India – Bangladesh relations

India was the first country to recognize Bangladesh as a separate and independent state immediately
after its independence in December 1971. The relationship between India and Bangladesh is anchored in
history, culture, language and shared values of secularism, democracy, and countless other
commonalities between the two countries. (MEA)

Recent High Level Visits and Exchanges

PM Modi, Bangladesh PM Sheikh Hasina and West Bengal CM Mamata Banerjee met in Shantiniketan in
May 2018 for the inauguration of the “Bangladesh Bhawan” Tagore museum, and for the Visva Bharati
University convocation. However, no formal talks were scheduled.

• PM of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina paid a State Visit to India in April 2017.

o Joint Statement (April 2017): India and Bangladesh –A Fraternal Relationship (A unique
phrase used for a unique relationship)
o During the visit, 36 bilateral documents were concluded in areas such as of Civil Nuclear
Energy, Space, Information Technology, Defence, Capacity building etc.
o A 3rd Line Of Credit (LOC) worth US$ 4.5 billion was also extended to Bangladesh.
o The two PMs presided over a commemorative ceremony in honour of Indian martyrs of
Liberation War of Bangladesh.
• Prior to this visit, PM Hasina had visited India in October 2016 to participate in the BRICS-BIMSTEC
Outreach Summit.
• PM Modi paid a State visit to Bangladesh in June, 2015.
o Exchange of instrument of ratification for India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement (LBA)
and a 2nd Line of Credit (LOC) worth US$ 2 billion.

Recently, the Bangladesh Foreign Minister A H Mahmud Ali attended the last rites/funeral of former PM
Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

What are India's main objectives in Bangladesh?

• To secure connectivity to the North East;
o Both signed the BBIN Motor Vehicle Agreement.
• Ensure that it does not become a launch pad for anti-India activities, including terrorism and
insurgencies;
• Ensure that it does not fall in the Chinese embrace.
• Illegal immigration continues to be a major worry for India.
o Central Government is vested with powers to deport a foreign national under section 3(2)(c)
of the Foreigners Act, 1946, under which the powers also been delegated to the State
Governments/ UTs and the Bureau of Immigration.
o The Indo-Bangladesh Border covering 5 states of India including Assam, Meghalaya,
Mizoram, Tripura and West Bengal is 4096 km long.
o Border security infrastructure of fence, roads, floodlights and border out posts (BOPs) in
1/3rd length of the border is yet to be started mainly due to land acquisition issues.
o Assam NRC being updated - Quietly, Delhi kept Dhaka in Assam NRC loop and assured
them that there was no talk of “deportation” to prevent a slide in bilateral ties.
What are Bangladesh's main objectives?
• Secure the flow of river waters, especially of the Teesta,
• Maintain an independent foreign policy. Some sections in Bangladesh are wary of a formal
defence relationship with India for the fear of being drawn too close to Delhi.
• Secure easy and continuing market access in India.
o Trade figures have gone up to $7 billion, though the adverse trade balance remains an issue.
India has tried to offset the trade imbalance by providing Lines of Credit and grants.
o A more fundamental solution will be when Indian companies invest in the SEZs and export
manufactured products back to India, redressing thereby the adverse trade balance.

Nuclear Energy cooperation - a new area of cooperation (PIB)

• Tripartite agreement between India, Russia and Bangladesh to cooperate for the construction of
the Rooppur Nuclear power Plant.
• Anil Kakodkar said, it will start a “new chapter of regional cooperation in the field of nuclear
energy”.

Two Key long-standing disputes resolved:

• India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) - Exchange of instrument of ratification took
place during PM Modi visit in 2015.
• Maritime boundary dispute in Bay of Bengal - India signed off on the award of an international
tribunal.

Yet, some big political obstacles remain.

• On the Indian side, West Bengal CM has been reluctant to endorse the Teesta waters agreement
that has become the touchstone for India’s good faith in Bangladesh.
• On the Bangladesh Side - Many in Bangladesh are nervous that Dhaka under Sheikh Hasina might
be drawing too close to India. They are especially concerned on the expanding defence
cooperation between the two countries. Some others see Delhi trying to limit or constrain the
unfolding strategic partnership between China and Bangladesh.
o Joint Statement on Defence Framework during PM Hasina visit in April 2018: A $500 million
line of credit (LoC) for defence procurement by the Bangladesh military forces, the largest
such LoC India has extended to any country so far.
o Bangladesh will not be bound to use it to source its supplies only from Indian companies.
This is India’s way to reposing confidence in the Hasina government that it will not challenge
New Delhi’s vital interests.
o India-Bangladesh joint military exercise SAMPRITI.

What are sets of issues at the root of the residual political? (C Raja Mohan)
1. Question of size and significance.
o Delhi’s insufficient strategic appreciation of the importance of Bangladesh. Dhaka, in turn,
has found it hard to stop seeing itself as a small country facing a large and insensitive
neighbour.
o The time is now for Delhi and Dhaka to get out of the “big-brother-small-neighbour”
syndrome.
2. With a border of nearly 4,060 km — India’s longest with any country — Delhi has no reason to see
itself in competition with Beijing in Bangladesh.
o Focus on the geographic imperative between Delhi and Dhaka.
 • The partition of the subcontinent and the inward economic orientation of India and
Bangladesh meant the two sides were working against the logic of geography than
with it.
• Merits of reconnecting Sonar Bangla, and also India’s northeast.
3. Bangladesh’s leadership role in the subcontinent and beyond.
o It is Bangladesh that took the lead in promoting South Asian regionalism.
o Dhaka also has the central role in shaping the future of sub-regional cooperation with
Bhutan, Burma, India and Nepal.
o It is also a land bridge to East Asia and the fulcrum of a future 'Bay of Bengal community'.

Growing mutual trust and political comfort between Delhi and Dhaka, backed by Kolkata, will have one
long-term consequence. It will restore the centrality of Bengal and its hinterlands that once decisively
shaped the history of Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Amb. Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty: India-Bangladesh ties have entered an era of consolidation and
expansion.
A kind of trilateral between India, Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal region could be
worked out. Later it could be expanded to include Thailand and Indonesia. We will have to think about
the maritime domain in a far more holistic and detailed manner. MoD and MEA would need to work in
collaboration in this aspect.
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• Unlike the past, Bangladesh under Hasina has cooperated with India on security issues. It has also
proceeded to incrementally expand connectivity. It is combating fundamentalist Islamic forces
that are reflexively pro-Pakistan.
• Thus, From India’s perspective, a positive political future for Hasina is a positive for bilateral ties.
In this context, the Teesta issue gains even more significance and can queer the pitch. Modi’s
political and diplomatic skills will be put to test, especially when China is enlarging its presence in
India’s neighbourhood.

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The Teesta water dispute: Geopolitics, myth and economics

Teesta's catchment area supports 8.5% of Bangladesh's population — roughly 10 million people — and
14% of crop production.

Bangladesh wants 50% of the river’s water supply, especially in the months between December and May
annually, while India claims a share of 55%. According to the FAO of the UN, the ratio of Bangladesh’s
external dependency for water is over 90%. A fair amount of that water comes through India.

Of the Teesta’s catchment area, 83% lies in India; the remaining 17% is in Bangladesh. Negotiations have
been on since 1983, when a preliminary arrangement had allocated 39% for India and 36% for
Bangladesh. A lesser share for Bangladesh takes into account a groundwater recharge that takes place
between the two barrages on the Teesta — at Gazaldoba in Jalpaiguri on the Indian side and at Dalia in
Lalmonirhat in Bangladesh. The remaining 25% was left unallocated for a later decision, especially
because the regular flow of a small quantity of water (in the case of the Teesta, 450 cusecs) is imperative
for the life of a river.
In 2011 when Delhi and Dhaka reached another agreement — an interim arrangement for 15 years —
where India would get 42.5% and Bangladesh, 37.5% of the Teesta’s waters during the dry season. Given
that the TMC was a key coalition partner of the central government at the time, and that water is a state
subject under the Indian Constitution, there was no way to ink the deal without the chief minister’s
stamp of approval.

Concerns of West Bengal

• Dependence of 6 districts of North Bengal.

Concerns of Sikkim:
• Environmental concerns - The Lepchas of Sikkim sat on hunger strike for over 900 days against the
construction of a hydel project.

Delhi and Dhaka have the advantage of a Joint River Commission (JRC), set up in 1972 after Bangladesh
won independence precisely for the purpose of water management.
• JRC has not met since 2011.

Joint Statement (April 2017) on Teesta and other Water sharing issues:
• Conclusion of the Interim Agreement on Sharing of the Water of Teesta as agreed upon by both
governments in January 2011 is due. Meanwhile discussions on various aspects relating to sharing
of waters of the Feni, Manu, Muhuri, Khowai, Gumti, Dharla and Dudhkumar rivers are also
going on.

Conclusion: Over 21% of the global population lives in Asia, but it is home to only a little over 8% of the
world’s water resources.
• Use the institutional mechanism at its disposal – the Joint Rivers Commission – to create a set of
norms and guidelines to regulate the use of not just the Teesta but all transboundary rivers shared
with Bangladesh; and
• Promote sustainable conservation, develop better ways to combat pollution, and manage existing
water supply and resources better.

PM’s Modi said that “rivers should nurture the India-Bangladesh relationship and not become a source
of discord” actually comes to life.
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Rohingya issue
Rohingyas are minority Muslim community in predominantly Buddhist Myanmar reside mainly in the
Rakhine province (also known as the Arakan region).
2012: Major Buddhist-Rohingya riots; large no. of Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh.

The roots of the problem go back to more than a century (didn't begin therefore in 2012). The Burmese
ethnic group has always been sensitive and find it difficult to accept any outside migrants in their
community (for e.g. Rohingyas). The Rohingyas were not given statehood, not considered a nationality
unlike the Shans, Wa etc. This is not peculiar to Rohingyas only, as even the Indians who have settled in
Myanmar (about 400,000 in number) have also not been given nationality in Myanmar.
The issue is thus cultural (ethnicity), religious (Buddhist Sangh is militant and Islam worldwide is
becoming militant); Rohingyas themselves used militancy at one point as in 1942 they were the
instruments of oppression against the Burmans mobilized by British) and political.

There are news of a new allegedly Islamic insurgent group named ‘harakat al-yaqeen’ comprising of
Rohingya Muslims having links in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Dubai and Bangladesh and possibly India. This
could become a security issue for India as well.

Muslim nations, human rights organisations, the western media, the UNHRC, and elements within
Myanmar have combined to project how the icon of democracy, Suu Kyi, failed to stop and condemn the
atrocities committed by security forces against Muslims in Rakhine state.

Prof. Baladas Ghosal: The main issue is the issue of legitimacy. Rohingyas are not really an ethnic
group, it is a political construction. There were Muslims living in that region from 9th century and there
was no problem in the period ruled under Arakan Kingdom. The major part of migration took place from
Bangladesh area (then undivided Bengal) in the 20th century along with colonial powers under the British
Burma during that period. So, they are mainly Muslims of Bengali origin. Infact it is difficult to give them
a single identity.
So, if they claim themselves to be as Muslims, then there of course wouldn't be any problem. But the
problem is that they are claiming themselves as an ethnic group and as we know Burma is patterned
along ethnic sort of identities (states in Burma are known by their ethnic names). Now, if Rohingyas are
recognised as an ethnic group, then they would also claim an ethnic state and this is the real fear of the
Rakhine Buddhists.

Actually, the repeated mention of them as 'Rohingyas' by the International Media validates the narrative
of essentialising a Muslim identity in Rakhine state and that is what the Rakhine Buddhists are afraid of.
That is why the Myanmar government calls them 'Bengalis'.

Amb. Preet Malik: "The 'Rohingyas' nomenclature will have to disappear, but that is not going to be
easy to do."

Amb. Vivek Katju says he is somewhat pessimistic about any early resolution of this issue for two
reasons:
i. Myanmar Army, is not an easy army to change, and
ii. Buddhist Sangh in Myanmar is a very aggressive Sangh.

Amb. Rajiv Bhatia: That the Rohingyas have been subjected to brutal suppression cannot be contested,
but critics tend to ignore the complexity of a problem that has defied solution for decades. The NLD did
not create it nor is its government directly in charge of security and border affairs, which is handled by
the military under the constitutional power-sharing formula. To expect Suu Kyi to play the role of the
government’s public critic, while serving in office, is unrealistic. Her endeavour has been to urge
restraint so that conditions become conducive to devising practical solutions. She set up the Kofi Annan
Commission to study the problem in depth and suggest long-term solutions. She has also spoken of the
need to stop violence in the region. This is a practical approach, especially as much of the Bamar
majority community is under the sway of anti-Muslim sentiments today.
Amb. M K Bhadrakumar: The stability of Bangladesh as a moderate Muslim country rooted in eclectic
values of secularism and democracy is of supreme importance for India. On the contrary, if Bangladesh
gets infiltrated by ‘jihadism’, the virus will inevitably take India down at some point. Rakhine could be
the incubator for creating the virus.
If Aung San Suu Kyi she gets discredited, Myanmar gets weakened and the legitimacy of state power to
effectively counter terrorism will suffer. India should stand beside her and give her all the support she
needs.

Pratap Bhanu Mehta on Rohingya Refugee Crisis: The Indian government’s stance on the Rohingya
refugees from Rakhine state in Myanmar is from a security point of view, imprudent; from a historical
point of view, myopic; and from a moral point of view, untenable.
The problem with our current strategy is not that it is placing security over humanitarianism. It is that it
is doing so in a way that is imprudent and likely to be self-defeating.

Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty: The Rohingyas have become the world's most unwanted people and the
future looks quite bleak. Myanmar is unlikely to take back most of the refugees and Bangladesh will
have to resettle them in new refugee camps and hope other countries will ease the burden by accepting
some refugees.

Bangladesh, Myanmar sign deal (Jan. 2018): Bangladesh and Myanmar have agreed to repatriate
650,000 Rohingya refugees, who fled Myanmar’s crisis-hit Rakhine province, in two years, according to
an agreement signed between the two countries.

India's dilemma comes from the fact that it needs to have good relations with both Bangladesh as well
as Myanmar for our own strategic reasons and thus cannot tilt to one side among the two. It is the test
of India's diplomacy.
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Internal Political Situation in Bangladesh (Pinak Chakravarty)

General Elections, 2018

• The Bangladeshi general election is expected be held between October 2018 - December 2018.
• The previous general elections, which took place in 2014, were boycotted by the main opposition
party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) led by three-time former Prime Minister Khaleda
Zia.

In February 2018, a special court in Bangladesh sentenced former PM Khaleda Zia to jail over
corruption charges. Her son, Tarique Rahman, the acting head of BNP has also been convicted in the
case.

There’s little doubt that the Khaleda-Tarique combine headed a corrupt and extortionist government
(2002-2006). Tarique and his younger brother (the late Arafat Rahman ‘Koko’) ran an extortion racket
and a parallel government during Khaleda Zia’s tenure.

During Khaleda Zia’s premiership, Bangladesh and Pakistan joined hands to subvert India’s interests.
• Support to Indian insurgent groups in the Northeast,
• Several Islamic extremist groups came into prominence. Tarique wanted to use these extremists
to target the AL leadership and workers, while Pakistan wanted to use them against India.
In 2004, PM Hasina escaped a grenade attack at a rally in which several AL leaders and workers were
killed, including the wife of the former president. Tarique is an accused in this case too.

Way forward for India: India has backed Sheikh Hasina and must continue to do so, given the track
record of the Khaleda-Tarique regime. But in Bangladesh, there is a growing perception of misrule by the
Awami League government even though Hasina has done a lot for the economic and infrastructure
development of the nation. So India must be prepared to deal with a BNP-Jamaat (BNP's electoral ally)
government in future and hope they would not commit the same mistakes vis-à-vis India once again.
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Bangladesh road-safety protests (29 July to 8 August 2018)

A series of public protests in Bangladesh advocating improved road safety were held from 29 July to 8
August 2018. They were sparked by the deaths of two high-school students in Dhaka struck by a bus
operated by an unlicensed driver. The incident impelled students to demand safer roads and stricter
traffic laws, and the demonstrations rapidly spread throughout Bangladesh.

The protests were peaceful until when police attempted to disperse the demonstrators with tear gas
and people believed to be members of Bangladesh Chhatra League (student wing of Awami League)
attacked protesters and journalists.

Following a live interview about the protests with Al Jazeera, photographer Shahidul Alam was detained
by police. Alam was charged under Section 57 of the Information and Communication Technology Act.
• The Act authorizes prosecution of any person who publishes in electronic form, material that is
“fake and obscene; defamatory; may cause, ‘deterioration in law and order’; prejudices the image
of the state or a person; or ‘causes or may cause hurt to religious belief.’”
• The Act is poorly drafted as it is very vague and broad.
• Seen as a tool to muzzle the press and freedom of expression. The maximum jail term is 14 years.
And law enforcers were empowered to make arrests without a warrant.
• The Indian Supreme Court in March 2015 struck down almost a similar section, terming it
unconstitutional - section 66A of the Information Technology Act.

Was the student protest aimed only at ensuring road safety? Or is it an outburst of people’s frustrations
against the government?
• Poor governance and law and order situation under AL government led by Sheikh Hasina.
• Government's intolerance of criticism; anybody who raises their voice is crushed with force.
• Government’s tendency to use violence to put down protests. Similar to August 2018, previous
protesters have been attacked by masked groups. It was the same for the students and job
seekers protesting against government job quotas in April 2018.
• Attacks on the media are also common in Bangladesh. The disappearances of journalists and
bloggers, their family members being followed, and so on are common and seldom reported.
• Issues of the infamous ICT Act.

The protest might be said to be an example of the frustration and anger present in society.

Video - Dissent in Bangladesh (Watch for clarity on internal politics in Bangladesh).

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