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POLITICAL STUDIES: 2012

doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00962.x

Democracy and Legitimacy in the European

Union Revisited: Input, Output and ‘Throughput’ post_962 1..21

Vivien A. Schmidt
Boston University

Scholars of the European Union have analyzed the EU’s legitimacy mainly in terms of two normative criteria: output
effectiveness for the people and input participation by the people. This article argues that missing from this
theorization is what goes on in the ‘black box’ of governance between input and output, or ‘throughput’. Throughput
consists of governance processes with the people, analyzed in terms of their efficacy, accountability, transparency,
inclusiveness and openness to interest consultation. This article defines and discusses this third normative criterion as
well as the interaction effects of all three normative criteria. It does so by considering EU scholars’ institutional and
constructivist analyses of EU legitimacy as well as empirical cases of and proposed solutions to the EU’s democracy
problems. The article also suggests that unlike input and output, which affect public perceptions of legitimacy both
when they are increased or decreased, throughput tends to be most salient when negative, because oppressive,
incompetent, corrupt or biased practices throw not just throughput but also input and output into question.

Keywords: input legitimacy; output legitimacy; throughput legitimacy; European Union;

democracy

Is the European Union democratically legitimate? This question has been hotly debated at
least since the early 1990s (e.g., Beetham and Lord, 1998; Follesdal, 2006; Hix, 2008; Lord,
2004; Majone, 1998; Moravcsik, 2002; Scharpf, 1999; Schmidt, 2006; Williams, 1991).
Democratic theorists tend to divide not only on their positive or negative responses to the
question but also on the normative criteria by which to evaluate legitimacy.While certain
theorists focus primarily on the quality of what goes on inside EU governance, such as
questions of authorization, representation and accountability (Beetham and Lord, 1998),
others are more concerned with the quality of what goes in or comes out of EU
governance, judging legitimacy primarily on the basis of policy outcomes (e.g., Caporaso
and Tarrow, 2008; Majone, 1998; Menon and Weatherill, 2008; Moravcsik, 2002) or on
citizens’ active participation and deliberation (e.g., Bellamy and Castiglione, 2003; Hix,
2008). These latter two normative criteria for evaluation are our focus here. They have long
been discussed in the language of systems theory, starting with Fritz Scharpf (1970), who
divided democratic legitimation into output, judged in terms of the effectiveness of the EU’s
policy outcomes for the people, and input, judged in terms of the EU’s responsiveness to
citizen concerns as a result of participation by the people. Missing from this theorization of
democratic legitimacy in the EU, this article will argue, is a third normative criterion for
evaluation: throughput. Throughput legitimacy builds upon yet another term from systems
theory, and is judged in terms of the efficacy, accountability and transparency of the EU’s
governance processes along with their inclusiveness and openness to consultation with the
people.
The article seeks to show that the quality of the governance processes, and not only the
effectiveness of the outcomes and the participation of the citizenry, is an important criterion
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for the evaluation of a polity’s overall democratic legitimacy. In the case of the European
Union, moreover, attention to the mechanisms of ‘throughput’ legitimacy, that is, to the
efficacy, accountability, openness and inclusiveness of the governance processes, has not only
been increasing among scholars but has long been among the central ways in which
EU-level institutional players have sought to counter claims about the poverty of input
legitimacy and to reinforce claims to output legitimacy. The purpose of this article,
however, is not to attempt to evaluate the EU’s empirical legitimacy against these normative
standards or to make an argument one way or another about the EU’s purported demo-
cratic deficit. Rather, it seeks systematically to conceptualize a new evaluative standard for
EU legitimacy, building on established normative theory. There is in fact already a large
body of work on various mechanisms of throughput legitimacy by democratic theorists of
the EU, including on the efficacy of the institutional rules and processes (Menon and Peet,
2010; Risse and Kleine, 2007; Scharpf, 1988; 1999; Schmidt, 2009), their accountability
(e.g., Beetham and Lord, 1998; Bogdanor, 2007; Bovens et al., 2010; Harlow, 2002; Héritier,
2003; Lord, 2004) and transparency (e.g., Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2011; Novak,
2011), as well as the inclusiveness and openness of the EU’s interest intermediation
processes (Greenwood, 2007; Kohler-Koch, 2007; 2010; Liebert and Trenz, 2009; Smismans,
2003).With throughput, this article seeks to bring these mechanisms together under a more
general rubric in order to show better not only how they together contribute to the
evaluation of the legitimacy of the EU’s governance processes but also how throughput in
its many guises may interact with the other two criteria of input and output in their many
guises.
The article explores the nature, problems and interactions of output, input and through-
put in normative theory about the EU, and assesses the ways in which all three criteria may
be used in normative as well as empirical arguments about the legitimacy of the EU. It
finds that in some cases arguments purportedly about output or input may actually be also
or instead about throughput. As for the interaction effects of the three, the article suggests
that whereas output policy and input participation can involve complementarities and
trade-offs, where less quality in the one may be offset by better quality in the other,
throughput does not interact with output and input in the same way. Although it too is
an important component of the EU’s democratic legitimacy, normative theorists would
have a hard time persuading the public that better quality throughput offsets bad policy
output or minimal input participation. But bad throughput – consisting of oppressive,
incompetent, corrupt or biased governance practices – regularly undermines public per-
ceptions of the legitimacy of EU governance, regardless of how extensive the input or
effective the output. The multi-level nature of the EU system further complicates matters,
since legitimacy is split between output and throughput at the EU level and input at the
national level. In this situation, throughput may be used in legitimizing arguments as a kind
of ‘cordon sanitaire’ for the EU, ensuring the trustworthiness of the processes and thereby
serving as a kind of reinforcement or, better, reassurance, of the legitimacy of EU-level
governance.
This article begins with a theoretical discussion of the three democratic legitimizing
criteria: ‘output’ for the people, ‘input’ by (and of) the people and ‘throughput’ with the
people. It then briefly addresses in turn output and input – since these mechanisms are well
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known – to follow with a more lengthy discussion of throughput legitimacy. The article
illustrates its arguments using both scholarly analyses and proposed empirical solutions to
the problems of EU legitimacy. With regard to the scholarly analyses, the article distin-
guishes between accounts focused on the institutional forms and practices of the EU – most
of which tend to use historical and rational choice institutionalism to explore the historical
logics of path-dependent institutions and the rationalist logics of calculation in the EU’s
institutions (see Bulmer, 1998; Moravcsik, 1998; Pierson, 1996; Scharpf, 1997; 1999) – and
those concerned with the ideational and discursive construction of democratic legitimacy,
most of which tend to use sociological and discursive institutionalism to explore the
ideational logics of appropriateness and the discursive logics of communication in the EU’s
deliberative public sphere (e.g., Fligstein, 2008; Habermas, 1996; 2001; Risse, 2010; Schmidt,
2006, ch. 5; 2008). The article differentiates between ‘institutional’ and ‘constructivist’
scholarship to highlight the fact that even for the elaboration of any one legitimizing
criterion, there can be contradictions and not just complementarities within, as much as
between, approaches to legitimation. In expanding the normative criteria of legitimacy in
the EU beyond input and output by adding throughput, moreover, the article offers scholars
engaged in the empirical investigation of the EU a third measure for the evaluation of EU
democratic legitimacy.

EU Legitimizing Mechanisms: Output, Input and Throughput

The concepts of output and input legitimacy as applied to the EU have their origins in
the work of Scharpf (1970; 1997; 1999), who delineated ‘output-oriented’ legitimization
as centering on the ability of EU institutions to govern effectively for the people and
‘input-oriented’ legitimization as involving political participation by the people. These
normative definitions of legitimacy pick up on Abraham Lincoln’s famous dictum about
democracy requiring government by the people (political participation), of the people
(citizen representation) and for the people (governing effectiveness) at the same time that
the input-output terms themselves have been borrowed from systems theories. They
appear in particular in the work of David Easton (1965), who defined input into the
political system as consisting of citizens’ demands and support (conferred not only
through elections but also by citizen identity and sense of system legitimacy) and output
as government decisions and actions, leaving what went on in the political system itself
largely blank.
For Scharpf (1999, pp. 7–21), input legitimacy refers to the participatory quality of the
process leading to laws and rules as ensured by the ‘majoritarian’ institutions of electoral
representation. Output legitimacy is instead concerned with the problem-solving quality of
the laws and rules, and has a range of institutional mechanisms to ensure it. Although
Scharpf finds both input and output necessary for democratic legitimization, he concludes
that, for the EU, one needs to focus on the problem-solving logics of institutional output
because the EU lacks not only the majoritarian institutional inputs (direct elections for a
government) but also its constructive preconditions (input as support), consisting of thick
collective identity and a European demos. As for his views of institutional output, Scharpf
has become increasingly doubtful even here about the EU’s potential legitimization,
whether due to the logics of interaction in the Council that produce sub-optimal policy
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outcomes (Scharpf, 1999) or to the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) that lately seem to favor the Single Market over national social solidarity (Scharpf,
2010).
Scholars who have taken an output approach to EU legitimacy are not always as
pessimistic as Scharpf about the EU’s potential legitimization, whether they focus on the
EU’s institutional form and practices or on the EU’s ideas and discursive construction.
Institutional scholars who are more optimistic about the legitimacy of the EU’s output
effectiveness for the people identify mechanisms such as the policy-related performance of
the EU’s ‘non-majoritarian’ institutions (e.g., Majone, 1998), the balance of its institutional
structures (e.g., Moravcsik, 2002) or the community-enhancing performance of the policies
themselves (e.g., Caporaso and Tarrow, 2008; Menon and Weatherill, 2008). Constructivist
scholars who take an output approach tend to concentrate less on the EU’s policy
performance than on to what extent such EU policies resonate with citizen values and build
identity (Cerutti, 2008) as well as how they are legitimated (or not) in the ‘communicative
discourse’ between EU leaders and the public (Schmidt, 2006; 2008), whether through elite
narratives (e.g., Leca, 2010), media discourses (e.g., Eder and Trenz, 2007; Koopmans, 2004)
or other ‘communicative’ actions of elites and citizens in the public sphere (e.g., Bellamy
and Castiglione, 2003; Habermas, 2001; Risse, 2010, pp. 107–76).
A wide range of scholars, both institutional and constructivist, are instead more con-
cerned – although often no more optimistic – than Scharpf about the EU’s input
legitimacy. Institutional scholars focus on the EU’s ‘majoritarian’ institutions and the
representation of citizen demands primarily through elections (e.g., Hix, 2008; Mair, 2006)
although more recently some also consider the representation of interest groups and
networks (e.g., Kohler-Koch, 2010). Constructivist scholars concentrate instead on the ideas
and communicative processes involved in elections and other forms of discursive interac-
tions with the public and civil society, and how these may contribute (or not) to the
construction of a sense of collective identity and/or the formation of a collective political
will in a European ‘public sphere’ (e.g., Lucarelli et al., 2011; Risse, 2010, pp. 127–57;
Steffek, 2003; Zürn, 2000).
Missing from this systemic theorization of legitimacy is a general theory about the
practices that go on in the ‘black box’ of governance, and constitute what we will call,
borrowing again from systems theory, ‘throughput’ legitimacy (expanding on Easton’s
concept, which is limited to bureaucratic practice). This conceptualization is intended to
encompass not only the internal processes and practices of EU governance but also what
Schmidt (2006) has previously termed, adding a preposition to Abraham Lincoln’s phrase,
interest intermediation with the people.
‘Throughput’ legitimacy concentrates on what goes on inside the ‘black box’ of EU
governance, in the space between the political input and the policy output, which has
typically been left blank by political systems theorists. It focuses on the quality of the
governance processes of the EU as contributing to a different kind of normative legitimacy
from both the performance-oriented legitimacy of output and the participation-oriented
legitimacy of input. Throughput is process-oriented, and based on the interactions –
institutional and constructive – of all actors engaged in EU governance. The point here is
that the quality of the interaction among actors engaged in the EU decision-making process
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– as opposed to the problem-solving ability of their products or the participatory genesis of

their preferences – is also a matter for normative theorizing. And how that interaction
proceeds contributes toward, or against, their ‘throughput’ legitimacy.
Curiously enough, with the exception of a small cluster of scholars mainly in Germany
and bordering countries (e.g., Benz and Papadopoulos, 2006; Holzhacker, 2007; Risse and
Kleine, 2007; Zürn, 2000), there has been little theorization about the ‘throughput’
legitimacy of governance processes taken as a whole, despite the fact that there is a vast
literature focused on the legitimacy of individual aspects of such processes. These aspects,
involving the quality of the governance processes as established by their efficacy, account-
ability, transparency, inclusiveness and openness to interest intermediation, can be seen as the
mechanisms of throughput legitimacy.
For scholars focused on institutional form and practice, throughput legitimacy involves
first of all the efficacy of the many different forms of EU governance processes and the
adequacy of the rules they follow in policy making. These include the joint decision
processes of the ‘Community Method’ that Scharpf (1988) considered to run the risk, as in
Germany, of constituting a ‘joint decision trap’; the intergovernmental processes of the
European Council and of the Treaties, which were expected to become more efficacious
with the Lisbon Treaty reforms, but continue to suffer from the large number of EU
member-state actors with veto powers due to the unanimity rule (Schmidt, 2009); the
supranational processes of the EU’s non-majoritarian institutions, often discussed in terms
of their policy outputs (e.g., Majone, 1998), but also to be considered in terms of the
independent regulatory nature of their processes (Coen and Thatcher, 2005); and the ‘new
governance’ methods mandated by the Commission, such as the ‘open method of coordi-
nation’ in employment and social policy, sometimes cast as improving input as well as
throughput legitimacy because mandated to promote civil society participation (Sabel and
Zeitlin, 2010; Zeitlin and Pochet, 2005).
Institutional throughput also encompasses the accountability and transparency of the
governance processes. Accountability is generally taken to mean that EU actors are judged
on their responsiveness to participatory input demands and can be held responsible for their
output decisions (Harlow and Rawlings, 2007) as well as that policy-making processes meet
standards of ethical governance, whether with regard to lobbyists (Cini and Pérez-
Solórzano Borragán, 2011) or civil servants (Nastase, 2011). Transparency is often seen as
a prerequisite of accountability but not as qualifying as accountability on its own because
the latter also demands some form of scrutiny by a specific forum, such as EU Commis-
sioners by the European Parliament (EP) (Fischer, 2004, p. 504; see discussion in Bovens
et al., 2010, p. 38). Transparency is generally taken to mean that citizens have access to
information about the processes (Héritier, 2003) and that decisions as well as decision-
making processes in formal EU institutions are public (Novak, 2011).
Finally, institutional throughput additionally concerns the quality and quantity of EU
governance processes’ inclusiveness and the openness of the EU’s various institutional
bodies to ‘civil society’ (e.g., Coen and Richardson, 2009). For the EU, this is mainly about
interest intermediation as part of the Community Method of decision making in particular.
Legitimacy here is generally linked to questions regarding the balance in access and
influence among organized interests representing business versus those representing unions
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or public interest organizations (Greenwood, 2007) although it can also be related to the
kind of trust-based relationship demanded by the Commission of all participants in ongoing
consultation processes (Coen, 2008). This kind of interest-based throughput is categorically
different from interest group-based ‘input’, in which demands are articulated through
interest group pressures, protests, demonstrations, letter-writing campaigns, social move-
ment activism and the like in efforts to influence elected representatives, and which does
not capture the ways in which interest articulation has become an integral part of the very
throughput process of EU governance (see Kohler-Koch, 2007; Kröger, 2008; Liebert and
Trenz, 2009; Smismans, 2003).
For scholars more concerned instead with ideational and discursive construction,
throughput legitimacy involves the ideas and deliberative interactions of the agents involved
in the wide range of governance processes outlined above, and how these promote efficacy,
accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and access to civil society. Constructivist through-
put encompasses, for example, the ways in which the Commission has defined ethics and
accountability over time (Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2011) or its usage of the
term ‘civil society’ to refer to functional interest groups, including business, as part of a
discursive strategy to improve perceptions of its legitimacy (Schmidt, 2006, p. 26; Smismans,
2003). Constructivist throughput also emerges from the deliberations in the various gov-
ernance processes that are seen as involving not just ‘bargaining’, as rational choice
institutionalists might assume, but also ‘arguing’ (Risse, 2000) and persuasion, following
Jürgen Habermas’ (1996; 2001) arguments about the significance of communicative action.
It is additionally embodied in the discursive interactions found primarily in the ‘coordi-
native’ discourses of policy construction among relevant policy actors, which include
elected officials and civil servants along with the communities of experts, analysts, lobbyists
and activists that influence them (Schmidt, 2006, ch. 5). These interactions may take place,
more specifically, in the institutionalized deliberations of experts (e.g., Joerges and Neyer,
1997), in the debates of the European Parliament (Eriksen and Fossum, 2002), in the
involvement of interest groups with EU institutions (Kröger, 2008; Liebert and Trenz, 2009;
Smismans, 2003) as well as in ad hoc deliberative moments like the Constitutional Con-
vention (e.g., Risse and Kleine, 2007). Constructivist throughput could even be conceived
of in terms of informal supranational ‘discursive representation’ (Dryzek and Niemeyer,
2008), when INGOs (International Non-governmental Organizations) such as Greenpeace
or significant personalities like Habermas articulate a discourse about what the EU ought
to do that has an impact on policy makers and their deliberative processes.
Throughput, in short, encompasses the myriad ways in which the policy-making pro-
cesses work both institutionally and constructively to ensure the efficacy of EU governance,
the accountability of those engaged in making the decisions, the transparency of the
information and the inclusiveness and openness to ‘civil society’. As such, it constitutes a
third and distinct criterion in the normative theoretical analysis of democratic legitimacy,
alongside output and input.
Output legitimacy requires policies to work effectively while resonating with citizens’
values and identity. Input legitimacy depends on citizens expressing demands institutionally
and deliberatively through representative politics while providing constructive support via
their sense of identity and community. Throughput legitimacy demands institutional and
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constructive governance processes that work with efficacy, accountability, transparency,

inclusiveness and openness (see Figure 1).
The differentiation of these three processes is important for the theorization of their
interaction effects. In the EU literature on democratic legitimacy, input and output tend to
be presented either as complementary, say, where good output policies are seen to make up
for a lack of participatory input or where citizen input makes up for mediocre output, or
as involving trade-offs, where increasing the one necessarily leads to a decrease in the other
– as when more politicized input via citizen participation in majoritarian institutions is seen
to reduce output performance, or when greater regulatory output by non-majoritarian
institutions is seen to diminish citizens’ political input. These two criteria may also have
interaction effects with throughput, since more politicized input can undermine the
throughput efficacy of governance processes while more regulatory output can reduce the
scope of throughput joint decision processes.
However, unlike input and output, where more input participation or better policy
output normally is expected to have a positive effect on public perceptions of legitimacy,
more EU-level throughput – whether through improved efficacy, more accountability and

Figure 1: A Revised Systems Approach to the EU: Input, Output and ‘Throughput’

Note: Dark arrows = direct effects; transparent arrows = less direct effects.

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transparency, or greater inclusiveness and openness – does not seem to matter much for
public perceptions of legitimacy. Violating throughput efficacy, accountability, transparency,
inclusiveness or openness, by contrast, can have a major negative impact on public percep-
tions of legitimacy (only after which their improvement may have positive effects on
legitimacy).
Major scandals involving incompetence, corruption, abuse of office, embezzlement or
other forms of official misconduct along with oppressive governance practices that violate
the constitutional rules, that impose practices perceived as illegitimate, or involve bias or
even exclusion with regard to access to interest intermediation can be highly delegitimiz-
ing, and not only for throughput. Such negative throughput can also cast a shadow over
both input and output by devaluing even good output policy if it is seen as tainted and more
input participation if it is seen as abused. Think of Prime Minister Blair with regard to Iraq:
the key delegitimizing factor was not so much the contested (output) decision or the lack
of parliamentary (input) agreement to invade alongside the US but the (throughput) process
in which the lack of evidence for the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was
obfuscated if not lied about. President Nixon and the Watergate scandal was similarly an
issue of throughput: it was not so much that his men burgled Democratic headquarters but
that he subsequently sought to cover it up, a procedural (throughput) violation that led to
his impeachment and threw into question his entire range of (output) policy achievements
(e.g., the vast expansion of environmental and social policy and the opening to China). For
the EU, the scandal involving the Santer Commission, in which nepotism on the part of the
Dutch Commissioner and abusive contracting on the part of the French Commissioner
(Edith Cresson, who signed a large contract for her personal dentist to do research on HIV),
among other peccadilloes, was seen as a major blow to the EU Commission’s legitimacy,
and provided grist for the mill regarding the EU’s democratic (input) deficit while
obscuring the Santer Commission’s (output) achievements, such as its successful negotia-
tions in the run-ups to the euro and enlargement.
Further complicating matters for the EU is its multi-level nature, in which these
legitimizing criteria are largely split between the EU and national levels of governance. At
the EU level, ‘output’ – governing effectiveness for the people – and ‘throughput’ –
governance with the people – are the primary legitimizing criteria whereas ‘input’ – political
participation by the people and citizen representation of the people – tends to be situated
largely at the national level (Schmidt, 2006, pp. 21–9), raising a whole host of legitimacy
questions related to the absence of direct EU-level input through an elected government
(discussed below). It is because of this that EU throughput has come to be evoked by EU
actors in normative arguments as a kind of ‘cordon sanitaire’, to suggest that whatever the
input that enters the system, the throughput governance process will ensure that it comes
out as uncorrupted output. Good throughput in this sense seemingly makes the EU level
disappear. By contrast, bad throughput can delegitimize everything, not only the through-
put itself but also input participation via national leaders in the Council and the EP and
output performance by EU non-majoritarian institutions.
My general definition of legitimacy here, as may already have become apparent in the
previous discussions, builds on Weber (and Scharpf, 1999), and relates to the extent to which
input politics, throughput processes and output policies are acceptable to and accepted by
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the citizenry, such that citizens believe that these are morally authoritative and they
therefore voluntarily comply with government acts even when these go against their own
interests and desires. Determining what citizens actually accept or find acceptable is
naturally another matter, however, since norms are not universal, and are based in citizens’
culture, history and values. Normative arguments about what is legitimate, as much as
empirical investigations into what publics find legitimate, can therefore be very varied
indeed, given differences among EU member states in their conceptions of national
democracy and their visions of the EU.
In what follows, therefore, I seek mainly to sketch out the broad patterns and major
problems involved in the normative theory of legitimization of the EU, while only
occasionally pointing to particular normative arguments or empirical problems and pat-
terns, that is, whether citizens accept, value and/or are satisfied with their level of EU
representation or participation (input), the delivery of EU public goods (output) or their
access to, information about or perception of the efficacy, accountability or openness of EU
governance processes (throughput). I begin with output because EU legitimacy was all
about output way before EU officials and scholars became concerned about input, let alone
throughput.

‘Output’ Legitimacy
Only a few scholars defend the EU as democratic enough already, and they generally tend
to base their defense on the output legitimacy of non-majoritarian institutions in form
and/or in practice. In so doing, they make three questionable assumptions. Grounding
output legitimacy primarily in institutional form or practice, whether through the EU’s
regulatory functions (Majone, 1998), its structural checks and balances (Moravcsik, 2002) or
its functional performance (Caporaso and Tarrow, 2008; Menon and Weatherill, 2008) seems
to assume, first, that output is necessarily good simply because it is produced by independent
regulators – an assumption that Giandomenico Majone (2009) himself now questions;
second, that its output cannot be bad simply because it has multiple vetoes; and third, that
its policies intrinsically serve the general interest.
First, the problem with assuming that EU output is necessarily good because produced
by independent EU regulators suggests that throughput processes insulated from political
input are democratically legitimate. This fails to deal with the difference between non-
majoritarian institutions at the EU and national levels. At the national level, the decisions
of non-majoritarian institutions are accepted as legitimate not because they are entirely
removed from politics but, rather, because they operate in the ‘shadow of politics’, as the
product of political institutions, with political actors who have the capacity not only to
create them but also to alter them and their decisions if they so choose – meaning that their
non-majoritarian throughput processes are balanced by majoritarian input politics. At the
EU level, there is no such balancing, given the EU’s (throughput) decision rules that make
it almost impossible to alter such decisions, let alone to alter the non-majoritarian institu-
tions that produce those decisions, in the absence of any kind of (input) political govern-
ment that could force the issue (Scharpf, 2010).
Second, as to the output benefits of the EU’s multiple-veto institutional (throughput)
structures, Scharpf (1988) has also convincingly argued that the ‘joint decision trap’ of the
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EU’s quasi-federal structure is even worse than that of Germany, raising questions about its
output effectiveness or its output tout court, while the rationalist logic of its multiple veto
structure often produces sub-optimal substantive policy outcomes (Scharpf, 1999).
Throughput processes, in other words, undermine output effectiveness. What is more, a
structural logic that sees checks and balances (or throughput processes) as in themselves
democratic and legitimate (e.g., Moravcsik, 2002) is also problematic because it takes as a
fundamental premise the thwarting of majoritarian expressions of the popular will, or input
representation – something that may be accepted as legitimate in compound federal systems
like Germany or the US but not in more simple unitary states like France and the UK
(Schmidt, 2006, ch. 2).
Third, with regard to the blanket normative assumption that the EU’s non-majoritarian
output policies are legitimate because in the general interest, an increasing number of
contested decisions by the EU Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) throw
this too into question empirically. These decisions include the Commission’s services
initiative that in its first iteration privileged home country rules, including pensions and
wage rates for service workers in host countries, and ECJ decisions focused on freedom of
movement that curtailed national unions’ rights to strike in the Laval and Viking cases or
struck down Austrian medical schools’ quotas on German medical students. Although these
could be seen positively from an EU-level normative perspective as promoting a Polanyian,
market-correcting governance for all Europeans (Caporaso and Tarrow, 2008), they can just
as readily be seen negatively from a national-level empirical perspective as a neo-liberal
post-Polanyian destruction of national labor relations and welfare systems (Höpner and
Schäfer, 2007).
These examples illustrate a fourth normative drawback to output, which takes us to
the interactive construction of legitimacy. As Furio Cerutti (2008) has argued, the
performance-based legitimacy of the ‘output’ variety is insufficient for legitimization, since
outcomes also require a kind of ‘Weberian legitimacy’, by which he means the substantive
values and principles guiding the performance, which make the performance valued. In
other words, even if policy performance is optimal in normative institutional output terms,
if the actual content of the policies clashes with national values and principles, as reflected
in European citizens’ perceptions of EU policies as acceptable and appropriate (or not), then
its output legitimacy is empirically in question.
Constructive output legitimacy thus must also be considered in terms of how EU
policies resonate with citizens’ substantive values and identity as well as how they fit with
their interests. This need not be a passive exercise. Political elites generally actively seek to
legitimate policies as well as to build identity through communicative discourses with their
citizens (Schmidt, 2006; 2008) as they seek to highlight the institutional output perfor-
mance of, say, the single currency (Dyson, 2002), to foster certain kinds of EU norms and
values such as the ‘European Social Model’ (Barbier, 2008) or cast the EU as a ‘normative
power’ in the world (Laïdi, 2008; Manners, 2002). The empirical problem for legitimacy
here is that national politicians in recent years have tended to engage in comparatively little
saying about what the EU is doing, engaging instead mainly in blame shifting on unpopular
policies or credit taking on popular policies, often without even letting on that the policy
was generated in Brussels (Schmidt, 2006). Empirical studies of media discourse and debate
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show that, with the exception of the big events like European Monetary Union, enlarge-
ment or the Constitutional Treaty, there has been relatively little increase in attention to EU
policies over time other than by elites (Fligstein, 2008; Koopmans, 2004; Risse, 2010, pp.
128–33). Moreover, although a transnational ‘community of communication’ in a European
public sphere has been developing, in which national publics by means of the media
increasingly debate the same issues at the same time using the same frames of reference
(Risse, 2010, chs 5, 6, 7; Trenz and Eder, 2004), there is nothing to guarantee that those
debates will build citizens’ sense of EU output legitimacy, or instead promote anti-EU
views.
In addition, no amount of constructive output via discourse can serve to legitimate the
EU if words are not followed by actions, that is, by institutional output. After all, with regard
to the principled discourse, what does ‘normative power’ Europe really mean if the EU
cannot deliver, as in the Copenhagen Environmental Summit? Or the ‘European Social
Model’, as inequalities rise massively between as well as within member states, in particular
those in the Southern European periphery subject to the deflationary and recessionary
austerity programs linked to their loans from the EU and International Monetary Fund
(IMF)? But however many words and actions there are to legitimate EU-level output, it can
still founder on the shoals of input legitimacy.

‘Input’ Legitimacy’
Unlike output legitimacy, there are almost no scholars who think that the EU has sufficient
input legitimacy.When it comes to the EU’s institutional input legitimacy, to begin with,
most institutional scholars agree that it does not make the grade. They cite the fact that
European Parliament elections suffer from high rates of abstention, and continue to be
mainly second-order elections in which national issues are more salient than EU ones (Hix,
2008; Mair, 2006); or that the absence of a government that citizens could vote in or out
makes it impossible for ‘the people’ to express their approval or disapproval of EU policies
directly – also the reason why Scharpf (1999) does not see the EU as ‘democratic’ in the
input sense.
Another empirical problem for robust input is that the EU has lacked the traditional kind
of left–right politics to which citizens are most likely to relate. Instead, EU-level party
differences and left–right political contestation have long been submerged by the general
quest for consensus and compromise, promoted by institutional (throughput) processes such
as co-decision procedures with the Council that are voted mostly by supermajorities in the
EP and the Commission’s consensus-oriented, technical approach to policy initiation and
development. In addition, European political parties remain weak, underdeveloped and not
very cohesive, with an amalgam in the EP of different national parties with divergent
agendas and ideologies in any given European party grouping (Ladrech, 2002; 2010; Mair,
2006).
As a result, policy making at the EU level can be characterized as policy without politics,
which in turn makes for national politics without policy, as increasing numbers of policies are
transferred from the national political arena to the EU, leaving national citizens with little
direct input on the EU-related policies that affect them, and only national politicians to
hold to account for them (Schmidt, 2006, ch. 4; 2009; see also Risse, 2010). This has already
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had a variety of destabilizing effects on national politics, including citizen demobilization

on the one hand or radicalization on the other (Mair, 2006). Moreover, all of these issues
have led to a decline for the EU in the kind of diffuse support that Easton identified as a
key factor in input legitimacy. This is because the ‘permissive consensus’ of the early years,
in which citizens largely ignored the EU and its outcomes, has been replaced by a
‘constraining dissensus’ along with a rise in Euroscepticism (Hooghe and Marks, 2009).
What makes matters worse is that new cleavages have developed between citizens whose
ideas for Europe are more open, liberal and cosmopolitan in orientation and those whose
ideas are more closed, xenophobic and nationalist or even EU-regionalist oriented (Kriesi
et al., 2008), leading to the specter of mobilization on EU-related issues in terms of identity
politics, especially on the right (Hooghe and Marks, 2009), and the gradual awakening of
the ‘sleeping giant’ of cross-cutting cleavages between pro-European ‘cosmopolitans’ and
Eurosceptic ‘nationalists’ in mainstream parties of the right and the left (Franklin and van
der Eijk, 2007).
For constructivist scholars, all the above problems are compounded by the thinness of
the communicative processes that articulate citizen ideas and concerns in the European
public sphere. The lack of a common European language, a European media or a Euro-
pean public opinion ensures that the communicative discourse comes largely by way of
national political actors speaking to national publics in national languages reported by
national media and considered by national opinion. Although the resulting fragmented
communication is attenuated somewhat by the fact that there is a developing European
‘community of communities’ (Risse, 2010), this does not get around the institutional
input reality that without a Europe-wide representative politics to focus debate, European
political leaders have little opportunity to speak directly to the issues and European
publics have little ability to deliberate about them or to state their conclusions directly,
through the ballot box. This said, where debates have occurred during referenda or
major EU initiatives, even where the empirical results for the EU’s institutional input are
negative and delegitimizing, some scholars see the results as nevertheless providing con-
structive input, as in the cases of the revision of the services directive that brought social
movements into the consultation process (Crespy, 2010) and the Europe-wide debates
following European political leaders’ sanctions of the Austrian Conservative governing
coalition’s inclusion of the right-wing extremist party of Jörg Haider in 2000 (Van de
Steeg, 2006) – although here one could argue that EU-level input at the same time
undercut national input legitimacy, given that the coalition was the democratic expres-
sion of the preferences of the Austrian voters.
So is the answer to bring in more politics with policy at the EU level, as many scholars
advocate, in the effort to diminish the EU’s input ‘democratic deficit’? Some have
resisted this suggestion because they see politicization as deleterious to the EU’s output
governing effectiveness for the people while others worry that it is too soon for any such
politicization given legitimacy problems related to the lack of citizen identity, collective
will and a fully developed public sphere (Bartolini, 2005; Scharpf, 1999). But other
scholars maintain that, whatever the normative arguments, empirically the cat is already
out of the bag, so the question is how to politicize within the context of the current
institutional set-up. Simon Hix’s (2008) normative proposal for gradually adding a greater
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majoritarian component to the politics of the Council and the EP in order to ensure
more clearly demarcated policies of the left or right, while a step in the right direction,
fails to deal sufficiently with the fact that EU political parties currently lack the kind of
cohesion and EU citizens the kind of collective identity necessary for this kind of input
politics. But at the very least, the EU needs greater input through citizen access to the
EP, either directly or through the national parliaments, as well as greater national par-
liament involvement with the EU, either through national oversight committees or
through direct links with the EP (Menon and Peet, 2010). But all of this also demands
better working EU institutions to respond to input and to produce output, which is the
domain of throughput legitimacy.

‘Throughput’ Legitimacy
Throughput legitimacy covers what goes on in between the input and the output. Because
it has not usually been part of normative theorizing about EU legitimacy, throughput has
sometimes been discussed in output terms, where particular institutional or discursive
processes are seen as preconditions for better output performance, and occasionally in input
terms, where certain institutional processes or deliberative interactions are preconditions for
better input participation. This is sometimes difficult to disentangle in normative arguments
or empirical cases, since individual scholars and/or political cultures may have preferences
for certain types of output or input that demand certain types of throughput – say,
monetarists and Germans with a preference for price stability in output performance will
prefer independent central banks with a stability mandate, in contrast to Keynesians and the
French prior to the mid-1980s, while federalists and Germans with a fear of input
majorities imposing their output preferences will favor institutional checks and balances, in
contrast to the British and the French. There are also numerous illustrations of these
entanglements in the previous sections, when scholars make normative arguments linking
independent regulatory or veto structures to better output performance, or produce
empirical studies attributing worse input support or participation to the thinness of the
communicative processes.
But disentangling throughput from output and input in normative theory is nonetheless
extremely useful for analytic reasons. Normative theorizing can show that throughput also
stands on its own, and not only because it refers to different mechanisms of legitimation
such as efficacy, accountability, transparency, openness and inclusiveness. It is also because,
unlike with input politics and output policies, where more of either is likely to increase the
public’s sense of democratic legitimacy, with throughput processes, more of it may have
little effect on public perceptions of legitimacy, while less of it via corruption, incompe-
tence and exclusion may bring down the whole house of cards. For this reason, in the
multi-level EU, better throughput can be seen to serve as a cordon sanitaire, to make the EU
disappear from public view, leaving front and centre both national input politics and EU
output policy.

Institutional Throughput
For institutional scholars, throughput legitimacy includes not only the workings of the
decision-making processes as a whole – that they work efficaciously in an accountable and
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transparent manner – but also the intermediation processes through which citizens orga-
nized in interest groups have a direct influence on policy making. This latter kind of
legitimacy has been theorized not only by the pluralist political scientists of the 1950s and
1960s in America such as Robert Dahl and DavidTruman to normatively legitimate interest
group participation in policy making but also by theorists of ‘associative democracy’ who
have also identified interest group access – in this case of public interests – as another form
of democracy in its own right, as well as a corrective to representative democracy (e.g.,
Cohen and Rogers, 1992). For the EU, throughput governance with the people through
pluralist-type consultation – mainly as part of the joint decision-making process commonly
known as the Community Method – has deliberately been encouraged as a way of
counterbalancing the paucity of input governance by the people through political partici-
pation. The result has been an explosion in interest representation and lobbying at the EU
level, first focused on the Commission but increasingly, as its powers have grown, on the EP
(Greenwood, 2007). It is only in recent years, however, that such ‘functional representation’
through interest groups has come to be seen as an additional form of democratic legiti-
mization in the EU (see Kohler-Koch, 2007; Kröger, 2008).
The Commission in particular has consciously sought to remedy the democratic (input)
deficit by finding ways to make (throughput) policy making ‘more inclusive and account-
able’ to ‘civil society’ – defined as including special interests like business and labor along
with activist citizens – as well as more transparent, as per the EU Commission’s (2001)
White Paper on European Governance (Kohler-Koch, 2007; 2010; Kröger, 2008; Smismans,
2003). Following accusations of one-sidedness in its openness to business in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, the Commission made a concerted effort to bring in more interest
representation from under-represented groups, although how effective it has been is open
to question (see Kröger, 2008). This has included creating ‘grass-roots’ interest groups (e.g.,
of women and consumers) at the EU level to counterbalance the more powerful, already
present business groups, with the resulting networks ones in which mutually suspicious
actors can ensure more demanding forms of reciprocal accountability (Héritier, 1999).
Moreover, the EU has given voice to a whole range of public interest groups which may
be marginalized in their national polities, and whose common interests are better expressed
at the EU level, such as in gender equality and sexual harassment laws (Zippel, 2006). In
addition, with regard to interest intermediation, rather than competition among interests
the EU Commission has sought to foster cooperation in its consensus-based policy
formulation process, with rules of the game which entail that in order to play, participants
must gain and maintain credibility as trusted actors providing accurate technical informa-
tion (Coen, 2008). Even social movements have been able to exercise informal influence
(Crespy, 2010; Della Porta, 2009).
But regardless of how open to public interest consultation with the people the EU may
be, the problem for national citizens is that this kind of supranational policy making is very
far from the kind of representative democracy by the people they tend to see as the most
normatively legitimate. And throughput governance processes are in any case not open to
most of them in practical terms, given the difficulties of transnational mobilization for most
citizens (Della Porta, 2009; Imig and Tarrow, 2001). Moreover, the more access there is
through lobbying, especially if unequal, the more questions can be raised about transparency
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and accountability, in particular given the long road to establishing even a voluntary
registration scheme and code of conduct for lobbyists (Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán,
2011).
Accountability itself became a major issue following the scandal and resignation of the
Santer Commission, as noted above. The new Commission’s response was to impose much
tighter controls on expenditure procedures (to the point of creating massive inefficiencies
in contracting and reporting) as well as by seeking to increase transparency. Transparency
was to be ensured through greater access to EU documentation for the media and interest
groups (Héritier, 2003) as well as through the internet and the development of
e-government – although the massive volume of EU-generated information has also led to
information overload, perversely making it all less transparent. As for accountability and
transparency in the decision-making processes themselves, these are often difficult given the
secrecy of much of the process, whether in the Commission, the COREPER (Committee
of Permanent Representatives) or in the Council, despite an increasing number of
publicity-related reforms. For example, although Council meetings are broadcast through
live video streaming (since 2006), the president can always suspend recording (usual for
debates on controversial issues) and, where debates must be public (because of co-decision
with the EP) negotiations take place over lunch or in the corridors (Novak, 2011).
Accountability, understood as being subject to scrutiny by a specific forum, is also
problematic. The decision-making processes of the Council, Commission or comitology in
particular suffer from a lack of accountability with regard to the EP (Bovens et al., 2010;
Lord, 2004). The EP has little influence over initiation, no connection to comitology and
so far also little connection to national parliaments (Menon and Peet, 2010). This said,
increasing the oversight by the EP, while in principle making the decision making more
accountable, could also insert input politics into the process and thereby undermine
throughput efficacy via more conflicts with the Council. And this in the end could even
undermine accountability, given the tension between the European parliamentary group-
ings and national parties resulting from EP party aggregation (Rose and Borz, 2011). As it
is, however, corresponding efforts to improve the efficacy of the co-decision process
through the growth of fast-track legislation via early agreements – which went from 28 per
cent in 1999–2004 to 80 per cent in the last parliamentary term, in which ‘trilogues’ among
a handful of individuals representing the EP (mainly the larger party groupings), the
Council and the Commission negotiate compromise – come at the expense of transparency
and accountability as well as input, in particular through the short-circuiting of parliamen-
tary debate and smaller party groupings’ voice (Dehousse, 2011; Héritier and Reh, 2011).
Equally problematic for efficacious institutional throughput is the unanimity rule for
treaties, in which the ability of any member state to veto any agreement can lead to treaty
delays, dilution or deadlock (Schmidt, 2009, pp. 28–32). There are certainly good input and
output arguments with regard to keeping the unanimity rule, that is, that it respects
member-state preferences and autonomy, but this cannot deny the throughput problems, or
the fact that the rule also frustrates other input and output goals or values. The failure of
the Constitutional Treaty following the French and Dutch referenda, and the myriad delays
on the Lisbon Treaty, are object lessons for why many find that the EU needs another way
of reaching binding agreements for the member states. One remedy, proposed by former
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Commissioner Mario Monti among others, would be to do away with the unanimity rule
and replace it instead with supermajorities (whether two-thirds, four-fifths or even more)
plus opt-outs agreed, say, by Council vote, so long as the opt-out does not negatively affect
the functioning of the proposed political community (e.g., as in fiscal harmonization, where
an opt-out might vitiate its very purpose) (Schmidt, 2009). In the interim, however, the
member states have other ways around this, such as through the enhanced cooperation
mechanism of the Lisbon Treaty, in which nine or more member states can move forward
in areas in which agreements have proven difficult to reach (as in the case of divorce).
Another way is through multiple bilateral (intergovernmental) agreements outside the
Treaties. An early example of this was Schengen. The most recent was the European
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), created over the weekend of 9–10 May 2010 in the
attempt to stop the contagion effect of the Greek crisis on other Southern Mediterranean
countries. In this case, however, the German political leadership insisted on a quick return
to the unanimity rule – worried about the national input-oriented rulings of the German
Constitutional Court – with the creation of a new facility, the European Stability Mecha-
nism (ESM), to begin in 2013, ratified unanimously by Treaty amendment.

Constructive Throughput
Throughput legitimacy requires not just accountable, transparent and accessible institu-
tional processes that also get beyond the unanimity trap. It additionally requires produc-
tive deliberative interrelationships among actors in the wide variety of throughput
governance processes that make up the coordinative discourse of the policy sphere. For
this, constructivist scholars generally cite formal deliberative processes, starting with Hab-
ermas (1996) on the quality of the deliberative procedures as a ‘counter-steering mecha-
nism’ ensuring that citizens’ community power is adequately channeled in societal and
administrative decision making, thereby improving accountability (see Bekkers and
Edwards, 2007, p. 53).
EU examples include discussions of Commission-led, consensus-focused intermediation
with experts in the comitology process, which are sometimes described as a form of
‘supranational deliberative democracy’ (Joerges and Neyer, 1997) or ‘directly-deliberative
polyarchy’ (Gerstenberg and Sabel, 2000). These particular examples, however, seem to blur
the boundaries between throughput processes and input participation, raising the question:
is involving experts in deliberations with policy makers really about input democracy or is
it not rather about providing for better (throughput) development of output policies? More
recent work by Charles Sabel and colleagues (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2010, pp. 12–17) provides
an answer to this question by focusing more exclusively on what they see as the more
dynamic (throughput) accountability of new forms of governance – by contrast with the
(rationalist) rule-compliance accountability of the old. They find these in the deliberative
processes of peer reviews, whether in fora, networked agencies, councils of regulators or the
open method of coordination. The mechanisms for accountability here include public
justification requirements in food safety regulations, the right of challenge and the duty to
explain in the new EU competition policy regime, and the penalty default mechanism that
makes non-agreement so costly that it pushes all parties to information-sharing regimes, as
in the Florence Electricity Forum. Transparency, similarly, is not just about publishing rules
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and information but also about ensuring that networked governance establishes procedural
requirements for active participation by a broad range of stakeholders in regulatory decision
making (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2010, pp. 18–20).
There are also more ad hoc deliberative processes of throughput legitimization. One of
these was the Constitutional Convention, described by Thomas Risse and Mareike Kleine
(2007) as a throughput process in which the debates were arguably the first (and only)
creation of a close to ideal EU deliberative public sphere of communication, in particular
in contrast to the closed-door bargaining routine of the intergovernmental conference
(IGC) that followed. Other informal processes of discursive interaction that contribute to
throughput legitimacy ‘from below’ include the role of social movements (Eder and Trenz,
2007, pp. 171–2), as in the case of the European Social Forum (ESF), which improved the
deliberative quality of communication among its own grass-roots activists in European
assemblies in ways that also contributed to output legitimacy by increasing these social
activists’ identification with Europe despite their continuing suspicion of the EU’s overly
neo-liberal policies (Doerr, 2009).
All this may make it appear that constructive throughput legitimacy is assured. But
serious problems remain here, too, in particular as they interact with the problems of input
and output legitimacy related to the EU’s policy without politics. Generally speaking, the
Commission has consciously sought to depoliticize EU policy formulation by presenting its
initiatives in neutral or ‘reasonable’ language, and by using communications techniques such
as its ‘Plan D’ for democracy (Barbier, 2008, pp. 231–2). National leaders, moreover, have
been perfectly happy with this depoliticized language because this leaves them free in their
national capitals to put any kind of political ‘spin’ of the left, right or center on EU policies.
This serves to ensure that, even as the EU Commission in particular seeks to make EU
policy-making processes more legitimate via accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and
openness, these processes tend to disappear from national public view – so long as, of course,
they avoid any negative throughput via oppressive rules, scandals, corruption, bias or even
simple incompetence, as discussed earlier. The problem is what Anchrit Wille (2010, pp.
84–5) has called the ‘accountability paradox’, in which increasing attention to internal
accountability by the Commission, which, Christopher Lord (2004) has suggested, makes it
the most controlled executive in the world, has done nothing to solve ‘the problems of
rendering accounts externally’, which continues to leave the EU invisible to the public,
remote and seemingly unaccountable.
To remedy some problems of constructive throughput legitimacy, in addition to con-
tinuing with efforts to improve mechanisms of accountability and transparency, EU-level
governance processes would need to find more ways to include citizens, say, by having
national governments do more to bring civil society into national formulation processes
focused on EU throughput decision making as well as doing more to ensure that disad-
vantaged interest groups and social movements make their views heard (Schmidt, 2009).
Importantly, however, stakeholder democracy, even if improved, is not necessarily public
interest-oriented democracy. And however much the EU and national governments seek to
promote policy with pluralist politics to enhance throughput legitimacy, this cannot be a
substitute for input legitimacy, although it can be a supplement to it as well as a way of
ensuring better output legitimacy.
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Conclusion
The normative criteria for democratic legitimacy, in sum, consist of institutional and
constructive throughput processes as well as of input participation and output policy.
What distinguishes throughput processes from the other two criteria is that input and
output can involve trade-offs, where more of the one may make up for less of the other,
whereas more (and better) throughput does not make up for problems with either input
or output while less (and worse) throughput can delegitimate both input and output.
The multi-level nature of the EU complicates this set of interaction effects further, since
more EU-level input or output can negatively affect national-level input legitimacy. The
EU’s answer to this problem has been largely to improve throughput processes of con-
verting input into output (through efficacy, accountability, transparency, openness and
inclusiveness) to make up for loss of national-level input and for national problems with
EU output. But this fails to recognize that no amount of throughput can make up for
a dearth of input or deleterious output. A brief illustration using the case of the Euro-
zone sovereign debt crisis beginning in 2010 should help demonstrate how adding this
normative criterion to the study of democratic legitimacy is also useful for empirical
analysis.
In the first phases of the Eurozone crisis, national leaders’ decisions to set up the EFSF
and the ESM can be seen as increasing supranational input legitimacy, given that they were
acting as the representatives of their member-state electorates along with EU institutional
actors such as the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Commission to deepen integra-
tion in response to the crisis. This followed a protracted (inefficacious) throughput process
of negotiation as the German Chancellor Merkel dragged her feet while the Greek crisis
got worse and the threat of contagion to other peripheral member states spread. In the end,
though, EU leaders did produce enhanced supranational output, to save the Eurozone. The
specific austerity-based output policies for Eurozone members in need of a bail-out
(Greece) or protection under the EFSF (Ireland and Portugal), however, involved a trade-off
with national input legitimacy, since those governments signing up for the strict budgetary
regime had to give up economic autonomy to the EU-IMF teams of experts. That
trade-off has for the moment been accepted as legitimate by much of these countries’
electorates, although not without movements of protest, under the belief that the bitter
(output) medicine will be effective in curing the disease. Subsequently, as the crisis rolled
on and EU leaders contemplated further economic integration, they also became increas-
ingly focused on throughput processes as a way to build trust along with compliance with
the austerity budgetary policies agreed in May 2010. These processes have largely involved
rule-compliance accountability – including numerically targeted automatic mechanisms,
‘golden rules’ and technocratic rules-based oversight – and seem to lack any elements of the
more dynamic deliberative accountability. But were such elements to be added, these would
in any case be no substitute for an input-based gouvernement économique, in which the
Eurozone countries were, say, to have ongoing deliberations about managing the economy,
involving not only the Council and the ECB but also the European Parliament and national
parliaments. Moreover, even if there were to be more supranational input governance,
public perceptions of illegitimacy would appear if member states did not follow the

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throughput rules – although even if they did, this would not help legitimacy in any way if
the output austerity policies turned out to be the wrong kind of medicine.
(Accepted: 2 October 2011)

About the Author

Vivien Schmidt is Jean Monnet Chair of European Integration, Professor of International Relations and Political
Science, and Director of the Center for the Study of Europe at Boston University. Recent books include Debating
Political Identity and Legitimacy in the European Union (co-edited with Sonia Lucarelli and Furio Cerutti, Routledge,
2011), Democracy in Europe (Oxford, 2006), The Futures of European Capitalism (Oxford, 2002) and Welfare and Work in
the Open Economy (volume 2, co-edited with F.W. Scharpf, Oxford, 2000). Her current work centers on the impact of
the economic crisis on European political economy and democracy, and on neo-institutionalism, with a book in
progress on ‘discursive institutionalism’. Vivien A. Schmidt, Center for the Study of Europe, Boston University, 152
Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215, USA; email: [email protected]

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