Liability of Unexplained Wealth corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or

retired.2
G.R. No. 104768               July 21, 2003
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q.
vs. Ramas ("Ramas"). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported
and ELIZABETH DIMAANO, Respondents. unexplained wealth of Ramas. The relevant part of the Resolution
reads:
DECISION
III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:
CARPIO, J.:
Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a
The Case house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. He is
also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an
area of 3,327 square meters.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set
aside the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (First Division)1 dated 18
November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The first The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated
Resolution dismissed petitioner’s Amended Complaint and ordered modestly at ₱700,000.00.
the return of the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano,
while the second Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found
Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by
its Amended Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of this elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all covered by
case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further proceedings invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO
allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence. Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items could not have been in the
possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by
Antecedent Facts respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army.

Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful Aside from the military equipment/items and communications
EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued equipment, the raiding team was also able to confiscate money in the
Executive Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") creating the Presidential amount of ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of
Commission on Good Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security
and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power "(a) Command, Philippine Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baños,
to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of
and carry out the purposes of this order" and the power "(h) to respondent. That respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas,
out the purpose of this order." Accordingly, the PCGG, through its Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and
then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board kisses respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in
("AFP Board") tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and
a car went to the residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under
cases filled with money and owned by MGen Ramas. Republic Act No. 1379 ("RA No. 1379") 4 against Ramas.

Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General
had no visible means of income and is supported by respondent for Francisco I. Chavez filed an Amended Complaint naming the Republic
she was formerly a mere secretary. of the Philippines ("petitioner"), represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff
and Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint also impleaded
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used Elizabeth Dimaano ("Dimaano") as co-defendant.
the military equipment/items seized in her house on March 3, 1986
without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth General of the Philippine Army until 1986. On the other hand,
Dimaano to claim that she owns the ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit,
Dollars for she had no visible source of income. Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from
1 January 1978 to February 1979. The Amended Complaint further
This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and alleged that Ramas "acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly
Liabilities of respondent. There was an intention to cover the out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income
existence of these money because these are all ill-gotten and from legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his
unexplained wealth. Were it not for the affidavits of the members of public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such
the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los Baños, officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate
Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money would have and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos."5
never been known.
The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a
The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also previous inquiry, found reasonable ground to believe that respondents
submitted for scrutiny and analysis by the Board’s consultant. have violated RA No. 1379.6 The Amended Complaint prayed for,
Although the amount of ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were among others, the forfeiture of respondents’ properties, funds and
not included, still it was disclosed that respondent has an unexplained equipment in favor of the State.
wealth of ₱104,134. 60.
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and
IV. CONCLUSION: Compulsory Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint. In his Answer,
Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential
In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at ₱700,000,
against respondent for ill-gotten and unexplained wealth in the which was not out of proportion to his salary and other legitimate
amount of ₱2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars. income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the
cash, communications equipment and other items confiscated from
V. RECOMMENDATION: the house of Dimaano.

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting
(ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended, her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-
otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies,
1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her
Unlawfully Acquired Property."3 house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.
After termination of the pre-trial,7 the court set the case for trial on the During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its
merits on 9-11 November 1988. inability to present further evidence. Giving petitioner one more
chance to present further evidence or to amend the complaint to
On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing conform to its evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May
due to its lack of preparation for trial and the absence of witnesses 1990. The Sandiganbayan, however, hinted that the re-setting was
and vital documents to support its case. The court reset the hearing to without prejudice to any action that private respondents might take
17 and 18 April 1989. under the circumstances.

On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to
complaint in order "to charge the delinquent properties with being proceed to trial because it had no further evidence to present. Again,
subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60
Dimaano alone x x x."8 days within which to file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan,
however, warned petitioner that failure to act would constrain the court
Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan to take drastic action.
proceeded with petitioner’s presentation of evidence on the ground
that the motion for leave to amend complaint did not state when Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on
petitioner would file the amended complaint. The Sandiganbayan Republic v. Migrino.9 The Court held in Migrino that the PCGG does
further stated that the subject matter of the amended complaint was not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by
on its face vague and not related to the existing complaint. The reason of mere position held without a showing that they are
Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the case had been "subordinates" of former President Marcos.
pending in court, petitioner should proceed to present its evidence.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the
After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a dispositive portion of which states:
postponement of the trial.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended
On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner Complaint, without pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are
manifested its inability to proceed to trial because of the absence of likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the confiscated sum of
other witnesses or lack of further evidence to present. Instead, money, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are
petitioner reiterated its motion to amend the complaint to conform to ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.
the evidence already presented or to change the averments to show
that Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired the monies or properties The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the
subject of the forfeiture. Hon. Ombudsman, who has primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture
cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as the
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the evidence warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of
case for over a year mainly because of its many postponements. the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability
Moreover, petitioner would want the case to revert to its preliminary of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.
stage when in fact the case had long been ready for trial. The
Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to prepare for presentation of its SO ORDERED.
additional evidence, if any.
On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.
In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
a Joint Comment/Opposition to which petitioner filed its Reply on 10 HOLDING THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE
January 1992. PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL
COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, SHOULD
On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE
denying the Motion for Reconsideration. SUPREME COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 194
SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO, 189 SCRA 289,
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the 1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and
following grounds: Republic v. Migrino, supra, are clearly not applicable to
this case;
(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance
with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v. 2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the
Sandiganbayan10 and Republic v. Migrino11 which involve the complaint in Civil Case No. 0037 was cured and/or
same issues. waived by respondents with the filing of their respective
answers with counterclaim; and
(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in
criminal cases was conducted against Ramas and Dimaano. 3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently
improper considering that they were filed after
(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute commencement of the presentation of the evidence of
a prima facie case against him. the petitioner and even before the latter was allowed to
formally offer its evidence and rest its case;
(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items
confiscated. C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE ARTICLES AND THINGS SUCH AS
The Issues SUMS OF MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT,
JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES CONFISCATED FROM THE
HOUSE OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO WERE ILLEGALLY
Petitioner raises the following issues:
SEIZED AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE.12
A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
The Court’s Ruling
CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE CANNOT
MAKE A CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS
NO SHOWING OF CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR First Issue: PCGG’s Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents
RELATIONSHIP BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY
AND BETWEEN RESPONDENT RAMAS AND This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this
RESPONDENT DIMAANO NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan13 and Republic v. Migrino.14
THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS WERE CLEARLY
UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE, HAVING BEEN The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the
RENDERED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition
PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER.
against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the
1379. PCGG.18

We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction. Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned
Ramas’ case to the PCGG. Therefore, Ramas’ case should fall under
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise
wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, whether in the active its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was
service or retired.15 The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the undoubtedly a subordinate of former President Marcos because of his
necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies on position as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
the action to be taken based on its findings.16 The PCGG gave this Petitioner claims that Ramas’ position enabled him to receive orders
task to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGG’s power under Section 3 directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a
of EO No. 1 "to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to subordinate of former President Marcos.
accomplish and to carry out the purposes of this order." EO No. 1
gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit: We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President
Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its
SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting amendments.
the President in regard to the following matters:
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former him a "subordinate" as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:
or abroad, including the takeover and sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily
administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue show what is contemplated within the term ‘subordinate.’ The
advantage of their public office and/ or using their powers, authority, Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the
influence, connections or relationship. ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the abroad.
President may assign to the Commission from time to time.
EO No. 2 freezes ‘all assets and properties in the Philippines in which
x x x. former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their
close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents,
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the or nominees have any interest or participation.’
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall
under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis
These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth that is-
during the administration of former President Marcos by being the
latter’s immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, ‘[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by
taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are
influence x x x;17 or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as
applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Resolution belies this contention. Although the Resolution begins with
Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., such statement, it ends with the following recommendation:
203].’
V. RECOMMENDATION:
[T]he term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who
enjoys a close association with former President Marcos and/or his Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas
wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended,
associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA
dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2. 1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of
Unlawfully Acquired Property."20
xxx
Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the result yielded a
government official or employee during the administration of former finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any
President Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO
respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close No. 1 and its amendments proves fatal to petitioner’s case. EO No. 1
association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose, and necessarily
(Emphasis supplied) its powers must be construed to address such specific and limited
purpose.
Ramas’ position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine
Army with the rank of Major General19 does not suffice to make him a Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended
"subordinate" of former President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 Complaint do not show that the properties Ramas allegedly owned
and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing were accumulated by him in his capacity as a "subordinate" of his
that Ramas was a close associate of former President Marcos, in the commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the properties
same manner that business associates, dummies, agents or Ramas allegedly owned and suggested that these properties were
nominees of former President Marcos were close to him. Such close disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate income without
association is manifested either by Ramas’ complicity with former showing that Ramas amassed them because of his close association
President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the with former President Marcos. Petitioner, in fact, admits that the AFP
deposed President or by former President Marcos’ acquiescence in Board resolution does not contain a finding that Ramas accumulated
Ramas’ own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any. his wealth because of his close association with former President
Marcos, thus:
This, the PCGG failed to do.
10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the
Petitioner’s attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does New Armed Forces of the Philippines did not categorically find a
not convince us. Petitioner argues that unlike in Migrino, the AFP prima facie evidence showing that respondent Ramas unlawfully
Board Resolution in the instant case states that the AFP Board accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation
conducted the investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in with former President Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that
relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner asserts that there is a presumption such omission was not fatal. The resolution of the Anti-Graft Board
that the PCGG was acting within its jurisdiction of investigating crony- should be read in the context of the law creating the same and the
related cases of graft and corruption and that Ramas was truly a objective of the investigation which was, as stated in the above,
subordinate of the former President. However, the same AFP Board pursuant to Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a;21 (Emphasis supplied)
Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should
facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was accumulated by a investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling under EO No.
"subordinate" of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained
PCGG. EO No. 122 clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on the wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the
urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the authority to file the
President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor General.27 The
close associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal is Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No. 6770 ("RA No. 6770") vests in
clearly contrary to the intent behind the creation of the PCGG. the Ombudsman the power to conduct preliminary investigation and to
file forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained wealth amassed after
In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,23 the Court outlined the cases that fall 25 February 1986.28
under the jurisdiction of the PCGG pursuant to EO Nos. 1,
2,24 14,25 14-A:26 After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still
pursued this case despite the absence of a prima facie finding that
A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in Ramas was a "subordinate" of former President Marcos. The petition
relation with Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Executive Order No. 14, shows for forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for
what the authority of the respondent PCGG to investigate and lack of authority by the PCGG to investigate respondents since there
prosecute covers: is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its amendments apply to
respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended
(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the Complaint state that there are violations of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379.
recovery of ill-gotten wealth under Republic Act No. 1379, Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas’ case to the
accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases. As
located in the Philippines or abroad, including the take-over or stated in Migrino:
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or [But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate
through his nominees, by taking undue advantage of their and cause the prosecution of private respondent for violation of Rep.
public office and/or using their powers, authority and influence, Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from
connections or relationships; and proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action that may be
taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates
(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the powers
committed in the acquisition of said ill-gotten wealth as granted to it.
contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.
Petitioner’s argument that private respondents have waived any
However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices defect in the filing of the forfeiture petition by submitting their
Act not otherwise falling under the foregoing categories, require respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as well.
a previous authority of the President for the respondent PCGG to
investigate and prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is
Executive Order No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is no jurisdiction to waive in the first place. The PCGG cannot exercise
vested in the Ombudsman and other duly authorized investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. PCGG’s
investigating agencies such as the provincial and city powers are specific and limited. Unless given additional assignment
prosecutors, their assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his by the President, PCGG’s sole task is only to recover the ill-gotten
assistants and the state prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)
wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. 29 Without these most of petitioner’s evidence) with being subject to forfeiture as
elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case. having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x."

Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of
PCGG to investigate and prosecute their cases by filing their Motion petitioner’s evidence since petitioner did not state when it would file
to Dismiss as soon as they learned of the pronouncement of the Court the amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan set the
in Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August 1990, which explains continuation of the presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and
why private respondents only filed their Motion to Dismiss on 8 9-11 October 1989, giving petitioner ample time to prepare its
October 1990. Nevertheless, we have held that the parties may raise evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989, petitioner manifested its
lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding. 30 Thus, we hold that inability to proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The
there was no waiver of jurisdiction in this case. Jurisdiction is vested Sandiganbayan issued an Order expressing its view on the matter, to
by law and not by the parties to an action.31 wit:

Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the
by the PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation. The above events because this case has been ready for trial for over a
Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary investigation for year and much of the delay hereon has been due to the inability of the
violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may government to produce on scheduled dates for pre-trial and for trial
file the forfeiture petition with the Sandiganbayan.32 The right of the documents and witnesses, allegedly upon the failure of the military to
State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject supply them for the preparation of the presentation of evidence
to prescription, laches or estoppel.33 thereon. Of equal interest is the fact that this Court has been held to
task in public about its alleged failure to move cases such as this one
Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case beyond the preliminary stage, when, in view of the developments such
Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence as those of today, this Court is now faced with a situation where a
case already in progress will revert back to the preliminary stage,
Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing despite a five-month pause where appropriate action could have been
the case before completion of the presentation of petitioner’s undertaken by the plaintiff Republic.35
evidence.
On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was
We disagree. conducting a preliminary investigation on the unexplained wealth of
private respondents as mandated by RA No. 1379.36 The PCGG
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this prayed for an additional four months to conduct the preliminary
case, we find that petitioner has only itself to blame for non- investigation. The Sandiganbayan granted this request and scheduled
completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has the presentation of evidence on 26-29 March 1990. However, on the
been pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. scheduled date, petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of the
Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only preliminary investigation the PCGG supposedly conducted. Again, the
began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner had almost Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until 18 May 1990 to continue with the
two years to prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient presentation of its evidence and to inform the court of "what lies
time, petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence ahead insofar as the status of the case is concerned x x x." 37 Still on
by filing numerous motions for postponements and extensions. Even the date set, petitioner failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11
before the date set for the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, July 1990, petitioner filed its Re-Amended Complaint. 38 The
on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint. 34 The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that a case already pending for
motion sought "to charge the delinquent properties (which comprise
years would revert to its preliminary stage if the court were to accept Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team
the Re-Amended Complaint. conducted the search and seizure "on March 3, 1986 or five days after
the successful EDSA revolution."39 Petitioner argues that a
Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of
blame for failure to complete the presentation of its evidence. The Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice
Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than sufficient time to finish the President Laurel were "taking power in the name and by the will of the
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan overlooked Filipino people."40 Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government
petitioner’s delays and yet petitioner ended the long-string of delays effectively withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which
with the filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would only prolong guaranteed private respondents’ exclusionary right.
even more the disposition of the case.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of
prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case since the PCGG ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights
has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at
private respondents. This alone would have been sufficient legal basis the time of the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the
for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the forfeiture case against private monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence
respondents. against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did
not enjoy any constitutional right.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the
case before completion of the presentation of petitioner’s evidence. Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.

Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As
succinctly stated in President Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3 dated 25
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was "done in defiance of the
properties confiscated from Dimaano’s house as illegally seized and provisions of the 1973 Constitution."41 The resulting government was
therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or
effect on petitioner’s case since these properties comprise most of legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary
petitioner’s evidence against private respondents. Petitioner will not government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed
have much evidence to support its case against private respondents if under international law.
these properties are inadmissible in evidence.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaano’s bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the
residence a search warrant captioned "Illegal Possession of Firearms interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power
and Ammunition." Dimaano was not present during the raid but by the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance
Dimaano’s cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the
items detailed in the seizure receipt together with other items not adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the
included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized these items: protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on
one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") and the Universal Declaration of
ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45; communications equipment, cash Human Rights ("Declaration") remained in effect during the
consisting of ₱2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles. interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not xxx
operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection
accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was
remained in effect during the interregnum. not due to constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in
violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos
government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the as the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be said
extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of that the organization of Mrs. Aquino’s Government which was met by
the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the
municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the
revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp
could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because of the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal
there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the
interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)
Reynato S. Puno:42
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained
A revolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the operative during the interregnum would render void all sequestration
established government in any country or state by those who were orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government
previously subject to it" or as "a sudden, radical and fundamental ("PCGG") before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The
change in the government or political system, usually effected with sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over
violence or at least some acts of violence." In Kelsen's book, General of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action,
Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which "occurs whenever would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the
the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order Bill of Rights.
. . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself."
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, revolutionary government bound by no constitution. No one could
and more popularly known as the "people power revolution" that the validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of
Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime. This Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the
government. sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary
to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been
defined as "an inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential
change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of Commission on Good Government,43 petitioner Baseco, while
government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum,
legal and constitutional methods of making such change have proved questioned the continued validity of the sequestration orders upon
inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable." It has been adoption of the Freedom Constitution in view of the due process
said that "the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the Freedom
of the state" and from there is derived "the right of the people to Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the
abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government without validity of sequestration orders, thus:
regard to the existing constitution."
If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not an allowable
considerations as to the validity and propriety of sequestration, freeze extrapolation. Hence, we should not give the exceptions asked for,
and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these and let me elaborate and give three reasons:
particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have
received constitutional approbation and sanction. As already First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of
mentioned, the Provisional or "Freedom" Constitution recognizes the the CONCOM is to hasten constitutional normalization. Very much at
power and duty of the President to enact "measures to achieve the the heart of the constitutional normalization is the full effectivity of the
mandate of the people to . . . (r)ecover ill-gotten properties amassed Bill of Rights. We cannot, in one breath, ask for constitutional
by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the normalization and at the same time ask for a temporary halt to the full
interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of functioning of what is at the heart of constitutionalism. That would be
assets or accounts." And as also already adverted to, Section 26, hypocritical; that would be a repetition of Marcosian protestation of
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution treats of, and ratifies the due process and rule of law. The New Society word for that is
"authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation "backsliding." It is tragic when we begin to backslide even before we
No. 3 dated March 25, 1986." get there.

The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become
Constitution were fully aware that the sequestration orders would ingrained. The committee report asks for extraordinary exceptions
clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both constitutions from the Bill of Rights for six months after the convening of Congress,
had to include specific language recognizing the validity of the and Congress may even extend this longer.
sequestration orders. The following discourse by Commissioner
Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the Constitutional Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become
Commission is instructive: vice. What the committee report is asking for is that we should allow
the new government to acquire the vice of disregarding the Bill of
FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic Rights.
about the arguments in defense of the present amendment.
Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The
For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salonga’s lecture in the practitioners of the vice begin to think that they have a vested right to
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, of which all of us have been its practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the franchise.
given a copy. On the one hand, he argues that everything the That would be an unhealthy way of consolidating the gains of a
Commission is doing is traditionally legal. This is repeated by democratic revolution.
Commissioner Romulo also. Minister Salonga spends a major portion
of his lecture developing that argument. On the other hand, almost as Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal
an afterthought, he says that in the end what matters are the results niceties is an argument that is very disturbing. When it comes from a
and not the legal niceties, thus suggesting that the PCGG should be staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and
allowed to make some legal shortcuts, another word for niceties or repeated verbatim by another staunch Christian like Commissioner
exceptions. Tingson, it becomes doubly disturbing and even discombobulating.
The argument makes the PCGG an auctioneer, placing the Bill of
Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the Rights on the auction block. If the price is right, the search and
CONCOM for special protection? The answer is clear. What they are seizure clause will be sold. "Open your Swiss bank account to us and
doing will not stand the test of ordinary due process, hence they are we will award you the search and seizure clause. You can keep it in
asking for protection, for exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes your private safe."
remedios, fine, as the saying stands, but let us not say grandes
Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people
hostage to the hoarders of hidden wealth. The hoarders will release continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost
the hidden health if the ransom price is paid and the ransom price is the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
the Bill of Rights, specifically the due process in the search and
seizure clauses. So, there is something positively revolving about The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure
either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale to the highest bidder government, assumed responsibility for the State’s good faith
nor can it be used to ransom captive dollars. This nation will survive compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory.
and grow strong, only if it would become convinced of the values Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect
enshrined in the Constitution of a price that is beyond monetary and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
estimation. jurisdiction the rights45 recognized in the present Covenant." Under
Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the
For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
Commission is to delete all of Section 8 of the committee report and interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence."
allow the new Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If Section 8 is
deleted, the PCGG has two options. First, it can pursue the Salonga The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides
and the Romulo argument — that what the PCGG has been doing has in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
been completely within the pale of the law. If sustained, the PCGG property." Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it
can go on and should be able to go on, even without the support of as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has
Section 8. If not sustained, however, the PCGG has only one interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles
honorable option, it must bow to the majesty of the Bill of Rights. of international law and binding on the State.46 Thus, the revolutionary
government was also obligated under international law to observe the
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. rights47 of individuals under the Declaration.
Let me conclude with what another Christian replied when asked to
toy around with the law. From his prison cell, Thomas More said, "I'll The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the
give the devil benefit of law for my nation’s safety sake." I ask the Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary
Commission to give the devil benefit of law for our nation’s sake. And government could have repudiated all its obligations under the
we should delete Section 8. Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue
here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part
Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied) of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are
proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the
Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate
amendment excepting sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the
Constitutional Commission still adopted the amendment as Section 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary
26,44 Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the government could not escape responsibility for the State’s good faith
Constitution were fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.
orders would not stand the test of due process under the Bill of
Rights. It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25
March 1986 that the directives and orders of the revolutionary
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if
in force during the interregnum, absent a constitutional provision contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. The
excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the
render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum. 1973 Constitution.48 The Provisional Constitution served as a self-
limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the they forced open these containers only to find out that they contained
absolute powers entrusted to it by the people. money.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, xxx

directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so
long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the
the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not reason why your team seized this money instead of weapons?
have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the
revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting
the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued him decided to bring along also the money because at that time it was
by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched already dark and they felt most secured if they will bring that because
and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items they might be suspected also of taking money out of those items, your
specifically described in the warrant. Honor.49

However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in Cross-examination
the warrant. As admitted by petitioner’s witnesses, the raiding team
confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus: Atty. Banaag

Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this
case was applied before the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas,
AJ AMORES Branch 1?

Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only A. Yes, sir.
for weapons. What else, aside from the weapons, were seized from
the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano? Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and
seizure of five (5) baby armalite rifles M-16 and five (5) boxes of
A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and ammunition?
US dollars, some jewelries, land titles, sir.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from
the house of Elizabeth Dimaano. Do you know the reason why your xxx
team also seized other properties not mentioned in said search
warrant? AJ AMORES
A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct
informed that the reason why they also brought the other items not surveillance in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
included in the search warrant was because the money and other
jewelries were contained in attaché cases and cartons with markings
A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with
"Sony Trinitron", and I think three (3) vaults or steel safes. Believing
the MSU elements, your Honor.
that the attaché cases and the steel safes were containing firearms,
Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house Q. In the fiscal’s office?
of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, sir.
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber
Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge? pistol had a Memorandum Receipt in the name of Felino Melegrito, is
that not correct?
A. Yes, your Honor.
A. I think that was the reason, sir.
Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search
warrant, any other properties or contraband which could be found in Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the
the residence of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano? search warrant, like for instance, jewelries. Why did you seize the
jewelries?
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden
items, for instance, the communications equipment and money. A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his
However, I did not include that in the application for search warrant assistant to bring along also the jewelries and other items, sir. I do not
considering that we have not established concrete evidence about really know where it was taken but they brought along also these
that. So when… articles. I do not really know their reason for bringing the same, but I
just learned that these were taken because they might get lost if they
Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to will just leave this behind.
believe that only weapons were in the house of Miss Elizabeth
Dimaano? xxx

A. Yes, your Honor.50 Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not
also included in the search warrant?
xxx
A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the
Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one money was discovered to be contained in attaché
armalite rifle M-16 and how many ammunition? cases.1âwphi1 These attaché cases were suspected to be containing
pistols or other high powered firearms, but in the course of the search
A. Forty, sir. the contents turned out to be money. So the team leader also decided
to take this considering that they believed that if they will just leave the
Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing money behind, it might get lost also.
Court, with the fiscal’s office who charged Elizabeth Dimaano for
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition? Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were
seized by your raiding team, like Transfer Certificates of Title of
A. Yes, sir. lands?

Q. Do you know what happened to that case? A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were
opened.51
A. I think it was dismissed, sir.
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant CORONA, J.:
did not include the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and
land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated seeking to (1) set aside the Resolution dated January 31, 2002 issued
them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to by the Special First Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No.
seize these items without showing that these items could be the 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et.
subject of warrantless search and seizure.52 Clearly, the raiding team al., and (2) reinstate its earlier decision dated September 19, 2000
exceeded its authority when it seized these items. which forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) the amount held in escrow in the Philippine National Bank
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items (PNB) in the aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January
are contraband per se,53 and they are not, they must be returned to 31, 2002.
the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not
declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to
seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the Presidential
these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano. Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of
questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18 November the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his
1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA 13791 in relation
records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as to Executive Order Nos. 1,2 2,3 144 and 14-A.5
the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate
of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED. amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be more than US$658
million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-
SO ORDERED. gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by the following five
account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss
Liability of Unexplained Wealth banks:

(1) Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts;

G.R. No. 152154            July 15, 2003 (2) Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus- Avertina
Foundation accounts;
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. (3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts;
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION),
FERDINAND E. MARCOS (REPRESENTED BY HIS (4) Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts and
ESTATE/HEIRS: IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA [IMEE]
MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE (5) Maler Foundation accounts.
MARCOS-ARANETA) AND IMELDA ROMUALDEZ
MARCOS, respondents.
In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and opposition thereto which was later adopted by respondents Mrs.
US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately
acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank In its resolution dated November 20, 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied
of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the petitioner's motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the
freeze order issued by the PCGG. pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the compromise
agreement "(took) precedence over the motion for summary
On October 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda judgment."
M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed their
answer. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on May 26, 1998
claiming she was not a party to the motion for approval of the
Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Compromise Agreement and that she owned 90% of the funds with
Supplemental Agreements6 dated December 28, 1993 were executed the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate.
by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol
Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. Meanwhile, on August 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the District
Subsequently, respondent Marcos children filed a motion dated Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland, an additional request for the
December 7, 1995 for the approval of said agreements and for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in the PNB.
enforcement thereof. The request was granted. On appeal by the Marcoses, the Swiss
Federal Supreme Court, in a decision dated December 10, 1997,
The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, upheld the ruling of the District Attorney of Zurich granting the request
collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to for the transfer of the funds. In 1998, the funds were remitted to the
be owned by the Marcos family under the conditions contained Philippines in escrow. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children
therein. The aforementioned General Agreement specified in one of moved that the funds be placed in custodia legis because the deposit
its premises or "whereas clauses" the fact that petitioner "obtained a in escrow in the PNB was allegedly in danger of dissipation by
judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, in its resolution dated September 8,
that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) 1998, granted the motion.
belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain
conditionalities are met x x x." The said decision of the Swiss Federal After the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-trial order and
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter supplemental pre-trial order dated October 28, 1999 and January 21,
Consandey, granting petitioner's request for legal 2000, respectively, the case was set for trial. After several resettings,
assistance.7 Consandey declared the various deposits in the name of petitioner, on March 10, 2000, filed another motion for summary
the enumerated foundations to be of illegal provenance and ordered judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million, based on
that they be frozen to await the final verdict in favor of the parties the following grounds:
entitled to restitution.
I
Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to
approve the General/Supplemental Agreements. Respondent THE ESSENTIAL FACTS WHICH WARRANT THE
Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as witness for the purpose of FORFEITURE OF THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE PETITION
establishing the partial implementation of said agreements. UNDER R.A. NO. 1379 ARE ADMITTED BY RESPONDENTS
IN THEIR PLEADINGS AND OTHER SUBMISSIONS MADE
On October 18, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment IN THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING.
and/or judgment on the pleadings. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her
 II total aggregate value equivalent to US$627,608,544.95 as of
August 31, 2000 together with the increments thereof forfeited
RESPONDENTS' ADMISSION MADE DURING THE PRE- in favor of the State.10
TRIAL THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY INTEREST OR
OWNERSHIP OVER THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a motion for reconsideration dated
ACTION FOR FORFEITURE TENDERS NO GENUINE ISSUE September 26, 2000. Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. filed
OR CONTROVERSY AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT IN THE their own motion for reconsideration dated October 5, 2000. Mrs.
PRESENT ACTION, THUS WARRANTING THE RENDITION Araneta filed a manifestation dated October 4, 2000 adopting the
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.8 motion for reconsideration of Mrs. Marcos, Mrs. Manotoc and
Ferdinand, Jr.
Petitioner contended that, after the pre-trial conference, certain facts
were established, warranting a summary judgment on the funds Subsequently, petitioner filed its opposition thereto.
sought to be forfeited.
In a resolution11 dated January 31, 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition to the petitioner's motion its September 19, 2000 decision, thus denying petitioner's motion for
for summary judgment, which opposition was later adopted by her co- summary judgment:
respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
CONCLUSION
On March 24, 2000, a hearing on the motion for summary judgment
was conducted. In sum, the evidence offered for summary judgment of the
case did not prove that the money in the Swiss Banks
In a decision9 dated September 19, 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists
petitioner's motion for summary judgment: in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds
in escrow from the Swiss Banks.
CONCLUSION
The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot
There is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation of be deemed to have been established and our judgment
evidence. thereon, perforce, must also have been without basis.

The Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted. WHEREFORE, the decision of this Court dated September 19,
2000 is reconsidered and set aside, and this case is now being
The Swiss deposits which were transmitted to and now held in set for further proceedings.12
escrow at the PNB are deemed unlawfully acquired as ill-
gotten wealth. Hence, the instant petition. In filing the same, petitioner argues that
the Sandiganbayan, in reversing its September 19, 2000 decision,
DISPOSITION committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction considering that --
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines and against the respondents, I
declaring the Swiss deposits which were transferred to and
now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the
PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO PROVE ITS CASE IN II
ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OF SECTIONS 2
AND 3 OF R.A. NO. 1379: SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER SINCE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT RAISED ANY GENUINE ISSUE
A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CATEGORICALLY OF FACT CONSIDERING THAT:
ADMITTED NOT ONLY THE PERSONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DEFENSE THAT
AND IMELDA R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS SWISS DEPOSITS WERE LAWFULLY ACQUIRED
BUT ALSO THE EXTENT OF THEIR SALARIES AS DOES NOT ONLY FAIL TO TENDER AN ISSUE BUT
SUCH PUBLIC OFFICIALS, WHO UNDER THE IS CLEARLY A SHAM; AND
CONSTITUTION, WERE PROHIBITED FROM
ENGAGING IN THE MANAGEMENT OF B. IN SUBSEQUENTLY DISCLAIMING OWNERSHIP
FOUNDATIONS. OF THE SWISS DEPOSITS, PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS ABANDONED THEIR SHAM
B. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ALSO ADMITTED THE DEFENSE OF LEGITIMATE ACQUISITION, AND
EXISTENCE OF THE SWISS DEPOSITS AND THEIR THIS FURTHER JUSTIFIED THE RENDITION OF A
OWNERSHIP THEREOF: SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

1. ADMISSIONS IN PRIVATE III

RESPONDENTS' ANSWER;
THE FOREIGN FOUNDATIONS NEED NOT BE IMPLEADED.
2. ADMISSION IN THE GENERAL /
SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENTS THEY IV
SIGNED AND SOUGHT TO IMPLEMENT;
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE COMMITTED
3. ADMISSION IN A MANIFESTATION OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING HIMSELF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IMELDA R. ON THE GROUND THAT ORIGINAL COPIES OF THE
MARCOS AND IN THE MOTION TO PLACE AUTHENTICATED SWISS DECISIONS AND THEIR
THE RES IN CUSTODIA LEGIS; AND "AUTHENTICATED TRANSLATIONS" HAVE NOT BEEN
SUBMITTED TO THE COURT, WHEN EARLIER THE
4. ADMISSION IN THE UNDERTAKING TO SANDIGANBAYAN HAS QUOTED EXTENSIVELY A
PAY THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS. PORTION OF THE TRANSLATION OF ONE OF THESE
SWISS DECISIONS IN HIS "PONENCIA" DATED JULY 29,
C. PETITIONER HAS PROVED THE EXTENT OF THE 1999 WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO RELEASE ONE
LEGITIMATE INCOME OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION US DOLLARS ($150,000,000.00)
AND IMELDA R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS. TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS.

D. PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA V

FACIE PRESUMPTION OF UNLAWFULLY
ACQUIRED WEALTH.
 PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE DEEMED TO HAVE THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
WAIVED THEIR OBJECTION TO THE AUTHENTICITY OF IN SETTING THE CASE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.14
THE SWISS FEDERAL SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.13
Mrs. Marcos contends that petitioner has a plain, speedy and
Petitioner, in the main, asserts that nowhere in the respondents' adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of the
motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2000 directing
reconsideration were the authenticity, accuracy and admissibility of petitioner to submit the authenticated translations of the Swiss
the Swiss decisions ever challenged. Otherwise stated, it was decisions. Instead of availing of said remedy, petitioner now elevates
incorrect for the Sandiganbayan to use the issue of lack of the matter to this Court. According to Mrs. Marcos, a petition for
authenticated translations of the decisions of the Swiss Federal certiorari which does not comply with the requirements of the rules
Supreme Court as the basis for reversing itself because respondents may be dismissed. Since petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate
themselves never raised this issue in their motions for reconsideration remedy, that is, to proceed to trial and submit authenticated
and supplemental motion for reconsideration. Furthermore, this translations of the Swiss decisions, its petition before this Court must
particular issue relating to the translation of the Swiss court decisions be dismissed. Corollarily, the Sandiganbayan's ruling to set the case
could not be resurrected anymore because said decisions had been for further proceedings cannot and should not be considered a
previously utilized by the Sandiganbayan itself in resolving a "decisive capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment.
issue" before it.
Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., in their comment, prayed
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for questioning the non- for the dismissal of the petition on the grounds that:
production of the authenticated translations of the Swiss Federal
Supreme Court decisions as this was a marginal and technical matter (A)
that did not diminish by any measure the conclusiveness and strength
of what had been proven and admitted before the Sandiganbayan, BY THE TIME PETITIONER FILED ITS MOTION FOR
that is, that the funds deposited by the Marcoses constituted ill-gotten SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 10 MARCH 2000, IT WAS
wealth and thus belonged to the Filipino people. ALREADY BARRED FROM DOING SO.

In compliance with the order of this Court, Mrs. Marcos filed her (1) The Motion for Summary Judgment was based on private
comment to the petition on May 22, 2002. After several motions for respondents' Answer and other documents that had long been
extension which were all granted, the comment of Mrs. Manotoc and in the records of the case. Thus, by the time the Motion was
Ferdinand, Jr. and the separate comment of Mrs. Araneta were filed filed on 10 March 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in
on May 27, 2002. against petitioner.

Mrs. Marcos asserts that the petition should be denied on the (2) By its positive acts and express admissions prior to filing
following grounds: the Motion for Summary Judgment on 10 March 1990,
petitioner had legally bound itself to go to trial on the basis of
A. existing issues. Thus, it clearly waived whatever right it had to
move for summary judgment.
PETITIONER HAS A PLAIN, SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE
REMEDY AT THE SANDIGANBAYAN. (B)

B.
EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT LEGALLY (C)
BARRED FROM FILING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS CORRECT IN IT WAS ONLY BY ARBITRARILY ISOLATING AND THEN
RULING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT YET ESTABLISHED TAKING CERTAIN STATEMENTS MADE BY PRIVATE
A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR THE FORFEITURE OF THE RESPONDENTS OUT OF CONTEXT THAT PETITIONER
SWISS FUNDS. WAS ABLE TO TREAT THESE AS "JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS"
SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE AND
(1) Republic Act No. 1379, the applicable law, is a penal THEREAFTER A CONCLUSIVE CASE TO JUSTIFY THE
statute. As such, its provisions, particularly the essential FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.
elements stated in section 3 thereof, are mandatory in nature.
These should be strictly construed against petitioner and (1) Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the
liberally in favor of private respondents. General and Supplemental Agreements, as well as the other
written and testimonial statements submitted in relation
(2) Petitioner has failed to establish the third and fourth thereto, are expressly barred from being admissible in
essential elements in Section 3 of R.A. 1379 with respect to evidence against private respondents.
the identification, ownership, and approximate amount of the
property which the Marcos couple allegedly "acquired during (2) Had petitioner bothered to weigh the alleged admissions
their incumbency". together with the other statements on record, there would be a
demonstrable showing that no such "judicial admissions" were
(a) Petitioner has failed to prove that the Marcos couple made by private respondents.
"acquired" or own the Swiss funds.
(D)
(b) Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the
fact of acquisition has been proven, petitioner has SINCE PETITIONER HAS NOT (YET) PROVEN ALL THE
categorically admitted that it has no evidence showing ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE
how much of the Swiss funds was acquired "during the CASE FOR FORFEITURE, AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
incumbency" of the Marcos couple from 31 December HAVE NOT MADE ANY JUDICIAL ADMISSION THAT
1965 to 25 February 1986. WOULD HAVE FREED IT FROM ITS BURDEN OF PROOF,
THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE
(3) In contravention of the essential element stated in OF DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR
Section 3 (e) of R.A. 1379, petitioner has failed to SUMMARY JUDGMENT. CERTIORARI, THEREFORE, DOES
establish the other proper earnings and income from NOT LIE, ESPECIALLY AS THIS COURT IS NOT A TRIER
legitimately acquired property of the Marcos couple OF FACTS.18
over and above their government salaries.
For her part, Mrs. Araneta, in her comment to the petition, claims that
(4) Since petitioner failed to prove the three essential elements obviously petitioner is unable to comply with a very plain requirement
provided in paragraphs (c)15 (d),16 and (e)17 of Section 3, R.A. of respondent Sandiganbayan. The instant petition is allegedly an
1379, the inescapable conclusion is that the prima facie attempt to elevate to this Court matters, issues and incidents which
presumption of unlawful acquisition of the Swiss funds has not should be properly threshed out at the Sandiganbayan. To respondent
yet attached. There can, therefore, be no premature forfeiture Mrs. Araneta, all other matters, save that pertaining to the
of the funds. authentication of the translated Swiss Court decisions, are irrelevant
and impertinent as far as this Court is concerned. Respondent Mrs.
Araneta manifests that she is as eager as respondent Sandiganbayan The urgency of this undertaking was tersely described by this Court
or any interested person to have the Swiss Court decisions officially in Republic vs. Lobregat22:
translated in our known language. She says the authenticated official
English version of the Swiss Court decisions should be presented. surely x x x an enterprise "of great pith and moment"; it was
This should stop all speculations on what indeed is contained therein. attended by "great expectations"; it was initiated not only out of
Thus, respondent Mrs. Araneta prays that the petition be denied for considerations of simple justice but also out of sheer necessity
lack of merit and for raising matters which, in elaborated fashion, are - the national coffers were empty, or nearly so.
impertinent and improper before this Court.
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG,
PROPRIETY OF PETITIONER'S ACTION FOR CERTIORARI this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities and
formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious
But before this Court discusses the more relevant issues, the question resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases resolved on
regarding the propriety of petitioner Republic's action for certiorari the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the
under Rule 6519 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere
Sandiganbayan Resolution dated January 21, 2002 should be legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and
threshed out. firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the
government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-
At the outset, we would like to stress that we are treating this case as gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the
an exception to the general rule governing petitions for certiorari. merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal
Normally, decisions of the Sandiganbayan are brought before this acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit
Court under Rule 45, not Rule 65.20 But where the case is undeniably conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these
ingrained with immense public interest, public policy and deep funds and other assets be finally determined and resolved with
historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and annoying
existence and availability of the remedy of appeal.21 procedural sidetracks.23

One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February We thus take cognizance of this case and settle with finality all the
1986 was the recovery of the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth issues therein.
reputedly amassed by former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E.
Marcos, their relatives, friends and business associates. Thus, the ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT
very first Executive Order (EO) issued by then President Corazon
Aquino upon her assumption to office after the ouster of the Marcoses The crucial issues which this Court must resolve are: (1) whether or
was EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It created the not respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and charged justify or negate summary judgment; and (2) whether or not petitioner
it with the task of assisting the President in the "recovery of all ill- Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with
gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379.
his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or (1) THE PROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them during his administration, directly or through We hold that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue
nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or of fact in their pleadings. Thus, on motion of petitioner Republic,
using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship." summary judgment should take place as a matter of right.
In the early case of Auman vs. Estenzo24, summary judgment was Settlements from June 1976 up to the peaceful revolution in
described as a judgment which a court may render before trial but February 22-25, 1986. She likewise served once as a member
after both parties have pleaded. It is ordered by the court upon of the Interim Batasang Pambansa during the early years of
application by one party, supported by affidavits, depositions or other martial law from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor
documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may in turn file an in concurrent capacity as Minister of Human Settlements. x x x
opposition supported also by affidavits, depositions or other
documents. This is after the court summarily hears both parties with xxx           xxx           xxx
their respective proofs and finds that there is no genuine issue
between them. Summary judgment is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by 11. At the outset, however, it must be pointed out that based
Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: on the Official Report of the Minister of Budget, the total
salaries of former President Marcos as President form 1966 to
SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant.- A party seeking 1976 was P60,000 a year and from 1977 to 1985, P100,000 a
to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to year; while that of the former First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as
obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 to February
in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting 22-25, 1986 was P75,000 a year xxx.
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment
in his favor upon all or any part thereof.25 ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS LEGITIMATE INCOME

Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue xxx

as to any material fact in the action.26 The theory of summary
judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender 12. Based on available documents, the ITRs of the Marcoses
issues requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or for the years 1965-1975 were filed under Tax Identification No.
admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious, 1365-055-1. For the years 1976 until 1984, the returns were
the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering filed under Tax Identification No. M 6221-J 1117-A-9.
summary judgment for petitioner Republic.
13. The data contained in the ITRs and Balance Sheet filed by
The Solicitor General made a very thorough presentation of its case the "Marcoses are summarized and attached to the reports in
for forfeiture: the following schedules:

xxx Schedule A:

4. Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and Schedule of Income (Annex "T" hereof);
represented by his Estate/Heirs) was a public officer for
several decades continuously and without interruption as Schedule B:
Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the
Republic of the Philippines from December 31, 1965 up to his
Schedule of Income Tax Paid (Annex "T-1" hereof);
ouster by direct action of the people of EDSA on February 22-
25, 1986.
Schedule C:
5. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, for short)
the former First Lady who ruled with FM during the 14-year Schedule of Net Disposable Income (Annex "T-2"
martial law regime, occupied the position of Minister of Human hereof);
 Schedule D: Balance Sheet attached to his 1965 ITR immediately
preceeding his ascendancy to the presidency he did not show
Schedule of Networth Analysis (Annex "T-3" hereof). any Receivables from client at all, much less the P10,65-M
that he decided to later recognize as income. There are no
14. As summarized in Schedule A (Annex "T" hereof), the documents showing any withholding tax certificates. Likewise,
Marcoses reported P16,408,442.00 or US$2,414,484.91 in there is nothing on record that will show any known Marcos
total income over a period of 20 years from 1965 to 1984. The client as he has no known law office. As previously stated, his
sources of income are as follows: networth was a mere P120,000.00 in December, 1965. The
joint income tax returns of FM and Imelda cannot, therefore,
conceal the skeletons of their kleptocracy.
Official - P 2,627,581.00 - 16.01%
Salaries
18. FM reported a total of P2,521,325.00 as Other Income for
Legal Practice - 11,109,836.00 - 67.71% the years 1972 up to 1976 which he referred to in his return as
Farm Income - 149,700.00 - .91% "Miscellaneous Items" and "Various Corporations." There is no
indication of any payor of the dividends or earnings.
Others - 2,521,325.00 - 15.37%
Total P16,408,442.00 - 100.00% 19. Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda did not declare any income
from any deposits and placements which are subject to a 5%
15. FM's official salary pertains to his compensation as Senate withholding tax. The Bureau of Internal Revenue attested that
President in 1965 in the amount of P15,935.00 and after a diligent search of pertinent records on file with the
P1,420,000.00 as President of the Philippines during the Records Division, they did not find any records involving the
period 1966 until 1984. On the other hand, Imelda reported tax transactions of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda in Revenue
salaries and allowances only for the years 1979 to 1984 in the Region No. 1, Baguio City, Revenue Region No.4A, Manila,
amount of P1,191,646.00. The records indicate that the Revenue Region No. 4B1, Quezon City and Revenue No. 8,
reported income came from her salary from the Ministry of Tacloban, Leyte. Likewise, the Office of the Revenue Collector
Human Settlements and allowances from Food Terminal, Inc., of Batac. Further, BIR attested that no records were found on
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, National Food any filing of capital gains tax return involving spouses FM and
Authority Council, Light Rail Transit Authority and Home Imelda covering the years 1960 to 1965.
Development Mutual Fund.
20. In Schedule B, the taxable reported income over the
16. Of the P11,109,836.00 in reported income from legal twenty-year period was P14,463,595.00 which represents 88%
practice, the amount of P10,649,836.00 or 96% represents of the gross income. The Marcoses paid income taxes totaling
"receivables from prior years" during the period 1967 up to P8,233,296.00 or US$1,220,667.59. The business expenses
1984. in the amount of P861,748.00 represent expenses incurred for
subscription, postage, stationeries and contributions while the
17. In the guise of reporting income using the cash method other deductions in the amount of P567,097.00 represents
under Section 38 of the National Internal Revenue Code, FM interest charges, medicare fees, taxes and licenses. The total
made it appear that he had an extremely profitable legal deductions in the amount of P1,994,845.00 represents 12% of
practice before he became a President (FM being barred by the total gross income.
law from practicing his law profession during his entire
presidency) and that, incredibly, he was still receiving 21. In Schedule C, the net cumulative disposable income
payments almost 20 years after. The only problem is that in his amounts to P6,756,301.00 or US$980,709.77. This is the
amount that represents that portion of the Marcoses income Kreditanstalt or SKA, also known as Swiss Credit Bank, for
that is free for consumption, savings and investments. The him to establish the AZIO Foundation. On the same date,
amount is arrived at by adding back to the net income after tax Marcos executed a power of attorney in favor of Roberto S.
the personal and additional exemptions for the years 1965- Benedicto empowering him to transact business in behalf of
1984, as well as the tax-exempt salary of the President for the the said foundation. Pursuant to the said Marcos mandate,
years 1966 until 1972. AZIO Foundation was formed on June 21, 1971 in Vaduz.
Walter Fessler and Ernst Scheller, also of SKA Legal Service,
22. Finally, the networth analysis in Schedule D, represents and Dr. Helmuth Merling from Schaan were designated as
the total accumulated networth of spouses, Ferdinand and members of the Board of Trustees of the said foundation.
Imelda. Respondent's Balance Sheet attached to their 1965 Ferdinand Marcos was named first beneficiary and the Marcos
ITR, covering the year immediately preceding their Foundation, Inc. was second beneficiary. On November 12,
ascendancy to the presidency, indicates an ending networth of 1971, FM again issued another written order naming Austrahil
P120,000.00 which FM declared as Library and Miscellaneous PTY Ltd. In Sydney, Australia, as the foundation's first and
assets. In computing for the networth, the income approach sole beneficiary. This was recorded on December 14, 1971.
was utilized. Under this approach, the beginning capital is
increased or decreased, as the case may be, depending upon 25. In an undated instrument, Marcos changed the first and
the income earned or loss incurred. Computations establish sole beneficiary to CHARIS FOUNDATION. This change was
the total networth of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda, for the recorded on December 4, 1972.
years 1965 until 1984 in the total amount of US$957,487.75,
assuming the income from legal practice is real and valid x x x. 26. On August 29, 1978, the AZIO FOUNDATION was
renamed to VERSO FOUNDATION. The Board of Trustees
G. THE SECRET MARCOS DEPOSITS IN SWISS BANKS remained the same. On March 11, 1981, Marcos issued a
written directive to liquidated VERSO FOUNDATION and to
23. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly transfer all its assets to account of FIDES TRUST COMPANY
show in detail how both respondents clandestinely stashed at Bank Hofman in Zurich under the account "Reference
away the country's wealth to Switzerland and hid the same OSER." The Board of Trustees decided to dissolve the
under layers upon layers of foundations and other corporate foundation on June 25, 1981.
entities to prevent its detection. Through their
dummies/nominees, fronts or agents who formed those 27. In an apparent maneuver to bury further the secret
foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained deposits beneath the thick layers of corporate entities, FM
numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the effected the establishment of VIBUR FOUNDATION on May
impossibility of detecting and documenting all those secret 13, 1981 in Vaduz. Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a
accounts as well as the enormity of the deposits therein wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust, were designated as
hidden, the following presentation is confined to five identified members of the Board of Trustees. The account was officially
accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M opened with SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial
with a reservation for the filing of a supplemental or separate owner was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust
forfeiture complaint should the need arise. Company acted as fiduciary. However, comparison of the
listing of the securities in the safe deposit register of the
H. THE AZIO-VERSO-VIBUR FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS VERSO FOUNDATION as of February 27, 1981 with that of
VIBUR FOUNDATION as of December 31, 1981 readily
24. On June 11, 1971, Ferdinand Marcos issued a written reveals that exactly the same securities were listed.
order to Dr. Theo Bertheau, legal counsel of Schweizeresche
28. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is certain that the the same bank using an American-sounding alias, JANE
VIBUR FOUNDATION is the beneficial successor of VERSO RYAN. Found among the voluminous documents in
FOUNDATION. Malacañang shortly after they fled to Hawaii in haste that
fateful night of February 25, 1986, were accomplished forms
29. On March 18, 1986, the Marcos-designated Board of for "Declaration/Specimen Signatures" submitted by the
Trustees decided to liquidate VIBUR FOUNDATION. A notice Marcos couple. Under the caption "signature(s)" Ferdinand
of such liquidation was sent to the Office of the Public Register and Imelda signed their real names as well as their respective
on March 21, 1986. However, the bank accounts and aliases underneath. These accounts were actively operated
respective balances of the said VIBUR FOUNDATION and maintained by the Marcoses for about two (2) years until
remained with SKA. Apparently, the liquidation was an attempt their closure sometime in February, 1970 and the balances
by the Marcoses to transfer the foundation's funds to another transferred to XANDY FOUNDATION.
account or bank but this was prevented by the timely freeze
order issued by the Swiss authorities. One of the latest 33. The XANDY FOUNDATION was established on March 3,
documents obtained by the PCGG from the Swiss authorities 1970 in Vaduz. C.W. Fessler, C. Souviron and E. Scheller
is a declaration signed by Dr. Ivo Beck (the trustee) stating were named as members of the Board of Trustees.
that the beneficial owner of VIBUR FOUNDATION is
Ferdinand E. Marcos. Another document signed by G. Raber 34. FM and Imelda issued the written mandate to establish the
of SKA shows that VIBUR FOUNDATION is owned by the foundation to Markus Geel of SKA on March 3, 1970. In the
"Marcos Familie" handwritten Regulations signed by the Marcos couple as well
as in the type-written Regulations signed by Markus Geel both
30. As of December 31, 1989, the balance of the bank dated February 13, 1970, the Marcos spouses were named
accounts of VIBUR FOUNDATION with SKA, Zurich, under the the first beneficiaries, the surviving spouse as the second
General Account No. 469857 totaled $3,597,544.00 beneficiary and the Marcos children – Imee, Ferdinand, Jr.
(Bongbong) and Irene – as equal third beneficiaries.
I. XANDY-WINTROP: CHARIS-SCOLARI-
VALAMO-SPINUS-AVERTINA FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS 35. The XANDY FOUNDATION was renamed WINTROP
FOUNDATION on August 29, 1978. The Board of Trustees
31. This is the most intricate and complicated account group. remained the same at the outset. However, on March 27,
As the Flow Chart hereof shows, two (2) groups under the 1980, Souviron was replaced by Dr. Peter Ritter. On March 10.
foundation organized by Marcos dummies/nominees for FM's 1981, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos issued a written order to
benefit, eventually joined together and became one (1) the Board of Wintrop to liquidate the foundation and transfer all
account group under the AVERTINA FOUNDATION for the its assets to Bank Hofmann in Zurich in favor of FIDES TRUST
benefit of both FM and Imelda. This is the biggest group from COMPANY. Later, WINTROP FOUNDATION was dissolved.
where the $50-M investment fund of the Marcoses was drawn
when they bought the Central Bank's dollar-denominated 36. The AVERTINA FOUNDATION was established on May
treasury notes with high-yielding interests. 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag
Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of FIDES TRUST
32. On March 20, 1968, after his second year in the CO., as members of the Board of Trustees. Two (2) account
presidency, Marcos opened bank accounts with SKA using an categories, namely: CAR and NES, were opened on
alias or pseudonym WILLIAM SAUNDERS, apparently to hide September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner of AVERTINA was
his true identity. The next day, March 21, 1968, his First Lady, not made known to the bank since the FIDES TRUST CO.
Mrs. Imelda Marcos also opened her own bank accounts with acted as fiduciary. However, the securities listed in the safe
deposit register of WINTROP FOUNDATION Category R as of 40 The SPINUS FOUNDATION was established on May 13,
December 31, 1980 were the same as those listed in the 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a
register of AVERTINA FOUNDATION Category CAR as of wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust Co., as members of
December 31, 1981. Likewise, the securities listed in the safe the Foundation's Board of Directors. The account was officially
deposit register of WINTROP FOUNDATION Category S as of opened with SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial
December 31, 1980 were the same as those listed in the owner of the foundation was not made known to the bank
register of Avertina Category NES as of December 31, since Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary. However, the list of
1981.Under the circumstances, it is certain that the beneficial securities in the safe deposit register of Valamo Foundation as
successor of WINTROP FOUNDATION is AVERTINA of December 31, 1980 are practically the same with those
FOUNDATION. The balance of Category CAR as of December listed in the safe deposit register of Spinus Foundation as of
31, 1989 amounted to US$231,366,894.00 while that of December 31, 1981. Under the circumstances, it is certain that
Category NES as of 12-31-83 was US$8,647,190.00. Latest the Spinus Foundation is the beneficial successor of the
documents received from Swiss authorities included a Valamo Foundation.
declaration signed by IVO Beck stating that the beneficial
owners of AVERTINA FOUNDATION are FM and Imelda. 41. On September 6, 1982, there was a written instruction
Another document signed by G. Raber of SKA indicates that from Spinus Foundation to SKA to close its Swiss Franc
Avertina Foundation is owned by the "Marcos Families." account and transfer the balance to Avertina Foundation. In
July/August, 1982, several transfers from the foundation's
37. The other groups of foundations that eventually joined German marks and US dollar accounts were made to Avertina
AVERTINA were also established by FM through his dummies, Category CAR totaling DM 29.5-M and $58-M, respectively.
which started with the CHARIS FOUNDATION. Moreover, a comparison of the list of securities of the Spinus
Foundation as of February 3, 1982 with the safe deposit slips
38. The CHARIS FOUNDATION was established in VADUZ on of the Avertina Foundation Category CAR as of August 19,
December 27, 1971. Walter Fessler and Ernst Scheller of SKA 1982 shows that all the securities of Spinus were transferred
and Dr. Peter Ritter were named as directors. Dr. Theo to Avertina.
Bertheau, SKA legal counsel, acted as founding director in
behalf of FM by virtue of the mandate and agreement dated J. TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
November 12, 1971. FM himself was named the first
beneficiary and Xandy Foundation as second beneficiary in 42. The Trinidad Foundation was organized on August 26,
accordance with the handwritten instructions of FM on 1970 in Vaduz with C.W. Fessler and E. Scheller of SKA and
November 12, 1971 and the Regulations. FM gave a power of Dr. Otto Tondury as the foundation's directors. Imelda issued a
attorney to Roberto S. Benedicto on February 15, 1972 to act written mandate to establish the foundation to Markus Geel on
in his behalf with regard to Charis Foundation. August 26, 1970. The regulations as well as the agreement,
both dated August 28, 1970 were likewise signed by Imelda.
39. On December 13, 1974, Charis Foundation was renamed Imelda was named the first beneficiary and her children Imelda
Scolari Foundation but the directors remained the same. On (Imee), Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and, Irene were named as
March 11, 1981 FM ordered in writing that the Valamo equal second beneficiaries.
Foundation be liquidated and all its assets be transferred to
Bank Hofmann, AG in favor of Fides Trust Company under the 43. Rayby Foundation was established on June 22, 1973 in
account "Reference OMAL". The Board of Directors decided Vaduz with Fessler, Scheller and Ritter as members of the
on the immediate dissolution of Valamo Foundation on June board of directors. Imelda issued a written mandate to Dr.
25, 1981. Theo Bertheau to establish the foundation with a note that the
foundation's capitalization as well as the cost of establishing it 47. Rosalys Foundation was established in 1971 with FM as
be debited against the account of Trinidad Foundation. Imelda the beneficiary. Its Articles of Incorporation was executed on
was named the first and only beneficiary of Rayby foundation. September 24, 1971 and its By-Laws on October 3, 1971. This
According to written information from SKA dated November foundation maintained several accounts with Swiss Bank
28, 1988, Imelda apparently had the intention in 1973 to Corporation (SBC) under the general account 51960 where
transfer part of the assets of Trinidad Foundation to another most of the bribe monies from Japanese suppliers were
foundation, thus the establishment of Rayby Foundation. hidden.
However, transfer of assets never took place. On March 10,
1981, Imelda issued a written order to transfer all the assets of 48. On December 19, 1985, Rosalys Foundation was
Rayby Foundation to Trinidad Foundation and to subsequently liquidated and all its assets were transferred to Aguamina
liquidate Rayby. On the same date, she issued a written order Corporation's (Panama) Account No. 53300 with SBC. The
to the board of Trinidad to dissolve the foundation and transfer ownership by Aguamina Corporation of Account No. 53300 is
all its assets to Bank Hofmann in favor of Fides Trust Co. evidenced by an opening account documents from the bank. J.
Under the account "Reference Dido," Rayby was dissolved on Christinaz and R.L. Rossier, First Vice-President and Senior
April 6, 1981 and Trinidad was liquidated on August 3, 1981. Vice President, respectively, of SBC, Geneva issued a
declaration dated September 3, 1991 stating that the by-laws
44. The PALMY FOUNDATION was established on May 13, dated October 3, 1971 governing Rosalys Foundation was the
1981 in Vaduz with Dr. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a same by-law applied to Aguamina Corporation Account No.
wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust Co, as members of the 53300. They further confirmed that no change of beneficial
Foundation's Board of Directors. The account was officially owner was involved while transferring the assets of Rosalys to
opened with the SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial Aguamina. Hence, FM remains the beneficiary of Aguamina
owner was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Co. Corporation Account No. 53300.
acted as fiduciary. However, when one compares the listing of
securities in the safe deposit register of Trinidad Foundation As of August 30, 1991, the ending balance of Account No.
as of December 31,1980 with that of the Palmy Foundation as 53300 amounted to $80,566,483.00.
of December 31, 1980, one can clearly see that practically the
same securities were listed. Under the circumstances, it is L. MALER FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
certain that the Palmy Foundation is the beneficial successor
of the Trinidad Foundation. 49. Maler was first created as an establishment. A statement
of its rules and regulations was found among Malacañang
45. As of December 31, 1989, the ending balance of the bank documents. It stated, among others, that 50% of the
accounts of Palmy Foundation under General Account No. Company's assets will be for sole and full right disposal of FM
391528 is $17,214,432.00. and Imelda during their lifetime, which the remaining 50% will
be divided in equal parts among their children. Another
46. Latest documents received from Swiss Authorities included Malacañang document dated October 19,1968 and signed by
a declaration signed by Dr. Ivo Beck stating that the beneficial Ferdinand and Imelda pertains to the appointment of Dr. Andre
owner of Palmy Foundation is Imelda. Another document Barbey and Jean Louis Sunier as attorneys of the company
signed by Raber shows that the said Palmy Foundation is and as administrator and manager of all assets held by the
owned by "Marcos Familie". company. The Marcos couple, also mentioned in the said
document that they bought the Maler Establishment from SBC,
K. ROSALYS-AGUAMINA FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS Geneva. On the same date, FM and Imelda issued a letter
addressed to Maler Establishment, stating that all instructions
 to be transmitted with regard to Maler will be signed with the 4. Respondents ADMIT paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Petition.
word "JOHN LEWIS". This word will have the same value as
the couple's own personal signature. The letter was signed by 5. Respondents specifically deny paragraph 5 of the Petition in
FM and Imelda in their signatures and as John Lewis. so far as it states that summons and other court processes
may be served on Respondent Imelda R. Marcos at the stated
50. Maler Establishment opened and maintained bank address the truth of the matter being that Respondent Imelda
accounts with SBC, Geneva. The opening bank documents R. Marcos may be served with summons and other processes
were signed by Dr. Barbey and Mr. Sunnier as authorized at No. 10-B Bel Air Condominium 5022 P. Burgos Street,
signatories. Makati, Metro Manila, and ADMIT the rest.

51. On November 17, 1981, it became necessary to transform xxx           xxx           xxx
Maler Establishment into a foundation. Likewise, the attorneys
were changed to Michael Amaudruz, et. al. However, 10. Respondents ADMIT paragraph 11 of the Petition.
administration of the assets was left to SBC. The articles of
incorporation of Maler Foundation registered on November 17, 11. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 12 of the
1981 appear to be the same articles applied to Maler Petition for lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to
Establishment. On February 28, 1984, Maler Foundation the truth of the allegation since Respondents were not privy to
cancelled the power of attorney for the management of its the transactions and that they cannot remember exactly the
assets in favor of SBC and transferred such power to Sustrust truth as to the matters alleged.
Investment Co., S.A.
12. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 13 of the
52. As of June 6, 1991, the ending balance of Maler Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form
Foundation's Account Nos. 254,508 BT and 98,929 NY a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents
amount SF 9,083,567 and SG 16,195,258, respectively, for a cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
total of SF 25,278,825.00. GM only until December 31, 1980. ITRs and Balance Sheet.
This account was opened by Maler when it was still an
establishment which was subsequently transformed into a 13. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 14 of the
foundation. Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents
53. All the five (5) group accounts in the over-all flow chart cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
have a total balance of about Three Hundred Fifty Six Million ITRs.
Dollars ($356,000,000.00) as shown by Annex "R-5" hereto
attached as integral part hereof. 14. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 15 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form
x x x           x x x.27 a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
Respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. ITRs.
Araneta and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., in their answer, stated the
following: 15. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 16 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form
xxx           xxx           xxx a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged 22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it
ITRs. alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's
wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and
16. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 17 of the layers of foundation and corporate entities for being false, the
Petition insofar as it attributes willful duplicity on the part of the truth being that Respondents aforesaid properties were
late President Marcos, for being false, the same being pure lawfully acquired.
conclusions based on pure assumption and not allegations of
fact; and specifically DENY the rest for lack of knowledge or 23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27,
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 28, 29 and 30 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs or the attachments allegation since Respondents were not privy to the
thereto. transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur
Foundation accounts, except that as to Respondent Imelda R.
17. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 18 of the Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form were lawfully acquired.
a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged 24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34,
ITRs. 35, 36,37, 38, 39, 40, and 41 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
18. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 19 of the truth of the allegations since Respondents are not privy to the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they
a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos
ITRs and that they are not privy to the activities of the BIR. she specifically remembers that the funds involved were
lawfully acquired.
19. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 20 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form 25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45,
a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents and 46, of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since
ITRs. Respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with
20. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 21 of the exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically
a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
ITRs. 26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and
52, of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information
21. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 22 of the sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form Respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except
ITRs.
 that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically (f) Memorandum dated December 12, 2000 of Mrs. Marcos
remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. and Memorandum dated December 17, 2000 of the Marcos
children;
Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent
Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children indubitably failed to tender (g) Manifestation dated May 26, 1998; and
genuine issues in their answer to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine
issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as (h) General/Supplemental Agreement dated December 23,
distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in 1993.
bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial. Respondents' defenses of "lack of knowledge An examination of the foregoing pleadings is in order.
for lack of privity" or "(inability to) recall because it happened a long
time ago" or, on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that "the funds were lawfully •             Respondents' Answer dated October 18, 1993.
acquired" are fully insufficient to tender genuine issues. Respondent
Marcoses' defenses were a sham and evidently calibrated to In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny each and every
compound and confuse the issues. allegation contained in the petition for forfeiture in the manner
required by the rules. All they gave were stock answers like "they
The following pleadings filed by respondent Marcoses are replete with have no sufficient knowledge" or "they could not recall because it
indications of a spurious defense: happened a long time ago," and, as to Mrs. Marcos, "the funds were
lawfully acquired," without stating the basis of such assertions.
(a) Respondents' Answer dated October 18, 1993;
Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
(b) Pre-trial Brief dated October 4, 1999 of Mrs. Marcos,
Supplemental Pre-trial Brief dated October 19, 1999 of A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the
Ferdinand, Jr. and Mrs. Imee Marcos-Manotoc adopting the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable,
pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, and Manifestation dated October shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he
19, 1999 of Irene Marcos-Araneta adopting the pre-trial briefs relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny
of her co- respondents; only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is
true and material and shall deny the remainder. Where a
(c) Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment dated March defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to
21, 2000, filed by Mrs. Marcos which the other respondents form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the
(Marcos children) adopted; complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a
denial.28
(d) Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000 filed by Mrs.
Marcos and adopted by the Marcos children; The purpose of requiring respondents to make a specific denial is to
make them disclose facts which will disprove the allegations of
(e) Motion for Reconsideration dated September 26, 2000 filed petitioner at the trial, together with the matters they rely upon in
by Mrs. Marcos; Motion for Reconsideration dated October 5, support of such denial. Our jurisdiction adheres to this rule to avoid
2000 jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., and and prevent unnecessary expenses and waste of time by compelling
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated October 9, both parties to lay their cards on the table, thus reducing the
2000 likewise jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.; controversy to its true terms. As explained in Alonso vs. Villamor,29
 A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more To elucidate, the allegation of petitioner Republic in paragraph 23 of
deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and the petition for forfeiture stated:
position, entraps and destroys the other. It is rather a contest
in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the 23. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly
court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly show in detail how both respondents clandestinely stashed
trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities away the country's wealth to Switzerland and hid the same
of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. under layers upon layers of foundations and other corporate
Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. entities to prevent its detection. Through their
dummies/nominees, fronts or agents who formed those
On the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that the funds were lawfully foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained
acquired. However, she failed to particularly state the ultimate facts numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the
surrounding the lawful manner or mode of acquisition of the subject impossibility of detecting and documenting all those secret
funds. Simply put, she merely stated in her answer with the other accounts as well as the enormity of the deposits therein
respondents that the funds were "lawfully acquired" without detailing hidden, the following presentation is confined to five identified
how exactly these funds were supposedly acquired legally by them. accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M
Even in this case before us, her assertion that the funds were lawfully with a reservation for the filing of a supplemental or separate
acquired remains bare and unaccompanied by any factual support forfeiture complaint should the need arise.32
which can prove, by the presentation of evidence at a hearing, that
indeed the funds were acquired legitimately by the Marcos family. Respondents' lame denial of the aforesaid allegation was:

Respondents' denials in their answer at the Sandiganbayan were 22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it
based on their alleged lack of knowledge or information sufficient to alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's
form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of the petition. wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and
layers of foundations and corporate entities for being false, the
It is true that one of the modes of specific denial under the rules is a truth being that Respondents' aforesaid properties were
denial through a statement that the defendant is without knowledge or lawfully acquired.33
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the material
averment in the complaint. The question, however, is whether the kind Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in
of denial in respondents' answer qualifies as the specific denial called the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant
for by the rules. We do not think so. In Morales vs. Court of with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded
Appeals,30 this Court ruled that if an allegation directly and specifically to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the
charges a party with having done, performed or committed a particular averments it was directed at.34 Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant
act which the latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or
and express denial must be made. at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It
is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged
Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against them, the in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying
Marcoses responded by simply saying that they had no knowledge or language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances
allegations. Such a general, self-serving claim of ignorance of the alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.35
facts alleged in the petition for forfeiture was insufficient to raise an
issue. Respondent Marcoses should have positively stated how it was In the instant case, the material allegations in paragraph 23 of the
that they were supposedly ignorant of the facts alleged.31 said petition were not specifically denied by respondents in paragraph
22 of their answer. The denial contained in paragraph 22 of the occurred a long time ago, except as to respondent Imelda R.
answer was focused on the averment in paragraph 23 of the petition Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved
for forfeiture that "Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's were lawfully acquired.
wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of
foundations and corporate entities." Paragraph 22 of the respondents' 25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 45,
answer was thus a denial pregnant with admissions of the following and 46 of the petition for lack of knowledge or information
substantial facts: sufficient to from a belief as to the truth of the allegations since
respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
(1) the Swiss bank deposits existed and transaction they were privy to, they cannot remember with
exactitude, the same having occurred a long time ago, except
(2) that the estimated sum thereof was US$356 million as of that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically
December, 1990. remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.

Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence 26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and
of the Swiss bank deposits in the sum of about US$356 million, not 52 of the petition for lack of knowledge and information
having been specifically denied by respondents in their answer, were sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since
deemed admitted by them pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure: transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with
exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except
Material averment in the complaint, xxx shall be deemed that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically
admitted when not specifically denied. xxx.36 remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.

By the same token, the following unsupported denials of respondents The matters referred to in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the respondents'
in their answer were pregnant with admissions of the substantial facts answer pertained to the creation of five groups of accounts as well as
alleged in the Republic's petition for forfeiture: their respective ending balances and attached documents alleged in
paragraphs 24 to 52 of the Republic's petition for forfeiture.
23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, Respondent Imelda R. Marcos never specifically denied the existence
28, 29 and 30 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or of the Swiss funds. Her claim that "the funds involved were lawfully
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the acquired" was an acknowledgment on her part of the existence of said
allegation since respondents were not privy to the transactions deposits. This only reinforced her earlier admission of the allegation in
regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture regarding the existence of
except that, as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she the US$356 million Swiss bank deposits.
specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired. The allegations in paragraphs 4737 and 4838 of the petition for
forfeiture referring to the creation and amount of the deposits of the
24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation as well as the averment in paragraph
35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge 52-a39 of the said petition with respect to the sum of the Swiss bank
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the deposits estimated to be US$356 million were again not specifically
allegations since respondents were not privy to the denied by respondents in their answer. The respondents did not at all
transactions and as to such transactions they were privy to, respond to the issues raised in these paragraphs and the existence,
they cannot remember with exactitude the same having nature and amount of the Swiss funds were therefore deemed
admitted by them. As held in Galofa vs. Nee Bon Sing,40 if a
defendant's denial is a negative pregnant, it is equivalent to an Marcos attached to the petition for forfeiture, as well as the veracity of
admission. the contents thereof.

Moreover, respondents' denial of the allegations in the petition for The answer again premised its denials of said ITRs and balance
forfeiture "for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a sheets on the ground of lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not form a belief as to the truth of the contents thereof. Petitioner correctly
privy to the transactions" was just a pretense. Mrs. Marcos' privity to points out that respondents' denial was not really grounded on lack of
the transactions was in fact evident from her signatures on some of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief but was based on
the vital documents41 attached to the petition for forfeiture which Mrs. lack of recollection. By reviewing their own records, respondent
Marcos failed to specifically deny as required by the rules.42 Marcoses could have easily determined the genuineness and due
execution of the ITRs and the balance sheets. They also had the
It is worthy to note that the pertinent documents attached to the means and opportunity of verifying the same from the records of the
petition for forfeiture were even signed personally by respondent Mrs. BIR and the Office of the President. They did not.
Marcos and her late husband, Ferdinand E. Marcos, indicating that
said documents were within their knowledge. As correctly pointed out When matters regarding which respondents claim to have no
by Sandiganbayan Justice Francisco Villaruz, Jr. in his dissenting knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and
opinion: necessarily within their knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack of
information will not be considered a specific denial. 44 An unexplained
The pattern of: 1) creating foundations, 2) use of pseudonyms denial of information within the control of the pleader, or is readily
and dummies, 3) approving regulations of the Foundations for accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an
the distribution of capital and income of the Foundations to the effective denial.45
First and Second beneficiary (who are no other than FM and
his family), 4) opening of bank accounts for the Foundations, The form of denial adopted by respondents must be availed of with
5) changing the names of the Foundations, 6) transferring sincerity and in good faith, and certainly not for the purpose of
funds and assets of the Foundations to other Foundations or confusing the adverse party as to what allegations of the petition are
Fides Trust, 7) liquidation of the Foundations as substantiated really being challenged; nor should it be made for the purpose of
by the Annexes U to U-168, Petition [for forfeiture] strongly delay.46 In the instant case, the Marcoses did not only present
indicate that FM and/or Imelda were the real owners of the unsubstantiated assertions but in truth attempted to mislead and
assets deposited in the Swiss banks, using the Foundations as deceive this Court by presenting an obviously contrived defense.
dummies.43
Simply put, a profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently
How could respondents therefore claim lack of sufficient knowledge or and necessarily within the pleader's knowledge or means of knowing
information regarding the existence of the Swiss bank deposits and is as ineffective as no denial at all.47 Respondents' ineffective denial
the creation of five groups of accounts when Mrs. Marcos and her late thus failed to properly tender an issue and the averments contained in
husband personally masterminded and participated in the formation the petition for forfeiture were deemed judicially admitted by them.
and control of said foundations? This is a fact respondent Marcoses
were never able to explain. As held in J.P. Juan & Sons, Inc. vs. Lianga Industries, Inc.:

Not only that. Respondents' answer also technically admitted the Its "specific denial" of the material allegation of the petition
genuineness and due execution of the Income Tax Returns (ITRs) without setting forth the substance of the matters relied upon
and the balance sheets of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. to support its general denial, when such matters were plainly
within its knowledge and it could not logically pretend
 ignorance as to the same, therefore, failed to properly tender addition to the particular issues of fact and law, it becomes apparent if
on issue.48 genuine issues are being put forward necessitating the holding of a
trial. Likewise, the parties are obliged not only to make a formal
Thus, the general denial of the Marcos children of the allegations in identification and specification of the issues and their proofs, and to
the petition for forfeiture "for lack of knowledge or information put these matters in writing and submit them to the court within the
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since they specified period for the prompt disposition of the action.50
were not privy to the transactions" cannot rightfully be accepted as a
defense because they are the legal heirs and successors-in-interest of The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, as subsequently adopted by
Ferdinand E. Marcos and are therefore bound by the acts of their respondent Marcos children, merely stated:
father vis-a-vis the Swiss funds.
xxx
•             PRE-TRIAL BRIEF DATED OCTOBER 18, 1993
WITNESSES
The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the three Marcos
children. In said brief, Mrs. Marcos stressed that the funds involved 4.1 Respondent Imelda will present herself as a witness and
were lawfully acquired. But, as in their answer, they failed to state and reserves the right to present additional witnesses as may be
substantiate how these funds were acquired lawfully. They failed to necessary in the course of the trial.
present and attach even a single document that would show and
prove the truth of their allegations. Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 xxx
Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, x x
x their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others: 5.1 Respondent Imelda reserves the right to present and
introduce in evidence documents as may be necessary in the
xxx course of the trial.

(d) the documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the Mrs. Marcos did not enumerate and describe the documents
purpose thereof; constituting her evidence. Neither the names of witnesses nor the
nature of their testimony was stated. What alone appeared certain
xxx was the testimony of Mrs. Marcos only who in fact had previously
claimed ignorance and lack of knowledge. And even then, the
(f) the number and names of the witnesses, and the substance substance of her testimony, as required by the rules, was not made
of their respective testimonies.49 known either. Such cunning tactics of respondents are totally
unacceptable to this Court. We hold that, since no genuine issue was
It is unquestionably within the court's power to require the parties to raised, the case became ripe for summary judgment.
submit their pre-trial briefs and to state the number of witnesses
intended to be called to the stand, and a brief summary of the •             OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY
evidence each of them is expected to give as well as to disclose the JUDGMENT
number of documents to be submitted with a description of the nature               DATED MARCH 21, 2000
of each. The tenor and character of the testimony of the witnesses
and of the documents to be deduced at the trial thus made known, in
The opposition filed by Mrs. Marcos to the motion for summary Make of record that as far as Imelda Marcos is
judgment dated March 21, 2000 of petitioner Republic was merely concerned through the statement of Atty. Armando M.
adopted by the Marcos children as their own opposition to the said Marcelo that the US$360 million more or less subject
motion. However, it was again not accompanied by affidavits, matter of the instant lawsuit as allegedly obtained from
depositions or admissions as required by Section 3, Rule 35 of the the various Swiss Foundations do not belong to the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure: estate of Marcos or to Imelda Marcos herself. That's
your statement of facts?
x x x The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits,
depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before Atty. MARCELO:
hearing. After hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, Yes, Your Honor.
and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and PJ Garchitorena:
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.51 That's it. Okay. Counsel for Manotoc and Manotoc, Jr.
What is your point here? Does the estate of Marcos
The absence of opposing affidavits, depositions and admissions to own anything of the $360 million subject of this case.
contradict the sworn declarations in the Republic's motion only
demonstrated that the averments of such opposition were not genuine Atty. TECSON:
and therefore unworthy of belief.
We joined the Manifestation of Counsel.
•             Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000; 52
              Motions for Reconsideration;53 and Memoranda PJ Garchitorena:
              of Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children54
You do not own anything?
All these pleadings again contained no allegations of facts showing
their lawful acquisition of the funds. Once more, respondents merely
Atty. TECSON:
made general denials without alleging facts which would have been
admissible in evidence at the hearing, thereby failing to raise genuine
issues of fact. Yes, Your Honor.

Mrs. Marcos insists in her memorandum dated October 21, 2002 that, PJ Garchitorena:
during the pre-trial, her counsel stated that his client was just a
beneficiary of the funds, contrary to petitioner Republic's allegation Counsel for Irene Araneta?
that Mrs. Marcos disclaimed ownership of or interest in the funds.
Atty. SISON:
This is yet another indication that respondents presented a fictitious
defense because, during the pre-trial, Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos I join the position taken by my other compañeros here,
children denied ownership of or interest in the Swiss funds: Your Honor.

PJ Garchitorena: xxx
 Atty. SISON: assets, including the Swiss deposits. This was, to us, an unequivocal
admission of ownership by the Marcoses of the said deposits.
Irene Araneta as heir do (sic) not own any of the
amount, Your Honor.55 But, as already pointed out, during the pre-trial conference,
respondent Marcoses denied knowledge as well as ownership of the
We are convinced that the strategy of respondent Marcoses was to Swiss funds.
confuse petitioner Republic as to what facts they would prove or what
issues they intended to pose for the court's resolution. There is no Anyway we look at it, respondent Marcoses have put forth no real
doubt in our mind that they were leading petitioner Republic, and now defense. The "facts" pleaded by respondents, while ostensibly raising
this Court, to perplexity, if not trying to drag this forfeiture case to important questions or issues of fact, in reality comprised mere
eternity. verbiage that was evidently wanting in substance and constituted no
genuine issues for trial.
•             Manifestation dated May 26, 1998 filed by MRS.
              Marcos; General/Supplemental Compromise We therefore rule that, under the circumstances, summary judgment
              Agreement dated December 28, 1993 is proper.

These pleadings of respondent Marcoses presented nothing but In fact, it is the law itself which determines when summary judgment is
feigned defenses. In their earlier pleadings, respondents alleged called for. Under the rules, summary judgment is appropriate when
either that they had no knowledge of the existence of the Swiss there are no genuine issues of fact requiring the presentation of
deposits or that they could no longer remember anything as it evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings
happened a long time ago. As to Mrs. Marcos, she remembered that it appear to raise issue, if the affidavits, depositions and admissions
was lawfully acquired. show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as
prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of law.56
In her Manifestation dated May 26, 1998, Mrs. Marcos stated that:
In sum, mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will be
COMES NOW undersigned counsel for respondent Imelda R. admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to raise genuine
Marcos, and before this Honorable Court, most respectfully issues of fact and will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. 57 A
manifests: summary judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an
expeditious settlement of the case, it appearing from the pleadings,
That respondent Imelda R, Marcos owns 90% of the subject depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important
matter of the above-entitled case, being the sole beneficiary of questions or issues of fact posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled
the dollar deposits in the name of the various foundations to a judgment as a matter of law. A motion for summary judgment is
alleged in the case; premised on the assumption that the issues presented need not be
tried either because these are patently devoid of substance or that
That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above- there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. It is a method
entitled case belongs to the estate of the late President sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the prompt disposition of a civil
Ferdinand E. Marcos. action where there exists no serious controversy. 58 Summary
judgment is a procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions
In the Compromise/Supplemental Agreements, respondent Marcoses in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as
sought to implement the agreed distribution of the Marcos to any material fact. The theory of summary judgment is that, although
an answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it
is established by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those
issues are not genuine but fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing In the hope of convincing this Court to rule otherwise, respondents
with the trial and rendering summary judgment for petitioner.59 Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc and Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. contend
that "by its positive acts and express admissions prior to filing the
In the various annexes to the petition for forfeiture, petitioner Republic motion for summary judgment on March 10, 2000, petitioner Republic
attached sworn statements of witnesses who had personal knowledge had bound itself to go to trial on the basis of existing issues. Thus, it
of the Marcoses' participation in the illegal acquisition of funds had legally waived whatever right it had to move for summary
deposited in the Swiss accounts under the names of five groups or judgment."60
foundations. These sworn statements substantiated the ill-gotten
nature of the Swiss bank deposits. In their answer and other We do not think so. The alleged positive acts and express admissions
subsequent pleadings, however, the Marcoses merely made general of the petitioner did not preclude it from filing a motion for summary
denials of the allegations against them without stating facts admissible judgment.
in evidence at the hearing, thereby failing to raise any genuine issues
of fact. Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Under these circumstances, a trial would have served no purpose at Rule 35

all and would have been totally unnecessary, thus justifying a
summary judgment on the petition for forfeiture. There were no Summary Judgment
opposing affidavits to contradict the sworn declarations of the
witnesses of petitioner Republic, leading to the inescapable Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party seeking
conclusion that the matters raised in the Marcoses' answer were false. to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the
Time and again, this Court has encountered cases like this which are pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with
either only half-heartedly defended or, if the semblance of a defense supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary
is interposed at all, it is only to delay disposition and gain time. It is judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
certainly not in the interest of justice to allow respondent Marcoses to
avail of the appellate remedies accorded by the Rules of Court to Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. - A party
litigants in good faith, to the prejudice of the Republic and ultimately of against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted
the Filipino people. From the beginning, a candid demonstration of or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with
respondents' good faith should have been made to the court below. supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary
Without the deceptive reasoning and argumentation, this protracted judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. (Emphasis
litigation could have ended a long time ago. ours)61

Since 1991, when the petition for forfeiture was first filed, up to the Under the rule, the plaintiff can move for summary judgment "at any
present, all respondents have offered are foxy responses like "lack of time after the pleading in answer thereto (i.e., in answer to the claim,
sufficient knowledge or lack of privity" or "they cannot recall because it counterclaim or cross-claim) has been served." No fixed reglementary
happened a long time ago" or, as to Mrs. Marcos, "the funds were period is provided by the Rules. How else does one construe the
lawfully acquired." But, whenever it suits them, they also claim phrase "any time after the answer has been served?"
ownership of 90% of the funds and allege that only 10% belongs to
the Marcos estate. It has been an incredible charade from beginning This issue is actually one of first impression. No local jurisprudence or
to end. authoritative work has touched upon this matter. This being so, an
examination of foreign laws and jurisprudence, particularly those of
the United States where many of our laws and rules were copied, is in rendered within sixty days after the final adjournment of the
order. term at which the case was tried. With the approval of the trial
justice, the plaintiff moved for a new trial under Section 442 of
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party the Civil Practice Act. The plaintiff also moved for summary
seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim may judgment under Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice. The
move for summary judgment at any time after the expiration of 20 motion was opposed mainly on the ground that, by
days from the commencement of the action or after service of a proceeding to trial, the plaintiff had waived her right to
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, and that a party summary judgment and that the answer and the opposing
against whom a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted may affidavits raised triable issues. The amount due and unpaid
move for summary judgment at any time. under the contract is not in dispute. The Special Term granted
both motions and the defendants have appealed.
However, some rules, particularly Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil
Practice of New York, specifically provide that a motion for summary The Special Term properly held that the answer and the
judgment may not be made until issues have been joined, that is, only opposing affidavits raised no triable issue. Rule 113 of the
after an answer has been served.62 Under said rule, after issues have Rules of Civil Practice and the Civil Practice Act prescribe
been joined, the motion for summary judgment may be made at any no limitation as to the time when a motion for summary
stage of the litigation.63 No fixed prescriptive period is provided. judgment must be made. The object of Rule 113 is to
empower the court to summarily determine whether or not
Like Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York, our rules a bona fide issue exists between the parties, and there is
also provide that a motion for summary judgment may not be made no limitation on the power of the court to make such a
until issues have been joined, meaning, the plaintiff has to wait for the determination at any stage of the litigation." (emphasis
answer before he can move for summary judgment.64 And like the ours)
New York rules, ours do not provide for a fixed reglementary period
within which to move for summary judgment. On the basis of the aforequoted disquisition, "any stage of the
litigation" means that "even if the plaintiff has proceeded to trial, this
This being so, the New York Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule does not preclude him from thereafter moving for summary
113 of the Rules of Civil Practice can be applied by analogy to the judgment."66
interpretation of Section 1, Rule 35, of our 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. In the case at bar, petitioner moved for summary judgment after pre-
trial and before its scheduled date for presentation of evidence.
Under the New York rule, after the issues have been joined, the Respondent Marcoses argue that, by agreeing to proceed to trial
motion for summary judgment may be made at any stage of the during the pre-trial conference, petitioner "waived" its right to summary
litigation. And what exactly does the phrase "at any stage of the judgment.
litigation" mean? In Ecker vs. Muzysh, 65 the New York Supreme Court
ruled: This argument must fail in the light of the New York Supreme Court
ruling which we apply by analogy to this case. In Ecker,67 the
"PER CURIAM. defendant opposed the motion for summary judgment on a ground
similar to that raised by the Marcoses, that is, "that plaintiff had
Plaintiff introduced her evidence and the defendants rested on waived her right to summary judgment" by her act of proceeding to
the case made by the plaintiff. The case was submitted. Owing trial. If, as correctly ruled by the New York court, plaintiff was allowed
to the serious illness of the trial justice, a decision was not to move for summary judgment even after trial and submission of the
case for resolution, more so should we permit it in the present case long been in the records of the case. Thus, by the time the motion
where petitioner moved for summary judgment before trial. was filed on March 10, 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in
against petitioner.
Therefore, the phrase "anytime after the pleading in answer thereto
has been served" in Section 1, Rule 35 of our Rules of Civil Procedure We disagree. Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an
means "at any stage of the litigation." Whenever it becomes evident at unreasonable or unexplained length of time to do that which, by
any stage of the litigation that no triable issue exists, or that the exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier,
defenses raised by the defendant(s) are sham or frivolous, plaintiff warranting a presumption that the person has abandoned his right or
may move for summary judgment. A contrary interpretation would go declined to assert it.70 In effect, therefore, the principle of laches is one
against the very objective of the Rule on Summary Judgment which is of estoppel because "it prevents people who have slept on their rights
to "weed out sham claims or defenses thereby avoiding the expense from prejudicing the rights of third parties who have placed reliance on
and loss of time involved in a trial."68 the inaction of the original parties and their successors-in-interest".71

In cases with political undertones like the one at bar, adverse parties A careful examination of the records, however, reveals that petitioner
will often do almost anything to delay the proceedings in the hope that was in fact never remiss in pursuing its case against respondent
a future administration sympathetic to them might be able to influence Marcoses through every remedy available to it, including the motion
the outcome of the case in their favor. This is rank injustice we cannot for summary judgment.
tolerate.
Petitioner Republic initially filed its motion for summary judgment on
The law looks with disfavor on long, protracted and expensive October 18, 1996. The motion was denied because of the pending
litigation and encourages the speedy and prompt disposition of cases. compromise agreement between the Marcoses and petitioner. But
That is why the law and the rules provide for a number of devices to during the pre-trial conference, the Marcoses denied ownership of the
ensure the speedy disposition of cases. Summary judgment is one of Swiss funds, prompting petitioner to file another motion for summary
them. judgment now under consideration by this Court. It was the
subsequent events that transpired after the answer was filed,
Faithful therefore to the spirit of the law on summary judgment which therefore, which prevented petitioner from filing the questioned
seeks to avoid unnecessary expense and loss of time in a trial, we motion. It was definitely not because of neglect or inaction that
hereby rule that petitioner Republic could validly move for summary petitioner filed the (second) motion for summary judgment years after
judgment any time after the respondents' answer was filed or, for that respondents' answer to the petition for forfeiture.
matter, at any subsequent stage of the litigation. The fact that
petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in any way prevent it from In invoking the doctrine of estoppel by laches, respondents must show
moving for summary judgment, as indeed no genuine issue of fact not only unjustified inaction but also that some unfair injury to them
was ever validly raised by respondent Marcoses. might result unless the action is barred.72

This interpretation conforms with the guiding principle enshrined in This, respondents failed to bear out. In fact, during the pre-trial
Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that the "[r]ules conference, the Marcoses disclaimed ownership of the Swiss
should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of deposits. Not being the owners, as they claimed, respondents did not
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action have any vested right or interest which could be adversely affected by
and proceeding."69 petitioner's alleged inaction.

Respondents further allege that the motion for summary judgment But even assuming for the sake of argument that laches had already
was based on respondents' answer and other documents that had set in, the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the
government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights. 73 Nor before any special election. The Court may, in addition, refer
can estoppel validate an act that contravenes law or public policy.74 this case to the corresponding Executive Department for
administrative or criminal action, or both.
As a final point, it must be emphasized that laches is not a mere
question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or From the above-quoted provisions of the law, the following facts must
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or be established in order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits
asserted.75 Equity demands that petitioner Republic should not be may be effected:
barred from pursuing the people's case against the Marcoses.
(1) ownership by the public officer of money or property
(2) The Propriety of Forfeiture acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his name or
otherwise, and
The matter of summary judgment having been thus settled, the issue
of whether or not petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for (2) the extent to which the amount of that money or property
forfeiture in accordance with the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA exceeds, i. e., is grossly disproportionate to, the legitimate
1379 now takes center stage. income of the public officer.

The law raises the prima facie presumption that a property is That spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officials
unlawfully acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value during the time material to the instant case was never in dispute.
is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful Paragraph 4 of respondent Marcoses' answer categorically admitted
income of the public officer who owns it. Hence, Sections 2 and 6 of the allegations in paragraph 4 of the petition for forfeiture as to the
RA 137976 provide: personal circumstances of Ferdinand E. Marcos as a public official
who served without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate
x x x           x x x President and President of the Republic of the Philippines from
December 1, 1965 to February 25, 1986. 77 Likewise, respondents
Section 2. Filing of petition. – Whenever any public officer or admitted in their answer the contents of paragraph 5 of the petition as
employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount or to the personal circumstances of Imelda R. Marcos who once served
property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa from 1978 to 1984
such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and as Metro Manila Governor, concurrently Minister of Human
and the income from legitimately acquired property, said Settlements, from June 1976 to February 1986.78
property shall be presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired. Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted in paragraph 10 of her answer
the allegations of paragraph 11 of the petition for forfeiture which
x x x           x x x referred to the accumulated salaries of respondents Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.79 The combined accumulated salaries
Sec. 6. Judgment – If the respondent is unable to show to the of the Marcos couple were reflected in the Certification dated May 27,
satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the 1986 issued by then Minister of Budget and Management Alberto
property in question, then the court shall declare such property Romulo.80 The Certification showed that, from 1966 to 1985,
in question, forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos had accumulated salaries
judgment the property aforesaid shall become the property of in the amount of P1,570,000 and P718,750, respectively, or a total of
the State. Provided, That no judgment shall be rendered within P2,288,750:
six months before any general election or within three months
Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President
 1966-1976 at P60,000/year P660,000 contradict them or subsequently take a position contrary to or
inconsistent with such admissions.83
1977-1984 at 800,000
P100,000/year
The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful
1985 at 110,000 income of respondents since they did not file any Statement of Assets
P110,000/year and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth
P1,570,00 could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand
E. Marcos as President could not receive "any other emolument from
Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister the Government or any of its subdivisions and
instrumentalities".84 Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand
E. Marcos as President could "not receive during his tenure any other
June 1976-1985 at P75,000/year P718,000 emolument from the Government or any other source."85 In fact, his
management of businesses, like the administration of foundations to
In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973
Marcos couple's combined salaries from January to February 1986 in Constitution:
the amount of P30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated salaries
amounted to P2,319,583.33. Converted to U.S. dollars on the basis of Article VII, Sec. 4(2) – The President and the Vice-President
the corresponding peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing during the shall not, during their tenure, hold any other office except
applicable period when said salaries were received, the total amount when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they
had an equivalent value of $304,372.43. practice any profession, participate directly or indirectly in the
management of any business, or be financially interested
The dollar equivalent was arrived at by using the official annual rates directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or
of exchange of the Philippine peso and the US dollar from 1965 to special privilege granted by the Government or any other
1985 as well as the official monthly rates of exchange in January and subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
February 1986 issued by the Center for Statistical Information of government owned or controlled corporation.
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Article VII, Sec. 11 – No Member of the National Assembly
Prescinding from the aforesaid admissions, Section 4, Rule 129 of the shall appear as counsel before any court inferior to a court
Rules of Court provides that: with appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or
indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in
Section 4. – Judicial admissions – An admission, verbal or any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government,
written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including
the same case does not require proof. The admission may be any government owned or controlled corporation during his
contradicted only by showing that it was made through term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.81 office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.

It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings Article IX, Sec. 7 – The Prime Minister and Members of the
filed by the parties; (b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or Cabinet shall be subject to the provision of Section 11, Article
written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of judicial VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or
proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case.82 Thus, facts pleaded in administrative body, or manage any business, or practice any
the petition and answer, as in the case at bar, are deemed admissions profession, and shall also be subject to such other
of petitioner and respondents, respectively, who are not permitted to disqualification as may be provided by law.
Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally holding that respondents had made judicial admissions of their
and fairly serve as basis for determining the existence of a prima ownership of the Swiss funds.
facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds.
In their answer, aside from admitting the existence of the subject
Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to establish a prima funds, respondents likewise admitted ownership thereof. Paragraph
facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss funds since it failed to prove 22 of respondents' answer stated:
the essential elements under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of
RA 1379. As the Act is a penal statute, its provisions are mandatory 22. Respondents specifically DENY PARAGRAPH 23 insofar
and should thus be construed strictly against the petitioner and as it alleges that respondents clandestinely stashed the
liberally in favor of respondent Marcoses. country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers
and layers of foundations and corporate entities for being
We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses' other false, the truth being that respondents' aforesaid properties
lawful income or income from legitimately acquired property for the were lawfully acquired. (emphasis supplied)
presumption to apply because, as between petitioner and
respondents, the latter were in a better position to know if there were By qualifying their acquisition of the Swiss bank deposits as lawful,
such other sources of lawful income. And if indeed there was such respondents unwittingly admitted their ownership thereof.
other lawful income, respondents should have specifically stated the
same in their answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic was concerned, it Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted ownership of the Swiss bank
was enough to specify the known lawful income of respondents. deposits by failing to deny under oath the genuineness and due
execution of certain actionable documents bearing her signature
Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in attached to the petition. As discussed earlier, Section 11, Rule 8 86 of
determining prima facie evidence of ill-gotten wealth, the value of the the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that material averments in
accumulated assets, properties and other material possessions of the complaint shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.
those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2 must be out of
proportion to the known lawful income of such persons. The The General87 and Supplemental88 Agreements executed by petitioner
respondent Marcos couple did not file any Statement of Assets and and respondents on December 28, 1993 further bolstered the claim of
Liabilities (SAL) from which their net worth could be determined. Their petitioner Republic that its case for forfeiture was proven in
failure to file their SAL was in itself a violation of law and to allow them accordance with the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379. The
to successfully assail the Republic for not presenting their SAL would whereas clause in the General Agreement declared that:
reward them for their violation of the law.
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment from
Further, contrary to the claim of respondents, the admissions made by the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the
them in their various pleadings and documents were valid. It is of $356 million belongs in principle to the Republic of the
record that respondents judicially admitted that the money deposited Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met, but even
with the Swiss banks belonged to them. after 7 years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able to procure
a final judgment of conviction against the PRIVATE PARTY.
We agree with petitioner that respondent Marcoses made judicial
admissions of their ownership of the subject Swiss bank deposits in While the Supplemental Agreement warranted, inter alia, that:
their answer, the General/Supplemental Agreements, Mrs. Marcos'
Manifestation and Constancia dated May 5, 1999, and the In consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereby agree that
Undertaking dated February 10, 1999. We take note of the fact that the PRIVATE PARTY shall be entitled to the equivalent of 25%
the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan were unanimous in
 of the amount that may be eventually withdrawn from said admissions of the respondents contained therein. Otherwise
$356 million Swiss deposits. stated, the admissions made in said agreements, as quoted
above, remain binding on the respondents.91
The stipulations set forth in the General and Supplemental
Agreements undeniably indicated the manifest intent of respondents A written statement is nonetheless competent as an admission even if
to enter into a compromise with petitioner. Corollarily, respondents' it is contained in a document which is not itself effective for the
willingness to agree to an amicable settlement with the Republic only purpose for which it is made, either by reason of illegality, or
affirmed their ownership of the Swiss deposits for the simple reason incompetency of a party thereto, or by reason of not being signed,
that no person would acquiesce to any concession over such huge executed or delivered. Accordingly, contracts have been held as
dollar deposits if he did not in fact own them. competent evidence of admissions, although they may be
unenforceable.92
Respondents make much capital of the pronouncement by this Court
that the General and Supplemental Agreements were null and The testimony of respondent Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. during the hearing
void.89 They insist that nothing in those agreements could thus be on the motion for the approval of the Compromise Agreement on April
admitted in evidence against them because they stood on the same 29, 1998 also lent credence to the allegations of petitioner Republic
ground as an accepted offer which, under Section 27, Rule 130 90 of that respondents admitted ownership of the Swiss bank accounts. We
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that "in civil cases, an quote the salient portions of Ferdinand Jr.'s formal declarations in
offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability and is not open court:
admissible in evidence against the offeror."
ATTY. FERNANDO:
We find no merit in this contention. The declaration of nullity of said
agreements was premised on the following constitutional and Mr. Marcos, did you ever have any meetings with
statutory infirmities: (1) the grant of criminal immunity to the Marcos PCGG Chairman Magtanggol C. Gunigundo?
heirs was against the law; (2) the PCGG's commitment to exempt
from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos F. MARCOS, JR.:
heirs was against the Constitution; and (3) the government's
undertaking to cause the dismissal of all cases filed against the Yes. I have had very many meetings in fact with
Marcoses pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts Chairman.
encroached on the powers of the judiciary. The reasons relied upon
by the Court never in the least bit even touched on the veracity and ATTY. FERNANDO:
truthfulness of respondents' admission with respect to their ownership
of the Swiss funds. Besides, having made certain admissions in those
Would you recall when the first meeting occurred?
agreements, respondents cannot now deny that they voluntarily
admitted owning the subject Swiss funds, notwithstanding the fact that
the agreements themselves were later declared null and void. PJ GARCHITORENA:

The following observation of Sandiganbayan Justice Catalino In connection with what?

Castañeda, Jr. in the decision dated September 19, 2000 could not
have been better said: ATTY. FERNANDO:

x x x The declaration of nullity of the two agreements rendered In connection with the ongoing talks to compromise the
the same without legal effects but it did not detract from the various cases initiated by PCGG against your family?
F. MARCOS, JR.: Well, basically, any assets. Anything that was under
the Marcos name in any of the banks in Switzerland
The nature of our meetings was solely concerned with which may necessarily be not cash.95
negotiations towards achieving some kind of
agreement between the Philippine government and the xxx           xxx           xxx
Marcos family. The discussions that led up to the
compromise agreement were initiated by our then PJ GARCHITORENA:
counsel Atty. Simeon Mesina x x x.93
x x x What did you do in other words, after being
xxx           xxx           xxx apprised of this contract in connection herewith?

ATTY. FERNANDO: F. MARCOS, JR.:

What was your reaction when Atty. Mesina informed I assumed that we are beginning to implement the
you of this possibility? agreement because this was forwarded through the
Philippine government lawyers through our lawyers and
F. MARCOS, JR.: then, subsequently, to me. I was a little surprised
because we hadn't really discussed the details of the
My reaction to all of these approaches is that I am transfer of the funds, what the bank accounts, what the
always open, we are always open, we are very much mechanism would be. But nevertheless, I was happy to
always in search of resolution to the problem of the see that as far as the PCGG is concerned, that the
family and any approach that has been made us, we agreement was perfected and that we were beginning
have entertained. And so my reaction was the same as to implement it and that was a source of satisfaction to
what I have always … why not? Maybe this is the one me because I thought that finally it will be the end.96
that will finally put an end to this problem.94
Ferdinand Jr.'s pronouncements, taken in context and in their entirety,
xxx           xxx           xxx were a confirmation of respondents' recognition of their ownership of
the Swiss bank deposits. Admissions of a party in his testimony are
ATTY. FERNANDO: receivable against him. If a party, as a witness, deliberately concedes
a fact, such concession has the force of a judicial admission.97 It is
Basically, what were the true amounts of the assets in apparent from Ferdinand Jr.'s testimony that the Marcos family agreed
the bank? to negotiate with the Philippine government in the hope of finally
putting an end to the problems besetting the Marcos family regarding
PJ GARCHITORENA: the Swiss accounts. This was doubtlessly an acknowledgment of
ownership on their part. The rule is that the testimony on the witness
stand partakes of the nature of a formal judicial admission when a
So, we are talking about liquid assets here? Just
party testifies clearly and unequivocally to a fact which is peculiarly
Cash?
within his own knowledge.98
F. MARCOS, JR.:
In her Manifestation99 dated May 26, 1998, respondent Imelda Marcos
furthermore revealed the following:
 That respondent Imelda R. Marcos owns 90% of the subject xxx           xxx           xxx
matter of the above-entitled case, being the sole beneficiary of
the dollar deposits in the name of the various foundations 3. Consistent with the foregoing, and the Marcoses having
alleged in the case; committed themselves to helping the less fortunate, in the
interest of peace, reconciliation and unity, defendant MADAM
That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above- IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, in firm abidance thereby,
entitled case belongs to the estate of the late President hereby affirms her agreement with the Republic for the release
Ferdinand E. Marcos; and transfer of the US Dollar 150 million for proper disposition,
without prejudice to the final outcome of the litigation
xxx           xxx           xxx respecting the ownership of the remainder.

Respondents' ownership of the Swiss bank accounts as borne out by Again, the above statements were indicative of Imelda's admission of
Mrs. Marcos' manifestation is as bright as sunlight. And her claim that the Marcoses' ownership of the Swiss deposits as in fact "the
she is merely a beneficiary of the Swiss deposits is belied by her own Marcoses defend that it (Swiss deposits) is a legitimate (Marcos)
signatures on the appended copies of the documents substantiating asset."
her ownership of the funds in the name of the foundations. As already
mentioned, she failed to specifically deny under oath the authenticity On the other hand, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc,
of such documents, especially those involving "William Saunders" and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. and Maria Irene Marcos-Araneta filed a
"Jane Ryan" which actually referred to Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda motion102 on May 4, 1998 asking the Sandiganbayan to place the res
Marcos, respectively. That failure of Imelda Marcos to specifically (Swiss deposits) in custodia legis:
deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution, of
the instruments bearing her signature, was tantamount to a judicial 7. Indeed, the prevailing situation is fraught with danger!
admission of the genuineness and due execution of said instruments, Unless the aforesaid Swiss deposits are placed in custodia
in accordance with Section 8, Rule 8 100 of the 1997 Rules of Civil legis or within the Court's protective mantle, its dissipation or
Procedure. misappropriation by the petitioner looms as a distinct
possibility.
Likewise, in her Constancia101 dated May 6, 1999, Imelda Marcos
prayed for the approval of the Compromise Agreement and the Such display of deep, personal interest can only come from someone
subsequent release and transfer of the $150 million to the rightful who believes that he has a marked and intimate right over the
owner. She further made the following manifestations: considerable dollar deposits. Truly, by filing said motion, the Marcos
children revealed their ownership of the said deposits.
xxx           xxx           xxx
Lastly, the Undertaking103 entered into by the PCGG, the PNB and the
2. The Republic's cause of action over the full amount is its Marcos foundations on February 10, 1999, confirmed the Marcoses'
forfeiture in favor of the government if found to be ill-gotten. ownership of the Swiss bank deposits. The subject Undertaking
On the other hand, the Marcoses defend that it is a legitimate brought to light their readiness to pay the human rights victims out of
asset. Therefore, both parties have an inchoate right of the funds held in escrow in the PNB. It stated:
ownership over the account. If it turns out that the account is of
lawful origin, the Republic may yield to the Marcoses. WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines sympathizes with
Conversely, the Marcoses must yield to the Republic. the plight of the human rights victims-plaintiffs in the
(underscoring supplied) aforementioned litigation through the Second Party, desires to
 assist in the satisfaction of the judgment awards of said human contradicted only by showing that it was made through
rights victims-plaintiffs, by releasing, assigning and or waiving palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.105
US$150 million of the funds held in escrow under the Escrow
Agreements dated August 14, 1995, although the Republic is In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, respondents'
not obligated to do so under final judgments of the Swiss judicial admission of ownership of the Swiss deposits is definitely
courts dated December 10 and 19, 1997, and January 8, binding on them.
1998;
The individual and separate admissions of each respondent bind all of
WHEREAS, the Third Party is likewise willing to release, them pursuant to Sections 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
assign and/or waive all its rights and interests over said
US$150 million to the aforementioned human rights victims- SEC. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. ─ The act or
plaintiffs. declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope
of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or
All told, the foregoing disquisition negates the claim of respondents agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the
that "petitioner failed to prove that they acquired or own the Swiss partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such
funds" and that "it was only by arbitrarily isolating and taking certain act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or
statements made by private respondents out of context that petitioner declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly
was able to treat these as judicial admissions." The Court is fully interested with the party.106
aware of the relevance, materiality and implications of every pleading
and document submitted in this case. This Court carefully scrutinized SEC. 31. Admission by privies. ─ Where one derives title to
the proofs presented by the parties. We analyzed, assessed and property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the
weighed them to ascertain if each piece of evidence rightfully qualified latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is
as an admission. Owing to the far-reaching historical and political evidence against the former.107
implications of this case, we considered and examined, individually
and totally, the evidence of the parties, even if it might have bordered The declarations of a person are admissible against a party whenever
on factual adjudication which, by authority of the rules and a "privity of estate" exists between the declarant and the party, the
jurisprudence, is not usually done by this Court. There is no doubt in term "privity of estate" generally denoting a succession in
our mind that respondent Marcoses admitted ownership of the Swiss rights.108 Consequently, an admission of one in privity with a party to
bank deposits. the record is competent.109 Without doubt, privity exists among the
respondents in this case. And where several co-parties to the record
We have always adhered to the familiar doctrine that an admission are jointly interested in the subject matter of the controversy, the
made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making admission of one is competent against all.110
such admission and becomes conclusive on him, and that all proofs
submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be Respondents insist that the Sandiganbayan is correct in ruling that
ignored, whether an objection is interposed by the adverse party or petitioner Republic has failed to establish a prima facie case for the
not.104 This doctrine is embodied in Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of forfeiture of the Swiss deposits.
Court:
We disagree. The sudden turn-around of the Sandiganbayan was
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. ─ An admission, verbal or written, really strange, to say the least, as its findings and conclusions were
made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same not borne out by the voluminous records of this case.
case, does not require proof. The admission may be
Section 2 of RA 1379 explicitly states that "whenever any public that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses
officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate
property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such salaries as public officials. Otherwise stated, petitioner presented
public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the enough evidence to convince us that the Marcoses had dollar
income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be deposits amounting to US $356 million representing the balance of
presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. x x x" the Swiss accounts of the five foundations, an amount way, way
beyond their aggregate legitimate income of only US$304,372.43
The elements which must concur for this prima facie presumption to during their incumbency as government officials.
apply are:
Considering, therefore, that the total amount of the Swiss deposits
(1) the offender is a public officer or employee; was considerably out of proportion to the known lawful income of the
Marcoses, the presumption that said dollar deposits were unlawfully
(2) he must have acquired a considerable amount of money or acquired was duly established. It was sufficient for the petition for
property during his incumbency; and forfeiture to state the approximate amount of money and property
acquired by the respondents, and their total government salaries.
(3) said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations states:
such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income
and the income from legitimately acquired property. Prima Facie Evidence. – Any accumulation of assets,
properties, and other material possessions of those persons
It is undisputed that spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were covered by Executive Orders No. 1 and No. 2, whose value is
former public officers. Hence, the first element is clearly extant. out of proportion to their known lawful income is prima facie
deemed ill-gotten wealth.
The second element deals with the amount of money or property
acquired by the public officer during his incumbency. The Marcos Indeed, the burden of proof was on the respondents to dispute this
couple indubitably acquired and owned properties during their term of presumption and show by clear and convincing evidence that the
office. In fact, the five groups of Swiss accounts were admittedly Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other
owned by them. There is proof of the existence and ownership of legitimate sources of income. A presumption is prima facie proof of
these assets and properties and it suffices to comply with the second the fact presumed and, unless the fact thus prima facie established by
element. legal presumption is disproved, it must stand as proved.111

The third requirement is met if it can be shown that such assets, Respondent Mrs. Marcos argues that the foreign foundations should
money or property is manifestly out of proportion to the public officer's have been impleaded as they were indispensable parties without
salary and his other lawful income. It is the proof of this third element whom no complete determination of the issues could be made. She
that is crucial in determining whether a prima facie presumption has asserts that the failure of petitioner Republic to implead the
been established in this case. foundations rendered the judgment void as the joinder of
indispensable parties was a sine qua non exercise of judicial power.
Petitioner Republic presented not only a schedule indicating the lawful Furthermore, the non-inclusion of the foreign foundations violated the
income of the Marcos spouses during their incumbency but also conditions prescribed by the Swiss government regarding the deposit
evidence that they had huge deposits beyond such lawful income in of the funds in escrow, deprived them of their day in court and denied
Swiss banks under the names of five different foundations. We them their rights under the Swiss constitution and international law.112
believe petitioner was able to establish the prima facie presumption
The Court finds that petitioner Republic did not err in not impleading confirmed what was already generally known: that the foundations
the foreign foundations. Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil were established precisely to hide the money stolen by the Marcos
Procedure,113 taken from Rule 19b of the American Federal Rules of spouses from petitioner Republic. It negated whatever illusion there
Civil Procedure, provides for the compulsory joinder of indispensable was, if any, that the foreign foundations owned even a nominal part of
parties. Generally, an indispensable party must be impleaded for the the assets in question.
complete determination of the suit. However, failure to join an
indispensable party does not divest the court of jurisdiction since the The rulings of the Swiss court that the foundations, as formal owners,
rule regarding indispensable parties is founded on equitable must be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings hinged
considerations and is not jurisdictional. Thus, the court is not divested on the assumption that they owned a nominal share of the
of its power to render a decision even in the absence of indispensable assets.118 But this was already refuted by no less than Mrs. Marcos
parties, though such judgment is not binding on the non-joined herself. Thus, she cannot now argue that the ruling of the
party.114 Sandiganbayan violated the conditions set by the Swiss court. The
directive given by the Swiss court for the foundations to participate in
An indispensable party115 has been defined as one: the proceedings was for the purpose of protecting whatever nominal
interest they might have had in the assets as formal owners. But
[who] must have a direct interest in the litigation; and if this inasmuch as their ownership was subsequently repudiated by Imelda
interest is such that it cannot be separated from that of the Marcos, they could no longer be considered as indispensable parties
parties to the suit, if the court cannot render justice between and their participation in the proceedings became unnecessary.
the parties in his absence, if the decree will have an injurious
effect upon his interest, or if the final determination of the In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,119 this Court ruled that impleading the
controversy in his absence will be inconsistent with equity and firms which are the res of the action was unnecessary:
good conscience.
"And as to corporations organized with ill-gotten wealth, but
There are two essential tests of an indispensable party: (1) can relief are not themselves guilty of misappropriation, fraud or other
be afforded the plaintiff without the presence of the other party? and illicit conduct – in other words, the companies themselves are
(2) can the case be decided on its merits without prejudicing the rights not the object or thing involved in the action, the res thereof –
of the other party?116 There is, however, no fixed formula for there is no need to implead them either. Indeed, their
determining who is an indispensable party; this can only be impleading is not proper on the strength alone of their having
determined in the context and by the facts of the particular suit or been formed with ill-gotten funds, absent any other particular
litigation. wrongdoing on their part…

In the present case, there was an admission by respondent Imelda Such showing of having been formed with, or having received
Marcos in her May 26, 1998 Manifestation before the Sandiganbayan ill-gotten funds, however strong or convincing, does not,
that she was the sole beneficiary of 90% of the subject matter in without more, warrant identifying the corporations in question
controversy with the remaining 10% belonging to the estate of with the person who formed or made use of them to give the
Ferdinand Marcos.117 Viewed against this admission, the foreign color or appearance of lawful, innocent acquisition to illegally
foundations were not indispensable parties. Their non-participation in amassed wealth – at the least, not so as place on the
the proceedings did not prevent the court from deciding the case on Government the onus of impleading the former with the latter
its merits and according full relief to petitioner Republic. The judgment in actions to recover such wealth. Distinguished in terms of
ordering the return of the $356 million was neither inimical to the juridical personality and legal culpability from their erring
foundations' interests nor inconsistent with equity and good members or stockholders, said corporations are not
conscience. The admission of respondent Imelda Marcos only themselves guilty of the sins of the latter, of the
 embezzlement, asportation, etc., that gave rise to the be rendered, amendments of the complaint in order to implead
Government's cause of action for recovery; their creation or them should be freely allowed, even on appeal, in fact even
organization was merely the result of their members' (or after rendition of judgment by this Court, where it appears that
stockholders') manipulations and maneuvers to conceal the the complaint otherwise indicates their identity and character
illegal origins of the assets or monies invested therein. In this as such indispensable parties."121
light, they are simply the res in the actions for the recovery of
illegally acquired wealth, and there is, in principle, no cause of Although there are decided cases wherein the non-joinder of
action against them and no ground to implead them as indispensable parties in fact led to the dismissal of the suit or the
defendants in said actions." annulment of judgment, such cases do not jibe with the matter at
hand. The better view is that non-joinder is not a ground to dismiss
Just like the corporations in the aforementioned case, the foreign the suit or annul the judgment. The rule on joinder of indispensable
foundations here were set up to conceal the illegally acquired funds of parties is founded on equity. And the spirit of the law is reflected in
the Marcos spouses. Thus, they were simply the res in the action for Section 11, Rule 3122 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It prohibits
recovery of ill-gotten wealth and did not have to be impleaded for lack the dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of
of cause of action or ground to implead them. parties and allows the amendment of the complaint at any stage of the
proceedings, through motion or on order of the court on its own
Assuming arguendo, however, that the foundations were initiative.123
indispensable parties, the failure of petitioner to implead them was a
curable error, as held in the previously cited case of Republic vs. Likewise, jurisprudence on the Federal Rules of Procedure, from
Sandiganbayan:120 which our Section 7, Rule 3124 on indispensable parties was copied,
allows the joinder of indispensable parties even after judgment has
"Even in those cases where it might reasonably be argued that been entered if such is needed to afford the moving party full
the failure of the Government to implead the sequestered relief.125 Mere delay in filing the joinder motion does not necessarily
corporations as defendants is indeed a procedural abberation, result in the waiver of the right as long as the delay is
as where said firms were allegedly used, and actively excusable.126 Thus, respondent Mrs. Marcos cannot correctly argue
cooperated with the defendants, as instruments or conduits for that the judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan was void due to
conversion of public funds and property or illicit or fraudulent the non-joinder of the foreign foundations. The court had jurisdiction to
obtention of favored government contracts, etc., slight render judgment which, even in the absence of indispensable parties,
reflection would nevertheless lead to the conclusion that the was binding on all the parties before it though not on the absent
defect is not fatal, but one correctible under applicable party.127 If she really felt that she could not be granted full relief due to
adjective rules – e.g., Section 10, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court the absence of the foreign foundations, she should have moved for
[specifying the remedy of amendment during trial to authorize their inclusion, which was allowable at any stage of the proceedings.
or to conform to the evidence]; Section 1, Rule 20 [governing She never did. Instead she assailed the judgment rendered.
amendments before trial], in relation to the rule respecting
omission of so-called necessary or indispensable parties, set In the face of undeniable circumstances and the avalanche of
out in Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. It is relevant in documentary evidence against them, respondent Marcoses failed to
this context to advert to the old familiar doctrines that the justify the lawful nature of their acquisition of the said assets. Hence,
omission to implead such parties "is a mere technical defect the Swiss deposits should be considered ill-gotten wealth and
which can be cured at any stage of the proceedings even after forfeited in favor of the State in accordance with Section 6 of RA
judgment"; and that, particularly in the case of indispensable 1379:
parties, since their presence and participation is essential to
the very life of the action, for without them no judgment may
 SEC. 6. Judgment.─ If the respondent is unable to show to the plus interest, are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the
satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the Philippines.
property in question, then the court shall declare such property
forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment SO ORDERED.
the property aforesaid shall become property of the State x x
x. Liability of Unexplained Wealth
THE FAILURE TO PRESENT AUTHENTICATED TRANSLATIONS
OF THE SWISS DECISIONS
G.R. No. 165835               June 22, 2005
Finally, petitioner Republic contends that the Honorable
Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena committed
MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, Petitioner,
grave abuse of discretion in reversing himself on the ground that the
vs.
original copies of the authenticated Swiss decisions and their
SANDIGANBAYAN and the OFFICE OF THE
authenticated translations were not submitted to the court a quo.
OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
Earlier PJ Garchitorena had quoted extensively from the unofficial
translation of one of these Swiss decisions in his ponencia dated July
29, 1999 when he denied the motion to release US$150 Million to the DECISION
human rights victims.
Tinga, J.:
While we are in reality perplexed by such an incomprehensible
change of heart, there might nevertheless not be any real need to Petitioner Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief of
belabor the issue. The presentation of the authenticated translations Staff for Comptrollership, J6, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
of the original copies of the Swiss decision was not de rigueur for the Petitioner filed this Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65
public respondent to make findings of fact and reach its conclusions. to annul and set aside public respondent
In short, the Sandiganbayan's decision was not dependent on the Sandiganbayan’s Resolution1 dated 29 October 2004 and Writ of
determination of the Swiss courts. For that matter, neither is this Preliminary Attachment2 dated 2 November 2004, and to enjoin public
Court's. respondents Sandiganbayan and Office of the Ombudsman from
further proceeding with any action relating to the enforcement of the
The release of the Swiss funds held in escrow in the PNB is assailed issuances.
dependent solely on the decision of this jurisdiction that said funds
belong to the petitioner Republic. What is important is our own On 27 September 2004, Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, Graft
assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence to rule in favor of either Investigation and Prosecution Officer II of the Field Investigation
petitioner Republic or respondent Marcoses. In this instance, despite Office of the Office of the Ombudsman, after due investigation, filed a
the absence of the authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions, complaint against petitioner with public respondent Office of the
the evidence on hand tilts convincingly in favor of petitioner Republic. Ombudsman, for violation of Sec. 8, in relation to Sec. 11 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6713,3 violation of Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code,
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed and violation of Section 52 (A)(1), (3) and (20) of the Civil Service
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2002 is SET Law. Based on this complaint, a case for Violations of R.A. No.
ASIDE. The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are now 1379,4 Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and Sec. 8 in relation to
deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the estimated Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 6713, docketed as Case
aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002,
No. OMB-P-C-04-1132-I, was filed against petitioner.5 Petitioner’s wife as can be gleaned from Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
Clarita Depakakibo Garcia, and their three sons, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo 1606,10 as amended, and Executive Orders (E.O.) Nos. 14 11 and 14-
and Timothy Mark, all surnamed Garcia, were impleaded in the A.12
complaint for violation of R.A. No. 1379 insofar as they acted as
conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts of petitioner in receiving, Theorizing that the Sandiganbayan, under P.D. No. 1606 or the law
accumulating, using and disposing of his ill-gotten wealth. creating it, was intended principally as a criminal court, with no
jurisdiction over separate civil actions, petitioner points to President
On the same day, 27 October 2004, the Republic of the Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino’s issuances after the EDSA Revolution, namely:
acting through public respondent Office of the Ombudsman, filed (1) E.O. No. 1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good
before the Sandiganbayan, a Petition with Verified Urgent Ex Parte Government (PCGG) for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth amassed by
Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family and cronies, (2) E.O. No.
Attachment6 against petitioner, his wife, and three sons, seeking the 14 which amended P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 by transferring
forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over civil actions filed against
1379, as amended. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. President Marcos, his family and cronies based on R.A. No. 1379, the
0193, entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Civil Code and other existing laws, and (3) E.O. No. 14-A whch further
Garcia, et al." It was alleged that the Office of the Ombudsman, after amended E.O. No. 14, P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 by providing
conducting an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation in criminal that the civil action under R.A. No. 1379 which may be filed against
cases, has determined that a prima facie case exists against Maj. President Marcos, his family and cronies, may proceed independently
Gen. Garcia and the other respondents therein who hold such of the criminal action.
properties for, with, or on behalf of, Maj. Gen. Garcia, since during his
incumbency as a soldier and public officer he acquired huge amounts Petitioner gathers from the presidential issuances that the
of money and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as Sandiganbayan has been granted jurisdiction only over the separate
such public officer and his other lawful income, if any.7 civil actions filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies,
regardless of whether these civil actions were for recovery of
Acting on the Republic’s prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary unlawfully acquired property under R.A. No. 1379 or for restitution,
attachment, the Sandiganbayan issued the reparation of damages or indemnification for consequential damages
questioned Resolution granting the relief prayed for. The or other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws.
corresponding writ of preliminary attachment was subsequently issued According to petitioner, nowhere in the amendments to P.D. No. 1606
on 2 November 2004 upon the filing of a bond by the Republic. On 17 and R.A. No. 1379 does it provide that the Sandiganbayan has been
November 2004, petitioner (as respondent a quo) filed a Motion to vested jurisdiction over separate civil actions other than those filed
Dismiss8 in Civil Case No. 0193 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of against President Marcos, his family and cronies. 13 Hence, the
the Sandiganbayan over forfeiture proceedings under R.A. No. 1379. Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over any separate civil action
On even date, petitioner filed the present Petition, raising the same against him, even if such separate civil action is for recovery of
issue of lack jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan. unlawfully acquired property under R.A. No. 1379.

Petitioner argues in this Petition that the Sandiganbayan is without Petitioner further contends that in any event, the petition for forfeiture
jurisdiction over the "civil action" for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired filed against him is fatally defective for failing to comply with the
properties under R.A. No. 1379, maintaining that such jurisdiction jurisdictional requirements under Sec. 2, R.A. No. 1379, 14 namely: (a)
actually resides in the Regional Trial Courts as provided under Sec. an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation conducted by the
29 of the law, and that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in civil prosecution arm of the government; (b) a certification to the Solicitor
actions pertains only to separate actions for recovery of unlawfully General that there is reasonable ground to believe that there has
acquired property against President Marcos, his family, and cronies been violation of the said law and that respondent is guilty thereof;
and (c) an action filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
Republic of the Philippines.15 He argues that only informations for officers of higher ranks;
perjury were filed and there has been no information filed against him
for violation of R.A. No. 1379. Consequently, he maintains, it is ….
impossible for the Office of the Ombudsman to certify that there is
reasonable ground to believe that a violation of the said law had been As petitioner falls squarely under the category of public positions
committed and that he is guilty thereof. The petition is also covered by the aforestated law, the petition for forfeiture should be
supposedly bereft of the required certification which should be made within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
by the investigating City or Provincial Fiscal (now Prosecutor) to the
Solicitor General. Furthermore, he opines that it should have been the Respondents also brush off as inconsequential petitioner’s argument
Office of the Solicitor General which filed the petition and not the that the petition for forfeiture is "civil" in nature and the
Office of the Ombudsman as in this case. The petition being fatally Sandiganbayan, having allegedly no jurisdiction over civil actions,
defective, the same should have been dismissed, petitioner therefore has no jurisdiction over the petition, since the same P.D. No.
concludes. 1606 encompasses all cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019,
irrespective of whether these cases are civil or criminal in nature. The
In their Comment,16 respondents submit the contrary, noting that the petition for forfeiture should not be confused with the cases initiated
issues raised by petitioner are not novel as these have been settled and prosecuted by the PCGG pursuant to E.O. Nos. 14 and 14-A, as
in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan17 which categorically ruled that "there these are dealt with under a separate subparagraph of P.D. No. 1606,
is no issue that jurisdiction over violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and as amended, in particular Sec. 4.c thereof.20 Further, respondents
1379 now rests with the Sandiganbayan." 18 Respondents argue that stress that E.O. Nos. 14 and 14-A exclusively apply to actions for
under the Constitution19 and prevailing statutes, the Sandiganbayan is recovery of unlawfully acquired property against President Marcos, his
vested with authority and jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture family, and cronies. It would also not be accurate to refer to a petition
under R.A. No. 1379 filed against petitioner. Respondents point to for forfeiture as a "civil case," since it has been held that petitions for
Sec. 4.a (1) (d) of P.D. 1606, as amended, as the prevailing law on forfeiture are deemed criminal or penal and that it is only the
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus: proceeding for its prosecution which is civil in nature.21

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive The Office of the Ombudsman filed a separate Comment,22 likewise
original jurisdiction in all cases involving: relying on Republic v. Sandiganbayan to argue that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture filed
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known against petitioner. The Ombudsman explains that the grant to the
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 1379 did not
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal change even under the amendments of
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting R.A. No. 797523 and R.A. No. 829424, although it came to be limited to
or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: cases involving high-ranking public officials as enumerated therein,
including Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of all other officers of higher rank, to which petitioner belongs.25
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and
higher of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 In arguing that it has authority to investigate and initiate forfeiture
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: proceedings against petitioner, the Office of the Ombudsman refers to
both the Constitution26 and R.A. No. 6770.27 The constitutional power
…. of investigation of the Office of the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified; its power to investigate any act of a public official or Petitioner also points out in his Reply32 to the Comment of the Office
employee which appears to be "illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient" of the Ombudsman, that the use of the phrase "violations of [R.A.]
covers the unlawful acquisition of wealth by public officials as defined Nos. 3019 and 1379" in P.D. No. 1606, as amended, implies
under R.A. No. 1379. Furthermore, Sec. 15 (11) 28 of R.A. No. 6770 jurisdiction over cases which are principally criminal or penal in nature
expressly empowers the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute because the concept of "violation" of certain laws necessarily carries
such cases of unlawful acquisition of wealth. This authority of the with it the concept of imposition of penalties for such violation. Hence,
Ombudsman has been affirmed also in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan.29 when reference was made to "violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and
1379," the only jurisdiction that can supposedly be implied is criminal
The Office of the Ombudsman then refutes petitioner’s allegation that jurisdiction, not civil jurisdiction, thereby highlighting respondent
the petition for forfeiture filed against him failed to comply with the Sandiganbayan’s lack of jurisdiction over the "civil case" for forfeiture
procedural and formal requirements under the law. It asserts that all of ill-gotten wealth. Of course, petitioner does not rule out cases
the requirements of R.A. No. 1379 have been strictly complied with. where the crime carries with it the corresponding civil liability such that
An inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation was conducted by a when the criminal action is instituted, the civil action for enforcement
Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman. The participation of the civil liability is impliedly instituted with it, and the court having
of the Office of the Solicitor General, claimed by petitioner to be jurisdiction over the criminal action also acquires jurisdiction over the
necessary, is actually no longer required since the Office of the ancillary civil action. However, petitioner argues that the action for
Ombudsman is endowed with the authority to investigate and forfeiture subject of this case is not the ancillary civil action impliedly
prosecute the case as discussed above.30 instituted with the criminal action. Rather, the petition for forfeiture is
an independent civil action over which the Sandiganbayan has no
In addition, the Office of the Ombudsman alleges that the jurisdiction. Petitioner points to P.D. No. 1606, as amended, which
present Petition should be dismissed for blatant forum-shopping. treats of independent civil actions only in the last paragraph of Sec. 4
Even as petitioner had filed a Motion to Dismiss as regards the thereof:
petition for forfeiture (docketed as Civil Case No. 0193) before the
Sandiganbayan on the ground of the Sandiganbayan’s alleged lack of Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary
jurisdiction, he filed the instant Petition raising exactly the same issue, notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action
even though the Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 0193 is still for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously
pending resolution.1avvphi1 Worse, it appears that the Motion to instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the
Dismiss and the instant Petition were filed on the same day, 17 Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal
November 2004. action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately
Petitioner refutes these arguments in his Reply31 and enunciates that from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That
the Sandiganbayan’s criminal jurisdiction is separate and distinct from where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but
its civil jurisdiction, and that the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is
forfeiture cases had been removed without subsequent amendments hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said
expressly restoring such civil jurisdiction. His thesis is that R.A. No. civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
1379 is a special law which is primarily civil and remedial in nature, appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint
the clear intent of which is to separate the prima facie determination in determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil
forfeiture proceedings from the litigation of the civil action. This intent action shall be deemed abandoned.
is further demonstrated by Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 which grants the
authority to make an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation Petitioner however did not raise any argument to refute the charge of
being done by the City or Provincial Fiscal, and the authority to file a forum-shopping.
petition for forfeiture to the Solicitor General.
The issues for resolution are: (a) whether the Sandiganbayan has On the foregoing premises alone, the Court in Republic v.
jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379; (b) Sandiganbayan, deduced that jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No.
whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to investigate, 3019 and 1379 is lodged with the Sandiganbayan.42 It could not have
initiate and prosecute such petitions for forfeiture; and (c) whether taken into consideration R.A. No. 797543 and R.A. No. 824944 since
petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping. both statutes which also amended the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan were not yet enacted at the time. The subsequent
The petition is patently without merit. It should be dismissed. enactments only serve to buttress the conclusion that the
Sandiganbayan indeed has jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No.
The seminal decision of Republic v. Sandiganbayan33 squarely rules 1379.
on the issues raised by petitioner concerning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman. Under R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan is vested with exclusive
After reviewing the legislative history of the Sandiganbayan and the original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019,
Office of the Ombudsman, the Court therein resolved the question of R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan over violations of R.A. No. 3019 Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying
and R.A. No. 1379. Originally, it was the Solicitor General who was the following positions whether in a permanent, acting or interim
authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings before the then Court of capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of
First Instance of the city or province where the public officer or the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
employee resides or holds office, pursuant to Sec. 2 of R.A. No. higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the
1379. Upon the creation of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to P.D. No. Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (R.A. No. 6758),
1486,34 original and exclusive jurisdiction over such violations was specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
vested in the said court. 35 P.D. No. 160636 was later issued expressly members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
repealing P.D. No. 1486, as well as modifying the jurisdiction of the assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (b) City
Sandiganbayan by removing its jurisdiction over civil actions brought mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
in connection with crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of said treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
court.37 Such civil actions removed from the jurisdiction of the (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
Sandigabayan include those for restitution or reparation of damages, and higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains,
recovery of instruments and effects of the crime, civil actions under and all officers of higher rank; (e) Officers of the Philippine National
Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil Code, and forfeiture proceedings Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those
provided for under R.A. No. 1379.38 holding the rank of senior superintended or higher; (f) City and
provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Blg. 12939 abolished the concurrent prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts and (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
over the offenses enumerated in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to embrace institutions or foundations; (2) Members of Congress and officials
all such offenses irrespective of the imposable penalty. Since this thereof classified as Grade '27' and up under the Compensation and
change resulted in the proliferation of the filing of cases before the Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary
Sandiganbayan where the offense charged is punishable by a penalty without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen
not higher than prision correccional or its equivalent, and such cases and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the
not being of a serious nature, P.D. No. 1606 was again amended by provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All other national and local
P.D. No. 186040 and eventually by P.D. No. 1861.41 officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.45
In the face of the prevailing jurisprudence and the present state of ….
statutory law on the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner’s
argument—that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the "Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods that seek
petition for forfeiture it being "civil" in nature and the Sandiganbayan no judgment of fine or imprisonment against any person are deemed
allegedly having no jurisdiction over civil actions—collapses to be civil proceedings in rem. Such proceedings are criminal in
completely. nature to the extent that where the person using the res illegally is the
owner of rightful possessor of it the forfeiture proceeding is in the
The civil nature of an action for forfeiture was first recognized nature of a punishment. They have been held to be so far in the
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, thus: "[T]he rule is settled that nature of
forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and, therefore, civil in
nature."46 Then, Almeda, Sr. criminal proceedings that a general verdict on several counts in an
information is upheld if one count is good. According to the authorities
v. Perez,47 followed, holding that the proceedings under R.A. No. 1379 such proceedings, where the owner of the property appears, are so
do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the far considered as quasicriminal proceedings as to relieve the owner
forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the State. It from being a witness against himself and to prevent the compulsory
noted that the production of his books and papers. . . ." (23 Am. Jur. 612)

procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that provided for ….

in a civil action.48
"Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and in
However, the Court has had occasion to rule that forfeiture of illegally the nature of proceedings in rem. The statute providing that no
acquired property partakes the nature of a penalty. In Cabal v. judgment or other proceedings in civil causes shall be arrested or
Kapunan, Jr.,49 the Court cited voluminous authorities in support of its reversed for any defect or want of form is applicable to them. In some
declaration of the criminal or penal nature of forfeiture aspects, however, suits for penalties and forfeitures are of quasi-
proceedings, viz: criminal nature and within the reason of criminal proceedings for all
the purposes of . . . that portion of the Fifth Amendment which
In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture of property without declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
compensation, in consequence of a default or an offense, and the a witness against himself. The proceeding is one against the owner,
term is used in such a sense in this article. A forfeiture, as thus as well as against the goods; for it is his breach of the laws which has
defined, is imposed by way of punishment not by the mere convention to be proved to establish the forfeiture and his property is sought to be
of the parties, but by the lawmaking power, to insure a prescribed forfeited." (15 Am. Jur., Sec. 104, p. 368)50
course of conduct. It is a method deemed necessary by the legislature
to restrain the commission of an offense and to aid in the prevention Cabal v. Kapunan modified the earlier ruling in Almeda, Sr. v.
of such an offense. The effect of such a forfeiture is to transfer the title Perez.51 The Court in Cabal held that the doctrine laid down
to the specific thing from the owner to the sovereign power. (23 Am. in Almeda refers to the purely procedural aspect of the forfeiture
Jur. 599) proceedings and has no bearing on the substantial rights of
respondents, particularly their constitutional right against self-
"In Black's Law Dictionary a 'forfeiture' is defined to be 'the incurring of incrimination.52 This was reaffirmed and reiterated in
a liability to pay a definite sum of money as the consequence of
violating the provisions of some statute or refusal to comply with some Republic v. Agoncillo53 and Katigbak v. Solicitor General.54
requirement of law.' It may be said to be a penalty imposed for
misconduct or breach of duty.'" (Com. vs. French, 114 S.W. 255.)
The Sandiganbayan is vested with jurisdiction over violations of R.A. Under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, it was the Solicitor General who was
No. 1379, entitled "An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings before the then Courts of
Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public First Instance. P.D. No. Decree No. 1486 was later issued on 11 June
Officer or Employee and Providing For the Proceedings 1978 vesting the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over R.A. No. 1379
Therefor." What acts would constitute a violation of such a law? A forfeiture proceedings. Sec. 12 of P.D. No. 1486 gave the Chief
reading of R.A. No. 1379 establishes that it does not enumerate any Special Prosecutor the authority to file and prosecute forfeiture cases.
prohibited acts the commission of which would necessitate the This may be taken as an implied repeal by P.D. No. 1486 of the
imposition of a penalty. Instead, it provides the procedure for forfeiture jurisdiction of the former Courts of First Instance and the authority of
to be followed in case a public officer or employee has acquired the Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture under Sec. 2 of R.A.
during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of No. 1379 by transferring said jurisdiction and authority to the
proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor, respectively.60 An
lawful income and income from legitimately acquired implied repeal is one which takes place when a new law contains
property.55 Section 1256 of the law provides a penalty but it is only some provisions which are contrary to, but do not expressly repeal
imposed upon the public officer or employee who transfers or conveys those of a former law.61 As a rule, repeals by implication are not
the unlawfully acquired property; it does not penalize the officer or favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the
employee for making the unlawful acquisition. In effect, as observed legislature so intended. Before such repeal is deemed to exist, it must
in Almeda, Sr. v. Perez, it imposes the penalty of forfeiture of the be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same
properties unlawfully acquired upon the respondent public officer or subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. The
employee.57 language used in the latter statute must be such as to render it
irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency
It is logically congruent, therefore, that violations of R.A. No. 1379 are that falls short of that standard does not suffice. What is needed is a
placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even though the manifest indication of the legislative purpose to repeal.62
proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally
acquired property amounts to a penalty. The soundness of this P.D. No. 1486 contains a repealing clause which provides that "[A]ny
reasoning becomes even more obvious when we consider that the provision of law, order, rule or regulation inconsistent with the
respondent in such forfeiture proceedings is a public officer or provisions of this Decree is hereby repealed or modified
employee and the violation of R.A. No. 1379 was committed during accordingly."63 This is not an express repealing clause because it fails
the respondent officer or employee’s incumbency and in relation to his to identify or designate the statutes that are intended to be repealed.
office. This is in line with the purpose behind the creation of the Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the
Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court—to address the urgent problem condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior
of dishonesty in public service.58 laws.64

Following the same analysis, petitioner should therefore abandon his The conflict between P.D. No. 1486 and R.A. No. 1379 refers to the
erroneous belief that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceeding and the authority to file the
petitions for forfeiture filed against President Marcos, his family and petition for forfeiture. As P.D. No. 1486 grants exclusive jurisdiction
cronies. and authority to the Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor,
the then Courts of First Instance and Solicitor General cannot
We come then to the question of authority of the Office of the exercise concurrent jurisdiction or authority over such cases. Hence,
Ombudsman to investigate, file and P.D. No. 1486 and Sec. 2, R.A. No. 1379 are inconsistent with each
other and the former should be deemed to have repealed the
prosecute petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379. This was the latter.lawphil.net
main issue resolved in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.59
On 11 June 1978, the same day that P.D. No. 1486 was enacted, before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or administrative
P.D. No. 148765 creating the Office of the Ombudsman (then known agency against any public personnel who has acted in a manner
as the Tanodbayan) was passed. The Tanodbayan initially had no warranting criminal and disciplinary action or proceedings was also
authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of the transferred from the Chief Special Prosecutor to the Tanodbayan.75
Sandiganbayan as provided in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1486, such
jurisdiction being vested in the Chief Special Prosecutor as earlier Thereafter, P.D. No. 1606 was amended by P.D. Nos. 1860 and
mentioned. 186176 which granted the Tanodbayan the same authority. The
present Constitution was subsequently ratified and then the
On 10 December 1978, P.D. No. 1606 was enacted expressly Tanodbayan became known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor
repealing P.D. No. 1486. Issued on the same date was P.D. No. which continued to exercise its powers except those conferred on the
160766 which amended the powers of the Tanodbayan to investigate Office of the Ombudsman created under the Constitution. 77 The Office
administrative complaints67 and created the Office of the Chief Special of the Ombudsman was officially created under R.A. No. 6770.78
Prosecutor.68 P.D. No. 1607 provided said Office of the Chief Special
Prosecutor with exclusive authority to conduct preliminary At present, the powers of the Ombudsman, as defined by R.A. No.
investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file 6770, corollary to Sec. 13, Art. XI of the Constitution, include the
informations therefor, and direct and control the prosecution of said authority, among others, to:
cases.69 P.D. No. 1607 also removed from the Chief Special
Prosecutor the authority to file actions for forfeiture under R.A. No. (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
1379.70 person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
The rule is that when a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
expressly so provided. From this it may fairly be inferred that the old jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
rule continues in force where a law which repeals a prior law, not agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;79
expressly but by implication, is itself repealed; and that in such cases
the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the …
language of the repealing statute provides otherwise.71 Hence, the
repeal of P.D. No. 1486 by P.D. No. 1606 necessarily revived the (11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-
authority of the Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture under gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986
R.A. No. 1379, but not the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance and the prosecution of the parties involved therein.80
over the case nor the authority of the Provincial or City Fiscals (now
Prosecutors) to conduct the preliminary investigation therefore, since Ostensibly, it is the Ombudsman who should file the petition for
said powers at that time remained in the Sandiganbayan and the forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379. However, the Ombudsman’s exercise
Chief Special Prosecutor.72 of the correlative powers to investigate and initiate the proper action
for recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth is restricted only to
The Tanodbayan’s authority was further expanded by P.D. No. cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth
163073 issued on 18 July 1990. Among other things, the Tanodbayan amassed after 25 February 1986.81 As regards such wealth
was given the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation accumulated on or before said date, the Ombudsman is without
of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, to file informations authority to commence before the Sandiganbayan such forfeiture
therefore and to direct and control the prosecution of said action—since the authority to file forfeiture proceedings on
cases.74 The power to conduct the necessary investigation and to file or before 25 February 1986 belongs to the Solicitor General—
and prosecute the corresponding criminal and administrative cases although he has the authority to investigate such cases for forfeiture
even before 25 February 1986, pursuant to the Ombudsman’s other tribunal or agency, involving the same issues as that in the
general investigatory power under Sec. 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770.82 above-captioned case.

It is obvious then that respondent Office of the Ombudsman acted 4.] To the best of my knowledge, no such action or proceeding is
well within its authority in conducting the investigation of petitioner’s pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
illegally acquired assets and in filing the petition for forfeiture against tribunal or agency.
him. The contention that the procedural requirements under Sec. 2 of
R.A. No. 1379 were not complied with no longer deserve 5.] If I should hereafter learn that such proceeding has been
consideration in view of the foregoing discussion. commenced or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report that
Now to the charge that petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping. Forum- fact to this Honorable Court within five (5) days from knowledge
shopping is manifest whenever a party "repetitively avail[s] of several thereof.
judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively,
all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same However, petitioner failed to inform the Court that he had filed
essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the a Motion to Dismiss88 in relation to the petition for forfeiture before the
same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by, Sandiganbayan. The existence of this motion was only brought to the
some other court."83 It has also been defined as "an act of a party attention of this Court by respondent Office of the Ombudsman in
against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum its Comment. A scrutiny of the Motion to Dismiss reveals that
of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, petitioner raised substantially the same issues and prayed for the
other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the same reliefs therein as it has in the instant petition. In fact, the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the Arguments and Discussion89 in the Petition of petitioner’s thesis that
same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over separate civil actions for
make a favorable disposition."84 Considered a pernicious evil, it forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties appears to be wholly lifted
adversely affects the efficient administration of justice since it clogs from the Motion to Dismiss. The only difference between the two is
the court dockets, unduly burdens the financial and human resources that in the Petition, petitioner raises the ground of failure of the
of the judiciary, and trifles with and mocks judicial processes. 85 Willful petition for forfeiture to comply with the procedural requirements of
and deliberate forum-shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of R.A. No. 1379, and petitioner prays for the annulment of the
the complaint or initiatory pleading with prejudice and constitutes Sandiganbayan’s Resolution dated 29 October 2004 and Writ of
direct contempt of court, as well as a cause for administrative Preliminary Attachment dated 2 November 2004. Nevertheless, these
sanctions, which may both be resolved and imposed in the same case differences are only superficial. Both Petition and Motion to
where the forum-shopping is found.86 Dismiss have the same intent of dismissing the case for forfeiture filed
against petitioner, his wife and their sons. It is undeniable that
There is ample reason to hold that petitioner is guilty of forum- petitioner had failed to fulfill his undertaking. This is incontestably
shopping. The present petition was filed accompanied by the forum-shopping which is reason enough to dismiss the petition
requisite Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping87 in outright, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against
which petitioner made the following representation: the counsel and party concerned.90 The brazenness of this attempt at
forum-shopping is even demonstrated by the fact that both
…. the Petition and Motion to Dismiss were filed on the same day, 17
November 2004. Petitioner should have waited for the resolution of
3.] As Petitioner, I have not heretofore commenced any other action his Motion to Dismiss before resorting to the petition at hand.
or proceeding in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any
Petitioner’s counsel of record, Atty. Constantino B. De Jesus, needs Hon. ANIANO DESIERTO, in His
to be reminded that his primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. As an officer of the court, his duties to the Official Capacity as Ombudsman
court are more significant and important than his obligations to his
clients. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the of the Philippines; TOBIAS
administration thereof contravenes his oath of office. 91 Atty. De Jesus
failed to accord due regard, as he must, the tenets of the legal
REYNALD M. TIANGCO;
profession and the mission of our courts of justice. For this, he should
be penalized. Penalties imposed upon lawyers who engaged in forum-
shopping range from severe censure to suspension from the practice MANUEL T. ENRIQUEZ;
of law.92 In the instant case, we deem the imposition of a fine in the
amount of ₱20,000.00 to be sufficient to make Atty. De Jesus realize GEORGE T. GOCO; JOSE C.
the seriousness of his naked abuse of the judicial process.
RUIZ JR.; EVANGELINE P.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DISMISSED.
Atty. Constantino B. De Jesus is DECLARED in CONTEMPT of this CRUZ; ERNESTO J. GARCIA; Promulgated:
Court and meted a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) to
be paid within ten (10) days from the finality of this D E C I S I O and VALERIO A. BINAYUG,
N. Costs against petitioner.
Respondents.October 19, 2005
SO ORDERED.
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Liaibility of Public Officer who signs or Initials documents -- -- -- x

RUPERTO V. PERALTA and G.R. No. 153152  

EMERITA P. PERALTA, DECISION

Petitioners, Present:  

Panganiban, J.,  

Chairman, PANGANIBAN , J. :

' - versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez, ' Carpio Morales,  

Corona, and
onsistent has been the policy of this Court to refrain
Garcia, JJ from interfering in a determination of probable cause by
the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB). Only a clear
C
showing of grave abuse of discretion in making that Reconsideration, on the ground that no new argument or
evidence had been presented to warrant a reversal of the
determination will justify a review by this Court. This policy is earlier Resolution.[5]
based not only on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the OMB, but also upon  

practicality. A contrary policy would seriously hamper the work  

of this Court, because innumerable petitions would be filed
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted The Facts
by the OMB; in much the same way, lower courts would be  
swamped with cases in which the parties would be asking for a
reversal of the prosecutors' disposition of criminal complaints.  

  This case originated from a Complaint filed before the OMB

for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019.
  The antecedents were summarized by the OMB as follows:

The Case  
[Petitioners] are the owners of a motor shop
  operating under the name of Shalom Motor
Works. They claimed that sometime in August
  2000, respondent Garcia, the head of the Motor
Pool Division of the municipality of Navotas,
engaged the services of their motor shop for the
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the
fixing and repair of the municipality's service
Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the OMB's August 30,
vehicles. Allegedly, the terms and conditions for
2001 Resolution[2] and January 11, 2002 Order[3] in OMB-
the repair is such that, the repair shall be based
0-01-0416. The challenged Resolution disposed as follows:
on the job estimate provided by the
[petitioners] as approved by the municipality.
 
 
The service vehicles owned by the municipal
'WHEREFORE, premises considered, for want of probable
government alleged to have been repaired by
cause to proceed criminally against the herein respondent
Shalom Motor Works, as well as the respective
officials of the [M]unicipality of Navotas, it is respectfully
repair cost of each are the following:
recommended that this instant case be DISMISSED for
 
insufficiency of evidence.[4]
Besta Ambulance - Php 60,000.00
Hyundai Ambulance - Php 28,500.00
The assailed Order denied petitioners' Motion for
L-3-000 Ambulance - Php 3,500.00
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Toyota Hi-Ace Green - Php 3,500.00
Water Tank Isuzu - Php 13,670.00 out that the said job order which is for the
L-300 White - Php 27,000.00 overhauling of a fire truck was not done by their
FX White Police Vehicle - Php 5,400.00 motor shop, but in the Purchase Order, it was
Police Vehicle - Php 3,750.00 made to appear that it was Shalom Motor Works
Hyundai Ambulance - Php 42,000.00 who did the repair because x x x the Cash
Total - Php ' 181,265.00[6] Invoice attached to that particular Purchase
[Petitioners] professed that they were not able Order made [use] of a receipt purportedly
to receive full payment for every repaired issued by the said motor shop. x x x
vehicle. Allegedly, they were forced by  
respondent Garcia to receive and encash the [Petitioners] also lament the fact that three (3)
checks issued by the municipal government in of their sub-contractors were pirated by the
the name of Shalom Motor Works, but in reality, municipal government to do the repair and
were not really issued to the said motor shop, fixing of the municipality's service vehicles, and
since [petitioners] were not receiving the full they were allegedly using falsified Cash Invoices
amount indicated therein, as they were forced of Shalom Motor works to secure payment from
to surrender the proceeds thereof after the local Treasury.[7]
encashing the checks to respondent Garcia, and  
thereafter be conten[t] with whatever will be  
given to them as a token or 'vale as a partial
payment. x x x Respondents Tiangco, Garcia and Binayug each filed separate
  Counter-Affidavits; while Respondents Enriquez, Goco, Ruiz
Because of fear of not being able to collect their Jr., and Cruz filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit. Mayor Tiangco's
receivables from the municipality, [petitioners] verified statement was summarized by the OMB as follows:
contended that they were also forced to sign
blank Purchase Orders forms provided for by  
respondent Garcia. They learn[ed] later that one In his Counter-Affidavit, respondent Tiangco
of the Purchase Order form[s] they signed admits that the municipality of Navotas had
contained an amount in excess of what they entered into a contract with Shalom Motor
have quoted, and the same bears the signature Works for the repair of some of its service
of respondents Enriquez (Mun. Treasurer), Goco vehicles, but denied that the payment of the
(Supply Officer), and Tiangco (Mun. Mayor). x x repair cost were based on the job estimate
x furnished by the [petitioners]. He also insist
  that [the] total obligation of the municipality to
[Petitioners] further averred that sometime in the said motor shop is only Eighty Nine
May 2001, when they personally made a follow Thousand Three Hundred Forty Pesos and Forty
up of their receivables from respondent Mayor, Centavos (Php 89,340.40), and not One
they were informed by the latter that he was Hundred Eighty One Thousand Two Hundred
about to sign a check containing a Purchase Sixty Five Pesos [(Php 181,265.00)] as what the
Order supposedly addressed to Shalom Motor [petitioners were] trying to impress to this
Works. But to [petitioners' ] dismay, they found Office. In support thereof, were the following
 Disbursement Vouchers covering the that the alleged fake Sales Invoice of Shalom
municipality's obligation. Motor Works, which [petitioners] claimed they
  were able to obtain during their visit to
1. Disbursement Voucher NO. 101-00117-2053 respondent's Office did not really come from his
with attachments, amounting to Twenty One office or any other offices of the municipal
Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy [F]our Pesos government. A scrutiny of the Disbursement
and Seventy Two Centavos (Php 21,724[.72]). Voucher covering the repair of the subject fire
  truck will show that the award for its repair was
2. Disbursement Voucher No. 101-010215-0332 granted to Mighty Mike Auto Supply and not to
with attachments, amounting to Twenty Eight Shalom Motor Works. Hence, the alleged fake
Thousand Two Hundred Seven Pesos and Sixty receipt of Shalom Motor Works was obviously
Eight Centavos (Php 28,207.68). manufactured by the [petitioners].
   
3. Disbursement Voucher No. 101-010215-0332 Said respondent likewise denied having any
with attachments, amounting to Thirty Nine knowledge of the municipal government's act of
Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Pesos (Php pirating [petitioners] sub-contractors. And even
39,360.00). assuming that the municipal government had
pirated the services of the sub-contractors of
  [petitioners], he averred that there is nothing
wrong with offering somebody a job at the
Accordingly, the obligation under the said municipality, especially when this will redound
vouchers had been paid in full by the to the benefit of the municipal government.
municipality as evidenced by the photocopies of  
the three (3) checks that [petitioners] Lastly, respondent Tiangco called the attention
mentioned in their Complaint-Affidavit. of this Office regarding [petitioners' ]
  outstanding obligation under Purchase Order
Respondent Tiangco also rebuts the accusation No. 361 dated April 10, 2001, for the
that he was in connivance with the other overhauling of the Hyundai Engine of the
municipal employees in the act of forcing municipality's ambulance. Allegedly,
complainants to receive and encash the checks [petitioners] had not yet commenced the
payable in the name of their motor shop. He general overhauling despite due demand and
insists that he had nothing to do with the notice, hence, the reason why no payment had
alleged forcing incident, since the said act was been given to them yet. In fact, the municipality
done after or subsequent to his act of signing is seriously considering filing a charge for
the Purchase Order and checks. x x x damages and fraud against the said
  complainants.[8]
With respect to the alleged fake Purchase Order  
and Cash Invoice purporting to cover Fire Truck  
No. SBT No. 338, respondent Tiangco contended  
that he investigated the matter and found out
Respondent Garcia's counterstatements were summed up by  
the OMB in the following manner: Respondents Enriquez, Goco, Ruiz, Jr. and Cruz,
in their Joint Counter-Affidavit likewise denied
  the accusation hurled against them. They
For his defense, respondent Garcia denied the averred that they [did not] have anything to do
allegation that he was the one who engaged the with the alleged forcing incident, considering
services of [petitioners' ] motor shop. Being the that the act was done after or subsequent to
head of the Motor Pool Division, he asserted their signing of the Purchase Order and Checks.
that his obligation consist only in informing the They also insists (sic) that complainants did not
complainants that the repair works of some of even specify the particular act of each of the
the municipality's service vehicles under the respondents in the alleged falsification of the
Disbursement Vouchers already mentioned in Purchase Order and Sales Invoice. And neither
respondent Tiangco's Counter-Affidavit were [could they] be held liable on the basis of their
awarded to their motor shop. signatures appearing in the Purchase Order and
  checks because, the said documents were
Respondent Garcia also denounced executed with regularity. x x x.
complainants allegation that the checks issued  
in the name of Shalom Motor Works were not Respondent Binayug in his separate Counter-
really issued to the said motor shop. He pointed Affidavit also refuted any participation in the
out that the checks clearly shows (sic) that the alleged forcing incident. He likewise disowned
payee is Shalom Motor Works. As to the his purported signature appearing in the alleged
accusation that he forced and coerced the fake Sales Invoice submitted by complainants
complainants to receive and encash the said as evidence. Allegedly, the fake Sales Invoice
checks, after which he will get the proceeds and was only manufactured by complainant since,
give the latter only a token or a vale as a partial record shows that Disbursement Vouchers
payment, said respondent claimed that such pertaining to the repair of Fire Truck No. SBT
allegation is malicious and baseless. 338 shows that it was not Shalom Motor Works
  who did the repair, but Mighty Mike Auto
As regards x x x the allegation of fake Sales Supply, and that the delivery of the spare parts
Invoice and the alleged piracy of three of the for the said Fire Truck was received by Chief
complainants sub-contractors, respondent Edgardo Pangan Antonio and not by him.[10]
Garcia advanced the same argument as that of  
respondent Tiangco.[9]  
 
  Ruling of the Ombudsman
 
 
The OMB's summation of the other respondents' allegations
in their Counter-Affidavit is as follows: The OMB gave credence to the counterstatement of
respondents that the Municipality's obligation to petitioners
was P89,342.40 only -- an amount already paid through Hence, the OMB concluded that no sufficient evidence
checks that petitioners have admittedly received. It likewise supported their allegations of graft and corruption against
echoed the submission of respondents that they could not respondent public officials of the Municipality of Navotas.
have forced petitioners to immediately encash the checks,
which had apparently been indorsed to another account.  
Having done so, petitioners never actually received the cash
proceeds of the checks; much less could they have been In denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and
forced to surrender part of the proceeds to Respondent Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, the OMB held that
Garcia.[11] no new arguments had been raised and no new evidence
presented --either to dispel the presumption of regularity
  accorded to respondent public officials, or to warrant the
reversal of its earlier findings.[14]
The OMB further underscored the failure of petitioners to
prove that the Purchase Order (PO) and the Cash Invoice  
they had accidentally seen at respondent mayor's office were
falsified. It stressed that the PO itself had been signed by Hence, this Petition.[15]
petitioners and supported by a Cash Invoice, the authenticity
of which they have not controverted. The anti-graft office did  
not give credence to their bare contention that they had
been forced to sign the PO. The Issue

According to the OMB, the municipal government could not  

have used the alleged fake Cash Invoice of Shalom Motor
Works for the repair of a fire truck that another shop had  
supposedly repaired, considering that the Invoice lacked the
Municipality's stamp of receipt.[12] Besides, respondents In its Memorandum,[16] petitioners raise this sole issue:
submitted documents showing that the repair of the fire
truck had actually been awarded to and done by another  
business establishment. The Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion
in ruling that the evidence presented by
  petitioners was not enough to establish the
liability of respondents under Sec. 3(e) of R.A.
Lastly, the OMB opined that the municipal legal officer's No. 3019, establishing probable cause to
demand upon petitioners to return the Hyundai vehicle of the warrant the filing of the case of violation of Sec.
Municipality was warranted. The demand could not have 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.[17]
been made to harass them, as they had apparently received
partial payment for the repair of the vehicle.[13]  

  This Court's Ruling

   
1. The accused is a public officer or a private
  person charged in conspiracy with the former;
 
The Petition is unmeritorious. 2. That he or she causes undue injury to any
party, whether the government or a private
  party;
 
3. That said public officer commits the
prohibited acts during the performance of his or
her official duties or in relation to his or her
Sole Issue: public positions;
 
Sufficiency of Evidence 4. 'Such undue injury is caused by giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
  to such parties; and
 
  5. That the public officer has acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence. [18]
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 makes the following act unlawful:
 
 
 
e. Causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefit, advantage,
Petitioners' Evidence
preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross  
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or In asserting that respondents are guilty of the above offense,
government corporations charged with the grant petitioners anchor their evidence on (1) an allegedly fake
of licenses or permits or other concessions. Cash Invoice -- found in the office of respondent mayor --
  that bore petitioners' business name (Shalom Motor Works)
  and was allegedly used to support the repair of one of the
town's fire trucks; and (2) a Purchase Order -- the
  authenticity of which is not denied by petitioners -- bearing
items that were in excess of those required for the actual
repair of the vehicle involved and were purportedly inserted
The elements of the above offense are as follows:
by respondents.
   

According to petitioners, the alleged use of fake receipts Petitioners also insist that they still have remaining
through the connivance of respondent local officials collectibles from the local government, obligations that
establishes the illegal disbursement of public funds. Not only respondents have failed to honor.
was the Cash Invoice fake; the repair of the vehicle to which
it allegedly referred was not done by petitioners.  

  Respondents' Evidence

To undermine the authenticity of the Cash Invoice,  

petitioners point to the date at the bottom left, which
indicates that it was printed in 1981. However, Shalom Motor On the other hand, respondents deny having executed the
Works was allegedly established only in 1993, as shown on documents to which the alleged fake Cash Invoice was
its genuine Official Receipts[19] and the Authority to Print attached. Instead, the repair of the same vehicle to which
Receipts/Invoices issued by the BIR.[20] the Invoice and its attachments pertained was allegedly
awarded to and accomplished by another business
  establishment -- Mighty Mike Auto Supply -- as shown by
official records of the Municipality.[22] Besides, petitioners
Petitioners further aver that they were coerced by used the same Invoices bearing the date '3-20-81 in all their
Respondent Garcia to sign the PO in blank. Only when they transactions with the Municipality.[23]
went to the municipal administrator to collect payment for a
vehicle they had repaired did they discover that many items  
of spare parts, which had not actually been used in the
repair, were listed and thus used to pad the total amount
due.[21]

Petitioners add that on at least three occasions, Respondent They further contended that petitioners failed to present any
Garcia -- upon handing them checks in payment of the repair
of various government vehicles -- demanded various sums proof to overcome their documentary evidence that the total
from them, allegedly upon the order of the mayor's office. He cost of all the repairs petitioners had done on the
purportedly required them to immediately encash the
checks; after which he collected part of the proceeds. He Municipality's vehicles was merely P89,342.40,
supposedly threatened them, saying that if they refused,
not P181,265.
they would neither get similar projects
from the Municipality nor be paid for their remaining job
contracts. Thus, they supposedly had no choice but to give  
him the sums he demanded.
Respondent Garcia, for his part, brands as malicious and  

false the allegation of petitioners that he forced them to

In sum, respondents submit that petitioners failed to
surrender certain amounts after the encashment of the
establish undue injury from the former's actions -- an
checks issued by the Municipality. He also denies having
essential element of the offense allegedly committed.
forced them to sign blank purchase forms, or that he had
[27] Hence, the OMB did not abuse its discretion in refusing
padded any.[24] The other respondents also deny having
to file an information against respondents.
knowledge of or participation in Garcia's purported coercion

and demands for money.

 

 
The OSG's Comments

Respondents further call attention to the supposed inconsistencies

 
in petitioners' pleadings. Petitioners allegedly averred in their initial

Complaint that only Respondent Garcia had coerced them to According to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the

encash the checks; but in their Motion for Reconsideration, they records reveal a dearth of evidence to establish a probable

claimed that Respondent Ruiz was also privy to the alleged cause or well-founded belief that an offense has been

coercion. In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, they committed by respondent officials of the Municipality of

dropped this issue entirely. [25] Navotas.

First, petitioners failed to present any documentary evidence

Furthermore, petitioners supposedly admit having received to prove that they had rendered services to the Municipality,

the checks issued by the Municipality, but at the same time services

allege that their signatures appearing on the vouchers, which supposedly amounting to P181,265 as claimed by them. In

attested to their receipt of the checks, were forged.[26] contrast, the documentary exhibits proffered by respondent
officials clearly show that the Municipality's obligation negate the presumption of regularity in the performance by

was P89,342.40 only, and that the amount was already paid respondents of their official functions.[30]

in full, as evidenced by the checks issued by the local

 
government and properly received by petitioners.[28]

Finally , the OSG asserts that the OMB enjoys a wide latitude
 
of investigatory and prosecutory powers. This Court should

Second,  likewise contradicted by the documentary evidence not inordinately interfere with the findings of the OMB; there

on record is Respondent Garcia's allegedly unlawful coercion is no showing that the latter committed grave abuse of

of petitioners, so that they would surrender to him certain discretion.[31]

amounts from the check payments due them. 'It is indicated

 
on the face of the checks that these were endorsed by

petitioners to another person's account. Hence, the allegedly Basis for Reviewing the

unlawful coercion to encash them would not have been OMB's Resolution
possible.[29]
 
 
At the outset, the Court reiterates that the OMB is given wide
Third, neither is there any showing either that respondent discretion to determine whether, given a set of facts and
officials connived in falsifying the receipts of Shalom Motor circumstances, a criminal information should be filed in
Works, or that they connived in depriving petitioners of court. The OMB may dismiss the complaint forthwith for want
amounts due the latter. Furthermore, the purportedly padded of palpable merit, or it may conduct an investigation and
PO was signed by petitioners themselves, who therefore determine whether the evidence is sufficient to establish
attested to the correctness of probable cause.[32]
its entries. Stronger proof, not a bare claim, is required to
 
In Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman,[33] the Court whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to an excess or a

described the OMB's powers thus: lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent

and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty; or

 
to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law; or to act

at all in contemplation of law, as when the power is

The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
vested in the Office of the Ombudsman.  To insulate the
passion or hostility.[36]
Office from outside pressure and improper influence, the

Constitution as well as RA 6770 has endowed it with a wide

 
latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually

free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention.  This Thus, a resolution of this controversy ultimately boils down

Court consistently refrains from interfering with the exercise to a determination of whether the OMB gravely abused its

of its powers, and respects the initiative and independence discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in

inherent in the Ombudsman who, 'beholden to no one, acts resolving not to charge respondents with a violation of

as the champion of the people and the preserver of the Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

integrity of public service.

 

  No Grave Abuse of

  Discretion

Without good and compelling reasons, the Court cannot  

interfere in the exercise by the OMB of its investigatory and

Petitioners contend that the OMB, in a whimsical and
prosecutory powers.[34] The only ground upon which it may
capricious manner, failed to appreciate properly the evidence
entertain a review of the OMB's Resolution is grave abuse of
presented before it. Contrary to its findings, they have
discretion.[35] By that phrase is meant the capricious and
allegedly amply satisfied the elements required to hold its remaining debts. Beyond their empty statements,

respondents liable for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. however, they have presented no evidence whatsoever in

support of their claim. If they truly had at least eight service

 
contracts with the Municipality of Navotas for the repair of its

vehicles,[37] they should have been able to produce copies

The Court cannot ascribe grave abuse of discretion to the
of some official documents evidencing their claim.
OMB's conclusion that petitioners failed to adduce sufficient

evidence to substantiate their allegations. The OMB found

 
that the documents they had submitted did not establish a

probable cause or engender a well-founded belief that an Normally, contracting with government agencies and

offense has been committed, and that respondents were instrumentalities should not be done verbally, much less

probably guilty of it; its finding was a judgment call. without any paper trail at all. In this case, the documents

Petitioners have not shown arbitrariness, despotism or evidencing job Contracts with petitioners were proffered by

capriciousness in its action. That judgment may or may not respondents.[38] These Contracts numbered only three, and

have been erroneous, but it has not been shown to be all have undisputedly been fully paid for, as evidenced by the

tainted with grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of checks duly issued to and received by petitioners.

jurisdiction.
Petitioners' accusation that Respondent Garcia unlawfully

  demanded a fraction of the cash equivalent of the checks is

likewise legally doubtful. True, this fact may be difficult to

The most important elements of the offense charged are (1)
prove, as only the parties might have witnessed it, and proof
causing undue injury to the government or a private party
of its occurrence may depend only on their credibility. In this
(2) by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
instance, though, petitioners claim that the supposed
to a party; (3) with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
extortion occurred at least three times in practically the same
gross inexcusable negligence. To show undue injury,
manner: Garcia would hand them the check payment, then
petitioners cite the alleged failure of the Municipality to pay
force them to immediately encash or rediscount it in his sample Official Receipt (submitted to show a different date of

company, and finally demand a portion of the printing), the Authority to Print Receipts/Invoices, and the

proceeds. [39] Yet, they failed to report promptly any of those Affidavit of Denial executed by petitioners are not sufficient
wrongful acts; neither did they do anything to avoid to convince us of their contention: that the OMB

respondent's succeeding unlawful actuations. was capricious in refusing to give credence to the charge that

there was forgery, and that the forgery was perpetrated by

Similarly, petitioners' charges of respondents' illegal
respondent public officials.
disbursements and use of forged documents lie on weak

underpinnings. The allegedly fake Cash Invoice being used The same is true with the alleged padding of the Purchase

by respondents is, except with respect to the written entries, Orders. Petitioners claim that, for the repair of the vehicles,

identical with the invoices attached to the supporting they provided job estimates that would then be approved by

documents of the three Contracts with petitioners. Yet, the the municipal government before the award of the related

authenticity of those other invoices are not questioned by contracts. But the corresponding check payments for the

petitioners, who have admittedly collected payments for services rendered would be higher than their estimates. They

services rendered in connection with the unquestioned contend that the difference went to respondents.[40]

invoices.
 

 
However, they have produced no copies of those job

The proof of forgery presented by petitioners is not estimates. Again, other than their self-serving words,

impeccable either. The date '3-20-81 appearing on the Cash nothing supports their serious allegations.

Invoice, which merely indicates the issuance to the business

 
entity of an authority to print receipts or invoices, is not

conclusive as to the date of the establishment of the

Considering the foregoing facts, we cannot overturn the
business. In any event, the allegedly fake Invoice, the
OMB's exercise of discretion in ruling that there was
 for grave abuse of authority, oppression, dishonesty,
insufficient evidence to support the charge against falsification of public document and violation of her lawyer's
respondents -- conspiracy in falsifying Purchase Orders and oath.

Cash Invoices in order to personally benefit from the public The complaint averred that:
coffers, thus causing undue injury to the government.
1. The [c]omplainants are legitimate spouses and residents
[41] We have consistently held that every public official who of Rizal St., Brgy. Taihi, Tabaco City; while [r]espondent is of
legal age and a resident of Barangay Basud, Tabaco City, and
signs or initials documents in the course of standard a member of [the] Philippine Bar and currently employed and
holding the position of Clerk of Court VI, of the Regional Trial
operating
Court[,] Fifth Judicial Region, Office of the Clerk of Court,
procedures does not automatically become a conspirator in a where her summons and other processes issued by this
Court may be served thereat;
crime that transpired at some stage in which the official had

no participation.[42] Moreover, nothing shows 2. That on May 18, 1960, x x x [the] compulsory heirs1 of the
late spouses Don Felipe Manalang and Doa Tomasa Legazpi,
that respondents were in conspiracy with one another; or executed a Deed of Partition that covered the entire estate of
the late spouses Don Felipe Manalang and Doa Tomasa
that, in their official capacity, they acted with evident bad fa Legazpi;

Criminal Liability RPC 3. Said Deed of Partition was signed in [complainants]

behalf, as well as, in behalf of my brothers and sisters by our
[A.M. No. P-03-1704. March 15, 2004 late (sic) Hermogena Cao married to Jacobo Manalang also
deceased;
SPS. ARTURO AND CORAZON BLANQUISCO, Petitioners,
v. ATTY. ASUNCION AUSTERO-BOLILAN, Clerk of Court 4. This Deed of Partition was questioned in Civil Case No. T-
VI, Respondent. 1824 now pending appeal before the Court of Appeals under
CA-CV UDK No. 7919B;
RESOLUTION
5. The Civil Case No. T-1824 (CA-CV UDK No. 7919B) was
CORONA, J.: filed in order to seek the annulment of the Deed of Partition
that was executed by the other heirs in fraud of the
[c]omplainants. The partition and division of estate of the
In a sworn letter-complaint dated April 17, 2002, spouses
said late spouses was disproportionate and unequal to the
Arturo B. Blanquisco and Corazon Manalang-Blanquisco
prejudice of the legitime of the [c]omplainants and their
prayed that respondent, Atty. Asuncion Austero-Bolilan, Chief
brother and sister. Because of said civil case for annulment
of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court
of the Deed of Partition, a Notice of Lis Pendens was
of Tabaco City, Fifth Judicial Region, be dismissed from her
recorded at the back of the Title Lot Nos. 4422-B and 4422-C
position and disbarred from practicing the profession of law
 previously covered by TCT No. T-106747 and T-106748 in office, dishonesty and falsification of public document
[respectively]; when she certified falsely that the lots in question are not
involved in any litigation or special proceedings nor offered
6. Respondent, Atty. Asuncion Austero-Bolilan, in grave as bond in any civil/criminal case.3
abuse of authority, oppression in office, dishonesty, grave
misconduct and serious partiality and in violation of her oath In her comment dated July 12, 2002,4 respondent alleged
of office as lawyer, executed a Certification in favor of that, before signing the certification prepared by her staff,
Angelina Gloria Ong2 certifying that Lot Nos. 4422-B and she verified the accuracy of what was stated therein. She
4422-C are not involve[d] nor been offered as bond in any studied the complaint (for annulment of deed of partition)
criminal or civil case nor litigated in any special proceedings and the deed of partition itself; she found no mention of lot
or land registration cases as per available record existing in nos. 4422-B and 4422-C. The complaint listed in its
her [o]ffice as of August 1997. Aware (sic) of the fact that paragraph 5 all the properties subject of the case and
the said civil case was already filed and pending before RTC, described them in detail except for one which was referred to
Branch 15 of Tabaco City; merely as:

7. On the basis of said Certification, Angelina Gloria Ong was d) Lands collectively know[n] as Pili Farm, located in Pili,
able to effect the cancellation of the [Notice Tabaco, Albay, consisting of 215.3492 hectares, more
of] Lis Pendens and able to sell the aforementioned Lot Nos. or less;
4422-B and 4422-C in favor of Efren Canlas and Eduardo
Busa and the corresponding TCT No. T-106748 covering Lot The same property was included in the deed of partition but
No. 4422-C [was] cancelled in favor of Engr. Efren Canlas was described as follows:
and while TCT No. 106747 covering Lot No. 4422-B was
likewise cancelled in favor of Mr. Eduardo Busa to the 4.) All the lands composing the Pili Farm located in Pili,
damage and prejudice of herein complainants and their Tabaco, Albay, each parcel being described as
brothers and sisters; follows:

8. That it was during the pendency of the aforementioned xxxxxx

Court of Appeals case that Respondent Atty. Bolilan executed
the aforementioned Certification; (c) Certificate of Title No. _______

9. The Notice of Lis Pendens was cancelled because of the A parcel of land (Lot No. 4422 of the
[c]ertification of [r]espondent issued in favor of Angelina Cadastral Survey of Tabaco); with the
Gloria Ong. This case resulted in the filing of an Ombudsman improvement thereon, x x x
case where the Provincial Register of Deeds Ricardo de la Paz
was suspended until now; Respondent stated that the above-mentioned paragraph 5
(d) of the complaint was erroneous because there was no
10. To reiterate, [in] the issuance of said [c]ertification, the Barangay Pili in Tabaco, Albay. Respondent also averred
[r]espondent Bolilan committed and violated her oath of that, although the deed of partition mentioned lot no. 4422,
office as lawyer and likewise committed the following it was technically different from lot no. 4422-B or lot no.
administrative offenses: grave abuse of authority, oppression 4422-C. She added that she took pains to verify from
Maximo Balayo, owner of a portion of lot no. 4422-A, which faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter
was part of lot no. 4422, whether his property was among into negotiations. If a department secretary entertains
those included in Civil Case No. T-1824 and she was told that important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to
it was not. Respondent alleged that this all the more call the restaurant about the amount of bill, question each
convinced her that lot no. 4422, subject matter of the guest whether he was present at the luncheon, inquire
complaint for annulment of deed of partition, was not at all whether the correct amount of food was served, and
related to lot nos. 4422-B and 4422-C. otherwise personally look into the reimbursement voucher's
accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some
She further explained that, in issuing a routing certification, added reason why he should examine each voucher in such
she could not be expected to "go outside" of the complaint detail. Any executive head of even small government
and its annexes to determine the subject matter of the case. agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers
Without evidence aliunde, it could not be said that lot nos. that must be signed. There are hundreds of documents,
4422-B and 4422-C, located in San Antonio, Tabaco, Albay, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that
were the subject matter of Civil Case No. T-1824 because routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger
this case referred to a parcel of land involving lot no. 4422 offices or departments is even more appalling. (Emphasis
supposedly located in Pili, Tabaco, Albay. Respondent added ours)
that even if she signed the certification without exhaustively
checking the accuracy thereof, she should still be exonerated Respondent furthermore alleged that, assuming that the
of the charges against her based on the ruling of the certification was erroneous, it was prepared by her
Supreme Court in Amado C. Arias vs. Sandiganbayan:5 subordinates and signed by her without any ulterior motive
to favor one litigant or to oppress another. If there was
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office anyone to be blamed, it was the complainant's lawyer who
plagued by all too common problems ― dishonesty or drafted the "poorly studied, incomplete complaint."
negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or Respondent also pointed out that under Rule 13, Section 14
positions, or plain incompetence ― is suddenly swept into a of the Revised Rules of Court, a notice of lis pendens can be
conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally cancelled only upon order of the court. A mere certification
examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step by an unauthorized person is not sufficient basis for the
from inception, and investigate the motive of every person cancellation of the notice of lis pendens. The erroneous
involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the reliance thereon by the Register of Deeds for the cancellation
final approving authority. of the notice of lis pendens, if such was in fact the case,
should not therefore be blamed on her.
xxx
In their opposition to the comment of respondent dated
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed November 6, 2002,6 complainants alleged that respondent's
records, inspected documents, received procedures and defenses were nothing but lame excuses aimed at misleading
questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly the Court. Complainants pointed out that the subject
sized office could personally do all these things in all properties were located in the "Barrio of Pili." There was no
vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be Barangay Pili to speak of because the term barangay was not
asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to in use then. Complainants also stressed that Civil Case No.
a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good T-1824 was no ordinary case as it involved properties worth
millions of pesos. Being the Chief of the Office of the Clerk of Respondent averred that she took pains to verify from one
Court, respondent should have been aware of that and Maximo Balayo, the owner of a portion of lot no. 4422-A
should have exercised greater care in issuing the certification whether his property was among those included in Civil Case
in question. Instead of consulting one Maximo B. Balayo who No. T-1824. When Maximo Balayo who was her relative told
had nothing to do with the case, respondent should have her that it was not, respondent concluded that lot nos. 4422-
inquired about the subject properties from the Clerk of Court B and 4422-C were also not involved. Instead of asking
of Branch 15, Tabaco City RTC, to which the case had been Balayo, who had nothing to do with the case, respondent
raffled. should have consulted the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch
15 where the case was pending. This she did not do. Simple
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), after evaluating neglect signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from
the records, recommends that respondent be fined in the carelessness or indifference.8 A clerk of court, being an
amount of P2,000 for negligence.7 We adopt the essential officer in the judicial system, is expected to be
recommendation of the OCA. assiduous in performing his or her official duties. Negligence
in the performance thereof warrants disciplinary action.9
Respondent should have been more prudent in issuing the
subject certification. The fact that some of the properties Lastly, while it is true that respondent should not perhaps be
were not described with specificity in the complaint (the deed blamed for the erroneous act of the Register of Deeds of
of partition mentioned lot no. 4422 of the cadastral survey of Albay in canceling the notice of lis pendens based alone on
Tabaco which was referred to in the complaint as lands the certification she issued (inasmuch as any such
collectively known as Pili Farm, located in Pili, Tabaco, Albay, cancellation required a court order under the Rules of Court),
consisting of 215.3492 hectares, more or less) should have the fact remains that there was negligence on her part in
warned her to make the necessary verification first before issuing the subject certification.
granting the request of Angelina Gloria-Ong for a certification
that lot nos. 4422-B and 4422-C were not involved in the WHEREFORE, respondent Clerk of Court Asuncion Austero-
case. Also, the fact that the person seeking the certification Bolilan is hereby FINED in the sum of P2,000 with a warning
was a defendant in the said complaint for annulment of the that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with
deed of partition should have put her on guard all the more. more severely.

Respondent invokes the case of Arias to support her SO ORDERED.

contention that, even if she signed the certification without
exhaustively checking the accuracy thereof, she should not Accused’s lack of Care may be a ground for
be held liable because she had the right to rely on the work administrative action only
of her subordinates. Arias involves a different set of facts
relating to allegations of a large-scale conspiracy involving [G.R. NO. 149613 : August 9, 2005]
several heads of offices and/or their deputies. Our ruling
there that heads of offices can rely to a reasonable extent on PAMELA
their subordinates and on the good faith of those who CHAN, Petitioners, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
prepare bids, purchase supplies or enter into negotiations is
only applicable if the facts are similar to the Arias case. They DECISION
are not.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.: Since it is a standard operating procedure of the COA to
conduct an audit examination whenever an accountable
Petitioner Pamela Chan seeks a reversal of the officer is replaced, an examination was conducted on March
Sandiganbayan decision of August 28, 2001 finding her guilty 1, 1996. As in the recently concluded audit, the period
of Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 of the covered was from June 15, 1995 up to the date of the audit,
Revised Penal Code. March 1, 1996. The auditor found that petitioner had a
cumulative shortage of cash accountability in the amount
In November 1989, petitioner was hired as Accounting Clerk of P333,360.00 which was reflected in her Cash
II and assigned at the Regional Office of the National Bureau Examination Report dated March 1, 1996, signed by
of Investigation (NBI) in Cebu City, discharging the function petitioner. Again the auditor issued a demand letter to
of Cashier or Collection Officer. petitioner requiring her to explain the shortage incurred, to
which petitioner did not respond.
Petitioner went on leave from December 7 to 27, 1995. On
December 27, 1995 Josephine Daclan, the auditor from the The COA Region VII thus filed a complaint against petitioner
Commission on Audit (COA) assigned to the NBI, conducted for Malversation of Public Funds in the amount
a routine audit examination of the accountability of of P333,360.00 with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
petitioner. Petitioner being then on leave, the audit was (Visayas) on April 10, 1996. By Resolution dated February
conducted upon Delza Bas (Bas) who was officially 18, 1997, said office found probable cause against petitioner
designated by the Regional Director to act as Collection and recommended the filing of the corresponding information
Officer during her absence. The auditor found that all against her.
collections for the period beginning December 7, 1995 up to
the date of the audit, December 27, 1995, were accounted Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Office of
for, as reflected in her Cash Report dated December 27, the Deputy Ombudsman's Resolution of February 18, 1997
1995 signed by Bas. and for Re-investigation of the case against her on the
ground that the entire amount subject thereof should not be
On January 24, 1996, the same auditor conducted another charged solely to her but also to Bas since the amount
audit examination. Since petitioner had already reported for consisted, so she claimed, in part of "vales" received by Bas
work, the audit covered the period beginning June 15, 1995. from her and of funds collected by Bas whenever she acted
The auditor found a shortage of P290,228.00 in petitioner's as collecting officer. The motion was denied by Order dated
cash accountability which was reflected in her Cash Report July 28, 19971 bearing the approval of the Deputy
dated January 24, 1996 on which petitioner affixed her Ombudsman, which order contained the following
signature. The auditor thus issued a demand letter to recommendation of the Graft Investigation Officer assigned
petitioner to restitute the missing funds and explain the to the case:
shortage. In a parallel move, she sent a memorandum to the
Regional Director requesting that petitioner be immediately This office had ordered COA on June 24, 1996 to conduct a
relieved of her assignment as Collecting Officer. Acting on thorough re-audit of the cash and account of respondent and
the memorandum, the Regional Director issued a Special Delsa Bas covering the period from June 15, 1995 to March
Order replacing petitioner with Gloria Alvarez effective March 1, 1996 to determine their respective cash accountabilities.
1, 1996.
In his letter-reply dated August 28, 1996 COA Director a Warrant of Arrest on October 8, 1997 which was denied by
Santos M. Alquizalas intimated that a re-audit is not allowed the trial court, Branch 5 of the Cebu RTC, by Order dated
under COA Memorandum 87-511 dated October 20, 1987. As October 17, 1997:3
far as COA is concerned, the audit examinations conducted
by State Auditor III Josephine O. Daclan on December 27, xxx
1995, January 24, 1996 and March 1, 1996 is deemed
complete, thorough and based on documentary evidence. The records show that the accused did not submit her
counter-affidavit during the preliminary investigation despite
Finding no cogent reason nor sufficient justification to disturb the order of the Ombudsman. She did not also attend the
the [February 18, 1997] resolution of this office sought to be clarificatory investigation. Thus, the matter sought by herein
reconsidered, it is respectfully recommended that the instant accused in her Motion For Reinvestigation was available to
motion be denied for lack of merit. her during the preliminary investigation or in the clarificatory
investigation.
x x x (Underscoring supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
During the hearing of accused' Motion in the afternoon of
Petitioner was thus indicted before the Regional Trial Court of October 17, 1997 as originally scheduled, Director Virginia
Cebu City for Malversation of Public Funds allegedly Santiago appeared and she opposed the Motion branding it
committed as follows: as a dilatory ploy of the accused. She argued that accused
was already afforded ample chance to controvert the
That on or about the 1st day of March, 1996 and for evidence of the prosecution but she did not make use of it.
sometime prior thereto, at Cebu City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court hereby
accused, a public officer, being then the Collecting Officer of reconsiders its earlier verbal order granting the accused'
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), CEVRO, Cebu Motion for Reinvestigation by denying it in view of the
City, in such capacity and while in the performance of her objection of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas).
official function was in the custody and possession of public If the accused believes that she has strong evidence in her
funds, in the total amount of P333,360.00, for which she is favor, the better trial technique is to go to trial and not to
accountable by reason of the duties of her office, with educate his opponent.
deliberate intent and with intent to gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, take, xxx
misappropriate, embezzle and convert to her own personal
use and benefit the said amount of P333,360.00 Philippine On arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty."
Currency, and despite notice and demands made upon her to
account for said public funds, she has failed and refused and During the pendency of the case before the trial court, Bas
up to the present time still fails to do so, to the damage and remitted the amount of P60,787.00, while petitioner
prejudice of the government in the amount remitted P89,760.82 which, to her, satisfied her obligations
aforestated.2 (Emphasis supplied)Ï‚rαlαωlιbrαrÿ to the government in relation to the present case, the
balance of P182,812.00 after deducting the total remittances
Petitioner at once filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation being chargeable to Bas.4
and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance and/or Enforcement of
By Judgment dated June 18, 1999, 5 the trial court found 1. . . . IN NOT UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime THE ACCUSED OF DUE PROCESS BY NOT ALLOWING A RE-
charged, with the mitigating circumstance that she had no EXAMINATION AND A RE-AUDIT OF THE ALLEGED
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. SHORTAGE IN THE AMOUNT OF P333,360.00.

As the trial court credited petitioner's claim "that during the 2. . . . IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE EXAMINATION AND
preliminary investigation, she was able to remit P150,000.00 AUDIT REPORT PREPARED AND CONDUCTED BY THE
to the government" and noted that such claim was not EXAMINING AUDITOR IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
denied by the prosecution, it held that she had an unremitted
balance of P183,360.00. The trial court accordingly 3. . . . IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BY HOLDING THE
sentenced petitioner to ACCUSED LIABLE FOR THE UNREMITTED COLLECTIONS OF
ANOTHER ACCOUNTABLE OFFICER DESIGNATED BY THE
x x x an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) SUPERIOR OF THE ACCUSED.7
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to Claiming that her right to due process was violated by the
suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and to denial of her plea for the conduct of a re-audit of her
pay a fine equal to the amount malversed, which is accountabilities, petitioner cites Tinga v. People8 wherein this
P183,360.00. Court observed:

On appeal, the Sandiganbayan, by Decision dated July 4, By that denial of the re-audit, petitioner was, as claimed by
2001,6 affirmed the conviction of petitioner. It found, him, not given the right to be fully heard before the charge
however, that the amount totally remitted was P150,547.82, was filed against him at a time when records were still
not P150,000.00 as found by the trial court, hence, it held available and past transactions still fresh in the memory of
petitioner to be liable for the unremitted balance all concerned. He was given the chance to defend himself
of P182,812.18. before the Sandiganbayan, yes, but as said Court itself
observed "Tinga continued to pursue his quest for a re-audit
The Sandiganbayan accordingly modified the penalty as in his honest belief that he had not malversed any
follows: government funds. In the process, many but not all
disbursement vouchers were located in the office of the
x x x imprisonment of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor Municipal treasurer of Bogo, Cebu, x x x." Perhaps, if he had
as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion been re-audited and his accountability reviewed, a different
temporal as maximum, to suffer the penalty of perpetual result may have been produced.9 (Underscoring
special disqualification and pay the government supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
P182,812.18, the amount malversed, as well as a fine equal
to the said amount malversed by the accused. The above-quoted observation of this Court in Tinga came
about after considering that
In the present Petition for Review , petitioner faults the
Sandiganbayan to have erred: [t]he many errors subsequently discovered in the audit
examination, even by the Sandiganbayan, raise the strong
probability that had the re-audit/review he had requested
been accorded him, the remaining balance could have been It is stressed that the audit, conducted on the cash and
satisfactorily accounted for.10 accounts of accountable officers in the government is
presumed to be complete, thorough and based on
In the later case of Quibal v. Sandiganbayan11 in which the documentary evidence and established auditing and
therein petitioners cited Tinga in arguing that the accounting procedures and is done to determine the
Sandiganbayan violated their right to due process when it correctness of the cash accountabilities of an accountable
disallowed a re-examination and re-audit of their officer at a particular time. Any accountable officer or
accountabilities, this Court held: interested person who disputes the propriety of a cash
examination or the accuracy of the result thereof may just
x x x Petitioners' reliance on the Tinga case is misplaced. In have to ventilate the issues raised by him to the proper body
said case, we ruled that Tinga was denied due process when or tribunal where the case is filed and treat the documents in
the Commission on Audit refused to conduct a re-evaluation support thereof as evidence for his defense.
of the accountabilities of Tinga. The ruling was based on the
Court's finding that COA's evaluation of Tinga's In the interest of justice and in order not to delay the
accountabilities was replete with errors x x x12 (Underscoring prosecution of cases filed with theTanodbayan, any request
supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ for a re-audit/re-examination of the cash and accounts of
accountable officers who were earlier found short in their
The burden of proof that the subject audit reports contain cash accountabilities should be submitted to the COA
errors sufficient to merit a re-audit lies with petitioner. What Chairman for approval, except when the Order, not merely
degree of error suffices, there is no hard and fast rule. While request, comes from the Sandiganbayan.
COA Memorandum 87-511 dated October 20, 1987 13 (which,
as reflected in the above-quoted Deputy Ombudsman's Order x x x (Underscoring supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
of July 28, 1997,14 was cited by COA Director Alquizalas
when he opposed petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration In the absence of specific guidelines then the question of
and/or Reinvestigation before the Ombudsman) recognizes whether re-audit is warranted must be determined in each
that a re-audit may be conducted in certain instances, it does case on the basis of equity. In Tinga, petitioner's plea for a
not specify or cite what those instances are. The pertinent re-audit was, it bears repeating, clearly meritorious in view
portion of the said Memorandum15 is reproduced hereunder: of the finding that the audit involved therein was replete with
errors.
xxx
While petitioner alleges that there was a discrepancy in the
It has been observed that some officials of this Commission audit as the reported collections, specifically for the period of
have been authorizing the re-audit of the cash and accounts February 12-16, 1996, were P310.00 less than the actual
of accountable officers who were earlier found short in their collections reflected in the receipts, 16 said discrepancy, if
cash accountabilities. Although the conduct thereof may be true, is too minimal, as correctly observed by the
justified in certain instances on meritorious grounds, such Sandiganbayan, to merit a re-audit considering the amount
practice has to be controlled by this Commission in order to of shortage incurred.
protect the interest of the government.
Petitioner draws attention to the conflicting findings of the
COA, the trial court, and the Sandiganbayan regarding her
total liability as indication that a re-audit was called for. As A Yes, sir.
against the amount of P333,360.00 demanded by the COA,
the trial court found her total liability to be P183,360.00 and Q In what amount?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the Sandiganbayan found it to be P182,812.18. These
inconsistent findings were not due to any error in the audits, A The total amount is P89,761.00.
however. The liability of petitioner as found by the trial court
and the Sandiganbayan was lower than that found by the Q Do you have still any financial or monetary obligation to
COA because there were remittances made while the case the government?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
was already pending which were deducted from petitioner's
accountability. On the other hand, the inconsistency between A No, sir.
the findings of the trial court and the Sandiganbayan was
due to their different computations as to the actual amount Q After you have remitted this amount of P89,761.00?
of remittances, not due to any error in the audits. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Parenthetically, the existence of any discrepancy of a A No, sir.

mathematical nature is belied by petitioner's own assertions.
On direct examination, she testified as follows: Q So what was the amount left which was unremitted and
you now say it is the financial obligation of Mrs. Bas?
ATTY. TORIBIO chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Q Now, how much is the total financial or A It is P182,812.00.17 (Emphasis and underscoring
monetary accountabilities of Mrs. Bas adding the unremitted supplied)Ï‚rαlαωlιbrαrÿ
collections and the vales?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thus, by petitioner's own reckoning, her liability before any
A The total amount is P243,599.00. remittances were made was P89,761.00 and that of Bas
was P243,599.00. Notably, the total of these amounts, which
Q Now, did Mrs. Bas subsequently make any remittance or is P333,360.00, is the same amount of shortage, as
partial restitution of her financial accountabilities? computed by the auditor and reflected in the information.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioner additionally alleges that another error of a different
A After the filing of this case, she made a total deposit of nature was committed. She claims that the auditor failed to
P60,787.00. distinguish her liability and that of Bas, which is contrary to
law. She thus argues that Bas should have been charged for
Q Where is your proof of that?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary the funds actually collected by her everytime she acted as
collecting officer in her stead, as well as for the amounts
A The remittance advices are in the office. which she (Bas) received as "vales" from her.

Q What about you, did you make any remittance to the That the auditor charged to petitioner's account the
government?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary unremitted amounts actually collected by Bas is not denied
by the auditor, she reasoning that only petitioner A: I told him verbally.
was the officially designated Collecting Officer. Thus the
auditor declared: Q: Why did you not reduce it into writing?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ATTY. TORIBIO
A: I [f]ound it very repetitive in my part because I already
xxx made it official in my audit report.

Q: What I am asking you is whether you actually know that ATTY. TORIBIO
some other person like Bas was designated as collecting
officer?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Q: You have established the fact that even if you
discovered shortages committed by the acting officer,
A: I have no concerned (sic) about that especially if there is you did not find that acting officer responsible?
no designation of other collecting officer. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Q: But you know from the receipts that Bas was also A: No, sir. That is why I did not file also a case against the
collecting for the bureau because you are familiar with her accused. I only made proper report.18 (Emphasis and
signature?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary underscoring supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

A: Yes, sir. Petitioner claims, however, that Bas was officially designated
in writing as collection officer on the following dates when
Q: So you admitted now that you know that Bas was she was on maternity leave: (1) October to December 1990,
acting collecting officer?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary (2) February to March 1992, and (3) July 19 to September,
1995; and that Bas was verbally designated on certain
A: She was collecting but she is not properly designated. occasions by the Regional Director as shown in his July 14,
How can I account that collection to her when she is not 1997 Certification reading:
recognize (sic) as accountable officer.
This is to certify that during the period February 12-13; 15
Q: Did you send a memo to that effect to the regional and 16, 1996, I have officially authorized/designated Mrs.
director advising him to put an end to that practice? DELZA BAS, Clerk III, to act temporarily as Collecting Officer
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary of this office, in lieu of PAMELA A. CHAN, Accounting Clerk II
& Collecting Officer-designate, who was then on leave of
A: I talked to the regional director but he said there is lack of absence.
personnel.
x x x19 (Underscoring supplied)Ï‚rαlαωlιbrαrÿ
COURT:
Granted that Bas was given official designation during all the
Q: Was your advise to Atty. Villarin in writing or times that she acted as collection officer, petitioner's liability
memorandum?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary is not, by that fact alone, mitigated. Petitioner could still be
held liable for the amount unremitted by Bas if it can be
shown that the latter was under her supervision. As held Q After that you have to report to the Regional
in Office of the Court Administrator v. Soriano:20 Director that this is the amount collected by Mrs. Bas
when you were absent?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
x x x Amando Soriano was the Officer-in-Charge and
Accountable Officer of the defunct Court of First Instance, A No, I don't report that to the Director.
Iriga City, Branch XXXIV and as such, he was responsible for
all the collections made by the court. Any loss or shortage Q So, you will not make any written accounting of the
resulting from non-remittance, unlawful deposit or amount collected by Bas during your absence?
misapplication thereof, whether he has a hand or not, shall chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
be for his account. It is not an excuse that his designated
collection clerk was the one who failed to remit the A I do it for my ownself. I confer with Bas.
questioned amount on time because it is incumbent upon
him to exercise the strictest supervision on the person he Q Why are you doing that?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
designated, otherwise, he would suffer the consequences of
the acts of his designated employee through negligence. In A I have to check if she has remitted the amount collected.
short, by failing to exercise strict supervision on respondent
Mila Tijam, he could be liable for malversation through Q You are doing that because it was your duty to check the
negligence.21 (Underscoring supplied)Ï‚rαlαωlιbrαrÿ collection of Bas?

While, in the immediately cited case, it was the accountable A Yes, sir.
officer himself who made the designation, unlike in the
present case, command responsibility should apply in every Q In short, you were checking the amount collected by Mrs.
case where the accountable officer has, in fact, the duty to Bas because you were the one designated as Acting Cashier?
supervise the designated person. That petitioner had the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
duty to supervise Bas, she herself so testified:
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q Not Bas?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
xxx
A Yes, sir.
Q Was there a procedure that after your leave when
you returned to work you have to go over the Q When Bas acted as cashier or collection officer in
collection of Bas?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary your absence, she was under you insofar as Acting
Cashier is concerned?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.22 (Emphasis supplied)Ï‚rαlαωlιbrαrÿ
Q So that is the procedure?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A Yes, sir.
The auditor thus committed no error when she charged to A - My collection sir, she borrowed it from me for her to be
petitioner's account the shortage in the collections actually able to depose (sic) for these dates.
done by Bas.
COURT:
Petitioner, nonetheless, could have shown that she was not
remiss in her supervision of Bas, by way of rebutting the Q - In other words, she could not deposit her previous
disputable presumption in Article 217 of the Revised Penal collection?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Code which states:
A - No, she did not.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any
public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon COURT:
demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or Q - So, that's why it would appear that what she was
property to personal use. depositing was your money collection she borrowed
the money from you?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioner, however, failed to do so. Not only did she omit to
report the shortages of Bas to the proper authority upon her A - Yes, she only deposited this by January, 1996.
discovery thereof; she even practically admitted to having
assisted Bas in covering up such shortages. Thus she COURT:
declared:
Q - And you allowed that?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ATTY. URSAL
A - Yes, I allowed this because she promised to pay me
Q - Now I want to show to you these remittances for the following day but she did not comply with her
collections on November 7 and 9, 1995, and for collection promise.23 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Ï‚rαlαÏ
on November 15, 1995 which corresponds (sic) ‰lιbrαrÿ
to P15,355 and P15,465.00. I want you to take a look on
these remittances and tell me whether, and tell this Petitioner was thus not merely lax in supervising Bas; she
Honorable Court whether this Miss Bas did actually remitted actively assisted her in concealing her shortages to the
(sic) the collections that she made during those dates, that is extent of lending her public funds for that purpose.
remittance Advise 9607 and 9608?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Significantly, petitioner acknowledged the illegality of her
own act.
A - Yes, she made these remittances but she
borrowed my collections for that day when she ATTY. URSAL:
deposited this.
xxx
COURT:
Q - Now, may we know if you have that authority for
Q - What do you mean by she borrowed? you to lend this money to [Bas]?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A - No, I don't have that authority but although it is ATTY. URSAL:
not legal anyway, but then it has been the usual
practice at the office for some of the employees to Q - Now, you said earlier that the amount of P112,118.00
borrow and to return them immediately but in the case something like that, was exactly made by Miss Bas as vales,
of Miss Bas she did not comply with her promise. what do you mean by vales?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

COURT: A - Vale, she will make IOU's.

Q - So, who told you it is not illegal? Q - So in effect, you have extended some sort of credit
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary or loan to Miss Bas out of the fund of your collection?

A - I know it is not proper. A - Yes, because at that time the one who will borrow
will return except Miss Bas.
COURT:
COURT:
Q - Who told you it is not illegal?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q - Did you charge interest?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A - It's not legal sir, I said, it's not legal.
A - No, sir.
COURT:
COURT:
Proceed.
Q - Are you telling the court that it is the practice of your
ATTY.URSAL: office?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Q - So, are you aware of the extent of your A - Yes, sir.

responsibility as cashier that your prime duty is to
safeguard the funds of the agency and that any COURT:
shortage of these funds is your accountability?
Q - And is it with the knowledge of the director?
A - Yes, sir. I do not think of anything because I chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
trusted my co-employee that she will not let me down
and then she will not put me in trouble.24 (Emphasis and A - Sometimes the director himself will borrow and he will
underscoring supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ return immediately.

To make matters worse, petitioner did not only lend Bas COURT:
those amounts given on November 7, 9, and 15, 1995. She
admittedly extended "vales" to her in the amount Q - You mean, the director will borrow your collections?
of P112,089.18, and to others, also out of public funds. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A - Yes, but he will return immediately. legalize the disbursements".29 (Underscoring
supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
COURT:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Q - Are you sure of that?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Costs against petitioner.
25
A - Yes, sir.  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Ï‚rαlαÏ
‰lιbrαrÿ SO ORDERED.

The granting of "vales" had been held in Meneses v. Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and
Sandiganbayan26 to be contrary to law, however: Garcia, JJ., concur.

The grant of loans through the "vale" system is a clear case Corona, J., on leave.
of an accountable officer consenting to the improper or
unauthorized use of public funds by other persons, which is Termination of Official relations
punishable by the law. To tolerate such practice is to give a
license to every disbursing officer to conduct a lending A.M. No. P-89-290 January 29, 1993
operation with the use of public funds.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,
There is no law or regulation allowing accountable officers to vs.
extend loans to anyone against "vales" or chits given in RAMON G. ENRIQUEZ, respondent.
exchange by the borrowers. On the other hand, the General
Auditing Office (now the Commission on Audit) time and
again, through repeated office memoranda and rulings had
warned against the acceptance of "vales" or chits by any PER CURIAM:
disbursing officer because such transactions are really forms
of loans (Memorandum Circular No. 570, June 24, 1968, In a letter dated 19 January 1987, one Eliodoro C. Cruz of Compania
General Auditing Office).27 (Underscoring supplied)Ï‚rαlÎ±Ï Maritima, Inc. informed this Court that the company's lawyer filed with
‰lιbrαrÿ the Tanodbayan on 12 December 1986 a complaint for falsification of
a public document, use of falsified documents, robbery and the
The alleged acquiescence of petitioner's superior, even if violation of R.A. No. 3019 against herein respondent Ramon G.
Enriquez, Deputy Sheriff of Branch XXXI of the Regional Trial Court
true, is not a valid defense. As Ilogon v.
(RTC) of Manila and others. The said company lawyer requested that
Sandiganbayan28 teaches:
an investigation be conducted on the administrative aspect of the
case.
The fact that petitioner did not personally use the missing
funds is not a valid defense and will not exculpate him from In his 20 January 1987 letter to Mr. Cruz, then Court Administrator
his criminal liability. And as aptly found by respondent Leo D. Medialdea, who later became a member of this Court,
Sandiganbayan, "the fact that (the) immediate superiors of informed the latter that as a matter of policy, the administrative aspect
the accused (petitioner herein) have acquiesced to the of the case "will be undertaken by this Office upon the filing of a
practice of giving out cash advances for convenience did not
corresponding information by the Tanodbayan before the Instead of filing the answer/explanation as ordered, the respondent
Sandiganbayan." forwarded to the Court Administrator a letter on 20 February 1989
informing the latter that Criminal Case No. 12987 was still pending
Consequently, an Information for falsification of a public document resolution before the Sandiganbayan and that therefore, he
was filed against the respondent with the Sandiganbayan on 6 (respondent) should not be held administratively liable.
October 1988. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 12987
and was assigned to the Second Division. A copy of the Information On 15 May 1989, the Sandiganbayan, acting on a demurrer to
was furnished the Office of the Court Administrator on 17 October evidence, promulgated a Resolution granting the same and
1988. dismissing the case against the respondent "for insufficiency of
evidence." This conclusion is based on its findings that (a) the
On 1 February 1989, then Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro, Sheriff's Certificate of Sale, presented and admitted without
pursuant to this Court's en banc resolution of 12 March 1981 and on qualification or limitation and objection as to purpose, showed that the
the basis of the Information filed with the Sandiganbayan, public auction was held on 12 May 1986 and that the movable
administratively charged the herein respondent with the crime of properties were sold to Rolando Patriarca for P1,325,000.00; this fact
falsification of a public document and with conduct prejudicial to the was confirmed by prosecution witness Rizalina Cailian, (b) the private
best interest of the service committed in the manner alleged in the prosecutor's contention that there was no public auction on that date
said Information, to wit: runs counter to the Information which is based on the fact that a public
auction was held on 12 May 1986, (c) it is presumed that the
That on or about May 12, 1986, in the City of Manila, respondent regularly performed his official duty when he sold, during
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable the said public auction, all the properties levied upon, and (d) the fact
Court, the said accused, a public officer, being then a stands in bold relief that payment was actually made; whether the
Deputy Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, same was to the respondent or to Genstar, the fact also stands out
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 31, taking that if the payment was to Genstar it was because the amount was
advantage of his official position and, committing the due it as a judgment creditor; if made to the respondent "it was in
offense in relation to his official duties, did then and effect to and intended for Genstar," — thus having the same net
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously forge and effect; as a result, the assertion that the bid price was paid on 12 May
falsify, or cause to be forged and falsified, Sheriff's (sic) 1986 to the respondent is not absolutely false but has some truth to it.
Certificate of Sale dated May 12, 1986, which is a The Sandiganbayan went on to state that the rule is settled that if the
public document, wherein he is legally bound to statements are not altogether false, there being some colorable truth
disclose the truth, by stating therein that the payment to them, the crime of falsification is not deemed to have been
for the properties which he levied and sold at public committed; it further declared that the records "do not show that the
auction was made on May 12, 1986, and that the rights . . . of the parties involved would not be substantially the same if
amount of P1,325,000.00, representing the bid price for the bid price was paid on May 12, 1986, through the accused
the aforesaid levied properties, was paid to him on May (respondent), as when the payment was done 11 days thereafter
12, 1986, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused directly to Genstar, or vice-versa." Hence, the integrity of the Sheriff's
well knew, the payment thereof was actually made on Certificate of Sale was not affected.
May 23, 1986 to Genstar Container Corporation
through its attorney-in-fact, to the damage and On 10 April 1991, respondent filed a Manifestation informing this
prejudice of public interest. Court of the promulgation of the above resolution and praying that "by
virtue of the dismissal of the Criminal Case filed against the
The respondent was directed to file his answer/explanation within ten respondent before the Sandiganbayan, the Administrative Case . . .
(10) days from receipt of the charge. be likewise dismissed."
On 6 May 1991, this Court resolved to refer the case to the Office of same afternoon, he was advised that Sheriff Enriquez
the Court Administrator for investigation, report and recommendation. appeared at past 4:00 o'clock but that no auction sale
was conducted.
In his Memorandum of 11 December 1991, then Court Administrator,
now a member of this Court, Josue N. Bellosillo, opined that the In a sheriff's partial report dated May 23, 1986,
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 12987 by the Sandiganbayan does not respondent deputy sheriff Enriquez stated that on May
necessarily warrant the dismissal of the administrative case against 3, 1986, he served a copy of a writ of execution issued
the respondent considering that the quantum of evidence needed to by Judge Regino T. Veridiano of the Regional Trial
sustain a judgment of conviction in a criminal case is proof beyond Court of Manila upon Gregorio Coronel at the El
reasonable doubt, while in administrative proceedings, only moral Varadero de Manila dockyard at Sangley Point, Cavite
certainty is required; by way of comment to the Sandiganbayan's City. Immediately thereafter, he made a levy of
statement to the effect that the records do not show that the rights and personal property of the defendant and scheduled the
obligations of any of the parties involved would have been sale on May 12, 1986 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning at
substantially affected if the bid price was paid either on 12 May 1986 El Varadero de Manila, Sangley Point, Cavite City, to
or 23 May 1986, he avers that in the crime of falsification of public or satisfy the writ of execution. On May 8, 1986, third
official documents, whether by public officials or private persons, it is party claims were filed involving the levied property. On
not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or intent to cause May 12, 1986, the judgment creditor posted the
damage to a third person for the reason that in contradistinction to necessary indemnity bond duly approved by the court.
falsification of private documents, the principal act punished in the After the bond was posted, deputy sheriff Enriquez
former is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the conducted the sale and one Rolando Patriarca was the
truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. 1 Court Administrator Bellosillo highest bidder in the total amount of P1,325.000.00
then recommended the referral of the case to the Executive Judge of and which amount was credited to the partial
the RTC of Manila for investigation, report and recommendation. satisfaction of the writ (copy of the Sheriff's Partial
Report dated May 23, 1986 as filed in the record of
Acting thereon, this Court, in the Resolution of 5 February 1992, Civil Case No. 85-30134 is hereto attached Annex "B"
referred the instant case to the said Executive Judge for investigation, for ready reference). In the minutes of the sheriff's sale
report and recommendation. dated May 12, 1986, it is made to appear that the
bidding started at 3:55 p.m. and was finished at 5:00
Thereupon, Executive Judge Bernardo P. Pardo conducted an p.m. on May 12, 1986 with Rolando C. Patriarca as the
investigation; after completing the same, he submitted on 5 August highest bidder (copy of the said minutes is hereto
1992 his Report and Recommendation wherein, on the basis of the attached as Annex "C").
following summation of evidence and findings:
Deputy Sheriff Ramon G. Enriquez did not present any
In his testimony, Atty. Redentor R. Melo stated that on evidence during the investigation. He submitted the
May 12, 1986, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, he case on the basis of the Sheriff's Return dated May 23,
personally went to El Varadero de Manila Compound in 1986. He stated that he received the bid money on May
Cavite City to attend the auction sale of property levied 12, 1986 on which date he issued the certificate of
upon by deputy sheriff Ramon G. Enriquez and sale. Respondent Enriquez admitted that he did not
advertised for sale at auction scheduled on said date require the judgment creditor to pay the sheriff's
and time. He waited until past 4:00 o'clock in the percentage of commission.
afternoon without sheriff Enriquez appearing. Then, he
left and returned to Manila. At about 5:00 o'clock that
In his testimony, Atty. Jose C. Sison, counsel for sheriff's certificate of sale was falsified because the
judgment creditor stated that the auction took place truth is that the bid price was not paid by the highest
May 12, 1986 on which date the bid price was given to bidder on May 12, 1986. In fact, there was no auction
him in check by the highest bidder Rolando Patriarca; conducted on that date because it was already past
that he would not have agreed if the payment was 4:00 o'clock, the (sic) sheriff was not yet at the place of
made on May 23, 1986. auction which was indeed scheduled at 10:00 a.m.,
May 12, 1896. The bid price was actually paid by a
Much as we would like to accept the testimony of Atty. third who bought the three (3) vessels out of several
Sison as the truth, we find that he is sadly mistaken. In other properties levied upon. She paid therefor directly
its resolution dated May 15, 1989, the Sandiganbayan, to the judgment creditor. The sheriff 's percentage of
on the basis of stipulation (sic) of facts and the commission was not paid.
evidence adduced, held that on May 23, 1986, the
highest bidder Rolando Patriarca offered the three (3) IN VIEW WHEREOF, we respectfully submit that the
vessels M/V Dadiangas, T/B Marinero and T/B Timonel respondent Deputy Sheriff Ramon G. Enriquez is guilty
out of several other personal properties bidded (sic), to of the charge of falsifying the sheriff's certificate of sale
Rizalina Ingco-Cailian, a businesswoman engaged in dated May 12, 1986 in Civil Case No. 85-30134 of the
the sale of scrap iron. These vessels were sold to Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Cailian for the price of P1,325,000.00. Cailian, highest
bidder Patriarca and his wife repaired to the Navotas he recommended the following:
Branch of the Philippine National Bank that same day.
Cailian bought cashier's check No. 273290 dated May WHEREFORE, we respectfully recommend that
23, 1986 for P1,325,000.00, which, upon request of respondent Deputy Sheriff Ramon G. Enriquez be
Patriarca, who said he had no money to pay for the dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of retirement
vessels, was made payable to the order of "Genstar benefits, if any.
Container c/o Atty. Jose C. Sison" the judgment
creditor (resolution, p. 4, p. 84, rec.). This piece of We find the above findings of Executive Judge Pardo to be supported
evidence is certainly eloquent proof of the fact that by the evidence. His conclusions and recommendation are therefore
there was no payment of the bid price by the bidder in order.
Rolando Patriarca on May 12, 1986 to the sheriff
amounting to P1,325,000.00. As found by the We wish to add, however, that from the facts surrounding the case, it
Sandiganbayan, it was the bidder's buyer (sic) Rizalina appears that (a) no bidding was held on 12 May 1986; even if one
Ingco-Cailian who paid the bid price directly to the was conducted, the alleged highest bidder, one Rolando Patriarca, did
judgment creditor. This took place on May 23, 1986. not have the money to pay for his bid of P1,325,000.00, thereby
Indeed, if the bid price was given to the respondent resulting in a failure of the proceedings; or (b) the sale was
deputy sheriff on May 12, 1986, it was his duty to consummated only on 23 May 1986, without the requisite bidding, to
deposit the amount immediately with the court's Rizalina Ingco-Cailian to whom Patriarca allegedly "sold" what he
cashier. He did not do this. He did not also require the bought during the "bidding" of 12 May 1986. In his Notice of Levy and
judgment creditor to pay the sheriff's percentage of Sale dated 3 May 1986, the respondent expressly stated that he "will
collection. sell at PUBLIC AUCTION to the highest bidder for CASH and in
Philippine Currency on May 12, 1986 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning
Consequently, the inevitable conclusion is that the or soon thereafter at El Varadero de Manila, Sangley Point, Cavite"
respondent sheriff was remiss in his duties and that the the vessel M/V Dadiangas, Tugboat Timonel, Tugboat Marinero and
the other properties therein described. The unrebutted testimony of Luz. Atty. Sison, Judge Luz, and Patriarca with his wife
Atty. Redentor R. Melo reveals that he went to the auction site at 9:00 brought Cailian to the canteen of the building housing
o'clock in the morning of 12 May 1986 and stayed there until past 4:00 Branch XXXI. She gave the cashier's check to Atty.
o'clock in the afternoon. Respondent did not show up to conduct the Sison, and Judge Luz prepared our Deed of Sale. It
auction sale. Later, at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Atty. Melo, was dated May 20, 1986, the figure "20" being
who had by that time returned to Manila, was advised that the handwritten, and appeared to have been
respondent appeared at 4:00 o'clock but that no auction was acknowledged on the same date.
conducted. In his Minutes of Sheriff's Sale dated 12 May 1986, the
respondent made it appear that he started the auction sale at 3:55 As a result of the transaction, Patriarca delivered to
P.M. and concluded the proceedings at 5:00 o'clock that same Cailian M/V Dadiangas and one of the tugboats, which
afternoon with Patriarca submitting the highest bid in the amount of was later on taken back from her. The other tugboat
P1,325,000.00. There is no explanation as to why he could not start was the subject of a third-party claim of Compania
the bidding at 10:00 o'clock in the morning as set out in his Notice. In Maritima alleged to be different from Maritime, the
the light of Atty. Melo's unrebutted testimony, it is evident that the judgment debtor.
respondent falsified this entry in the Minutes. In his Sheriff's Certificate
of Sale also dated 12 May 1986, the respondent certified that the Clearly, therefore, if indeed the public auction was held on 12 May
highest bidder "thereupon did pay to the undersigned Deputy Sheriff 1986 and Patriarca was the highest bidder therein, he did not at such
the bid price of ONE MILLION THREE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE time have the cash, corresponding to his submitted bid, for delivery to
THOUSAND (P1,325,000.00) PESOS, which amount was credited to the respondent and eventually, the judgment creditor. Accordingly,
the partial satisfaction of the Writ of Execution." However, it is a fact pursuant to his own Notice, which of course is binding on him,
that as also found by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of 15 May Patriarca could not be awarded the bid. The latter's inability to
1989, which the respondent cannot refute as he himself submitted the produce cash is equivalent to a bidder's refusal to pay under Section
same to this Court and even asked for the dismissal of the 22, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in which case, as provided therein,
administrative case against him on the basis of the said Resolution: the sheriff "may again sell the property to the highest bidder and shall
not be responsible for any loss occasioned thereby." Moreover, the
. . .on May 23, 1986, Patriarca offered the three sheriff may thereafter reject any subsequent bid of such person. Since
vessels — M/V Dadiangas, T/B Marinero, and T/B Patriarca had no available cash to pay for the bid, the respondent
Timonel — to Rizalina Ingco-Cailian, a businesswoman could neither deliver the subject articles nor execute and deliver to the
engaged in the buy and sell of scrap iron. Having former a certificate of sale as provided for in Section 25, Rule 39 of
agreed on the price of P1,325,000.00 for the three the Rules of Court. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that
vessels, Cailian, Patriarca, and his wife repaired to the he did conduct the public auction on 12 May 1986, the respondent, in
Navotas Branch of the Philippine National Bank that view of the non-payment of the purchase price, violated said Section
same day. Cailian bought Cashiers Check No. 273290 25. Furthermore, he falsified his Sheriff's Certificate of Sale upon
dated May 23, 1986, for P1,325,000.00 which, upon entering therein the fact that Patriarca "thereupon did pay" to him the
request of Patriarca who said he had no money to pay bid price of P1,325,000.00 which was credited to the partial
for the vessels, was made payable to the order of satisfaction of the writ of execution. Assuming that Patriarca truly paid
"GEN. STAR CONTAINER C/O ATTY. JOSE C. the purchase price, there could be no possible explanation for the
SISON," the judgment creditor. belated Sheriff's Partial Report dated 23 May 1986.

On the same day, May 23, 1986, they went to Branch In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that Patriarca never
XXXI, RTC of Manila, where Cailian met the accused acquired ownership over the vessel M/V Dadiangas and the tugboats
for the first time. Atty. Jose C. Sison, and one Judge Marinero and Timonel. Neither could he then have "sold" the same to
Cailian. Hence, the latter stands on an entirely different footing and Respondent is therefore guilty of gross dishonesty, grave misconduct
must then be considered as the true vendee who purchased the and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He not only
vessels on 23 May 1986 without any public bidding. In this regard, the deliberately violated the integrity of official acts of an employee of the
respondent, together with a certain Judge Luz and Atty. Jose C. court, but also undermined the faith and trust of the public in the
Sison, became a willing co-conspirator to conceal this illegal act by Judiciary. He has transgressed the constitutional command that as a
making it appear that Patriarca sold the vessels to Cailian per a deed public office is a public trust, all public officers and employees must at
of sale which the said Judge Luz prepared on 23 May 1986, but which all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
was dated 20 May 1986. In his haste to cover up for his misdeeds, he responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and
even forgot to charge against the proceeds of the said "sale" the justice and lead modest lives. 6 In Jereos vs. Reblando, 7 We laid
sheriff's fee which is prescribed in Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of down the rule that the conduct and behavior of every one connected
Court; such an omission certainly prejudiced the government. It is with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, such as the
unfortunate that the Sandiganbayan failed to appreciate these illegal court of which the herein respondent is the assigned sheriff, should be
acts and despicable maneuverings. Be that as it may, its dismissal of circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at
the criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence was never all times, must not only be characterized with propriety and decorum,
meant, as respondent doggedly believed and arrogantly asserted, to but above all else must be beyond suspicion.
foreclose administrative action against him or to give him a clean bill
of health in all respects. The Sandiganbayan, in dismissing the same, While it is but proper that the respondent should not be kept a minute
was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt longer in the Judiciary, his dismissal from the service should not end
of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua this case. In the light of the above findings of conspiracy with other
non for conviction 2 because of the presumption of innocence which parties, including a certain Judge Luz who prepared the alleged deed
the Constitution guarantee an accused. 3 Lack or absence of proof of sale in favor of Cailian, there is a need to dig deeper, in a manner
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence of speaking, in this case. This could open the door to the secret
whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though chambers of a rumored syndicate which is in the business of fixing
insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in attachments and execution sales.
civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. 4 Then too, there is the
"substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedings which merely WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS from the service,
requires in these cases such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind effective immediately, respondent RAMON G. ENRIQUEZ, for gross
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 5 dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except the
Going back to Our findings, there is no doubt in Our minds that the monetary value of his leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to his
respondent (a) falsified the Minutes of Sale and the Sheriff's re-employment in any branch or service of the government, including
Certificate of Sale; (b) violated Sections 22 and 25, Rule 39 of the government-owned or controlled corporations.
Rules of Court by not conducting another bidding — assuming one
was held on 12 May 1986 — after the alleged highest bidder, The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to conduct a
Patriarca, failed to pay the bid price, by executing in the latter's favor a thorough inquiry into and investigation of the circumstances
certificate of Sheriff's Sale and by delivering the auctioned vessels surrounding the execution sale in question, more particularly the true
despite the failure to pay: (c) illegally sold the vessels to Cailian on 23 identity and alleged participation of a certain Judge Luz as above
May 1986 without a public bidding; and (d) maliciously connived and indicated. For that purpose, it should avail of the records of Criminal
conspired with Patriarca, Cailian and others to cover up such illegal Case No. 12987 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan and
acts by making it appear, by means of an antedated deed of sale, that take the testimonies of, among others, the respondent, Ms. Rizalina
Patriarca sold the vessels to Cailian. Ingco-Cailian, Atty. Jose C. Sison and Mr. Rolando Patriarca.
This decision is immediately executory. Proceedings therein continued with respect to the election protest of
petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch
SO ORDERED. XIV, presided by respondent Judge, who initially took cognizance of
the same as it is unquestionably a justiciable controversy.
Termination of Official relations
In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President
of the Republic of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 1081,
placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two months
G.R. No. L-38025 August 20, 1979 thereafter, more or less, or specifically on November 29, 1972, the
1971 Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution
to supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same was thereafter
DANTE O. CASIBANG, petitioner,
overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of the
vs.
Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, this Court
HONORABLE NARCISO A. AQUINO, Judge of the Court of First
declared that "there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, and REMEGIO P.
Constitution being considered in force and effect" (Javellana vs.
YU, respondents.
Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 [1973]).
Nicanor & Bautista and Agaton D. Yaranon for petitioner.
Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time petitioner had
already completed presenting his evidence and in fact had rested his
Bince, Sevilleja, Agsalud & Associates for respondents. case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of
petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over
the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason
of which — principally) Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions]
MAKASIAR, J.: and Section 2 of Article XI — a political question has intervened in the
case. Respondent Yu contended that "... the provisions in the 1935
Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as Constitution relative to all local governments have been superseded
the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, all local government should
by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, who adhere to our parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the
seasonably filed on November 24, 1971 a protest against the election New Constitution under its Article XI." He further submitted that local
of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the elective officials (including mayors) have no more four-year term of
grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power
counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; embodied in the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII.
(2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting;
and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the Petitioner vigorously opposed the motion to dismiss, and, relying
1971 Election Code. mainly on Sections 7 and 8 of Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) of
the New Constitution and G.O. No. 3, contended that the New
Respondent Yu filed on November 29, 1971 his answer and counter- Constitution did not divest the Court of First Instance of its jurisdiction
protest which petitioner answered on December 10, 1971. However, to hear and decide election protests pending before them at the time
respondent Yu withdrew his counter-protest after waiving the opening of its ratification and effectivity; that the ratification of the New
and revision of the ballot boxes specified therein. Constitution and its effectivity did not automatically abolish the office
and position of municipal mayor nor has it automatically cut short the
tenure of the office, so as to render the issue as to who is the lawfully
elected candidate to said office or position moot and academic; that of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for
election protests involve public interest such that the same must be the purpose.
heard until terminated and may not be dismissed on mere speculation
that the office involved may have been abolished, modified or It is respectfully submitted that the contention of the
reorganized; and that the motion to dismiss was filed manifestly for protestant to the effect that the New Constitution
delay. "shows that the office of the Municipal Mayor has not
been abolished ... ," is not ACCURATE. Otherwise, the
Respondent Yu replied pointing out, among others, that petitioner provisions of Section 9 of Article XVII, is meaningless.
failed to refute the issue of political question; and reiterated his stand,
expanding his arguments on the political question, thus: All officials and employees in the
existing Government of the Republic
It is an undeniable fact that this case has its source shall continue in office until otherwise
from the 1971 elections for municipal mayoralty. provided by law or decreed by the
Unsatisfied with the counting of votes held by the incumbent President of the
Board of Canvassers, the herein protestant filed this Philippines, ...
present case. And before the termination of the same
and pending trial, the Filipino people in the exercise of In the above-quoted provision is the protection of the
their free will and sovereign capacity approved a NEW officials and employees working in our government,
CONSTITUTION, thus a NEW FORM OF otherwise, by the force of the New Constitution they are
GOVERNMENT-PARLIAMENTARY IN FORM was all out of the government offices. In fact, in the case
enforced. We find this provision under Article XI of the above-cited (Javellana) we are all performing our
New Constitution, which provides: duties in accordance with the New Constitution.

SEC. 2. The National Assembly shall Therefore, election cases of the 1935 Constitution
enact a local government code which being interwoven in the political complexion of our new
may not thereafter be amended except Constitution should be dismissed because only those
by a majority vote of all its members, incumbent official and employees existing in the new
defining a more responsive and government are protected by the transitional provisions
accountable local government structure of the New Fundamental Law of the Land. The
with an effective system of recall, protestant, we respectfully submit, is not covered by
allocating among the different local the provisions of Section 9 Article XVII of the
government units their powers, Constitution. And in case he will win in this present
responsibilities, and resources, and case he has no right to hold the position of mayor of
providing for the qualifications, election the town of Rosales, Pangasinan, because he was not
and removal, term, salaries, powers, then an official of the government at the time the New
functions, and duties of local officials, Constitution was approved by the Filipino People. His
and all other matters relating to the right if proclaimed a winner is derived from the 1935
organization and operation of the local Constitution which is changed by the Filipino people.
units. However, any change in the
existing form of local government shall On December 18, 1973, the trial court, presided by respondent Judge,
not take effect until ratified by a majority sustained the political question theory of respondent Yu and ordered
the dismissal of the electoral protest. Thus:
There is no dispute that the Filipino people have with a political complexion above and beyond the
accepted and submitted to a new Constitution to power of judicial review. As fittingly commented by Mr.
replace the 1935 Constitution, and that we are now Justice Antonio in a separate opinion in the Javellana,
living under its aegis and protection. ... et al. cases, 69 0. G. No. 36, September 3, 1973, p.
8008:
xxx xxx xxx
The essentially political nature of the
Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the new Constitution, question is at once manifest by
above-quoted, only those officials and employees of understanding that in the final analysis,
the existing Government of the Republic of the what is assailed is not merely the validity
Philippines like the protestee herein, are given of Proclamation No. 1102 of the
protection and are authorized to continue in office at President, which is merely declaratory of
the pleasure of the incumbent President of the the fact of the approval or ratification,
Philippines, while under Section 2 of Article XI of the but the legitimacy of the government. It
new Constitution, also above-quoted, the intention of is addressed more to the frame-work
completely revamp the whole local government and political character of this
structure, providing for different qualifications, election government which now functions under
and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and the new Charter. It seeks to nullify a
duties, is very clear. These present questions of policy, Constitution that is already effective. In
the necessity and expediency of which are outside the other words, where a complete change
range of judicial review. With respect to the fate of in the fundamental law has been
incumbent oficials and employees in the existing effected through political action, the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, as well Court whose existence is affected by
as to the qualifications, election and removal, term of such a change is, in the words of Mr.
office, salaries, and powers of all local officials under Meville Fuller Weston "precluded from
the parliamentary form of government — these have passing upon the fact of change by a
been entrusted or delegated by the sovereign people logical difficulty which is not to be
or has reserved it to be settled by the incumbent Chief surmounted as the change relates to the
Executive or by the National Assembly with full existence of a prior point in the Court's
discretionary authority therefor. As if to supplement "chain of title" to its authority and "does
these delegated powers, the people have also decreed not relate merely to a question of the
in a referendum the suspension of all elections. Thus, horizontal distribution of powers." It
in the United States, questions relating to what persons involves a matter which 'the sovereign
or organizations constituted the lawful government of a has entrusted to the so-called political
state of the Union (Luther vs. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12, L. departments or has reserved to be
Ed 58), and those relating to the political status of a settled by its own extra-governmental
state (Highland Farms Dairy vs. Agnew, 57 S. et 549, action." The present Government
300 U.S. 608, 81 L.ed 835), have been held to be functions under the new Constitution
political and for the judiciary to determine. which has become effective through
political action. Judicial power
To the mind of the Court, therefore, the ratification and presupposes an established government
effectivity of the new Constitution has tainted this case and an effective constitution. If it decides
 at all as a court, it necessarily affirms discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative or
the existence and authority of the Executive branch of the government."
Government under which it is exercising
judicial power. I

The Court is not unaware of provisions of the new There is an imperative need to re-state pronouncements of this Court
Constitution, particularly Sections 7 and 8, Article XVII on the new Constitution which are decisive in the resolution of the
(Transitory Provisions) decreeing that all existing laws political question theory of respondent Yu.
not inconsistent with the new Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, modified, or repealed by the WE ruled:
National Assembly, and that all courts existing at the
time of the ratification of the said new Constitution shall 1. That Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not
continue and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise render moot and academic pending election protest cases (Santos vs.
provided by law in accordance with the new Castañeda, 65 SCRA 114 [1975]; Euipilag vs. Araula, 60 SCRA 211
Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall [1974]; Nunez vs. Averia, 57 SCRA 726 [1974]; Parades vs. Abad, L-
be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in 36927, Sunga vs. Mosueda, L-37715, Valley vs. Caro, L-38331, 56
force. Again, to the mind of the Court, these refer to SCRA 522, [1974]).
matters raised in the enforcement of existing laws or in
the invocation of a court's jurisdiction which have not 2. That "the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made
been "entrusted to the so-called political department or by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were
has reserved to be settled by its own extra incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new
governmental action. Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately
encompassing every person who at the time happened to be
Hence, this petition. performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or
contest" and that "subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in
We reverse. Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor
could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental
The thrust of the aforesaid political question theory of respondent Yu law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a condidate for
is that the 1973 Constitution, through Section 9 of Article XVII thereof, elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election
protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its ratification Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper
and effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue in office determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect's
and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, right to the contested office."' (Santos vs. Castañeda, supra); and We
as the same has been entrusted or committed to, the incumbent rationalized that "the Constitutional Convention could not have
President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department; and that intended, as in fact it .did not intend, to shielf or protect those who had
Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the been unduly elected. To hold that the right of the herein private
revamp of the entire local government structure by the enactment of a respondents to the respective offices which they are now holding, may
local government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the no longer be subject to question, would be tantamount to giving a
necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial stamp of approval to what could have been an election victory
review. In short, for the respondent Judge to still continue assuming characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote buying, or other
jurisdiction over the pending election protest of petitioner is for him to forms of irregularities prohibited by the Election Code to preserve
take cognizance of a question or policy "in regard to which full inviolate the sanctity of the ballot." (Parades, Sunga and Valley
cases, supra).
3. That "the right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in 6. That the New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of
office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Article XVII of courts of first instance to hear, try and decide election protests:
the New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed "Section 7 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides that 'all
elected to their respective positions as a result of the November 8, existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain
1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly operative until amended, modified or repealed by the National
elected to their respective positions and consequently, have no right Assembly. 'And there has been no amendment, modification or repeal
to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and of Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 which gave the herein
emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the petitioners the right to file an election contest against those
indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional provision" proclaimed elected," and "according to Section 8, Article XVII of the
(Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra). New Constitution 'all courts existing at the time of the ratification of
this Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until
4. That "until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all
otherwise, the right of respondent (protestee) to continue as mayor cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined
rests on the legality of his election which has been protested by herein under the laws then in force.' Consequently, the Courts of First
petitioner. Should the court decide adversely against him the electoral Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges should continue
protest, respondent (protestee) would cease to be mayor even before and exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election
a law or presidential decree terminates his tenure of office pursuant to protests filed by herein petitioners" (Santos, Euipilag, Nunez,
said Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution" Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).
(Euipilag, supra).
While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is
5. That "there is a difference between the 'term' of office and the 'right' now the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns,
to hold an office. A 'term' of office is the period during winch an and qualifications of members of the National Assembly as well as
elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its elective provincial and city officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2, Article XII-C of
functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A 'right' to hold a the 1973 Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral
public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers contests concerning municipal elective positions.
and responsibilities of the office. In other words, the 'term' refers to the
period, duration of length of time during which the occupant of an 7. That General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the
office is .entitled to stay therein whether such period be definite or Philippines merely reiterated his powers under Section 9 of Article
indefinite. Hence, although Section 9, Article XVII of the New XVII of the New Constitution. The President did not intend thereby to
Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not modify the aforesaid constitutional provision (Euipilag, supra).
foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election
protest, of the 'right' of the private respondents to continue holding General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does
their respective office. What has been directly affected by said not expressly include electoral contests of municipal elective positions
constitutional provision is the 'term' to the office, although the 'right' of as among those removed from the jurisdiction of the courts; for said
the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive General Order, after affirming the jurisdiction of the Judiciary to decide
with the 'term' thereof," and that "it is erroneous to conclude that under in accordance with the existing laws on criminal and civil cases,
Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the simply removes from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court certain crimes
private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their specified therein as well as the validity, legality or constitutionality of
respective offices under a new term. We are of the opinion that they any decree, order or acts issued by the President or his duly
hold their respective offices still under the term to which they have designated representative or by public servants pursuant to his
been elected, although the same is now indefinite" (Parades, Sunga decrees and orders issued under Proclamation No. 1081.
and Valley cases, supra).
8. That General Order No. 3 may not be invoked by the courts to without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
avoid exercise of their jurisdiction because to do co "is nothing short discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
of unwarranted abdication of judicial', authority, which no judge duly resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches
imbued with the implications of the paramount principle of of the government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
independence of the judiciary should ever think of doing. It is to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
unfortunate indeed that respondent Judge is apparently unaware that embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
it is a matter of highly significant historical fact that this Court has departments on one question" (p. 217). And Chief Justice Enrique M.
always deemed General Order No. 3 including its amendment by Fernando, then an Associate Justice, of this Court fixed the limits of
General Order No. 3-A as practically inoperative even in the light of the term, thus: "The term has been made applicable to controversies
Proclamation No. 1081 of September 21, 1972 and Proclamation No. clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to an issue
1104 of January 17, 1973, placing the whole Philippines under martial involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which
law. While the members of the Court are not agreed on whether or not there has been a prior legislative or executive determination to which
particular instances of attack against the validity of certain Presidential deference must be paid (Cf. Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946];
decrees raise political questions which the Judiciary would not Lopez vs. Roxas, L-25716, July 28, 1966, 17 SCRA 756; Gonzales
interfere with, there is unanimity among Us in the view that it is for the vs. Commission on Elections, L-28196, Nov. 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774).
Court rather than the Executive to determine whether or not We may It 'has likewise been employed loosely to characterize a suit where the
take cognizance of any given case involving the validity of acts of the party proceeded against is the President or Congress, or any branch
Executive Department purportedly under the authority of the martial thereof (Cf. Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 [1937]; Vera vs. Avelino, 77
law proclamations" (Lina vs. Purisima, 3 PHILAJUR 605, 610-611, 82 Phil. 192 [1946]). If to be delimited with accuracy; 'political questions'
SCRA 344 [1978]). should refer to such as would under the Constitution be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full
II discretionary authority is vested either in the President or Congress. It
is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon. ..."
1. In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, We hold that the (Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448, 504-505 [1971]).
electoral protest case herein involved has remained a justiciable
controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into this 2. The only issue in the electoral protest case dismissed by
case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the respondent Judge on the ground of political question is who between
Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if protestant — herein petitioner — and protestee — herein respondent
the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term "political Yu — was the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan, and legally
question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges and emoluments appurtenant
question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the thereto and to discharge the functions, duties and obligations of the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign position. If the protestee's election is upheld by the respondent Judge,
capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been then he continues in office; otherwise, it is the protestant, herein
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It petitioner. That is the only consequence of a resolution of the issue
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of therein involved — a purely justiciable question or controversy as it
a particular measure" (Tañada vs. Cuenco, L-1052, Feb. 28, 1957). A implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or
broader definition was advanced by U.S. Supreme Court Justice ommission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned
Brennan in Baker vs. Carr (369 U.S. 186 [1962]): "Prominent on the by law, for said breach of right (Tan vs. Republic, 107 Phil. 632-633
surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a [1960]). Before and after the ratification and effectivity of the New
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a Constitution, the nature of the aforesaid issue as well as the
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and consequences of its resolution by the Court, remains the same as
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding above-stated.
3. Any judgment to be made on that issue will not in any way collide or The construction made by respondent Judge of Sections 7 and 8 of
interfere with the mandate of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Article XVII of the New Constitution "... that these refer to matters
Constitution, as it will merely resolve who as between protestant and raised in the enforcement of existing laws or in the invocation of a
protestee is the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan; hence, court's jurisdiction which have not been 'entrusted to the so-called
entitled to enjoy the extended term as mandated by said provision of political department or reserved to be settled by its own extra-
the New Constitution. As construed by this Court, the elective officials governmental action,"' strained as it is, cannot be sustained in view of
referred to in Section 9 of Article XVII are limited to those duly elected the result herein reached on the issue of political question as well as
as the right to said extended term was not personal to whosoever was Our previous pronouncements as above restated on the same
incumbent at the time of the ratification and effectivity of the New Sections 7 and 8 of the New Constitution.
Constitution. Nor would such judgment preempt, collide or interfere
with the power or discretion entrusted by the New Constitution to the WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS
incumbent President or the Legislative Department, with respect to HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE RESPONDENT COURT IS
the extended term of the duly elected incumbents; because whoever DIRECTED TO IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH THE TRIAL AND
between protestant and protestee is declared the duly elected mayor DETERMINATION OF THE ELECTION PROTEST BEFORE IT ON
will be subject always to whatever action the President or the THE MERITS. THIS DECISION SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY
Legislative Department will take pursuant thereto. EXECUTORY UPON PROMULGATION HEREOF. NO COSTS.

4. Neither does Section 2 of Article XI stigmatize the issue in that Termination of Official relations
electoral protest case with a political color. For simply, that section
allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a local
government code "which may not thereafter be amended except by a
majority of all its Members, defining a more responsive and [G.R. No. L-89. February 1, 1946.]
accountable local government allocating among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
JOSE TOPACIO NUENO, MANUEL DE LA FUENTE,
providing for their qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries,
powers, functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters EUSTAQUIO C. BALAGTAS, and DELIA C.
relating to the organization and operation of the local units" but "... any DIÑO, Petitioners, v. GERARDO ANGELES, AGATON
change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect EVANGELISTA, ANDRES SANTA MARIA, VICENTE G.
until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the CRUZ, AMADO V. HERNANDEZ and FELICIDAD
purpose." It is apparent at once that such power committed by the MANUEL, Respondents.
New Constitution to the National Assembly will not be usurped or
preempted by whatever ruling or judgment the respondent Judge will Jose Topacio Nueno, for Petitioners.
render in the electoral protest case. Whoever will prevail in that
contest will enjoy the indefinite term of the disputed office of mayor of Assistant Fiscal Gregorio S. Narvasa for Respondents.
Rosales, Pangasinan in the existing set-up of local government in this
country; subject always to whatever change or modification the Nicolas V. Villaruz for respondent members of "Young
National Assembly will introduce when it will enact the local Philippines."cralaw virtua1aw library
government code.
SYLLABUS
III
1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; "QUO WARRANTO" ;
COMPLAINT; NECESSITY OF SPECIFYING CLAIMANT TO, AND
USURPER OF, OFFICE INVOLVED. — An individual who files a 16 thereof which provides for the filling of all vacancies,
complaint of quo warranto must set name of the person who temporary or otherwise, which might occur during and after
claims to be entitled to the office and that of the defendant the expiration of a term of office, so as to avoid the necessity
who is unlawful in possession thereof, and those who claim and even the occasion for holding over, clearly show the
to be entitled to the same office may be made parties in manifest intention of Congress to suppress the hold-over.
order to determine their respective rights to the office in the
same action. An individual can not sue and oust two or more 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; POLICY OF RECALL ANNOUNCED BY
persons although the latter are holding illegally their PRESIDENT. — The policy announced by the President of the
respective offices, unless he is entitled to all of them. Commonwealth in his message to Congress on June 9, 1945,
that "the provincial and municipal officers who were elected
2. PUBLIC OFFICERS; TERM OF OFFICE DISTINGUISHED in 1940 should, as a general principle, be recalled to their
FROM TENURE OF INCUMBENT; TERM OF OFFICE NOT respective positions, thus giving due consideration to the will
EXTENDED BY REASON OF WAR. — The term of an office of the people as expressed at the polls, and only for strong
must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The reasons should they be deprived of their privilege to serve,"
term means the time during which the officer may claim to cannot be invoked in support of the right to hold-over. In the
hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which first place, because the message has not the force and effect
the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The of law and is therefore not a legislative interpretation of the
tenure represents the term during which the incumbent law; and secondly, because if any weight may be given to
actually holds the office. The tenure may be shorter than the that policy in the decision of this case it would work against
term for reasons within or beyond the power of the the alleged right to hold-over. If provincial and municipal
incumbent. There is no principle, law or doctrine by which officers are entitled by law to hold-over, they would have the
the term of an office may be extended by reason right to continue in office irrespective of any policy which the
President may adopt, for the latter cannot deprive them of
3. ID.; RULE OF HOLD-OVER. — While there is authority to said right. If the President has to recall and appoint them to
the contrary, the general trend of decisions of American their respective original positions pursuant to such policy, it
courts is to adopt the common-law rule of hold-over. The is because they are not entitled to hold-over.
rule is, as enunciated in 46 Corpus Juris, 968, that "in the
absence of an express or implied constitutional or statutory 6. ID.; VACANCIES IN ELECTIVE PROVINCIAL OR MUNICIPAL
provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to hold his OFFICES AND OF CITY OF MANILA. — The only vacancies
office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has which may possibly occur in elective provincial or municipal
qualified." This enunciation of the rule is substantially the offices, as well as of the City of Manila, are those provided
same as that in McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, vol. II, for in section 16 of Commonwealth Act No. 357, and in
second ed., art. 307. The legislative intent not to permit section 2440 (e) of the Revised Administrative Code,
holding over may therefore be express or implied in applicable only to members of the Municipal Board of the City
legislative acts or enactments. of Manila, besides those enumerated in said section 16 which
are not in conflict therewith for according to section 2440 (d)
4. ID.; ID.; SUPPRESSION OF HOLD-OVER BY LEGISLATION as amended by Act No. 233 "in so far as they are applicable,
INTENT. — The repeal of all prior provisions for holding over all the provisions of the Election Law are made effective as to
by the provincial, city and municipal elective officers by the members of the Board and to their election to the same
Commonwealth Act No. 357, and the enactment of section extent as if the City of Manila were a province . . ." And each
and every one of said vacancies may be immediately filled in contemplated in the provisions of subsections (c) and (d) of
the manner therein provided. and therefore there can not be said section 16. To meet or provide for the interregnum or
any interregnum during which the office may be temporarily temporary vacancy during which no one actually holds or
without an incumbent. could hold the office, said subsection (a) of section 16
empowers the President to appoint a person to fill such
7. ID; ID.; TEMPORARY DISABILITY OF MEMBER OF temporary vacancy or interregnum, and the person so
MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CITY OF MANILA; TEMPORARY appointed shall hold the office until the permanent successor
APPOINTMENT BY PRESIDENT WHEN IS AN OFFICE SAID TO has been elected or appointed in accordance with the
BE VACANT. — In case of sickness or absence, or if for any provisions of said subsections (c) and (d) to fill the office for
reason it becomes necessary to maintain a quorum in that the unexpired term, according to subsection (f) of said
board, as in case of suspension or temporary disability of any section 16 of Commonwealth Act No. 357. Election or
member of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, section appointment of a person to fill a vacancy under subsections
16 (a) can not be applied, because no vacancy, temporary or (b), (c), (d) and (e) for the unexpired term according to
otherwise, is created thereby since the office is not without subsection (f), should not be confused with the appointment
an incumbent, and because that contingency is covered by under subsection (a) of a person to fill the temporary
section 2349 of the Administrative Code which is specially vacancy until the permanent incumbent for the unexpired
applicable to members of the Municipal Board of the City of term has been elected or appointed in accordance with said
Manila. In accordance with said section, the Governor subsections (c) and (d).
General (now the President) may make in such case a
temporary appointment of a person "who shall possess all Per PERFECTO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
the rights and perform all the duties of a member; of the
Board" until the return to duty of the incumbent An office is 9. "QUO WARRANTO." — To obtain the remedy in this quo
said to be vacant where there is no incumbent elected or warranto case, petitioners must show. in the first place, that
appointed to hold it. "A temporary absence will not result in a they are entitled to the positions they are claiming as
vacancy." Temporary "physical and mental disability of the members of the Manila Municipal Board. (Section 6, Judicial
incumbent of an elective office does not create a Rule 68; Lumontad v. Cuenco, 41 Off. Gaz., 894.)
vacancy."cralaw virtua1aw library
10. NO ELECTIONS SINCE 1943. — Since 1943, until
8. ID., ID., ID., ID.; ID.; APPLICATION OF SECTION 16 (a) respondents were appointed, no election, whether regular or
OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 357 TO "TEMPORARY special, had taken place in Manila, and, therefore, no one can
VACANCY" CONTEMPLATED IN OR IN CONNECTION WITH rightfully claim to have been elected to any position in the
SECTIONS 16 (c) AND 16 (d). — Even assuming that it was Municipal Board of Manila.
also the intention of Congress to apply, though improperly,
the words "temporary vacancy" used in section 16 (a) of Act 11. TWO DIFFERENT THREE-YEAR TERMS. — Petitioners
No. 357, to cases of sickness, absence, suspension or any were elected in 1940 for the three-year term of 1941-1943.
other temporary disability of any member of provincial or Respondents were appointed for a period belonging to the
municipal boards, it would not exclude the application of said three-year term of 1944-1946. Both terms cannot be
section 16 (a) to the proper "temporary vacancy" which may confused. The first belongs to the past; the second, to the
result from the delay in the election or appointment of a present. The past is dead. The present is alive. It is
successor of the incumbent of the previous term in the cases impossible to engraft the dead in the living. Life and death
are metaphysical opposites. 18. COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 153. — To implement the
constitutional prohibition and make it effective by penal
12. TERM OF OFFICE AND TENURE OF OFFICE. — Term of sanction, the First National Assembly enacted Act No. 153.
office cannot be confused with tenure of office. The last may
be coetaneous with the first. It may be shorter or it may not 19. ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DEMOCRACY. — One
take place at all. That fact does not change the duration of of the essential characteristics of democracy is temporary
the term of office. tenure of office for those officers who are more immediately
called upon to expose, sponsor, or voice the people’s fresh
13. SEPARATION FROM OFFICE. — Petitioners alleged that aspirations and developing policies, whether national or local.
they have not been legally removed or suspended, nor
resigned or abandoned their positions in the Municipal Board. 20. HOLD-OVER ELIMINATED — The hold-over provision in
Their term of office having expired, there was no office from section 2439 of the Administrative Code was eliminated by
which they could be removed or suspended, or which may be section 6 of Act No. 2774. The hold-over provision in section
the object of resignation or abandonment. Separation takes 2074 of the Administrative Code was repealed by section 4 of
place whether the occupant of an office, spontaneously or the Election Code enacted by the National Assembly.
involuntarily, is separated therefrom, or the office, by its
expiration, is removed from the occupant. 21. POPULAR OPINION AGAINST HOLD-OVER. — The general
attitude of provincial and municipal officers elected in 1940
14. ABANDONMENT BY ACCEPTANCE OF JAPANESE in abstaining from occupying their former positions after
POSITIONS. — By their acceptance of official positions under liberation in 1945 is in accordance with a unanimous popular
the Japanese military administration in January, 1942, before opinion against the hold-over theory.
the expiration of their term of office, petitioners vacated their
Commonwealth positions. 22. TOLERATION BY NECESSITY. — In the absence of
express statutory authority, hold-over is tolerated only in
15. INCOMPATIBILITY. — Continuance in official cases of extreme necessity.
Commonwealth positions is incompatible with acceptance of
positions from a foreign government (46 C. J., 947; 22 R. C. 23. HOLD-OVER BY THE SECOND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. —
L., 560). To fill the legislative gap from November 15, 1941, when the
term of office of its members had to expire, to December 30,
16. CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION. — No person "holding 1941, when Congress had to begin its existence, was for the
any office of profit or trust shall, without the consent of the Second National Assembly a case of extreme, paramount,
Congress of the Philippines, accept any present, emolument, and insurmountable necessity.
office, or title of any kind whatever from any foreign state."
(Art. III, section 1:9, Constitution of the Philippines.) 24. EXAMPLE OF SECOND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY NOT A
PRECEDENT. — The example of the Second National
17. INCOMPATIBILITY EMPHASIZED. — The incompatibility of Assembly is an individual case which, by its exclusive
petitioners’ former Commonwealth positions with those they peculiarities, cannot be taken as a precedent in support of
accepted from the Japanese military administration, is the hold-over theory, it having been the result of an express
emphasized by the fact that Japan was an enemy. understanding at the time the constitutional amendments
were approved and, later, ratified by the people.
 on January 1, 1941. Subsequently, Jose Topacio Nueno and
25. A FICTION. — Hold-over is a fiction. It cannot have the Carmen Planas resigned to run for seats in the House of
contingent statute of hypothesis, resorted to by scientists to Representatives in the national election held on November
build up and develop a theory. It cannot be raised to the 14, 1941, but they were not elected. After the election, the
category of a principle nor ranked with the simplest and most President of the Philippine Commonwealth appointed
elemental truth. petitioner Nueno to fill the vacancy created by his own
resignation, and petitioner Delia C. Diño to fill the vacancy in
26. DORMANT VOLCANO. — To give intimation that the hold- the place of Carmen Planas, for the last two belonged to the
over theory can be elevated to the category of a judicial same political party, "The Young Philippines."cralaw
doctrine is to place Philippine democracy on a dormant virtua1aw library
volcano which might erupt at any moment.
On January 3, 1942, when the City of Manila was occupied
27. AMBITION FOR POWER. — President Quezon said that by the Japanese Forces, the Commander in Chief of the
ambition for power is one of the greatest urges in the human Imperial Japanese army proclaimed military administration
heart. No one knew human nature better than the late under martial law over all districts occupied by the army, and
Filipino national leader. Ambition for power knows no in the proclamation it was provided that "so far as military
bounds. administration permits, all the laws now in force in the
Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions
28. PERPETUATION IN POWER. — By the hold-over theory shall continue to be effective as in the past," and "all public
municipal and provincial officers, members of Congress and officials shall remain in their present posts and carry on
the Chief Magistrate might be tempted to perpetuate faithfully their duties as before."cralaw virtua1aw library
themselves in power by the simple ruse of frustrating the
holding of elections. By Order No. 1 of January 23, 1942, of the Commander in
Chief of the Imperial Japanese army, a central administrative
organization or government under the name of Philippine
DECISION Executive Commission was organized, and Jorge Vargas
appointed Chairman thereof, and the latter, in Executive
Order No. 4, section 9 (b) of February 5, 1942, approve by
FERIA, J.: the said Commander in Chief, provided that "the provincial
boards and the boards or councils of cities, municipalities and
specially-organized local governments shall merely serve in
This is an action of quo warranto instituted by the four an advisory capacity to their respective governor and
petitioners against the six respondents to oust the latter mayors." Under the so-called Republic of the Philippines
from their offices as members of the Municipal Board of the inaugurated on October 14, 1943, no material change was
city of Manila on the ground that the petitioners are entitled introduced in so far as the City of manila was concerned.
to occupy and respondents are illegally holding them.
The regular election which, according to section 4 of Act No.
Jose Topacio Nueno, Manuel de la Fuente, Eustaquio Balagtas 357 (Election Code), should have been have held on the
and Carmen Planas and six others were elected in the second Tuesday in December 1943 to elect the members of
general election held on December 10, 1940, and qualified the Municipal Board of the City of Manila who were to
assume office on the first of January, 1944, could not be held The respondents, represented by the Fiscal of the City of
for the city was still under the Japanese military occupation; Manila, contend that petitioners have no right to hold the
and as the special election provided for in section 16 (c) of public offices claimed by them, because their term of office
said Act could not also be held after the re-occupation of the had already expired on December 31, 1943, and they are not
Philippines and the restoration of the Commonwealth entitled to hold-over; that whether or not they have served
Government on February 27, 1945, due to physical completely for three years as members of the Municipal
impossibility, the President of the Commonwealth appointed Board of Manila is immaterial, for the term of office must be
on July 18, 1945, the six respondents and four of those distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent; that as
elected in December, 1940, as members of the Board. petitioners have no right to institute the present action, this
Court has no jurisdiction to proceed and inquire into the
The four petitioners, Jose Topacio Nueno, Manuel de la validity of respondents’ appointments; and that the
Fuente, Eustaquio C. Balagtas and Delia C. Diño, instituted appointments of the respondents are legal and valid under
this action against the six respondents, Gerardo Angeles, the emergency powers granted by Act No. 671 of the
Agaton Evangelista, Andres Santa Maria, Vicente G. Cruz, Congress of the Philippines upon the President of the
Amado V. Hernandez and Felicidad Manuel, on the ground Commonwealth.
that petitioners, having been elected as members of the
Municipal Board of Manila in the general election held in The decision in this case depends upon whether or not, under
December, 1940, for three years, their term of office has not the law, petitioners are entitled to hold-over as members of
yet expired because they have not served for three years the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, notwithstanding
completely due to the Japanese occupation, and besides, the expiration of their term of office on the last day of
because they are entitled to hold-over or continue in office December of the year 1943.
until their successors are elected and qualified, and therefore
respondents’ appointments are null and void. In view of the conclusion we have reached in this decision,
we shall not discuss the sufficiency of the pleading filed by
Attorney Nicolas V. Villaluz appeared to intervene in behalf of the four petitioners who claim to be entitled to hold the
the political party "Young Philippines," and incidentally for offices now held by the six respondents. According to section
the petitioner Delia C. Diño, and claims that although the 7 of Rule 68, an individual who files a complaint of quo
latter is not, under the law, entitled to holdover after the warranto must set forth the name of the person who claims
expired term of the office of Carmen Planas (who resigned as to be entitled to the office and that of the defendant who is
above stated and in whose place she was appointed by the unlawfully in possession thereof, and those who claim to be
President), the appointments of the respondents were in entitled to the same office may be made parties in order to
contravention of section 16 (b) of Act No. 357, because no determine their respective rights to the office in the same
one of the respondents belongs to the "Young Philippines," action. An individual can not sue and oust two or more
whereas in the former Board there was one belonging to that persons although the latter are holding illegally their
political party, petitioner Delia C. Diño; and besides, their respective offices, unless he is entitled to all of them.
appointments, not having been submitted to the Commission Although this question has not been raised by the parties, we
on appointments, became ineffective from September 18, may rest our decision on that ground alone and dismiss the
1945, the day following the adjournment of the second action; for if we were to decide this case in favor of the
special session of the Congress of the Philippines. petitioners, we would be at a loss how to determine which of
the six respondents should be ousted as holding illegally the
four offices or places claimed by the four petitioners. There is express or implied in legislative acts.
nothing in the record showing which of the six respondents
occupy the four seats or offices formerly occupied by the four In many states of the Union, the constitutions and statute
petitioners. The record does not show the respective dates or expressly provide for the holding over of public officers until
seniority of the respondents’ appointments. But we want to their successors are elected or appointed and have qualified.
decide the case on its merits and not on technicalities, so as (46 C.J., sec. 111, p. 969.)
to avoid any other or further proceedings.
Here in the Philippines, in enacting the provisions of the
The contention that petitioners are entitled to continue in Revised Administrative Code relating to elective provincial
office because they have not completely served for three officers, members of the Municipal Board of the City of
years due to the war, is untenable, even assuming that they Manila and municipal officers in general, the Philippine
had not discharged the duties of their office during the Legislature was dealing with the same or similar subject
Japanese occupation of Manila. For the simple reason that matter, and notwithstanding the trend of American decisions
the term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure to adopt the common-law rule of hold-over, recognized and
of the incumbent. The term means that the time during applied by this Court to appointive officers in the case of
which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and Tayko v. Capistrano (53 Phil., 866), our lawmakers have
fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall followed the policy and practice of those States that provide
succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during expressly in their statutes for holding over of provincial, city
which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of and municipal officers, in the following provisions of the
office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent part of which we
shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power have underscored.
of the incumbent. There is no principle, law or doctrine by
which the term of an office may be extended by reason of Section 2074 of the Revised Administrative Code (Provincial
war. Law) provided:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

We shall, therefore, discuss and decide only the question of "Term of office of elective official. — The term of a provincial
the petitioners’ right to hold-over and, consequently, the officer elected at any general election commencing with the
power of the President to appoint their successors after the year nineteen hundred and thirty-seven, shall begin on the
expiration of their term of office. sixteenth of July following such election and shall end on the
fifteenth of the same month three years thereafter; but if a
While there is authority to the contrary, the general trend of successor be not inducted at the time appointed by law, the
decisions of American courts is to adopt the common-law incumbent shall hold-over until a successor shall be duly
rule of hold- over. The rule is, as enunciated in 46 Corpus qualified."cralaw virtua1aw library
Juris, 968, that "in the absence of an express or implied
constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an Section 2177 of the same Code (Municipal Law) read as
officer is entitled to hold his office until his successor is follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
appointed or chosen and has qualified." This enunciation of
the rule is substantially the same as that in McQuillin, "Term of elective officer. — The term of a municipal officer
Municipal Corporations, Vol. II, second ed., art. 307. The elected at any general election commencing with the year
legislative intent not to permit holding over may therefore be nineteen hundred and thirty-seven, shall begin on the
sixteenth of July following such election and shall end on the repealed by section 184 of Commonwealth Act No. 457.
fifteenth of the same month three years thereafter; but if a Section 4 of said act provides, in lieu of said provisions, that
successor be not inducted at the time appointed by law, the "on the second Tuesday in December, nineteen hundred and
incumbent shall hold over until a successor shall e duly forty, and upon the same day every three years thereafter, a
qualified."cralaw virtua1aw library regular election shall be held to elect the officers who are to
occupy all elective provincial, municipal and city offices
The original provision of section 2439 (Charter of the City of throughout the Philippines. The officers elected shall assume
Manila) which provided "that the Municipal Board shall be the office on the first day of January next following." This repeal
legislative body of the city, and shall consist of ten elective of all provisions for holding over by the provincial, city and
members who shall hold office for four years or until their municipal elective officers by Commonwealth Act No. 357,
successors are elected and qualified" was amended by Act and the enactment of section 16 thereof which provides for
No. 2774 so as to read: "The Municipal Board shall be the the filling of all vacancies, temporary or otherwise, which
legislative body of the City, and shall consist of ten elected might occur during and after the expiration of a term of
members who shall hold office for three years." But the office, so as to avoid the necessity and even the occasion for
suppression of the provision for holding over did not have holding over, clearly show the manifest intention of Congress
any effect, since it was then a surplusage, because the to suppress the hold-over. The very attorney who appeared
second paragraph of section 2440 provided among others the for petitioner Delia C. Diño argued in his brief and oral
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph argument that the latter has no right under the law to hold-
over, but is entitled to be reappointed in accordance with
"Election for the members of the Board shall be held on the section 16 (b) of Act No. 357.
date of the general trienial election, and elected members
shall take office on the sixteenth day of October next The policy announced by the President of the Commonwealth
following their election, upon qualifying, and shall hold office in his message to Congress on June 9, 1945, that "the
until their successors are elected and qualified."cralaw provincial and municipal officers who were elected in 1940
virtua1aw library should, as a general principle, be recalled to their respective
positions, thus giving due consideration to the will of the
From the express provision above quoted, it clearly appears people as expressed at the polls, and only for strong reasons
that it was the intention of the Legislative, independent or should they be deprived of their privilege to serve," quoted in
irrespective of the ruling of this Court in the above-cited case the dissenting opinion, cannot be invoked in support of the
of Tayko v. Capistrano relating to appointive officers, to right to hold-over. In the first place, because the message
provide expressly that the elective members of the Municipal has not the force and effect of law and is therefore not a
Board of the City of Manila as well as elective provincial and legislative interpretation of the law; and secondly, because if
municipal officers in general, shall hold-over after the any weight may be given to the policy in the decision of this
expiration of their terms until their successors shall be duly case, it would work against the alleged right to hold-over. If
qualified. Such provision was enacted to provide against all provincial and municipal officers are entitled by law to hold-
contingencies which might result from an office becoming for over, they would have the right to continue in office
any period of time vacant or without an incumbent. irrespective of any policy which the President may adopt, for
the latter cannot deprive them of said right. If the President
Subsequently, the above-quoted provisions of sections 2974, has to recall and appoint them to their respective original
2177, and 2440 (second paragraph), were expressly positions pursuant to such policy, it is because they are not
entitled to hold-over. provincial or municipal offices, as well as of the City of
Manila, are those provided for in the above-quoted
Section 16, of Commonwealth Act No. 357 reads as provisions, and in section 2440 (e), applicable only to
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph members of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila,
besides those enumerated in said section 16 which are not in
"Sec. 16. Vacancy in elective provincial or municipal office. — conflict therewith, for according to section 2440 (d) as
(a) Whenever a temporary vacancy in any elective local amended by Act No. 233, "in so far as they are applicable, all
office occurs, the same shall be filled by appointment by the the provisions of the Election Law are made effective as to
President if it is a provincial office, and by the provincial the members of the Board and to their election to the same
governor, with the consent of the provincial board, if it is a extent as if the City of Manila were a province . . ." And each
municipal office. and every one of said vacancies may be immediately filled in
the manner therein provided, and therefore there can not be
"(b) Whenever in any elective local office a vacancy occurs any interregnum during which the office may b temporarily
as a result of the death, resignation, removal or cessation of without an incumbent as we shall show later on.
the incumbent, the President shall appoint thereto a suitable
person belonging to the political party of the officer whom he In case of sickness or absence, or if for any reason it
is to replace, save in the case of a mayor, which shall be becomes necessary to maintain a quorum in that Board, as in
filled by the vice-mayor. case of suspension or temporary disability of any member of
the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, section 16 (a) can
"(c) Whenever the election for a local office fails to take place not be applied, because no vacancy, temporary or otherwise,
on the date fixed by law, or such election results in a failure is created thereby since the office is not without an
to elect, the President shall issue as soon as practicable, a incumbent, and because that contingency is covered by
proclamation calling a special election to fill said office. section 2439 of the Administrative Code which is specially
applicable to members of the Municipal Board of the City of
"(d) When a local officer-elect dies before assumption of Manila. In accordance with said section, the Governor
office, or, having been elected provincial or municipal officer, General (now the President) may make in such case a
his election is not confirmed by the President for disloyalty, temporary appointment of a person "who shall possess all
or such officer- elect fails to qualify, for any reason, the the rights and perform all the duties of a member of the
President may in his discretion either call a special election or Board" until the return to duty of the incumbent. An office is
fill the office by appointment. said to be vacant where there is no incumbent elected or
appointed to hold it. (46 C.J., 971.) "A temporary absence
"(e) In case a special election has been called and held and will not result in a vacancy." (Young v. Morris, 47 Okl., 743.)
shall have resulted in a failure to elect, the President shall fill Temporary "physical and mental disability of the incumbent
the office by appointment. of an elective office does not a create a vacancy." (46 C.J.,
973.)
"(f) The person appointed or elected to fill a vacancy in an
elective provincial or municipal office shall hold the same for But even assuming that it was also the intention of Congress
the unexpired term of the office."cralaw virtua1aw library to apply, though improperly, the words "temporary vacancy"
used in section 16 (a) of Act No. 357, to cases of sickness,
The only vacancies which may possibly occur in elective absence, suspension or any other temporary disability of any
member of provincial or municipal boards, it would not In addition to all the foregoing, we may add that petitioners
exclude the application of said section 16 (a) to the proper Jose Topacio Nueno and Delia C. Diño can not claim the right
"temporary vacancy" which may result from the delay in the to hold-over as elective officers of the Municipal Board of
election or appointment of a successor of the incumbent of Manila, because, as above stated, they held the office before
the previous term in the cases contemplated in the the war by appointment under subsection (b) to fill the
provisions of subsections (c) and (d) of said section 16. vacancies caused by resignation of the elective incumbents,
Under these provisions, whenever (1) the election fails to one of them the same petitioner Nueno, and to hold the
take place on the date fixed by law (as in the case at bar), or office for the unexpired term in accordance with subsection
(2) results in a failure to elect, or (3) the officer-elect dies (f), section 16, of said Commonwealth Act No. 357. And that
before assumption of office, or (4) his election is not petitioner Diño’s claim is based on the incorrect assumption
confirmed for disloyalty, or (5) he fails to qualify for reason that the respondents were appointed under subsection (b) of
of noneligibility or other reasons, the successor to fill the said Act.
vacancy shall be elected in a special election, if the President
does not exercise his discretion to fill the vacancy in the last From the foregoing it clearly appears that petitioners are not
three cases (3) (4) and (5) by appointment. Now, as entitled to hold-over, and after the expiration of their term of
according to section 18 of the same Act No. 357, the said office on December 31, 1943, the offices of members of the
special election shall be called by the President by Municipal Board of Manila became vacant from January 1,
proclamation for a date which shall not be earlier than thirty 1944, because of failure to hold the regular election on the
days nor later than ninety days from the date of said second Tuesday of December 1943 and the special election,
proclamation, it is evident that from the first day of January, and consequently to elect the would-be incumbents. And
the beginning of the new term, to the election or during the interregnum or temporary vacancy from January
appointment and qualification of the successor elected in that 1, 1944, until the said special election is held and new
special election, or appointed if the special election result in a members elected or, in case of failure to elect, appointed by
failure to elect, as provided in subsection (e), there would the President (under section 16 [c] and [d] of
necessarily be an interregnum or temporary vacancy during Commonwealth Act No. 357) the President had, under
which no one actually holds or could hold the office. To meet section 16 (a) of the same Act, the power to appoint the
or provide for such a contingency, said subsection (a) of respondents or any other, at his discretion, to fill said
section 16 empowers the President to appoint a person to fill temporary vacancy or vacancies. As the petitioners are not
such temporary vacancy or interregnum, and the person so entitled to hold-over or continue, after the expiration of their
appointed shall hold the office until the permanent successor term, in the offices claimed by them and held now by the
has been elected or appointed to fill the office for the respondents, they have no right to bring the present action
unexpired term, according to subsection (f) of said section 16 and impugn the validity of the latter’s appointments,
of Commonwealth Act No. 357. Election or appointment of a according to the provisions of section 6, rule 68, of the Rules
person to fill a vacancy under subsections (b), (c), (d) and of Court.
(e) for the unexpired term should not be confused with the
appointment under subsection (a) of a person to fill the The record does not show whether the respondents were
temporary vacancy until the permanent incumbent for the appointed by the President under section 16 (a) of
unexpired term has been elected or appointed (subsection Commonwealth Act No. 357, or under the emergency powers
[f]). granted him by Commonwealth Act No. 671 of the Congress
of the Philippines as contended by the City Fiscal, attorney
for the respondents. But having arrived at the above The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) summarized the
conclusion, this Court does not deem it necessary to decide complainants' charges against respondent Sahi, thus:
whether or not the President had the authority to appoint the
respondents by virtue of his emergency powers; and whether Complainant Judge Alano claims that when he assumed office as
or not the respondents’ appointments became ineffective presiding judge of the 2nd MCTC, Maluso, Basilan on 18 February
from September 18, 1945, which was the day following the 2004, he immediately met with the staff of the said court regarding
adjournment of the Congress of the Philippines convened ethical and work related standards. He even made sure that each of
after their appointments, because the latter had not been the staff members knows his or her job description well, with
submitted to Congress or the Commission Appointments, as emphasis on respondent Sahi, since he learned that the latter is not
performing her job to prepare minutes of proceedings, calendar and
claimed by the attorney for respondent Diño.
keep records of calendared cases. From then on, complainant Judge
Alano noticed that respondent Sahi has been grossly inefficient in
The action of quo warranto filed by the petitioners is
performing her duties and such issue was even raised during their
therefore dismissed, with costs against them. So ordered. Judicial Service Team Meetings.
Termination by resignation Complainant Judge Alano alleges that from the day he resumed
office, respondent Sahi never prepared any court calendar or minutes.
A.M. No. P-11-3020               June 25, 2014 He further alleges that respondent Sahi does not know how to speak
(Formerly OCA LP.I. No. 10-3525-P) the Yakan and Visayan dialects, which is necessary for her position.
Also, complainant Judge Hizon gathered that even prior to 2004, it
PRESIDING JUDGE JUAN GABRIEL HIZON ALANO, MARY was Mary Annabelle A. Katipunan (one of the complainants) who
ANNABELLE A. KATIPUNAN, SUZEE WONG JAMOTILLO, prepared the minutes of proceedings, calendar of cases and kept
ANALIE DEL RIO BALITUNG, EDWINO JAYSON OLIVEROS AND records of the same. Respondent Sahi also abused her position when
ROBERTO BABAODONO, Complainants, she required one of the complainants, Suzee Wong Jamotillo, Court
vs. Stenographer I, to fill up her Income Tax Return to include names of
PADMA LATIP SAHI, COURT INTERPRETER I, MUNICIPAL children that are not her own. She also required complainant Analie
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT (MCTC), MALUSO, BASILAN. Respondent. Del Rio Balitung to prepare a promissory note in favor of a party
litigant in an election protest before another court.
DECISION
Complainant Judge Alano claims that in all cases he heard since
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: 2004, he was the one who would usually interpret the testimonies of
the witnesses into English, to avoid inconvenience and delay in the
The present administrative matter arose from a Verified Complaint 1 for proceedings. He also claims that respondent Sahi’s performance
Gross Inefficiency, Gross Insubordination, and for being Notoriously deteriorated to a point bordering to recklessness, resulting in her
Undesirable, filed by complainants Presiding Judge Juan Gabriel consecutive unsatisfactory ratings for the first and second semesters
Hizon Alano (Judge Alano), Mary Annabelle A. Katipunan of 2008.
(Katipunan), Suzee Wong Jamotillo (Jamotillo), Analie Del Rio
Balitung (Balitung), Edwino Jayson Oliveros (Oliveros), and Roberto Furthermore, complainant Judge Alano asserts that when respondent
Babao Dofio (Dofio), of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Sahi was assigned in the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Maluso, Basilan, against respondent Padma Latip Sahi (Sahi), Court Court, Basilan Province, her stay was no longer extended and she
Interpreter I, of the same court. was directed by the Court to returnto her official position at the 2nd
MCTC, S[u]misip-Maluso-Lantawan, Basilan in A.M. No. 08-12350-
MCTC dated March 2010. Complainant Judge Alano also asserts that Judge. Respondent Sahi contended that in just a short period of time
from the time that respondent Sahi reported back to office, she was from complainant Judge Alano’s assumption as presiding judge of the
not in the office for more than a month and worse, her Daily Time 2nd MCTC for Sumisip, Maluso and Lantawan, Basilan, the latter
Records from August 2009 to May 2010 bore no signature of those already ousted three court personnel from the service, including
authorized to sign the same. former Clerk of Court Akil Pawaki, who, said Judge pressured to
retire. She also refuted complainant Judge Alano’s charge that she
On 28 July 2009, complainant Judge Alano claims that respondent does not know how to speak the Yakan and Visayan dialects, calling
Sahi again received an unsatisfactory rating due to her poor attention to the fact that she had been a court interpreter for years and
performance and unjustified failure to perform her duties. Even worse, had served several judges without any complaint of such nature.
the very next day, after respondent Sahi received her Notice of Respondent Sahi further averred that she did not expect a good
Unsatisfactory Rating, complainant Judge Alano again called her performance rating from complainant Judge Alano since the said
attention due to her inexcusable errors in formatting and grammar. Judge already disliked her from the very beginning. She insisted that
she should not be held solely liable for the clerical errors pointed out
On 16 September 2010, respondent Sahi calendared only one case. by complainant Judge Alano because when she approached said
In the morning of the same day, a representative from the Provincial Judge, he ignored her, and even worse, at one time, he placed his
Prosecutors’ Office approached complainant Katipunan regarding the clutch bag on top of his table and pulled out his gun. Lastly,
cases that are calendared on that day, since respondent Sahi failed to respondent Sahi alleged that because of the unfair treatment she
post a copy outside the courtroom. Consequently, at around 1:00 received from complainant Judge Alano, she suffered a stroke,
o’clock of the same day, respondent Sahi failed to call the case for leaving her with no choice but to resign from the service. Hence, she
hearing, as she was not around. However, the court’s logbook shows argued that the administrative complaint against her was already moot
that she was present at that time. Because of respondent Sahi’s and academic and should be dismissed.
inefficiency and stubborn refusal to perform her duties, complainant
Judge Alano decided to relieve her of her duties and designated In its Report dated September 20,2011, the OCA recommended that:
complainants Jamotillo and Balitung as acting court interpreters.
1. The instant administrative complaint against Padma Latip
As to the allegations that respondent Sahi’s action is notoriously Sahi, Court Interpreter I, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Maluso,
undesirable, complainants claim that the latter even tried to implicate Basilan be REDOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
them when she was sued for extortion in A.M. No. 08-29960-P. They and
also claim that respondent Sahi always acted with indifference and
aloofness towards them and other court staff in and out of the office. 2. Respondent Sahi be held GUILTY for Inefficiency and
Moreover, complainants assert that respondent Sahi would always Incompetence in the Performance of Official Duties and be
manipulate her officemates to do her job and falsely implicate those meted the penalty of fine equivalent to her two (2) months
who would do otherwise. They also assert that respondent Sahi’s salary, to be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice.4
superiority complex and condescension, brought about by her being a
senior employee coupled by her ominous hypocrisy, has earned her In a Resolution5 dated November 28, 2011, the Court re-docketed the
the reputation of being notoriously undesirable.2 instant administrative complaint against respondent Sahi as a regular
administrative matter and required the parties to manifest if they were
In her Comment3 dated July 11, 2011, respondent Sahi vehemently willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
denied the charges against her and asserted that the allegations in records/pleadings filed within 10 days from notice. Only complainants
the Verified Complaint are maliciously concocted lies which are just submitted their Manifestation dated February 16, 2012. 6 Respondent
part of complainant Judge Alano’s scheme to get back at her for Sahi’s failure to file the required manifestation despite notice was
earlier filing a complaint for grave abuse of authority against said
deemed a waiver of her right to do so. Resultantly, the Court The foregoing incidents demonstrate respondent Sahi’s indifference to
considered the case submitted for resolution. her work and lack of effort to improve despite already receiving
unsatisfactory performance ratings for the first and second semesters
The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA that respondent Sahi is of 2008.
administratively liable for inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties. Respondent Sahi’s general denial carries little weight. As the
preceding paragraphs will show, there are specific charges against
The charge that respondent Sahi was remiss in her duties as court her, supported by documentary evidence, which she had the
interpreter has been duly proven. Not only do the complainants opportunity to directly address and explain, but she merely glossed
corroborate one another, but the documentary evidence supports the over. Her allegations that complainant Judge Alano was merely
charge. retaliating against her after she filed an administrative case against
him; that the other complainants are mere stooges, subservient to
In A.M. No. 08-12-350-MCTC dated March 10, 2010, respondent Sahi complainant Judge Alano; that Judge Alano had been pressuring
was directed to report back to her official station at the 2nd MCTC employees to leave the court; and that complainant Judge Alano gave
Sumipsip-Maluso-Lantawan, Basilan, after her detail at the Office of her unsatisfactory performance rating because he did not like her from
the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Basilan Province, had the very beginning, are all uncorroborated and self-serving.
already ended. Yet, respondent Sahi actually reported back to her
official station only on May 18, 2010. Respondent Sahi did not give an In contrast, complainants have adequately shown that respondent
explanation as to where she had been reporting for work during the Sahi’s unsatisfactory performance ratings were warranted in view of
interval. Her Daily Time Records from August 2009 to May 2010 were the error-filled output she had consistently produced and her
not signed by authorized persons. indifferent attitude towards her work. While it is true that respondent
Sahi is merely human and may commit mistakes, there is simply no
The calendar of cases actually prepared by respondent Sahi for July excuse for making the same mistakes repeatedly despite her superior
29, 2010 is just one example of her carelessness and inattention to constantly calling her attention to correct them. 7 Granting that
details. The calendar contained several errors (i.e., wrong name of respondent Sahi was not good at using computers in the beginning,
accused and putting two different criminal cases under one heading she should have taken steps to learn and hone her computer skills
even though said cases have not been consolidated) which may not which were essential to her work.
only cause the court and the parties confusion and unjustified delays,
but may also make the court appear inefficient in the eyes of the As the Court pronounced in Judge Domingo-Regala v. Sultan8:
public. There is no showing that respondent Sahi eventually corrected
the errors despite being instructed to do so by complainant Judge [N]o other office in the government service exacts a greater demand
Alano. for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than the
judiciary. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an
There was also respondent Sahi’s failure to prepare a calendar of office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding
cases for September 16, 2010. A representative of the Office of the judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must
Provincial Prosecutor approached complainant Katipunan about the be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Public
hearing schedule as no calendar of cases was posted outside the officers must be accountable to the people at all times and serve them
courtroom. At 1:00 p.m., respondent Sahi was not around to call the with the utmost degree of responsibility and efficiency. Any act which
lone case scheduled to be heard that day, although the court’s falls short of the exacting standards for public office, especially on the
registry book showed that she logged in at 1:00 p.m. Fed up with part of those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall not
respondent Sahi, complainant Judge Alano already assigned her work be countenanced. It is the imperative and sacred duty of each and
to other court employees.
everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a WHEREFORE, respondent Padma Latip Sahi is found GUILTY of
true temple of justice. (Citations omitted.) inefficiency and incompetence and is FINED an amount equivalent to
her two months salary, to be paid to the Court within 30 days from
The Court further reminded court employees in Rodrigo-Ebron v. receipt of a copy of this Decision.
Adolfo,9 that as public officers, they are bound to discharge their
duties with care, caution, and attention which prudent men usually SO ORDERED.
exercise in the management of their affairs; and that the image of a
court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the Meaning of Resignation
men and women who work in the judiciary, from the judge to the
lowest of its personnel. G.R. No. 149451 : May 8, 2003

Respondent Sahi’s actuations fell short of these exacting standards REMEDIOS S. PADILLA, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE
for court personnel.1âwphi1 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
and EMPLOYMENT, Respondents.
During the pendency of the present administrative matter, respondent
Sahi suffered a stroke and resigned from office in January 2011. Her
DECISION
claim for separation benefits and accrued leave credits though cannot
be processed and released for lack of requirements. Nonetheless,
respondent Sahi’s resignation does not render this case moot. CORONA, J.:
Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when a
court employee is facing administrative sanction.10 Before this Court is a petition for review of the
decision1 dated January 22, 2001 of the Court of Appeals
Section 46(B)(4) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the affirming (1) Resolution No. 980256 2 dated February 5, 1998
Civil Service (RRACCS) classifies inefficiency and incompetence in of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) dismissing petitioner
the performance of official duties as a grave offense and punishable Remedios Padillas appeal and (2) Resolution No.
by suspension ranging from 6 months and 1 day to 1 year, for the first 9814253 dated June 10, 1998 of CSC denying her motion for
offense, and dismissal for the second offense. At the same time, reconsideration.
Section 48 of the RRACCS allows the Court to consider aggravating
and mitigating circumstances in the determination of the penalty to be The antecedent facts, as found by respondent CSC and
imposed on the erring public employee. affirmed by the Court of Appeals, follow.

The Court takes into account the following factors in determining the On January 18, 1982, petitioner Remedios Padilla assumed
proper penalty to be imposed against respondent Sahi: (a) respondent the permanent position of Clerk II in the then Ministry of
Sahi can no longer be suspended because of her resignation; (b) Labor and Employment. On May 11, 1983, petitioner was
respondent Sahi’s poor health condition as of the moment; and (c) the
promoted to the position of Labor Development Assistant.
delay in the processing of respondent Sahi’s separation benefits claim
Without waiting for the CSCs approval of her appointment,
because of her failure to complete the requirements. Consequently,
the Court metes out upon respondent Sahi the penalty of a fine she assumed her new position.
equivalent to her salary for two months, which she is to pay the Court
within 30 days from receipt of a copy of this Decision. On March 4, 1985, CSC-NCR Regional Director Aurora de
Leon sent a 1st Indorsement to the Minister of Labor and
Employment disapproving petitioners appointment as Labor
Development Assistant on the ground that she failed to meet the CSC for appropriate action. Acting on the complaint, the
the eligibility requirement for the position. Maria Esther CSC treated the same as a petition to seek relief. In its
Manigque, Officer-In-Charge of the Institute of Labor and Resolution No. 980256 dated February 5, 1998, the CSC
Manpower Studies, sought reconsideration of respondent dismissed the petition and denied petitioners claim. Her
CSCs ruling by pointing out petitioners satisfactory motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in CSC
performance. It was denied. In May 1985, petitioner resigned Resolution No. 981425 dated June 10, 1998.
from the service citing personal reasons.
Petitioner appealed the CSC resolutions to the Court of
On July 28, 1985, petitioner took the Career Service Appeals. On January 22, 2001, the appellate court rendered
Examination (Professional Level). After passing the same in a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
August, 1985, she re-applied at the respondent Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE). She was appointed as WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED
Casual Research Assistant on October 17, 1988, effective and accordingly DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly,
until November 30, 1988. Upon expiration of her the assailed Resolution No. 98-0256 dated February 5, 1998
appointment, the same was extended to December 31, 1988. issued by the Civil Service Commission dismissing the
From January 1989 until December 1989, petitioner occupied petitioners appeal, as well as its Resolution No. 981425
the position of Casual Technical. dated June 10, 1998, is (sic) AFFIRMED.

Due to the implementation of RA 6758, otherwise known as SO ORDERED.5cräläwvirtualibräry

the Salary Standardization Act of 1989, casual items such as
Casual Research Assistant and Casual Technical were The Court of Appeals held that the CSC had the power to
abolished. Petitioner was offered the position of Clerk II (the revoke the appointment of a public officer whose qualification
only available permanent position then) for which the did not meet the minimum requirements of the law. To
Selection Board deemed her qualified. However, she declined refute petitioners contention that respondent DOLE was
the offer. obliged to give her a permanent position upon becoming
eligible, the appellate court ruled that, although the
On January 2, 1990, petitioner was appointed Casual Clerk petitioner was a civil service eligible, her acceptance of a
III, effective till the end of June 1990. After the expiration of temporary appointment as a casual vested her no right to
her appointment as a casual employee, petitioner was no security of tenure. Her appointment depended exclusively on
longer given any position. She then requested the monetary the pleasure of the appointing authority.6cräläwvirtualibräry
conversion of her unused sick and vacation leaves which
respondent DOLE granted. On July 4, 2001, the appellate court issued a
resolution7 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Nevertheless, petitioner appealed her alleged termination as
casual employee to the CSC but this was dismissed for Hence, this appeal based on the following assignments of
having been filed out of time. 4cräläwvirtualibräry error:

Thereafter, petitioner filed a letter-complaint addressed to I

then Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona. The letter-
complaint was forwarded to respondent DOLE and later to
WHETHER OR NOT THE TERMINATION OF PETITIONER IS factual findings of the Court of Appeals affirm the findings of
LEGAL. fact of the CSC.

II One of the exceptions to the rule is when the appellate

courts factual disquisitions are not supported by
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF HER COMPLAINT BY evidence.11 In the case at bar, petitioner seeks reinstatement
PUBLIC RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WAS on the ground that she was unjustly removed from the
PROPER UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.8cräläwvirtualibräry service, which was contrary to the appellate courts finding
that she voluntarily resigned. Considering that petitioners
Petitioner does not question anymore the disapproval of her submission was premised on an alleged misapprehension of
appointment as Labor Development Assistant due to her facts, she had the burden of showing that the CSC and the
failure to meet the eligibility requirements. However, she appellate courts findings of fact were not supported by
invokes her alleged right to be reinstated to a permanent evidence.12 However, she fell short of that responsibility and
position considering that she has since attained the required ended up with hollow claims.
civil service eligibility and that she used to hold a permanent
position. Petitioner bewails the fact that she ended up as a On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
casual employee despite her civil service eligibility and representing respondents CSC and DOLE, adequately proved
without any derogatory record during her stint in the that petitioner voluntarily resigned and was never removed
government. To support her claim, she cites Section 24 (d) from the service. The OSG presented as evidence petitioners
of PD 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Law of 1975, own letter in 1990 addressed to Sec. Flerida Ruth
which states that (a)ny person who has been permanently Romero,13 then Special Assistant to the President and
appointed to a position in the career service and who has, Presidential Legislative Liaison Officer, which read:
through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated
therefrom, may be reinstated to a position in the same level In 1985, The Civil Service Commission (CSC) disapproved
for which he is qualified. my appointment because the qualification standard for the
position of Labor Development Assistant was raised from
She also contends that she was not accorded due process sub-professional to professional level. Despite my best effort
when she was removed from her permanent position without to appeal before the Civil Service Commission, I never got a
prior notice. Neither was she given an opportunity to explain favorable response. I was hurt so much that I decided to
why she should not be removed from office. resign in April 1985.14 (underlining supplied)

Did respondent DOLE violate petitioners purported right to Petitioner used to occupy the permanent position of Clerk II
security of tenure? We do not think so. before the disapproval of her appointment for Labor
Development Assistant, a higher permanent position.
The jurisdiction of this Court over cases brought to it from Thereafter, she voluntarily resigned and later came back to
the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is occupy casual positions only despite passing the eligibility
limited to reviewing errors of law.9 The factual findings of the requirement for a permanent position. Like removal for just
Court of Appeals are generally conclusive and may not be cause, voluntary resignation results in the abdication of all
reviewed on appeal.10 We have good reason to apply this present and future rights accorded to an employee and in the
well-entrenched principle in the instant case because the severance of all work-related ties between the employer and
the employee. When she returned to work for respondent Meaning of Resignation
DOLE, the same was not a continuation of her previous
service but the start of a new work slate. Petitioner could not G.R. No. 149356               March 14, 2008
therefore demand from respondent DOLE her reinstatement
to a permanent position under Section 24 (d) of PD 807 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the Department
inasmuch as she was never unjustly removed. of Trade and Industry, Petitioner,
vs.
We agree with the observation of the OSG that when WINSTON T. SINGUN, Respondent.
petitioner re-applied for and was offered the position of
Casual Research Assistant and later Casual Technical, she DECISION
readily and unqualifiedly accepted the said offer. Having
accepted the position of a casual employee, petitioner should CARPIO, J.:
have known that she had no security of tenure and could
thus be separated from the service anytime. The Case

We also take note of the fact that in December 1989, after This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 of the 1 August 2001
finishing her contract as a Casual Technical, respondent Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64953. The 1
DOLE offered to petitioner the permanent position of Clerk II August 2001 Decision affirmed Civil Service Commission (CSC)
Resolution Nos. 0026513 and 0108434 dated 27 November 2000 and
(the only available permanent position then) for which the
27 April 2001, respectively. CSC Resolution No. 002651 held that
Selection Board deemed her qualified. However, she declined
respondent Winston T. Singun’s (respondent) resignation was
the offer and instead opted to accept another casual position inoperative and inefficacious and ordered the payment of his salaries
as Casual Clerk III. Respondent DOLE therefore gave her the and other benefits from 1 January 2000. CSC Resolution No. 010843
opportunity to re-assume a permanent position but petitioner denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
was apparently bent on acquiring a position equal to a Labor
Development Assistant, a position she could not obtain by The Facts
right due to her earlier resignation. On the ground
of estoppel, petitioner is barred from asserting her right to a Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) is represented by the
permanent position. Department of Trade and Industry, Regional Office No. 2 (DTI-RO2).
Respondent was the former Chief Trade and Industry Development
Not having been unjustly removed from the service, it Specialist of DTI-RO2, Cagayan Province.
follows that petitioners right to due process was not violated.
In fact, there was no need to furnish her a notice of In a letter5 dated 20 October 1999, respondent wrote Regional
termination since, as a casual employee, petitioner was Director Jose Hipolito (Director Hipolito) signifying his intention to
aware of the date of expiration of her temporary apply for an 8½ month leave of absence starting 16 November 1999
appointment. until 31 July 2000. Respondent also signified his intention to retire
from the service on 1 August 2000. On 4 November 1999, respondent
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. No costs. filed his application for leave of absence and early
retirement.6 Director Hipolito denied the request.
SO ORDERED.
On 8 November 1999, respondent again filed an application for leave restore him to his position because Director Hipolito should first
of absence and resignation.7 In a memorandum dated 9 November approve the withdrawal before it becomes effective.
1999, Director Hipolito endorsed the application to Assistant Secretary
Zenaida C. Maglaya (Assistant Secretary Maglaya) for comment.8 In a letter15 dated 11 February 2000, Director Hipolito informed
Undersecretary Ordoñez that respondent had resigned effective 14
On 12 November 1999, without waiting for Assistant Secretary January 2000 and, thus, the detail order was without effect. Director
Maglaya’s comment, respondent again filed an application for leave of Hipolito added that during respondent’s leave of absence, respondent
absence but for a shorter period from 16 November 1999 until 14 accepted employment with the Philippine Rural Banking Corporation
January 2000.9 Respondent also signified his intention to resign (PRBC).
"effective at the close of office hours on 14 January 2000." According
to Director Hipolito, he immediately approved respondent’s application In a letter16 dated 23 February 2000, respondent informed
for leave of absence and resignation and he reiterated said approval Undersecretary Ordoñez that his application for resignation was made
in a memorandum10 dated the same day. In a letter 11 dated 23 under duress because it was imposed by Director Hipolito as a
November 1999, Director Hipolito also notified Regional Director Jose condition for the approval of his application for leave of absence.
T. Soria (Atty. Soria) of the Civil Service Commission, Regional Office Respondent explained that he did not intend to resign on 14 January
No. 2 (CSC-RO2) of his acceptance of respondent’s resignation. 2000 as his original intention was to resign on 1 August 2000 after
completing 15 years of service in the government. Respondent also
Then on 14 January 2000, at about 4:00 p.m., the DTI-RO2 received, stated that his resignation was ineffective because he was not notified
through facsimile, Memorandum Order No. 2012 issued by of its acceptance for he did not receive a copy of his approved
Undersecretary Ernesto M. Ordoñez (Undersecretary Ordoñez) resignation letter and Director Hipolito’s memorandum accepting his
detailing respondent to the Office of the Undersecretary for Regional application for resignation. Respondent added that even assuming he
Operations effective 17 January 2000. was duly notified of its acceptance, his resignation was still made
under duress and, therefore, no amount of acceptance would make it
On 17 January 2000, the DTI-RO2 received respondent’s 14 January valid.
2000 letter13 informing Director Hipolito that he was reconsidering his
earlier letter of resignation and that he decided to wait until he could On 2 March 2000, Undersecretary Ordoñez required Director Hipolito
qualify for early retirement. to comment on respondent’s 23 February 2000 letter. Undersecretary
Ordoñez asked Director Hipolito to submit documentary evidence to
On 25 January 2000, Director Hipolito wrote Atty. Soria requesting an show that respondent received a copy of Director Hipolito’s formal
opinion on whether respondent was considered resigned as of 12 acceptance in writing of respondent’s letter of resignation and that
November 1999 and, hence, Undersecretary Ordoñez’s detail order respondent was employed by PRBC during his leave of absence.
was without effect.
On 28 March 2000, respondent demanded from Director Hipolito the
In CSC-RO2 Opinion No. LO-00020214 dated 2 February 2000, Atty. payment of his salaries and other benefits from 1 December 1999 to
Soria ruled that respondent was considered resigned effective 14 31 March 2000.
January 2000. CSC-RO2 opined that respondent effectively resigned
on that date because (1) of respondent’s voluntary written notice On 5 April 2000, Undersecretary Ordoñez ordered Director Hipolito to
informing Director Hipolito that he was relinquishing his position and advise him as to respondent’s request for the payment of his unpaid
the effectivity date of said resignation and (2) Director Hipolito’s salaries. Undersecretary Ordoñez also asked Director Hipolito to
acceptance of respondent’s resignation in writing which indicated the support his claim that respondent was considered resigned effective
date of effectivity of the resignation. CSC-RO2 also said that 14 January 2000 with a ruling from the CSC.
respondent’s letter withdrawing his resignation did not automatically
In a letter17 dated 18 April 2000, Atty. Soria asked Director Hipolito to acceptance of his resignation. This being the case, it cannot be
comment on respondent’s 14 April 2000 letter 18 requesting for the concluded that Singun had, either impliedly or expressly, surrendered,
reconsideration of CSC-RO2 Opinion No. LO-000202. In his renounced, or relinquished his office. In explaining this precept, the
comment,19 Director Hipolito denied that he "forced, intimidated, Commission in CSC Resolution No. 00-2394 dated October 18, 2000,
threatened, and unduly pressured" respondent to resign. Director held:
Hipolito also insisted that respondent received a copy of the 12
November 1999 memorandum regarding the acceptance of his ‘It is explicit that resignation, as a mode of terminating the employee’s
resignation. official relations, is pre-conditioned on the (i) written notice of the
concerned employee to sever his employment tie coupled with an act
On 5 June 2000, the CSC-RO2 rendered Decision No. A- of relinquishing the office; and, (ii) acceptance by the appointing
00060120 denying respondent’s motion for reconsideration. CSC-RO2 authority for which the employee shall have been properly notified...’21
ruled that respondent was considered resigned as of 14 January 2000
because the detail order made no mention that its issuance meant On 15 December 2000, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
that the acceptance of the resignation was revoked. CSC-RO2 added Two supplemental motions for reconsideration were subsequently
that since Undersecretary Ordoñez was not the appointing authority, filed on 12 January 200122 and 11 April 2001.23 In Resolution No.
he had no power to accept respondent’s withdrawal of his resignation. 010843,24 the CSC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Respondent appealed to the CSC. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.25

The Ruling of the Civil Service Commission The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 27 November 2000, the CSC rendered Resolution No. 002651 On 1 August 2001, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s appeal
declaring respondent’s resignation inoperative and inefficacious. The and affirmed CSC Resolution Nos. 002651 and 010843. The Court of
CSC also ordered the payment of respondent’s salaries and other Appeals declared that there was substantial evidence to support the
benefits from 1 January 2000. The CSC ruled: CSC’s finding that respondent’s resignation was inoperative and
inefficacious. The Court of Appeals stated that findings of fact of an
There is no dispute that Singun tendered his resignation to Regional administrative agency must be respected, as long as such findings
Director Hipolito to take effect on January 14, 2000. But it is likewise are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence might
undisputed that on the very day that his cessation from office is to not be overwhelming or preponderant. The Court of Appeals said "the
take effect, DTI Undersecretary Ordoñez ordered his detail to his fact of resignation cannot be presumed by the petitioner’s simple
Office. This act of Undersecretary Ordoñez, who is the immediate expedient of relying on memoranda or letters merely showing the
supervisor of Regional Director Hipolito, is a tacit, if not express, purported approval of resignation which bore his signature, because
repudiation and revocation of the ostensible acceptance by the latter to constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or
of the supposed resignation of Singun. This, in effect, can be employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his
construed as if no acceptance was ever made on the tender of position."26
resignation of Singun.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that respondent’s alleged act of
Finally, even on the assumption that Singun’s tender of resignation accepting employment with PRBC did not amount to abandonment of
was indeed accepted, such acceptance is inoperative and office. The Court of Appeals held that abandonment is inconsistent
inefficacious. This is so simply because there is no showing from the with respondent’s (1) motion for reconsideration of CSC-RO2’s
records that Singun was duly informed of said acceptance. In fact, Opinion No. LO-000202, (2) appeal questioning CSC-RO2’s Decision
there is no mention whatsoever that Singun was informed of the
No. A-000601, and (3) bringing the matter to the National Office of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the
CSC for resolution. proper authority.29

The Court of Appeals also declared that petitioner was not denied due Petitioner maintains that respondent’s resignation was complete
process because the essence of due process in administrative because all the elements of a complete and operative resignation
proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity were present. On the other hand, respondent claims that his
to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In this resignation was not complete because there was no valid acceptance
case, petitioner was able to file a motion for reconsideration and two of his offer to resign since he was not duly informed of its acceptance.
supplemental motions for reconsideration.
In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public
Hence, this petition for review with prayer for a temporary restraining officer to be operative and effective. Without acceptance, resignation
order. is nothing and the officer remains in office.30 Resignation to be
effective must be accepted by competent authority, either in terms or
On 8 October 2001, the Court issued a temporary restraining order by something tantamount to an acceptance, such as the appointment
enjoining the CSC from enforcing the 1 August 2001 Decision of the of the successor.31 A public officer cannot abandon his office before
Court of Appeals and respondent from assuming office at the DTI- his resignation is accepted, otherwise the officer is subject to the
RO2, Cagayan Province.27 penal provisions of Article 23832 of the Revised Penal Code.33 The
final or conclusive act of a resignation’s acceptance is the notice of
The Issues acceptance.34 The incumbent official would not be in a position to
determine the acceptance of his resignation unless he had been duly
Petitioner raises the following issues: notified therefor.35

1. Whether respondent validly resigned from DTI-RO2 In this case, the Court of Appeals and the CSC declared that there
effective 14 January 2000; and was nothing in the records to show that respondent was duly informed
of the acceptance of his resignation. There was no indication that
2. Whether the detail order issued by Undersecretary Ordoñez respondent received a copy of his 12 November 1999 application for
effectively withdrew respondent’s resignation. leave of absence and resignation as accepted by Director Hipolito.
Neither was there any indication that respondent received Director
Hipolito’s 12 November 1999 Memorandum informing him of the
The Court’s Ruling
acceptance of his resignation. Therefore, we affirm the ruling of the
Court of Appeals that respondent’s resignation was incomplete and
The petition has no merit. inoperative because respondent was not notified of the acceptance of
his resignation.1avvphi1
The Final Act of a Resignation’s Acceptance
is the Notice of Acceptance Petitioner’s contention that respondent knew that his resignation was
accepted because respondent had notice that his application for leave
Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, of absence was approved does not deserve any merit. As respondent
express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and explained, there is a specific form used for an application of leave of
relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful absence and the approval of his application for leave of absence does
authority.28 To constitute a complete and operative resignation from not necessarily mean the acceptance of his resignation.
public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the
On respondent’s alleged employment with the PRBC, the Court notes
that if respondent was employed by PRBC, it was undertaken during
his approved leave of absence. It does not have any connection with
the acceptance of his resignation. We agree with the findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals that this does not amount to
abandonment. If respondent was indeed employed by PRBC during
his approved leave of absence and he violated Civil Service rules,
then the proper case should be filed against him.

Resignation may be
Withdrawn before its Acceptance

Until the resignation is accepted, the tender or offer to resign is

revocable.36 And the resignation is not effective where it was
withdrawn before it was accepted.37

In this case, since respondent’s resignation was not finally and

conclusively accepted as he was not duly notified of its acceptance,
respondent could validly withdraw his resignation. There was no need
for Director Hipolito to accept the withdrawal of resignation since there
was no valid acceptance of the application of resignation in the first
place. Undersecretary Ordoñez also validly issued the detail order as
respondent had not effectively resigned from DTI-RO2.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the 1 August 2001

Decision of the Court of Appeals. We LIFT the temporary restraining
order enjoining the Civil Service Commission from enforcing the 1
August 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals and respondent
Winston T. Singun from assuming office at the Department of Trade
and Industry, Regional Office No. 2, Cagayan Province.

SO ORDERED.