhafi’s Bedouin tent, Qadhafi’s traditional site for receiving
visitors and conducting meetings, as it offers him a non-verbal
way of communicating that he is a man close to his cultural
roots.

4. (S/NF) Qadhafi’s dislike of long flights and apparent fear of

flying over water also caused logistical headaches for his
staff. When discussing flight clearances with Emboffs,XXXXXXX
explained that the Libyan delegation would arrive from Portugal,
as Qadhafi “cannot fly more than eight hours” and would need to
overnight in Europe prior to continuing his journey to New York. XXXXXXXX also revealed in the same
conversation that Qadhafi
does not like to fly over water. Presumably for similar
reasons, Qadhafi’s staff also requested a stop in Newfoundland
to break his travel from Venezuela to Libya on September 29.
[Note: The Government of Canada recently confirmed that the
Libyan delegation canceled plans to stop in Newfoundland. End
Note.]

DEPENDENCIES: RELIANCE ON A SELECTIVE GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS

5. (S/NF) Qadhafi appears to be almost obsessively dependent on

a small core of trusted personnel. This group includes
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX coordinate the logistics of Qadhafi’s
visit. XXXXXXXXXX balanced the UNGA preparations between equally
frenetic preparations for the August 31 African Union (AU)
Summit and September 1 celebration of Qadhafi’s coup. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX At large events such as the
August 31 AU Summit and
September 1 celebrations, XXXXXXXXX every last
detail of these complex gatherings, ranging from the overall
program to the position of the press pool. At UNGA, XXXXXXXXX Qadhafi to the podium at the UNGA and
XXXXXXXXXX his papers and props upon the conclusion of
the Leader’s remarks. Long-time Qadhafi Chief of Staff Bashir
Salah appears to play an equally important role in Qadhafi’s
personal retinue, and XXXXXXX via an
old-fashioned green phone XXXXXXXX. It is next to a
red phone, which presumably connects to Qadhafi himself. We
constantly hear that National Security Adviser and son,
Muatassim, also plays a key role as his father’s confidante and
handler during travel abroad. Muatassim also seems to have been
tasked with insuring that the Leader’s image is well-preserved
through the full array of carefully-planned media events.

6. (S/NF) Finally, Qadhafi relies heavily on his long-time

Ukrainian nurse, Galyna Kolotnytska, who has been described as a
”voluptuous blonde.” Of the rumored staff of four Ukrainian
nurses that cater to the Leader’s health and well-being, XXXXXXXXXXX emphasized to multiple Emboffs
that Qadhafi
cannot travel without Kolotnytska, as she alone “knows his
routine.” When Kolotnytska’s late visa application resulted in
her Security Advisory Opinion being received on the day
Qadhafi’s party planned to travel to the U.S., the Libyan
Government sent a private jet to ferry her from Libya to
Portugal to meet up with the Leader during his rest-stop. Some
embassy contacts have claimed that Qadhafi and the 38 year-old
Kolotnytska have a romantic relationship. While he did not
comment on such rumors, a Ukrainian political officer recently
confirmed that the Ukrainian nurses “travel everywhere with the
Leader.”

PREFERENCES - FROM DANCING TO HORSEMAN

7. (S/NF) In addition to the personality quirks revealed through

Qadhafi’s travel to New York, the Qadhafi’s preferences for
dancing and cultural performances were displayed over the last
month. The three-day spectacle of his 40th anniversary in power
included performances by dance troupes from Ukraine, Tunisia,
Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco, as well as musical performances by
bands from Mexico, Russia, New Zealand, and a number of other
nations. Qadhafi appeared particularly enthralled by Tuareg
horse racing during two of the events, clapping and smiling
throughout the races. The flamenco dancers that participated in
his celebratory events appeared to spark a similar interest, as
Qadhafi decided to stop in Seville (for a “personal trip”
according to the Spanish Ambassador here) on his way back to
Libya from Venezuela specifically to attend a flamenco dance
performance. [Note: That stop has reportedly been scrapped for
unknown reasons. End note.]

NO NEW YORK PHOTO OPS - QADHAFI LEAVES FEMALE GUARDS AT HOME

8. (S/NF) While Qadhafi’s reported female guard force has become

legendary, it played no role in his travels to New York. Only
one female guard was included among the approximately 350-person
strong Libyan delegation to New York. This is the same female
bodyguard who sticks close to Qadhafi in his domestic and
international public appearances and may, in fact, play some
sort of formal security role. Observers in Tripoli speculate
that the female guard force is beginning to play a diminished
role among the Leader’s personal security staff.

9. (S/NF) Comment: Qadhafi’s state visits and appearances at

various conferences and summits, both at home and abroad, have
revealed greater details about his personality and character.
While it is tempting to dismiss his many eccentricities as signs
of instability, Qadhafi is a complicated individual who has
managed to stay in power for forty years through a skillful
balancing of interests and realpolitik methods. Continued
engagement with Qadhafi and his inner circle is important not
only to learn the motives and interests that drive the world’s
longest serving dictator, but also to help overcome the
misperceptions that inevitably accumulated during Qadhafi’s
decades of isolation. As XXXXXXX told us, pointing to a
larger-than-life portrait of Qadhafi, “When you have been
isolated for so long, it is important to communicate.” End
comment.

CRETZ

2009-10-15

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001003

SIPDIS

FOR ALEX MCKNIGHT AND STACIE ZERDECKI OF EUR/WE

ALESSANDRO NARDI OF EUR/ERA
JENNIFER MCELVEEN AND STEPHEN WOROBEC OF INR/TNC
JOHN REGAS OF NIC
THOMAS FIRESTONE OF EMBASSY MOSCOW

SCOTT HARRIS OF INL

PASS TO BARRY M. BRAUN AND KAREN GREENAWAY OF FBI’S
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
PASS TO TOM OTT AND BRUCE OHR OF DOJ’S CRIMINAL DIVISION
EO 12958 DECL: 10/15/2019
TAGS PREL, PINR, KCRM, KCOR, KJUS, SP, RS
SUBJECT: SPAIN: ANTI-MAFIA PROSECUTORS WELCOME USG
OUTREACH, SEEK COLLABORATION
REF: A. MADRID 870 B. MADRID 869
MADRID 00001003 001.2 OF 002

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission William Duncan for reason s 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY. Embassy Madrid POLOFF and POL/GSO Officer from the Barcelona CG on September
29 met Gerardo Cavero, Barcelona’s chief prosecutor on counter-narcotics and organized crime, and
Fernando Bermejo, the city’s prosecutor for anti-mafia, anti-corruption and money laundering issues. They
also are dual-hatted as special prosecutors on these issues within Catalonia’s Superior Court of Justice who
work in conjunction with counterparts from the national government in Madrid. The two welcomed USG
outreach to begin a working relationship based on mutual interests. They expressed interest in meeting DOJ
and/or FBI officials during proposed travel to Barcelona on November 13 to speak to private audiences on
criminal justice issues, money laundering issues as well as the Russian mafia (See Ref A). COMMENT:
Separately, Embassy Madrid understands from the US Consular Agent in La Palma that Mallorcan
authorities involved in the June 2008 arrest of Russian crimelord Gennadios Petrov (see Ref B) are prepared
to host a dinner for visiting USG officials on November 11 or 12. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

//Taking on the Russian Mafia//

2. (C) Bermejo claimed that there is large scale money laundering going on in Catalonia and “many, many”
members of the Russian mafia are active in the region. (NOTE: In Spain, the term “Russian mafia” refers to
organized crime members from not only Russia but also all other former members of the USSR.) He and
Cavero suggested that public declarations by senior Spanish officials in mid-2008 (see Ref A) that the raid
that nabbed Petrov and others had “decapitated” the Russian mafia in Spain were optimistic statements
made in a moment of euphoria that did not reflect the current reality. They asserted that the Russian mafia
presence has not diminished. Bermejo said that Russian mafia leaders were originally drawn to Spain’s
Costa Brava as a vacation destination. Recognizing the opportunities and lax law enforcement, however, the
Russian mafia subsequently started using Catalonia as a base for money laundering and other illegal
ventures. He asserted that Catalonia cannot allow itself to become a refuge for the Russian mafia nor can it
prejudice the investments of legitimate Eurasian businessmen.

3. XXXXXXXXXXXX

. END COMMENT.

4. (C) Bermejo agreed with the notion that money talks, and added this is especially true when the amounts
being offered as bribes are so large. Bermejo related to USG officials a saying that in Italy, the mafia is so
powerful that it can buy judges. He then added that Italian author Roberto Saviano, famous for his work on
the Italian mafia, has commented that the judicial system in Spain is so corrupt that the mafia does not need
to buy judges. COMMENT: USG officials understood that Bermejo believed there was an element of truth in
what Saviano said. END COMMENT.

5. (C) Bermejo and Cavero are part of a small office - three prosecutors and 4-5 staffers - that is short-
handed because their workload is so extensive. Bermejo was promoted to his anti-mafia post in June. Press
commentary prior to his appointment identified Bermejo as the best candidate for the job. He took over for
David Martinez Madero, who stepped down following death threats by the Russian mafia (See Ref A).
Bermejo stated that he has inherited the death threat, which is against the person filling the anti-mafia
prosecutor post rather than the individual per se. Bermejo, who had a bodyguard when he worked as a
prosecutor in San Sebastian due to threats from Basque terrorist group ETA, will have a bodyguard in his
current post. Bermejo, who mentioned several times in passing that he currently works closely with Austrian
and Swiss authorities, indicated his willingness to meet Embassy LEGAT and DEA officials during one of his
upcoming trips to Madrid. CHACON

2009-10-27

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 001187

NOFORN
SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 10/23/2026

TAGS PGOV, PREL, IT
SUBJECT: ITALY: SCANDALS TAKING TOLL ON BERLUSCONI’S
PERSONAL AND POLITICAL HEALTH

REF: ROME 1143

ROME 00001187 001.2 OF 003

Classified By: Ambassador David H. Thorne for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY. Though PM Berlusconi’s parliamentary majority is strong, and

nobody is yet willing to predict his political demise, a growing list of
scandals, adverse court decisions and health issues have weakened him and led
some erstwhile Berlusconi allies to begin hedging their bets on his political
longevity. In a souring political environment, talk of conspiracy theories often
trumps real political debate and distracts the Berlusconi government from
pursuing, or even developing, a coherent political agenda. END SUMMARY.

PRIVATE MATTERS WEIGHING ON BERLUSCONI

¶2. (SBU) After a long hot spring and summer of personal and professional
scandals, PM Berlusconi, returning from the August recess appeared briefly
rejuvenated by a successful G8 summit and continued popularity with his base.
However, the first of several blows fell on October 7 when a civil court ruled
that the Berlusconi family’s flagship business, Finnivest, must pay a rival
company Euro 750 million for damages occurred as a result of a Finnivest lawyer
bribing a judge in a decision involving both companies. Two days later, the
Italian Constitutional Court concluded that one of the Berlusconi government’s
first pieces of legislation, a 2008 law postponing criminal investigations
against Berlusconi and other senior officials, was unconstitutional (REFTEL). As
a result, Italian magistrates have, once again, taken up several long-standing
criminal cases against Berlusconi, with one case due to resume as early as
November.

¶3. (C/NF) Two officials XXXXXXXXXXXX in separate conversations with the

Embassy, recently described the Prime Minister in strikingly similar terms.
XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Ambassador October 23 that Berlusconi is “physically and
politically weak,” describing the normally hyperactive Berlusconi as “not
energetic.” XXXXXXXXXXXX told an Embassy political officer October 22 that, “we
are all worried about his health,” noting that Berlusconi has fainted three
times in public in recent years and that his medical tests have come back “a
complete mess.” XXXXXXXXXXXX said Berlusconi’s frequent late nights and penchant
for partying hard mean he does not get sufficient rest. The Italian press
reported October 27 that Berlusconi has a mild case of scarlet fever, which he
reportedly contracted from his grandchild. (Note: Berlusconi dozed off briefly
during the Ambassador’s initial courtesy call in September, and looked
distracted and tired at an October 19 event attended by the Ambassador. End
note.)
¶4. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX termed Berlusconi overwhelmed with private concerns. He
noted that Berlusconi has felt alienated from his family since his wife,
Veronica Lario, set off a public uproar by publishing an open letter last spring
asking for a divorce and accusing the 74-year old PM of consorting with minors.
Lario is reportedly asking for fifty percent of Berlusconi’s personal assets
plus Euro 100 million in yearly support. At the same time, according to
XXXXXXXXXXXX, Berlusconi is afraid he will need to liquidate important business
assets to make the Euro 750 million payment ordered by a civil court.
XXXXXXXXXXXX added that a Palermo-based mafia investigation involving
XXXXXXXXXXXX Berlusconi ally and confidant already convicted of ties to
organized crime could turn into a damaging public spectacle.

LEADING TO CONSPIRACY THEORIES

¶5. (C/NF) A number of Embassy contacts have described a political environment

dominated by conspiracy theories. In the wake of the two court rulings,
Berlusconi accused President of the Republic Napolitano of working against him
and lashed out emotionally against the judicial system, in general. XXXXXXXXXXXX
told the Ambassador that Berlusconi’s outburst had led to “frosty” relations
with Napolitano and said the episode has made him appear weak. Several PdL
officials have hinted darkly to us that “institutional forces” are trying to
unseat Berlusconi. (Note: In Italian political parlance, “institutional forces”
can serve to mean one of many groups operating and wielding influence behind the
scenes: business groups, intelligence services, freemasons, the Vatican, the
magistracy, the United States, etc. While Italians are notably conspiracy-
minded, their paranoia -- at least as far as Italian domestic politics go -- has
historically been well-founded. End note.)

ROME 00001187 002.2 OF 003

¶6. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX confided that Berlusconi believes the Italian

intelligence services might have deliberately entrapped him in his alleged
affair involving a minor. During XXXXXXXXXXXX’s conversation with the Embassy
political officer, Berlusconi called XXXXXXXXXXXX to confide that an arrest was
imminent of four Italian Carabinieri believed to be blackmailing the Lazio
regional governor with a sex-tape. (Note: The story of the Lazio governor and a
transsexual prostitute exploded in the press a few days later. End note.)
XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Embassy officer that this case has convinced Berlusconi
that he cannot trust his own intelligence services. Separately, on October 21,
Northern League leader Umberto Bossi, commenting on Berlusconi’s troubles, told
the Ambassador that organized crime figures had probably set the trap for
Berlusconi on some of the sex scandals, but that nobody denies that Berlusconi
willingly went for the bait.

¶7. (C/NF) In a replay of the foreign press-induced scandals of last spring and
summer, a London Times article accusing Italian troops in Afghanistan of paying
off Taliban insurgents sparked speculation in and out of the GoI that the USG
might have leaked the information to discredit the Berlusconi government.
Moreover, it is not uncommon these days for PdL politicians to speculate-- via
the press or even directly to Embassy officers-- that the new U.S.
administration would like to see the Berlusconi government fall; some even
believe the USG is actively undermining Berlusconi. The Ambassador recently
probed XXXXXXXXXXXX and Foreign Minister Franco Frattini to determine whether
they shared this belief; both averred that they thought Berlusconi’s
relationship with the US administration was strong.

AND PALACE INTRIGUE

¶8. (C/NF) One of Berlusconi’s would-be heirs, Chamber of Deputies President

Gianfranco Fini, picked one of his periodic fights with Berlusconi in September,
ostensibly over euthanasia and living wills, but the real issues were
Berlusconi’s non-democratic leadership style inside the party and the growing
weight of the Northern League (LN). More recently, the powerful Minister of
Economy, Giulio Tremonti, has openly challenged Berlusconi on fiscal policy,
leading to talk simultaneously of his possible resignation as well as the
possibility he was seeking to eventually succeed Berlusconi. In response to a
direct question from the Ambassador, XXXXXXXXXXXX said there was a small, but
unlikely, possibility the government could fall. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us Tremonti,
Fini and former Minister of Interior Giuseppe Pisanu are laying the groundwork
for a post-Berlusconi succession struggle but felt the government remained
stable for the time being.

AS WELL AS ERRATIC DECISIONS

¶9. (C/NF) Media mogul Berlusconi might be gaffe-prone when speaking off the
cuff, but he has historically shown himself astute at strategic messaging. Those
skills were noticeably absent in a recent incident which provoked both criticism
and head-scratching from Berlusconi friend and foe alike. Ahead of a three-day
trip to Russia to celebrate Vladimir Putin’s birthday in mid-October, Berlusconi
put out a press line that the visit was a “strictly private affair.” This
announcement was met with disbelief and some mockery. Adding to the mystery,
however, the day before his departure, Berlusconi canceled his participation in
the state visit of Jordan’s King Abdullah of Jordan, staying in Milan with the
explanation that he was feeling under the weather. Berlusconi, who prides
himself on his personal relationships with key Middle East interlocutors thus,
unavoidably, left the impression that, in choosing private fun over statecraft,
he was husbanding his flagging energies for a blow-out party at Putin’s private
dacha. With the further news that Berlusconi was accompanied on the trip solely
by Valentino Valentini, an unofficial intermediary/bagman who serves as
Berlusconi’s interpreter, Italy’s political class openly questioned whether
Berlusconi was going to Russia principally because the scrutiny of his private
time by Italian and foreign photographers had made parties in Italy too risky
for the time being.

COMMENT

¶10. (C/NF) Sex scandals, criminal investigations, family problems and financial
concerns appear to be weighing heavily on Berlusconi’s personal and political
health, as well as on
ROME 00001187 003.2 OF 003
his decision-making ability. It is too early to begin speculating about
Berlusconi’s political demise, and Berlusconi has a well-known knack for
rebounding. However, though most are trying hard not to be too obvious about it,
some of Berlusconi’s own lieutenants have apparently decided it is not too early
to begin laying the groundwork for “il dopo,” as Italians call the potential
post-Berlusconi era. In this souring political environment, conspiracy theories
have all but supplanted serious political debate. Septel will address the
implications of Berlusconi’s fortunes on how we do business with the government.
END COMMENT THORNE

2009-11-09

VZCZCXRO2847
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDBU RUEHDU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHMR RUEHNP RUEHPA
RUEHRN RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHROV #0119/01 3231533
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191533Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY VATICAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1190
INFO RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME PRIORITY 0007
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0001
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 1229
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VATICAN 000119

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2034

TAGS: AORC BEXP EAGR ENRG FAO PGOV PREL SENV UN DA SF
VT
SUBJECT: POPE TURNS UP THE HEAT ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

REF: A. A) VATICAN 104

¶B. B) VATICAN 96

VATICAN 00000119 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Rafael Foley, Pol Chief.

REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Pope Benedict addressed the opening of the
World Food Summit urging leaders to care for the world's hungry
and protect the environment. Similarly, at the UN General
Assembly, the Vatican nuncio stressed the need for a
comprehensive international energy policy that protects the
environment and limits climate change. Meanwhile Vatican
officials remain largely supportive of genetically modified
crops as a vehicle for protecting the environment while feeding
the hungry, but -- at least for now -- are unwilling to
challenge bishops who disagree. End Summary.

¶2. (U) In remarks at the opening of the World Food Security

Summit in Rome on November 16th, Pope Benedict devoted over one
third of his speech to the link between food security and
environmental degradation. The Pope stressed that states have
an obligation to future generations to reduce environmental
degradation. Citing the probable link between environmental
destruction and climate change, he stated that protecting the
environment requires "change in the lifestyles of individuals
and communities, in habits of consumption and in perceptions of
what is genuinely needed." Benedict urged the international
community to promote development while safeguarding the planet.

¶3. (SBU) The Pope also stated that access to "sufficient,

healthy and nutritious" food is a fundamental right upheld by
the Catholic Church. Linking development with use of
agricultural technologies (i.e., biotechnologies), Benedict
stressed good governance and further infrastructure development
as essential to increasing food security over the long-term.
(Note: Benedict's mention of agricultural technologies is a
small but significant step towards more vocal Vatican support
of biotechnologies. End Note)

¶4. (C) In a separate meeting November 11, Poloff spoke with

Monsignor James Reinert, the point person on food security and
biotechnology at the Vatican's Council of Justice and Peace - a
Vatican think tank on social issues . Reinert said the Vatican
agrees that countries must be empowered to increase domestic
agricultural production and that genetically modified crops
(GMOs) have a role in this process, but not everybody in the
Church is comfortable with them. The Vatican cannot force all
bishops to endorse biotechnology, he said, particularly if their
opposition has to do with concerns over protecting profits
oflarge corporations who hold the patents for the crops, versus
feeding the hungry. In the Philippines, he noted, bishops
strongly protested GMOs in the past. (Note: South African
Cardinal Wilfrid Fox Napier's November 16 comments to a news
agency that "Africans do not need GMOs, but water" is another
example of specific Church leaders skeptical about the potential
benefits of new biotechnologies. End note.).

¶5. (U) Comment: The Vatican is publicly stressing in various

fora the need to care for the environment in the run-up to the
Copenhagen Climate Change Summit. Pope Benedict places caring
for the environment ("the creation") as a central social,
economic and moral issue to his papacy. The Pope's proposal to
curb environmental degradation is for people everywhere to
reject excessive materialism and consumerism. In the Vatican's
view, unsustainable lifestyles in developed countries--and not
population growth worldwide--is to blame for global warming.
Vatican officials claim that the planet has the capacity to feed
and sustain its expanding population, provided resources are
properly distributed and waste controlled. Until recently,
Vatican officials often noted that the countries that released
most of the greenhouse gases were not the world's most populous.
As China and India industrialize and release more greenhouse
gases, however, the Vatican may find it more difficult to blame
climate change on lifestyles only. Even as this happens,
however, the Vatican will continue to oppose aggressive
population control measures to fight hunger or global warming.

¶6. (SBU) While the Vatican's message on caring for the

environment is loud and clear, its message on biotechnologies
is still low-profile (ref. b). Quietly supportive, the Church
considers the choice of whether to embrace GMOs as a technical
decision for farmers and governments. The Vatican's own

VATICAN 00000119 002.2 OF 002

scientific academy has stated that there is no evidence GMOs are

harmful, and that they could indeed be part of addressing global
food security. However, when individual Church leaders, for
ideological reasons or ignorance, speak out against GMOs, the
Vatican does not -- at least not yet -- feel that it is its duty
to challenge them. Post will continue to lobby the Vatican to
speak up in favor of GMOs, in the hope that a louder voice in
Rome will encourage individual Church leaders elsewhere to
reconsider their critical views. End Comment.
DIAZ
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2010-01-01

Friday, 01 January 2010, 15:02

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000001
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2020
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PINR, IT
SUBJECT: VISITING WITH A RECUPERATING BERLUSCONI
ROME 00000001 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador David H. Thorne. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. C) Summary: The Ambassador visited recuperating Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi at his Lombardy estate for a private luncheon December 30. The
Ambassador had suggested he visit Berlusconi after the Prime Minister was
assaulted at a Milan rally in mid-December. Accompanied by Gianni Letta, the
Undersecretary in the Prime Minister’s office and effectively Berlusconi’s
second in command, Ambassador flew up for the meeting on the Prime Minister’s
plane. Bandaged and bruised from the December attack, Berlusconi was nonetheless
upbeat and eager to show off his new project for training Italy’s elite and
share his thoughts on European leaders and domestic politics. Berlusconi was
effusive about U.S.-Italian relations and Letta promised action on roping in ENI
operations in Iran and pushing ahead on Megaports. End Summary
The Recuperating Prime Minister
-------------------------------
¶2. C) Following the Ambassador’s call to Gianni Letta suggesting the Ambassador
visit the Prime Minister during his recuperation, Letta, the Undersecretary in
the Prime Minister’s Office, invited Ambassador Thorne to accompanied him to
Milan on December 30 for a private afternoon with the Prime Minister. The three
hour session, held in Italian, involved only the Prime Minister, Letta and the
Ambassador, and included a visit to Berlusconi’s latest endeavor, a private
training school for Italy’s elite, and a wide-ranging lunch with the two top
decision makers in the Italian government.
¶3. C) Berlusconi was still bandaged and scarred from the assault in early
December where a mentally unstable man hurled a die cast model of Milan’s
cathedral at his head. Berlusconi noted that the missile had struck a glancing
blow to his cheek, cutting him, breaking his nose and some of his teeth, but if
it had hit him straight on “it would have killed” him. Letta recounted
separately that Berlusconi had slumped into a depression following the attack -
“he’s an impresario, he wants everyone to love him “ - but that had snapped out
of it and was on the mend. Letta also noted that their tour of Berlusconi’s new
project site was the Prime Minister’s first excursion outdoors since his release
from the hospital.
U.S.-Italy: A Prized Relationship
---------------------------------
¶4. C) In luncheon discussions, Berlusconi unabashedly stated that he prized
Italy’s relationship with the U.S. and that his government stood ready to help
us, whatever the issue. He noted that Italy owed the United States a debt of
gratitude for salvation during World War II, and for protection throughout the
Cold War. On Afghanistan, basing issues, and other tough problems, Italy was
committed to helping the U.S. get to the right solution. He noted that he hoped
that the Italian increase in Afghanistan would help President Obama and address
the situation on the ground.
Berlusconi on European Leaders
------------------------------
¶5. C) The Prime Minister and Letta also gave their run down of current European
political leadership. Berlusconi assessed that Sarkozy’s star was clearly waning
in European circles and that the French President did not command the same
influence he did a year ago. Letta was less convinced, noting to the Ambassador
that both Berlusconi and Sarkozy were “big dogs angling for the same spotlight.”
Berlusconi recounted how he had played an instrumental role in the Spring in
persuading a reluctant Erdogan to accept Danish PM Rasmussen as the new NATO
Secretary General, overcoming the Turkish President’s profound irritation at
Rasmussen for not silencing Kurdish language radio stations despite numerous
requests. On Russia, Berlusconi felt that Putin and Medvedev got along well,
respected each other, and had an effective relationship. In fact, farewells
after lunch were unexpectedly cut short by an incoming call from Putin.
Iran: Appalled by violence, Will try to rope in ENI
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶6. C) On Iran, Berlusconi noted that he was appalled by the Iranian crackdown.
He offered the capabilities of the Italian intelligence services and assured
full sharing of information gathered on the internal dynamics in Tehran. Letta,
as the supervising authority over Italy’s intelligence services, assured the
Ambassador of a continuation of our
ROME 00000001 002.2 OF 003
already excellent bilateral cooperation on the issue. Letta also promised that
he would talk to ENI CEO Scaroni about the energy giant’s ongoing operations in
Iran and, if he could, persuade them to halt activities.
Megaports - GOI to determine POC
--------------------------------
¶7. C) In response to the U.S. request to move forward on Megaports, Letta told
the Ambassador that the issue would be discussed at the Council of Ministers
meeting on January 8 and that they would be in contact soon thereafter to convey
which ministry would have lead in the GOI for implementing the project and as
such be the primary interlocutor for our Embassy.
Italy’s Courts - Problem Number One
-----------------------------------
¶8. C) Berlusconi forthrightly identified the magistratura - Italy’s judiciary
and courts -- as Italy’s “biggest problem” and told the Ambassador that he was
ready to forge an alliance with the center left opposition to implement judicial
reform. He noted that a legal system where issues were never definitively
resolved -- where you can be absolved of a crime and yet have the case
resurrected later - sapped Italy’s political and economic system. He argued that
this is what has happened in his own case, where he has been cleared in the past
but the same charges keep on returning repeatedly. He said that he had allies in
the opposition on the need for reform, including PD Leader Bersani. Letta
cautioned the government won’t know if it has the clout to deliver on such an
idea unless it secures a decent showing in regional elections in March 2010.
Smart Guys in the Opposition
----------------------------
¶9. C) Berlusconi and Letta displayed a great deal of respect for opposition
leaders. Berlusconi praised the Democratic Party Leader, Pier Luigi Bersani as a
“straight shooter” who was fair with a top rate intellect. Separately Letta was
also complimentary about former Prime Minister (and archrival) Massimo D’Alema
who he credited with showing courage and integrity during the Balkans crisis and
taking some very tough decisions. Letta noted that D’Alema’s prickliness and
“smartest guy in the room” demeanor made dealing with him a chore, but
acknowledged his judgment and political effectiveness, which was why Berlusconi
backed him for the EU Foreign Minister position despite their differences. Letta
told the Ambassador that he did not have a clear judgment on how DiPietro will
play in domestic politics and looked forward to future conversations. On other
domestic political issues, Letta thought that the current estrangement between
the governing PDL party and Sicilian President Lombardo was a minor issue and
they would patch it up quickly.
Worried about a flat 2010

¶10. C) Both Berlusconi and Letta expressed concern about the limited prospects
for economic growth in 2010. Berlusconi thought that Italy had weathered the
past year of the financial crisis fairly well but thought it would be a
challenge to produce enough growth in 2010 to start replacing jobs lost. The
Prime Minister was less concerned that a financial meltdown in Greece would have
EU-wide impact. He said that he had a good relationship with Greek PM Papendreou
and was confident that he could right the situation.
New Media - Important for Liberty

Sia Berlusconi che Letta hanno espresso preoccupazione per le limitate

prospettive di crescita economica per il 2010. Berlusconi pensa che l’Italia ha
resistito abbastanza bene alla crisi finanziaria dell’anno, scorso anche se
sarebbe stato difficile produrre una crescita per il 2010 per sufficiente per
recuperare i posti di lavoro persi.Il primo ministro non ritiene che lo
sbandamento finanziario in Grecia possa avere ripercussioni per l’Europa. Ha
detto di avere una buona relazione con il primo ministro greco Papendreou e di
essere sicuro di poter raddrizzare la situazione

¶11. C) In response to the Ambassador’s questions to the Prime Minister about

the role of the internet, Berlusconi shot back “it’s important for liberty.” New
media - particularly Facebook which has been instrumental in the past month in
organizing a national parade against Berlusconi, and more controversially in
continuing to host “Kill Berlusconi” pages - has vexed the GOI, - but the Prime
Minister stated that he felt the evolving media was both critical to the future
and also to the preservation of liberty. But he felt there needed to be better
tuned controls to prevent the most extreme use of the new outlets.

Nuovi tipi di media, importanti per la liberta’ - In risposta alle questioni sul
ruolo di internet formulate dall’ambasciatore al primo ministro, Berlusconi ha
risposto al volo: “e’ importante per la liberta’”. Anche se nuovi media come
facebook, che e’ stato strumentale nello scorso mese per organizzare una
manifestazione contro Berlusconi, e che in maniera piùcontroversa continua ad
ospitare pagine “uccidi berlusconi”, ha davvero infuriato il primo ministro, il
quale sostiene che da una parte l’evoluzione dei media e’ un pilastro per il
futuro e per preservare la liberta’, MA RITIENE ANCHE INDISPENSABILE UN
CONTROLLO PIU’CALIBRATO PER EVITARE GLI USI PIU’ ESTREMI

---------------------------------
¶12. C) The Prime Minister commenced the visit by personally conducting a guided
tour of his most recent project, a private academy to train Italy’s brightest
young minds. Berlusconi led Letta and the Ambassador on a personal tour of a
newly rehabbed Lombardy estate that will serve as the home of the enterprise.
The completely renovated 17th century country mansion, Villa Gernetto, will
house a special school set to open in March for one hundred of Italy’s most
talented young leaders, completely funded from Berlusconi’s personal fortune.
The Prime Minister intends to choose the students himself and he envisions an
environment where Italy’s best and brightest live and study, taught by world
leaders “like Blair and Clinton.”

L’Accademia di berlusconi - Il primo ministro ha cominciato la visita a Roma

conducendomi personalmente ad un tour guidato del suo ultimo progetto, una
accademi privata per educare i giovani piu’ meritevoli. Berlusconi ha guidato
Letta e l’ambasciatore in una villa lombarda del diaciassettesimo secolo
completamente ristrutturata, che sara’ la sede del progetto (Villa Gernetto). La
scuola aprira’ in marzo per un centinaio di giovani talenti. La scuola e’
completamente finanziata con il patrimonio personale di Berlusconi. Il primo
ministro vuole scegliere pedrsonalmente gli studenti, e si immagina un ambiente
dove le migliori menti italiane possano studiare e vivere avendo come
insegnanti leader mondiali come Blair e Clinton (Ovviamente questa minchiata da
sparacazzate è finita nel nulla. NdR)

-------
¶13. C) The Ambassador’s intimate afternoon with Italy’s two top decision makers
was both a testament to the priority Berlusconi gives the U.S.-Italy
relationship but also perhaps a sign that the GOI has achieved its long-sought
level comfort and ease with the Obama administration. It is also a dividend of
the Ambassador’s cultivation of the relationship with Letta, which has opened up
a personal channel to the Prime Minister. The Italian press coverage of the
following day clearly took this message from what they viewed as an
extraordinary private session. The Prime Minister was clear that he expects to
be called upon to deliver for the U.S., which he will do out of principle, not
self-interest. Despite being given numerous openings, neither the Prime Minister
nor Letta asked for anything from the U.S. during the lengthy luncheon. A
striking aspect of the session was Letta’s clear position as co-regent, with
Berlusconi deferring regularly to his colleague and with Letta airing opposing
points of view to his boss during the luncheon. THORNE

2010-01-13

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 000049

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, IT
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FOREIGN MINISTER FRATTINI'S VISIT
TO WASHINGTON

Classified By: DCM Elizabeth L. Dibble, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) Foreign Minister Frattini's visit to Washington is an

opportunity to reinforce Italy's commitment to Afghanistan,
and stress the need for close coordination on Iran: you will
want to thank Italy for its early announcement of additional
troop contributions for Afghanistan, and deliver a firm
message regarding Italian cooperation on Iran sanctions. The
Berlusconi government aims to use this visit to highlight
close US-Italian consultation on key issues, and to
demonstrate that it is one of the allies that "matter." This
is crucial to a government still somewhat uncertain of its
stature with the Obama administration.

2. (C) Frattini's tenure as Foreign Minister has been

characterized by a desire for closeness with the US and
support for the priorities of PM Berlusconi, with a focus on
human rights at time conflicting and competing with a policy
of "commercial diplomacy" and a hard line on immigration
issues. Frattini hews closely to Berlusconi's support for
Israel in the context of the Middle East Peace Process, and
the GOI has stood with the US in opposing referral of the
Goldstone Report to the UNSC or the ICC, and in advocating
for more helpful EU statements more broadly. Frattini has
also pushed Turkish accession to the European Union.

3. (C) Frattini last visited Washington in May, 2009.

Domestic Context
----------------

4. (C) Frattini visits Washington at a time of flux in

Italian politics. Although Prime Minister Berlusconi remains
personally popular, and his government enjoys a wide margin
in Parliament, some of Berlusconi,s erstwhile allies have
begun to criticize him openly or look beyond him as they
maneuver to secure their own political futures. Berlusconi
faces no credible opponent within the center right or in the
opposition, but his allies and confidantes tell us that he is
increasingly irritated by ongoing
personal and legal issues, as well as by political attacks by
former allies, first and foremost President of the Chamber of
Deputies Gianfranco Fini. (See Ref Rome 01381)

5. (C) A former judge and a technocrat by nature, Frattini

is a strong Berlusconi loyalist--consistently espousing and
defending the PM's positions, unlike other cabinet ministers,
even on issues wholly unrelated to foreign policy. He enjoys
a strong international reputation, as well as a good measure
of respect from the opposition left. Although he does not
command a political base, Frattini's political
survival is probably no longer dependent on Berlusconi, given
the the good opinion in which the Italian public and
political class hold him. Amidst the at-times vicious
maneuvering and political backstabbing in Rome this fall,
Frattini has managed to remain above the fray.

Key Advocate for Robust Italian Participation in ISAF and

UNIFIL
--------------------------

6. (C) Frattini has consistently pushed within GOI circles to

respond positively to U.S. requests for more support in
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Lebanon, and has played a critical
role within the GOI in pushing for robust continued Italian
participation in military missions abroad, particularly ISAF
and UNIFIL. He was key to the GOI decision to announce
Italy,s 1,000 troop contribution to ISAF well ahead of the
NATO Foreign Ministerial and President Obama's December 1
speech, a risky political move designed to demonstrate
Italy's credentials as a staunch U.S. ally, and to ensure
domestic political support for the measure. Italian troop
levels will increase to an average of 3,700 in summer 2010,
with an overall ceiling of 4,000. Italy previously pledged
200 Carabinieri police trainers to Afghanistan, 60 of which
are on the ground now; the remainder should deploy in the
coming months.

7. (C) Despite substantial domestic budgetary and political

pressure to halve the 2,300-strong Italian troop contingent
in Lebanon when Italy hands the UNIFIL command to Spain in
February 2010, Frattini actively supported our request to
keep Italian troop levels high, so that Italy will likely
retain around 2,000 troops there. Frattini has also
protected Italy,s modest development aid contributions to
Afghanistan and Pakistan from budget cuts that have gutted
other Italian aid programs: Italy contributes about Euro 50
million to Afghanistan per year and has approved over Euro 60
million in aid to Pakistan in 2009. Some of that aid is

ROME 00000049 002 OF 004

being held up by the Zardari government,s failure to sign an

MOU with Italy governing disbursement.

Iran: Italy needs to be fully on board

---------------------------

8. (C) On sanctions, throughout all levels of the

policy-making apparatus, GOI officials have professed strong
allegiance to President Obama's two-track approach; since PM
Berlusconi's meeting with President Obama in June, GOI
officials have insisted that the word has been passed clearly
to Italian companies that no new projects should be initiated
in Iran. As recently as December 30, Undersecretary Gianni
Letta, PM Berlusconi's right-hand man, assured Amb. Thorne he
would personally press Eni CEO Scaroni to halt any ongoing
activities. On January 12, FM Frattini published an
editorial in which he wrote that if UNSC sanction don't work
"we must be ready to consider sanctions adopted by a more
restricted group of countries, the so-called 'like-minded'
group. . ." Though Italy is among Iran's main economic
partners, he continued, "we believe that physical security
and responsibility to our allies and to the entire world come
before other considerations," and "our firms with interests
in Iran have shown a great sense of responsibility."

9. (C) Yet while the GOI claims that it has been successful
in applying "moral suasion" to Italian companies, these
efforts have at times appeared to be half-hearted, and the
results are certainly uneven. Major Italian energy firms Eni
and Edison have only offered to hold off
new expansion plans in Iran temporarily. Eni has repeatedly
told U.S. officials that it will not undertake "new"
projects while in fact it is expanding oil production
operations in Iran under existing (i.e., "not new")
contracts. It would be helpful to reiterate to Minister
Frattini our strong concerns about the continuation of
business as usual in Iran by Italian companies, and in
particular the expansion of any activity by Italian energy
companies, notably Eni.

10. (C/NF) The GOI often claims that Italy has a major
economic relationship with Iran which makes the economic pain
of sanctions difficult to bear for Italian companies. In
reality, Iran ranks 24th among Italy's trading partners,
representing a mere 0.5 percent of its total exports; even
Italian energy imports from Iran are relatively low and
fungible (about 5 percent of total oil imports). While we
see Iran as not particularly significant in economic terms
for Italy, the reverse is not true, however. In 2007, Italy
was Iran,s fifth largest export destination, and Iran,s
sixth largest import source -- Italy supplied Iran with about
4 percent of its imports, and purchased approximately 5.7
percent of Iranian exports. Thus any vulnerability on the
restriction of trade appears to be more on the Iranian
side; the fear of undertaking measures that really bite in
Iran likely stems more from Italian fear of political
retaliation by Iran against future commercial opportunities,
than of a substantial economic price to be borne by Italian
companies now.

11. (C) The Italians are neuralgic on the issue of the P5 1,

a grouping they feel cuts them out of the
decision-making process on issues of direct import to their
commercial opportunities, and they have advocated for a
"like-minded" states mechanism in order to have a seat of
some kind at the
table. Italian officials reacted with alarm to word of
possible inclusion of Eni and Irasco on the Iran Sanctions
Act list, with MFA Secretary General Massolo telling A/S
Gordon in November that Eni would "do anything" to avoid
inclusion. Frattini has been an outspoken advocate for human
rights in Iran in the aftermath of the June elections, and
has repeatedly criticized the regime for its harsh measures
against demonstrators and opposition activists.
Russia
------

12. (C) PM Berlusconi's close personal ties with Vladimir

Putin and the very strong corporate ties between Italian
energy parastatal Eni and Russia's Gazprom often put Italy at
odds with U.S. and EU energy security efforts. Italy's
energy policy too often reflects Russian, rather than
European, priorities. For example, the GOI is ambivalent
about supporting the EU's Nabucco Caspian pipeline, while
Eni is poised to help Gazprom construct Black Sea and Baltic
Sea pipelines that will only deepen EU dependence on Russia.
Eni often appears to dictate GOI energy policy and uses its
influence to hinder EU energy market liberalization plans.

ROME 00000049 003 OF 004

However, Italy is taking some steps in the right direction by

supporting energy projects that will diversify its own energy
sources.

13. (C/NF) It would be helpful to remind Minister Frattini of

long-standing USG concerns about European dependence on
Russia or any other single energy supplier, emphasizing that
Italian help in increasing the flow of Russian gas around
Ukraine is not the same as a policy of seeking diversity of
energy sources, routes and technologies.

14. (C) Ever loyal, FM Frattini has been a vocal supporter

of strengthening political and security ties with Russia and
has also publicly defended PM Berlusconi,s friendship with
PM Putin from media criticism, such as when Berlusconi
abruptly left Rome during Jordan,s King Abdullah recent
state visit for a "private visit" to Russia to celebrate
Putin's birthday at the latter's dacha.

15. (C) We understand that the GOI has not yet begun to
assess the draft Russia EU security treaty in detail. FM
Frattini has been careful in his public remarks, however, to
underline that any new treaty cannot supplant existing NATO
and OSCE structures. Frattini and Russian FM Lavrov recently
published a joint editorial in centrist influential daily La
Stampa calling for "a new world order" based on
interdependence and cooperation between the EU and Russia, as
well as reinforced and expanded U.S.-EU-Russia relations
within the framework of existing organizations and
agreements. In the context of the December 3 Italy-Russia
Summit in Rome, Frattini noted it was a mistake to say
Russian-Italian or
Russian-EU relations were based chiefly on energy interests,
and stressed that Russia is an indispensable partner for
European stability and security. Frattini also lauded
President Obama,s 'reset" of U.S.-Russian relations as a
window of opportunity which Italy strongly supports.

Belarus
-------

16. (C) Amid questioning over the appropriateness of

Berlusconi,s November visit to Belarus, Frattini
characterized it as a "visit by a head of government that
blazed the trail for the others." Frattini,s consistently
positive statements on Belarus contrast with his EU
colleagues, (and the U.S.,) deep concerns about President
Lukashenko,s suppression of political opposition and other
human rights abuses. In September 2009, Frattini was the
first European government minister to visit Belarus since
1994. His advisors noted to us at the time that he was
undertaking the trip in the context of and in line with the
EU's evolving policy toward Belarus. During the trip,
Frattini underscored Italy,s great interest in strong
economic relations with Belarus and hinted at deals major
Italian concerns would be closing
with Belarus. Frattini also advocated that Belarus move
closer to European institutions and came out in favor of
lifting the EU visa freeze (suspended, although not
terminated, since 2008) for senior Belarusian officials,
including Lukashenko. (In November, the EU recommended to
extend the sanctions and their suspension.)

Italian Nuclear Energy Project

------------------------------

17. (C/NF) The GOI is pursuing plans to build up to ten

nuclear power plants in Italy. Heavy French lobbying led to a
political deal for an Italian electricity parastatal ENEL
joint venture with France,s EdF to build four nuclear plants
with French technology. The lack of a fair and open bidding
process for this deal and continuing French lobbying has
placed U.S.-based companies at a disadvantage in entering the
Italian nuclear energy market. A word to Minister Frattini
that we expect U.S. companies to be given
a level-playing field to compete is critical if they are to
have a fair chance to bid for Italian nuclear energy
projects.

Yemen
-----

18. (C) Following the foiled Christmas attack in Detroit and

the closure of the U.S. and UK Embassies in Sana'a, Frattini
forcefully called for EU coordination (based on the
anti-terrorism strategy adopted by the EU in 2005) in
combating terrorism and encouraged the EU High Representative
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton to
move Yemen to the front of the EU foreign policy agenda for

ROME 00000049 004 OF 004

its January meeting.

19. (C) Frattini strongly supports tight collaboration with

the U.S. and all democratic countries in combating terrorism
and its causes. Frattini also believes stronger coordination
with Arab countries is absolutely necessary and that while
Europe has a role, Arab leaders must be in the forefront in
fighting terrorism. Frattini recently commented in the press
that Saudi FM al-Faisal and Arab League SecGen Amre Moussa
share his view that in combatting terrorism, a strong focus
must be placed on preventing terrorist groups from forming in
the first place. In the case of Yemen, he said, this means
advancing national
reconciliation, involving the ROYG in anti-terrorism efforts
and providing increased anti-terrorism support.

DIBBLE

2010-01-22

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000087

SUBJECT: STAFFDEL KESSLER DISCUSSES IRAN WITH MFA, ENI, PD

Classified By: DCM Elizabeth Dibble for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Staff Director of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HCFA) Dr. Richard
Kessler and HCFA staff members probed senior MFA and energy and gas parastatal
Eni officials on Italy's intentions concerning Iran sanctions and prospects for
effective multilateral action to curb Iran's nuclear program. Opposition
Democratic Party (PD) officials discussed Iran, Italy's role in Afghanistan, the
MEPP, Iraq, and nonproliferation with the Staffdel. End Summary.

IRAN DOMINATES MFA TALKS

¶2. (C) A January 8 roundtable discussion with Dr. Kessler and three HCFA staff
members at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) included MFA Director General
for Multilateral Political Cooperation Stefano Ronca, Ronca's Deputy Filippo
Formica, and Deputy DG for Economic Cooperation Claudio Spinedi. Office
Directors Massimo Marotti (Political-Military Security and NATO Affairs); Diego
Brasioli (G8 Issues and Global Challenges); and Giovanni Pugliese (Arms Control
and Nonproliferation) also participated. After the roundtable the Staffdel had a
meeting with MFA Deputy SecGen and Political Director Sandro De Bernardin. Post
was represented by the Charge, Pol-Mil Counselor and Poloff (notetaker).

¶3. (C) Ronca believes the deteriorating situation in Iran will soon come to a
head and that the UNSC should convey to Iran that delay tactics will not work
and support this position by readiness to adopt further pressure. Ronca and
Spinedi told the Staffdel Italy is ready to explore, with its EU colleagues, the
possibility of further sanctions, which, however, must conform to EU
regulations, and not affect the legal rights of European companies. Ronca
suggested that the Iranian financial, oil and gas, and insurance sectors (but
not the Central Bank) could be targeted and that the list sensitive products on
the export ban list could be expanded.

¶4. (C) Spinedi, who (with Formica) attended the October 7 Washington meeting
of "Likeminded States on Iran," started by briefly alluding to Italy's
longstanding complaint of exclusion from P5 1. Spinedi pointed out we needed to
determine what kind of sanctions would be acceptable to China and Russia, adding
that even at the beginning of January, China's UN ambassador said that China
"needed more time," which, Spinedi noted, was not a total rejection of tougher
sanctions. Spinedi advocated strengthening what already exists and deciding
where we are willing to exert additional pressure (especially in the oil and gas
sector). It would be important to determine which technologies others (e.g.,
China and India) are willing to provide and embargo those which they cannot.
Spinedi acknowledged that Italy had not yet imposed legally binding sanctions,
but that the GOI had successfully used "moral suasion."

¶5.(C) Spinedi noted that sanctions proposed by the U.S. at the October 7
Likeminded meeting included targeting the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Command
(IRGC), but did not include an embargo of refined oil and gas products. Spinedi
echoed Ronca in saying that in the coming months Italy will need to see how the
rest of the Europe will approach new sanctions.
¶6. (C) MFA Deputy SecGen Sandro De Bernardin told the Staffdel that Italy was
well aware of the danger posed by Iran and supported a "firm line." De
Bernardin noted Eni's considerable investments in Iran and characterized Italy's
"moral suasion" efforts to wean Iran away from its nuclear ambitions as a
"significant success." On sanctions, De Bernardin stated that Italy was
prepared to assume its "share of responsibility," but that sanctions are a means
of pressure, not a goal; effective ones must be found. In De Bernardin's view,
U.S.domestic legislation should not negatively affect other countries and the
presidential waiver has been useful in the past; he hoped it will still figure
in the future.

¶7.(C) Kessler encouraged Italy to continue and reinforce their past efforts.
De Bernardin agreed that if Iran gets the bomb, then others will seek to acquire
nuclear weapons too and that the Iranian regime must realize there is a heavy
price to be paid for persisting in non-compliance. "De Bernardin reiterated
Italy's support for openess to dialogue in addition to pressure, or the dual-
track approach, and that "putting Iran in a corner" is not the same as "cutting
it off" and characterized Italy as a "crucial player," essential to catalyzing
consensus in Europe. He added that, given Iran's critical domestic situation,
the regime was not in a position to decide anything.

KEY TO SUCCESS IN AFGHANISTAN

¶8. (C) With regard to the critical situation in Afghanistan, Ronca
acknowledged that we must strengthen the military aspect of the campaign, but
that institution building and engaging President Karzai on fighting corruption
must not be neglected. On the security side, Ronca said that Italy will increase
its force by 1000 men during the first half of 2010 and that its Afghan National
Police (ANP) training program is a first priority. As for civilian engagement,
Italy has committed 465 million euros in various civilian sectors, including
health, education, and justice. Ronca and Marotti stressed the need for better
coordination of civilian and military activities as an issue that should be on
the agenda of the January 28 London NATO conference. Ronca noted that reaching
out to insurgents was a task that should also be pursued. The Italians stressed
the need for a long-term development strategy based on Afghan priorities, but
which would also include private sector involvement and the development of good
governance.

Chiavi di successo in Afghanistan - Con riferimento alla situazione critica in

Afghanistan, Ronca e’ d’ccordo sulla necessità di rafforzare l’aspetto militare
della campagna, ma non si possono lasciare indietro la ricostruzione o la lotta
tramite il presidente Karzai alla corruzione. Sull’aspetto della sicurezza,
Ronca ha detto che l’Italia incrementera’ di 1000 unita’ le sue forze nella
prima meta’ del 2010, e che la prima priorita’ e’ di addestrare le forze di
polizia afgane. Per quanto riguarda l’aspetto civile,l’Italia ha promesso 465
milioni di euro per vari scopi, tra cui sanità, istruzione, giustizia. Ronca e
Marotti hanno stressato il bisogno di una coordinazione migliore tra le
attivita’ civili e militari, chiedendo che sia soggetto di discussione al
prossimo meeting Nato del 28 di gennaio a Londra. Ronca ha fatto notare che la
politica di riavvicinamento coi combattenti dovrebbe essere implementata. Gli
italiani stressano il concetto di priorita’ basate sulle necessita’ afgane , ma
anche il bisogno di sviluppare il settore privato e lo sviluppo di un buon
sistema di governo.

CENTER LEFT PD AIRS FOREIGN POLICY POSITIONS

¶9. (C) Head of the opposition Partito Democratico's (PD) Foreign Policy
Department Piero Fassino told the Staffdel the PD supports President Obama's
initiative to dialogue and build bridges with the Islamic world, but is very
concerned about the blocked MEPP and the "new wave of terror" in Afghanistan.
As for Iran, the PD supports pursuing a negotiated solution, but Fassino
questioned whether the current leadership is in a position to negotiate
credibly. He suggested it could be useful to change the order of
priorities in Iran; that is, be more flexible on the nuclear issue, but harder
on human rights. According to Fassino, the greatest risk with nuclear
proliferation is that irresponsible governments like the one in Iran could gain
access to nuclear arms, adding that the PD assessed that there was little to
fear with nations such as India, Britain, and France having nuclear weapons. He
asked whether a democratic government in Iran might not have a different
position on the nuclear program.

¶10. (C) Fassino said the PD supports the GOI's increased (military) support
for Afghanistan, but stressed that strengthening civil and governmental
institutions and economic development are equally important. On the MEPP,
Fassino characterized Netanyahu's proposed 10-month settlement freeze "a little
window of opportunity," but questioned whether it was enough, given the sraelis'
refusal to discuss (the status of) Jerusalem. As for Iraq, Fassino said the
stabilization process must be supported; there was no alternative.ENI JUSTIFIES
IRAN ACTIVITIES

Fassino ha detto che il PD appoggia l’incremento del supporto militare in

Afghanistan, ma ha sottolineato che sono altrettanto importanti supporti alle
istituzioni civili ed istituzionali, ed allo sviluppo economico. Sul Medio
Oriente, Fassino ha detto che la proposta di Nethanyahu di un raffreddamento
della situazione per 10 mesi può essere una piccola “finestra” di trattatgiva,
ma si è chiesto se sia sufficiente, visto il rifiuto di Israele di discutere
sullo status di Gerusalemme. Come per l’Iraq, Fassino ha detto che il procxesso
di stabilizzazione dev’essere supportato. Non ci sono alternative. L’ENI
GIUSTIFFICA LE ATTIVITA’ IN IRAN

¶11. ( C ) Energy and gas parastatal Eni (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi) officials
told the Congressional delegation that it is cooperating to address USG concerns
over the company,s Iran activities, but insisted that it will continue to
fulfill its contractual obligations there. The company officials said that Eni
has understood the USG message to reduce its presence in Iran, and as a result
it has already decreased its Iran activities to a minimum level. The Eni
officials provided the Staffdel with a copy of the November 16, 2009 CEO Scaroni
letter to Ambassador Thorne that states the company,s position (A copy of Eni's
letter was provided to EEB in November). Referencing this letter, the officials
pointed out that Eni will not undertake new activities in Iran, including no new
activities by its subsidiaries, Saipem ROME 00000087 003.2 OF 003 and Polimeri
Europa. They added that following Scaroni,s September 16 meetings in Washington
the company also gave up plans for an MOU with Iran for development of the phase
III of the Darquain oil field. The officials stated that while EU law prevents
the Eni from responding to official requests for information on its Iran
operations, it has been transparent in informing the USG on a voluntary basis.

¶12. ( C ) The Eni officials stated, however, that Eni intends to carry out
exploration and development activities in Iran that fall under its contractual
obligations there. The officials acknowledged that this is a &gray area 8 due to
the differences of opinion between the company and the USG over what is &new8
activity and what is &old.8 The company officials said that they hope to clarify
this issue with Washington during separate meetings in January with senior
officials from the State Department and Department of Treasury. Pressed for
details over the company,s existing obligations, the officials said that it is
under contract to meet certain targets of (oil) production in order to guarantee
defined levels of production within a given time frame. They added that Eni must
keep a certain threshold of production in order to recover its investments in
Iran. They also explained that Eni receives periodic (possibly scheduled)
payments by Iran in oil equivalent amounts that correspond to the attained
target levels of production.

¶13. ( C ) The Eni officials admitted the frustrating difficulties of operating

in Iran, but stated that Eni's priority is to recover its investments there
while meeting EU laws. The officials estimated Eni's total Iran investments at
around $3 billion dollars, of which they said Eni has already recovered already
about 60 percent (or about $1.7 billion according to one Eni representative).
The company officials said Eni still needs to recover about $1.4 billion from
its Iran operations. They added that &if all goes as planned8 Eni will recover
this remainder of its investments by the end of 2013 or early in 2014. They
further explained that Eni's Iran contracts provide the possibility of
extensions if the company is not able to recover its investments within the
stipulated time frame. The Eni officials cautioned that the company may face EU
sanctions if it withdraws from Iran due to pressure from USG unilateral
sanctions.

2010-01-28

S E C R E T STATE 008676

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2035

TAGS: PINR, EINV, ENRG, ETRD, PGOV, PREL, IT, RS
SUBJECT: (C) REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON ITALY-RUSSIA
RELATIONS (C-RE9-02730)

REF: A. ROME 000097

B. ROME 000948
C. ROME 001409
D. MOSCOW 001273

Classified By: ELISSA G. PITTERLE, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS

1. (C) WASHINGTON ANALYSTS GREATLY APPRECIATE THE

EXCELLENT REFS ON ITALIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND WOULD
APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THIS TOPIC, AS
POST'S TIME AND RESOURCES PERMIT. BECAUSE ITALY IS ONE OF
RUSSIA'S STRATEGIC PARTNERS IN EUROPE, THERE IS SIGNIFICANT
POLICYMAKER INTEREST IN ITALY'S POLICIES TOWARDS RUSSIA AND
THE FACTORS DRIVING THOSE POLICIES. ANY INFORMATION REGARDING
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS, PARTICULARLY
THOSE BETWEEN ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER SILVIO BERLUSCONI AND
RUSSIAN PRIME MINSTER VLADIMIR PUTIN OR RUSSIAN PRESIDENT
DIMITRY MEDVEDEV, AND ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA
WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED.

2. (C) THERE IS ALSO CONTINUED POLICYMAKER INTEREST IN THE

ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA,
PARTICULARLY IN THE ENERGY SECTOR. ITALY IS AT THE FOREFRONT
OF EUROPEAN ENERGY AND CONTINUES TO ENGAGE IN BUSINESS DEALS
WITH GAZPROM, THE RUSSIAN ENERGY GIANT. ENI, ITALY'S
PARTIALLY STATE-OWNED ENERGY CONGLOMERATE, IS GAZPROM'S
LARGEST PARTNER IN ITS EFFORTS TO STREAMLINE THE SOUTH STREAM
PIPELINE, AND WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN HOW THE TWO COMPANIES
ARE OPERATING TOGETHER. U.S. POLICYMAKERS ALSO REMAIN
INTERESTED IN ITALY'S MOVEMENT TOWARDS ENERGY DIVERSIFICATION
AND THE RESTART OF ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM. ANALYSTS WELCOME ANY
AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON THESE TOPICS, AS TIME AND RESOURCES
PERMIT.

A. (U) FOREIGN AND ECONOMIC POLICY:

1) (C) PLEASE PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION ON THE PERSONAL

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RUSSIAN PM VLADIMIR PUTIN AND ITALIAN PM
SILVIO BERLUSCONI. WHAT PERSONAL INVESTMENTS, IF ANY, DO THEY
HAVE THAT MIGHT DRIVE THEIR FOREIGN OR ECONOMIC POLICIES?

2) (C) WHAT FACTORS ARE DRIVING ITALY'S FOREIGN POLICY WITH

RUSSIA?

3) (C) HOW DO ITALIAN LEADERS VIEW U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

TOWARDS RUSSIA. HAVE ITALIAN POLITICAL OR BUSINESS LEADERS
INFLUENCED RUSSIAN POLICY AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS, AND IF SO,
HOW?

B. (U) ENERGY POLICY:

1) (C) WHAT ARE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS' AND ENI

OFFICIALS' VIEWS ON ITALY'S ENERGY RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA
AND THE SOUTH STREAM PROJECT? WHERE DOES ITALIAN ENERGY
POLICY CONVERGE WITH RUSSIAN ENERGY POLICY, ESPECIALLY
REGARDING LIBYA AND THE BALKANS?

2) (C) PLEASE PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION ON THE RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN ENI EXECUTIVES, INCLUDING CEO SCARONI, AND ITALIAN
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, ESPECIALLY PM BERLUSCONI AND THE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

3) (C) PLEASE PROVIDE EXAMPLES, IF POSSIBLE, OF ANY

INSTANCES WHERE THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT MADE DECISIONS TO
BENEFIT ITALIAN BUSINESS OR COMMERCIAL INTERESTS AT THE
EXPENSE OF POLITICAL CONCERNS ABOUT ENERGY POLICY.

3. (U) PLEASE CITE C-RE9-02730 IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF

REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS.
CLINTON

2010-02-03

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Opponents of a new bill before Italian

parliament that would further regulate the Internet say it
endangers free speech and is a threat to Italian democracy.
The bill also appears to favor PM Berlusconi's Mediaset
television service while disadvantaging Sky, one of its major
competitors. The GOI says the bill is intended to implement
an EU directive that harmonizes media regulation and that the
provisions being criticised are designed to establish greater
protection of copyrighted material, to protect children from
inappropriate broadcasts, and to keep consumers from paying
twice by being subjected to excessive advertising on pay-TV
channels. Opponents say the law far exceeds the scope and
spirit of the EU law and severely restricts free expression
on the Internet. Due to advertising and content regulation
in the bill, some have read it as an effort to give
Berlusconi greater control over communication and to drive
out Mediaset's competitors. Implementation of the bill has
been postponed from its original date of January 27 and
parliament is holding hearings on the matter. The GOI
appears open to discussion of the bill's text. While
reaction to the bill has been strong among opposition
politicians and telecom professionals, the issue has not made
it to the front pages of newspapers so there has been no
strong public reation. Despite GOI protestations, the bill
is troubling as it appears to have been written to give the
government enough leeway to block or censor any Internet
content. END SUMMARY
¶2. (SBU) According to the GOI, the Romani Bill (named for
Paolo Romani, Deputy Economic Development Minister, who
covers communications issues) is designed to implement EU
Directive 2007/65CE, which aims to harmonize media regulation
in the EU. Many telecom sector professionals, however,
believe that the bill vastly exceeds the scope and spirit of
the EU law. The bill is complex, but there are three primary
areas of concern: limits to uploading on the Interet,
television advertising ceilings, and limits to content aimed
for adults, which would also restrict films judged by the
Italian rating system as being for those 14 and older. This
would likely include the vast majority if not all
U.S.-produced PG-13 movies.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
LIABILITY FOR VIDEO ON THE INTERNET
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶3. (U) Provisions contained in the bill would make Internet

service providers (ISPs), and hosting sites such as Blogspot
and YouTube, liable for content in the same way a television
station is. In the strictest interpretation of the law, the
sites and ISPs would have to monitor all content on their
sites, content which is uploaded by millions of individual
users. This is widely viewed as impossible both in practical
and economic terms. The Italian Communications Authority
(AGCOM) would be responsible for oversight of the law, and
some have interpreted the bill as requiring government
permission before a video could be uploaded.

¶4. (C) Antonello Busetto, director of institutional relations

for Confindustria Servizi Innovativi e Tecnologici, a
business association representing the interests of IT
companies, said the measure would mean "the death of the
Internet in Italy."

¶5. (U) Italian communications commissioner Nicola D'Angelo

was quoted in the press as saying, "Italy will be the only
Western country in which it is necessary to have prior
government permission to operate this kind of service...This
aspect reveals a democratic risk, regardless of who happens
to be in power." Likewise, AGCOM president Corrado Calabro
has said that Italy would be unique in the West as imposing
Internet restrictions until now only imposed by authoritarian
governments.

¶6. (SBU) The GOI says the measure is aimed at protecting

copyrighted material from being uploaded and downloaded

ROME 00000125 002 OF 003

illegally, as well as at monitoring other potentially illegal

activity on the Internet. The copyright industry has
expressed some limited approval of the bill. Enzo Mazza,
president of the Italian Music Federation, said the music
industry is generally in favor of making ISPs and sites more
responsible for protecting copyrighted material, though, he
added that his industry's analysis of the bill was focused on
this aspect and not other implications.

¶7. (SBU) Because this could make ISPs and opinion sites
liable for defamation in the way television broadcasts are,
some see this as an effort to control political discourse on
the Internet. Others see a commercial angle aimed at limiting
the video and TV available on the Internet as Mediaset moves
into the Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) market.
Alessandro Gilioli, who writes a blog for the liberal weekly
magazine Espresso wrote "It's the Berlusconi method: Kill
your potential enemies while they are small. That's why
anyone doing Web TV -- even from their attic at home -- must
get ministerial approval and fulfill a host of other
bureaucratic obligations."

¶8. (SBU) AGCOM would have the authority to enforce the law.
Among the authority's powers would be the ability to block
traffic into Italy of sites whose content did not meet the
requirements of the law. For example, YouTube could be
blocked because the content was not uploaded with government
approval. AGCOM would also be able to levy fines of up to
150,000 euros against foreign companies violating the law.
Though AGCOM is theoretically an independent agency, many
fear that it may not be strong enough to resist political
pressure.

- - - - - - - - - - -
ADVERTISING CEILINGS
- - - - - - - - - - -

¶9. (C) The bill would place limits on advertising on pay-TV

channels that exceed the EU directive. It would reduce the
EU ceiling of 20% to 12% in Italy by 2012. The provision
would penalize Sky in particular. Some argue that the
measure is designed to favor PM Berlusconi's free-to-air
Mediaset channels, which would not be subject to the limit.
Mediaset's pay channels would be subject to the advertising
ceiling, but Mediaset's channels currently have less than 12%
each hour dedicated to ads. In addition, reducing the
overall possibility to advertise on pay-TV would push
advertising towards free channels operated by Mediaset and by
the Italian state network RAI. Busetto said this would allow
Berlusconi to earn more money and also to exercise greater
control of public information.

- - - - - - - - -
ADULT CONTENT
- - - - - - - - -

¶10. (SBU) The bill places stringent time restrictions on

broadcasting of so-called "adult content," virtually
prohibiting it between 7 a.m. and 11 p.m. Pay channels such
as those offered by Sky would be subject to the restrictions;
it appears pay-per-view content would be as well. Because
they obtain a significant part of their income from pay adult
content, pay-TV would suffer financially from this
restriction. The bill would limit broadcast of any film
rated for viewers above age 14 to after 10:30 p.m. One press
report said this would make films such as Saturday Night
Fever unavailable until late-night. Again, some opponents
worry that the objective is to hurt Mediaset's competition.

- - - - - - - -
EU OPINION
- - - - - - - -
¶11. (U) Opinion at the EU appears to be conflicting.
According to press reports, the EU is threatening to start an
infraction procedure against Italy for failing to swiftly
implement the media directive. At the same time, other press
reports say the restrictions in the Italian bill would
likely violate the EU e-commerce directive.

- - - - - - -

ROME 00000125 003 OF 003

COMMENT
- - - - - - -

¶12. (C) In official statements the government insists the

bill is in no way intended to stifle free speech. Opponents
are vocal and using alarmist language, but outside of telecom
industries their numbers appear to be small. There has been
no visible public outrage, and even Beppe Grillo, a public
personality usually outspoken about government regulation,
especially that involving the Internet, has said very little.

¶13. (C) After Berlusconi was attacked in Milan in December

and a Facebook fan page for his attacker quickly amassed
fans, the GOI expressed the need for regulation of social
networking sites. At that time, Romani said the government
would work with ISPs and sites to develop a method of
self-regulation and that there would be no attempt to
legislate internet content. Despite Romani's prior
statements, this bill appears to have been written to give
the government enough leeway to block or censor any Internet
content it deems defamatory or to be encouraging criminal
activity.

¶14. (C) For years, the USG has urged the GOI to take action
to protect copyrighted material on the Internet, in
particular encouraging the establishment of clear
notice-and-takedown procedures and cooperation among rights
holders and ISPs to prevent illegal filesharing. Italy has
done very little. Now, this bill skips over collaboration,
and suddenly moves directly to very stern regulation. In
light of its reluctance to take action on this issue in the
past, and also given the many commercial advantages that this
law appears to give Mediaset and state TV, the GOI claim that
Internet provisions of this law are aimed at copyright
protection alone are suspect.

¶15. (C) In all liklihood, if this bill were to become law as

it is currently written, little would change immediately in
the way Internet sites operate in Italy, and the average 11th
grader uploading video to his blog would never be targeted
for legal action. It would, however, provide a basis for
legal actions against media operators that proved to be
commercial or political competition for government figures.
Over the last three years we have seen several GOI efforts to
exert control over the Internet, including one infamous
effort to require bloggers to obtain GOI journalism licenses.

¶16. (C) Advocates of Internet freedom have repeatedly warned

us that Italy's traditional elites -- on both sides of the
political spectrum -- are very uncomfortable with the
Internet's ability to bypass the traditional media that they
control. Becasue this new bill seems to address these kinds
of concerns, and because it also serves Berlusconi's business
interests, it is conceivable that this seemingly improbable
legislation might actually come into force in Italy. We note
that officers from SKY have told us that Deputy GOI Minister
Romani (for whom the new bill is named) has been leading
efforts within the GOI to help Berlusconi's Mediaset and to
put SKY at a disadvantage. This represents a familiar
pattern: Berslusoni and Mediaset have been using government
power in this way ever since the days of Prime Minister
Bettino Craxi. In addition, this bill would set precidents
that nations such as china could copy or cite as
justification for their own crackdowns on free speech.
THORNE

-------------------------------------------

2010-02-05

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000266

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND GREENSTEIN,

S/EEE MORNINGSTAR, EUR/WE, INR
DOE FOR HEGBURG, EKIMOFF
DOC FOR JBROUGHER
NSC FOR MMCFAUL

EO 12958 DECL: 02/05/2035

TAGS EPET, ENRG, ECON, PREL, PINR, RS, IT
SUBJECT: (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX ON ENERGY INTERESTS,
PUTIN-BERLUSCONI LINK (C-RE9-02730)
REF: A. STATE 8676 B. 09 MOSCOW 1273

Classified By: Econ MC Matthias Mitman for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

----------------------------
PUTIN-BERLUSCONI DIRECT LINK
----------------------------

1. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us during a February 4 lunch that his Embassy and
his Foreign Ministry often only learn of conversations between PM Berlusconi and
PM Putin after the fact, and with little detail or background. He expressed
frustration about the PMs’ “direct line,” which sometimes leaves the Embassy in
the dark. He said if there is action to be taken, the cabinet secretary will
instruct the Foreign Ministry or the Embassy without providing any background,
and only note that Berlusconi and Putin had agreed on whatever the action item
is. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that while the close relationship is not ideal from
the bureaucracy’s perspective and more detrimental than beneficial, it can be
useful at times. He cited the case of the sale to Gazprom by Italian energy
giant ENI of its 20% share in Gazprom’s oil subsidiary Gazpromneft. He said
Gazprom had insisted on paying far below the market price, but that it
ultimately paid the market price after Berlusconi weighed in with Putin.
------------
ENI AND ENEL
------------

2. (C/NF) In response to our comment that ENI’s Moscow Representative, Ernesto

Ferlenghi, won’t meet with us, XXXXXXXXXXXX said Ferlenghi “for some reason”
doesn’t like to meet with foreign diplomats. (Note: We had a very open and
friendly meeting with Ferlenghi about two years ago, but ever since, he has
deflected our requests for a meeting. See also ref B. End note.) XXXXXXXXXXXX
said he believes Ferlenghi may have a directive from ENI headquarters to refer
foreign governments to ENI’s Rome-based international governmental affairs
director. While [XXXXXXXXXXXX, his cell phone rang -- it was Ferlenghi.
explained that although major projects such as the proposed South Stream gas
pipeline gain the most attention, ENI’s main business in Russia is “buying gas.”

3. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX said the Italian Embassy is organizing a visit by a trade

and investment delegation to Novy Urengoi, the Yamal region city that is a
project site of Severenergia, an upstream joint-venture between Gazprom, ENI,
and Italy’s Enel. Gazprom bought a controlling stake in Severenergia from ENI
and Enel, which had set up Severenergia to purchase some of the assets of the
former Yukos oil company at its bankruptcy auction. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that in
addition to its investment in Severenergia, Enel also has approximately $6
billion invested in the Russian electricity sector and may raise its investment
in that sector to $9 billion.

------------------------------
SOUTH STREAM AND SAMSUN-CEYHAN
------------------------------

4. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that ENI XXXXXXXXXXXX and “we” (presumably the
Italian government) have regular contact with Russian DPM and “Energy Czar” Igor
Sechin. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that lately the discussions relate to an explicit
business link between South Stream and the proposed Samsun-Ceyhan Turkish oil
pipeline, of which ENI is the operating partner. He explained that ENI, and its
Turkish partner (which he said is Turkish PM Erdogan’s son-in-law) need Russian
oil to make Samsun-Ceyhan a reality, while Gazprom needs Turkish cooperation to
move ahead on South Stream.

-------
COMMENT
-------

5. (C/NF) On major issues, it seems that Russian-Italian

MOSCOW 00000266 002 OF 002
economic relations are directed by PMs who have a direct line to each other as
well as control over some of the largest assets of their respective economies.
To whatever end they direct those assets, it is likely they are not doing so
based solely on commercial or rate-of-return calculations. As our contact
himself acknowledged -- “it seems that everything that happens at the lower
levels is just for show.” Beyrle

2010-02-12

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000173

NOFORN
SIPDIS

SECDEF FOR USDP, ISA, ISA/EURNATO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020

TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO IT AF IR
SUBJECT: SECDEF MEETING WITH ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
FRANCO FRATTINI, FEBRUARY 8, 2010

ROME 00000173 001.2 OF 003

Classified By: Ambassador Alexander Vershbow for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D
)

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (SecDef)

met with Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Franco Frattini
during an official visit to Rome on February 8. On
Afghanistan, Frattini was eager to move beyond the London
Conference and work to produce practical results for the
Afghan people. He proposed better civil-military
coordination at senior levels in NATO, and raised the
prospect of coordination on local projects across the
Afghanistan-Iran border. SecDef thanked Frattini for Italy's
pledge of more troops for operations in Afghanistan and
explained where gaps in civil-military cooperation existed.
Frattini believed the international community was lining up
against Iran, and encouraged better coordination with
countries outside the P5-plus-1. SecDef warned that a
nuclear Iran would lead to greater proliferation in the
Middle East, war, or both. SecDef agreed with Frattini that
a United Nations conference highlighting security challenges
in the Horn of Africa was a good idea. END SUMMARY.

------------
Afghanistan
------------

2. (S/NF) Frattini opened by telling SecDef that the U.S. can

count on Italy's full support on Afghanistan, Iran and
fighting terror. He had recently talked with General Jones
and Secretary Clinton and relayed the same message. He
expressed a desire to focus on the comprehensive approach in
such a way to improve the daily lives of Afghans. He
asserted a need to press President Karzai on delivering
improved governance or risk losing support for the mission in
coalition Parliaments. Frattini wanted to get beyond "just
talking" -- referencing the London conference -- and noted
concrete Italian projects to convert poppy cultivation to
olive oil production and to create a national high school for
public administration.

3. (S/NF) SecDef commended Rome's efforts to increase Italian contributions,

asking whether even more Carabinieri might be available for training the Afghan
security forces. He observed that General McChrystal's emphasis on protecting
Afghan civilians has changed attitudes among Allied publics. SecDef said he is
pushing the comprehensive approach, noting a need for all stakeholders in
Afghanistan to share information effectively. He said he hoped that NATO's new
Senior Civilian Representative, Ambassador Mark Sedwill, could facilitate this.
SecDef recommended a focus on better governance below the level of the national
government -- which would take decades to turn into a modern government) taking
advantage of traditional institutions and competent governors at the regional
and sub-regional levels and leveraging them into local success stories. At the
national level, however, our priority should be to develop those ministries most
critical to our success, such as Defense, Interior, Finance, Agriculture, and
Health. Noting Gen. McChrystal's recent statement that the situation in
Afghanistan is no longer deteriorating, SecDef said that much of the challenge
is psychological -- convincing Afghans that we can win and that we will not
abandon them.

Il Segretario alla Difesa ha elogiato gli sforzi di Roma nell’incrementare il

contributo dell’Italia, ed ha chiesto se altri carabinieri possano essere messi
a disposizione per addestrare le forze di sicurezza afgane. Ha inoltre osservato
che l’enfasi posta dal Generale McChrystal sulla difesa dei civili afghani ha
cambiato l’atteggiamento tra dell’opinione pubblica degli alleati. Il Segretario
della Difesa ha detto che sta cercando un approccio esteso, in quanto ha notato
un bisogno da parte dei partecipanti (alla missione?) in Afghanistan di
condividere le informazioni in modo più efficace.Ha detto di sperare che il
nuovo Ambasciatore della NATO, Mark Sedwill possa facilitare questo processo.
Il Segretario ha raccomandato di focalizzarsi sul miglioramento della governance
ai livelli inferiori a quello del Governo nazionale, il quale avrà bisogno di
decenni per modernizzarsi, approfittando delle istituzioni tradizionali e di
governanti competenti ai livelli regionali e sub-regionali e coinvolgendoli in
storie di successo locali. A livello nazionale, comunque, la nostra priorità
dovrebbe essere lo sviluppo dei ministeri più critici verso il nostro successo
(che ostacolano la nostra vittoria?), quali Difesa, Interni, Finanze,
Agricoltura e Sanità.Notando la recente affermazione del Gen. McChrystal, che la
situazione in Afghanistan non sta più peggiorando, il Segretario alla Difesa ha
detto che la sfida più grande è di tipo psicologico, convincere cioè gli afgani
che possiamo vincere e che non li abbandoneremo.

4. (S/NF) Frattini agreed that civilian-military integration is the weakest part

of the Afghan strategy. He expressed frustration that NATO foreign ministers
only discuss issues like agriculture and education while defense ministers only
discuss security. The problem, Frattini suggested, is that they don't talk to
each other. He proposed a joint meeting of foreign and defense ministers,
beginning with talks at the expert level. SecDef responded that Gen. McChrystal
and Ambassador Eikenberry do civilian-military collaboration at the national
level on the basis of a Joint Campaign Plan, as do local ground commanders with
leaders of PRTs. What is missing is the level in between -- the regional
commands -- and SecDef expressed a desire for Sedwill to appoint subordinates to
address this in each RC, building on the example of the civ-mil cell in RC-
South. The effect would be cascading civil-military coordination at the
national, regional, and local levels. SecDef noted that similar efforts by
UNSRSG Kai Eide had been hamstrung by resourcing and the UN's aversion to
working with the military. As a NATO representative, Sedwill should not have
these problems.

Frattini è d’accordo sul fatto che integrare civili e militari sia la parte più
debole della strategia afghana. Ha espresso insoddisfazione in quanto i ministri
degli esteri della NATO discutono solo di agricoltura ed educazione, mentre i
ministri della difesa discutono solo di sicurezza. Secondo Frattini il problema
è che i ministri non parlano tra di loro, ed ha così proposto un incontro tra i
ministri degli Esteri e quelli della Difesa dove si cominci a parlare a livello
di esperti. Il Segretario alla Difesa ha risposto che il Gen. McChrystal e
l’Ambasciatore Eikenberry incoraggiano a livello nazionale la collaborazione tra
civili e militari, sulla base di un Piano di campagna condiviso, così come a
livello locale fanno i vari comandanti con i leaders del PRT [...]

5. (S/NF) Frattini also asked about practical cooperation across the Afghan-
Iranian border. Local incentives for cooperation might undermine weapons and
drug trafficking and help co-opt reconcilable Taliban. SecDef noted that Iran is

playing both sides of the street -- trying to be friendly with the Afghanistan
government while trying to undermine ISAF efforts. He noted that intelligence
indicated there was little lethal material crossing the Afghanistan-Iran border.

SecDef suggested that trade route protection from Afghanistan into Eastern Iran,
which is important for local economies on both sides of the border, might be a
place to start. SecDef noted that any effort will need to be coordinated with
Kabul. Frattini agreed this would be a good starting point.

Frattini si è anche informato sulla cooperzione pratica sul confine Afghano-

Iraniano. Incentivi locali alla cooperazione potrebbero indebolire il traffico
di armi e droga ed aiutare a cooptare i talebani disposti alla riconciliazione
(?). Il Segretario alla Difesa ha notato che l’Iran sta giocando su due fronti
(facendo il doppio gioco?), cercando di essere amichevole verso il governo
Afghano e nello stesso tempo cercando di indebolire gli sforzi dell’ISAF. Il
Segretario ha detto che l’intelligence ritiene di piccole dimensioni il traffico
di materiale letale (Armi?) attraverso il confine. Il Segretario ha suggerito
che proteggere la strada che dall’Afghanistan entra nell’Iran dell’Est, strada
importante per l’economia di entrambi i lati del confine, potrebbe essere un
buon punto di partenza. Ha inoltre sottolineato che ogni sforzo deve essere
coordinato con Kabul. Frattini è stato d’accordo sul fatto che questo sarebbe un
buon punto di partenza.

Iran
6. (S/NF) Frattini supported recent public statements by SecDef raising the
pressure on Iran. He declared that Ahmadinejad cannot be trusted, especially
after contradicting recent constructive statements by his own government.
Frattini, citing a recent conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov,
said he believed Russia would support the sanctions track. The challenge was to
bring China on board; China and India, in Frattini's view, were critical to the
adoption of measures that would affect the government without hurting Iranian
civil society. He also specifically proposed including Saudi Arabia, Turkey,
Brazil, Venezuela and Egypt in the conversation. He expressed particular
frustration with Ankara's "double game" of outreach to both Europe and Iran.
Frattini proposed an informal meeting of Middle East countries, who were keen to
be consulted on Iran, and noted that Secretary Clinton was in agreement.

7. (S/NF) SecDef emphasized that a UNSC resolution was

important because it would give the European Union and
nations a legal platform on which to impose even harsher
sanctions against Iran. SecDef pointedly warned that urgent
action is required. Without progress in the next few months,
we risk nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, war
prompted by an Israeli strike, or both. SecDef predicted "a
different world" in 4-5 years if Iran developed nuclear
weapons. SecDef stated that he recently delivered the same
warning to PM Erdogan, and he agreed with Frattini's
assessment on Saudi Arabia and China, noting that Saudi
Arabia is more important to both Beijing and Moscow than
Iran.

RIPRENDERE

8. (S/NF) SecDef urged Frattini to reconsider a planned visit to Italy by a

prominent Iranian Parliamentarian in the wake of recent executions of students
in opposition to the government. At the same time, we needed to ensure we did
not discredit the opposition by creating the impression that they
are the tools of foreign partners.

Il secretatario della difesa ha chiesto a Frattini di riconsiderare una visita

in Italia da parte di un importante parlamentare iraniano, sulla scia di
esecuzioni di studenti che si erano opposti al governo. Allo stesso tempo
necessitavamo di non discreditare l’opposizione, creando l’impressione che
possano essere gli strumenti di partner stranieri

Horn of Africa
9. (C) Frattini expressed concern about deteriorating conditions in Somalia and
Yemen. He noted a recent conversation with President Sharif of Somalia's
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), in which Sharif said that he would be
unable to pay his security forces by the end of February. Frattini said that
Italy was encouraging the EU Presidency to focus on Somalia and Yemen, and had
proposed a United Nations conference addressing Horn of Africa security issues.
Italy was providing funding to the TFG's national budget. SecDef concurred that
the region deserved more focus.

Corno d’Africa
Frattini ha espresso preoccupazioni per le condizioni deteriorate di Somalia e
Yemen. Frattini Ha notato in una recente conversazione con il presidente Sharif
del governo federale di transizione somalo, nella quale Shariff ammette
l’impossibilita’di pagare le forze dell’ordine gia’ alla fine di febbraio.
Frattini ha detto che l’italia sta incoraggiando la presidenza dell’unione
europea su Somalia e Yemen, ed ha proposto una conferenza delle nazioni unite
per indirizzare I problemi sulla sicurezza nel corno d’africa. L’Italia stava
fornendo fondi per il budget del governo federale di transizione somalo.Il
secretario della difesa e’ daccordo nel ritenere che la regione ha bisogno di
piu’ focus

Classified By: Ambassador Alexander Vershbow for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (SecDef) met with Italian
Minister of Foreign Affairs Franco Frattini during an official visit to Rome on
February 8. On Afghanistan, Frattini was eager to move beyond the London
Conference and work to produce practical results for the Afghan people. He
proposed better civil-military coordination at senior levels in NATO, and raised
the prospect of coordination on local projects across the Afghanistan-Iran
border. SecDef thanked Frattini for Italy's pledge of more troops for operations
in Afghanistan and explained where gaps in civil-military cooperation existed.
Frattini believed the international community was lining up against Iran, and
encouraged better coordination with countries outside the P5-plus-1. SecDef
warned that a nuclear Iran would lead to greater proliferation in the Middle
East, war, or both. SecDef agreed with Frattini that a United Nations conference
highlighting security challenges in the Horn of Africa was a good idea. END
SUMMARY.

Afghanistan
2. (S/NF) Frattini opened by telling SecDef that the U.S. can count on Italy's
full support on Afghanistan, Iran and fighting terror. He had recently talked
with General Jones and Secretary Clinton and relayed the same message. He
expressed a desire to focus on the comprehensive approach in
such a way to improve the daily lives of Afghans. He asserted a need to press
President Karzai on delivering improved governance or risk losing support for
the mission in coalition Parliaments. Frattini wanted to get beyond "just
talking" -- referencing the London conference -- and noted concrete Italian
projects to convert poppy cultivation to olive oil production and to create a
national high school for public administration.

3. (S/NF) SecDef commended Rome's efforts to increase Italian contributions,

asking whether even more Carabinieri might be available for training the Afghan
security forces. He observed that General McChrystal's emphasis on protecting
Afghan civilians has changed attitudes among Allied publics. SecDef said he is
pushing the comprehensive approach, noting a need for all stakeholders in
Afghanistan to share information effectively. He said he hoped that NATO's new
Senior Civilian Representative, Ambassador Mark Sedwill, could facilitate this.
SecDef recommended a focus on better governance below the level of the national
government -- which would take decades to turn into a modern government)taking
advantage of traditional institutions and competent governors at the regional
and sub-regional levels and leveraging them into local success stories. At the
ational level, however, our priority should be to develop those ministries most
critical to our success, such as Defense, Interior, Finance, Agriculture, and
Health. Noting Gen. McChrystal's recent statement that the situation in
Afghanistan is no longer deteriorating, SecDef said that much of the challenge
is psychological -- convincing Afghans that we can win and that we will not
abandon them.

4. (S/NF) Frattini agreed that civilian-military integration is the weakest part

of the Afghan strategy. He expressed frustration that NATO foreign ministers
only discuss issues like agriculture and education while defense ministers only
discuss security. The problem, Frattini suggested, is that they don't talk to
each other. He proposed a joint meeting of foreign and defense ministers,
beginning with talks at the expert level. SecDef responded that Gen. McChrystal
and Ambassador Eikenberry do civilian-military collaboration at the national
level on the basis of a Joint Campaign Plan, as do local ground commanders with
leaders of PRTs. What is missing is the level in between -- the regional
commands -- and SecDef expressed a desire for Sedwill to appoint
subordinates to address this in each RC, building on the

Frattini ha incominciato col dire al segretario della difesa che gli Stati Uniti
possono contare sul totale supporto italiano sulla lotta al terrorismo,
sull’Afghanistan e sull’Iran. Frattini ha recentemente parlato con il generale
Jones e col il segretario di stato Clinton risottolineando lo stesso punto. Ha
espresso il suo desiderio di vedere un maggiore focus nel migliorare le
condizioni di vita degli afgani e di spingere il presidente Karzai verso un
sistema di governo migliore, o si potrebbe correre il rischio di perdere il
supporto politico nei parlamenti della coalizione.

5. (S/NF) Frattini also asked about practical cooperation across the Afghan-
Iranian border. Local incentives for cooperation might undermine weapons and
drug trafficking and help co-opt reconcilable Taliban. SecDef noted that Iran is

playing both sides of the street -- trying to be friendly with the Afghanistan
government while trying to undermine ISAF efforts. He noted that intelligence
indicated there was little lethal material crossing the Afghanistan-Iran border.

SecDef suggested that trade route protection from Afghanistan into Eastern Iran,
which is important for local economies on both sides of the border, might be a
place to start. SecDef noted that any effort will need to be coordinated with
Kabul. Frattini agreed this would be a good starting point.

----
Iran
----

6. (S/NF) Frattini supported recent public statements by

SecDef raising the pressure on Iran. He declared that
Ahmadinejad cannot be trusted, especially after contradicting
recent constructive statements by his own government.
Frattini, citing a recent conversation with Russian Foreign
Minister Lavrov, said he believed Russia would support the
sanctions track. The challenge was to bring China on board;
China and India, in Frattini's view, were critical to the
adoption of measures that would affect the government without
hurting Iranian civil society. He also specifically proposed
including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Brazil, Venezuela and Egypt
in the conversation. He expressed particular frustration
with Ankara's "double game" of outreach to both Europe and
Iran. Frattini proposed an informal meeting of Middle East
countries, who were keen to be consulted on Iran, and noted
that Secretary Clinton was in agreement.

7. (S/NF) SecDef emphasized that a UNSC resolution was

important because it would give the European Union and
nations a legal platform on which to impose even harsher
sanctions against Iran. SecDef pointedly warned that urgent
action is required. Without progress in the next few months,
we risk nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, war
prompted by an Israeli strike, or both. SecDef predicted "a
different world" in 4-5 years if Iran developed nuclear
weapons. SecDef stated that he recently delivered the same
warning to PM Erdogan, and he agreed with Frattini's
assessment on Saudi Arabia and China, noting that Saudi
Arabia is more important to both Beijing and Moscow than
Iran.

8. (S/NF) SecDef urged Frattini to reconsider a planned

visit to Italy by a prominent Iranian Parliamentarian in the
wake of recent executions of students in opposition to the
government. At the same time, we needed to ensure we did not
discredit the opposition by creating the impression that they
are the tools of foreign partners.

--------------
Horn of Africa
--------------

9. (C) Frattini expressed concern about deteriorating

conditions in Somalia and Yemen. He noted a recent
conversation with President Sharif of Somalia's Transitional
Federal Government (TFG), in which Sharif said that he would
be unable to pay his security forces by the end of February.
Frattini said that Italy was encouraging the EU Presidency to
focus on Somalia and Yemen, and had proposed a United Nations
conference addressing Horn of Africa security issues. Italy
was providing funding to the TFG's national budget. SecDef
concurred that the region deserved more focus.

ROME 00000173 003.2 OF 003

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Classified By: Classified by DCM Elizabeth Dibble for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d)

2010-12-13

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Opponents of a new bill before Italian

parliament that would further regulate the Internet say it
endangers free speech and is a threat to Italian democracy.
The bill also appears to favor PM Berlusconi's Mediaset
television service while disadvantaging Sky, one of its major
competitors. The GOI says the bill is intended to implement
an EU directive that harmonizes media regulation and that the
provisions being criticised are designed to establish greater
protection of copyrighted material, to protect children from
inappropriate broadcasts, and to keep consumers from paying
twice by being subjected to excessive advertising on pay-TV
channels. Opponents say the law far exceeds the scope and
spirit of the EU law and severely restricts free expression
on the Internet. Due to advertising and content regulation
in the bill, some have read it as an effort to give
Berlusconi greater control over communication and to drive
out Mediaset's competitors. Implementation of the bill has
been postponed from its original date of January 27 and
parliament is holding hearings on the matter. The GOI
appears open to discussion of the bill's text. While
reaction to the bill has been strong among opposition
politicians and telecom professionals, the issue has not made
it to the front pages of newspapers so there has been no
strong public reation. Despite GOI protestations, the bill
is troubling as it appears to have been written to give the
government enough leeway to block or censor any Internet
content. END SUMMARY

¶2. (SBU) According to the GOI, the Romani Bill (named for
Paolo Romani, Deputy Economic Development Minister, who
covers communications issues) is designed to implement EU
Directive 2007/65CE, which aims to harmonize media regulation
in the EU. Many telecom sector professionals, however,
believe that the bill vastly exceeds the scope and spirit of
the EU law. The bill is complex, but there are three primary
areas of concern: limits to uploading on the Interet,
television advertising ceilings, and limits to content aimed
for adults, which would also restrict films judged by the
Italian rating system as being for those 14 and older. This
would likely include the vast majority if not all
U.S.-produced PG-13 movies.

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LIABILITY FOR VIDEO ON THE INTERNET
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¶3. (U) Provisions contained in the bill would make Internet

service providers (ISPs), and hosting sites such as Blogspot
and YouTube, liable for content in the same way a television
station is. In the strictest interpretation of the law, the
sites and ISPs would have to monitor all content on their
sites, content which is uploaded by millions of individual
users. This is widely viewed as impossible both in practical
and economic terms. The Italian Communications Authority
(AGCOM) would be responsible for oversight of the law, and
some have interpreted the bill as requiring government
permission before a video could be uploaded.

¶4. (C) Antonello Busetto, director of institutional relations

for Confindustria Servizi Innovativi e Tecnologici, a
business association representing the interests of IT
companies, said the measure would mean "the death of the
Internet in Italy."

¶5. (U) Italian communications commissioner Nicola D'Angelo

was quoted in the press as saying, "Italy will be the only
Western country in which it is necessary to have prior
government permission to operate this kind of service...This
aspect reveals a democratic risk, regardless of who happens
to be in power." Likewise, AGCOM president Corrado Calabro
has said that Italy would be unique in the West as imposing
Internet restrictions until now only imposed by authoritarian
governments.

¶6. (SBU) The GOI says the measure is aimed at protecting

copyrighted material from being uploaded and downloaded

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illegally, as well as at monitoring other potentially illegal

activity on the Internet. The copyright industry has
expressed some limited approval of the bill. Enzo Mazza,
president of the Italian Music Federation, said the music
industry is generally in favor of making ISPs and sites more
responsible for protecting copyrighted material, though, he
added that his industry's analysis of the bill was focused on
this aspect and not other implications.

¶7. (SBU) Because this could make ISPs and opinion sites
liable for defamation in the way television broadcasts are,
some see this as an effort to control political discourse on
the Internet. Others see a commercial angle aimed at limiting
the video and TV available on the Internet as Mediaset moves
into the Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) market.
Alessandro Gilioli, who writes a blog for the liberal weekly
magazine Espresso wrote "It's the Berlusconi method: Kill
your potential enemies while they are small. That's why
anyone doing Web TV -- even from their attic at home -- must
get ministerial approval and fulfill a host of other
bureaucratic obligations."

¶8. (SBU) AGCOM would have the authority to enforce the law.
Among the authority's powers would be the ability to block
traffic into Italy of sites whose content did not meet the
requirements of the law. For example, YouTube could be
blocked because the content was not uploaded with government
approval. AGCOM would also be able to levy fines of up to
150,000 euros against foreign companies violating the law.
Though AGCOM is theoretically an independent agency, many
fear that it may not be strong enough to resist political
pressure.

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ADVERTISING CEILINGS
- - - - - - - - - - -

¶9. (C) The bill would place limits on advertising on pay-TV

channels that exceed the EU directive. It would reduce the
EU ceiling of 20% to 12% in Italy by 2012. The provision
would penalize Sky in particular. Some argue that the
measure is designed to favor PM Berlusconi's free-to-air
Mediaset channels, which would not be subject to the limit.
Mediaset's pay channels would be subject to the advertising
ceiling, but Mediaset's channels currently have less than 12%
each hour dedicated to ads. In addition, reducing the
overall possibility to advertise on pay-TV would push
advertising towards free channels operated by Mediaset and by
the Italian state network RAI. Busetto said this would allow
Berlusconi to earn more money and also to exercise greater
control of public information.

- - - - - - - - -
ADULT CONTENT
- - - - - - - - -

¶10. (SBU) The bill places stringent time restrictions on

broadcasting of so-called "adult content," virtually
prohibiting it between 7 a.m. and 11 p.m. Pay channels such
as those offered by Sky would be subject to the restrictions;
it appears pay-per-view content would be as well. Because
they obtain a significant part of their income from pay adult
content, pay-TV would suffer financially from this
restriction. The bill would limit broadcast of any film
rated for viewers above age 14 to after 10:30 p.m. One press
report said this would make films such as Saturday Night
Fever unavailable until late-night. Again, some opponents
worry that the objective is to hurt Mediaset's competition.

- - - - - - - -
EU OPINION
- - - - - - - -

¶11. (U) Opinion at the EU appears to be conflicting.

According to press reports, the EU is threatening to start an
infraction procedure against Italy for failing to swiftly
implement the media directive. At the same time, other press
reports say the restrictions in the Italian bill would
likely violate the EU e-commerce directive.

- - - - - - -

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COMMENT
- - - - - - -

¶12. (C) In official statements the government insists the

bill is in no way intended to stifle free speech. Opponents
are vocal and using alarmist language, but outside of telecom
industries their numbers appear to be small. There has been
no visible public outrage, and even Beppe Grillo, a public
personality usually outspoken about government regulation,
especially that involving the Internet, has said very little.

¶13. (C) After Berlusconi was attacked in Milan in December

and a Facebook fan page for his attacker quickly amassed
fans, the GOI expressed the need for regulation of social
networking sites. At that time, Romani said the government
would work with ISPs and sites to develop a method of
self-regulation and that there would be no attempt to
legislate internet content. Despite Romani's prior
statements, this bill appears to have been written to give
the government enough leeway to block or censor any Internet
content it deems defamatory or to be encouraging criminal
activity.

¶14. (C) For years, the USG has urged the GOI to take action
to protect copyrighted material on the Internet, in
particular encouraging the establishment of clear
notice-and-takedown procedures and cooperation among rights
holders and ISPs to prevent illegal filesharing. Italy has
done very little. Now, this bill skips over collaboration,
and suddenly moves directly to very stern regulation. In
light of its reluctance to take action on this issue in the
past, and also given the many commercial advantages that this
law appears to give Mediaset and state TV, the GOI claim that
Internet provisions of this law are aimed at copyright
protection alone are suspect.

¶15. (C) In all liklihood, if this bill were to become law as

it is currently written, little would change immediately in
the way Internet sites operate in Italy, and the average 11th
grader uploading video to his blog would never be targeted
for legal action. It would, however, provide a basis for
legal actions against media operators that proved to be
commercial or political competition for government figures.
Over the last three years we have seen several GOI efforts to
exert control over the Internet, including one infamous
effort to require bloggers to obtain GOI journalism licenses.

¶16. (C) Advocates of Internet freedom have repeatedly warned

us that Italy's traditional elites -- on both sides of the
political spectrum -- are very uncomfortable with the
Internet's ability to bypass the traditional media that they
control. Becasue this new bill seems to address these kinds
of concerns, and because it also serves Berlusconi's business
interests, it is conceivable that this seemingly improbable
legislation might actually come into force in Italy. We note
that officers from SKY have told us that Deputy GOI Minister
Romani (for whom the new bill is named) has been leading
efforts within the GOI to help Berlusconi's Mediaset and to
put SKY at a disadvantage. This represents a familiar
pattern: Berslusoni and Mediaset have been using government
power in this way ever since the days of Prime Minister
Bettino Craxi. In addition, this bill would set precidents
that nations such as china could copy or cite as
justification for their own crackdowns on free speech.
THORNE