OCT

2015

Version 1.1

Threat Tactics Report:

North Korea

TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
 Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

Introduction
The Korean peninsula is a location of strategic interest for the US in the Pacific Command (PACOM), and
many observers note that North Korea is an unpredictable and potentially volatile actor. According to
the Department of Defense in its report to Congress and the intelligence community, the DPRK “remains
one of the United States’ most critical security challenges for many reasons. These include North Korea’s
willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing behavior, including attacks on the Republic of
Korea (ROK), its pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, and its willingness to
proliferate weapons in contravention of United Nations Security Council Resolutions.”1 Some of the
latest evidence of irrational behavior is the elevation of Kim Jong Un’s 26-year old sister to a high
governmental post late in 2014, the computer hacking of the Sony Corporation supposedly by North
Korea during late 2014 over the possible release of a film that mocked Kim Jong Un, and the April 2015
execution of a defense chief for allegedly nodding off during a meeting. Over the past 50 years, North
Korea has sporadically conducted operations directed against its enemies, especially South Korea. These
actions included attacks on South Korean naval vessels, the capturing of a US ship and holding American
hostages for 11 months, the hijacking of a South Korean airline jet, electronic warfare against South
Korean signals including global positioning satellites (GPS), and assassinations or attempted
assassinations on South Korean officials including the ROK president. The attempted 1968 Blue House
Raid by North Korean elite military personnel resulted in the death or capture of all 31 infiltrators
involved in the assassination attempt as well as the death of 71 personnel, including three Americans,
and the injury of 66 others as the North Korean SPF personnel attempted to escape back to DPRK
territory.2
The purpose of this North Korean Threat Tactics Report (TTR) is to explain to the Army training
community how North Korea fights including its doctrine, force structure, weapons and equipment, and
the warfighting functions. A TTR also identifies where the conditions specific to the actor are present in
Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) and other training materials so that these conditions can
easily be implemented across all training venues.

Executive Summary

 North Korea is an oligarchy with Kim Jong Un as its supreme leader.

 The DPRK is a militaristic society with about 1.2 million active duty personnel in uniform out of a
population of 24 million with another 7.7 million in the reserve forces.
 All military personnel serve under the umbrella of the Korean People’s Army (KPA); the Korean
People’s Air Force (KPAF) and Korean People’s Navy (KPN) primarily support the KPA ground
forces.
 The KPAF focuses on homeland defense and close air support to the KPA.
 The KPN’s primary mission is to protect the North Korean coastline and support the KPA special
purpose forces (SPF) in mission execution.

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 Much of the equipment in all military branches is old and obsolete, but the KPA has
concentrated its modernization efforts on missile technology that may provide the means to
successfully launch a nuclear warhead.
 North Korea possesses a nuclear weapon and is modernizing its missile fleet in order to increase
the attack range for its nuclear arsenal.
 North Korea possesses both chemical and biological weapons.
 The KPA practices both passive and active camouflage to hide its units, headquarters, and other
important resources from the air.

This (U) Threat Tactics Report (TTR) was produced in accordance with (U) Intelligence Community Directive Number 203: Analytical
Standards (Effective: Jan 2015). This TTR was coordinated with:

 National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)—Carl E. Pales

 Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)—Tom Wilhelm
 Asymmetrical Warfare Group (AWG)—CPT John M. Solomon, SFC Mike Goularte, and Steven D. Durrant
 Eighth United States Army (EUSA) G2—COL Dwight L. Duquesnay
 EUSA Information Operations—COL Paul T. Brooks
 United States Forces-Korea (USFK)—COL Maxwell S. Thibodeaux
 United Nations Command, Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC)—COL James M. Minnich
Comments and feedback are welcome.

Jon S. Cleaves
Director, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration

Cover photo: Photo of a missile by Stefan Krasowski at a Victory Day parade in Pyongyang on 26 July
2013. Picture listed on Bing as free to modify, share, and use commercially.

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 Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

Section 1: Introduction to North Korea

The US military has been learning about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), commonly
referred to as North Korea, since 1950 when the US, in conjunction with the UN, went to war against
Kim Il Sung’s military forces. The DPRK is a country in Asia run by an oligarchy led by Kim Jong Un. Most
DPRK military and civilian leaders consist of second and third generation leaders who are familial or
close friends of the DPRK’s founder, Kim Il Sung; his son, Kim Jong Il; or grandson, Kim Jong Un. The Kim
family has ruled North Korea since the end of World War II. Historically, the Korean peninsula has found
itself ruled by outside forces for significant periods of time to include China and the latest, Japan, which
occupied the entire Korean peninsula at the conclusion of the 1905 Russo-Japanese War until Japan’s
surrender to the allied powers in August 1945.3
In June 1950, North Korea invaded its southern neighbor in an attempt to unify the peninsula under Kim
Il Sung. With the intervention of the UN, after the Soviet Union boycotted a UN Security Council
meeting, the international coalition led by the US pushed the North Korean military back across the pre-
1950 boundary between the two countries in September 1950. American General Douglas MacArthur
then drove the UN forces all the way to the Yalu River where China, feeling threatened by anti-
communist forces, interceded on behalf of North Korea with organized Chinese forces. The Chinese-led
counterattacks pushed the American military and its allies back to the 38th parallel, the original dividing
line between the two Koreas. Over the next two years, a stalemate ensued with only minor changes of
territory between the warring sides. In late July 1953, the military commanders of the Korean People’s
Army, the Chinese People’s Volunteers, and the United Nations Command (UNC) signed an armistice
that ended the fighting and created a demilitarized zone (DMZ) 2,000 meters wide on either side of the
then current unit disposition or what is known as the military demarcation line (MDL). Over 60 years
after the armistice or ceasefire, the warring sides have yet to sign a formal peace treaty, and the MDL
and the 4,000 meter wide DMZ still exists from the peninsula’s east coast to the west coast. The DPRK,
however, still seeks its ultimate goal, which is to unify all of Korea under its control. With a population of
only 24 million people, over five percent or 1.2 million personnel serve on active military service in the
DPRK. Another 7.7 million North Koreans serve in the reserve forces. Besides military operations, the
DPRK government often uses its uniformed personnel for public service projects or to harvest crops.
The presence of the US military in South Korea deters the DPRK from crossing the border to reunite the
two Koreas by force. Since the armistice was signed, North Korea has broken it many times with
incursions into the DMZ and South Korea by land, sea, air, and even underground by tunnels. Today, the
DPRK faces off against the Combined Forces of the ROK and the United States with a conventional
regular force backed with a nuclear deterrent. North Korea also emphasizes SPF units that primarily use
irregular tactics. The KPN uses a combination of tactics based on old Soviet doctrine, Chinese
developments, and/or lessons learned by the North Koreans during the 1950–53 Korean War as well as
the US’s most recent actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other locations around the world. North Korea,
however, has no issues with initiating provocative actions against South Korea, Japan, or the US’s in
defiance of the armistice’s terms. These actions, however comedic they are seen as by outsiders, are
often used prior to international meetings in an attempt to obtain concessions from the other side of
the negotiating table.4

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While the military hardware owned by North Korea is vast, much of it is outdated. The DPRK military
loathes to abandon any hardware as evidenced by the retention of the T-34/85, a World War II-era tank,
in some of its armor units. The age and variety of equipment from the former Soviet Union, Russia, or
China and its own internally produced equipment generate major logistical issues for the KPA to
effectively keep the assortment of weapons systems fully functional.

Strategy and Goals

The DPRK espouses three primary goals with additional second-tier objectives that support its principal
aims. From Kim Il Sung through Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s overarching intention is the
unification of all of Korea under control of the DPRK government. While this ambition is probably not
obtainable in the near future—as long as American forces remain on the peninsula—a unified Korea
under the Kim family’s control remains the DPRK’s ultimate objective. North Korea’s second goal is to
remain an independent state free of outside interference, especially from the Western powers. North
Korea’s possession of a nuclear arsenal and its pursuit of missile technology is an attempt to ensure that
external powers do not interfere with the DPRK’s internal affairs for fear of a nuclear reprisal. North
Korea’s third goal is for Kim Jong Un and his family to maintain its position of authority in the regime
through the ideological control of the country’s population. The Kim family and its supporters will likely
pursue any strategy necessary to remain firmly in power in the DPRK.5
North Korea’s strategy is focused on the control of the DPRK government by the Kim family in pursuit of
the long-term goal of the reunification of the entire Korean peninsula under the same government. The
large military is not only used as a threat to North Korea’s neighbors, but to maintain control of its own
citizens. The DPRK uses limited military provocations to obtain diplomatic concessions at the negotiating
table with South Korea, Japan, the US, and other countries. North Korea uses threats of possible war to
obtain not only diplomatic concessions, but to obtain economic aid for its people. The North Korean
government knows that the Western powers and South Korea do not want another active war on the
peninsula so the DPRK’s threats often lead to success at the negotiating table. The North Korean nuclear
arsenal and fear by other countries that the DPRK will initiate a nuclear attack often serves as the trump
card that forces the DPRK’s enemies to acquiesce to the Kim regime’s demands.6
While North Korea’s leaders may seem cartoonish at times to the outside world, the Kim family is
treated reverently and seen as almost godlike in its almost non-religious country. Kim Il Sung developed
a personality cult around himself during his long period in power. His son, Kim Jong Il, continued to
cultivate the myth of the Kim family during his time as the DPRK’s supreme leader. The North Korean
people treat the current ruler, Kim Jong Un, with almost the same awe the DPRK citizens held the
previous two rulers or are too afraid not to do so. The Kim family cult status is a major component of the
glue that holds the DPRK together.7

Key Leaders
While the DPRK professes to still be a communist country where the people are in charge, North Korea is
actually an oligarchy where a small number of people control the country. The DPRK supreme leader is
currently Kim Jong Un—the grandson of the original founder of North Korea, Kim Il Sung—who took
power in December 2011 upon the death of his father, Kim Jong Il. Kim Jong Un is not the only third
generation leader in the DPRK as many of the current governmental officials’ parents or grandparents
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also loyally served the Kim family. In his mid-30s, Kim Jong Un has been busy over the last three years
easing out an older generation of officials that owed their allegiance to Kim Jong Il or Kim Il Sung and
replacing the old guard with younger supporters of himself. To take ultimate control of the DPRK, Kim
Jong Un perpetuated the arrest, trial, conviction, and execution of his uncle, Jang Song Taek, then the
second most powerful person in North Korea.8
Members of the government wield their power through the station a bureaucrat holds in the Korean
Workers’ Party (KWP), the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), the Korean People’s Army (KPA), the
National Defense Committee (NDC), or a cabinet post. The most powerful North Korean leaders often
hold more than one position in their portfolio. Military personnel will also hold civilian positions and
bureaucrats that rise through the civil service ranks may eventually receive a military title, for
appearance purposes, upon reaching a certain senior level in governmental service or prior to the
assumption of a more military-related job. The NDC is the most important group in the country with Kim
Jong Un as First Chairman, three vice-chairman positions, and six additional members. The vice-
chairmen include Vice Marshal Hwang Pyong So, currently considered the second-most powerful person
in the DPRK; General O Kuk Ryol, a second-generation bureaucrat whose father fought with Kim Il Sung;
and Vice Marshal Ri Yong Mu, the husband of one of Kim Jong Il’s aunts. The other NDC members
include Cho Chun Ryong, a civilian with an economics background; General Choe Pu Il, Minister of the
People’s Security; General Hyon Yong Chol (executed in late April 2015, but only announced on 13 May
2015), Minister of the People’s Armed Forces; General Kim Won Hong, Minister of State Security;
Colonel General Pak To Chun, a civilian with an industrial background and recently awarded a military
rank; and General Ri Pyong Chol, a relatively unknown officer. Hwang Pyong So and several other North
Korean leaders made an unexpected and last-minute visit to South Korea in early October 2014 when
Kim Jong Un was unseen for several weeks. This led to some speculation on Kim Jong Un’s status, but
the North Korean ruler emerged several weeks later, still in charge, with the excuse for his absence from
the public eye that he was recovering from foot surgery. See the March 2015 Red Diamond article on
North Korean Leadership for additional details on most of these DPRK leaders.9

Key Alliances
While North Korea practices an ideology of independence called juche, the DPRK does possess a few, but
important, allies. Kim Il Sung began juche in 1972 and this national ethos places an emphasis on self-
reliance, independence, resourcefulness, a display of one’s strength, and self-defense, with the
responsibility to internally solve problems without outside assistance. Despite the bravado of self-
reliance, North Korea’s most important ally and major benefactor is China. About 63% of DPRK exports
go to China while the DPRK receives 73% of its imports from its northern neighbor. China usually
opposes any economic sanctions that other countries may try to enact on the DPRK for its military and
nuclear provocations. North Korea serves as a buffer state between the economically capitalistic and
democratic South Korea and the communist People’s Republic of China (PRC). China has ruled over the
Korean peninsula at various times during the past 4,000 years and this somewhat disharmonious
relationship between China and the peninsula continues. Both current regimes share a common
foundation as the PRC and DPRK both arose by revolutionary means based on the Marxist model and
both countries profess to still somewhat follow these communist teachings. The historical ties between
North Korea and China continue to bind the two countries together and China’s fear of a unified,

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economically powerful Korean peninsula under a democratic-style government is probably enough

motivation to continue to support the status quo on the Korean peninsula.10
The second-most important ally for North Korea is Russia. While the closeness between the two
countries is not the same as it was between North Korea and the Soviet Union, there are still some
residual feelings based on the North Koreans’ long-term relationship with the Russian leadership. In the
early 1990s, the relationship suffered under then-Russian president Boris Yeltsin before rebounding
later in the decade. During the Cold War, North Korea sent its military officers to the USSR to attend
officer, technical, or aviation schools. Much of the North Korean conventional weapons and vehicles
were produced in the USSR or former Soviet bloc countries, but are now produced in Russian or Eastern
European factories. Due to the DPRK’s inability to pay its financial debt to Russia, North Korea provides
up to 10,000 construction workers and loggers to work in eastern Russia. For the near future, Russia will
likely continue to tenuously support North Korea.11
North Korea has developed a relationship with a number of countries due to the export of weapons,
especially ballistic missiles, and missile technology to states and actors willing to evade the various
sanctions placed on the DPRK by the international community. These countries include Egypt, Iran,
Libya, Pakistan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. A North Korean ship, sailing from Cuba, was
caught trying to cross the Panama Canal with MiG-21 jets and spare airplane parts. UN inspectors seized
the weapons, but there has been no final disposition of the case. It is likely that North Korea will
continue to engage in legal and illegal arms trades in order to gain much-needed hard currency.12

Organizational Size and Structure

General Information
While the DPRK operates both a navy and air force, all military forces technically fall under control of the
Korean People’s Army. North Korea is one of the most militarized countries in the world with 1,193,000
active duty and 7.7 million reserve personnel. The DPRK spends between 15.9% and 22% of its GDP on
its military and about 25% of all North Koreans serve in some military capacity. Of the active duty
personnel, approximately 1,020,000 serve in the army while 110,000 work for the air force, and 60,000
support the navy.13
Army
The army comprises the largest portion of the North Korean military with 85% of all personnel serving in
the ground forces. The army is responsible for all KPA ground units, the Special Purpose Forces (SPF),
and low-level air defense missions. The KPA positions about 70% of all ground forces along the
demilitarized zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea. Much of the KPA artillery is located in
hardened positions located forward along the border in order to maximize its weapons systems’ ranges
without needing to reposition to fire its opening salvos. While useful for offensive operations, the
closeness of the artillery to the DMZ may make it vulnerable during defensive operations.14
The KPA features a combination of armor, mechanized, and basic infantry units. Besides the major units
listed on the chart below, the KPA also fields seven tank regiments and five to eight independent river
crossing regiments. The rocket brigades operate FROG [free rocket over ground], KN-02, KN-08, KN-09

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No Dong, or Musudan missiles. The KPA specializes its units for the tasks they are expected to complete
if and when the war on the peninsula resumes between North and South Korea.15
Table 1. KPA Units16
Corps/Divisions Brigades
Mechanized Corps 2 Armor Brigade 11-15
Infantry Corps 9 Infantry/Motorized Infantry Brigade 68
Capitol Defense Corps 1 Mechanized/Mechanized River Crossing Brigade 14-20
Armor Division 1 Light Infantry Brigade 12
Mechanized Division 4 Airborne Brigade 3
Infantry Division 27 Sniper Brigade 7
Light Infantry Division 7 Reconnaissance Brigade 3
Artillery Division 1 Coastal Security/Border Security Brigade 10
Reserve Infantry Division 40 Artillery, Multiple Rocket Launcher, Heavy Mortar 21-26
Reserve Military Training Unit 10 Engineer River Crossing Brigade 1
Rocket Brigade 4-7

The KPA also fields a large SPF of approximately 200,000 personnel that consists of eight Bureau of
Reconnaissance Special Forces (SF) battalions; a reconnaissance group with 17 additional battalions; a
light infantry group with nine light infantry brigades and six sniper brigades; an air maneuver group with
three airborne brigades, one airborne battalion, and two sniper brigades; and an amphibious group with
two sniper brigades. Despite the KPA’s large size, much of its training is conducted without vehicles due
to the lack of fuel and the high cost to properly maintain vehicles.17
Equipment issues as well as the lack of spare parts and fuel hinder the ability of the KPA, especially the
armor and mechanized units, to conduct a large number of realistic training exercises. Units that would
normally move in vehicles must conduct its training as dismounted forces. Further reducing training
time is the requirement that certain KPA units must send their soldiers to the countryside to help the
farmers bring in the rice crop at harvest time.18
Most of the KPA reserve consists of ground forces personnel. The army reserve consists of about
940,000 Red Youth Guard (RYG) participants, 620,000 Reserve Military Training Unit (RMTU) members,
5.7 million Workers’ Peasants’ Red Guard (WPRG) members, and 420,000 members of other
paramilitary groups. The RYG began in 1970 and, similar to the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps
program in the US, the participants consist of male and female students from the age of 14 to 17. The
RYG conducts 450 hours of classroom training and seven days of military training each semester. The
RYG seeks to locate potential anti-government militants or counter-revolutionaries, and can even be
called upon to defend the country at a time of war. The ages of RMTU members range from 17 to 45 for
males and 17 to 30 for females. The RMTU inducts those 17-year olds who did not join the regular army
or who have completed their active-duty obligation. The Ministry of People’s Armed Forces (MPAF)
controls the 37 RMTU infantry divisions, which conduct 30 days of mobilization training and 10 days of
self-defense training annually. When males reach the age of 46, they are transferred to the WPRG until
discharged at the age of 60. Begun in January 1959, the WPRG provides basic military training to the
North Korean people and is responsible for internal security, rear area defense, guerrilla warfare, and
support to the active duty KPA. The WPRG’s structure mirrors the military with regiments, battalions,
and companies based on the available population. Company-size WPRG units can be found in the rural
areas while the larger units are found in the more urban areas. The WPRG conducts 15 days of
mobilization and 15 days of self-defense training annually. The MPAF is responsible for other
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paramilitary training units that consist primarily of former soldiers. Units from squad to division are
based on the unit’s location, its association with a factory or business, or a university. About 35-40% of
the members come under control of one of the 36 MPAF Paramilitary Training Unit divisions. These units
provide a trained reserve for the KPA and can be incorporated into the KPA in time of war, serve as
fillers or replacements for KPA units, deploy as independent units directly subordinate to the MPAF, or
provide security for large government facilities, rear area defense, or security missions. Most of the
units operate as infantry, but there may be some specialized units such as anti-aircraft, artillery, rear
service, or possibly even armored units.19

Air Force
The KPAF’s primary mission is to defend its homeland from the air with secondary missions to provide
tactical air support to the army and navy, transportation, logistical support, and SPF insertion/
extraction. To accomplish its mission, the KPAF fields three air combat divisions, two air transportation
divisions, and a single air training division. Subordinate combat units include eighteen fighter regiments,
three light bomber regiments, one fighter/ground attack regiment, one ground attack regiment, and one
attack helicopter regiment. In addition, the KPAF operates a number of transportation regiments,
helicopter regiments, training regiments, and nineteen surface-to-air missile (SAM) brigades.20
There are approximately 110,000 personnel in the KPAF with approximately fifty percent of the aviation
assets located within 100 km of the DMZ. Many of the forward deployed air force regiments operate
from underground airfields, or as a minimum, the airplanes are stored in underground bunkers. The
KPAF can convert several stretches of road in North Korea to auxiliary airstrips. The SAM brigades
operate in three sectors—northeast, northwest, and south—with most of the SA-2 and SA-3 battalions
in position along the coasts with the newer SA-5 battalions near Pyongyang or the DMZ. The KPAF
operates over 50 ground-based early warning radar systems that provide overlapping coverage
throughout the country, but with extra emphasis on the west coast and the DMZ. There are fewer radar
systems, however, along the North Korea/China border in the north. The mountainous terrain of North
Korea causes problems with radar and is the reason for the large number of overlapping systems
needed to prevent dead space in the KPAF radar coverage.21
The 84th Air Division (Training) conducts all KPAF training. Both pilots and ground personnel attend the
same ground school training. When pilots head off to learn how to fly, the ground personnel receive
their training in an aviation specialty. It takes about four years of instruction for a KPAF pilot to learn
how to fly. The pilots receive about 70 hours of primary flight instruction training, mostly in a CJ-6
aircraft, before they are assigned to a unit. Fewer than five years ago, pilots flew only 20–25 times per
year for a total of 15–25 flight hours annually due to the cost, the shortage of aviation fuel, and the lack
of spare parts. Each training flight usually lasted only 30–45 minutes and focused mainly on taking off
and landing the aircraft safely. There were few resources available to devote to actual air combat
maneuver training or close air support training. Some units, usually those that fly the MiG-29, the MiG-
23, or the Su-25 may have received more flight time than the others. Since Kim Jong Un took power over
three years ago, however, the number of hours each pilot flies increased from 25 to approximately 50
hours annually. While the doubling of flight hours in the last three years is impressive, the KPAF pilots
still do not receive the flight hours to become truly proficient in their aviator tasks. KPAF pilots are likely
sub-standard when compared to most Western military pilots who receive many more flight hours than
their North Korean counterparts.22
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Navy
The KPN is essentially a brown water force, with little capability to operate more than 50 miles off the
North Korean coastline. Even with approximately 60,000 personnel, the KPN fields no aviation units as
almost all aircraft come under KPAF control. The purpose of the navy is to primarily support SPF
missions and to conduct amphibious assaults. To accomplish its clandestine missions, the KPN deploys
40 SANG-O 37-meter Class special operations midget submarines, 33 YUGO 20-meter Class special
operations midget submarines, and ten YONO 29-meter submarines. The KPN also can deploy 20
Romeo-class attack submarines against surface ships. To support landing operations of ground troops,
the KPN operates four HANTAE-class medium landing ships, four HANCHON-class utility landing craft, 60
NAMPO-class personnel landing craft, and 40 KONG BANG-series personnel landing craft. Between 10 to
20 percent of all KPN vessels are stored in dry dock, on land, or in tunnels, and many of the KPN ships
would need significant repairs to make them combat ready. The major exceptions to the poor readiness
rates are the submarines and small combatant ships that are often used to support the KPA’s SPF
units.23
The KPN is also responsible for protection of its shores through the use of coastal defense guns and
surface-to-surface missiles. The KPN fields a large, but unknown number of coastal artillery ranging from
122-mm to 152-mm guns as well as missiles including the SSC-2B Samlet, HY-2, and SS-N-2 Styx. Most of
these guns are in hardened sites and would be very difficult to reposition during combat operations.
One of the KPA’s newest missiles, the KN-08, is a mobile launcher with a range of 9,650 km. This
distance places California within the outer fringes of the KN-08’s maximum range.24
The KPN is known to conduct aggressive patrolling and has been known to accost fishermen from other
countries outside of the internationally recognized territorial waters and trespass south of the Northern
Limit Line (NLL), the boundary on the west coast that is supposed to serve as the demarcation between
the two Koreas. Notable naval incidents between North Korea and South Korean occurred in 1999, 2002,
2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 including one North Korean vessel sailing 3.7 km south of the NLL where it
remained for two hours in South Korean waters. The KPN was also likely responsible for one of its
submarines sinking the South Korean corvette, Cheonan, in March 2010, even though the DPRK denied
any culpability in the incident.25

Strengths
While analysts may debate the North Korean military’s capabilities, the KPA does possess some
strengths. First is the sheer size of the active and reserve military. With over a million active duty
personnel and over seven million more in reserve, the DPRK can mobilize higher percentage of its
population for military service than almost any other country in the world. Second is the idea that the
military comes first. Any resources that the country possesses goes to the military before it is provided
to the North Korean people. In a country where starvation is at times rampant, the DPRK military
personnel receive their larger rations before most civilians. During any war, the KPA would only take
even more of any available resources in order for the DPRK regime to survive. Third, both the North
Korean military personnel and civilians are used to hardships. Due to the tough life most North Korean
people already endure, the ravages of war would not have the same effect that military conflict would
cause most other countries. Lastly, the DPRK possesses nuclear weapons as well as chemical and
offensive biological weapons. The fear of a CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear) attack,
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especially nuclear, may cause Western inaction as North Korea’s enemies debate whether to act or not
due the high possibility of the DPRK’s threats of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) reprisals.26

Weaknesses
Although the North Korean military may feature some positive attributes as a fighting force, the KPA
also suffers from many weaknesses as well. Much of the military’s equipment is old and obsolete. The
North Korean military consciously refuses to rid itself of any equipment and still operate tanks that date
back to World War II. This wide range of military hardware from many generations of warfare also
generates logistical issues. The KPA’s supply personnel must not only find the spare parts for a large
variety of equipment, the KPA maintenance personnel must be well-versed in the repair of a great
assortment of vehicles and weapons. In addition, the DPRK lacks the logistical capability to support the
KPA beyond a few months. Due to the shortage of fuel and the cost to operate vehicles for a cash-
strapped country, many of the KPA soldiers find themselves involved in public works projects or helping
farmers bring in their rice crops. Any time spent in non-military support is less time that the KPA soldiers
can spend training for combat. Even the mechanized and armor forces, due to resource restraints, spend
much of their training time doing light infantry training instead of mounted operations. While KPA
soldiers may be well trained in individual skills or small unit tactics, the amount of time spent on larger
exercises pales in comparison to most Western militaries. Without adequate time and resources to
practice large scale military operations, the KPA will always face a steep learning curve when the KPA is
forced to perform them in actual combat for the first time.27
Current Locations
While North Korean military units are scattered throughout the country, approximately 70 percent of
the ground forces are located between Pyongyang and the DMZ. The KPA ground forces are often
located in hardened positions and their artillery can easily reach South Korea with nearly every artillery
piece situated so that two-thirds of the weapon’s range covers South Korea’s side of the border. The
South Korean capital city, Seoul, is within range of some of some 250 of DPRK’s longest-ranging artillery
and missile systems. The KPAF is also focused on South Korea with many of its runways in the southern
third of the country. The KPN operates off the east and west coast of the country as North Korea
possesses few navigable rivers. There are very few military units located along the DPRK’s northern
border with China. See the map in the military organization section for locations of major bases of the
army, air force, and navy as well as most runways throughout North Korea.28

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Figure 1. North Korean military installations. Numbers correspond with the map numbers under
Section 4, Military Organizations, below. Locations on map are approximate.

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Section 2: KPA Tactics and Techniques

The DPRK believes that the average KPA soldier is physically,
mentally, militarily, and politically better trained and Throughout this TTR, North
prepared for war than any individual soldier the North Korean doctrinal terms, when
Korean will meet on the battlefield—American, South known, will be used instead of the
Korean, Japanese, or other Western army. Due to the terms found in TC 7-100.2,
materiel weakness that the DPRK will face in any war on the Opposing Force (OPFOR) Tactics.
Korean peninsula, the KPA teaches its soldiers that the next Where there is collation, the TC 7-
war will not be decided by technology or weapons, but by
100.2 OPFOR term will be inserted
the revolutionary spirit as the soldiers fight for the liberation
in parenthesis to demonstrate the
of their comrades. The KPA soldiers are also indoctrinated
with the idea that one of them is more than a match for 100 connectivity between real-world
of the enemy. The KPA trains every soldier to serve one level actors to the composite OPFOR in
up from his current position. With this type of mental the TC.
indoctrination, it is likely that many KPA military personnel
would rather fight to the death than surrender.29

Figure 2. Building blocks of KPA tactical doctrine. Adapted from COL James M. Minnich from his
book, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, 2005, p 66. Modified by
TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats, 17 June 2015.

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KPA Tactical Doctrine Building Blocks

The KPA tactical doctrine is based on a series of six “building blocks” as demonstrated in Figure 2. The
Military Training Bureau serves as the KPA’s military think tank and has studied conflict from World War
II to the present. With that knowledge, the KPA has developed a military ideology based on its
experiences from 1950-53 fighting the US, old Soviet theory, and Chinese light infantry tactics modified
by the most recent US experience in numerous locations around the world over the past three decades.
Due to the United States’ ability to overwhelm almost any enemy with technology and firepower, the
KPA emphasizes asymmetric warfare in conjunction with large numbers of SPF units. Even with the
emphasis on asymmetric warfare, the KPA plans the use of large amounts of artillery including multiple
rocket launchers in lieu of air support, heavy reliance on anti-tank guns, and anti-armor support by a
variety of first and second generation wire-guided anti-tank missiles. The KPA will attempt to
concentrate and coordinate the firing of large numbers of older weapons systems in order to make up
for a shortage of the latest technologically advanced equipment.30
The second building block is the national objective discussed in the section on strategy and goals early
on in this TTR. Juche, or self-reliance, is discussed in the section on key alliances above. From these three
building blocks, the KPA military strategy of a surprise attack, a quick decisive war, and one fought with
mixed tactics emerges to become the fourth block. Based on the military strategy, the KPA’s principles
of war generate the fifth block. From the principles of war, the KPA develops its offensive and defensive
tactical doctrine.
Military Strategy
Surprise Attack
The KPA will attempt to attack its enemy in an unexpected place, time, or means. The characteristics of
a surprise attack could include the use of inclement weather, nighttime operations, or rugged terrain; a
detailed deception plan; skilled infiltration units to include SPF units; parachute or air assault operations;
the massing of fires; the quick concentration of forces at the decisive point and time; or the unexpected
employment of large scale mechanized or armor forces.31
Quick Decisive War
The DPRK lacks the resources to fight a protracted war and therefore any war the KPA fights must be
quick and decisive. Based on recent experience, the DPRK also realizes that the US democratic system
takes time to react as the Americans attempt to build a coalition. If the war is over before the Americans
can react, the US may have to let the status quo remain, such as in the recent action in Crimea by the
Russians.32
Mixed Force Tactics
Offensively, the KPA plans a two-front war through both conventional and unconventional means. The
DPRK is willing to launch a pre-emptive strike and is willing to risk its country’s annihilation in order to
defeat its enemies. The first front would consist of a massive conventional assault across the DMZ with
substantial firepower and chemical attacks on selected forward position targets in order to surround
Seoul and then move farther south. Additionally, ballistic missile strikes, including some with chemical
warheads, would hit South Korean and US air bases; ports; and command, control, communications,

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computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets throughout South Korea and in
Japan. There is also a real possibility that North Korea would attempt to use offensive biological
weapons in its attacks.33
The second front would be an attack by the large KPA SPF units throughout the South Korean rear area
in conjunction with North Korean agents already in place. The SPF could reach South Korea by a number
of means including helicopters, hovercraft, light planes, parachutes, small boats, submarines, or
infiltration tunnels. These SPF personnel would also simultaneously hit US bases in Japan including
Okinawa. In addition, the DPRK would focus on asymmetric warfare attacks using lessons learned from
American military actions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and other places over the last thirty years.
Since 1992, North Korean leaders have espoused that its military forces could reach Pusan in just three
days. While totally unrealistic, some DPRK leaders actually believe that in the right military and political
conditions, its goal of reaching Pusan could occur in less than a month. Some South Korean reports
indicate that some KPA generals now believe that the capture of the entire peninsula is an impossibility
and that after the capture of Seoul, North Korea would need to sue for a negotiated peace treaty based
upon its position of greater strength. It is not known how Kim Jong Un stands on this change in policy,
but some of the KPA’s military plans reflect this change in attitude about taking over the entire
peninsula. If war were to resume on the Korean peninsula, the US and its allies would face a formidable
foe both on the front line and in its rear areas.34
Operational/Tactical Doctrine
The KPA’s doctrine is based on five fundamental principles of war: surprise attack, mass and dispersion,
increased maneuverability, cunning and personified tactics, and secure secrets. The use of surprise
attack has been covered under military strategy, above.
Mass and Dispersion
The KPA will concentrate its combat power at the decisive point and time and will weight its main effort.
Unlike US doctrine, the KPA believes that its forces will only need a 2:1 ratio of its forces at the decisive
point to the enemy to find success in offensive operations. The main effort will operate on a narrower
front than the attacks to its flanks and the supporting attacks will disperse over a wider front to deceive
the enemy about where the attack may occur. The KPA will use the terrain to maximize its success and
use deception operations when dispersing to avoid excessive concentration that will make the force a
lucrative target.35
Increase Maneuverability
The KPA wants to fight and win a quick and decisive war and to achieve this objective, the combat units
will seek to use the terrain to their advantage. The KPA will employ ground vehicles to quickly reposition
artillery, armor, and infantry on the battlefield using the existing high-speed networks or aircraft. The
KPA, however, will conduct night moves and use the minor roads as well as the rugged terrain to
surprise its enemy. The SPF or other forces will conduct raids to seize key transportation nodes from
other forces and the KPA emphasizes maneuverability as a basic element of combat power during
training.36

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Cunning and Personified Tactics

The KPA focuses on cunning in all planning for its troops and emphasizes to its leaders to use its
initiative and aggressiveness with no hesitation. While the KPA conducts comprehensive planning and
keep these plans close-hold, the leaders expect its subordinates to conduct quick estimates and conduct
bold operations that will result in a quick but decisive war.37
Secure Secrets
North Korea not only keeps a close hold on all plans, but also distributes false information to confuse its
enemy. Activities to secure the KPA’s secrets could include reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance,
deceptions, counterintelligence operations, and conducting operations in inclement weather or
darkness.38
Defensive and Offensive Tactics
The KPA professes both a defensive and offensive strategy in case of war. The defensive strategy is to
prevent any invasion across the DMZ or an amphibious landing on either of its coasts. If such an attack
would occur, the DPRK would mobilize not only its 7.7 million reserve personnel but likely declare a total
war in which all North Korean citizens would be obligated to defend their country. To deter any foe from
attacking the country, the DPRK has threated the use of nuclear weapons against South Korea, Japan, or
any reachable US military facility in Asia. The DPRK also has no qualms about the use of chemical or
offensive biological weapons. The military decision-making process to invade North Korea could be
delayed as its enemies debate its ramifications as long as the DPRK still retains control of its NBC
arsenal.39

Other Techniques
Besides the military strategy and operational/tactical doctrine previously discussed, there are also a
number of techniques that the KPA will employ for an offensive or defensive operation.40
Adequate Logistics
The KPA doctrine calls for each commander to ensure that there are sufficient supplies to successfully
complete the mission. Due to the lack of supplies faced by the KPA, most commanders will plan to use
captured supplies, military or civilian, to adequately complete the assigned mission. The KPA weapons
systems, mortars, and artillery, are often of a slightly larger caliber than those of its enemy allowing the
DPRK military to use captured military stores while denying the same option to its opponent.41
Annihilation
The KPA offensive doctrine calls for the destruction of the enemy at all costs by continuing the pursuit,
staying close to the enemy to reduce the likelihood of its foe’s superior artillery and close air support
coming to the rescue, and continual contact to prevent the enemy from withdrawing or regrouping for a
future attack. The taking of terrain is a secondary mission to the enemy’s destruction. In the KPA’s seven
designated offensive movements—penetration, thrust, holding, turning, infiltration, besetment, and
encirclement—the focus is on the destruction of the enemy or the movement of ground forces in order
to set up another maneuver that will aid in the enemy’s annihilation.42

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The KPA will often use a combination of the seven offensive forms of movement as seen from any unit
level of operation. The purpose of the penetration, a division-level movement, is to destroy the
defending unit by using the first tactical echelon to penetrate the initial defensive position on a 2- to 3-
km front to allow the passage of the second tactical echelon to conduct a deep fight in the enemy’s
rear.43
The thrust is an offensive movement form used by the KPA at the company, battalion, or regimental
level to attack a terrain-oriented defense. Once the defensive position is breached, the remainder of the
unit passes through quickly to conduct one of three follow-on missions—strike the enemy in the flank,
conduct a turning movement, or initiate a besetment. See the tactical example diagram of an integrated
attack below for more details.44
A KPA holding movement is used by units conducting an attack that is not part of the main attack. These
units receive a much larger front to operate in compared to the main attack. The holding maneuver may
consist of a demonstration or feint in order to draw off enemy forces from the main attack’s primary
route of attack.45
The KPA turning movement is normally the prelude for another type of KPA attack in the enemy’s rear
area. The turning maneuver force often follows behind a penetrating or thrust force to rush armor or
mechanized forces to the enemy’s vulnerable rear areas. Upon the completion of the turning
movement, the exploitation force may then become part of an encirclement or besetment maneuver.46
A KPA infiltration movement is just as it sounds as the force uses covert means to pass through the
enemy’s lines to attack positions in the enemy’s rear area. In an infantry corps-level operation,
approximately two-thirds of the light infantry brigade and sniper brigade or a total of eight battalions
may be given the mission to conduct raids on key targets in the enemy’s rear—artillery positions, vital
chokepoints on major roads, or command posts. This focus on infiltration continues down to all levels:
four of six companies from the division light infantry battalion at the division level, one regular infantry
company in each regiment, and one regular infantry platoon in each battalion may all receive infiltration
missions.47
The KPA besetment movement is the surrounding of an enemy strong point in order to inflict maximum
casualties on the defensive force. There are four types of besetments: front and one flank; front and two
flanks; front and rear; and front, rear, and two flanks. No matter what type of besetment is chosen,
indirect fire will attempt to seal any enemy side not covered by the direct fire.48
Encirclement is the final KPA offensive movement and is used when the majority of a retreating force
can be intercepted, encircled, and annihilated. The preferred location for the attack is between the
enemy’s frontline defensive positions and the reserve force’s location(s). KPA Army and Corps
headquarters may deploy up to two divisions to conduct an encirclement operation. Lower level units
will use whatever forces are available. There are four sub-categories of KPA encirclement operations:
partitioned destruction for large forces; compressed destruction for smaller forces; fire power
destruction in narrow areas; and raid destruction for built up areas. See the operational example
diagram of a dispersed attack below for more details.49

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Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception

Keeping secrets secure involves the use of camouflage, concealment, and deception by all units. Since
North Korea will likely not obtain even local air superiority, the KPA doctrine calls for denying the enemy
any intelligence it may receive from aerial platforms through the use of both active and passive
camouflage, concealment, and deception techniques. The KPAF uses both underground runways and
hardened sites to hide aircraft from aerial attack. The KPN not only hides its ships in caves that are
connected to the sea by fortified tunnels, it will also attempt to hide its vessels among civilian fishing
boats found in small villages. All three services will use decoys in order for the enemy to waste
ammunition, something North Korea gleaned from the American aerial strikes on Serbia where the US
Air Force fired at fake sites almost as often as actual positions. The KPA armed forces believe that each
operation should include a deception plan that may include a demonstration, feint, raid, or an attempt
to create fratricide among enemy units.50
Combined Operations
KPA doctrine emphasizes that all actions, conventional or SPF, must be coordinated at all levels and
between the different types of units. Much of this coordination will be done through liaison or courier
that reduces the likelihood that an enemy can learn KPA intent by an increase in radio chatter or the
interception of electronic signals. The KPA has many specialized units including river crossing brigades
and regiments, sniper brigades in all three services, and large numbers of SPF units. Any major KPA
attack will coordinate the use of all the different arms to attack the decisive point at the proper time.51
Echelon Forces
The KPA takes from old Soviet doctrine in its use of echelons during both offensive and defensive
operations. In the offense, the KPA will likely place two-thirds of its ground forces in the first echelon
and two-ninths in the second echelon, with only one-ninth in operational reserve or as a third echelon.
The KPA ground forces will also use echelons when forced to go on the defense, as the KPA believes
echeloning its forces provides for defensive depth with rapid counterattack possibilities.52
Firepower
Like the old Soviet Union doctrine that dates back to World War II, the KPA doctrine also expounds the
use of large quantities of artillery fire on a single target. The KPA will use massed fires, including
chemical weapons, from artillery, missiles, or multiple rocket launchers to both psychologically frighten
as well as annihilate the enemy position. The KPA fields over 4,400 artillery pieces of all types and the
KPAF is focused on support of the ground forces. With this large amount of indirect fire support
available on the battlefield, the KPA can ensure that almost all targets receive the emphasis they
deserve. When not otherwise employed, KPAF aircraft will fly in support of ground troops.53
KPAF and KPN Employment
The KPA doctrine states that joint operations should be used for most missions. Any major attack by the
DPRK will likely use KPAF and KPN assets to deploy KPA units into the enemy’s rear areas. The KPAF will
fly SPF units in with small airplanes such as the recently repainted Antonov An-2 fleet or helicopters. The
KPAF can also use its airplanes or helicopters to parachute drop the KPA’s airborne units to conduct an

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air assault operation. The KPN will use its small boats and submarines to clandestinely transport SPF
behind the enemy’s lines on both coasts of South Korea.54
Mobility
The KPA doctrine also stresses the use of armored vehicles in all its operations. The KPA ground forces
will use the speed of vehicles to exploit all openings and, when on defense, the KPA will employ its
mobile forces to counterattack any enemy penetration. KPA vehicles will use the major and minor roads
to move quickly, but the KPA light infantry units possess the ability to travel on foot through the rugged
mountainous terrain to sneak up on enemy positions from an unexpected direction.55
Rear Area Protection
The KPA understands the vulnerability of rear areas as the KPA leaders see its enemy’s rear area as an
operational center of gravity for American forces. Much of the DPRK’s SPF effort will be directed at its
enemy’s rear area. Conversely, the KPA will also defend its own rear area against ground attacks. The
DPRK will deploy its vast number of paramilitary units to defend against enemy rear area attacks in
order to free up its regular KPA units for more conventional offensive operations.56
Reconnaissance
Reconnaissance is very important to KPA military doctrine. The KPA will strive to conduct reconnaissance
continuously at all levels to include the enemy’s rear area in order to achieve surprise when attacking
and to prevent surprise when on defense. Each forward-deployed KPA infantry corps fields a
reconnaissance battalion and each KPA infantry division contains an organic reconnaissance company.
Each KPA infantry regiment possesses its own organic reconnaissance platoon, but there are also three
independent reconnaissance brigades that could be deployed anywhere on the battlefield for additional
intelligence-gathering operations.57
Two Front War
KPA doctrine calls for a two-front war, but not in the traditional sense of the term such as in World War I
or World War II. Instead, the DPRK will use its SPF units and agents already on the ground in South Korea
to create a “second front” in the enemy’s rear areas while its enemy must continue to deal with the
conventional battle on the primary front. The SPF units will attack enemy key command and control (C2)
facilities, important logistical centers, and attempt to create fratricide between enemy rear echelon
units.58
Use the Terrain
Lastly, the KPA doctrine calls for its forces to use the terrain to its best advantage with a focus on the
mountains, poor weather, or night operations in order to minimize the effects of a technologically
superior foe. Just like during the Korean War, the KPA will likely use the mountain ranges and ridges as
an avenue of advance in bad weather or at night while its enemy focuses on the more easily accessible
valley floor with its highways.

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Tactical Vignettes
The following vignettes explore two operational level and two tactical level actions in detail,
accompanied by tactical diagrams to graphically depict the actions. Throughout the following four
examples, references will be made to North Korean tactics and, when applicable, related to OPFOR
tactics found in TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. The terms will be shown in parenthesis where the
North Korean tactic or term is translatable into TC 7-100.2 terminology.

1. Operational Offense: Encirclement (Dispersed Attack)

Figure 3. KPA Division encirclement movement (dispersed attack) of an enemy brigade position.
Adapted from COL James M. Minnich from his book, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins
and Current Tactics, 2005, pp 86-87. Modified by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats, 17 June 2015.
Though a KPA division may conduct an encirclement movement at its operational level, many of the
subordinate KPA units are involved in other forms of military movement as defined by KPA offensive
doctrine. A KPA encirclement movement is the functional equivalent of the OPFOR dispersed attack
described in TC 7-100.2, pages 3-13 to 3-16. While the KPA assault forces conduct the main attack in the
form of an encirclement movement, the fixing forces may conduct thrust, penetration, or holding

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movements in its own areas of operation. In this example, one of the assault forces also conducts a
turning movement before becoming part of the encirclement forces.59
A dispersed attack requires deliberate planning and can be accomplished with or without an advantage
in forces over the defensive foe. To make an attack, the KPA requires only a 2:1 advantage at the point
of the attack. The KPA doctrine designates that the main attack advance on a much narrower attack
zone and this requires the rest of the division to disperse more widely throughout the remainder of the
divisional front. The KPA commander’s intent is to provide the appearance to the enemy that there is
significant military force to its front to keep them from assisting other units. The division’s four artillery
battalions, three conventional and one rocket, are located in the Division Artillery Group (DAG). The
DAG may receive additional indirect fire assets from the corps dependent upon whether the division is
conducting the main or supporting attack. The DAG initiates the dispersed attack by indirectly firing
artillery and rockets not only at the front line units, but at the brigade command post and brigade
reserve as well. (For ease of clarity in this example, only one artillery round is shown.) The DAG’s task is
to provide adequate indirect fire in order to achieve neutralization of the brigade reserve; disrupt the
command and control of the battalion command post; and to harass as minimum or neutralize, if
possible, the front line units (see TC 7-100.2, p 9-2 to 9-3 for the definition of the terms harass, disrupt,
and neutralize in regard to artillery battle damage assessment).60
The KPA Division uses its light infantry units (one battalion with six companies) on infiltration missions to
initiate the attack during the night, a period of inclement weather, or during poor visibility. All six light
infantry companies in the division take part in this example, but only two companies are involved in the
actual main encirclement movement. On the western flank, two light infantry companies assist the
mechanized battalion to clear a mountain pass that is a terrain chokepoint. The task of the light infantry
company and the mechanized infantry battalion is to clear the pass to gain freedom of movement and
allow possible exploitation from second echelon units (TC 7-100.2, p 3-1). (See Figure 4 below and its
accompanying details for an example of a possible KPA thrust attack that could be used to clear this type
of chokepoint.) Two other light infantry companies on the same flank infiltrate farther to the south to
attack the enemy’s brigade command post by fire in order to destroy it if not already eliminated by the
artillery fire. On the eastern flank, the remainder of the light infantry battalion—two companies—
infiltrate over the mountain ridge to serve as the support force on the eastern side of the planned kill
zone. Even though there are adjacent KPA divisions also attacking, the division’s recon company still
protects the eastern flank of the main attack, especially as the main assault force makes its turning
movement to the west and then north again. A single platoon screens the division’s western flank by
screening to prevent a surprise attack from the enemy from the adjacent division’s areas of operation.61
Away from the main attack and the light infantry battalion activities, there are three other supporting
attacks that occur almost simultaneously. This includes the thrust attack on the west flank already
mentioned above, a holding maneuver to the west of the main attack (fixing attack in TC 7-100.2, p 3-5)
and a penetration movement to the east of the main attack (also designated a fixing attack in TC 7-
100.2, p 3-5). The engineer battalion and first echelon tank company are prepared to follow the main
attack along the major road or along possible secondary avenues of approach to the east. The engineer
battalion is prepared to assist with any breach operations required along the main axis of advance or the
secondary axis located to the east. The second echelon units consisting of a tank company and two
mechanized infantry battalions serve as the division’s exploitation force and are back farther to follow

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whichever first echelon unit is most successful. The planned exploitation is along the main axis of
advance, but could possibly go west through the cleared chokepoint to the west or if the penetration
attack has been more successful than the main attack, farther to the east.
The main attack has many moving parts. One tank company and two mechanized infantry companies
(Assault Force) would then conduct a turning movement from the east to attack the enemy’s brigade
reserve from the south. Its task is to get behind the enemy’s brigade reserve with the purpose to drive it
into the planned kill zone. If possible, the timing of this attack would occur just after the enemy’s
brigade reserve initiated its movement from its assembly area in a move to reinforce a gap in the front
lines to its north. The planned KPA kill zone is located between the front line units and the brigade
reserve force. If executed correctly, the tank company and two mechanized infantry battalions would
attack by fire from the south; one mechanized infantry battalion with possibly a tank company would
support by fire from the north. The intent is for the main assault force to annihilate the brigade reserve
at its most vulnerable time, just as it begins its movement from the reserve assembly area. The two light
infantry companies that infiltrated earlier support by fire from the east to prevent the reserve from
escaping in that direction. The kill zone’s fourth flank to the west is blocked by high ground. If necessary,
indirect fire from artillery and rockets in the DAG could cover the west flank not covered by direct fire
from ground units. Besides the second echelon units that will exploit the success of the first echelon
assaults, the division will keep approximately one battalion in reserve for other contingencies. The
division’s organic air defense battalion will provide sector coverage for the area of operation (see TC 7-
100.2, Chapter 11).62
Upon completion of the encirclement of the brigade reserve and any front-line units falling back into the
kill zone and their annihilation, the KPA would continue its movement to the south. Based on its
experiences during the Korean War, the KPA expects that if a significant penetration of the enemy’s
front lines occur, enemy adjacent units often conduct retrograde operations to maintain contact with its
flanks and to avoid being cut off. If the KPA first echelon forces still maintain adequate forces, these
units would continue to press the attack southward. If not strong enough to remain a viable force or
based on the situation, the KPA division’s second echelon forces could then pass through the first
echelon to attack the enemy’s combat support, combat service support, and C2 units in the division
and/or corps rear area. The second echelon could follow the planned primary avenue of approach as the
Assault Force (TC 7-100.2, p 3-5 to 3-6) or along the secondary roads to the east or west if either of
those attacks yielded better success. In the tradition of old Soviet doctrine, the KPA will reinforce
success and any KPA division plan will contain different route options for the second echelon units to
follow based on the success of the first echelon units.63

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2. Tactical Offense: Thrust (Attack to Gain Freedom of Movement)

Figure 4. KPA Thrust Attack (Attack to Gain Freedom of Movement) of an enemy strong point.
Adapted from COL James M. Minnich from his book, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins
and Current Tactics, 2005, pp 82-83. Modified by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats, 17 June 2015.
At the tactical level, the KPA thrust maneuver is an example of one of the six offensive tactical missions
found in TC 7-100.2 (pages 3-1 to 3-2)—an attack to gain freedom of movement. The other five tactical
offensive missions in TC 7-100.2 are to restrict freedom of movement; gain control of key terrain,
personnel, or equipment; or gain information, dislocate, or disrupt the enemy. The KPA most often uses
the thrust maneuver at the regimental, battalion, or company level. An enabling force attacks the
enemy position and once the blue forces are defeated, the exploitation force then passes through the
cleared axis of advance to continue the attack in the enemy’s rear area as the battalion or higher unit
regains its freedom of movement. This example is conducted by a mechanized battalion without
assistance from any light infantry company, but the mechanized battalion could possibly receive
additional assets, if they were available.64
While the size of the operation may vary depending on the level of command involved, the actions are
very similar. Initially, the KPA will use artillery or mortars from the DAG or RAG (Regimental Artillery
Group) to support the operation by providing indirect fire on the enemy positions. (For ease of clarity in

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this example, only one artillery attack is shown.) The RAG’s task is to neutralize (TC 7-100.2, p 9-3) the
enemy platoons to allow the enabling elements to successfully assault and occupy the positions
overwatching the minefield placed on the road. Additionally, the artillery would be used as a fixing force
to prevent any potential enemy forces from coming to the attacked unit’s assistance. In this role, the
artillery would neutralize (TC 7-100.2, p 9-3) the enemy artillery or enemy ground units that react to the
attack on the enemy forces. SPF, spies, or forward observers that infiltrated (TC 7-100.2, p 9-15 to 9-17)
to observation positions would provide the call for fire on arriving units attempting to reach the
attacked units. For a battalion level thrust, 110 to 150 tubes (artillery, mortar, or rocket) could be
allocated to the unit making the attack. Even though this battalion will have adjacent friendly units, the
battalion commander would still provide security on his flanks to avoid an attack by the enemy without
warning. The KPA commander would most likely use observation posts on high terrain or likely avenues
of approach to warn the main body composed of soldiers internal to his battalion or the attached light
infantry company.65
Due to the rugged terrain on the Korean peninsula, the KPA will likely use light infantry or possibly
mechanized infantry operating dismounted to attack enemy units holding a physically difficult terrain
feature. While the KPA would like a better force ratio, its ground forces will attack even if the assault
force only possesses a 2:1 ratio advantage against the defenders. If possible, the KPA ground forces will
use an indirect approach to attack the position from a direction the defensive unit least expects an
assault. The enabling elements would eliminate the squad positions on either side of the road that are
providing observation to the minefield for its breaching and then to give the battalion back its freedom
of movement. While the attack by the enabling elements and the breaching occurred, additional
security personnel would place observation posts on the most likely avenues of approach by enemy
reserves that may come to the assaulted squads’ assistance. Either the engineers, the infantry, or an
attached obstacle removal company (only in forward divisions) would conduct the breaching operation
in order to continue the advance as rapidly as possible to gain the freedom of movement needed by the
mechanized battalion. If the infantry that made the actual enabling assault on the enemy squad
positions were dismounted mechanized or motorized infantry, the successful attackers would rejoin
their vehicles as the battalion regains its freedom of movement down the primary avenue of advance or
secondary avenue if that route proved easier to traverse.66

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3. Operational Defense: Anti-Tank Defense System (Maneuver

Defense)

Figure 5. KPA Division Anti-Tank Defense System (Maneuver Defense). Adapted from COL James
M. Minnich from his book, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, 2005, pp
93-99. Modified by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats, 17 June 2015.
The area defense is the KPA’s principal defensive tactic, which it designs around stopping the enemy’s
armor as the KPA leaders consider tanks as the enemy’s most lethal ground attack vehicle. If on defense,
the KPA plans to fight an anti-armor battle along the predictable routes that the enemy’s vehicles will
likely travel. The KPA’s area defensive doctrine is the functional equivalent of the Maneuver Defense
found in TC 7-100.2 (pp 4-10 to 4-14). The KPA breaks down its defensive plan into six phases: anti-
armor obstacles, anti-armor fire plan, anti-tank defensive positions, anti-tank engagement areas, the
anti-tank reserve, and the counterattack force.67
The KPA’s defense phase 1 is the Anti-Armor Obstacle Plan that takes place in front of the forward
defensive positions and within each anti-tank (AT) engagement area or kill zone (TC 7-100.2, p 2-15). The
KPA will place these obstacle belts so they tie into the terrain and include a combination of AT and anti-
personnel (AP) mines. The KPA will cover each concealed obstacle belt with both observers to call in

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indirect fire and direct fire weapons. The obstacle belts will consist of several layers positioned to take
advantage of the KPA’s various AT weapons’ ranges, normally from 400 to 1,000 meters.68
Phase 2 or the Anti-Armor Fire Plan contains four sub-phases conducted by Disruption Forces based on
the location of the enemy observed by security elements located ahead of the forward defensive line
whose task is to call in indirect fire for the purpose of preventing an effective attack by the enemy (TC 7-
100.2, p 4-4 to 4-5 and pp 9-15 to 9-17). During Phase 2a, the KPA plans area fires at potential
chokepoints along the suspected avenues of approach, often along main roads. The KPA allocates two
artillery battalions per each enemy company to its front. The KPA will fire mortars, artillery, or rockets at
these chokepoints. The normal size of a battery target is approximately 100 meters wide by 900 meters
deep. Phase 2b is a set of planned rolling fires approximately 2,000 meters in front of the forward battle
positions with the purpose to disrupt and destroy armor march units as they transition to battle
formations. The normal width for these barrages are 400 to 700 meters and may occur every 500 to 800
meters for a maximum of four times. Phase 2c or anti-armor rectangular target fires occurs immediately
after Phase 2b. The primary difference between these two types of fire is that while the width is
approximately the same (400 to 700 meters), the depth of the fire is less, 300 to 500 meters, and is fired
in three sequential volleys first by rockets, then by artillery, and lastly by mortars as opposing forces
approach the obstacle belts. Anti-armor rectangular fire will cease at the obstacle belt along the forward
battle positions. Phase 2d or the direct-fire fight begins at the forward defensive obstacle belts where
tanks, AT guns, recoilless rifles, and RPGs fire at their maximum ranges while KPA soldiers fight the
enemy’s infantry. The KPA plans indirect final protective fire when the enemy closes to within 300
meters of the KPA’s front line forces.69
Phase 3 is the AT Defensive Position planned by the regimental commander, but executed by the
battalion commander. The AT defensive position is not shown in detail on this map, but see the next
example for a diagram and a detail description of the KPA’s defensive position. The AT defensive
position will be set up along the most likely armor avenue of approach into the forward infantry
regiment’s area. Any units or personnel in the forward units that are not killed by the enemy will remain
behind to set up stay behind ambushes of enemy combat support and combat service support units as
they enter the overrun unit’s area of operations.70
Phase 4 or the AT Engagement Area is similar to the AT defensive position, but occurs at the regimental
or divisional level. Any enemy forces that pass successfully through the forward regiments’ battalion AT
defensive positions will likely run into an AT engagement area set up by other first or second echelon
units. The KPA will likely allocate two platoons of SU-100 howitzers to use in a direct fire role and up to
two RPG-7 platoons for a regimental or divisional level AT engagement area. Any additional weapons
systems that might be available such as tanks and recoilless rifles can also be used. The regimental or
divisional commander will select a location so that the enemy force will be channelized and then can be
attacked on three, if not four sides. The attack is similar to the AT defensive position described in the
example below, but on a much larger scale.71
Phase 5 is the AT Mobile Reserve (TC 7-100.2, p 4-6) that is designed to destroy any tanks that appear
unexpectedly within the KPA’s defensive system, especially in the vulnerable rear areas. This AT mobile
reserve would confront any enemy tanks that manage to get through the AT defensive positions, the
regimental engagement areas, and the division engagement areas. Each KPA division normally keeps
two AT companies for this role and locates them between the division’s first and second echelons.72
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The counter attack conducted by the Counterattack Force (TC 7-100.2, p 4-5 to 4-6) is Phase 6 and the
final piece of the KPA defensive plan. All regimental and higher units will possess a plan to conduct a
counterattack to eliminate any enemy penetrations into its lines. Only the division counterattack force
(two tank companies and a mechanized infantry company) is shown on the diagram, but each battalion,
regiment, division, and corps will designate a counterattack force. Once a penetration becomes a
possibility, the appropriate KPA commander will attempt to predict the direction the penetration will
continue and then select a counterattack position, normally one kilometer to the rear of the penetrated
unit. The type of counterattack chosen by the KPA commander will depend on the depth of the
penetration (the rear area of that level of unit) and the criticality of the position penetrated. The normal
KPA procedure is to conduct a rapid counterattack for a company-level penetration, a standard
counterattack for a battalion-level penetration, and a delayed counterattack for a regimental
penetration level. The difference between the types of counterattacks is how fast the mission can be
executed. The key to reading the counterattack chart below is that if a KPA infantry regiment received
the mission to counterattack the penetration of one of its first echelon battalions, it would need to
conduct a delayed counterattack (the longest of the three types of KPA counterattacks before the
mission can be accomplished) that takes additional time and planning to execute. The division, however,
might be able to respond quicker with a standard counterattack against the same penetration while the
corps could respond the fastest with a rapid counterattack. The situation at the time and what
counterattack force was available could also dictate what unit received the counterattack mission. Once
the unit chosen for the counterattack method is designated, the depth of the penetration into the KPA’s
lines would determine what method the counterattack force would employ against the penetration.73
Table 2. KPA Counterattack Type/Criteria74
Counterattack Type Regiment Division Corps
Rapid Counterattack 1st Echelon Platoon 1st Echelon Company 1st Echelon Battalion
Penetration Penetration Penetration
Standard Counterattack 1st Echelon Company 1st Echelon Battalion 1st Echelon Regiment
Penetration Penetration Penetration
Delayed Counterattack 1st Echelon Battalion 1st Echelon Regiment 1st Defense Zone
Penetration Penetration Penetration

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4. Tactical Defense: Anti-Tank Defensive Position (Area Defense)

Figure 6. KPA Battalion Anti-Tank Defensive Position (Area Defense). Adapted from COL James M.
Minnich from his book, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, 2005, pp
96-97. Modified by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats, 17 June 2015.
The anti-tank (AT) defensive position is phase 3 of the six phases of the KPA’s defensive battle plan
described previously. The regimental commander designates and plans the main effort battalion’s AT
defensive position. The regimental commander will often select a parallel forward ridgeline so that the
armor vehicles can be hit by a crossfire from two, if not, three directions. The battalion creating this
defensive position will receive additional resources such as anti-tank missiles and/or recoilless rifles.
(See area defense in TC 7-100.2, pages 4-14 to 4-18.) The purpose of the area defense is to force the
enemy’s offensive operations to culminate before its objectives are obtained and to deny the enemy its
objectives while preserving combat power until a decision in the KPA’s favor can be reached through
operational or strategic operations.75
The KPA considers enemy armor to be the most deadly ground threat, and the elimination of the armor
threat takes priority during defensive planning. When the enemy armor enters artillery range, the
Observation Posts’ (TC 7-100.2, p 8-13) task is to locate and observe the armor and its purpose is to
provide security for the main defensive position as well as to call for indirect fire from the disruption

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force. See previous example for additional indirect fire details, but the artillery is not shown in this
example for simplicity. When the enemy armor is within range, the Main Defense Force Element (TC 7-
100.2, pp 4-5 and 4-21) composed of tanks and AT guns, such as Saggers, engages the enemy with direct
fire. The main defense force’s task is to attack by direct fire with a mission to destroy the enemy armor.
As the enemy armor continues to advance, the vehicles will meet an AT/AP minefield where disruption
elements with recoilless rifles and RPG-7s will engage as the vehicles become bogged down trying to
breach the minefield. The disruption elements’ (TC 7-100.2, pp 4-5, 4-20 to 4-21) task is to support by
fire with its purpose to contain the enemy within the kill zone and to prevent the armor from flanking
the defensive battalion’s position. During this time, the main defense force continue to engage the
enemy in the kill zone. Any armor vehicles that make it through the minefield will be attacked by
additional RPG-7 teams of the Disruption Force with the task to support by fire with the mission to
prevent the armor from escaping from the desired axis of advance. Any AT weapons from the forward
position disruption forces that are still operational can relocate to supplemental positions to continue to
engage the enemy armor that made it successfully through the kill zone to eliminate those vehicles. The
KPA battalion commander will possess a counterattack element (TC 7-100.2, p 4.5 and 4-21) composed
of armor and/or AT weapon systems, often hidden from view and shielded from direct fire on the
reverse slope of a hill. On order, the counterattack element of two tank platoons will maneuver and
attack the enemy’s flank with the purpose to destroy the remaining armor threat before the enemy
escapes the AT defensive position. Even if some armor vehicles pass through this first echelon AT
defensive position, those elements could face other AT defensive positions, regimental AT engagement
areas, or even possibly a division engagement area. Any surviving soldiers and operational weapons
systems will continue to engage the attackers, often as a stay behind ambush force focused on
unsuspecting combat support or combat service support units that may pass along the avenue of
advance.76

Section 3: KPA Weapons and Equipment

North Korea fields one of the world’s largest militaries, but its equipment ranges from World War II
vintage to the most modern. The modern equipment, however, is only in niche areas such as ballistic
missiles. There are many sources, such as Jane’s or Military Periscope, for a breakdown of the quantity
and types of equipment. Only selected equipment will be discussed here.77

Army
The KPA is composed of both armor and light units, with large quantities of artillery to provide indirect
fire support to both types. The KPA possesses at least 3,700 medium and light tanks that range from the
T-34/85 produced in World War II to the Songun-ho, North Korea’s internally-produced tank that
combines technologies of the Soviet/Russian T-62, T-72, 7-80, and T-90, and the Chinese-produced Type
88 main battle tank (MBT). For information on North Korean tanks, see the two-part series in the
TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration Red Diamond newsletter (published in the May and June 2015
issues). The KPA can also deploy at least 2,100 infantry fighting vehicles or armored personnel carriers,
many of them in the BTR family of vehicles. See the TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration product, “The
BTR Handbook-The Universal APC,” for additional details on the BTR’s capabilities. The KPA ground
forces receive indirect fire support from over 13,500 artillery pieces that include mortars, cannons, guns,

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and howitzers that range from 1930s technology to more modern vintage; free-rocket-over-ground
(FROG) missiles based on 1960s and 1970s knowledge; and multiple rocket launcher systems (MRLS)
that consist of Soviet-era types to present-day production models. The KPA also possesses over 15,600
antiaircraft artillery (AA) pieces including single, double, and quad AA guns; missile launchers; and man-
portable air defense systems (MANPADS).78

Air Force
The KPAF, a subordinate element of the KPA, operates an air fleet of approximately 1,600 aircraft of all
types. This includes approximately 80 bombers, 780 fighters, 300 An-2 biplanes, 100 support aircraft,
and 300 helicopters. Many of these aircraft are outdated, but the KPAF does fly some formidable
fighters, such as the MiG-29 and the slightly-outdated MiG-21 and MiG-23. The An-2 biplane is used to
insert KPA SPF elements. The KPAF operates approximately 139 Mi-2 Hoplite and 20 Mi-24 Hind
helicopters. The KPA SPF forces can also use MD-500D/E helicopters, ironically originally produced in the
US, to insert SPF personnel. The KPAF is also taking advantage of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and
possesses over 300 UAVs of various models and technological levels.79

Navy
While the KPN operates approximately 1,000 vessels of all types, most of them are not that large and
are used primarily for SPF operations, amphibious assaults, and coastal defense. The most formidable of
the KPN’s ships are the 20 ROMEO Class attack submarines that could operate against enemy surface
ships. The KPN also fields over 80 midget submarines that would likely deliver SPF personnel to either
coast of South Korea. The KPN operates approximately 430 surface combatant ships and 260 landing
craft. Many of these, however, are in dry dock and inoperable. In addition, the Ministry of People’s
Armed Forces Coastal Security Bureau operates 150 corvettes, guided-missile patrol boats, torpedo
boats, and fire support boats. The KPN also is responsible for coastal defense, with coastal defense guns
on both its east and west coasts as well as surface-to-surface missile batteries.80

Section 4: North Korean Military Organization

North Korea operates a conventional military with a strong SPF capable of irregular warfare. Due to the
lack of modern weapons and equipment with a few exceptions—nuclear weapons, missiles, and
submarines—even the conventional army may use a number irregular force tactics including
information warfare (INFOWAR) in its operations. The following tables provide the locations of the
major KPA, KPAF, and KPN units or bases as well as the locations of most North Korean runways. The
numbers in the last column of each chart correspond with its approximate location on the associated
map in Section 1 under locations.
Table 3. Major North Korean Army Unit Locations
Unit Headquarters Map #
1 District Command Wonsan 1
I Army Corps Hoeyang 2
II Army Corps Hanpori 3

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Unit Headquarters Map #

III Army Corps Kaechon 4
IV Army Corps Haeju 5
V Army Corps Hupyong Ni 6
VII Army Corps Tongsin 7
VIII Army Corps Tongnim (Changhong) 8
IX Army Corps Hamgyong Province 9
X Army Corps Yanggang Province 10
108 Mechanized Corps Hamhung 11
425 Mechanized Corps Chongju 12
Pyongyang Defense Command Pyongyang Si 13
Pyongyang Air Defense Command Sonnae-san 13
11 ‘Storm’ Corps (Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau) Unknown NA
Strategic Rocket Forces Command Suhoe Dong 14
81
Table 4. Major Air Force Unit Locations
Unit Locations Map #s
1 Air Combat Kaechon Military Air Base (MAB), Uiji MAB, Sunchon MAB, Onchon Up MAB, 4, 15, 16, 17,
Division Pukchang Ni MAB, Panghyon MAB; Yonggang Ni Helicopter Base, Kangdong 18, 19, 20, 13
MAB, Sonchon Helicopter Base, Sunan International Airport
2 Air Combat Toksan MAB, Hwangsuwon MAB, Iwon Airport, Changjin MAB 21, 22, 23, 24
Division
3 Air Combat Hwangju MAB, Koksan Airport, Kwail MAB, Hyon Ni MAB, Nuchon Ni Airport, 25, 26, 27, 28,
Division Taetan MAB 29, 30
5 Air Transport Kwakson MAB, Manpo MAB, Taechon MAB, Sunan International Airport, 31, 32, 33, 13,
Division Sonchon Helicopter Base, Pukchang East Helicopter Base, Sinjiju Airport 17, 34
6 Air Transport Sondok MAB, Yonpo MAB 35, 36
Division
8 Air Training Orang MAB, Samjiyon MAB, Kyongsong Chuul MAB, Sungam Ni Air Base, 37, 38, 39, 40
Division Kuktong MAB
Table 5. Major Navy Unit Locations
Unit Location Map #s
Naval Headquarters Pyongyang 13
East Fleet (Headquarters) Toejo Dong 41
1 Naval Squadron (East Fleet) Kosong 42
2 Naval Squadron (East Fleet) Munchon Up 43
3 Naval Squadron (East Fleet) Nagwon Up (Yoho Ri) 44
4 Naval Squadron (East Fleet) Mayang Do 45

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Unit Location Map #s

5 Naval Squadron (East Fleet) Chaho 46
6 Naval Squadron (East Fleet) Puam Dong 47
7 Naval Squadron (East Fleet) Najin 48
West Fleet Headquarters Nampo 16
8 Naval Squadron (West Fleet) Sagon Ni 49
9 Naval Squadron (West Fleet) Chodo 50
11 Naval Squadron (West Fleet) Pipa Got 51
12 Naval Squadron (West Fleet) Yongdok and Yomjugun (Yongampo) 52, 53

Military Capabilities
Command and Control
The KPA’s ground units are the DPRK’s primary military force. The KPAF and KPN support the KPA
ground forces, primarily through defense of the homeland and the deployment of SPF in the enemy’s
rear area. The KPA uses the old Soviet C2 structure with a highly structured chain of command. While
the KPA trains its soldiers to operate at the next higher command level, many commanders may hesitate
or show the initiative desired by the chain of command in fear of doing the wrong thing if out of
communication with his/her superior for an extended period or if a break occurs in the chain of
command. Since he took over in December 2011, Kim Jong Un has selected four different officers to lead
his military, showing that the DPRK’s supreme leader may possess little tolerance for failure.82
Maneuver
The KPA will use old Soviet tactics along the mobile corridors that are usually found on the valley floors.
The armored and mechanized forces will likely place two-thirds of its ground forces forward in the first
echelon and a little less than one-third in its second attack echelon. The light infantry will likely travel via
the mountain ranges or ridges on foot. KPA SPF will likely land in its enemy’s rear areas by sea,
helicopter, plane, or via a tunnel. While the US and South Korean forces may become mesmerized by
the mobile units in front of them and concentrate their attention on the armor units, the US/South
Korean forces will need to watch their flanks and sides for attacks on foot by light infantry forces or SPF
units coming from an unexpected direction.83
INFOWAR
The DPRK will likely use the seven INFOWAR capabilities—electronic warfare (EW), computer attack,
information attack, deception, physical destruction, protection and security measures, and perception
management—as best they can. North Korea has already practiced EW with several previous attacks
against South Korean GPS systems. The hacking of Sony shows that the DPRK, despite North Korea’s
denial of the cyberattack, also possesses the ability to attack its enemy’s computer networks. As
discussed earlier, the KPA places great emphasis on camouflage, a major component of deception
operations. The common North Korean cannot access the Internet so there is little social media in the

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DPRK. The DPRK attempts to manage the perception of its own people through the control of the
information environment. The KPA will also likely use old school techniques such as leaflets and other
propaganda methods to attempt to turn South Koreans. See the Red Diamond articles from November
2014 and January 2015 for additional details on North Korean INFOWAR capabilities.84
RISTA
The KPA emphasizes reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA)
capabilities and will use its intelligence resources to gain information about its enemies. North Korea will
also use spies and SPF units in its enemy’s rear area to conduct its RISTA activities. The KPA can deploy
up to three separate reconnaissance brigades from theater-level assets to conduct RISTA activities. The
SPF and agents already planted in country could assist with the location of strategic targets. In addition,
each KPA ground unit from corps to regiment fields its own reconnaissance unit—battalion for the
corps, company for the division, and platoon for the regiment. The KPA will also be able to use its UAV
fleet of over 300 unmanned aircraft to obtain additional information on the enemy.85
Fire Support
The KPA doctrine is similar to old Soviet doctrine with heavy emphasis on artillery, missiles, and multiple
rocket launchers combined on a single target. If aviation assets are available and not involved in
homeland defense, the KPAF will most likely use any additional aviation assets to provide close air
support to the KPA ground forces.86
Protection
KPA doctrine, due to its belief that its forces cannot achieve air superiority against most of its enemies,
expounds maximum use of both active and passive camouflage, concealment, and deception in order to
prevent the enemy from locating KPA units and important static positions. The more ordnance that its
enemy uses against decoys, the less ordnance will hit actual KPA units, positions, buildings, and
weapons.87
Logistics
While KPA doctrine states that adequate logistics is important, it is most likely that the DPRK will run out
of vital supplies within a short time of the onset of any military operation. It is likely that South Korea
maintains a two- to three-month stockpile of food and POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants). North Korea
maintains at least one million tons of rice in storage for potential military operations and only under the
severest conditions will it release some of its stores to help the North Korean citizens avoid starvation. In
any case, the capture of enemy food, equipment, and ammunition will become a priority for the KPA in
order to continue its military operations for a sustained period of time. The DPRK may have up to 10
million barrels of fuel in storage for wartime use. In 2011, the DPRK purchased between 3,000 and 4,000
trucks from China for its military. There are 180 arms factories in North Korea along with about 115
nonmilitary factories that have a dedicated wartime materiel production mission. The theory of sonjun
or “military first” means that any supplies that are available will go to the KPA before civilians.88
The General Rear Service Bureau is responsible for all KPA logistics and combat service support
operations. This bureau appears to be bloated with at least 15 different subordinate organizations
including bureaus for Buildings Management, Clothing, Energy, External Affairs, Farm Management,

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Finance, Medical Service, Military Decorations Management, Munitions Production, Organization and
Planning, Provisions, Rear Service Political Operations, Road Management, Vehicle Management, and
Veterinary Services. This large bureaucracy may reduce the effectiveness of the KPA in military
operations.89
Air Defense
KPA’s air defense operates primarily from the ground and not from counter-air operations in the sky.
While North Korea possesses one of the most dense air defense networks in the world, it is comprised
mostly of obsolete weapons, including its radar, and its air defense weapons are most effective at low
altitude targets. Many of the air defense units are situated to protect Pyongyang, the DPRK capital city,
instead of military units or installations.90
UAVs
North Korea operates as least eight different types of UAVs and maintains an inventory of at least 300
UAVs. Many of these UAVs are outdated models and include the D-4, the Durumi, the MQM-107D, the
Panghyon I/II, the Pchela-1T, the Sky-09P, the Shmel, and at least one other unidentified model. The
KPAF and the Reconnaissance General Bureau operate the North Korean UAV fleet. There have been
known cases where DPRK UAVs have violated the southern boundary of the DMZ, but the North Korean
government always denies that the downed UAVs in South Korean territory belong to them.91

Conclusion
The DPRK’s unorthodox use of provocation in order to obtain concessions from its enemies—especially
the US, South Korea, and Japan—is a danger. One never knows what North Korea will do next as, in the
past, the DPRK has sanctioned assassination attempts on South Korean political leaders and conducted
bombings when South Korean contingents are in another country, unannounced attacks on ships by
submarines, unprovoked artillery attacks, or has tunneled underground into another country. US
military personnel stationed in South Korea must be prepared for the unexpected from the DPRK.92
One of these incidents could ignite the Korean peninsula back into a full-blown war. While an armistice
has been in place since 1953, an armistice is just a ceasefire waiting for a peace treaty to be signed or for
the resumption of hostilities. Any conflict between North and South Korea would inevitably bring the US
into the conflict as the ROK has been an ally for over six decades.
North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons and the missiles to transport it up to 9,650 km makes it a
threat to US forces stationed in Korea, Japan, Alaska, or even the west coast of the continental United
States. Even more concerning was the DPRK’s first successful test launch of a KN-11 missile from a
submarine on 23 January 2015 since, in the near future, the North Korean submarines could silently
move closer to their targets before launching a nuclear missile that would give the US less warning time.
If the DPRK thought that the survival of its country or the Kim regime was at stake, North Korea might
use any nuclear weapons at its disposal. The KPA also possesses chemical weapons and its doctrine calls
for their employment. The DPRK is also involved in biological weapons research and would likely use
those with offensive capabilities. US military personnel training for deployment to South Korea must be
prepared to fight in a chemical, biological, or nuclear environment.93

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The KPA fields a large conventional military force of over one million soldiers, airmen, and sailors with
over seven million uniformed personnel in reserve. North Korea also possesses one of the largest SPF in
the world. The KPA will fight using conventional tactics, but will also use unconventional tactics on the
“second front,” especially against rear areas. The US military must be prepared to fight this dual
threat—conventional war on the ground from the north with irregular warfare in its rear areas. The KPA
emphasizes the attack on an enemy’s rear, so US combat support and combat service personnel must be
vigilant and be ready to fight the enemy while they continue to provide support to the American combat
soldier on the front lines.

REAL-WORLD CONDITIONS APPLIED TO TRAINING

Of the five DATE countries, the one that most resembles North Korea is Ariana. Militarily, Ariana is the
second strongest country in DATE, but is more representative of North Korea than the strongest
country, Donovia. Ariana, however, fields more modern equipment and weapons than North Korea.
Exercise planners may need to reduce the equipment tier level for Ariana to more closely replicate
North Korea. While politically Ariana is a theocracy and North Korea an oligarchy, both countries are
ruled by a small group of people. The difference is that Ariana is ruled by elites from a particular religion
while North Korea is ruled by a small number of elites being related to or are close friends with the three
generations of the Kim family, the family that has ruled North Korea since the end of World War II. For
the other six variables, the DATE could be easily modified to replicate conditions in North Korea.
 North Korea primarily uses Soviet/Russian/Eastern bloc weapons systems. These are the legacy
systems that the OPFORs have used at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) for years. There
should be no issues with replication of these former Eastern bloc weapons systems at the CTCs,
but it could be more difficult to successfully imitate these weapons systems during home station
training.
 All tactical tools needed to recreate North Korean tactics in training exercise are available in the
TC 7-100 series; many of them are based on old Soviet tactics modified for the Korean
peninsula. Home station OPFOR personnel would likely need some additional training to better
use the tactics and techniques favored by North Korea, but the training will be more greatly
enhanced than if the OPFOR used modified American methods.
 The terrain of North Korea would be hard to replicate at any of the CTCs. Fort Irwin is in the
desert and there is no similar environment in either one of the Koreas. The Korean peninsula is
very mountainous and that is not the terrain found at either the Joint Readiness Training Center
in Louisiana or the Joint Maneuver Training Center in Germany. Home station training may be
difficult depending on the location of the unit. For the most part, however, most infantry and
armor divisions are stationed at posts that are not mountainous enough to resemble North
Korea. Some Army National Guard combat arms units could find similar terrain to what is found
in North Korea, but others could not.
The Army Training Network (ATN) provides US Soldiers with access to a variety of resources that would
assist them with their preparation for deployment to South Korea. These products include.

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 Field Manual (FM) 7-100.1: Opposing Force Operations (December 2004); This manual is one of
a series that describes a contemporary opposing force (OPFOR) for training US Army
commanders, staffs, and units. It and the other manuals in the series outline an OPFOR that can
cover the entire spectrum of military and paramilitary capabilities against which the Army must
train to ensure success in any future conflict.
 Training Circular (TC) 7-100.4: Hybrid Threat Force Structure Organization Guide (June 2015):
The OPFOR organizations outlined in TC 7-100.4 and the associated online organizational
directories represent a realistic composite of potential adversaries the Army might encounter in
real-world situations of the near- and mid-term.
 TC 7-100: Hybrid Threat (November 2010): This TC describes hybrid threats and summarizes the
manner in which such future threats may operationally organized to fight US forces. It also
outlines the strategy, operations, tactics and organization of the Hybrid Threat that represents a
composite of actual threat forces as an OPFOR for training exercises.
 TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics (December 2011): Provides tactics for an OPFOR that exists
for the purpose of training US forces for potential combat operations.
 TC 7-100.3: Irregular Opposing Forces (January 2014): This TC addresses the irregular opposing
force (OPFOR) and represents a composite of actual threats and enemies that comprise irregular
forces. The three primary categories of irregular forces are insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals.
These actors may operate separately or in conjunction with one another and/or combined with
regular military forces as the Hybrid Threat. Included are functional tactics for irregular forces.
 TC 7-101: Exercise Design Guide (November 2010): This TC outlines a methodology for designing
and executing training exercises.
 TC 7-102: Operational Environment and Army Learning (November 2014): This TC presents
concise and enduring doctrine-based guidance on how to integrate the variables of an
operational environment (OE) into Army training, education, and leader development.
 US Army TRADOC G-2 Handbook No. 1.08, Irregular Forces (December 2010): This handbook
describes the contemporary irregular forces and summarizes irregular threat actions to counter
US forces in the OE. The handbook describes irregular force tactics; forms of offensive and
defensive operations; irregular tactics, techniques, and terrorism; and the irregular forces
planning cycle.
 Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG)—2014: The WEG is a list of equipment that US forces would
most likely find used by its enemies on the battlefield. While not all weapons and weapons
systems are listed in the WEG, similar weapons can be found. The WEG also tells how an
exercise planner substitutes a weapon or vehicle in the WEG for one found in the actual military
that is being replicated for the exercise.
 Decisive Action Training Environment (April 2015): The purpose of this Decisive Action Training
Environment (DATE) document, version 2.2, is to provide the US Army training community with
a detailed description of the conditions of five composite OEs in the Caucasus region. It presents
trainers with a tool to assist in the construction of scenarios for specific training events, but does

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 Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

not provide a complete scenario. The DATE offers discussions of OE conditions through the
political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time
(PMESII-PT) variables. The DATE incorporates real-world data and artificial data in order to set
the conditions for a wide range of training events, to include decisive operations.
 Regionally Aligned Forces Training Environment (RAFTE) Pacific (September 2014): A RAFTE is
intended to be used when already familiar with DATE. A RAFTE is a supplement to DATE that can
be used when training must occur for operations in a known part of the world. A RAFTE
identifies the conditions of a selected OE that are unique from what is already in the DATE. It
will enable training based on current conditions specific to an OE, in this case most of the
countries that fall under the responsibility of the Pacific Command (PACOM). RAFTEs are
different but not separate from the DATE.
 RAFTE North Korea (April 2014): This is a RAFTE specifically focused on North Korea.
 Information Environment Assessment (June 2008): This product describes the Information
Environment for a number of countries including North Korea.
 North Korea Operational Environment Assessment (OEA) (2006): This is the most current OEA
published by ACE Threats Integration, but is mostly outdated since it is nearly a decade old.
Many changes have occurred since its publication including the death of Kim Jong Il and the
succession of his son, Kim Jong Un. Some information, especially in the Physical Environment
variable, is still valid.
 Asymmetrical Warfare Group (AWG) Subterranean Warfare Handbook. This FOUO handbook
contains a section on North Korean use of tunneling operations.
 Red Diamond Newsletters Articles
o March 2015: North Korean Leadership Turmoil
o January 2015: INFOWAR-North Korean Capabilities (Part 2)
o November 2014: INFOWAR-North Korean Capabilities (Part 1)
o July 2014: Unmanned Aircraft System Vulnerabilities
o May 2014: The BRDM: The Multi-Purpose Reconnaissance Vehicle
o August 2013: Shaping the North Korean EMP Threat
o June 2012: North Korean Jamming of GPS Systems
 North Korea GPS Jamming: This ACE Threats Integration Threat Report examines the jamming of
South Korean GPS signals by North Korea.
 BTR: The Universal APC Handbook: This ACE Threats Integration Handbook describes the various
BTR variants on the battlefield. The KPA fields a large number and a variety of BTRs.
The following chart provides a connection between the real-world condition in North Korea, a
comparable example of the condition in DATE as well as the relevant pages from the threat Field
Manuals, Training Circulars, or other product. The page numbers where these connections can be found

36 UNCLASSIFIED
 Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

are also listed in the chart. To find the product, use the links to the documents listed in the previous
section.

Conditions in DATE and Doctrine

Real-World Comparable Chapter/section/ Relevant Manual and
Condition Condition in word or phrase to Information in Page(s)
DATE search Threat Doctrine
DPRK Oligarchy National Command DATE 2A, 2B, 2D, National Command FM 7-100.1, 1-2; TC
Government Authority; Centers of 2E; National Authority 7-101, 3-2 to 3-6; TC
Political Power- Command Authority; 7-102, 1-4; TC 7-
Family Authority Centers of Political 100.2, 1-1 to 1-2
Power
DPRK Strategic National Strategic DATE 2A, 2B, 2C, National Strategic FM 7-100.1, 1-2; TC
Goals Goals/Strategy 2D, 2E; National Goals 7-100.2, 1-3 to 1.4
Strategic Goals;
Strategy
DPRK National Military Authority DATE 2A, 2B, 2C, Framework for FM 7-100.1, 1-2 to 1-
Security Strategy 2D, 2E; Military implementing 5; TC 7-100.2, 1-4 to
Framework Authority National Security 1.5
Strategy
DPRK Strategic Strategic Operations DATE 2A, 2B, 2C, Strategic Operations FM 7-100.1, 1-8 to 1-
Operations 2D, 2E; Strategic 9; TC 7-100.2, 1-5
Operations
DPRK Regional Regional Operations Regional Operations FM 7-100.1, 1-9 to 1-
Operations DATE 2A, 2B, 2C, 10; TC 7-100.2, 1-5
2D, 2E; Regional to 1-6
Operations
DPRK Transition Transition Transition FM 7-100.1, 1-10 to
Operations Operations DATE 2A, 2B, 2C, Operations 1-12; TC 7-100.2, 1-
2D, 2E; Transition 6
Operations
DPRK SPF Adaptive Adaptive FM 7-100.1, 1-12;
Operations Operations/Hybrid DATE 2A, 2B, 2C, Operations/Hybrid TC 7-100; TC 7-
Threats 2D, 2E; Adaptive Threats 100.2, 1-6
Operations; Hybrid
Threat
DPRK Nuclear CBRN; Nuclear DATE 2A, 2B, 2E; Cause Politically FM 7-100.1, 1-15
Capability Power Nuclear; CBRN Unacceptable
Casualties
DPRK Lack of Neutralize FM 7-100.1, 1-15 to
Technology Technological 1-16
Overmatch
DPRK Annihilation Allow no sanctuary FM 7-100.1, 1-17
Doctrine
DPRK Paramilitary Government DATE 2A, 2B, 2C, Role of Paramilitary FM 7-100.1, 1-20;
Forces Paramilitary Forces; 2D, 2E; RAFTE- & Irregular Forces in TC 7-100, 2-5; TC 7-
7 million reservists North Korea; Operations 100.2, 1-16
Paramilitary;
Reserve
DPRK Internal Internal Security DATE 2E; Internal Internal Security FM 7-100.1, 1-20 to
Security Forces Forces Security Forces 1-21
DPRK Centralized Centralized Planning FM 7-100.1, 2-2
Planning
DPRK Decentralized FM 7-100.1, 2-2

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 Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

Real-World Comparable Chapter/section/ Relevant Manual and

Condition Condition in word or phrase to Information in Page(s)
DATE search Threat Doctrine
Decentralized Execution
Execution
DPRK C2 Command & Control DATE 2A, 2B, 2C, Command & Control FM 7-100.1, 2-3; TC
2D, 2E; Command; Structures 7-100.2, 2-1 to 2-34
Control; C2
KPA Peacetime Army Overview; DATE 2A, 2B, 2C, Administrative Force FM 7-100.1, 2-6;
Structure Army Size & 2D, 2E; Force Structure TC 7-100.4, 2-1 to 2-
Structure; Order of Structure; Order of 20; TC 7-101, 3-6 to
Battle (OB) Battle; OB 3-11; TC 7-100.2, 1-
2 to 1-3
KPA Wartime Army Size & DATE 2A; 2B; 2E; Task-Organizing TC 7-100.4, 3-1 to 3-
Structure Structure Wartime Force 25 & Appendix B; TC
Structure 7-100, 6-1 to 6-8
KPA Strategic Strategic Forces DATE 2E; Rocket Integrated Fires FM 7-100.1, 2-14
Forces Rocket Command
Command
KPA General Rear Integrated Support FM 7-100.1, 2-17
Service Bureau Command
KPA “Two Front” Battlefield Geometry FM 7-100.1, 2-18 to
War 2-22
KPA Operations Operations & FM 7-100.1, 2-50
Security Information Security
KPA Offensive Army Doctrine & DATE 2A; 2E; Offensive Operations FM 7-100.1, 3-1 to 3-
Doctrine Tactics; Maneuver Offensive Doctrine; 28; TC 7-100.2, 3-1
Tactics; Maneuver to 3-43
KPA Defensive Army Doctrine & DATE 2A; Defensive Defensive FM 7-100.1, 4-1 to 4-
Doctrine Tactics Doctrine; Tactics Operations 28; TC 7-100.2, 4-1
to 4-35
DPRK INFOWAR INFOWAR DATE 2A, 2B, 2C, Information Warfare FM 7-100.1, 5-1 to 5-
2D, 2E INFOWAR; 18; TC 7-100, 3-5 to
Information Warfare 3-6, 5-1 to 5-2; TC 7-
101, 3-20 to 3-25;
TC 7-102, 1-5; 2-3,
3-4; TC 7-100.2, 7-1
to 7-16; IEA
KPA RISTA RISTA DATE 2A, 2B, 2C, Reconnaissance FM 7-100.1, 6-1 to 6-
2D, 2E; RISTA; 10; TC 7-100.2, 8-1
Reconnaissance to 8-18
KPA Fire Support Fire Support DATE 2A, 2B, 2C, Fire Support FM 7-100.1, 7-1 to 7-
Operations 2D, 2E; Fire Support; 17; TC 7-100.2, 9-1
Artillery; Close Air to 9-26
Support; CAS
KPAF Air Force Overview; DATE 2A, 2B, 2C, Aviation FM 7-100.1, 8-1 to 8-
Air Force Size & 2D, 2E; Air Force 14; TC 7-100.2, 10-1
Structure Structure to 10-31
KPN Naval Forces DATE 2A, 2B, 2C,
Overview; Navy Size 2D, 2E; Navy
& Structure Structure
KPAF Air Defense Air Defense DATE 2A, 2B, 2C, Air Defense Support FM 7-100.1, 9-1 to 9-
2D, 2E; Air Defense; 34, TC 7-100.2, 11-1
AD; ADA to 11-30

38 UNCLASSIFIED
 Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

Real-World Comparable Chapter/section/ Relevant Manual and

Condition Condition in word or phrase to Information in Page(s)
DATE search Threat Doctrine
KPA Emphasis on Protection DATE 2A, 2B, 2C, Camouflage, FM 7-100.1, 9-18
Camouflage 2D, 2E; Camouflage; Concealment, Cover,
Concealment; Cover; & Deception
Deception
KPA Engineering & Subterranean DATE 2A, 2B, 2E; Engineer Support FM 7-100.1, 10-1 to
Tunneling Environment Subterranean; 10-15; TC 7-101, 3-
Tunnel 26 to 3-30; TC 7-
102, 1-5; TC 7-
100.2, 12-1 to 12-32;
AWG Tunneling
Handbook
DPRK WMD Biological Weapons RAFTE-North Korea, CBRN and Smoke FM 7-100.1, 11-1 to
Threat Biological Operations 11-18; TC 7-100, 2-7
to 2-8; TC 7-100.2,
13-1 to 32
KPA Logistics Logistics; Defense DATE 2A, 2B, 2C, Logistics FM 7-100.1, 12-1 to
Industries; Lack of 2D, 2E; RAFTE- 12-22; TC 7-100.2,
motorized North Korea; 14-1 to 14-17
transportation Logistics; Supply
SPF Navy Doctrine & DATE 2A, 2E; Airborne, Special- FM 7-100.1, 13-1 to
Tactics; 25 SPF RAFTE-North Korea; Purpose Forces, & 13-20; TC 7-100.2,
Brigades Navy Doctrine; SPF Amphibious 15-1 to 15-34, 16-1
Operations to 16-12
KPA Weapons Army Equipment & DATE 2A, 2B, 2C, Equipment TC 7-100.4, 4-1 to 4-
Systems Weapons; Navy 2D, 2E; Equipment Operations/OPFOR 12; TC 7-101, 2-9 to
Equipment & Tier Levels 2-11
Weapons; Air Force
Equipment &
Weapons
Reverence of Kim Cult of Personality RAFTE-Pacific;
Family RAFTE-North Korea;
Personality Cult
Inexperienced Young dictator with RAFTE-Pacific;
Dictator no succession plan RAFTE-North Korea;
Dictator
Diplomacy by Nuclear weapons RAFTE-Pacific;
threat of WMB trump card RAFTE-North Korea;
Nuclear
Military First Sanjun RAFTE-North Korea;
Concept Sanjun
Preemptive Attack Attack first if they RAFTE-North Korea;
Doctrine feel threaten Preemptive Strike;
Surprise Attack

North Korean Weapons in the WEG

Real-World Weapon Type of Weapon WEG Location

39 UNCLASSIFIED
 Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

Real-World Weapon Type of Weapon WEG Location

Russian T-34/85 Main Battle Tank (MBT) Vol 1, Chapter 5
Russian T-54/T-55 MBT Vol 1, Chapter 5
Russian PT-76B Amphibious Tank Vol 1, Chapter 6
North Korean M1985 Light Tank Vol 1, Chapter 6
Chinese Type 63A Light Tank Vol 1, Chapter 6
Russian BRDM-2 Scout Car Vol 1, Chapter 6
Russian BTR-60PB Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Vol 1, Chapter 3
Russian BTR-80 APC Vol 1, Chapter 3
Russian BTR-80A APC Vol 1, Chapter 3
Russian BTR-152 APC Vol 1, Chapter 3
Chinese YW 531A/531C APC Vol 1, Chapter 3
North Korean VTT-323 APC Vol 1, Chapter 3
Russian BMP-1 Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) Vol 1, Chapter 3
Russian BMP-1P IFV Vol 1, Chapter 3
North Korean M1978 & M1989 170-mm Self Propelled (SP) Gun (Koksan) Vol 1, Chapter 7
Russian M-46 130-mm Towed Gun Vol 1, Chapter 7
100/120-mm Mortars Vol 1, Chapter 7
Russian 2S9-1 120-mm SP Combination Gun Vol 1, Chapter 7
Russian M-37 82-mm Mortar Vol 1, Chapter 7
Russian 9P140 220-mm Multiple Rocket Launcher System (MRLS) Vol 1, Chapter 7
Russian 9A51/PRIMA 122-mm MRLS Vol 1, Chapter 7
Russian BM-21 122-mm MRLS Vol 1, Chapter 7
Chinese Type 63 107-mm MRLS Vol 1, Chapter 7
Russian B-11 107-mm Recoilless Gun Vol 1, Chapter 6
Russian B-10 82-mm Recoilless Gun Vol 1, Chapter 6
Russian D-44 85-mm Towed Anti-Tank (AT) Gun Vol 1, Chapter 6
Russian Malyutka-2 Anti-Tank (AT)-3 Sagger Anti-Tank Gun Missile (ATGM) Vol 1, Chapter 6
Launcher
Russian 9P135 (9K111) AT-4 Spigot ATGM Vol 1, Chapter 6
Russian 9P148 AT-5 Spandrel ATGM Vol 1, Chapter 6
Russian KS-19M2 100-mm Towed Anti-Aircraft (AA) Gun Vol 2, Chapter 6
Russian ZSU-57-2 57-mm SP AA Gun Vol 2, Chapter 6
Russian S-60 57-mm Towed AA Gun Vol 2, Chapter 6

40 UNCLASSIFIED
 Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

Real-World Weapon Type of Weapon WEG Location

Russian M-1939 37-mm Towed AA Gun Vol 2, Chapter 6
Chinese Type 65 37-mm Towed AA Gun Vol 2, Chapter 6
Russian ZSU-23-4 23-mm SP AA Gun Vol 2, Chapter 6
Russian ZU-23 23-mm Towed AA Gun Vol 2, Chapter 6
Russian ZPU-4 14.5-mm Heavy Machine Gun (MG) Vol 2, Chapter 6
Russian SA-3 Surface to Air (SA) Goa Missile Vol 2, Chapter 6
Russian S-200V SA-5B Gammon SA Missile Vol 2, Chapter 6
Russian 9K32M (Strela-2M) SA-7B Grail SA Missile Vol 2, Chapter 6
Russian S-300-M SA-10B Grumble SA Missile Vol 2, Chapter 6
Russian S-300PMU1 SA-20A Gargoyle SA Missile Vol 2, Chapter 6
Russian 9K35M3 (Strela- SA-13B Gopher SA Missile Vol 2, Chapter 6
10M3)
Russian 9K34 (Strela-3) SA-14 Gremlin SA Missile Vol 2, Chapter 6
Russian 9K310 (Ingla-1) SA-16 Gimlet SA Missile Vol 2, Chapter 6
Russian 9K38 (Igla) SA-18 Grouse SA Missile Vol 2, Chapter 6
US FIM-92 Stinger SA Missile Vol 2, Chapter 6
Russian Scud-B/C Surface to Surface (SS) Missile Vol 2, Chapter 5
North Korean Nodong-1/2 SS Missile Vol 2, Chapter 5
Chinese H-5 Beagle Light Bomber Vol 2, Chapter 3
Russian Su-17 Fitter Close Air Support (CAS) Aircraft Vol 2, Chapter 3
Russian Su-25tm & Su-39 Frogfoot Multi-Role Attack Aircraft Vol 2, Chapter 3
Chinese F-6 Farmer Fighter Vol 2, Chapter 3
Russian MiG-29 Fulcrum Multi-Role Fighter Vol 2, Chapter 3
Russian MiG-23 Flogger Multi-Role Fighter Vol 2, Chapter 3
Russian MiG-21 Fishbed Multi-Role Fighter Vol 2, Chapter 3
Chinese J-7 Fishbed Fighter Vol 2, Chapter 3
Russian An-2 Colt Transport Aircraft Vol 2, Chapter 3
Russian Il-18 Coot Transport Aircraft Vol 2, Chapter 3
Russian Shmel-1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Vol 2, Chapter 4
Russian Pchela-1K UAV Vol 2, Chapter 4
Russian Mi-2 Hoplite Medium Multi-Role Helicopter Vol 2, Chapter 2
Russian Mi-24/35 Hind Attack Helicopter Vol 2, Chapter 2
US MD-500MD Defender Light Helicopter Vol 2, Chapter 2

41 UNCLASSIFIED
 Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

Real-World Weapon Type of Weapon WEG Location

Russian Mi-8 Hip-C Multi-Role Helicopter Vol 2, Chapter 2
Russian AA-2 Atoll Air-To-Air (AA) Missile Vol 2, Chapter 2
Russian AA-7 Apex AA Missile Vol 2, Chapter 2
Russian AA-8 Aphid AA Missile Vol 2, Chapter 2
Russian AA-10 Alamo AA Missile Vol 2, Chapter 2
Russian AA-11 Archer AA Missile Vol 2, Chapter 2 & 3
Chinese Pl-5 Thunderbolt AA Missile Vol 2, Chapter 2
Russian Volga-75SM Guideline SA Missile Vol 2, Chapter 2
SANG-O Coastal Infiltration Submarine Vol 3, Chapter 3
North Korean SOJU Guided Missile Patrol Craft Vol 3, Chapter 3
North Korean SOHUNG Guided Missile Patrol Craft Vol 3, Chapter 3
Chinese HUANGFENG Fast Attack Missile Craft Vol 3, Chapter 3
North Korean Infiltration Landing Craft Vol 3, Chapter 3
Semisubmersible
Russian 4K40 Surface-To-Surface (Anti-Ship) Missile Vol 3, Chapter 1
Indian/Russian BrahMos Supersonic Cruise (Anti-Ship) Missile Vol 3, Chapter 5

42 UNCLASSIFIED
 Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

Legend for Tactical Diagrams

This legend presents the military symbols, mission task symbols, and control measures from a threats
perspective as used in the tactical diagrams in this report. The primary adversary or enemy is presented
in the color blue.

43 UNCLASSIFIED
 Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

POCs

Author
H. David Pendleton
913-684-7946 (COMM)
552-7946 (DSN)

TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element Threats Integration (ACE-TI)

803 Harrison Drive, BLDG 467
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

Jon Cleaves, ACE-TI Director

Jennifer Dunn, ACE-TI Deputy Director
Jon Moilanen, ACE-TI Operations
Angela Wilkins, ACE-TI Product Integration

Note: Not all references listed in this publication are readily available to the public; some require
a government common access card (CAC) to view.

References
Agence France-Presse (AFP). “US reconnaissance plane under jamming attack: aide.” 9 September 2011.
Ashdown, Neil, Nick Hansen, and Sean O’Connor. “Stability in North Korea? Assessing the impact of recent elections.” Janes.
June 2014.
Associated Press (AP). “N. Korea fires artillery onto St. Korean Island; 2 dead.” USA Today. 23 November 2010.
Bechtol, Bruce E. Jr. “South Korea: Responding to the North Korean Threat.” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research (AEI). November 2013.
Bolton, John R. “How little we know about North Korea.” AEO. 23 October 2014.
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). “North Korea issues mobile phone etiquette guidelines.” 29 September 2014.
Bruner, Edward F. “North Korean Crisis: Possible Military Options.” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 29 July
2003.
The Brookings Institution, “Beyond Official North Korea: A British Diplomat’s Observations of Daily Life,” 25 June 2012.
Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). “Record of North Korea’s Major Conventional Provocations since 1960s.” 25
May 2010.
Congressional Research Service (CRS).
Eberstadt, Nicholas. “North Korea could be in store for a purge – and destabilization.” AEI. 13 December 2013.
Eberstadt, Nicholas. “North Korea merry-go-round.” AEI. 9 October 2014.
Eberstadt, Nicholas. “Time for the ‘never agains’ on North Korea.” AEI. 18 February 2014.
Fillingham, Zachary. “An Opaque North Korean Power Struggle.” Geopolitical Monitor. 30 December 2013.
Ford, Roger. “The Gatefold Book of Tanks.” Barnes & Noble Books. 1998.
Foss, Christopher F. “Tanks and Combat Vehicles Recognition Guide.” Jane’s. 2000.
Friedman, George. “Ferocious, Weak and Crazy: The North Korean Strategy.” STRATFOR.
Gallagher, Sean. “North Korea pumps up the GPS jamming in week-long attack.” ARS Technica. 9 May 2012.
Gause, Ken. “Leadership Transition in North Korea.” Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). January 2012.
Hewlett-Packard (HP) Security Research. “Profiling an enigma: The mystery of North Korea’s cyber threat landscape.” August
2014.

44 UNCLASSIFIED
 Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

Hickey, Walter. “Cyber War: North Korea Is Getting Dangerously Good At Knocking Out Networks.” Business Insider. 8 June
2012.
Hogg, Chris. “Two South Korean civilians died in attack by North.” British Broadcasting System (BBC). 24 November 2010.
Hui, Ma Tong. “Reunification of Korea is a Major Security Issue on the Korean Peninsula: The North Korean Perspective,”
Institute for Security and Development Policy, October 2010.
Jane’s Amphibious and Special Forces. “Country Overview.” [Korea, North] 17 December 2012.
Jane’s Amphibious and Special Forces. “Sea Lift.” [North Korea] 17 December 2012.
Jane’s Defence Weekly, “Briefing: Korean Armed Forces Capabilities: North/South Divide,” Page 30-32.
Jane’s Intelligence Weekly. “Changed Reactor – North Korea’s nuclear expansion.” 29 August 2013.
Jane’s Intelligence Weekly. “North Korea replaces armed forces minister.” 14 May 2013.
Jane’s Missiles & Rockets. “Unha-3 launches North Korea’s first satellite.” 12 December 2012.
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment. “Korea, North > Demography.” 28 August 2014.
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment. “Korea, North > Economy.” 28 August 2014.
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment. “Korea, North > Executive Summary.” 28 August 2014.
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment. “Korea, North > Infrastructure.” 28 August 2014.
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment. “Korea, North > Natural Resources.” 28 August 2014.
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment. “Korea, North > Non-State Armed Groups.” 28 August 2014.
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment. “Korea, North > Procurement.” 1 September 2014.
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment. “Strategic Weapon Systems.” [Korea, North] 23 July 2014.
Jane’s World Air Forces. “North Korea – Air Force.” 9 April 2014.
Kim, Sung Han. “The Future of North Korea.” Center for Strategic & International Studies. 4 November 2014.
Military Periscope. “Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions: Asia – North Korea: State Dept. Travel Reports.” 3 November 2011.
Newser. “North Korea: Yes, We have Labor Camps.” 8 October 2014.
Next Government. “North Korean GPS Jamming Update.” 10 May 2012.
North Korea Tech, “GPS jamming ends, says report.” 16 May 2012.
North Korea Tech. “Pyongyang denies GPS jamming.” 19 May 2012.
North Korea Tech. “Report: DPRK again jams GPS signals.” 7 March 2011.
North Korea Tech. “Report: Stronger GPS jammer developed.” 11 September 2011.
Oh, Dongdan. “Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula.” Institut für Strategic-Politik-Sicherheits-und
Wirtschaftsberatung, Berlin, 11 February 2011.
Phneah, Ellyne. “South Korea to beef up GPS surveillance system.” 10 April 2013.
Physorg.com. “North Korea upgrades jamming devices: report.” 6 September 2011.
Sanger, David E. and Nicole Perlroth. “U.S. Said to Find North Korea Ordered Cyberattack on Sony.” The New York Times. 17
December 2014.
Sieff, Martin. “Hardline Hwang Pyong-so is North Korea’s second in command.” Asia Pacific Defense (APD) Forum. 28 May 2014.
Sieff, Martin. “Kim Jong-un purges more officials, cracks down on soap operas.” APD Forum. 7 November 2014.
STRATFOR. “China’s Response to the Yeonpyeong Barrage.” 30 November 2010.
STRATFOR. “Deciphering North Korea’s Provocations.” 24 November 2010.
STRATFOR. “South Korea’s Tougher Approach to North Korean Provocations.” 29 November 2010.
Sungwon, Baik. “Exclusive: North Korea Denies Involvement in Cyber-attack on Sony Pictures.” Voice of America (VOA). 4
December 2014.
United States Army, Eighth United States Army (Rear), “Technical Memorandum ORO-T-64 (AFSE), UN Partisan Warfare in
Korea, 1951-9854 (U), 19 September 1956.
United States Department of State (DOS). “Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments: Korea, North.” 25
September 2014.
US DOS. “Human Rights.” [North Korea]. Undated.
US Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, “North Korea Country Handbook,” May 1997.
Voice of America (VOA). “North Korea Appears Capable of Jamming GPS Receivers.” 6 October 2010.

Diagram Credits
Figure 1. North Korean military installations and runways. Numbers correspond with the map numbers under Section 4, Military
Organizations, below. Map from CIA, modified by TRISA, 17 June 2015.

45 UNCLASSIFIED
 Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

Figure 2. Building blocks of KPA tactical doctrine. Adapted from COL James M. Minnich from his book, The North Korean
People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, 2005, p 66. Modified by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats, 17 June 2015.
Figure 3. KPA Division encirclement movement (dispersed attack) of an enemy brigade defensive position. Adapted from COL
James M. Minnich from his book, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, 2005, pp 86-87. Modified
by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats, 17 June 2015.
Figure 4. KPA Thrust Attack (Attack to Gain Freedom of Movement) of an enemy strop point). Adapted from COL James M.
Minnich from his book, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics 2005, pp 82-83. Modified by TRADOC
G-2 ACE Threats, 17 June 2015.
Figure 5. KPA Anti-Tank Defensive System (Maneuver Defense). Adapted from COL James M. Minnich from his book, The North
Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, 2005, pp 93-99. Modified by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats, 17 June 2015.
Figure 6. KPA Battalion Anti-Tank Defense Position (Area Defense). Adapted from COL James M. Minnich from his book, The
North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, 2005, pp 96-97. Modified by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats, 17 June
2015.

Endnotes

1 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,”
Annual Report to Congress, p 1, 2013.
2 Voice of America (VOA), “North Korea Clarifies Political Role of Kim Jong Un’s Sister,” 26 November 2014; Scott Smith, “Kim

Jong Un’s little sister named to top leadership post in North Korea,” United Press International (UPI), 28 November 2014;
North Korea Leadership Watch, “Kim Yo Jong,” 10 March 2014; BBC, “Timeline: North Korean attacks,” 1 April 2013; Troy
P. Krause, “Countering North Korean Special Purpose Forces,” pp 3-4, Air Command and Staff College, Air University,
Maxwell Air Force Base AL, April 1999; KJ Won and Hilary Whiteman, “North Korea publicly executes defense chief, South
Korean spy agency says,” CNN, 13 May 2015.
3 North Korea Leadership Watch, “Kim Jong Un,” Undated; BBC, “Profile: Kim Jong-un,” 14 October 2014.
4 Steve Herman, “Secret Manual Gives Glimpse of North Korean Military Tactics,” VOA, 18 September 2010; STRATFOR,

“Dispatch: Korea’s Refocusing Policy Postures,” 18 November 2010; Charles Scanlon, “North Korea: Past lessons will affect
the next move,” 4 April 2013.
5 Vincent R. Stewart, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment,” Defense Intelligence Agency Director to the

Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives, 3 February 2015; Office of the Secretary of Defense,
“Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” Annual Report to Congress, p
6, 2013; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014; Associated Press (AP),
“Chronology of North Korea’s missile program,” The Las Vegas Sun, 15 March 2012; NewsmaxWorld, “SKorea: NKorea Can
Launch Nuclear-Tipped Missiles,” 3 September 2013; Homer Hodge, “North Korea’s Military Strategy,” Parameters, pp 68-
81, Spring 2003, Nautilus DPRK Briefing Book; James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current
Tactics” Naval Institute Press, 2005, pp 68-69.
6 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea,” Annual Report to Congress, pp 6-7, 2013; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “North Korea – Strategic Weapons
Systems,” 23 July 2014.
7 Frank L. Goldstein and Frank E. Emmett, “A Psychological Perspective on the People within the Democratic People’s Republic

of Korea (DPRK),” 18 April 2004.

8 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “North Korea – Internal Affairs,” 28 August 2014; Julian Ryall, “Kim Jong-un’s aunt died of

stroke during ‘heated argument on phone with leader,” The Telegraph, 1 December 2014; Chris Irvine, “Rare images show
Kim Jong-un’s uncle being dragged away,” The Telegraph, 9 December 2013; Christolf Lehmann, “North Korea’s Execution
of Jang Song Taek, Peace in the Korean Peninsula and National Sovereignty,” NSBC International, 13 December 2013;
North Korea Leadership Watch, “Jang Song Taek Dies By Execution,” 13 December 2013; Choe Sang Hun and David E.
Sanger, “Korea Execution Is Tied to Clash Over Businesses,” The New York Times, 23 December 2013; North Korea
Leadership Watch, “Jang Song Taek,” 28 January 2011; Benjamin Kang Lim, “Exclusive: North Korea’s military to share
power with Kim’s heir,” Reuters, 21 December 2011; BBC, “What is known about North Korea’s brutal purge?,” 13

46 UNCLASSIFIED
 Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

December 2013; BBC, “What does purge say about North Korea’s stability?,” 12 December 2013; BBC, “Profile: Chang
Song-thaek,” 12 December 2013.
9 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea,

North > Army,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Air Force,” 1 September 2014;
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Navy,” 1 September 2014; Central Intelligence Agency, “Chiefs of
State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments: Korea, North – NDE,” 25 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security
Assessment, “North Korea – Internal Affairs,” 28 August 2014; Victor Cha, “North Korea’s Saturday Surprise at the Asian
Games,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 6 October 2014; Dana Ford, “North Korea says leader has
reappeared,” CNN, 15 October 2014; Choe Sang Hun, “North Korea Chief Walks Minus Cane,” The New York Times, 5
November 2014; Hyung Jin Kim and Foster Klug, “Top North Korea Officials Make Rare Visit to South Korea,” AP via
Huffington Post, 6 October 2014; Michael Madden, “Kim Jong Un’s Pyongyang Shuffle, 38 North, 5 April 2013; Martin Sieff,
“Hardliner Hwang Pyong So is North Korea’s second in command,” APD Forum, 28 May 2014; James Pearson and Jack Kim,
“North Korea Official Hwang Pyong So Rises Ranks Amid Speculation Over Kim,” The World Post, 14 October 2014; Hot Air,
“O Kuk-ryol: The Power Behind the Throne,” 3 June 2009; Elites et economie de la Coree du Nord, “O Kuk Ryol: The Old
Guard Never Dies,” 11 April 2013; North Korea Leadership Watch, “VMAR Ri Yong Mu,” Undated; North Korea Leadership
Watch, “Gen. Choe Pu Il,” 27 September 2013; North Korea Leadership Watch, “Gen. Hyon Yong Chol,” 25 June 2014; AP,
“Hyong Yong Chol Named North Korea’s New Military Chief,” The World Post, 16 July 2012; Brian Kim, “Hyon Yong Chol,”
CSIS, Undated; Fortuna’s Corner, “The New Face in the North Korean Regime,” 11 April 2014; North Korea Leadership
Watch, “Pak To Chun,” 14 August 2013; North Korea Leadership Watch, “Gen. Kim Won Hong,” 12 April 2012; North Korea
Leadership Watch, “Ri Yong Mu,” Undated; The Chosunilbo, “N.Korean Military in Crisis,” 18 July 2012.
10 Vincent R. Stewart, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment,” Defense Intelligence Agency Director to the

Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives, 3 February 2015; Hewlett-Packard Development
Company, “Profiling an enigma: The mystery of North Korea’s cyber threat landscape,” HP Security Briefing, Episode 16,
August 2014, Page 3-4; United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) The World Factbook. “North Korea.” 20 June 2014;
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “North Korea – External Affairs,” 28 August 2014.
11 Central Intelligence Agency, “Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments: Korea, North – NDE,” 25

September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > External Affairs,” 28 August 2014.
12 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Security,” 28 August 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea,

North > External Affairs,” 28 August 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “North Korea – Strategic Weapons
Systems,” 23 July 2014: Foster Klug, “A Look at North Korea’s Global Weapons Business,” AP via The Irrawaddy, 18 July
2013; Tim Johnson, “Panama: Cuban weapons aboard North Korean ship part of ‘major deal’,” The Christian Science
Monitor, 11 October 2013; AFP, “N. Korea shipped missile parts to Syria: media,” 14 Google News, November 2012; Global
Security, “North Korea Selling Missiles in Asia, Middle East: U.N. Report,” 17 May 2011.
13 US Library of Congress Federal Research Division, “Area Handbook Series: North Korea—A Country Study,”2008, pp 247, 252-

253; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Defence Budget,” 1 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security
Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Military Periscope, “Nations/Alliances/Geographic Areas: Asia –
North Korea: Overview,” 1 September 2014.
14 US Library of Congress Federal Research Division, “Area Handbook Series: North Korea—A Country Study,”2008, p 247;

Vincent R. Stewart, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment,” Defense Intelligence Agency Director to
the Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives, 3 February 2015; Jane’s Sentinel Security
Assessment, “Korea, North > Security,” 28 August 2014; Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), “Annual Threat Assessment,”
[North Korea], 11 February 2014; Association of the United States Army (AUSA), “The U.S. Army in Korea,” August 2014;
Homer Hodge, “North Korea’s Military Strategy,” Parameters, pp 68-81, Spring 2003, Nautilus DPRK Briefing Book.
15 Military Periscope, “Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions: Asia – North Korea: Army,” September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel

Security Assessment, “Strategic Weapons Systems,” 23 July 2014.

16 Military Periscope, “Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions: Asia – North Korea: Army,” September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel

Security Assessment, “Strategic Weapons Systems,” 23 July 2014.

17 US Library of Congress Federal Research Division, “Area Handbook Series: North Korea—A Country Study,”2008, pp 249-252;

Military Periscope, “Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions: Asia – North Korea: Army,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel
Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North >
Army,” 1 September 2014; The Chonsunilbo, “N Korean Elite Sniper Defects,” 16 November 2011; Troy P. Krause,

47 UNCLASSIFIED
 Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

“Countering North Korean Special Purpose Forces,” pp 12-18, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air
Force Base AL, April 1999.
18 Military Periscope, “Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions: Asia – North Korea: Army,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel

Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North >
Army,” 1 September 2014.
19 US Library of Congress Federal Research Division, “Area Handbook Series: North Korea—A Country Study,”2008, pp 254-257;

Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Security and Foreign Forces,” 28 August 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security
Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014.
20 Military Periscope, “Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions: Asia – North Korea: Air Force,” September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel

Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Air Force,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s World Air Forces, “North Korea – Air Force,” 9
April 2014.
21 Military Periscope, “Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions: Asia – North Korea: Air Force,” September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel

Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Air Force,” 1 September 2014.

22 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Air Force,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s World Air Forces, “North Korea –

Air Force,” 9 April 2014; Jane’s World Air Forces, “North Korea – Air Force,” 9 April 2014.
23 Military Periscope, “Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions: Asia – North Korea: Navy,” September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel

Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Navy,” 1 September 2014; David Axe, “North Korea Preps Hovercraft Assault Force,”
Danger Room, 3 February 2011; The Inquisitr, “Two North Korean Submarines Allegedly Missing,” 16 April 2013.
24 Vincent R. Stewart, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment,” Defense Intelligence Agency Director to the

Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives, 3 February 2015; Military Periscope,
“Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions: Asia – North Korea: Navy,” September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,
“Korea, North > Navy,” 1 September 2014: The Washington Free Beacon, “U.S. Commander in Korea Leads Secret Strategy
Session,” 26 January 2015; Raf Sanchez, “Here’s What We Know About What North Korea Can Hit,” The Telegraph, 30
March 2013; BBC, “North Korea threats: Missile defences in the region,” 5 April 2013; BBC, “How potent are North Korea’s
threats,” 2 April 2013.
25 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Military Periscope,

“Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions: Asia – North Korea: Navy,” September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,
“Korea, North > Navy,” 1 September 2014.
26 Frank L. Goldstein and Frank E. Emmett, “A Psychological Perspective on the People within the Democratic People’s Republic

of Korea (DPRK),” 18 April 2004; Association of the United States Army (AUSA), “The U.S. Army in Korea,” August 2014.
27 Paul Szoldra and Geoffrey Ingersoll, “North Korea’s Fighter Fleet is Full of Decrepit Russian MiG 21s,” Business Insider, 2 April

2013; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security
Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014.
28 Vincent R. Stewart, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment,” Defense Intelligence Agency Director to the

Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives, 3 February 2015; US Library of Congress Federal
Research Division, “Area Handbook Series: North Korea—A Country Study,”2008, p 247; Association of the United States
Army (AUSA), “The U.S. Army in Korea,” August 2014; BBC, “North Korea’s missile programme,” 17 June 2014.
29 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,

“Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014; Steve Herman, “Secret Manual Gives Glimpse of North Korean Military Tactics,”
VOA, 18 September 2010.
30 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,

“Korea, North > Navy,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Air Force,” 1 September
2014; Steve Herman, “Secret Manual Gives Glimpse of North Korean Military Tactics,” VOA, 18 September 2010; James M.
Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,
PP 5-7.
31 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, pp 73-74; James

M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth
KS, pp 10.
32 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, pp 68-69.
33 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “North

Korea – Strategic Weapons Systems,” 23 July 2014; Association of the United States Army (AUSA), “The U.S. Army in

48 UNCLASSIFIED
 Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

Korea,” August 2014; James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute
Press, 2005, pp 68-69.
34 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,

“Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014; Troy P. Krause, “Countering North Korean Special Purpose Forces,” p 1, Air
Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base AL, April 1999.
35 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, p 75; James M.

Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,
pp 10.
36 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, p 75; James M.

Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,
PP 10.
37 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, p 76; James M.

Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,
PP 10.
38 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, pp 75-76; James

M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth
KS, PP 10.
39 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,

“Korea, North > Navy,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “North Korea – Strategic Weapons
Systems,” 23 July 2014; James R. Holmes, “Anti-Access on the Korean Peninsula,” The Diplomat, 30 October 2012.
40 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,

“Korea, North > Navy,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014;
Steve Herman, “Secret Manual Gives Glimpse of North Korean Military Tactics,” VOA, 18 September 2010.
41 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,

“Korea, North > Navy,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014;
Steve Herman, “Secret Manual Gives Glimpse of North Korean Military Tactics,” VOA, 18 September 2010; James M.
Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,
PP 9-11.
42 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics” Naval Institute Press, 2005, pp 79-87;

James M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort
Leavenworth KS, PP 9-15; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel
Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Navy,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North >
Army,” 1 September 2014; Steve Herman, “Secret Manual Gives Glimpse of North Korean Military Tactics,” VOA, 18
September 2010.
43 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, pp 80-82; James

M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth
KS, PP 11-12.
44 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, pp 82-83; James

M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth
KS, PP 12-13.
45 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, pp 83-84; James

M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth
KS, p 13.
46 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, p 84; James M.

Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,
pp 13-14.
47 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, pp 84-85; James

M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth
KS, p 14.
48 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, pp 85-86; James

M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth
KS, pp 14-15.

49 UNCLASSIFIED
 Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

49 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, pp 86-87; James
M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth
KS, p 15.
50 James M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort

Leavenworth KS, PP 10; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel
Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Navy,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North >
Army,” 1 September 2014; Steve Herman, “Secret Manual Gives Glimpse of North Korean Military Tactics,” VOA, 18
September 2010; James M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff
College, Fort Leavenworth KS, PP 9-11.
51 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,

“Korea, North > Navy,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014;
Steve Herman, “Secret Manual Gives Glimpse of North Korean Military Tactics,” VOA, 18 September 2010; James M.
Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,
pp 9-11.
52 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,

“Korea, North > Navy,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014;
Steve Herman, “Secret Manual Gives Glimpse of North Korean Military Tactics,” VOA, 18 September 2010; James M.
Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,
pp 9-11.
53 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,

“Korea, North > Navy,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014;
Steve Herman, “Secret Manual Gives Glimpse of North Korean Military Tactics,” VOA, 18 September 2010; James M.
Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,
pp 9-11.
54 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,

“Korea, North > Navy,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014;
Steve Herman, “Secret Manual Gives Glimpse of North Korean Military Tactics,” VOA, 18 September 2010; James M.
Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,
pp 9-11; BBC, “North Korea: New camouflage for biplane fleet,” 7 April 2015.
55 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,

“Korea, North > Navy,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014;
Steve Herman, “Secret Manual Gives Glimpse of North Korean Military Tactics,” VOA, 18 September 2010; James M.
Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,
pp 9-11 & 23.
56 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,

“Korea, North > Navy,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014;
Steve Herman, “Secret Manual Gives Glimpse of North Korean Military Tactics,” VOA, 18 September 2010; James M.
Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,
pp 9-11.
57 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,

“Korea, North > Navy,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014;
Steve Herman, “Secret Manual Gives Glimpse of North Korean Military Tactics,” VOA, 18 September 2010; James M.
Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,
pp 9-11.
58 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,

“Korea, North > Navy,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014;
Steve Herman, “Secret Manual Gives Glimpse of North Korean Military Tactics,” VOA, 18 September 2010; James M.
Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,
pp 9-11; James M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort
Leavenworth KS, PP 9-11.
59 Department of the Army, “TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics,” Approved Final Draft, August 2011, pp 3-13 to 3-16; James M.

Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,

50 UNCLASSIFIED
 Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

pp 11-15; James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, pp
86-87.
60 Department of the Army, “TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics,” Approved Final Draft, August 2011, pp 3-13 to 3-16; James M.

Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,
pp 13-15;
61 Department of the Army, “TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics,” Approved Final Draft, August 2011, pp 3-13 to 3-16.
62 Department of the Army, “TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics,” Approved Final Draft, August 2011, pp 3-13 to 3-16; James M.

Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,
p 15.
63 Department of the Army, “TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics,” Approved Final Draft, August 2011, pp 3-13 to 3-16; James M.

Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,
pp 5-7, 11-15; Homer Hodge, “North Korea’s Military Strategy,” Parameters, pp 72-73, Spring 2003, Nautilus DPRK Briefing
Book.
64 James M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort

Leavenworth KS, pp 12-13; Department of the Army, “TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics,” Approved Final Draft, August
2011, pp 3-9 to 3-13 .
65 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, pp 82-83; James

M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth
KS, pp 12-13; Department of the Army, “TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics,” Approved Final Draft, August 2011, pp 3-9 to
3-13
66 James M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort

Leavenworth KS, pp 12-13, 29; Department of the Army, “TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics,” Approved Final Draft,
August 2011, pp 3-9 to 3-13.
67 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, pp 93-99; James

M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth
KS, p 19; Department of the Army, “TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics,” Approved Final Draft, August 2011, pp 4-10 to 4-
14.
68 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, pp 93-94; James

M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth
KS, p 19-20.
69 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, pp 94-96; James

M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth
KS, p 19-20.
70 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, p 96; James M.

Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,
p 19, 20-21.
71 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, pp 96-97;

James M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort
Leavenworth KS, p 19, 22.
72 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, pp 97-98; James

M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth
KS, p 19, 22-23.
73 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, p 99; James M.

Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,
p 19, 23.
74 James M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort

Leavenworth KS, p 19, 23.

75 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, p 96; James M.

Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,
pp 19, 21-23; Department of the Army, “TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics,” Approved Final Draft, August 2011, pp 4-14
to 4-18.

51 UNCLASSIFIED
 Threat Tactics Report: North Korea

76 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005, p 96; James M.
Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,” September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS,
pp 19, 21-23.
77 Military Factory, “Pokpung-ho (Storm Tiger) (M2002) Main Battle Tank (1992),” Military Factory, 27 January 2014; Jung Sung-

Ki, “S. Korea Studies North’s New Battle Tank,” Defense News, 17 August 2010; David Isenberg, “North Korea rolls out new
tank,” Asia Times Online, 6 July 2002.
78 US Library of Congress Federal Research Division, “Area Handbook Series: North Korea—A Country Study,”2008, pp 247-249;

Military Periscope, “Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions: Asia – North Korea: Army,” September 2014, September 2014.
79 US Library of Congress Federal Research Division, “Area Handbook Series: North Korea—A Country Study,”2008, pp 252-253;

Military Periscope, “Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions: Asia – North Korea: Air Force,” September 2014; Periscope,
“Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions: Asia – North Korea: Air Force,” September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security
Assessment, “Korea, North > Air Force,” 1 September 2014.
80 US Library of Congress Federal Research Division, “Area Handbook Series: North Korea—A Country Study,”2008, pp 253-254;

Periscope, “Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions: Asia – North Korea: Navy,” September 2014

81 Periscope, “Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions: Asia – North Korea: Air Force,” September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security

Assessment, “Korea, North > Air Force,” 1 September 2014.

82 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014.
83 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014.
84 Vincent R. Stewart, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment,” Defense Intelligence Agency Director to the

Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives, 3 February 2015; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,
“Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September
2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “North Korea – Strategic Weapons Systems,” 23 July 2014.
85 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; James M. Minnich, “North Korean Tactics,”

September 2001, United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS, pp 28-30.
86 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014.
87 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,

“Korea, North > Navy,” 1 September 2014.

88 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,

“Korea, North > Security,” 28 August 2014; Jason Miks, “North Korea Gets Military Trucks,” The Diplomat, 24 August 2011.
89 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014.
90 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Armed Forces,” 2 July 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment,

“Korea, North > Air Force,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September
2014; Jane’s World Air Forces, “North Korea – Air Force,” 9 April 2014.
91 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Air Force,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s World Air Forces, “North Korea –

Air Force,” 9 April 2014; Military Periscope, “Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions: Asia – North Korea: Army,” September
2014.
92 BBC, “Timeline: North Korean attacks,” 1 April 2013.
93 Association of the United States Army (AUSA), “The U.S. Army in Korea,” August 2014; Bill Gertz, “North Korea Flight Tests

New Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile,” Free Beacon, 18 February 2015.

52 UNCLASSIFIED