FM 5-0 Operations Process 2010
FM 5-0 Operations Process 2010
THE OPERATIONS
PROCESS
MARCH 2010
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited.
HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Foreword
The environment in which we conduct operations is characterized by four clear trends: growing
uncertainty, rapid change, increased competitiveness, and greater decentralization. Given these
trends, our leaders must expect and be prepared to confront a variety of complex problems, most
of which will include myriad interdependent variables and all of which will include a human
dimension.
With the publication of FM 5-0, The Operations Process, and the introduction of design into our
doctrine, we highlight the importance of understanding complex problems more fully before we
seek to solve them through our traditional planning processes.
Design is neither a process nor a checklist. It is a critical and creative thinking methodology
to help commanders understand the environment, analyze problems, and consider potential
approaches so they can exploit opportunities, identify vulnerabilities, and anticipate transitions
during a campaign.
Commanders apply design to understand before entering the visualize, describe, direct, lead, and
assess cycle. Einstein once said, “If I were given one hour to save the planet, I would spend 59
minutes defining the problem and one minute resolving it.” Combining design with the military
decisionmaking process provides Army leaders with a more comprehensive approach to problem
solving under conditions of complexity and uncertainty. The mission narrative produced through
design enables leaders to articulate the context in which they operate to both subordinates and
superiors alike.
In addition to the introduction of design, this revision of FM 5-0 builds on and expands the
body of doctrine associated with full spectrum operations described in the 2008 edition of
FM 3-0, Operations. Moving beyond planning and orders production, this manual holistically
addresses planning, preparation, execution, and assessment in the continuous learning cycle of
the operations process. It reinforces the central role of commanders in the operations process
through battle command—applying the art and science of understanding, visualizing, describing,
directing, leading, and assessing operations—in exercising effective command and control. The
intent of FM 5-0 is to encourage greater flexibility through critical thought, action, and initiative.
Army leaders must not only develop effective plans, they must be able to convert those plans into
timely action while maintaining the capability to reframe and adapt as the situation changes in an
increasingly dynamic operational environment.
MARTIN E. DEMPSEY
General, U.S. Army
Commanding General
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
*FM 5-0
Field Manual Headquarters
No. 5-0 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 26 March 2010
Contents
Page
PREFACE...............................................................................................................v
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................vi
Chapter 1 FUNDAMENTALS OF THE OPERATIONS PROCESS .................................... 1-1
The Nature of Operations ................................................................................... 1-1
Command and Control ....................................................................................... 1-3
The Operations Process ..................................................................................... 1-9
Integrating Processes and Continuing Activities .............................................. 1-12
Running Estimates ........................................................................................... 1-13
Chapter 2 PLANNING ......................................................................................................... 2-1
Planning and Plans............................................................................................. 2-1
Planning and the Levels of War ......................................................................... 2-1
The Value of Planning ........................................................................................ 2-2
Conceptual and Detailed Planning ..................................................................... 2-6
Fundamentals of Planning .................................................................................. 2-9
Key Components of a Plan ............................................................................... 2-14
Chapter 3 DESIGN .............................................................................................................. 3-1
Design Defined ................................................................................................... 3-1
Design Goals ...................................................................................................... 3-2
Design in Context ............................................................................................... 3-3
Leading Design ................................................................................................... 3-6
Design Methodology ........................................................................................... 3-7
Chapter 4 PREPARATION ................................................................................................. 4-1
Preparation Functions ........................................................................................ 4-1
Preparation and the Operations Process ........................................................... 4-2
Preparation Activities .......................................................................................... 4-3
Chapter 5 EXECUTION ....................................................................................................... 5-1
Fundamentals of Execution ................................................................................ 5-1
Responsibilities During Execution ...................................................................... 5-3
*This publication supersedes FM 5-0, 20 January 2005, and FMI 5-0.1, 31 March 2006.
i
Contents
Figures
Introductory figure-1. The operations process .......................................................................... vi
Figure 1-1. Combining the elements of full spectrum operations .......................................... 1-3
Figure 1-2. The cognitive hierarchy ....................................................................................... 1-4
Figure 1-3. Battle command and the operations process ...................................................... 1-9
Figure 2-1. The Army problem solving model ........................................................................ 2-3
Figure 2-2. The planning construct ........................................................................................ 2-7
Figure 2-3. Commander’s visualization.................................................................................. 2-9
Figure 3-1. The design methodology ..................................................................................... 3-7
Figure 5-1. Decisions in execution ......................................................................................... 5-6
Figure 5-2. Rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process .......................................... 5-8
Figure A-1. Functional and integrating cells........................................................................... A-3
Figure A-2. Integration of plans, future operations, and current operations .......................... A-5
Figure B-1. The steps of the military decisionmaking process .............................................. B-3
Tables
Introductory table-1. New Army terms ..................................................................................... viii
Introductory table-2. Modified Army definitions ....................................................................... viii
Introductory table-3. Rescinded Army definitions .................................................................... viii
• Critical and creative thinking aid in understanding and decisionmaking throughout the
operations process. To assist commanders in understanding and decisionmaking, commanders and
staffs apply critical and creative thinking techniques throughout the operations process. Critical
thinking is purposeful, reflective, and self-regulating judgment to determine the meaning and
significance of what is observed or expressed. Creative thinking involves creating something new
or original. Creative thinking leads to new insight, novel approaches, fresh perspectives, and new
ways of understanding and conceiving ideas.
• Commanders continually consider and combine tasks focused on the population (stability or
civil support operations) as well as those tasks focused on enemy forces (offensive and defensive
operations). Military operations involve more than combat between armed opponents. Winning
battles and engagements while shaping the civilian situation is critical to long-term success.
Because of this, commanders continually consider and combine stability tasks focused on the
population with offensive and defensive tasks focused on the enemy during planning and
execution. For homeland security, commanders focus operations on civil support.
• Mission command is the preferred method of exercising command and control. Because of the
complex, uncertain, and ever-changing nature of operations, mission command—as opposed to
detailed command—is the preferred method for exercising command and control. (See FM 6-0.)
Prerequisites for effective mission command are the use of mission orders, full familiarity with the
commander’s intent throughout the force, and mutual trust and understanding between
commanders and subordinates. Mission command fosters operational adaptability—a quality that
Army leaders and forces exhibit based on critical thinking, comfort with ambiguity and
decentralization, a willingness to accept prudent risk, and the ability to make rapid adjustments
based on continuous assessment of the situation.
• Continuous assessment enables organizational learning and adaptation throughout the conduct
of operations. Assessment is a continuous activity of the operations process and a primary
feedback mechanism that enables the command as a whole to learn and adapt. Plans are based on
imperfect understanding and assumptions on how the commander expects a situation to evolve.
Continuous assessment helps commanders recognize shortcomings in the plan and changes in the
operational environment. In those instances when assessment reveals minor variances from the
commander’s visualization, commanders adjust plans as required. In those instances when
assessment reveals a significant variance from the commander’s original visualization,
commanders reframe the problem and develop an entirely new plan as required.
Lessons learned from ongoing operations, transformation to the modular force, and recent revisions to capstone
and keystone joint and Army doctrine required major revisions to the 2005 edition of FM 5-0. Additionally, the
joint community and the Army have developed ways to assist commanders, staffs, and others in understanding
complex problems and ways to develop broad approaches to solve or manage those problems. Collectively, this
approach is referred to as design and is incorporated throughout FM 5-0.
While retaining the details of planning and planning products, this version of FM 5-0 expands the scope of the
manual to include doctrine on the exercise of command and control during all operations process activities
(planning, preparing for, execution, and assessing). Other major changes include:
• An increased emphasis on full spectrum operations (combining elements of offense, defense,
stability, or civil support) throughout the conduct of operations.
• Modifications of command and control techniques and products formerly based on the battlefield
operating systems to the warfighting functions. This affects several areas, including command post
organization, duties of the staff, and formats for operation orders and their attachments.
• Modifications of the military decisionmaking process and operation order format to better account
for design, full spectrum operations, the warfighting functions, and the five Army information
tasks.
• The addition, modification, and rescindment of new Army terms. (See introductory table-1,
introductory table-2, and introductory table-3 on page viii.)
This edition of FM 5-0 provides doctrine on the operations process as a whole, a chapter on design, and a
chapter for each activity of the operations process. The appendixes describe the tactics, techniques, and
procedures for conducting the military decisionmaking process, conducting troop leading procedures, and
writing operation plans and orders.
Chapter 1 provides the foundation for the operations process. This chapter discusses the general nature of
operations. It demonstrates how building, maintaining, and revising situational understanding throughout the
operations process is fundamental to exercising command and control effectively. It describes the relationships
among the operations process activities and how commanders drive the operations process though battle
command. This chapter concludes with discussions of running estimates.
Chapter 2 addresses the fundamentals of planning. It describes planning as an essential element of command
and control and a continuous activity of the operations process. This chapter defines planning, describes
planning at the different levels of war, and lists the value of effective planning. This chapter concludes by
offering fundamentals for effective planning and describing how to develop key components of a plan or order.
Chapter 3 describes the practice of design. It describes a methodology that assists commanders, staffs, and
others in understanding the operational environment, framing problems, and developing a design concept that
guides more detailed planning. This chapter addresses the requirements to reframe the problem when changes in
the operational environment render the design concept, and associated understanding and logic behind the
design concept, no longer applicable.
Chapter 4 is about preparation—the activity that helps transition the force from planning to execution. The
chapter discusses activities within the headquarters and across the force that improve a unit’s ability to execute
operations.
Chapter 5 provides doctrine for exercising command and control during execution. It provides fundamentals to
guide execution and describes the roles of the commander and staff when directing and synchronizing the
current operation. It describes assessment and decisionmaking in execution and concludes with a discussion of
the rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process.
Chapter 6 provides the fundamentals of assessment, including its definition and purpose. It describes the
assessment process and offers guidelines for effective assessment.
Ten appendixes complement the body of this manual. Appendix A discusses command post organization and
operations. The steps of the military decisionmaking process are in appendix B. Troop leading procedures are
addressed in appendix C. Commanders planning guidance and formats for operation plans and orders are
addressed in appendixes D and E, respectively. Appendix F provides formats for developing task organization.
Running estimates are described in appendix G. Guidelines for developing a formal assessment plan are
addressed in appendix H. Techniques for conducting rehearsals and developing military briefings are addressed
in appendixes I and J, respectively.
This manual provides a starting point for the exercise of command and control during operations. It establishes
a common frame of reference and intellectual tools Army leaders use to plan, prepare for, execute, and assess
operations. By establishing a common approach and language for conducting command and control, doctrine
promotes mutual understanding and enhances effectiveness during operations. The doctrine in this manual is a
guide for action rather than a set of fixed rules. While it provides an authoritative guide for leaders and Soldiers,
it requires original applications adapted to circumstances. In operations, effective leaders recognize when and
where doctrine, training, or even their past experience no longer fits the situation and adapt accordingly.
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1-4. Whether operations are designed to relieve suffering from a natural disaster or to defeat a large
enemy force, operations are conducted in complex, ever-changing, and uncertain operational environments.
An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the
employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). An operational
environment includes physical areas (air, land, maritime, and space domains) and cyberspace. It also
includes the information that shapes conditions in those areas as well as enemy, adversary, friendly, and
neutral aspects relevant to operations. An operational environment is not isolated or independent but
interconnected by various influences (for example, information and economics) from around the globe.
results in differing circumstances. No two operational environments are the same. While aspects of an
operational environment may be less complex than other aspects, an operational environment as a whole is
both structurally and interactively complex.
1-6. In addition, an operational environment is not static but continually evolves. This evolution results
from people interacting within an operational environment as well as from their ability to learn and adapt.
As they take action within an operational environment, the operational environment changes. Some of these
changes are anticipated while others are not. Some changes are immediate and apparent, while other
changes are delayed or hidden. The complex and ever-changing nature of an operational environment
makes determining the relationship between cause and effect difficult and contributes to the uncertainty of
military operations.
Uncertainty
1-7. Uncertainty is what is not known about a given situation or a lack of understanding of how a
situation may evolve. Effective leaders accept that they conduct military operations in operational
environments that are inherently uncertain. They realize that concrete answers or perfect solutions usually
do not exist. For example, friendly forces may be uncertain about existing conditions, such as the exact
location and strength of enemy forces. Even if the staff feels confident about the location and strength of an
enemy force, the commander still questions what to infer from those facts—the enemy’s intentions, for
example. And even if the commander makes a reasonable inference, the many options available to the
enemy make predicting the enemy’s exact behavior quite difficult.
1-8. Similarly, clearly discerning the motivations and reactions of various population groups with respect
to the friendly force or the enemy often proves difficult. American ideas of what is normal or rational are
not universal. Members of other societies often have different notions of rationality, appropriate behavior,
levels of religious devotion, and cultural norms. These differences in perspectives and culture add to the
uncertain nature of operations.
1-9. Chance and friction contribute to the uncertain nature of operations. Chance is the lack of order or
clear predictability of operations. A major sand storm that delays offensive operations, the death of a key
local leader that leads to an eruption of violence, or an unexpected encounter with an enemy force all
illustrate chance. Friction is the combination of countless factors that impinge on the conduct of operations.
Friction may be mental, as in indecision over a course of action. It may be physical, as in effective enemy
fire. Friction may be external, such as actions imposed by enemy. It may be self-induced, such as the lack
of a clearly defined goal, lack of coordination, or complicated plans and command and support
relationships.
1-10. During operations, leaders make decisions, develop plans, and direct actions under varying degrees
of uncertainty. Commanders contend with thinking, adaptive enemies in areas of operations where many
events occur simultaneously. Often commanders have difficulty accurately predicting how enemies will act
and react, how populations will perceive or react to friendly actions, or how events will develop. Within
these complex, ever-changing, and uncertain operational environments, commanders conduct full spectrum
operations.
battles and engagements is critical but not always decisive. Army forces conduct operations in the midst of
populations. This requires defeating the enemy while simultaneously understanding and shaping civil
conditions with other military forces, civilian organizations, and the host nation when applicable. Whereas
offensive and defensive operations are designed to defeat enemy forces, stability operations help shape civil
conditions and secure a lasting peace. In operations within the United States and its territories, civil support
operations dominate, complemented by defensive and offensive operations.
1-13. Figure 1-1 illustrates possible combinations of the elements of full spectrum operations. The
emphasis on the different elements of full spectrum operations changes with echelon, time, and location.
No single element is always more important than the others. Rather, combinations of the elements, which
commanders constantly adapt to changing conditions, are the key to successful full spectrum operations.
(See FM 3-0 for a detailed discussion on combining the elements of full spectrum operations.)
See FM 6-0 for a detailed discussion on command, control, the C2 system, and the duties and
responsibilities of the staff.
Situational Understanding
1-18. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to
determine the relationships among the mission variables to facilitate decisionmaking (FM 3-0). As
commanders develop their situational understanding, they see patterns emerge, dissipate, and reappear in
their operational environment. These patterns help them direct their own forces’ actions with respect to
other friendly forces, civilian organizations, the enemy, the terrain, and the population. While complete
understanding is the ideal for planning and decisionmaking, commanders accept they will often have to act
despite significant gaps in their understanding.
1-19. The complex nature of an operational environment requires both analysis and synthesis to build and
maintain situational understanding throughout the conduct of operations. Analysis is the process of
studying a situation by successively dividing it into parts and addressing each part in turn. For example, the
initial stages of mission analysis and intelligence preparation of the battlefield rely heavily on analysis.
Understanding the parts of a situation is necessary; however, alone it does not provide an appreciation of
the relationships among the parts. That appreciation requires synthesis. Synthesis is thinking about how the
parts of a situation work together as a whole rather than in isolation. For example, the commander and staff
synthesize results of mission analysis to make sense of situations before developing courses of action.
1-20. This situational understanding is essential to the commander’s ability to establish the situation’s
context, develop effective plans, assess the progress of operations, and direct changes to the plan as
required during execution. Commanders realize that their initial situational understanding developed during
planning is not complete and may include inaccurate information. As operations are prepared for and
executed, conditions change. As commanders continue to pursue a better understanding of the situation,
they expect to work through periods of reduced understanding. They adjust plans and orders (or develop a
new plan) as they improve their situational understanding throughout the conduct of operations.
Cultural Understanding
1-22. As part of building their situational understanding, commanders consider how culture (both their own
and others’ within an operational area) affects operations. Culture is the shared beliefs, values, customs,
behaviors, and artifacts members of a society use to cope with the world and each other. Culture influences
how people make judgments about what is right and wrong and assess what is important and unimportant.
Culture provides the framework for rational thought and decisions. What one culture considers rational
another culture may consider irrational.
1-23. Understanding the culture of a particular society or group within a society can significantly improve
the force’s ability to accomplish the mission. Leaders are mindful of cultural factors in three contexts:
z Awareness of the cultures within a region that the organization operates.
z Sensitivity to the different backgrounds, traditions, and operational methods of the various
military (joint and multinational), civilian (intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and private),
and host-nation organizations.
z Awareness of how one’s own culture affects how one perceives a situation.
1-24. Understanding other cultures applies to all operations, not just those dominated by stability. For
example, some enemies consider surrender a dishonor worse than death, whereas others consider surrender
an honorable option. Commanders use different tactics with the enemy depending on the culture.
1-25. Understanding the culture of joint and multinational forces and civilian organizations within an
operational area is crucial to successful operations. Army leaders take the time to learn the customs as well
as the doctrine and procedures of their partners. These leaders consider how culture influences how their
military and civilian partners understand situations and arrive at decisions. This understanding helps build
unity of effort.
1-26. Effective Army leaders understand and appreciate their own culture (individual, military, and
national) in relation to the various cultures of others in the operational area. Just as culture shapes how
other groups view themselves and the world around them, culture shapes how commanders, leaders, and
Soldiers perceive the world. Individuals tend to interpret events according to the principles and values
intrinsic to their culture. Effective commanders acknowledge that their individual perceptions greatly
influence how they understand situations and make decisions. Through reflection, collaboration, and
analysis of differences between their culture and that of the cultures in the operational area, commanders
expose and question their assumptions about the situation. (See FM 3-24 and FM 2-01.3 for details to
analyze socio-cultural data.)
Decisionmaking
1-27. Success in operations demands timely and effective decisions based on applying judgment to
available information and knowledge. It requires knowing both when and what to decide. Commanders and
staff members make countless decisions throughout an operation under constantly changing conditions.
Commanders delegate some decisions to the staff while reserving the most important ones for themselves.
Commanders are aware that, once executed, the effects of their decisions are frequently irreversible.
Therefore, they anticipate actions that follow their decisions.
1-28. Decisionmaking is a cognitive process—it happens in the minds of individuals. Individuals receive
information and process it differently based on their intellect, education, culture, and past experiences.
Depending on the situation, leaders may rely heavily on intuition to inform their decisionmaking. In other
situations, leaders may take a more deliberate approach when arriving at a decision. The primary difference
is awareness of one’s knowledge on which leaders draw to make judgments and decisions. Sometimes that
knowledge appears as immediate knowing or feeling (intuition). Other times, cognitive effort is put forth in
a more deliberate process. Based on the situation, Army leaders use several methodologies to help them
understand situations and make decisions. These methodologies include:
z Design. (See chapter 3.)
z The rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process. (See chapter 5.)
z The military decisionmaking process. (See appendix B.)
z Troop leading procedures. (See appendix C.)
1-33. Disciplined questioning helps commanders, staffs, subordinate commanders, and other partners
probe their own and others’ thinking as they collaborate and dialog. Disciplined questioning helps to
explore ideas, understand problems, and uncover assumptions. These questions help challenge claims or
premises by revealing a contradiction or internal inconsistency in logic. Examples of disciplined questions
that probe reasons and evidence include the following:
z Could you give me an example?
z How does X relate to Y?
z When you say X, are you implying Y?
z All your reasoning depends on the idea that X exists. Why have you based your reasoning on X
instead of Y?
z Why do you think that is true? What is your evidence?
1-34. In addition to the organizations within their command, commanders also collaborate with civilian
and other military organizations in the operational area to better understand their perspectives and build
unity of effort. Unity of effort requires the practice of collaborative leadership. Leaders continually
collaborate throughout the conduct of operations. This leads to increased understanding and a sense of
participation in the commander’s decisionmaking. It improves coordination and cooperation toward
common objectives by all participants.
1-35. Collaboration occurs during planning (to include design) and continues through execution regardless
of the physical location of participants. Today’s information systems and collaborative planning tools
enable commanders and staffs worldwide to collaborate in real time. During planning, commanders,
subordinates, and other partners share their understanding of the situation, participate in course of action
development and decisionmaking, and resolve conflicts before the higher headquarters issues the operation
order. This collaboration results in an improved understanding of the situation, commander’s intent,
concept of operations, and tasks to subordinate units throughout the force. Since all echelons develop their
plans nearly simultaneously, collaborative planning shortens planning time.
1-36. Similar benefits of collaboration apply during preparation and execution. Commanders and
subordinates compare assessments of the situation and exchange ideas on how to act during execution.
Coupled with firm decisionmaking by the commander, collaboration and dialog enable the force to adapt
more quickly in changing conditions. Assessment, which occurs continuously, is also enhanced when
commanders and subordinates collaborate in assessing the progress of the operation, to include sharing
ideas on what is or is not working and how to modify plans to better accomplish the mission. Knowledge
management facilitates collaboration and the transfer of knowledge among the commander, staff,
subordinate commanders, and other partners throughout the operations process. (See FM 6-01.1.)
RED TEAMING
1-37. Red teaming is a function that provides commanders an independent capability to fully explore
alternative plans and operations in the context of the operational environment and from the perspective of
partners, adversaries, and others. Red teams assist the commander and staff with critical and creative
thinking and help them avoid groupthink, mirror imaging, cultural missteps, and tunnel vision throughout
the conduct of operations. Red teams are part of the commander’s staff at division through theater army.
Brigades may be augmented with a red team as required. Commanders use red teams to provide alternatives
during planning, execution, and assessment to—
z Broaden the understanding of the operational environment.
z Assist the commander and staff in framing problems and defining end state conditions.
z Challenge assumptions.
z Ensure the perspectives of the adversary and others are appropriately considered.
z Aid in identifying friendly and enemy vulnerabilities and opportunities.
z Assist in identifying areas for assessment.
z Anticipate cultural perceptions of partners, adversaries, and others.
z Conduct independent critical reviews and analyses of plans and concepts to identify potential
weaknesses and vulnerabilities.
1-38. Throughout the conduct of operations, red team members are key members of the staff. Trained and
educated to think critically, creatively, and from various perspectives, they help the commander to develop
effective plans. Red team members help identify relevant actors, clarify the problem, and explain how
others may view the problem from their perspectives. They challenge assumptions and the analysis that is
used to build the plan. In essence, red teams provide the commander and staff with an independent
capability to challenge the organization’s thinking.
MISSION COMMAND
1-39. Effective C2 requires an appreciation for the general nature of operations and how the dynamic
relationships among friendly forces, enemies, populations, and the physical environment create uncertainty
and risk. The situation and concept of operations described in the operation order may change substantially
during execution. During execution, subordinate commanders need maximum latitude to take advantage of
opportunities or to counter threats as the situation changes. Centralized decisionmaking and time-
consuming processes may not accommodate the ever-changing nature of operations. As such, mission
command is the preferred method of C2. (See FM 6-0.)
1-40. Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on
mission orders. Successful mission command demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise
disciplined initiative, acting aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission within the
commander’s intent (FM 3-0). Mission command emphasizes timely decisionmaking and understanding the
higher commander’s intent. The commander’s intent, formalized in the order and understood two levels
below the issuing commander, provides subordinates with the broad idea behind the operation and allows
them to act promptly as the situation requires.
1-41. Mission command requires plans with the proper level of detail; not so detailed that they stifle
initiative or so general that they provide insufficient direction. Some operations require tighter control over
subordinate elements than others. An air assault or a gap crossing, for example, requires precise
synchronization. In these examples, plans or portions of the plan are more thorough. (See chapter 2 for a
discussion on mission orders.)
1-42. Under mission command, commanders delegate most decisions to subordinates. Doing this
minimizes detailed control and allows subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action within the
commander’s intent. Collaboration among commanders during execution supports mission command as
leaders in contact interpret the situation, seize opportunities, and coordinate with each other to gain
advantages. Subordinates report their actions promptly to allow the command as a whole to adapt to
conditions throughout the operations process.
RISK
1-43. Because uncertainty exists in all military operations, commanders incur risk when making decisions.
Faced with an uncertain situation, there is a natural tendency to hesitate and gather more information to
reduce the uncertainty. However, waiting and gathering information might reduce uncertainty but will not
eliminate it. Waiting may even increase uncertainty by providing the enemy with time to seize the initiative
or it may allow events to deteriorate. It is far better to manage uncertainty by acting and developing the
situation.
1-44. Making reasonable estimates and intentionally accepting risk is fundamental to conducting
operations. Reasonably estimating and intentionally accepting risk is not gambling. Carefully determining
the risks, analyzing and minimizing as many hazards as possible, and executing a plan that accounts for
those hazards contributes to successful operations. Gambling, in contrast, imprudently stakes the success of
an entire action on a single, improbable event.
1-45. The Army operational concept and mission command requires commanders to take prudent risks,
exercise initiative, and act decisively. The staff helps the commander identify risks and offers
recommendations to mitigate those risks. (See FM 5-19 for doctrine on composite risk management.)
However, military judgment is required to determine whether the risk is worth taking. A key aspect of
command includes identifying risks, deciding how much risk, and minimizing the effects of accepted risk
by establishing controls to mitigate those risks. Ultimately, the willingness to take prudent risks is the
decision of the commander.
BATTLE COMMAND
1-49. At the center of the operations process is battle command—the art and science of understanding,
visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing forces to accomplish missions. Commanders are
the most important participants in the operations process. The staff and subordinate commanders assist
commanders in the exercise of battle command during all activities of the operations process.
1-50. The relationships among the activities of battle command and the activities of the operations process
are dynamic. All the activities of battle command occur in planning, preparation, execution, and
assessment, but take on different emphasis throughout the operations process. For example, during
planning commanders focus their activities on understanding, visualizing, and describing while directing,
leading, and assessing. During execution, commanders often focus on directing, leading, and assessing
while improving their understanding and modifying their visualization.
Understand
1-51. Throughout the operations process, commanders (supported by their staffs and subordinate
commanders) seek to build and maintain their situational understanding as described in paragraphs 1-18
through 1-20. Commanders collaborate with superior, subordinate, and adjacent commanders, and other
military and civilian organizations within the area of operations to build and maintain their understanding.
They also circulate and talk with subordinate commanders, Soldiers, and members of other military and
civilian organizations as they observe operations for themselves. Commanders continuously update their
understanding as the operation progresses.
Visualize
1-52. As commanders begin to understand the situation and the problem, they often start envisioning
potential solutions. Collectively, this is known as the commander’s visualization—the mental process of
developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning a broad concept on
how the force may achieve the end state. The commander’s visualization provides the basis for developing
plans and orders. During execution, it helps commanders determine if, when, and what to decide as they
adapt to changing conditions.
Describe
1-53. As commanders visualize an operation, they describe it to their staffs and subordinates to facilitate
shared understanding of the situation, the mission, and commander’s intent. Commanders ensure
subordinates understand the visualization well enough to begin course of action development and
preparation activities. Commanders describe their visualization in their commander’s intent and planning
guidance. During execution, commanders describe their updated visualization as planning guidance that
results in fragmentary orders.
Direct
1-54. To direct is implicit in command; commanders direct action to achieve results and lead forces to
mission accomplishment. Commanders make decisions and direct actions based on their situational
understanding that they maintain by continuous assessment. They use control measures to focus the
operation on the desired end state. Commanders direct operations by—
z Preparing and approving plans and orders.
z Assigning and adjusting tasks, task organization, and control measures based on changing
conditions.
z Positioning units to maximize combat power, anticipate actions, or create or preserve options.
z Positioning key leaders to ensure observation and supervision at critical times and places.
z Allocating resources based on opportunities and threats.
z Accepting risk to create opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
Assess
1-55. Effective battle command requires commanders to assess continuously. Assessment helps
commanders to better understand current conditions and determine how the operation is progressing.
Commanders incorporate the assessments of the staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners in the
area of operations to form their personal assessment of the situation. (See chapter 6 for doctrine on
assessment.) Based on their assessment, commanders modify plans and orders to better accomplish the
mission. If their assessment reveals a significant variance from their original commander’s visualization,
commanders may choose to reframe the problem and develop a completely new plan. (See chapter 3 for a
discussion on framing and reframing problems.)
Lead
1-56. Commanders lead by example and personal presence. Leadership is the process of influencing people
by providing purpose, direction, and motivation, while operating to accomplish the mission and improving
the organization (FM 6-22). Leadership inspires Soldiers to accomplish things that they otherwise might
not. Where the commander locates within the area of operations is an important consideration for effective
C2. Through leadership, commanders provide purpose, direction, and motivation to subordinate
commanders, their staff, and Soldiers. No standard pattern or simple prescription exists for command
presence; different commanders lead differently. Commanders balance their time among the command post
(CP) and staff, subordinate commanders, forces, and other organizations to make the greatest contribution
to success. (FM 6-22 discusses leadership in detail.)
PLANNING
1-57. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying
out effective ways of bringing that future about. Planning is both conceptual and detailed. Conceptual
planning includes developing an understanding of the operational environment, framing the problem,
defining a desired end state, and developing an operational approach to achieve the desired end state.
Conceptual planning generally corresponds to the art of operations and is commander led. Both design (see
chapter 3) and the military decisionmaking process (see appendix B) assist commanders and staffs with the
conceptual aspects of planning. In contrast, detailed planning translates the broad concept into a complete
and practical plan. Detailed planning generally corresponds to the science of operations and encompasses
the specifics of implementation. Detailed planning works out the scheduling, coordination, or technical
issues involved with moving, sustaining, administering, and directing forces.
1-58. Planning results in a plan or order that communicates the commander’s intent, understanding, and
visualization to subordinates, focusing on the desired end state. While planning may start an iteration of the
operations process, planning is continuous as commanders and staffs revise plans and develop branches and
sequels throughout the conduct of operations. (Chapter 2 addresses the fundamentals of planning. Chapter 3
addresses design—a conceptual aspect of planning.)
PREPARATION
1-59. Preparation consists of activities that units perform to improve their ability to execute an operation.
Preparation includes, but is not limited to, plan refinement; rehearsals; intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; coordination; inspections; and movement. Activities of preparation help the force and
Soldiers improve their ability to execute an operation. It creates conditions that improve friendly forces’
opportunities for success. Preparation requires staff, unit, and Soldier actions to transition the force from
planning to execution.
1-60. Activities of preparation help develop a common understanding of the situation and what is required
for execution. They are not solely preexecution activities but continue into operations. These activities—
such as backbriefs, rehearsals, and inspections—help staffs, units, and Soldiers better understand their roles
in upcoming operations, practice complicated tasks, and ensure equipment and weapons function properly.
(Chapter 4 addresses preparation in detail.)
EXECUTION
1-61. Execution puts a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using
situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions. Army forces
generate combat power by converting potential combat power into effective action. Combat power can be
constructive as well as destructive. In stability or civil support operations, combat power is applied mainly
for constructive purposes. The opposite is the case in offensive and defensive operations.
1-62. Execution focuses on concerted action to seize and retain the initiative, build and maintain
momentum, and exploit success. Commanders create conditions for seizing the initiative by acting.
Successful operations maintain momentum generated by initiative and exploit success within the
commander’s intent. (Chapter 5 discusses C2 during execution.)
ASSESSMENT
1-63. Assessment is continuously monitoring and evaluating the current situation and the progress of an
operation. Assessment involves continuously analyzing the operational environment to help commanders
and their staff to understand the current situation and its evolution during operations. Based on this
understanding, commanders and staffs evaluate relevant information to help them judge how operations are
progressing toward achieving objectives and the desired end state. Assessment is a primary feedback
mechanism that enables the command as a whole to learn and adapt.
1-64. Assessment precedes and guides the other activities of the operations process and concludes each
operation or phase of an operation. However, the focus of assessment differs during planning, preparation,
and execution. During planning, assessment focuses on gathering information about the operational
environment to assist the commander and staff with understanding the current situation. Assessment
activities during planning also include developing an assessment plan that describes measurable tasks,
objectives, end state conditions, and associated criterion to assist with assessing progress. During
preparation and execution, assessment focuses on monitoring the current situation and evaluating the
operation’s progress toward stated objectives and end state conditions.
1-65. During operations, commanders and staffs also assess the underlying framework of the plan itself.
This involves reexamining the original design concept and determining if it is still relevant to the situation.
This requires a deliberately conceived effort to learn as a part of the operation. Collaboration and dialog
with higher, subordinate, and adjacent commanders and staffs, backed up by quantitative and qualitative
assessments, contribute to this learning. Commanders also seek expertise outside the military such as
civilian academics to help them with their assessments. Based on this reexamination, commanders may
conduct reframing activities that lead to a new design concept and eventually to an entirely new plan that
adapts the force to accomplish the mission better.
RUNNING ESTIMATES
1-69. The commander and staff use the running estimate throughout the operations process. A running
estimate assesses the current situation to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the
commander’s intent and if future operations are supportable. In their running estimates, the commander and
each staff section continuously consider the effect of new information and update the following:
z Facts.
z Assumptions.
z Friendly force status.
z Enemy activities and capabilities.
z Civil considerations.
z Conclusions and recommendations.
1-70. Effective plans and successful execution hinge on current running estimates. Running estimates
always include recommendations for anticipated decisions. During planning, commanders use these
recommendations to select feasible courses of action for further analysis. During preparation and execution,
commanders use recommendations from running estimates in decisionmaking. Failure to maintain running
estimates may lead to errors or omissions that result in flawed plans or bad decisions.
1-71. The commander’s running estimate includes a summary of the problem and all variables that affect
the mission. Commanders integrate personal knowledge of the situation, analysis of the operational and
mission variables, assessments by subordinate commanders and other organizations, and relevant details
gained from running estimates. Commanders use their personal estimates to cross-check and supplement
the running estimates of the staff.
1-72. The commander and staff sections maintain their running estimates between operations, even when
not deployed. At a minimum, the commander and staff must maintain their situational awareness of
friendly force capabilities. Upon receipt or anticipation of a mission, each staff section begins updating its
estimate based on information requirements related to the mission. (See appendix G for more detailed
discussion on running estimates.)
2-7. The levels of war correspond to specific levels of responsibility and planning with decisions at one
level affecting other levels. Among the levels of war, the planning horizons differ greatly.
2-8. Joint strategic planning provides strategic guidance and direction to friendly forces for security
cooperation planning, joint operations planning, and force planning. Joint strategic planning occurs
primarily at the national and theater strategic levels. This planning helps the President, the Secretary of
Defense, and other members of the National Security Council—
z Formulate political-military assessments.
z Define political and military objectives and end states.
z Develop strategic concepts and options.
z Allocate resources.
2-9. Combatant commanders prepare strategic estimates, strategies, and plans to accomplish their
mission. Commanders base these estimates, strategies, and plans on strategic guidance and direction from
the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (See JP 5-0 for more
information on joint strategic planning.)
2-10. Typically, operational-level planning focuses on developing plans for campaigns and major
operations. Joint force commanders (combatant commanders and their subordinate joint task force
commanders) and their component commanders (Service and functional) conduct operational-level
planning. Planning at the operational level focuses on operational art, the application of creative
imagination by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience—to design
strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art
integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war (JP 3-0). Operational-level planners use the Joint
Operation Planning and Execution System (known as JOPES), the joint operation planning process (known
as JOPP), and elements of operational design to develop campaign plans, joint operation plans and orders,
and supporting plans. (JP 5-0 discusses joint operation planning. JP 3-31 discusses operational level
planning from a land component perspective.)
2-11. While components of a joint force assist joint force commanders in developing a campaign plan,
Army forces do not develop independent campaign plans. A campaign plan is a joint operation plan for a
series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time
and space (JP 5-0). Army forces develop supporting plans (operation plans and orders) nested with the joint
force commander’s campaign plan.
2-12. Operational- and tactical-level planning complements each other but have different aims.
Operational-level planning involves broader dimensions of time, space, and purpose than tactical-level
planning involves. It is often more complex and less defined. Operational-level planners need to define an
operational area, estimate forces required, and evaluate operation requirements. In contrast, tactical-level
planning proceeds from an existing operational design. Normally, areas of operations are prescribed,
objectives and available forces are identified, and sequences of activities are specified for tactical-level
commanders.
2-13. Tactical-level planning revolves around how best to achieve objectives and accomplish tasks
assigned by higher headquarters. Planning horizons for tactical-level planning are relatively shorter than
planning horizons for operational-level planning. While tactical-level planning works within the framework
of an operational-level plan, tactical planning includes developing long-range plans for solving complex
problems. These plans combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations to achieve
objectives and accomplish the mission over extended periods.
decisionmaking. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower referred to this quality of planning when
saying, “Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.”
2-15. All military activities benefit from some kind of planning. If commanders had no way to influence
the future, if they believed that the natural course of events would lead to a satisfactory outcome, or if they
could achieve the desired results purely by reacting, they would have no reason to plan. While there may be
instances where these conditions apply, they are rare. Planning and plans help leaders—
z Understand and develop solutions to problems.
z Anticipate events and adapt to changing circumstances.
z Task organize the force and prioritize efforts.
z Direct, coordinate, and synchronize action.
Well-Structured Problems
2-21. Well-structured problems are easy to identify, required information is available, and methods to
solve them are fairly obvious. While often difficult to solve, well-structured problems have verifiable
solutions. Problems of mathematics and time and space relationships, as in the case with detailed logistics
planning and engineering projects, illustrate well-structured problems.
Medium-Structured Problems
2-22. Medium-structured problems are more interactively complex than well-structured problems. For
example, a field manual describes how a battalion task force conducts a defense, but it offers no single
solution that applies to all circumstances. Leaders can agree on the problem (“how best to conduct a
defense”), appropriate tasks, and the end state for the operation. However, they may disagree about how to
apply the doctrinal principles to a specific piece of terrain against a specific enemy. Furthermore, a defense
can succeed against one enemy yet fail against another under precisely the same circumstances. Success
and failure may differ as a function of interactive complexity rather than a structure or technical difference
between the two enemy forces. Success during execution requires not only learning to perfect a technique
but also adjusting the solution based on changing conditions. Army problem solving, the military
decisionmaking process (MDMP) (see appendix B), and troop leading procedures (TLP) (see appendix C)
are methods to help leaders understand and develop solutions for medium-structured problems.
Ill-Structured Problems
2-23. Ill-structured problems are the most interactive. They are also complex, nonlinear, and dynamic—
and therefore the most challenging to solve. Unlike well- or medium-structured problems, leaders disagree
about how to solve ill-structured problems, what the end state should be, and whether the desired end state
is even achievable. At the root of this lack of consensus is the difficulty in agreeing on what is the problem.
Unlike medium-structured problems, there is no clear action to take because the nature of the problem itself
is not clear. This is often the case in operations involving multiple military (joint and multinational) and
civilian organizations over extended periods. Leaders use design to help them understand complex,
ill-structured problems and to develop a broad operational approach to manage or solve them. (See chapter
3.) Based on this understanding and operational approach, Army leaders continue more detailed planning
using the MDMP to develop a fully synchronized plan or order that serves as the practical scheme for
solving the problem.
2-32. Task organizing is the act of configuring an operating force, support staff, or sustainment package of
specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission. It includes allocating available assets to
subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships. Through task
organization, commanders establish relationships and allocate resources to weight the decisive operation.
Task organizing results in task organization—a temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a
particular mission. Appendix F contains guidelines and formats for developing task organizations.
2-33. In addition to task organizing, commanders establish priorities of support. Priority of support is a
priority set by the commander to ensure a subordinate unit has support in accordance with its
relative importance to accomplish the mission. Priorities of movements, fires, sustainment, and
protection all illustrate priorities of support that commanders use to weight the decisive operation.
2-34. The concept of operations may also identify a main effort if required; otherwise, the priorities of
support go to the unit conducting the decisive operation. The main effort is the designated subordinate unit
whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. It is usually weighted
with the preponderance of combat power (FM 3-0). Designating a main effort temporarily gives that unit
priority of support. Commanders shift resources and priorities to the main effort as circumstances and the
commander’s intent require. Commanders may shift the main effort several times during an operation. A
unit conducting a shaping operation may be designated as the main effort until the decisive operation
commences. However, the unit with primary responsibility for the decisive operation becomes the main
effort upon execution of the decisive operation.
establishing end state conditions and objectives; instead, it works out actions to accomplish the
commander’s intent and concept of operations.
2-39. The commander personally leads the conceptual component of planning. While commanders are also
engaged in parts of detailed planning, they often leave the specifics to the staff. Conceptual planning
provides the basis for all subsequent planning. Planning normally progresses from general to specific. For
example, the commander’s intent and concept of operations form the framework for the entire plan. This
framework leads to schemes of support, such as schemes of intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires,
protection, sustainment, and command and control. In turn, the schemes of support lead to the specifics of
execution, including tasks to subordinate units. However, the dynamic does not operate in only one
direction, as shown in figure 2-2. Conceptual planning must respond to detailed constraints. For example,
the realities of deployment schedule (a detailed concern) influence the concept of operations (a conceptual
concern).
DESIGN
2-41. Commanders conduct design to help them with the conceptual aspects of planning to include
understanding, visualizing, and describing. After receipt of or in anticipation of a mission, commanders
may begin design to understand the operational environment, frame the problem, and develop an
operational approach to solve the problem. The situation—to include the complexity of the problem—
guides the commander’s decision on whether to use design.
2-42. The design methodology relies heavily on structuring inquiry about the operational environment and
the problem through collaboration and dialog. (See chapter 1.) Design emphasizes developing a holistic
understanding of the operational environment and framing the problem. From this understanding, design
continues by considering an operational approach for problem resolution and developing a design concept.
The design concept consists of the problem statement, initial commander’s intent, mission narrative, and
commander’s planning guidance. The design concept serves as the foundation for more detailed planning,
including course of action development and the production of plans and orders using the MDMP.
FUNDAMENTALS OF PLANNING
2-50. Effective planning requires dedication, study, and practice. Planners must be technically and
tactically competent, be disciplined to use doctrinally correct terms and symbols, and understand
fundamentals of planning. Fundamentals of planning that aid in effective planning include the following:
z Commanders focus planning.
z Commanders plan for full spectrum operations.
z Commanders continuously test the validity of assumptions.
z Planning is continuous.
z Planning is time sensitive.
z Simple, flexible plans work best.
z Commanders avoid planning pitfalls.
desired end state. The commander’s visualization of the end state and operational approach of how to
achieve that end state serve as the framework for more detailed planning.
2-55. To develop their commander’s visualization, commanders draw on several sources of knowledge and
relevant information. These include—
z The elements of operational design. (See FM 3-0.)
z Input from the staff, other commanders, and partners.
z Principles of war. (See FM 3-0.)
z Operational themes (see FM 3-0) and related doctrine.
z Running estimates.
z The common operational picture.
z Their experience and judgment.
z Subject matter experts.
2-56. Commanders describe their visualization in doctrinal terms, refining and clarifying it as
circumstances require. Commanders express their initial visualization as—
z Initial commander’s intent.
z Planning guidance, including an initial operational approach.
z Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).
z Essential elements of friendly information that must be protected.
2-60. In the absence of facts, the commander and staff consider assumptions from their higher headquarters
and develop their own assumptions necessary for continued planning. Assumptions could relate to any
mission variable, such as the strength and disposition of an enemy force or postconflict conditions.
2-61. Assumptions must be logical and reflect the reality of the situation. Commanders and staffs use care
with assumptions to ensure they are not based on preconceptions; bias; false historical analogies; or simple,
wishful thinking. Additionally, planners must be aware of any unstated assumptions.
2-62. Accepting a broad assumption without understanding its sublevel components often leads to other
faulty assumptions. For example, a division commander might assume a combined arms battalion from the
continental United States is available in 30 days. This commander must also understand the sublevel
components—adequate preparation, load and travel time, viable ports and airfields, favorable weather, and
enemy encumbrance. The commander considers how the sublevel components hinder or aid the battalion’s
ability to be available.
2-63. Commanders and staffs continuously question whether their assumptions are valid throughout
planning and the operations process. Key points concerning the use of assumptions include—
z Assumptions must be logical, realistic, and considered likely to be true.
z Too many assumptions result in a higher probability that the plan or proposed solution may be
invalid.
z The use of assumptions requires the staff to develop branches and sequels to execute if one or
more key assumptions prove false.
z Often, an unstated assumption may prove more dangerous than a stated assumption proven
wrong.
PLANNING IS CONTINUOUS
2-64. Even after the operation order is issued, planning continues throughout the operations process. Since
situations (or the information available about them) continuously change, plans are revised as time allows
and variations (options or branches) continue to be developed. Accurately predicting an operation’s
outcome is difficult, as is anticipating the possible contingencies. As planners develop a solution to a
problem, the problem changes. Continuous planning enables organizations to adjust from an existing
concept of operations based on a common understanding of the situation and the expected result. Based on
their assessment, the commander and staff refine and revise the plan during preparation and execution.
One-Third–Two-Thirds Rule
2-66. Effective execution requires issuing timely plans and orders to subordinates. Timely plans are those
issued soon enough to allow subordinates enough time to plan, issue their orders, and prepare for
operations. At a minimum, commanders follow the “one-third–two-thirds rule” to allocate time available.
They use one-third of the time available before execution for their planning and allocate the remaining
two-thirds to their subordinates for planning and preparation.
2-67. When time is short, commanders develop the best possible products. In time-constrained
environments, best products contain just enough information for commanders to make a reasoned decision
and subordinates to assess the situation quickly and plan, prepare, and execute the necessary actions. To
optimize available time and ensure the best possible synchronization, commanders encourage collaborative
and parallel planning between their headquarters and higher and lower headquarters.
Planning in Time
2-71. Tension exists between planning too far ahead and not planning enough. Planning too far into the
future may overwhelm planning staffs’ capabilities, especially those of subordinate organizations. It also
risks preparations and coordination becoming irrelevant. However, not planning far enough ahead may
result in losing the initiative and being unprepared for unforeseen opportunities and threats. Commanders
should plan to the foreseeable end of the operation, even if that future condition is somewhat unclear. They
can and should extend and add detail to their basic plan as their operation develops and their visualization
becomes clearer, including anticipated sequels to the current operation.
2-72. Planning horizons help commanders think about operations and divide planning responsibilities
among integrating cells (current operations integration, future operations, and plans). Planning horizons are
measured from weeks or months to hours or days. Organizations often plan within several different
planning horizons simultaneously. As commanders think in terms of planning horizons, they can better
organize their planning efforts and allocate resources. As a rule, the higher the echelon, the more distant the
planning horizon with which it is concerned. (See appendix A for a discussion of organizing
responsibilities within the command post by planning horizons.)
chances it will no longer be applicable. Sometimes the situations change in response to friendly and enemy
actions. Sometimes outside factors occur beyond the control of either side (such as the weather).
2-75. Simple plans require an easily understood concept of operations. Planners also promote simplicity by
minimizing details where possible and by limiting the actions or tasks to what the situation requires.
Subordinates can then develop specifics within the commander’s intent. For example, instead of assigning a
direction of attack, planners can designate an axis of advance.
2-76. Simple plans are not simplistic plans. Simplistic refers to something made overly simple by ignoring
the situation’s complexity. Good plans simplify complicated situations. However, some situations require
more complex plans than others do. Commanders at all levels weigh the apparent benefits of a complex
concept of operations against the risk that subordinates will be unable to understand or follow it.
Commanders prefer simple plans because they can understand and execute them more easily.
2-77. Flexible plans help units adapt quickly to changing circumstances. Commanders and planners build
opportunities for initiative into plans by anticipating events that allow them to operate inside of the
enemy’s decision cycle or react promptly to deteriorating situations. Identifying decision points and
designing branches ahead of time—combined with a clear commander’s intent—help create flexible plans.
Incorporating control measures to reduce risk also makes plans more flexible. For example, a commander
may hold a large, mobile reserve to compensate for the lack of information concerning an anticipated
enemy attack.
2-78. Commanders stress the importance of mission orders as a way of building simple, flexible plans.
Mission orders is a technique for developing orders that emphasizes to subordinates the results to be
attained, not how they are to achieve them. It provides maximum freedom of action in determining how to
best accomplish assigned missions (FM 3-0). Mission orders focus on what to do and the purpose of doing
it without prescribing exactly how to do it. Control measures are established to aid cooperation among
forces without imposing needless restrictions on freedom of action. Mission orders contribute to flexibility
by allowing subordinates freedom to seize opportunities or react effectively to unforeseen enemy actions
and capabilities.
2-79. Mission orders follow the five-paragraph format and are as brief and simple as possible. Mission
orders clearly convey the unit’s mission and commander’s intent. They summarize the situation (current or
anticipated starting conditions), describe the operation’s objectives and end state (desired conditions), and
provide a simple concept of operations to accomplish the unit’s mission. When assigning tasks to
subordinate units, mission orders include all components of a task statement: who, what, when, where, and
why. However, commanders particularly emphasize the purpose (why) of the tasks to guide (along with the
commander’s intent) individual initiative. Effective plans and orders foster mission command by—
z Describing the situation to create a common situational understanding.
z Conveying the commander’s intent and concept of operations.
z Assigning tasks to subordinate units and stating the purpose for conducting the task.
z Providing the control measures necessary to synchronize the operation while retaining the
maximum freedom of action for subordinates.
z Task organizing forces and allocating resources.
z Directing preparation activities and establishing times or conditions for execution.
2-80. Mission orders contain the proper level of detail; they are neither so detailed that they stifle initiative
nor so general that they provide insufficient direction. The proper level depends on each situation and is not
easy to determine. Some phases of operations require tighter control over subordinate elements than others
require. An air assault’s air movement and landing phases, for example, require precise synchronization. Its
ground maneuver plan requires less detail. As a rule, the base plan or order contains only the specific
information required to provide the guidance to synchronize combat power at the decisive time and place
while allowing subordinates as much freedom of action as possible. Commanders rely on individual
initiative and coordination to act within the commander’s intent and concept of operations. The attachments
to the plan or order contain details regarding the situation and instructions necessary for synchronization.
z What sequence of actions is most likely to attain these conditions (ways)? The sequence of
actions, to include phasing, is described in the concept of operations.
z What resources are required, and how can they be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions
(means)? The application of resources throughout the operation is addressed in the concept of
operations, the warfighting function schemes of support (for example, the scheme of protection
and scheme of sustainment), tasks to subordinate units, and task organization.
z What risks are associated with that sequence of actions, and how can they be mitigated (risks)?
The concept of operations incorporates risk mitigation as does coordinating instructions.
2-88. The unit’s mission statement, commander’s intent, concept of operations, tasks to subordinate units,
coordinating instructions, and control measures are key components of a plan. Commanders ensure their
mission and end state are nested with those of their higher headquarters. Whereas the commander’s intent
focuses on the end state, the concept of operations focuses on the way or sequence of actions by which the
force will achieve the end state. The concept of operations expands on the mission statement and
commander’s intent. It describes how and in what sequence the commander wants the force to accomplish
the mission. Within the concept of operations, commanders may establish objectives as intermediate goals
toward achieving the operation’s end state. When developing tasks for subordinate units, commanders
ensure that the purpose of each task nests with the accomplishment of another task, with the achievement of
an objective, or directly to the attainment of an end state condition.
MISSION STATEMENT
2-89. The mission is the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the
reason therefore (JP 1-02). Commanders analyze a mission in terms of the commander’s intent two
echelons up, specified tasks, and implied tasks. They also consider the mission of adjacent units to
understand how they contribute to the decisive operation of their higher headquarters. Results of that
analysis yield the essential tasks that—with the purpose of the operation—clearly specify the action
required. This analysis produces the unit’s mission statement—a clear statement of the action to be taken
and the reason for doing so. The mission statement contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and
why, but seldom specifies how. The format for writing a task to subordinate units also follows this format.
See appendix B for detailed instructions for writing mission and task statements as part of the MDMP.
COMMANDER’S INTENT
2-90. The commander’s intent is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions
the force must establish with respect to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations that represent the
desired end state (FM 3-0). The commander’s intent succinctly describes what constitutes success for the
operation. It includes the operation’s purpose and the conditions that define the end state. It links the
mission, concept of operations, and tasks to subordinate units. A clear commander’s intent facilitates a
shared understanding and focuses on the overall conditions that represent mission accomplishment. During
planning, the initial commander’s intent summarizes the commander’s visualization and is used to develop
and refine courses of action. During execution, the commander’s intent spurs individual initiative.
2-91. The commander’s intent must be easy to remember and clearly understandable two echelons down.
The shorter the commander’s intent, the better it serves these purposes. Typically, the commander’s intent
statement is three to five sentences long.
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
2-92. The concept of operations is a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate
to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end
state. It is normally expressed in terms of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations (FM 3-0). The
concept of operations expands on the mission statement and commander’s intent by describing how and in
what sequence the commander wants the force to accomplish the mission.
2-93. Commanders ensure they identify the decisive operation and units responsible for conducting the
decisive operation. From this focal point, commanders articulate shaping operations and the principal task
of the units assigned each shaping operation. Commanders complete their concept of operations with
sustaining actions essential to the success of decisive and shaping operations. Individual schemes of
support by warfighting function are addressed in subparagraphs of paragraph 3 (execution) in the base plan,
after the concept of operations. The concept of sustainment is addressed in paragraph 4 (sustainment).
2-94. When writing the concept of operations, commanders consider nested concepts, the sequence of
actions and phasing, decisive points and objectives, and lines of operations and lines of effort.
Nested Concepts
2-95. Nested concepts is a planning technique to achieve unity of purpose whereby each succeeding
echelon’s concept of operations is aligned by purpose with the higher echelons’ concept of operations.
An effective concept of operations describes how the forces will support the mission of the higher
headquarters and how the actions of subordinate units fit together to accomplish the mission. Commanders
do this by organizing their forces by purpose. Commanders ensure the primary tasks for each subordinate
unit include a purpose that links the completion of that task to achievement of another task, an objective, or
an end state condition.
2-99. Phasing assists in planning and controlling operations. Individual phases gain significance only in the
overall operation’s context. Links between phases and the requirement to transition between phases are
critically important. Commanders establish clear conditions for how and when these transitions occur.
Although phases are distinguishable to friendly forces, an effective plan conceals these distinctions from
adversaries through concurrent and complementary actions during transitions.
facilities, distribution networks and nodes, and bases of operations. Specific events and elements of an
enemy force may also be decisive points. Decisive points have a different character during operations
dominated by stability or civil support. These decisive points may be less tangible and more closely
associated with important events and conditions. Examples include—
z Participation in elections by a certain group.
z Electric power restored in a certain area.
z Police and emergency services reestablished.
2-101. Often, a situation presents more decisive points than the force can act upon. The art of planning
includes selecting decisive points that best lead to mission accomplishment and acting on them in a
sequence that most quickly and efficiently leads to mission success. Once identified for action, decisive
points become objectives. Objectives provide the basis for determining tasks to subordinate units. The most
important objective forms the basis for developing the decisive operation.
Note: An objective can be physical (an enemy force or terrain feature) or conceptual in the form
of a goal (rule of law established). As a graphic control measure, an objective is a location on the
ground used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate changes of direction, and provide
for unity of effort (FM 3-90).
COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
2-106. Coordinating instructions apply to two or more units. They are located in the coordinating
instructions subparagraph of paragraph 3 (execution) of plans and orders. Examples include CCIRs, fire
support coordination and airspace coordinating measures, rules of engagement, risk mitigation measures,
and the time or condition when the operation order becomes effective.
CONTROL MEASURES
2-107. Planners develop and recommend control measures to the commander for each considered COA. A
control measure is a means of regulating forces or warfighting functions (FM 3-0). Control measures
assign responsibilities, coordinate actions between forces, impose restrictions, or establish guidelines to
regulate freedom of action. Control measures are essential to coordinating subordinates’ actions and are
located throughout the plan.
2-108. Control measures can free up subordinate commanders to conduct operations within their assigned
area of operations without having to conduct additional coordination. Such control measures reduce the
need for subordinates to ask higher headquarters for permission to act or not to act. Commanders establish
only the minimum control measures needed to provide essential coordination and deconfliction among
units. The fewer restrictions, the more latitude subordinates have to exercise individual initiative.
2-109. Control measures can be permissive or restrictive. Permissive control measures allow specific
actions to occur; restrictive control measures limit the conduct of certain actions. For example, a
coordinated fire line—a line beyond which conventional and indirect surface fire support means may fire at
any time within the boundaries of the establishing headquarters without additional coordination—illustrates
a permissive control measure. A route—the prescribed course to be traveled from a specific point of origin
to a specific destination—illustrates a restrictive control measure. (FM 1-02 contains definitions of control
measures and how to depict them. FM 3-90 discusses control measures commonly used in offensive and
defensive operations.)
DESIGN DEFINED
3-1. Design is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize,
and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them. Critical thinking
captures the reflective and continuous learning essential to design. Creative thinking involves thinking in
new, innovative ways while capitalizing on imagination, insight, and novel ideas. Design is a way of
organizing the activities of battle command within an organization. Design occurs throughout the
operations process before and during detailed planning, through preparation, and during execution and
assessment.
3-2. Planning consists of two separate, but closely related components: a conceptual component and a
detailed component. The conceptual component is represented by the cognitive application of design. The
detailed component translates broad concepts into a complete and practical plan. During planning, these
components overlap with no clear delineation between them. As commanders conceptualize the operation,
their vision guides the staff through design and into detailed planning. Design is continuous throughout
planning and evolves with increased understanding throughout the operations process. Design underpins
the exercise of battle command, guiding the iterative and often cyclic application of understanding,
visualizing, and describing. As these iterations occur, the design concept—the tangible link to detailed
planning—is forged.
3-3. Design enables commanders to view a situation from multiple perspectives, draw on varied sources
of situational knowledge, and leverage subject matter experts while formulating their own understanding.
Design supports battle command, enabling commanders to develop a thorough understanding of the
operational environment and formulate effective solutions to complex, ill-structured problems. The
commander’s visualization and description of the actions required to achieve the desired conditions must
flow logically from what commanders understand and how they have framed the problem. Design provides
an approach for how to generate change from an existing situation to a desired objective or condition.
3-4. Moreover, design requires effective and decisive leadership that engages subordinate commanders,
coordinating authorities, representatives of various staff disciplines, and the higher commander in
continuing collaboration and dialog that leads to enhanced decisionmaking. (Paragraphs 1-31 through 1-36
discuss collaboration and dialog.) This facilitates collaborative and parallel planning while supporting
shared understanding and visualization across the echelons and among diverse organizations. It is the key
to leveraging the cognitive potential of a learning organization, converting the raw intellectual power of the
commander and staff into effective combat power.
3-5. Innovation, adaptation, and continuous learning are central tenets of design. Innovation involves
taking a new approach to a familiar or known situation, whereas adaptation involves taking a known
solution and modifying it to a particular situation or responding effectively to changes in the operational
environment. Design helps the commander lead innovative, adaptive work and guides planning, preparing,
executing, and assessing operations. Design requires agile, versatile leaders who foster continuous
organizational learning while actively engaging in iterative collaboration and dialog to enhance
decisionmaking across the echelons.
3-6. A continuous, iterative, and cognitive methodology, design is used to develop understanding of the
operational environment; make sense of complex, ill-structured problems; and develop approaches to
solving them. In contrast to detailed planning, design is not process oriented. The practice of design
challenges conventional wisdom and offers new insights for solving complex, ill-structured problems.
While plans and orders flow down the echelons of command, new understanding may flow up from
subordinate echelons where change often appears first. By enhancing and improving commanders’
understanding, design improves a higher authority’s understanding of the operational environment and the
problems commanders are tasked to solve.
DESIGN GOALS
3-7. Successfully applying design seeks four concrete goals that, once achieved, provide the reasoning
and logic that guide detailed planning processes. Each goal is an essential component to reshaping the
conditions of the operational environment that constitute the desired end state. Collectively, they are
fundamental to overcoming the complexities that characterize persistent conflict. The goals of design are—
z Understanding ill-structured problems.
z Anticipating change.
z Creating opportunities.
z Recognizing and managing transitions.
ANTICIPATING CHANGE
3-11. Applying design involves anticipating changes in the operational environment, projecting
decisionmaking forward in time and space to influence events before they occur. Rather than responding to
events as they unfold, design helps the commander to anticipate these events and recognize and manage
transitions. Through the iterative and continuous application of design, commanders contemplate and
evaluate potential decisions and actions in advance, visualizing consequences of possible operational
approaches to determine whether they will contribute to achieving the desired end state. A thorough design
effort reduces the effects of complexity during execution and is essential to anticipating the most likely
reactions to friendly action. During detailed planning, these actions and sequences are often linked along
lines of effort, which focus the outcomes toward objectives that help to shape conditions of the operational
environment.
3-12. Design alone does not guarantee success in anticipating change—it also does not ensure that friendly
actions will quantifiably improve the situation. However, applied effectively and focused toward a common
goal, design provides an invaluable cognitive tool to help commanders anticipate change and innovate and
adapt approaches appropriately. Performed haphazardly and without proper focus and effort, it may become
time-consuming, ineffective, process-focused, and irrelevant. Iterative, collaborative, and focused design
offers the means to anticipate change effectively in the current situation and operational environment, as
well as achieve lasting success and positive change.
CREATING OPPORTUNITIES
3-13. The ability to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative is rooted in effective design. Applying design
helps commanders anticipate events and set in motion the actions that allow forces to act purposefully and
effectively. Exercising initiative in this manner shapes the situation as events unfold. Design is inherently
proactive, intended to create opportunities for success while instilling the spirit of the offense in all
elements of full spectrum operations. Effective design facilitates mission command, ensuring that forces are
postured to retain the initiative and, through detailed planning, consistently able to seek opportunities to
exploit that initiative.
3-14. The goals of design account for the interdependent relationships among initiative, opportunity, and
risk. Effective design postures the commander to combine the three goals to reduce or counter the effects of
complexity using the initial commander’s intent to foster individual initiative and freedom of action.
Design is essential to recognizing and managing the inherent delay between decision and action, especially
between the levels of war and echelons. The iterative nature of design helps the commander to overcome
this effect, fostering initiative within the initial commander’s intent to act appropriately and decisively
when orders no longer sufficiently address the changing situation. This ensures commanders act promptly
as they encounter opportunities or accept prudent risk to create opportunities when they lack clear
direction. In such situations, prompt action requires detailed foresight and preparation.
DESIGN IN CONTEXT
3-16. The introduction of design into Army doctrine seeks to secure the lessons of 8 years of war and
provide a cognitive tool to commanders who will encounter complex, ill-structured problems in future
operational environments like in March 2003. Division commanders of the 101st Airborne (Air Assault),
4th Infantry Division, and 1st Armored Division were ordered to maneuver their units from Kuwait and
into Iraq to defeat the Iraqi Army and to seize key cities and infrastructure. This was a task familiar to each
of them—a structured problem—and they communicated their intent and began to build orders through the
military decisionmaking process. Soon after accomplishing their mission, they were issued further
instructions to “establish a safe and secure environment” in Ninewa Province, Diyala Province, and
Baghdad. This was a task unfamiliar to them—an ill-structured problem—and each of them realized that
they had to first understand the problem and frame the task before seeking to solve it. These commanders
used design intuitively and adapted their existing processes to gain this understanding.
3-17. As learned in recent conflicts, challenges facing the commander in operations often can be
understood only in the context of other factors influencing the population. These other factors often
include, but are not limited to, economic development, governance, information, tribal influence, religion,
history, and culture. Full spectrum operations conducted among the population are effective only when
commanders understand the issues in the context of the complex issues facing the population.
Understanding context and then deciding how, if, and when to act is both a product of design and integral
to the art of command.
PERSISTENT CONFLICT
3-18. In the 21st century, several global trends shape the emerging strategic environment and exacerbate
the ideological nature of current struggles. These trends present dilemmas as well as opportunities. Such
trends include—
z Globalization.
z Technological diffusion.
z Demographic shifts.
z Resource scarcity.
z Climate changes and natural disasters.
z Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
z Failed or failing states.
3-19. The collective impact of these trends makes it likely that persistent conflict will characterize the next
century. Persistent conflict is the protracted confrontation among state, nonstate, and individual
actors that are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.
Conflicts will erupt unpredictably, vary in intensity and scope, and endure for extended periods. In a
dynamic and multidimensional operational environment, design offers tools vital to solving the complex,
ill-structured problems presented by persistent conflict.
FUNDAMENTALS OF DESIGN
3-21. Today’s operational environment presents situations so complex that understanding them—let alone
attempting to change them—is beyond the ability of a single individual. Moreover, significant risk occurs
when assuming that commanders in the same campaign understand an implicit design concept or that their
design concepts mutually support each other. The risks multiply, especially when a problem involves
multiple units, Services, multinational forces, or other instruments of national power. Commanders mitigate
these risks with collaboration and by applying the design fundamentals:
z Apply critical thinking.
z Understand the operational environment.
z Solve the right problem.
z Adapt to dynamic conditions.
z Achieve the designated goals.
operational environment. From this perspective, they can identify the fundamental problem with greater
clarity and consider more accurately how to solve it. Design is essential to ensuring commanders identify
the right problem to solve. Effective application of design is the difference between solving a problem right
and solving the right problem.
LEADING DESIGN
3-30. Commanders are the central figure in design. Generally, the more complex a situation is, the more
important the commander’s role is in design. Commanders draw on design to overcome the challenges of
complexity. They foster iterative collaboration and dialog while leveraging their collective knowledge,
experience, judgment, and intuition to generate a clearer understanding of the conditions needed to achieve
success. Design supports and reinforces the application of battle command, supporting the commander’s
ability to understand and visualize the operational environment.
3-31. The practice of design is not exclusive to a particular level of command. Design can apply to all
levels, depending on the context and circumstances. However, given the complexity of the operational
environment, the need for design at lower echelons often increases as brigades and battalions contend with
the challenges of shaping environments and conducting operations over extended periods.
3-32. In leading design, commanders typically draw from a select group within the planning staff, red team
members, and subject matter experts internal and external to the headquarters. The commander selects
these individuals based on their expertise relative to the problem. The commander expects these individuals
to gain insights and inputs from areas beyond their particular expertise—either in person or through
reachback—to frame the problem more fully. Design serves to establish the context for guidance and
orders. By using members of the planning staff to participate in the design effort, commanders ensure
continuity between design and detailed planning as well as throughout the operations process. These are
purpose-built, problem-centric teams, and the commander may choose to dissolve them once they complete
the design effort.
3-33. Commanders compare similarities of their current situations with their own experiences or history
and the design team’s experiences or history to distinguish unique features that require novel, innovative, or
adaptive solutions. They understand that each situation requires a solution tailored to the context of the
problem. Design provides an approach for leading innovative, adaptive efforts from which to effectively act
on and efficiently solve a complex, ill-structured problem. It fosters thinking and interacting as
commanders develop approaches to resolve the differences between the current conditions and desired
conditions of the environment through the conduct of full spectrum operations.
3-34. Commanders leverage design to create and exploit opportunity, not just to ward off the risk of
failure. Design provides the means to convert intellectual power into combat power. A creative design
tailored to a unique operational environment promises—
z Economy of effort.
z Greater coherence across rotations among units and between successive operations.
z Better integration and coordination among the instruments of national power.
z Fewer unintended consequences.
z Effective adaptation once the situation changes.
3-35. Design requires the commander to lead adaptive, innovative efforts to leverage collaboration and
dialog to identify and solve complex, ill-structured problems. To that end, the commander must lead
organizational learning and develop methods to determine if reframing is necessary during the course of an
operation. This requires continuous assessment, evaluation, and reflection that challenge understanding of
the existing problem and the relevance of actions addressing that problem.
DESIGN METHODOLOGY
3-36. Three distinct elements collectively produce a design concept as depicted in figure 3-1. Together,
they constitute an organizational learning methodology that corresponds to three basic questions that must
be answered to produce an actionable design concept to guide detailed planning:
z Framing the operational environment—what is the context in which design will be applied?
z Framing the problem—what problem is the design intended to solve?
z Considering operational approaches—what broad, general approach will solve the problem?
do not achieve a thorough enough understanding of behaviors or events, commanders reframe their
understanding of the operational environment and problem. This cycle of inquiry, contextual
understanding, and synthesis relies on continuous collaboration and dialog. Collaboration—especially with
joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners—is fundamental to success. Collaboration
affords commanders opportunities to revise their understanding or approaches so they can execute feasible,
acceptable, and suitable approaches to achieve desired conditions or objectives.
3-38. Design is essentially nonlinear. It flows back and forth between environmental framing and problem
framing while considering several operational approaches. No hard lines separate the efforts of each design
element. When an idea or issue is raised, the commander can address it in the appropriate element, even if
the idea or issue is outside the current focus. The change in emphasis shifts from focusing on understanding
the tendencies and potentials of actors in the operational environment, to understanding how they relate to
and affect the problem, to understanding their likely contributions toward transforming existing conditions
to a desired end state. As commanders and staffs gain new knowledge or begin a new line of questioning,
they often shift their focus among elements of design while building understanding and refining potential
operational approaches to solve the problem.
Environmental Frame
3-44. The commander and staff develop a contextual understanding of the situation by framing the
operational environment. The environmental frame is a narrative and graphic description that captures the
history, culture, current state, and future goals of relevant actors in the operational environment. The
environmental frame describes the context of the operational environment—how the context developed
(historical and cultural perspective), how the context currently exists (current conditions), and how the
context could trend in the future (future conditions or desired end state). The environmental frame enables
commanders to forecast future events and the effects of potential actions in the operational environment.
The environmental frame explains the actors and relationships within a system and surfaces assumptions to
allow for more rapid adaptation. The environmental frame evolves through continuous learning, but scopes
aspects of the operational environment relevant to higher guidance and situations.
3-45. Within the environmental frame, commanders review existing guidance, articulate existing
conditions, determine the desired end state and supporting conditions, and identify relationships and
interactions among relevant operational variables and actors. They analyze groupings of actors that exert
significant influence in the operational environment knowing that individual actors rarely share common
goals. By identifying and evaluating tendencies and potentials of relevant actor interactions and
relationships, commanders and their staffs formulate a desired end state that accounts for the context of the
operational environment and higher directives.
Relevant Actors
3-49. Commanders use the environmental frame to understand and explain behaviors of relevant actors in
the operational environment. An actor is an individual or group within a social network who acts to
advance personal interests. Relevant actors may include states and governments; multinational actors such
as coalitions; and regional groupings, alliances, terrorist networks, criminal organizations, and cartels. They
may also include multinational and international corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and other
actors able to influence the situation either through, or in spite of, the appropriate civil, religious, or
military authority.
3-50. A diagram illustrating relevant actor relationships is a valuable tool for understanding and visualizing
the operational environment. However, such diagrams may become so complicated for more complex
situations that they impart only limited insight and inhibit critical and creative thought when viewed in
isolation. The environmental frame’s narrative captures a more detailed understanding of the relevant
actors and their interactions and relationships. Often relationships among actors are multifaceted and differ
depending on the scale of interaction and their temporal aspects (history, duration, type, and frequency).
Clarifying the relationships among actors requires intense effort since relationships must be examined from
multiple perspectives. Commanders can also depict relationships by identifying and categorizing their
unique characteristics.
Operational Initiative
3-60. In developing an operational approach, the commander and staff consider how potential actions will
enable the force to maintain the operational initiative. The operational initiative is the setting or dictating
the terms of action throughout an operation (FM 3-0). The staff evaluates what combination of actions
might derail opposing actors from achieving their goals while reinforcing their own desired end state. This
entails evaluating an action’s potential risks and the relevant actors’ freedom of action. By identifying the
possible emergence of unintended consequences or threats, commanders consider exploitable opportunities
to create effects that reinforce the desired end state. The staff explores the risks and opportunities of action
by considering exploitable tensions. This includes identifying capabilities and vulnerabilities of the actors
who oppose the desired end state. The commander and staff can then formulate methods to neutralize those
capabilities and exploit such vulnerabilities.
approaches can greatly amplify the limited resources directly controlled by the commander. Detailed
planning determines the exact resources required.
3-62. The initial planning guidance addresses risk. It explains the acceptable level of risk to seize, retain, or
exploit the initiative and broadly outlines risk mitigation measures. Planners identify and consider risks
throughout the iterative application of design. Collaboration, coordination, and cooperation among
multinational military and civilian partners are essential to mitigating risk, conserving resources, and
achieving unity of effort. These are easier to achieve if military and civilian partners participate in design
from the outset to build trust and confidence in the effort and one another.
REFRAMING
3-68. Reframing is a shift in understanding that leads to a new perspective on the problems or their
resolution. Reframing involves significantly refining or discarding the hypotheses or models that form the
basis of the design concept. At any time during the operations process, the decision to reframe can stem
from significant changes to understanding, the conditions of the operational environment, or the end state.
Reframing allows the commander and staff to make adjustments throughout the operations process,
ensuring that tactical actions remain fundamentally linked to achieving the desired conditions.
Commanders must retain this versatility and agility while exercising battle command.
3-69. Because the current operational environment is always changing and evolving, the problem frame
must also evolve. Recognizing when an operation—or planning—is not progressing as envisioned or must
be reconsidered provides the impetus for reframing in design. Reframing criteria should support the
commander’s ability to understand, learn, and adapt—and cue commanders to rethink their understanding
of the operational environment, and hence rethink how to solve the problem. Generally, reframing is
triggered in three ways: a major event causes a “catastrophic change” in the operational environment, a
scheduled periodic review shows a problem, or an assessment and reflection challenges understanding of
the existing problem and the relevance of the operational approach.
3-70. During operations, commanders decide to reframe after realizing the desired conditions have
changed, are not achievable, or cannot be attained through the current operational approach. Reframing
provides the freedom to operate beyond the limits of any single perspective. Conditions will change during
execution, and such change is expected because forces interact within the operational environment.
Recognizing and anticipating these changes is fundamental to design and essential to an organization’s
ability to learn.
3-71. Reframing is equally important in the wake of success. By its very nature, success transforms the
operational environment, creating unforeseen opportunities to exploit the initiative. Organizations are
strongly motivated to reflect and reframe following failure, but they tend to neglect reflection and
reframing following successful actions.
PREPARATION FUNCTIONS
4-1. Preparation consists of activities performed by units to improve their ability to execute an operation.
Preparation includes, but is not limited to, plan refinement; rehearsals; intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; coordination; inspections; and movement (FM 3-0). Preparation creates conditions that
improve friendly forces’ opportunities for success. It requires commander, staff, unit, and Soldier actions to
ensure the force is ready to execute operations.
4-2. Preparation helps the force transition from planning to execution. Preparation normally begins during
planning and continues into execution by uncommitted units. Preparation activities help commanders,
staffs, and Soldiers to understand the situation and their roles in the upcoming operations. The primary
functions of preparation include—
z Improving situational understanding.
z Developing a common understanding of the plan.
z Practicing and becoming proficient on critical tasks.
z Integrating, organizing, and configuring the force.
z Ensuring forces and resources are ready and positioned.
base their guidance on time available and unit readiness. Commanders also allocate time during preparation
for units and Soldiers to train on unfamiliar tasks prior to execution. For example, a unit unfamiliar with
small boat operations requires significant training and familiarization prior to crossing a river by small
boat. Units may need to practice crowd control techniques in support of a local election. Leaders also
allocate time for maintaining proficiency on individual Soldier skills (such as zeroing individual weapons,
combat lifesaving tasks, language familiarization, and cultural awareness) during preparation.
BATTLE COMMAND
4-9. During preparation, commanders continue to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess.
They gather additional information to improve their situational understanding, revise the plan, coordinate
with other units and partners, and supervise preparation activities to ensure their forces are ready to execute
missions.
4-10. During preparation, commanders update and improve their commander’s visualization as they
receive relevant information that helps satisfy their commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs)
and verify assumptions made during planning. Preparation activities—particularly subordinate
confirmation briefs and rehearsals—help commanders visualize the situation from their subordinates’
perspectives. Additionally, information from ISR and liaisons improves the commander’s situational
understanding. Commanders describe any changes in their visualization to their subordinates resulting in
additional planning guidance and fragmentary orders prior to execution.
4-11. During preparation, commanders circulate among subordinate units and with the population in areas
under friendly control. This allows commanders to assess subordinates’ preparation, get to know new units
in the task organization, and personally motivate Soldiers. By personally briefing subordinates,
commanders gain firsthand appreciation for the situation as well as ensure Soldiers understand the
commander’s intent. Commanders also visit with civilian organizations (other government agencies,
intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector) in the
operational area to build personal relationships with civilian partners. Knowledge gained during these visits
allows the commander to maintain situational understanding and continuously update their commander’s
visualization prior to execution.
PREPARATION ACTIVITIES
4-16. Mission success depends as much on preparation as on planning. Higher headquarters may develop
the best of plans; however, plans serve little purpose if subordinates do not receive them in time.
Subordinates need enough time to understand plans well enough to execute them. Subordinates develop
their own plans and prepare for the operation. After they fully comprehend the plan, subordinate leaders
rehearse key portions of it and ensure Soldiers and equipment are positioned and ready to execute the
operation. To help ensure the force is protected and prepared for execution, commanders, units, and
Soldiers conduct the following activities:
z Conduct ISR.
z Conduct security operations.
z Conduct protection.
z Manage terrain.
z Coordinate and conduct liaison.
z Continue to build partnerships and teams.
z Conduct confirmation briefs.
z Conduct rehearsals.
z Conduct plans-to-operations transitions.
z Revise and refine the plan.
z Complete task organization.
z Integrate new Soldiers and units.
z Train.
z Initiate troop movements.
z Prepare terrain.
z Conduct sustainment preparation.
z Initiate deception operations.
z Conduct preoperations checks and inspections.
CONDUCT PROTECTION
4-21. Protection is both a warfighting function and a continuing activity. The protection warfighting
functions consist of twelve tasks (see FM 3-0) for which commanders and staffs continuously plan and
execute to preserve the force. Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatants and
noncombatants), physical assets, and information of the United States and multinational military and
civilian partners. (See FM 3-37 for doctrine on protection.)
4-22. Because the force is often most vulnerable to attack and surprise while preparing, emphasis on
protection increases during preparation and continues throughout execution. While all protection tasks are
important, commanders particularly emphasize the protection tasks of operations security, survivability,
and operational area security during preparation.
4-23. Operations security identifies and implements measures to protect essential elements of friendly
information. During preparation, forces implement measures that eliminate or reduce the vulnerability of
friendly forces to exploitation. These measures include concealing rehearsals, troop movements,
positioning of forces, and other indicators of unit intentions that enemy intelligence may exploit.
4-24. Survivability includes protecting the force while deceiving the enemy. It includes developing and
constructing protective positions to reduce the effectiveness of enemy weapon systems. Protective positions
can include earth berms, dug-in positions, overhead protection, and countersurveillance. Survivability
tactics range from employing camouflage, concealment, and deception to the hardening of facilities,
command and control nodes, and critical infrastructure.
4-25. Operational area security focuses on protecting areas, routes, or installations. During preparation,
operational area security focuses on protecting assembly areas and securing routes required for task
organization, sustainment, or positioning units for upcoming operations.
MANAGE TERRAIN
4-26. Terrain management is the process of allocating terrain by establishing areas of operation,
designating assembly areas, and specifying locations for units and activities to deconflict activities
that might interfere with each other. Terrain management is an important activity during preparation as
units reposition and stage prior to execution. Commanders assigned an area of operations manage terrain
within their boundaries. Through terrain management, commanders identify and locate units in the area.
Staffs can then deconflict operations, control movements, and deter fratricide as units get in position to
execute planned missions. Commanders also consider the civilians and civilian organizations located in
their area of operations.
are frequently present before forces arrive and remain after forces depart. As part of mission analysis,
commanders identify civilian organizations in the operational area and develop plans to build relationships
with them. During preparation, commanders, staffs, and subordinate commanders identify and make
contact with those various organizations. A challenge in building partnerships among civilian and military
efforts is the differing capabilities and cultures in the civilian and host-nation organizations compared to
those of the headquarters. To help build partnerships, commanders strive to have participants—
z Represented, integrated, and actively involved in planning and coordinating activities.
z Share an understanding of the situation and problems to solve.
z Strive for unity of effort toward achieving a common goal.
z Integrate and synchronize capabilities and activities wherever possible.
z Collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their goal.
Note: Commanders avoid creating a false impression of the headquarters’ readiness to make
available classified military materiel, technology, or information when coordinating with foreign
governments and international originations. See AR 380-10 for guidance on foreign disclosure
and contacts with foreign representatives.
4-32. Developing partnerships with civilian organizations requires considerable effort by the commander,
staff, and subordinate commanders. Some organizations are willing to cooperate with the command. Other
organizations may avoid a close affiliation. Sometimes they fear compromising their impartiality with the
local populace or have suspicions that the force may intend to take control of, influence, or even prevent
operations. Despite different goals among military and civilian agencies and organizations, discovering
common ground is essential to unity of effort.
CONDUCT REHEARSALS
4-34. A rehearsal is a session in which a staff or unit practices expected actions to improve
performance during execution. Commanders use this tool to ensure staffs and subordinates understand
the concept of operations and commander’s intent. Rehearsals also allow leaders to practice synchronizing
operations at times and places critical to mission accomplishment. Effective rehearsals imprint a mental
picture of the sequence of the operation’s key actions and improve mutual understanding and coordination
of subordinate and supporting leaders and units. The extent of rehearsals depends on available time. In
cases of short-notice requirements, rehearsals may not be possible.
4-35. Rehearsals contribute to external and internal coordination. Even if staff members do not attend a
rehearsal, they may receive a tasking for internal coordination. Properly executed, they—
z Help commanders visualize conditions associated with decisionmaking before, during, and after
the operation.
z Help prepare commanders and staffs to synchronize the operation at key points. Rehearsals do
this by identifying actions, times, and locations that require coordination.
z Reveal unidentified external coordination requirements.
TRAIN
4-46. Training prepares forces and Soldiers to conduct operations according to doctrine, SOPs, and the
unit’s mission. Training develops the teamwork, trust, and mutual understanding that commanders need to
exercise mission command and that forces need to achieve unity of effort. Training does not stop when a
unit deploys. If the unit is not conducting operations or recovering from operations, it is training. Training
while deployed focuses on fundamental skills, current SOPs, and skills for a specific mission. See FM 7-0
for details on training the force.
PREPARE TERRAIN
4-48. Terrain preparation starts with the situational understanding of terrain through proper terrain
analysis. It involves shaping the terrain to gain an advantage, to include improving cover, concealment and
observation, fields of fire, new obstacle effects through reinforcing obstacles, or mobility operations for
initial positioning of forces. It can make the difference between the operation’s success and failure.
Commanders must understand the terrain and the infrastructure of their area of operations as early as
possible to identify potential for improvement, establish priorities of work, and begin preparing the area as
rapidly as possible.
FUNDAMENTALS OF EXECUTION
5-1. Planning and preparation accomplish nothing if the command does not execute effectively. Execution
is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational
understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions (FM 3-0). In execution,
commanders focus their efforts on translating decisions into actions to accomplish their missions.
5-2. In any operation, the situation may change rapidly. Operations the commander envisioned in the plan
may bear little resemblance to actual events in execution. Subordinate commanders need maximum latitude
to take advantage of situations and meet the higher commander’s intent when the original order no longer
applies. Effective execution requires leaders trained in independent decisionmaking, aggressiveness, and
risk taking in an environment of mission command. (See FM 6-0.) During execution, leaders must be able
and willing to solve problems within the commander’s intent without constantly referring to higher
headquarters. Subordinates need not wait for top-down synchronization to act.
5-3. Throughout execution, commanders (assisted by their staff) use forces and other resources for both
constructive and destructive purposes to mass effects at decisive points and times. To successfully execute
operations, commander’s consider the following execution fundamentals:
z Seize and retain the initiative.
z Build and maintain momentum.
z Exploit success.
Take Action
5-5. Commanders create conditions for seizing the initiative by acting. Without action, seizing the
initiative is impossible. Faced with an uncertain situation, there is a natural tendency to hesitate and gather
more information to reduce the uncertainty. However, waiting and gathering information might reduce
uncertainty but will not eliminate it. Waiting may even increase uncertainty by providing the enemy with
time to seize the initiative. It is far better to manage uncertainty by acting and developing the situation.
5-6. In stability operations, commanders act quickly to improve the civil situation while preventing
conditions from deteriorating further. Immediate action to stabilize the situation and provide for the
immediate humanitarian needs of the people begins the process toward stability. Friendly forces dictate the
terms of action and drive positive change to stabilize the situation rapidly. In turn, this improves the
security environment, creating earlier opportunities for civilian agencies and organizations to contribute.
By acting proactively to influence events, Army forces exploit the initiative to ensure steady progress
toward conditions that support stability. Failing to act quickly may create a breeding ground for dissent and
possible recruiting opportunities for enemies or adversaries.
5-7. During execution, action must be synchronized with information themes and messages. Commanders
use information engagement in their area of operations to communicate, build trust and confidence, and
influence perceptions and behavior. Failure to synchronize words and actions may result in adverse
behavior by groups whose behavior is key to mission accomplishment.
EXPLOIT SUCCESS
5-13. Ultimately, only successes that achieve the end state count. To determine how to exploit tactical and
operational successes, commanders assess them in terms of the higher commander’s intent. However,
success will likely occur in ways unanticipated in the plan. Commanders may gain an objective in an
unexpected way. Success signals a rapid assessment to answer these questions:
z Does the success generate opportunities that more easily accomplish the objectives?
z Does it suggest other lines of operations or lines of effort?
z Does it cause commanders to change their overall intent?
z Should the force transition to a sequel?
z Should the force accelerate the phasing of the operation?
5-14. Exploitation demands assessment and understanding of the impact on sustainment operations.
Sustainment provides the means to exploit success and convert it into decisive results. Sustainment
preserves the freedom of action necessary to take advantage of opportunity. Commanders remain fully
aware of the status of units and anticipate sustainment requirements, recognizing that sustainment often
determines the depth to which Army forces exploit success.
STAFF
5-20. In execution, the staff—primarily through the current operations integration cell—integrates forces
and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission. The staff assesses short-term actions and activities as
part of this integration. While the COS (XO) integrates staff activities among all functional and integrating
cells and separate sections, the operations officer integrates the operation through the current operations
integration cell. Other staff principals integrate within their areas of expertise.
5-21. Formal and informal integration of the warfighting functions by functional and integrating cells is
continuous. The integration occurs both within and among command post cells and staff sections and
between headquarters. When staffs need a more structured integration, they establish meetings (to include
working groups and boards) to share information, coordinate actions, and solve problems. (See command
post operations in appendix A.) The COS (XO) also identifies staff members to participate in the higher
commander’s working groups and boards.
A decision support matrix is a written record of a war-gamed course of action that describes decision
points and associated actions at those decision points. The decision support matrix lists decision points,
locations of decision points, criteria to be evaluated at decision points, actions that occur at decision points,
and the units responsible to act on the decision points. It also lists the units responsible for observing and
reporting information affecting the criteria for decisions.
5-26. The current operations integration cell uses the decision support template and the decision support
matrix to determine the need and timing for execution decisions. This involves assessing the progress of the
operation and evaluating the criteria for upcoming decision points to see if the criteria for the upcoming
decision points have been met or not.
5-27. An execution matrix is a visual and sequential representation of the critical tasks and
responsible organizations by time. An execution matrix could be for the entire force, such as an air
assault execution matrix, or it may be specific to a warfighting function, such as a fire support execution
matrix. The current operations integration cell uses the execution matrix to determine which friendly
actions to expect forces to execute in the near term or, in conjunction with the decision support matrix,
which execution decisions to make.
TYPES OF DECISIONS
5-36. Decisions made during execution are either execution decisions or adjustment decisions. Execution
decisions involve options anticipated in the order. Adjustment decisions involve options that commanders
did not anticipate. These decisions may include a decision to reframe the problem and develop an entirely
new plan. Commanders may delegate authority for some execution decisions to the staff; however,
commanders are always responsible for and involved in decisions during execution. Table 5-1 summarizes
the range of possible actions with respect to decisions made during execution.
Table 5-1. Decision types and related actions
Decision Types Actions
Minor Variances from Execute Planned Actions
the Plan • Commander or designee decides which planned actions
Operation proceeding best meet situation and directs their execution.
Execution Decisions
state in ways that differ concept or use the military decisionmaking process to
significantly from the plan. develop a new plan. In these instances, the decision initiates
planning. Otherwise, the commander directs the staff to
refine a single course of action or directs actions by
subordinates to exploit the opportunity or counter the threat
Unanticipated Situation— and exercise initiative within the higher commander’s intent.
Enemy Threat • Commander normally does not attempt to restore the plan.
Significant, unanticipated • Commander issues a verbal warning or fragmentary order to
negative variances impede subordinate commanders.
mission accomplishment.
• Staff resynchronizes operation, modifies measures of
effectiveness, and begins assessing the operation for
progress using new measures of effectiveness.
Execution Decisions
5-37. Execution decisions implement a planned action under circumstances anticipated in the order. In
their most basic form, execution decisions are decisions the commander foresees and identifies for
execution during the operation. They apply resources at times or situations generally established in the
order. For example, changing a boundary, altering the task organization, transitioning between phases, and
executing a branch are execution decisions. Commanders are responsible for those decisions but may direct
the COS (XO) or staff officer to supervise implementation. The current operations integration cell oversees
the synchronization of integrating processes needed to implement execution decisions.
Adjustment Decisions
5-38. Adjustment decisions modify the operation to respond to unanticipated opportunities and threats.
They often require implementing unanticipated operations and resynchronizing the warfighting functions.
Commanders make these decisions, delegating implementing authority only after directing the major
change themselves.
5-39. When basic operational assumptions prove inaccurate, the commander may have to change the
mission. Commanders do this only as a last resort while still accomplishing the higher commander’s intent.
Changing the mission proves most difficult as it may desynchronize the force’s operations with those of the
overall force.
Change in mission.
• Change in organization of unit. impacting on the population, agriculture,
industry.
• Change in leadership of unit.
• Upcoming local election.
• Signing or implementation of peace treaty or
other key political arrangement. • Changes in key civilian leadership.
• Identification of enemy main effort. • Enemy electronic attack use.
• Identification of enemy reserves or • Indicators of illicit economic activity.
counterattack. • Identification of threats from within the
• Indications of unexpected enemy action or population.
preparation. • Increased unemployment within the
Intelligence
leadership. civilians.
Control
5-47. Staff members are particularly alert for answers to CCIRs that support anticipated decisions. They
also watch for exceptional information. Exceptional information is information that would have answered
one of the commander’s critical information requirements if the requirement for it had been foreseen and
stated as one of the commander’s critical information requirements (FM 6-0). Exceptional information
usually reveals a need for an adjustment decision. (See FM 6-0.)
5-48. When performing the RDSP, the current operations integration cell first compares the current
situation to the one envisioned in the order. (See chapter 2.) It may obtain assistance from the assessment
section or the red team section in this analysis. If the situation requires greater analysis, the COS (XO) may
task the future operations cell (where authorized) or the plans cell to perform this analysis. At echelons
with no future operations cell, the plans cell or the current operations integration cell performs this
function.
5-56. When reallocating resources or priorities, commanders assign only minimum essential assets to
shaping operations. They use all other assets to weight the decisive operation. This applies when allocating
resources for the overall operation or within a warfighting function.
Table 5-3. Considerations for synchronization and decision implementation actions
Types Actions
• Modifying priority intelligence • Updating the enemy SITEMP and enemy
Intelligence
Maneuver
• Modifying the high-payoff target list and • Modifying the priority of fires.
the attack guidance matrix. • Modifying fire support coordination measures.
• Moving air defense weapons systems. • Changing air defense weapons control status.
Protection
• Synchronizing and adjusting information themes and messages to support the new decision.
• Adjusting measures for minimizing civilian interference with operations.
• Revising recommended protected targets to the fires cell.
• Recommending modifications of stability operations, including employment of civil affairs
operations and other units, to perform civil affairs operations tasks.
COA course of action
SITEMP situation template
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
5-57. Commanders normally direct the future operations cell to prepare a fragmentary order or the current
operations integration cell to issue a fragmentary order setting conditions for executing a new COA. When
lacking time to perform the MDMP or quickness of action is desirable, commanders make an immediate
adjustment decision—using intuitive decisionmaking—in the form of a focused COA. Developing the
focused COA often follows the mental war-gaming by commanders until they reach an acceptable COA. If
time is available, commanders may direct the plans cell to develop a new COA using the MDMP, and the
considerations for planning become operative.
with a future operations cell may assign that cell responsibility for developing the details of the new COA
and drafting a fragmentary order to implement it. The commander or COS may direct an “on-call”
operations synchronization meeting to perform this task and ensure rapid resynchronization.
5-59. Validation and refinement is done very quickly. Normally, the commander and staff officers conduct
a mental war game of the new COA. They consider potential enemy reactions, the unit’s counteractions,
and secondary effects that might affect the force’s synchronization. When time allows, the XO or chief of
operations assembles command post cell chiefs and refines and validates the COA in an open forum. Each
staff member considers the following:
z Is the new COA feasible in terms of my area of expertise?
z How will this action affect my area of expertise?
z Does it require changing my information requirements?
Should any of the information requirements be nominated as a CCIR?
What actions within my area of expertise does this change require?
Will it require changing objectives or targets nominated by the staff section?
z What other command post cells and elements does this action affect?
z What are potential enemy reactions?
z What are the possible friendly counteractions?
Does this counteraction affect my area of expertise?
Will it require changing my information requirements?
Are any of my information requirements potential CCIRs?
What actions within my area of expertise does this counteraction require?
Will it require changing objectives or targets nominated by the staff section?
What other command post cells and elements does this counteraction affect?
5-60. The validation and refinement show if the COA will acceptably solve the problem. If it does not, the
XO or chief of operations modifies it through additional analysis or develops a new COA. The XO informs
the commander of any changes made.
IMPLEMENT
5-61. When the COA is acceptable, the XO recommends implementation to the commander or implements
it directly if the commander has delegated that authority. Implementation normally requires a fragmentary
order; in exceptional circumstances, it may require a new operation order. That order changes the concept
of operations (in adjustment decisions), resynchronizes the warfighting functions, and disseminates changes
to control measures. The staff uses warning orders to alert the unit to a pending change. The staff also
establishes sufficient time for the unit to implement the change without losing integration or being exposed
to unnecessary tactical risk. Stability operations demand special attention to execution of information
engagement. Part of implementing in stability operations includes informing the population of the purpose
of an operation and amending the information engagement plan to account for changes that occur as the
operation proceeds.
5-62. Commanders often issue orders to subordinates verbally in situations requiring a quick reaction. At
battalion and higher levels, written fragmentary orders confirm verbal orders to ensure synchronization,
integration, and notification of all parts of the force. Common revisions to products needed to affect
adjustments include the following:
z Updated enemy situation, including the situation template.
z Revised CCIRs.
z Updated ISR plan.
z Updated scheme of maneuver and tasks to maneuver units, including an execution matrix and
decision support matrix or template.
z Updated scheme of fires, including the fire support execution matrix, high-payoff target list, and
attack guidance matrix.
z Updated information tasks.
5-63. If time permits, leaders verify that subordinates understand critical tasks. Methods for doing this
include the confirmation brief and backbrief. These are done both between commanders and within staff
elements to ensure mutual understanding.
5-64. After the analysis is complete, the current operations integration cell and command post cell chiefs
update decision support templates and synchronization matrixes. When time is available, the operations
officer or chief of operations continues this analysis to the operation’s end to complete combat power
integration. Staff members begin the synchronization needed to implement the decision. This
synchronization involves collaboration with other command post cells and subordinate staffs. Staff
members determine how actions in their areas of expertise affect others. They coordinate those actions to
eliminate undesired effects that might cause friction. The cells provide results of this synchronization to the
current operations integration cell and the common operational picture.
5-65. During implementation of the RDSP, the current operations integration cell keeps the warfighting
functions synchronized as the situation changes. It considers the following outcomes when making
synchronization decisions or allowing others’ synchronization in collaboration to proceed:
z Combined arms integration.
z Responsiveness—both anticipatory and reactive.
z Timeliness.
Anticipating certain outcomes lets commanders mass the effects of combat power at decisive times and
places.
5-66. Commanders also synchronize collaboratively. Coordination among higher, adjacent, supporting, and
subordinate commanders facilitates effective execution by improving interaction between their units as they
anticipate and solve problems. Cross talk among subordinate commanders can provide synchronization as
well as lead to decisionmaking. Such synchronization occurs without the higher commander becoming
involved, except to affirm, either positively or through silence, the decisions or agreements of subordinates.
CAUTIONS
5-67. Validating and refining action is a rapid and largely intuitive activity. It should be done quickly and
not be drawn out. Commanders focus on maintaining the tempo and minimizing necessary synchronization.
The RDSP is not designed to mass maximum combat power but to make the minimum coordination needed
to generate enough combat power to prevail.
5-68. Most decisions during execution are made at a relatively low level by command post cell chiefs.
They refine execution of the order without changing it significantly. However, even small changes can
affect other staff sections. All changes that affect operations should be coordinated between cells and
reported to the staff as a whole. When time does not allow this, the staff element making the change
immediately advises all affected elements.
5-69. To work, the RDSP must be done continuously, not tied to the battle rhythm. Commanders can use
cyclical events (such as targeting working groups) to review an entire process or evaluate the entire ISR or
targeting plan. The key is to be able to act and react in real time as events occur, not at predetermined
points. Only in this way can Army forces operate within the enemy’s decision cycles at a tempo the enemy
cannot match.
ASSESSMENT FUNDAMENTALS
6-1. Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation, particularly the
enemy, and progress of an operation (FM 3-0). Assessment is both a continuous activity of the operations
process and an activity of battle command. Commanders, assisted by their staffs and subordinate
commanders, continuously assess the operational environment and the progress of the operation. Based on
their assessment, commanders direct adjustments thus ensuring the operation remains focused on
accomplishing the mission.
6-2. Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes with actual events to determine the
overall effectiveness of force employment. More specifically, assessment helps the commander determine
progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. It also involves
continuously monitoring and evaluating the operational environment to determine what changes might
affect the conduct of operations. Assessment helps commanders determine if they need to reframe the
problem and develop an entirely new plan. (Chapter 3 addresses reframing.)
6-3. Throughout the operations process, commanders integrate their own assessments with those of the
staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners in the area of operations. Primary tools for assessing
progress of the operation include the operation order, the common operational picture, personal
observations, running estimates, and the assessment plan. The latter includes measures of effectiveness,
measures of performance, and reframing criteria. The commander’s visualization forms the basis for the
commander’s personal assessment of progress. Running estimates provide information, conclusions, and
recommendations from the perspective of each staff section. They help to refine the common operational
picture and supplement it with information not readily displayed.
6-4. Commanders avoid excessive analyses when assessing operations. Committing valuable time and
energy to developing excessive and time-consuming assessment schemes squander resources better devoted
to other operations process activities. Commanders reject the tendency to measure something just because it
is measurable. Effective commanders avoid burdening subordinates and staffs with overly detailed
assessment and collection tasks. Generally, the echelon at which a specific operation, task, or action is
conducted should be the echelon at which it is assessed. This provides a focus for assessment at each
echelon. It enhances the efficiency of the overall operations process.
ASSESSMENT PROCESS
6-5. Assessment is continuous; it precedes and guides every operations process activity and concludes
each operation or phase of an operation. Broadly, assessment consists of the following activities:
z Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information.
z Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing
tasks.
z Recommending or directing action for improvement.
6-6. The three activities that make up the assessment process are also continuous; they are logically
sequential while constantly executed throughout the operations process. This process applies to assessments
of every type and at every echelon.
MONITORING
6-7. Monitoring is continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation.
Monitoring within the assessment process allows staffs to collect relevant information, specifically that
information about the current situation that can be compared to the forecasted situation described in the
commander’s intent and concept of operations. Progress cannot be judged, nor effective decisions made,
without an accurate understanding of the current situation.
6-8. During planning, commanders monitor the situation to develop facts and assumptions that underlie
the plan. During preparation and execution, commanders and staffs monitor the situation to determine if the
facts are still relevant, if their assumptions remain valid, and if new conditions emerged that affect the
operations.
6-9. Commander’s critical information requirements and decision points focus the staff’s monitoring
activities and prioritize the unit’s collection efforts. Information requirements concerning the enemy,
terrain and weather, and civil considerations are identified and assigned priorities through intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) synchronization. Operations officers use friendly reports to
coordinate other assessment-related information requirements. To prevent duplicated collection efforts,
information requirements associated with assessing the operation are integrated into both the ISR plan and
friendly force information requirements. (See appendix H for more detail in building an assessment plan.)
6-10. Staffs monitor and collect information from the common operational picture and friendly reports.
This information includes operational and intelligence summaries from subordinate, higher, and adjacent
headquarters and communications and reports from liaison teams. The staff also identifies information
sources outside military channels and monitors their reports. These other channels might include products
from civilian, host-nation, and other government agencies. Staffs apply information management and
knowledge management principles to facilitate getting this information to the right people at the right time.
(See FM 6-0 and FM 6-01.1.)
6-11. Staff sections record relevant information in running estimates. Each staff section maintains a
continuous assessment of current operations as a basis to determine if they are proceeding according to the
commander’s intent, mission, and concept of operations. In their running estimates, staff sections use this
new information, updated facts, and assumptions as the basis for evaluation.
EVALUATING
6-12. The staff analyzes relevant information collected through monitoring to evaluate the operation’s
progress. Evaluating is using criteria to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining
why the current degree of progress exists. Evaluation is the heart of the assessment process where most
of the analysis occurs. Evaluation helps commanders determine what is working, determine what is not
working, and gain insights into how to better accomplish the mission.
6-13. Criteria in the forms of measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) aid
in determining progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks.
MOEs help determine if a task is achieving its intended results. MOPs help determine if a task is completed
properly. MOEs and MOPs are simply criteria—they do not represent the assessment itself. MOEs and
MOPs require relevant information in the form of indicators for evaluation.
6-14. A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or
operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an
objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). MOEs help measure changes in conditions, both positive and
negative. MOEs help to answer the question “Are we doing the right things?” MOEs are commonly found
and tracked in formal assessment plans. Examples of MOEs for the objective to “Provide a safe and secure
environment” may include—
z Decrease in insurgent activity.
z Increase in population trust of host-nation security forces.
6-15. A measure of performance is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task
accomplishment (JP 3-0). MOPs help answer questions such as “Was the action taken?” or “Were the tasks
completed to standard?” A MOP confirms or denies that a task has been properly performed. MOPs are
commonly found and tracked at all levels in execution matrixes. MOPs are also heavily used to evaluate
training. MOPs help to answer the question “Are we doing things right?”
6-16. At the most basic level, every Soldier assigned a task maintains a formal or informal checklist to
track task completion. The status of those tasks and subtasks are MOPs. Similarly, operations consist of a
series of collective tasks sequenced in time, space, and purpose to accomplish missions. Current operations
integration cells use MOPs in execution matrixes and running estimates to track completed tasks. The uses
of MOPs are a primary element of battle tracking. MOPs focus on the friendly force. Evaluating task
accomplishment using MOPs is relatively straightforward and often results in a yes or no answer. Examples
of MOPs include—
z Route X cleared.
z Generators delivered, are operational, and secured at villages A, B, and C.
z Hill 785 secured.
z $15,000 spent for schoolhouse completion.
6-17. In the context of assessment, an indicator is an item of information that provides insight into a
measure of effectiveness or measure of performance. Staffs use indicators to shape their collection effort
as part of ISR synchronization. Indicators take the form of reports from subordinates, surveys and polls,
and information requirements. Indicators help to answer the question “What is the current status of this
MOE or MOP?” A single indicator can inform multiple MOPs and MOEs. Examples of indicators for the
MOE “Decrease in insurgent activity” are—
z Number of hostile actions per area each week.
z Number of munitions caches found per area each week.
Appendix H provides a more detailed discussion of developing MOEs, MOPs, and indicators as part of
building the assessment plan. Table 6-1 provides additional information concerning MOEs, MOPs, and
indicators.
Table 6-1. Assessment measures and indicators
6-18. Evaluation includes analysis of why progress is or is not being made according to the plan.
Commanders and staffs propose and consider possible causes. In particular, the question of whether
changes in the situation can be attributed to friendly actions is addressed. Commanders and staffs consult
subject matter experts, both internal and external to the staff, on whether staffs have identified the correct
underlying causes for specific changes in the situation. Assumptions identified in the planning process are
challenged to determine if they are still valid.
6-19. A key aspect of evaluation is determining variances—the difference between the actual situation and
what the plan forecasted the situation would be at the time or event. Based on the significance of the
variances, the staff makes recommendations to the commander on how to adjust operations to accomplish
the mission more effectively. See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of assessment during execution to
include the relationship between the degree of variance from the plan and execution and adjustment
decisions.
6-20. Evaluating includes considering whether the desired conditions have changed, are no longer
achievable, or are not achievable through the current operational approach. This is done by continually
challenging the key assumptions made when framing the problem. When an assumption is invalidated, then
reframing may be in order. (Chapter 3 discusses framing and reframing.)
6-27. Often, time available for detailed analysis and assessment is shorter at the tactical level. Additionally,
tactical staffs are progressively smaller and have less analytic capability at each lower echelon. As such,
assessment at the tactical level focuses on the near term and relies more on direct observation and
judgments than on detailed assessment methods. This is not to say that tactical units cannot use detailed
assessment methods.
6-28. For small units (those without a staff), assessment is mostly informal. Small-unit leaders focus on
assessing their unit readiness—personnel, equipment, supplies, and morale—and their unit’s ability to
perform assigned tasks. Leaders also determine whether the unit has completed assigned tasks. If those
tasks have not produced the desired results, leaders explore why they have not and consider what smart
improvements could be made for unit operations. As they assess and learn, small units change their tactics,
techniques, and procedures based on their experiences.
ASSESSMENT IS CONTINUOUS
6-30. Assessment is a continuous activity of the operations process. The focus of assessment, however,
changes for each operations process activity. During planning, assessment focuses on understanding current
conditions of the operational environment and developing an assessment plan, including what and how to
assess progress. Understanding the commander’s intent and desired future conditions is key when building
the assessment plan. During preparation, assessment focuses on determining the friendly force’s readiness
to execute the operation and on verifying the assumptions on which the plan is based. During execution,
assessment focuses on evaluating progress of the operation. Based on their assessment, commanders direct
adjustments to the order, ensuring the operation stays focused on accomplishing the mission. They adjust
their assessment plan as required.
6-31. Assessment is continuous, even when the unit is not actively engaged in operations. At a minimum,
staffs maintain running estimates of friendly force capabilities and readiness within their areas of expertise.
Some running estimates, such as the intelligence estimate, also assess operational environments to which
the unit is likely to deploy.
6-34. To assist commanders learning throughout the conduct of operations, they establish their
commander’s critical information requirements, set priorities for assessment in the form of MOEs and
reframing criteria, and explicitly state assumptions. When results fail to meet expectations, commanders
decide whether this is due to a failure in implementing the plan (execution) or if the plan and its underlying
logic are flawed.
COMMANDERS AND STAFFS USE CAUTION WHEN ESTABLISHING CAUSE AND EFFECT
6-40. Establishing cause and effect is sometimes difficult, but it is crucial to effective assessment.
Sometimes, establishing causality between actions and their effects can be relatively straightforward, such
as in observing a bomb destroy a bridge. In other instances, especially regarding changes in human
behavior, attitudes, and perception, establishing links between cause and effect proves difficult.
Commanders and staffs must guard against drawing erroneous conclusions in these instances.
6-41. Understanding how cause and effect works requires careful consideration and shrewd judgment.
Even when two variables seem to be correlated, commanders must still make assumptions to establish
which one is cause and which one is effect. In fact, both may be caused by a third unnoticed variable.
Commanders clearly acknowledge all assumptions made in establishing causes and effects. The payoff for
correctly identifying the links between causes and effects is effective and smart recommendations.
Commanders and staffs are well-advised to devote the time, effort, and energy needed to properly uncover
connections between causes and effects. Assumptions made in establishing cause and effect must be
recorded explicitly and challenged periodically to ensure they are still valid.
6-42. In its simplest form, an effect is a result, outcome, or consequence of an action. Direct effects are the
immediate, first-order consequences of a military action unaltered by intervening events. They are usually
immediate and easily recognizable. For example, an enemy command and control center destroyed by
friendly artillery or a terrorist network courier captured by a direct-action mission. Establishing the link
between cause and effect in the physical domains is usually straightforward, as is assessing progress.
6-43. It is often difficult to establish a link or correlation that clearly identifies actions that produce effects
beyond the physical domains. The relationship between action taken (cause) and nonphysical effects may
be coincidental. Then the occurrence of an effect is either purely accidental or perhaps caused by the
correlation of two or more actions executed to achieve the effect. For example, friendly forces can
successfully engage enemy formations with fire and maneuver at the same time as psychological
operations. The psychological operations might urge enemy soldiers to surrender. If both these events occur
at the same time, then correlating an increase in surrendering soldiers to psychological operations will be
difficult. As another example, friendly forces may attempt to decrease population support for an insurgency
in a particular city. To accomplish this task, the unit facilitates the reconstruction of the city’s power grid,
assists the local authorities in establishing a terrorist tips hotline, establishes a civil-military operations
center, and conducts lethal operations against high-payoff targets within the insurgency. Identifying the
relative impact of each of these activities is extremely challenging but is critical for allocating resources
smartly to accomplish the mission. Unrecognized influences completely invisible to assessors can also
cause changes unforeseen or attributed inaccurately to actions of the force.
6-44. Furthermore, because commanders synchronize actions across the warfighting functions to achieve
an objective or obtain an end state condition, the cumulative effect of these actions may make the impact of
any individual task indistinguishable. Careful consideration and judgment are required, particularly when
asserting cause-and-effect relationships in stability operations.
Quantitative
6-47. In the context of assessment, a quantitative indicator is an observation-based (objective) item of
information that provides insight into a MOE or MOP. Little human judgment is involved in collecting a
quantitative indicator. Someone observes an event and counts it. For example, that individual tally the
monthly gallons of diesel provided to host-nation security forces by a unit or the monthly number of tips
provided to a tips hotline. Then the commander or staff collects that number.
6-48. Some human judgment is inevitably a factor even when dealing with quantitative indicators.
Choosing which quantitative indicators to collect requires significant human judgment prior to collection.
During collection the choice of sources, methods, and standards for observing and reporting the events
require judgment. After collection, the commander or staff decides whether to use the number as an
indicator in a formal assessment plan and for which MOEs or MOPs.
6-49. Quantitative indicators prove less biased than qualitative indicators. In general, numbers based on
observations are impartial (assuming that the events in question were observed and reported accurately).
Often, however, these indicators are less readily available than qualitative indicators and more difficult to
select correctly. This is because the judgment aspect of which indicators validly inform the MOE is already
factored into qualitative indicators to a degree. Experts factor in all considerations they believe are relevant
to answering questions. However, this does not occur inherently with quantitative indicators. The
information in quantitative indicators is less refined and requires greater judgment to handle appropriately
than information in qualitative indicators.
6-50. Public opinion polling can be easily miscategorized. It often provides an important source of
information in prolonged stability operations. Results of a rigorously collected and statistically valid public
opinion poll are quantitative, not qualitative. Polls take a mathematically rigorous approach to answering
the question of what people really think; they do not offer opinions on whether the people are correct.
6-51. While the results of scientifically conducted polls are quantitative, human judgment is involved in
designing a poll. Decisions must be made on what questions to ask, how to word the questions, how to
translate the questions, how to select the sample, how to choose interviewers, what training to give
interviewers, and what mathematical techniques to use for getting a sample of the population.
Qualitative
6-52. In the context of assessment, a qualitative indicator is an opinion-based (subjective) item of
information that provides insight into a MOE or MOP. A high degree of human judgment is involved when
collecting qualitative indicators. Qualitative indicators are themselves opinions, not just observed opinions
of others such as polls. For example, the division commander estimates the effectiveness of the host-nation
forces on a scale of 1 to 5. Sources of qualitative indicators include subject matter experts’ opinions and
judgments as well as subordinate commanders’ summaries of the situation.
6-53. Qualitative indicators can account for real-world complexities that cannot be feasibly measured using
quantitative indicators. Qualitative indicators are also more readily available; commanders often have
access to staff principals and other subject matter experts from whom to garner opinions. In some cases, the
only available indicator for a particular MOE or MOP is an expert opinion. For example, determining
changes in the size and number of enemy sanctuaries may prove impossible without asking local
commanders. Without large amounts of objective data, subjective indicators can be used to give a relatively
informed picture. However, subjective measures have a higher risk of bias. Human opinion is capable of
spectacular insight but also vulnerable to hidden assumptions that may prove false.
6-54. Differentiating between quantitative and qualitative indicators is useful but signifies a major
tendency rather than a sharp distinction in practice. Quantitative indicators often require a degree of
judgment in their collection. For example, determining the number of mortar attacks in a given area over a
given period requires judgment in categorizing attacks as mortar attacks. A different delivery system could
have been used, or an improvised explosive device could have been mistaken for a mortar attack. The
attack could also have landed on a boundary, requiring a decision on whether to count it. Similarly,
qualitative indicators always have some basis in observed and counted events. The same indicator may be
quantitative or qualitative depending on the collection mechanism. For example, the indicator may measure
a change in market activity for village X. If a Soldier observes and tracks the number of exchanges, then
the indicator is quantitative. If the battalion commander answers that question in a mandated monthly
report based on a gut feel, then the indicator is qualitative.
assessing an upcoming operation. In protracted stability operations, commanders may desire a formal
assessment plan, an assessment working group, and standard reports. Subordinate units use these tools to
assess local or provincial governance, economics, essential services, or the state of security. In fast-paced
offensive or defensive operations or in an austere theater of operations, a formal assessment may prove
impractical. To assess progress in those cases, commanders rely more on reports and assessments from
subordinate commanders, the common operational picture, operation updates, assessment briefings from
the staff, and their personal observations. The principles in this chapter apply to formal and informal
assessment methods. The tools described in table 6-1 on page 6-3 are useful for the assessment process
even if not recorded in a formal assessment framework. (Appendix H discusses formal assessment plans.)
6-56. A common informal assessment method is the after action review (AAR). Leaders use the AAR to
assess unit performance in training and throughout an operation. Leaders at all echelons conduct AARs to
generate candid, professional unit evaluations that include specific recommendations for improving unit
performance. (See FM 6-01.1 for tactics, techniques, and procedures on conducting AARs during and after
operations.)
6-57. Collecting, assembling, and analyzing information takes time and resources. Commanders balance
time and resources for assessment just as they do for planning, preparation, and execution. To help achieve
this balance, commanders and staffs ask the following questions:
z What will be assessed and to what detail?
z How will a particular task, objective, end state condition, or assumption be assessed? What
MOEs and MOPs will be used?
z What information requirements (indicators) are needed to support a particular assessment?
z Who on the staff has primary responsibility for assessing a particular area? What is the
collection plan?
6-58. Commanders must be careful, however, not to over assess. Staffs can easily get bogged down in
developing formal assessment procedures for numerous tasks and objectives. Additional numerous reports,
questions, and information requirements from higher headquarters can smother subordinate commanders
and their staffs. Often standard reports, operational and intelligence summaries, and updates by subordinate
commanders suffice. Higher echelons should never ask for something that the lower echelon does not need
for its own purposes. The chief of staff or executive officer helps the commander achieve the right balance
between formal and informal assessments.
Framework. (See appendix D in FM 3-07.) They examine the assessment plan to ensure MOEs, MOPs, and
indicators are still valid and develop new measures and indicators as required. They provide input to ISR
synchronization for adjusting collection requirements. The results of the assessment working group support
and feed short-, mid-, and long-range planning in the current operations integration, future operations, and
plans cells respectively.
6-63. Minority views are heard and dissenters speak up in the assessment working group. Commanders
encourage all subject matter experts and relevant staff sections to debate vigorously on the proper
understanding of observed trends and their associated causes. Minority views often create critical insights;
they also are presented to the commander at the assessment board.
6-64. The frequency with which the assessment working group meets depends on the situation.
Additionally, the assessment working group may present its findings and recommendations to the
commander for decision. Subordinate commanders may participate and provide their assessments of the
operations and recommendations along with the staff. Commanders combine these assessments with their
personal assessment, consider recommendations, and then direct changes to improve performance and
better accomplish the mission.
ASSESSMENT SUPPORT
6-65. The ORSA staff section supports assessment on many levels. Staff analytical resources and expertise
increase at each echelon. Division and corps headquarters, for example, have an assigned ORSA staff
section. In addition to managing a formal assessment framework, these staff sections can provide other
capabilities to assist the commander. These include—
z Trend analysis.
z Hypothesis testing.
z Forecasting.
6-66. ORSA staff sections can use various mathematical techniques to identify and analyze trends in data.
They confirm or rule out suspected trends in a statistically rigorous manner. They can also determine how
much a given trend depends on other variables within the information. For example, given sufficient
information, the ORSA staff section can determine which essential services trends correlate most to the
trend in the number of attacks.
6-67. The ORSA staff section confirms or rules out many theories about given information. For example,
the commander may propose a hypothesis that enemy surface-to-air attacks increased because helicopter
flight patterns became too predictable. The ORSA cell can analyze the flight patterns and determine a
correlation to attacks to confirm or rule out the hypothesis.
6-68. The ORSA staff section can use statistical techniques to predict the next information point in a series.
Margins of error for this activity can be significant, but it is one more tool the commander can use to
develop estimates in an unknown situation.
COMMAND POSTS
A-3. A command post is a unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their
activities. The headquarters’ design of the modular force, combined with robust communications, gives
commanders a flexible C2 structure consisting of a main CP, a tactical CP, and a command group for
brigades, divisions, and corps. Combined arms battalions are also resourced with a combat trains CP and a
field trains CP. Theater army headquarters are resourced with a main CP and a contingency CP. See
appropriate echelon manuals for doctrine on specific CP and headquarters’ organization.
A-4. Each CP performs specific functions by design as well as tasks the commander assigns. Activities
common in all CPs include—
z Maintaining running estimates and the common operational picture.
z Controlling operations.
z Assessing operations.
z Developing and disseminating orders.
z Coordinating with higher, lower, and adjacent units.
z Conducting knowledge management and information management. (See FM 6-01.1.)
z Performing CP administration.
mobile than the tactical CP. The COS (XO) leads and provides staff supervision of the main CP. Functions
of the main CP include—
z Controlling and synchronizing current operations.
z Monitoring and assessing current operations (including higher and adjacent units) for their
impact on future operations.
z Planning operations, including branches and sequels.
z Assessing the overall progress of operations.
z Preparing reports required by higher headquarters and receiving reports for subordinate units.
z Providing a facility for the commander to control operations, issue orders, and conduct
rehearsals.
Command Group
A-10. A command group consists of the commander and selected staff members who accompany
commanders and enable them to exercise command and control away from a command post. The
command group is organized and equipped to suit the commander’s decisionmaking and leadership
requirements. It does this while enabling the commander to accomplish critical C2 functions anywhere in
the area of operations. The command group consists of critical staff officers necessary to assist the
commander in directly influencing the ongoing operation.
A-11. Command group personnel includes staff representation that can immediately affect current
operations, such as maneuver, fires (including the air liaison officer), and intelligence. The mission and
available staff, however, dictate the command group’s makeup. For example, during a deliberate breach,
the command group may include an engineer and an air defense officer. When visiting a dislocated
civilians’ collection point, the commander may take a translator, civil affairs operations officer, a medical
officer, and a chaplain.
A-12. Divisions and corps headquarters are equipped with a mobile command groups. The mobile
command group serves as the commander’s mobile CP. It consists of ground and air components. The
ground component contains vehicles configured with Army Battle Command System multifunctional
displays and communications equipment. The air component includes a UH-60A/L equipped with the
Army Airborne Command and Control System. The mobile command group’s mobility allows
commanders to move to critical locations to personally assess a situation, make decisions, and influence
operations. The mobile command group’s information systems and small staff allow commanders to do this
while retaining communication with the entire force.
Functional Cells
A-17. Functional cells coordinate and synchronize forces and activities by warfighting function. The
functional cells within a CP are intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, sustainment, and
command and control. Echelons above brigade are resourced to establish all six functional cells described
in paragraphs A-18 through A-23. See appropriate brigade and battalion manuals for specifics on the
functional cells at those levels.
Intelligence Cell
A-18. The intelligence cell coordinates activities and systems that help commanders understand the enemy,
terrain and weather, and civil considerations. The intelligence cell requests, receives, and analyzes
information from all sources to produce and distribute intelligence products. This includes tasks associated
with intelligence preparation of the battlefield and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Most of
the intelligence staff section resides in this cell. The unit’s intelligence officer leads this cell.
Fires Cell
A-20. The fires cell coordinates activities and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army
indirect fires, joint fires, and C2 warfare through the targeting process. The fires cell consists of elements of
fire support, Air Force (or air component), and electronic warfare staff section. The unit’s chief of fires (or
fire support officer brigade and below) leads this cell.
Protection Cell
A-21. The protection cell coordinates the activities and systems that preserve the force through composite
risk management. This includes tasks associated with protecting personnel, physical assets, and
information. Elements of the following staff sections form this cell: air and missile defense; chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives; engineer; operations security; personnel
recovery; force health protection; and provost marshal. Additionally, a safety officer is assigned at theater
army and is often augmented as required down to the brigade level. The protection cell coordinates with the
signal staff section in the C2 cell to further facilitate the information protection task. The chief of protection
leads this cell.
Sustainment Cell
A-22. The sustainment cell coordinates activities and systems that provide support and services to ensure
freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. It includes those tasks associated with
logistics, personnel services, and Army health system support. The following staff sections form this cell:
personnel, logistics, financial management, engineer, and surgeon. The chief of sustainment (or logistics
officer brigade and below) leads this cell.
Integrating Cells
A-24. Whereas functional cells are organized by warfighting functions, integrating cells coordinate and
synchronize forces and warfighting functions within a specified planning horizon and include the plans,
future operations, and current operations integration cells. A planning horizon is a point in time
commanders use to focus the organization’s planning efforts to shape future events. The three
planning horizons are long, mid, and short. Generally, they are associated with the plans cell, future
operations cell, and current operations integration cell respectively. Planning horizons are situation-
dependent; they can range from hours and days to weeks and months. As a rule, the higher the echelon, the
more distant the planning horizon with which it is concerned. (See chapter 2 for a discussion of planning in
time.)
A-25. Not all echelons and types of units are resourced for all three integrating cells. Battalions, for
example, combine their planning and operations responsibilities in one integrating cell. The brigade combat
team has a small, dedicated plans cell but is not resourced for a future operations cell. Divisions and above
are resourced for all three integrating cells as shown in figure A-2.
Plans Cell
A-26. The plans cell is responsible for planning operations for the long-range planning horizons. It prepares
for operations beyond the scope of the current order by developing plans and orders, including branch plans
and sequels. The plans cell also oversees military deception planning.
A-27. The plans cell consists of a core group of planners and analysts led by the plans officer (or the
operations officer at battalion level). All staff sections assist as required. Whereas a brigade has a small,
dedicated plans cell, the majority of its staff sections balance their efforts between the current operations
integration and plans cells. Battalions are not resourced for a plans cell. Planning in combined arms
battalions occurs in the current operations integration cell.
Staff Sections
A-33. Not all staff sections reside in one of the functional or integrating cells. Personal staff officers and
their associated staff sections, such as the inspector general and public affairs staff sections, are examples.
Special staff sections such as the operations research/systems analysis, red team, and knowledge
management are other examples. These staff sections maintain their distinct organizations. They operate in
different CP cells as required and coordinate their activities in the various meetings established in the unit’s
battle rhythm.
headquarters to enhance how they exercise C2. Commanders use the following to assist them with effective
CP operations:
z Command and control SOPs.
z Battle rhythm.
z Meetings.
(XO) oversees the briefing, with participants briefing their areas of expertise. The briefing’s purpose is to
inform the incoming shift of—
z Current unit status.
z Significant activities that occurred during the previous shift.
z Significant decisions and events anticipated during the next shift.
The commander may attend and possibly change the focus of the briefing. If the commander issues
guidance or makes a decision, issuing a fragmentary order may be necessary.
A-40. The shift-change briefing format and emphasis change based on the situation. For example, the
format for a force supporting civil authorities in a disaster area differs from one for a force conducting
offensive operations abroad. To facilitate a quick but effective shift-change briefing, unit SOPs should
contain tailored formats.
A-41. The shift-change briefing provides a mechanism to formally exchange information periodically
among CP staff members. However, CP staff members share information throughout the shift. They
coordinate activities and inform each other continuously. Information that answers a commander’s critical
information requirement and exceptional information is given to the commander immediately. Information
that can potentially affect the entire force is disseminated to the commander, higher headquarters, and
subordinate units as the situation dictates. Situational understanding for CP staff members includes
knowing who needs what relevant information and why they need it. CP staff members exercise initiative
when they ensure relevant information gets to people who need it.
z All staff members have a common understanding of current operation, including upcoming
decision points and projected actions at those decision points.
z All warfighting functions are synchronized and appropriate fragmentary orders are issued to
subordinates based on the commander’s intent for current operations.
A-46. The operations synchronization meeting does not replace the shift-change briefing or operation
update and assessment briefing. The meeting is chaired by the commander or COS (XO). Representatives
of each CP cell and separated staff section attend. Key outputs of the operations synchronization meeting
include a fragmentary order addressing any required changes to maintain synchronization of the current
operations planning guidance for upcoming working groups and boards.
BATTLE RHYTHM
A-49. Battle rhythm is a deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to
synchronize current and future operations (JP 3-33). A headquarters’ battle rhythm consists of a series of
meetings, briefings, and other C2 activities synchronized by time and purpose. The COS (XO) oversees the
battle rhythm. Each meeting, to include working groups and boards, should be logically sequenced so that
one meeting’s outputs are available as another meeting’s inputs (to include higher headquarters meetings).
The COS (XO) balances the time required to plan, prepare for, and hold meetings and conduct briefings
with other staff duties and responsibilities. The COS (XO) also critically examines attendance
requirements. Some staff sections and CP cells may lack the personnel to attend all events. The COS (XO)
and staff members constantly look for ways to combine meetings and eliminate unproductive ones.
A-50. The battle rhythm facilitates integration and collaboration. The COS (XO) manages the headquarters’
battle rhythm. This battle rhythm serves several important functions, to include—
z Establishing a routine for staff interaction and coordination.
z Facilitating interaction between the commander and staff.
z Synchronizing activities of the staff in time and purpose.
z Facilitating planning by the staff and decisionmaking by the commander.
A-51. The battle rhythm changes during execution as operations progress. For example, early in the
operation a commander may require a plans update briefing daily. As the situation changes, the commander
may only require a plans update every three days. Many factors help determine a unit’s battle rhythm.
Some factors include the staff’s proficiency, higher headquarters’ battle rhythm, and current mission. In
developing the unit’s battle rhythm, the chief COS (XO) considers—
z Higher headquarters’ battle rhythm and report requirements.
z Subordinate headquarters’ battle rhythm requirements.
z The duration and intensity of the operation.
z Integrating cells’ planning requirements.
MEETINGS
A-52. Meetings are gatherings to present and exchange information, solve problems, coordinate action, and
make decisions. They may involve the staff; the commander and staff; or the commander, subordinate
commanders, staff, and other partners. Who attends depends on the issue. Commanders establish these
meetings to integrate the staff and enhance planning and decisionmaking within the headquarters.
Commanders also identify staff members to participate in the higher commander’s meeting, including
working groups and boards. (See JP 3-33 for a discussion of the various working groups and boards used
by joint force commanders.)
A-53. The number of meetings and subjects they address depend on the situation and echelon. While
numerous informal meetings occur daily within a headquarters, meetings commonly included in a unit’s
battle rhythm and the cells responsible for them include—
z A shift-change briefing (current operations integration cell).
z An operation update and assessment briefing (current operations integration cell).
z An operations synchronization meeting (current operations integration cell).
z Planning meetings and briefings (plans or future operations cells).
z Working groups and boards (various functional and integrating cells).
A-54. Often, the commander establishes and maintains only those meetings required by the situation.
Commanders—assisted by the COS (XO)—establish, modify, and dissolve meetings as the situation evolves.
The COS (XO) manages the timings of these events through the unit’s battle rhythm. (See paragraphs A-49
through A-51.)
A-55. For each meeting, the unit’s SOPs address—
z Purpose.
z Frequency.
z Composition (chair and participants).
z Inputs and expected outputs.
z Agenda.
A-56. Working groups and boards are types of meetings and are included on the unit’s battle rhythm. A
working group is a grouping of predetermined staff representatives who meet to provide analysis,
coordinate, and provide recommendations for a particular purpose or function. Working groups are
cross-functional by design to synchronize the contributions of multiple CP cells and staff sections. For
example, the targeting working group brings together representatives of all staff elements concerned with
targeting. It synchronizes the contributions of all staff elements with the work of the fires cell. It also
synchronizes fires with future operations and current operations integration cells.
A-57. Typical working groups and the lead cell or staff section at division and corps headquarters include
the—
z Assessment working group (plans or future operations cell).
z Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance working group (intelligence cell).
z Targeting working group (fires cell).
z Information engagement working group (information engagement staff section).
z Protection working group (protection cell).
z Civil affairs operations working group (civil affairs operations staff section).
A-58. The number of subjects that working groups address depends on the situation and echelon. Battalion
and brigade headquarters normally have fewer working groups than higher echelons. Working groups may
convene daily, weekly, monthly, or on call depending on the subject, situation, and echelon.
A-59. A board is a grouping of predetermined staff representatives with delegated decision authority
for a particular purpose or function. Boards are similar to working groups. However, commanders
appoint boards with the purpose to arrive at a decision. When the process or activity being synchronized
requires command approval, a board is the appropriate forum.
OVERVIEW
B-1. The military decisionmaking process is an iterative planning methodology that integrates the
activities of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and other partners to understand the
situation and mission; develop and compare courses of action; decide on a course of action that best
accomplishes the mission; and produce an operation plan or order for execution. The MDMP helps
leaders apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to understand
situations, develop options to solve problems, and reach decisions. It is a process that helps commanders,
staffs, and others think critically and creatively while planning. (See chapter 1.)
Note: Joint force headquarters use the joint operation planning process (known as JOPP), which
is similar to the Army’s MDMP. (See JP 5-0.) Marine Corps headquarters use the Marine Corps
planning process, which is similar to both the MDMP and the joint operation planning process.
(See MCWP 5-1.)
B-2. The MDMP facilitates collaborative and parallel planning as the higher headquarters solicits input
and continuously shares information concerning future operations with subordinate and adjacent units,
supporting and supported units, and other military and civilian partners through planning meetings, warning
orders, and other means. Commanders encourage active collaboration among all organizations affected by
the pending operations to build a shared understanding of the situation, participate in course of action
development and decisionmaking, and resolve conflicts before publication of the plan or order.
B-3. The MDMP also drives preparation. Since time is a factor in all operations, commanders and staffs
conduct a time analysis early in the planning process. This analysis helps them determine what actions are
required and when those actions must begin to ensure forces are ready and in position before execution.
This may require the commander to direct subordinates to start necessary movements; conduct task
organization changes; begin intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations; and execute
other preparation activities before completing the plan. These tasks are directed in a series of warning
orders (WARNOs) as the commander and staff conducts the MDMP.
B-4. During planning, assessment focuses on developing an understanding of the current situation and
determining what to assess and how to assess progress using measures of effectiveness and measures of
performance. Developing the unit’s assessment plan occurs during the MDMP—not after the plan or order
is developed. (See chapter 6 for a discussion of the fundamentals of assessment. See appendix H for details
in developing an assessment plan.)
B-5. Depending on complexity of the situation, commanders may initiate design activities before or in
parallel with the MDMP. Commanders may choose to conduct design to assist them in understanding the
operational environment, framing the problem, and considering operational approaches to solve or manage
the problem. The products of design, including the design concept, would guide more detailed planning as
part of the MDMP. Commanders may also conduct design in parallel with the MDMP. In this instance,
members of the staff conduct mission analysis as the commander and other staff members engage in design
activities prior to course of action development. In time-constrained conditions or if the problem is
relatively straight forward, commanders may conduct the MDMP without the benefit of a formal design
process. During execution, commander may conduct design to help refine their understanding and
visualization and adjust the plan as required. (See chapter 2 for a discussion on the interface between
design and the MDMP.)
visualization, and direct the staff to perform the MDMP activities that support the required decisions. (See
paragraphs B-182 through B-198.) In extremely compressed situations, commanders rely on more intuitive
decisionmaking techniques, such as the rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process described in
chapter 5.
RECEIPT OF MISSION
B-15. Commanders initiate the MDMP upon receipt or in anticipation of a mission. The purpose of this
step is to alert all participants of the pending planning requirements, determine the amount of time available
for planning and preparation, and decide on a planning approach, including guidance on design and how to
abbreviate the MDMP, if required. When a new mission is identified, commanders and staffs perform the
actions and produce the outputs as described in paragraphs B-16 through B-24.
MISSION ANALYSIS
B-25. The MDMP continues with an assessment of the situation called mission analysis. Commanders
(supported by their staffs and informed by subordinate and adjacent commanders and by other partners)
gather, analyze, and synthesize information to orient themselves on the current conditions of the
operational environment. The commander and staff conduct mission analysis to better understand the
situation and problem, and identify what the command must accomplish, when and where it must be done,
and most importantly why—the purpose of the operation.
B-26. Since no amount of subsequent planning can solve a problem insufficiently understood, mission
analysis is the most important step in the MDMP. This understanding of the situation and the problem
allows commanders to visualize and describe how the operation may unfold in their initial commander’s
intent and planning guidance. During mission analysis, the commander and staff perform the process
actions and produce the outputs shown in figure B-2. See FM 6-0 for specific areas of responsibility for
each staff section.
concept of operations of the higher headquarters. The commander and staff seek to completely
understand—
z The higher headquarters’—
Commander’s intent.
Mission.
Concept of operations.
Available assets.
Timeline.
z The missions of adjacent, supporting, and supported units and their relationships to the higher
headquarters’ plan.
z The missions of interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations that work
in the operational areas.
z Their assigned area of operations.
B-28. If the commander misinterprets the higher headquarters’ plan, time is wasted. Additionally, when
analyzing the higher order, the commander and staff may identify difficulties and contradictions in the
higher order. Therefore, if confused by the higher headquarters’ order or guidance, commanders seek
clarification immediately. Liaison officers familiar with the higher headquarters’ plan can help clarify
issues. Collaborative planning with the higher headquarters also facilitates this task. Staffs also use requests
for information (RFIs) to clarify or obtain additional information from the higher headquarters.
minimum, provide for civil security, restoration of essential services, and civil control for civil populations
in their AO that they control. Based on this analysis, the staff determines if there are other agencies, civil or
military, that can provide these tasks. If not, the unit plans to provide these tasks using available assets. If
the unit determines that it does not have the assets, it informs its higher headquarters. The higher
headquarters then either provide the assets or assigns the task to another unit.
B-35. Once staff members have identified specified and implied tasks, they ensure they understand each
task’s requirements and purpose. Any task that must be successfully completed for the commanders to
accomplish their purpose is an essential task. An essential task is a specified or implied task that must be
executed to accomplish the mission. Essential tasks are always included in the unit’s mission statement.
Determine Constraints
B-37. The commander and staff identify any constraints placed on their command. A constraint is a
restriction placed on the command by a higher command. A constraint dictates an action or inaction,
thus restricting the freedom of action of a subordinate commander. Constraints are found in paragraph
3 in the OPLAN or OPORD. Annexes to the order may also include constraints. The operation overlay, for
example, may contain a restrictive fire line or a no fire area. Constraints may also be issued verbally, in
WARNOs, or in policy memoranda.
Note: Joint doctrine uses the term operational limitation that includes the terms constraints and
restrictions that differ from Army doctrine. An operational limitation is an action required or
prohibited by higher authority, such as a constraint or a restraint, and other restrictions that limit
the commander’s freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, rules of engagement,
political and economic conditions in affected countries, and host nation issues (JP 5-0). In the
context of joint operation planning, a constraint is requirement placed on the command by a
higher command that dictates an action, thus restricting freedom of action (JP 5-0). In the
context of joint operation planning, a restraint requirement placed on the command by a higher
command that prohibits an action, thus restricting freedom of action (JP 5-0).
fundamental judgments rest throughout the MDMP. Rechecking assumptions is valuable at any time during
the operations process prior to rendering judgments and making decisions. (See chapter 2 for a detailed
discussion on verifying assumptions.)
B-55. The commander and COS (XO) also refine the staff planning timeline. The refined timeline includes
the—
z Subject, time, and location of briefings the commander requires.
z Times of collaborative planning sessions and the medium over which they will take place.
z Times, locations, and forms of rehearsals.
Example 1. Not later than 220400 Aug 09 (when), 1st Brigade (who) secures ROUTE SOUTH
DAKOTA (what/task) in AO JACKRABBIT (where) to enable the movement of humanitarian
assistance materials (why/purpose).
B-60. The mission statement may have more than one essential task. The following example shows a
mission statement for a phased operation with a different essential task for each phase:
B-61. The who, what, where, and when of a mission statement are straightforward. The what and why are
more challenging to write and can confuse subordinates if not stated clearly. The what is a task and is
expressed in terms of action verbs. These tasks are measurable and can be grouped as “actions by friendly
forces” or “effects on enemy forces.” The why puts the task into context by describing the reason for
performing it. The why provides the mission’s purpose—the reason the unit is to perform the task. It is
extremely important to mission command and mission orders.
B-62. Commanders should use tactical mission tasks or other doctrinally approved tasks contained in
combined arms field manuals or mission training plans in mission statements. These tasks have specific
military definitions that differ from dictionary definitions. A tactical mission task is the specific activity
performed by a unit while executing a form of tactical operation or form of maneuver. FM 3-90, appendix
B, describes each of the tactical tasks. FM 3-07 provides a list of primary stability tasks which military
forces must be prepared to execute. Commanders and planners should carefully choose the task that best
describes the commander’s intent and planning guidance.
Note: If design precedes or is conducted in parallel with the MDMP, the updated design concept
provides an overarching structure COA development.
Generate Options
B-82. Based on the commander’s guidance and the initial results of the relative combat power assessment,
the staff generates options. A good COA can defeat all feasible enemy COAs while accounting for essential
stability tasks. In an unconstrained environment, the goal is to develop several possible COAs. Time
dependent, commanders may limit the options in the commander’s guidance. Options focus on enemy
COAs arranged in order of their probable adoption or on those stability tasks that are most essential to
prevent the situation from deteriorating further.
B-83. Brainstorming is the preferred technique for generating options. It requires time, imagination, and
creativity, but it produces the widest range of choices. The staff (and members of organizations outside the
headquarters) must be unbiased and open-minded when developing proposed options.
B-84. In developing COAs, staff members determine the doctrinal requirements for each type of operation
being considered, including doctrinal tasks for subordinate units. For example, a deliberate breach requires
a breach force, a support force, and an assault force. Essential stability tasks require the ability to provide a
level of civil security, civil control, and certain essential services. In addition, the staff considers the
potential capabilities of attachments and other organizations and agencies outside military channels.
B-85. When generating options, the staff starts with the decisive operation identified in the commander’s
planning guidance. The staff checks that the decisive operation nests within the higher headquarters’
concept of operations. The staff clarifies the decisive operation’s purpose and considers ways to mass the
effects (lethal and nonlethal) of overwhelming combat power to achieve it.
B-86. Next, the staff considers shaping operations. The staff establishes a purpose for each shaping
operation tied to creating or preserving a condition for the decisive operation’s success. Shaping operations
may occur before, concurrently with, or after the decisive operation. A shaping operation may be
designated as the main effort if executed before or after the decisive operation.
B-87. The staff then determines sustaining operations necessary to create and maintain the combat power
required for the decisive operation and shaping operations. After developing the basic operational
organization for a given COA, the staff then determines the essential tasks for each decisive, shaping, and
sustaining operation.
B-88. Once staff members have explored possibilities for each COA, they examine each COA to determine
if it satisfies the screening criteria stated in paragraph B-75. In doing so, they change, add, or eliminate
COAs as appropriate. During this process, staffs must avoid the common pitfall of focusing on the
development of one good COA among several throwaway COAs.
Array Forces
B-89. After determining the decisive and shaping operations and their related tasks and purposes, planners
determine the relative combat power required to accomplish each task. To do this, planners may use
minimum historical planning ratios shown in table B-1 as a starting point. For example, historically
defenders have over a 50 percent probability of defeating an attacking force approximately three times their
equivalent strength. Therefore, as a starting point, commanders may defend on each avenue of approach
with roughly a 1:3 force ratio.
Table B-1. Historical minimum planning ratios
Friendly Mission Position Friendly:Enemy
Delay 1:6
Defend Prepared or fortified 1:3
Defend Hasty 1:2.5
Attack Prepared or fortified 3:1
Attack Hasty 2.5:1
Counterattack Flank 1:1
B-90. Planners determine whether these and other intangibles increase the relative combat power of the unit
assigned the task to the point that it exceeds the historical planning ratio for that task. If it does not,
planners determine how to reinforce the unit. Combat power comparisons are provisional at best. Arraying
forces is tricky, inexact work. It is affected by factors that are difficult to gauge, such as impact of past
engagements, the quality of leaders, morale, maintenance of equipment, and time in position. It is also
affected by levels of electronic warfare support, fire support, close air support, and civilian support, among
many other factors.
B-91. In counterinsurgency operations, planners can develop force requirements by gauging troop
density—the ratio of security forces (including host-nation military and police forces as well as foreign
counterinsurgents) to inhabitants. Most density recommendations fall within a range of 20 to 25
counterinsurgents for every 1,000 residents in an AO. Twenty counterinsurgents per 1,000 residents are
often considered the minimum troop density required for effective counterinsurgency operations; however,
as with any fixed ratio, such calculations strongly depend on the situation. (See FM 3-24.)
B-92. Planners also determine relative combat power with regard to civilian requirements and conditions
that require attention and then array forces and capabilities for stability tasks. For example, a COA may
require a follow-on force to establish civil security, maintain civil control, and restore essential services in a
densely populated urban area over an extended period. Planners conduct a troop-to-task analysis to
determine the type of units and capabilities to accomplish these tasks.
B-93. Planners then proceed to initially array friendly forces starting with the decisive operation and
continuing with all shaping and sustaining operations. Planners normally array ground forces two levels
down. The initial array focuses on generic ground maneuver units without regard to specific type or task
organization and then considers all appropriate intangible factors. For example, at corps level, planners
array generic brigades. During this step, planners do not assign missions to specific units; they only
consider which forces are necessary to accomplish its task. In this step, planners also array assets to
accomplish essential stability tasks.
B-94. The initial array identifies the total number of units needed and identifies possible methods of
dealing with the enemy and stability tasks. If the number arrayed is less than the number available, planners
place additional units in a pool for use during the develop a concept step. If the number of units arrayed
exceeds the number available and the difference cannot be compensated for with intangible factors, the
staff determines whether the COA is feasible. Ways to make up the shortfall include requesting additional
resources, accepting risk in that portion of the AO, or executing tasks required for the COA sequentially
rather than simultaneously. Commanders should also consider requirements to minimize and relieve
civilian suffering. Establishing civil security and providing essential services such as medical care, food
and water, and shelter are implied tasks for commanders during any combat operation. See FM 3-07 for a
full discussion on stability tasks.
z Designation of sustaining operations, along with their tasks and purposes, linked to how they
support the decisive and shaping operations.
z Designation of the reserve, including its location and composition.
z ISR operations.
z Security operations.
z Essential stability tasks.
z Identification of maneuver options that may develop during an operation.
z Assignment of subordinate AOs.
z Scheme of fires.
z Information themes, messages, and means of delivery.
z Military deception operations.
z Key control measures.
B-96. Planners select control measures, including graphics, to control subordinate units during the
operation. These establish responsibilities and limits that prevent subordinate units’ actions from impeding
one another. These measures also foster coordination and cooperation between forces without unnecessarily
restricting freedom of action. Good control measures foster freedom of action, decisionmaking, and
individual initiative. (See FM 3-90 for a discussion of control measures associated with offensive and
defensive operations. See FM 1-02 for a listing of doctrinal control measures and rules for drawing control
measures on overlays and maps.)
B-97. Planners may use both lines of operations and lines of effort to build their broad concept. Lines of
operations portray the more traditional links among objectives, decisive points, and centers of gravity. A
line of effort, however, helps planners link multiple tasks with goals, objectives, and end state conditions.
Combining lines of operations and lines of efforts allows planners to include nonmilitary activities in their
broad concept. This combination helps commanders incorporate stability or civil support tasks that, when
accomplished, help set end state conditions of the operation.
B-98. Based on the commander’s planning guidance (informed by the design concept if design preceded
the MDMP), planners develop lines of effort by—
z Confirming end state conditions from the initial commander’s intent and planning guidance.
z Determining and describing each line of effort.
z Identifying objectives (intermediate goals) and determining tasks along each line of effort.
B-99. During COA development, lines of efforts are general and lack specifics, such as tasks to subordinate
units associated to objectives along each line of effort. Lines of effort, to include specific tasks to
subordinate units, are developed and refined during war-gaming. (See FM 3-0 and FM 3-07 for examples
of operations depicted along lines of effort.)
B-100. As planning progresses, commanders may modify lines of effort and add details during war-
gaming. Operations with other instruments of national power support a broader, comprehensive approach to
stability operations. Each operation, however, differs. Commanders develop and modify lines of effort to
focus operations on achieving the end state, even as the situation evolves.
Assign Headquarters
B-101. After determining the broad concept, planners create a task organization by assigning headquarters
to groupings of forces. They consider the types of units to be assigned to a headquarters and the ability of
that headquarters to control those units. Generally, a headquarters controls at least two subordinate
maneuver units (but not more than five) for fast-paced offensive or defensive operations. The number and
type of units assigned to a headquarters for stability operations will vary based on factors of METT-TC. If
planners need additional headquarters, they note the shortage and resolve it later. Task organization takes
into account the entire operational organization. It also accounts for the special command and control
requirements for operations such as a passage of lines, gap crossing, or air assault.
War-Gaming Responsibilities
B-113. This section provides the responsibilities of key staff members during the war game.
Intelligence
B-115. The assistant chief of staff (ACOS), G-2 (S-2), intelligence, role-plays the enemy commander.
This officer develops critical enemy decision points in relation to the friendly COAs, projects enemy
reactions to friendly actions, and projects enemy losses. When additional intelligence staff members are
available, the intelligence officer assigns different responsibilities to individual staff members within the
section for war gaming (such as the enemy commander, friendly intelligence officer, and enemy recorder).
The intelligence officer captures the results of each enemy action and counteraction as well as the
corresponding friendly and enemy strengths and vulnerabilities. By trying to win the war game for the
enemy, the intelligence officer ensures that the staff fully addresses friendly responses for each enemy
COA. For the friendly force, the intelligence officer—
z Identifies IRs.
z Refines the situation and event templates, including named areas of interest that support decision
points.
z Refines the event template with corresponding decision points, target areas of interest, and high-
value targets.
z Participates in targeting to select high-payoff targets from high-value targets identified during
IPB.
z Recommends PIRs that correspond to the decision points.
Fires
B-119. The chief of fires (fire support officer) assesses the fire support feasibility of each COA. For each
COA, the chief of fires develops the fire support execution matrix and evaluation criteria to measure the
effectiveness of the fire support. This officer develops a proposed high-priority target list, target selection
standards, and attack guidance matrix. The chief of fires identifies named and target areas of interest, high-
value targets, high-priority targets, and additional events that may influence the positioning of fire support
assets.
Protection
B-120. The provost marshal advises the commander regarding military police functions, security, force
protection issues, and the employment of assigned or attached military police elements for each COA. The
provost marshal assesses military police operations in support of freedom of movement, security for ground
lines of communication, operational law enforcement, and operational internment and resettlement
operations.
Sustainment
B-121. The following officers are responsible for sustainment:
z ACOS, G-1 (S-1), personnel.
z ACOS, G-4 (S-4), logistics.
z ACOS, G-8, financial management.
z Surgeon.
B-122. The G-1 (S-1) assesses the personnel aspect of building and maintaining the combat power of
units. This officer identifies potential shortfalls and recommends COAs to ensure units maintain adequate
manning to accomplish their mission. The personnel officer estimates potential personnel battle losses and
assesses the adequacy of resources to provide human resources support for the operation.
B-123. The G-4 (S-4) assesses the logistics feasibility of each COA. This officer determines critical
requirements for each logistics function (classes I through VII and IX) and identifies potential problems
and deficiencies. The G-4 (S-4) assesses the status of all logistics functions required to support the COA,
including potential support required to provide essential services to the civilians, and compares it to
available assets. This officer identifies potential shortfalls and recommends actions to eliminate or reduce
their effects. While improvising can contribute to responsiveness, only accurately predicting requirements
for each logistics function can ensure continuous sustainment. The logistics officer ensures that available
movement times and assets support each COA.
B-124. The G-8 assesses the commander’s area of responsibility to determine the best COA for use of
resources. This includes both core functions of financial management (resource management and finance
operations). This officer determines partner relationships (joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational), requirements for special funding, and support to the procurement process.
B-125. The surgeon section coordinates, monitors, and synchronizes the execution of the Army health
system (AHS) activities for the command for each COA to ensure a fit and healthy force. The surgeon
provides advice for medically related matters and exercises technical supervision of all medical activities
within the AO.
B-132. The ORSA staff section provides analytic support to the commander for planning and assessment
of operations. Specific responsibilities includes—
z Providing quantitative analytic support, including regression and trend analysis, to planning and
assessment activities.
z Assisting other staff elements in developing customized analytical tools for specific
requirements, providing a quality control capability, and conducting assessments to measure the
effectiveness of operations.
B-133. The use of recorders is particularly important. Recorders are trained to capture coordinating
instructions, subunit tasks and purposes, and information required to synchronize the operation. Doing this
allows part of the order to be written before planning is complete. Automated INFOSYS simplify this
process. These systems enable recorders to enter information into preformatted forms that represent either
briefing charts or appendixes to orders. Each staff section keeps formats available to facilitate networked
orders production.
List Assumptions
B-137. The commander and staff review previous assumptions for continued validity and necessity.
protect from enemy disclosure, such as pending operations or locations of key nodes. A decision point
requires a decision by the commander. It does not dictate what the decision is, only that the commander
must make one, and when and where it should be made to maximally impact friendly or enemy COAs or
the accomplishment of stability tasks.
PMO
AMD
CBRNE
Sustainment
Command and
MAIN CP with 1st BCT
Control
Close Air Support
Electronic Warfare Enemy C2 jammed
Nonlethal Surrender broadcasts and
leaflets
Host Nation
Interagency
NGOs Begins refugee relief
Note: The first column is representative only and can be modified to fit formation needs.
AMD air and missile defense FPOL forward passage of lines
Avn Bde aviation brigade LD line of departure
BCT brigade combat team NGO nongovernmental organization
C2 command and control OBJ objective
CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high- PMO provost marshal office
yield explosives R&S reconnaissance and surveillance
CP command post
B-157. The staff continually assesses the risk to friendly forces from catastrophic threats, seeking a
balance between mass and dispersion. When assessing the risk of weapons of mass destruction to friendly
forces, planners view the target that the force presents through the eyes of an enemy target analyst. They
consider ways to reduce vulnerability and determine the appropriate level of mission-oriented protective
posture consistent with mission accomplishment.
B-158. The staff identifies the required assets of the warfighting functions to support the concept of
operations, including those needed to synchronize sustaining operations. If requirements exceed available
assets, the staff recommends priorities based on the situation, commander’s intent, and planning guidance.
To maintain flexibility, the commander may decide to create a reserve to account for assets for unforeseen
tasks or opportunities.
B-159. The commander can modify any COA based on how things develop during the war game. When
doing this, the commander validates the composition and location of the decisive operation, shaping
operations, and reserve forces. Control measures are adjusted as necessary. The commander may also
identify situations, opportunities, or additional critical events that require more analysis. The staff performs
this analysis quickly and incorporates the results into the war-gaming record.
B-160. An effective war game results in the commander and staff refining, identifying, analyzing,
developing, and determining several effects.
B-161. An effective war game results in the commander and staff refining—
z Or modifying each COA, including identifying branches and sequels that become on-order or
be-prepared missions.
z The locations and times of decisive points.
z The enemy event template and matrix.
z The task organization, including forces retained in general support.
z Command and control requirements, including control measures and updated operational
graphics.
z CCIRs and IRs—including the last time information of value—and incorporating them into the
ISR plan and information management plans.
B-162. An effective war game results in the commander and staff identifying—
z Key or decisive terrain and determining how to use it.
z Tasks the unit retains and tasks assigned to subordinates.
z Likely times and areas for enemy use of weapons of mass destruction and friendly chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear defense requirements.
z Potential times or locations for committing the reserve.
z The most dangerous enemy COA.
z The most dangerous civilian reaction.
z Locations for the commander, command posts, and INFOSYS nodes.
z Critical events.
z Requirements for support of each warfighting function.
z Effects of friendly and enemy actions on civilians and infrastructure, and how these will affect
military operations.
z Or confirming the locations of named areas of interest, target areas of interest, decision points,
and IRs needed to support them.
z Analyzing, and evaluating strengths and weaknesses of each COA.
z Hazards, assessing their risk, developing controls for them, and determining residual risk.
z The coordination required for integrating and synchronizing interagency, host-nation, and
nongovernmental organization involvement.
B-163. An effective war game results in the commander and staff analyzing—
z Potential civilian reactions to operations.
z Potential media reaction to operations.
z Potential impacts on civil security, civil control, and essential services in the AO.
B-164. An effective war game results in the commander and staff developing—
z Decision points.
z A synchronization matrix.
z A decision support template and matrix.
z Solutions to achieving minimum essential stability tasks in the AO.
z The ISR plan and graphics.
z Initial information themes and messages.
z Fires, protection, and sustainment plans and graphic control measures.
B-165. Lastly, an effective war game results in the commander and staff—
z Determining requirements for military deception and surprise.
z Determining the timing for concentrating forces and starting the attack or counterattack.
z Determining movement times and tables for critical assets, including INFOSYS nodes.
z Estimating the duration of the entire operation and each critical event.
z Projecting the percentage of enemy forces defeated in each critical event and overall.
z Projecting the percentage of minimum essential tasks that the unit can or must accomplish.
z Anticipating media coverage and impact on key audiences.
z Integrating targeting into the operation, to include identifying or confirming high-payoff targets
and establishing attack guidance.
z Allocating assets to subordinate commanders to accomplish their missions.
it in an OPLAN or OPORD. The commander and staff perform certain actions and processes that lead to
the key outputs in figure B-14.
B-173. The staff compares feasible COAs to identify the one with the highest probability of success
against the most likely enemy COA, the most dangerous enemy COA, the most important stability task, or
the most damaging environmental impact. The selected COA should also—
z Pose the minimum risk to the force and mission accomplishment.
z Place the force in the best posture for future operations.
z Provide maximum latitude for initiative by subordinates.
z Provide the most flexibility to meet unexpected threats and opportunities.
z Provide the most secure and stable environment for civilians in the AO.
z Best facilitate initial information themes and messages.
B-174. Staff officers may each use their own matrix to compare COAs with respect to their functional
areas. Matrixes use the evaluation criteria developed before the war game. Decision matrixes alone cannot
provide decision solutions. Their greatest value is providing a method to compare COAs against criteria
that, when met, produce operational success. Staff officers use these analytical tools to prepare
recommendations. Commanders provide the solution by applying their judgment to staff recommendations
and making a decision.
plans. It confirms guidance issued in person or by VTC and expands on details not covered by the
commander personally. The WARNO issued after COA approval normally contains—
z Mission.
z Commander’s intent.
z Updated CCIRs and EEFIs.
z Concept of operations.
z The AO.
z Principal tasks assigned to subordinate units.
z Preparation and rehearsal instructions not included in the SOPs.
z A final timeline for the operations.
ORDERS PRODUCTION
B-180. The staff prepares the order or plan by turning the selected COA into a clear, concise concept of
operations and required supporting information. The COA statement becomes the concept of operations for
the plan. The COA sketch becomes the basis for the operation overlay. Orders and plans provide all the
information subordinates need for execution. Mission orders avoid unnecessary constraints that inhibit
subordinate initiative. The staff assists subordinate staffs with their planning and coordination.
B-181. Commanders review and approve orders before the staff reproduces and disseminates them unless
they have delegated that authority. Subordinates immediately acknowledge receipt of the higher order. If
possible, the order is briefed to subordinate commanders face-to-face by the higher commander and staff.
The commander and staff conduct confirmation briefings with subordinates immediately afterwards.
Confirmation briefings can be done collaboratively with several commanders at the same time or with
single commanders. These briefings may be performed face-to-face or by VTC. (See appendix E for
formats for plans and orders.)
TIME-SAVING TECHNIQUES
B-193. Several time-saving techniques can speed up the planning process. These techniques include the
following:
z Increase commander’s involvement.
z Limit the number of COAs to develop.
z Maximize parallel planning.
z Increase collaborative planning.
z Use liaison officers.
commander’s involvement. This technique allows commanders to make decisions during the MDMP
without waiting for detailed briefings after each step.
based on existing plans and orders (contingency plans or be-prepared missions) and on their understanding
of the situation.
C-9. Parallel planning hinges on distributing information as it is received or developed. (See chapter 2.)
Leaders cannot complete their plans until they receive their unit mission. If each successive WARNO
contains enough information, the higher headquarters’ final order will confirm what subordinate leaders
have already analyzed and put into their tentative plans. In other cases, the higher headquarters’ order may
change or modify the subordinate’s tasks enough that additional planning and reconnaissance are required.
relative importance of each factor. For example, leaders may concentrate on the mission, enemy, and
terrain, leaving weather and civil considerations until they receive more detailed information.
C-14. Often, leaders do not receive their final unit mission until the WARNO is disseminated after COA
approval or after the OPORD. Effective leaders do not wait until their higher headquarters complete
planning to begin their planning. Using all information available, leaders develop their unit mission as
completely as they can. They focus on the mission, commander’s intent, and concept of operations of their
higher and next higher headquarters. They pick out the major tasks their unit will probably be assigned and
develop a mission statement based on information they have received. At this stage, the mission may be
incomplete. For example, an initial mission statement could be, “First platoon conducts an ambush in the
next 24 hours.” While not complete, this information allows subordinates to start preparations. Leaders
complete a formal mission statement during TLP step 3 (make a tentative plan) and step 6 (complete the
plan).
C-15. Based on what they know, leaders estimate the time available to plan and prepare for the mission.
They begin by identifying the times at which major planning and preparation events, including rehearsals,
must be complete. Reverse planning helps them do this. Leaders identify the critical times specified by
higher headquarters and work back from them, estimating how much time each event will consume.
Critical times might include times to load aircraft, the line of departure, or the start point for movement.
C-16. Leaders ensure that all subordinate echelons have sufficient time for their own planning and
preparation needs. A general rule of thumb for leaders at all levels is to use no more than one-third of the
available time for planning and issuing the OPORD. Leaders allocate the remaining two-thirds of it to
subordinates. Figure C-3 is a sample time schedule for an infantry company. The company adjusts the
tentative schedule as TLP progress.
C-18. The WARNO contains as much detail as possible. It informs subordinates of the unit mission and
gives them the leader’s timeline. Leaders may also pass on any other instructions or information they think
will help subordinates prepare for the new mission. This includes information on the enemy, the nature of
the higher headquarters’ plan, and any specific instructions for preparing their units. The most important
thing is that leaders not delay in issuing the initial WARNO. As more information becomes available,
leaders can—and should—issue additional WARNOs. By issuing the initial WARNO as quickly as
possible, leaders enable their subordinates to begin their own planning and preparation.
C-19. WARNOs follow the five-paragraph OPORD format. (See appendix E.) Normally an initial
WARNO issued below battalion level includes—
z The mission or nature of the operation.
z The time and place for issuing the OPORD.
z Units or elements participating in the operation.
z Specific tasks not addressed by unit standing operating procedures (SOPs).
z The timeline for the operation.
Mission Analysis
C-21. To frame the tentative plan, leaders perform mission analysis. This mission analysis follows the
METT-TC format, continuing the initial assessment performed in TLP step 1. FM 6-0 discusses the factors
of METT-TC.
Mission
C-22. Leaders analyze the higher headquarters’ WARNO or OPORD to determine how their unit
contributes to the higher headquarters’ mission. They examine the following information that affects their
mission:
z Higher headquarters’ mission and commander’s intent.
z Higher headquarters’ concept of operations.
z Specified, implied, and essential tasks.
z Constraints.
C-23. Leaders determine the mission and commander’s intent of their higher and next higher headquarters.
When these are unavailable, leaders infer them based on the information they have. When they receive the
actual mission and commander’s intent, they revise their plan, if necessary.
C-24. Leaders examine their higher headquarters’ concept of operations to determine how their unit’s
mission and tasks contribute to the higher mission’s success. They determine details that will affect their
operations, such as control measures and execution times.
C-25. From WARNOs and the OPORD, leaders extract the specified and implied tasks assigned to their
unit. They determine why each task was assigned to their unit so to understand how it fits within the
commander’s intent and concept of operations. From the specified and implied tasks, leaders identify
essential tasks. These tasks must be completed to accomplish the mission. Failure to complete an essential
task results in mission failure.
C-26. Leaders also identify any constraints placed on their unit. Constraints can take the form of a
requirement (for example, maintain a reserve of one platoon) or a prohibition on action (for example, no
reconnaissance forward of Line Bravo before H-hour).
C-27. The product of this part of the mission analysis is the restated mission. The restated mission is a
simple, concise expression of the essential tasks the unit must accomplish and the purpose to be achieved.
The mission statement states who (the unit), what (the task), when (either the critical time or on order),
where (location), and why (the purpose of the operation). (See appendix B for a discussion of developing
the unit’s mission statement.)
Enemy
C-28. With the restated mission as the focus, leaders continue the analysis with the enemy. For small-unit
operations, leaders need to know about the enemy’s composition, disposition, strengths, recent activities,
ability to reinforce, and possible COAs. Much of this information comes from higher headquarters.
Additional information comes from adjacent units and other leaders. Some information comes from the
leader’s experience. Leaders determine how the available information applies to their operation. They also
determine what they do not know about the enemy but should know. To obtain the necessary information,
they identify these intelligence gaps to their higher headquarters or take action (such as sending out
reconnaissance patrols).
strengths and weaknesses of subordinate leaders. They realistically determine all available resources. This
includes troops attached to, or in direct support of, the unit. The assessment includes knowing the strength
and status of their equipment. It also includes understanding the full array of assets in support of the unit.
Leaders know, for example, how much indirect fire will become available, and when it is available, they
will know the type. They consider any new limitations based on the level of training or recent fighting.
Time Available
C-37. Leaders not only appreciate how much time is available, they understand the time-space aspects of
preparing, moving, fighting, and sustaining. They view their own tasks and enemy actions in relation to
time. They know how long it takes under such conditions to prepare for certain tasks (such as orders
production, rehearsals, and subordinate element preparations). Most important, leaders monitor the time
available. As events occur, they assess their impact on the unit timeline and update previous timelines for
their subordinates. Timelines list all events that affect the unit and its subordinate elements.
Civil Considerations
C-38. Civil considerations are the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes
and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an AO on the conduct of
military operations (FM 6-0). Rarely are military operations conducted in uninhabited areas. Most of the
time, units are surrounded by noncombatants. These noncombatants include residents of the AO, local
officials, and governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Based on information from higher
headquarters and their own knowledge and judgment, leaders identify civil considerations that affect their
mission. (See FM 6-0 and FM 3-05.401.) Civil considerations are analyzed in terms of six factors known
by the memory aid ASCOPE:
z Areas.
z Structures.
z Capabilities.
z Organizations.
z People.
z Events.
enough Soldiers and equipment (to include vehicles and barrier materials) to establish the necessary check
points and security stations within the town to control the population in town X.
Generate Options
C-41. During this step, leaders brainstorm different ways to accomplish the mission. They determine the
doctrinal requirements for the operation, including the tactical tasks normally assigned to subordinates.
Doctrinal requirements give leaders a framework from which to develop COAs.
C-42. Next, leaders identify where and when the unit can mass overwhelming combat power to achieve
specific results (with respect to enemy, terrain, time, or civil considerations) that accomplish the mission.
Offensive and defensive operations focus on the destructive effects of combat power. Stability operations,
on the other hand, emphasize constructive effects. Leaders identify the decisive point or points. Leaders
determine what result they must achieve at the decisive points to accomplish the mission. This helps leaders
determine the amount of combat power to apply at the decisive point and the required tasks.
C-43. After identifying the tasks, leaders next determine the purpose for each task. There is normally one
primary task for each mission. The unit assigned this task is the main effort. The purpose of the other tasks
should support the accomplishment of the primary task.
Assign Responsibilities
C-45. Leaders assign responsibility for each task to a subordinate. Whenever possible, they depend on the
existing chain of command. They avoid fracturing unit integrity unless the number of simultaneous tasks
exceeds the number of available elements. Different command and control arrangements may be the
distinguishing feature among COAs.
C Co/2-67 IN (L) defends NLT 281700(Z) AUG 2005 to destroy enemy forces
Mission
from GL 375652 to GL 389650 to GL 394660 to GL 373665 to prevent the
Statement:
envelopment of A Co, the battalion main effort.
The company defends with two platoons (PLTs) forward and one PLT in depth from
PLT battle positions. The northern PLT (2 squads) destroys enemy forces to
prevent enemy bypass of the main effort PLT on Hill 657. The southern PLT (3
squads, 2 Javelins) destroys enemy forces to prevent an organized company attack
against the Co main effort on Hill 657. The main effort PLT (3 squads, 2 TOWS)
retains Hill 657 (vic GL378659) to prevent the envelopment of Co A (BN main
COA Statement:
effort) from the south. The anti-armor section (1 squad, 4 Javelins) establishes
ambush positions at the road junction (vic GL 377653) to destroy enemy recon to
deny observation of friendly defensive position and to prevent a concentration of
combat power against the main effort PLT. The company mortars establish a
mortar firing point vic GL 377664 to suppress enemy forces to protect the main
effort platoon.
INITIATE MOVEMENT
C-50. Leaders conduct any movement directed by higher headquarters or deemed necessary to continue
mission preparation or position the unit for execution. They do this as soon as they have enough
information to do so or the unit is required to move to position itself for a task. This is also essential when
time is short. Movements may be to an assembly area, a battle position, a new AO, or an attack position.
They may include movement of reconnaissance elements, guides, or quartering parties.
CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE
C-51. Whenever time and circumstances allow, or as directed by higher headquarters, leaders personally
observe the AO for the mission prior to execution. No amount of intelligence preparation of the battlefield
can substitute for firsthand assessment of METT-TC from within the AO. Unfortunately, many factors can
keep leaders from performing a personal reconnaissance. The minimum action necessary is a thorough map
reconnaissance supplemented by imagery and intelligence products. As directed, subordinates or other
elements (such as scouts) may perform the reconnaissance for the leader while the leader completes other
TLP steps.
C-52. Leaders use results of the war game to identify information requirements. Reconnaissance operations
seek to confirm or deny information that supports the tentative plan. They focus first on information gaps
identified during mission analysis. Leaders ensure their leader’s reconnaissance complements the higher
headquarters’ reconnaissance plan. The unit may conduct additional reconnaissance operations as the
situation allows. This step may also precede making a tentative plan if commanders lack enough
information to begin planning. Reconnaissance may be the only way to develop the information required
for planning.
INTELLIGENCE
D-7. For the intelligence warfighting function, planning guidance may include—
z Guidance on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
z Gaps in knowledge required to understand the situation.
z Enemy COAs to consider during COA development and COA analysis. At a minimum, these
may be the enemy’s most probable COA, most dangerous COA, or a combination of the two.
These COAs may include the—
Enemy commander’s mission.
Enemy commander’s concept of operations.
Enemy’s critical decision points and vulnerabilities.
z Priority intelligence requirements.
z High-value targets.
z Desired enemy perception of friendly forces.
z Intelligence focus for each phase of the operation.
z Specific terrain (including identification of key terrain) and weather factors.
z Identification of key aspects of the environment, including civil considerations.
z Guidance on counterintelligence.
z Request for intelligence support from nonorganic resources and special collection requests.
FIRES
D-9. For fires, planning guidance may include—
z Synchronization and focus of fires (lethal and nonlethal) with maneuver.
z Priority of fires.
z High-payoff targets to include—
Methods of engagement.
Desired effects.
z An observer plan.
z Requirements, restrictions, and priorities for special munitions.
z Task and purpose of fires.
z Counterfire.
z Target acquisition radar zones consisting of—
Critical friendly zones.
Call for fire zones.
Artillery target intelligence zones.
Sensor zones.
z Suppression of enemy air defenses.
z Fire support coordination measures.
z Attack guidance.
z A no-strike list, including cultural, religious, historical, and high-density civilian areas.
z Restricted target list.
PROTECTION
D-10. For protection, planning guidance may include—
z Protection priorities.
z Work priorities for survivability assets.
z Guidance on air and missile defense positioning.
z Specific terrain and weather factors.
z Intelligence focus and limitations for security efforts.
z Areas or events where risk is acceptable.
z Protected targets and areas.
z Vehicle and equipment safety or security constraints.
z Guidance on environmental considerations.
z Guidance on unexploded explosive ordnance.
z Operational security risk tolerance.
z Rules of engagement, standing rules for the use of force, and rules of interaction.
z Guidance on escalation of force and nonlethal weapons.
SUSTAINMENT
D-11. For sustainment, planning guidance may include—
z Priorities in terms of tactical sustainment functions (manning, fueling, fixing, arming, and
moving the force, and sustaining Soldiers and their systems).
z Army health system support.
z Anticipated requirements and prestockage of class III, IV, and V supplies.
z Controlled supply rates.
z Guidance on construction and provision of facilities and installations.
z Guidance on the movement of detainees and the sustainment of internment and resettlement
activities.
CHARACTERISTICS
E-1. Commanders direct operations and communicate their visualization, commander’s intent, and
decisions through plans and orders. Effective plans and orders clearly describe how the commander intends
to combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations throughout the conduct of
operations. They synchronize subordinate activities in time, space, and purpose to achieve objectives and
accomplish missions. Plans and orders not only direct subordinate units but provide information to facilitate
coordination among organizations outside the command. Effective plans and orders account for those joint,
interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and host-nation organizations involved in the operation.
E-2. The amount of detail provided in a plan or order depends on several factors, including the cohesion
and experience of subordinate units and complexity of the operation. Effective plans and orders encourage
subordinate’s initiative by providing the what and why of tasks to subordinate units, and leave the how to
perform the tasks to subordinates. (Paragraphs 2-73 through 2-80 discuss mission orders in detail.) To
maintain clarity and simplicity, the base plan or order is kept as short and concise as possible. Detailed
information and instructions are addressed in annexes as required.
E-3. Good operation plans (OPLANs) and operation orders (OPORDs)—
z Possess simplicity.
z Possess authoritative expression.
z Possess positive expression.
z Avoid qualified directives.
z Possess brevity.
z Possess clarity.
z Contain assumptions.
z Incorporate flexibility.
z Exercise timeliness.
E-4. Plans and orders are simple and direct to reduce misunderstanding and confusion. The situation
determines the degree of simplicity required. Simple plans executed on time are better than detailed plans
executed late. Commanders at all echelons weigh potential benefits of a complex concept of operations
against the risk that subordinates will fail to understand it. Multinational operations mandate simplicity due
to the differences in language, doctrine, and culture. The same applies to operations involving interagency
and nongovernmental organizations.
E-5. Authoritative expression through the commander’s intent is reflected in plans and orders. As such,
their language is direct. Effective plans and orders unmistakably state what the commander wants the unit
and its subordinate units to do and why.
E-6. Instructions in plans and orders are stated in the affirmative. For example, “Combat trains will
remain in the assembly area” instead of “The combat trains will not accompany the unit.”
E-7. Plans and orders avoid meaningless expressions, such as “as soon as possible (ASAP).” Indecisive,
vague, and ambiguous language leads to uncertainty and lack of confidence.
E-8. Effective plans and orders are brief, clear, and concise. They use short words, sentences, and
paragraphs. Use acronyms unless clarity is hindered. Do not include material covered in standing operating
procedures (SOPs). Refer to those SOPs instead.
E-9. Plans and orders possess clarity. They use doctrinally correct terms and symbols, avoid jargon, and
eliminate every opportunity for misunderstanding the commander’s exact, intended meaning.
E-10. Effective plans and orders contain assumptions. This helps subordinates and others to better
understand the logic behind a plan or order and facilitates the preparation of branches and sequels.
E-11. Plans and orders incorporate flexibility. They leave room to adapt and make adjustments to counter
unexpected challenges and seize opportunities. Effective plans and orders identify decision points and
proposed options at those decision points to build flexibility.
E-12. Plans and orders exercise timeliness. Plans and orders sent to subordinates in time allow subordinates
to collaborate, plan, and prepare their own actions.
TYPES OF PLANS
E-13. Plans come in many forms and vary in scope, complexity, and length of planning horizons. A plan is
a design for a future or anticipated operation. Strategic plans establish national and multinational military
objectives and include plans to achieve those objectives. Operational-level or campaign plans cover a series
of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given
time and space. Tactical plans cover the employment of units in operations, including the ordered
arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and to the enemy within the framework of an
operational-level or campaign plan. (See paragraph E-59 for operation plan formats.) There are several
types of plans:
z Campaign plan.
z Operation plan.
z Supporting plan.
z Concept plan.
z Branch.
z Sequel.
E-14. A campaign plan is a joint operation plan aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives
within a given time and space. Developing and issuing a campaign plan is appropriate when the
contemplated simultaneous or sequential military operations exceed the scope of single major operation.
Only joint force commanders develop campaign plans.
E-15. An operation plan is any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in response to actual
and potential contingencies (JP 5-0). An OPLAN may address an extended period connecting a series of
objectives and operations, or it may be developed for a single part or phase of a long-term operation. An
OPLAN becomes an OPORD when the commander sets an execution time or designates an event that
triggers the operation.
E-16. A supporting plan is an operation plan prepared by a supporting commander, a subordinate
commander, or an agency to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander’s plan
(JP 5-0). For example, the ARFOR commander develops a supporting plan as to how Army forces will
support the joint force commander’s campaign plan or OPLAN.
E-17. A concept plan is an OPLAN in an abbreviated format that requires considerable expansion or
alteration to convert it into a complete operation plan or operation order. Often branches and sequels are
written in the form of concept plans. (See chapter 2 for a discussion on branches and sequels.) As time and
the potential allow for executing a particular branch or sequel, these concept plans are developed in detail
into OPLANs.
TYPES OF ORDERS
E-18. An order is a communication, written, oral, or by signal, which conveys instructions from a superior
to a subordinate (JP 1-02). (See figures E-2 through E-5 for OPORD formats.) There are three types of
orders:
z Operation order.
z Fragmentary order (FRAGO).
z Warning order (WARNO).
E-19. An operation order is a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose
of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation (JP 5-0). Commanders issue OPORDs to direct the
execution of long-term operations as well as the execution of discrete short-term operations within the
framework of a long-range OPORD.
E-20. A fragmentary order is an abbreviated form of an operation order issued as needed after an operation
order to change or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order (JP 5-0). FRAGOs
include all five OPORD paragraph headings and differ from OPORDs only in the degree of detail provided.
After each paragraph heading, it provides either new information or states “no change.” This ensures that
recipients know they have received the entire FRAGO. FRAGOs provide brief and specific instructions.
They address only those parts of the original OPORD that have changed. The higher headquarters issues a new
OPORD when the situation changes completely or when many changes make the current order ineffective.
E-21. FRAGOs may be issued as overlay orders. An overlay order is a technique used to issue an order that
has abbreviated instructions written on an overlay. Commanders may issue an overlay order when planning
and preparation time is severely constrained and they must get the order to subordinate commanders as
soon as possible. Commanders verbally issue the order using the standard five-paragraph outline. When
giving a verbal briefing, the briefer discusses only the items in the order that have changed from an original
order and focuses attention to key events and tasks, the main effort, priority of support, and control
measures and graphics. The overlay order accompanies this verbal briefing and may be presented by any
suitable graphic presentation. (See figure E-6 on page E-26 for a sample overlay order.)
E-22. A warning order is a preliminary notice of an order or action that is to follow (JP 3-33). WARNOs
help subordinate units and staffs prepare for new missions by describing the situation, providing initial
planning guidance, and directing preparation activities. WARNOs increase subordinates’ planning time,
provide details of the impending operation, and list events that accompany preparation and execution. The
amount of detail a WARNO includes depends on the information and time available when it is issued and
the information subordinate commanders need for planning and preparation. Unless specifically stated, a
WARNO does not authorize execution other than planning and the words warning order precede the
message text. (See figure E-4 on page E-23for a WARNO formats.)
E-23. Commanders issue orders verbally or in writing. The five-paragraph format (situation, mission,
execution, sustainment, and command and control) remains the standard for issuing orders. The technique
used to issue orders is at the discretion of the commander; each method is time and situation dependent.
VERBAL ORDERS
E-24. Commanders use verbal orders when operating in an extremely time-constrained environment. These
orders offer the advantage of being passed quickly but risk important information being overlooked or
misunderstood. Verbal orders are usually followed by written FRAGOs.
WRITTEN ORDERS
E-25. Commanders issue written plans and orders that contain both text and graphics. Graphics convey
information and instructions through military symbols. (See FM 1-02.) They complement the written
portion of a plan or an order and promote clarity, accuracy, and brevity. Written orders are often generated
and disseminated by electronic means to shorten the time needed to gather and brief the orders group.
Orders are easily edited and modified when electronically produced. The same order can be sent to multiple
recipients simultaneously. Using computer programs to develop and disseminate precise corresponding
graphics adds to the efficiency and clarity of the orders process.
E-26. Electronic editing makes importing text and graphics into orders very easy. Unfortunately, such ease
can result in orders becoming unnecessarily large without added operational value. Commanders need to
ensure that orders contain only that information needed to facilitate effective execution. Orders should not
be a regurgitation of unit SOPs. They should be clear, concise, and relevant to the mission.
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
E-27. The following information pertains to administrative instructions for preparing all plans and orders.
Unless otherwise stated, the term order refers to both plans and orders. The term base order refers to the
main body of a plan or order without annexes.
E-28. Regardless of echelon, all orders adhere to the same guidance. Show all paragraph headings on
written orders. A paragraph heading with no text will state “None” or “See [attachment type] [attachment
letter or number].” In this context, attachment is a collective term for annex, appendix, tab, and exhibit.
E-29. The base order and all attachments follow a specific template for the paragraph layout. Every order
follows the five-paragraph format. Title case, underline, and bold the titles of these five paragraphs—
Situation, Mission, Execution, Sustainment, and Command and Control. The paragraph title begins with a
capital letter and is bold and underlined. For example, “situation” is Situation. All subparagraphs and
subtitles begin with capital letters and are underlined. For example, “concept of operations” is Concept of
Operations.
E-30. When a paragraph is subdivided, it must have at least two subdivisions. The tabs are 0.25 inches and
the space is double between paragraphs. Subsequent lines of text for each paragraph may be flush left or
equally indented at the option of the chief of staff or executive officer, as long as consistency is maintained
throughout the order. (See figure E-1.)
1. Title. Text.
a. Title. Text.
1 Title. Text.
E-34. When first mentioning a place or feature on a map, print the name in capital letters exactly as spelled
on the map and show its complete grid coordinates (grid zone designator, 100-kilometer grid square, and
four-, six-, eight-, or ten-digit grid coordinates) in parentheses after it. When first using a control measure
(such as a contact point), print the name or designation of the point followed by its complete grid
coordinates in parentheses. Thereafter, repeat the coordinates only for clarity; use names, planning names,
or codes.
E-35. Describe areas by naming the northernmost (12 o’clock) point first and the remaining points in
clockwise order. Describe positions from left to right and from front to rear, facing the enemy. To avoid
confusion, identify flanks by compass points, rather than right or left of the friendly force.
E-36. If the possibility of confusion exists when describing a route, add compass points for clarity. For
example, “The route is northwest along the road LAPRAIRIE–DELSON.” If a particular route already has
a planning name, such as main supply route SPARTAN, refer to the route using only that designator.
E-37. Designate trails, roads, and railroads by the names of places along them or with grid coordinates.
Precede place names with trail, road, or railroad. For example, “road GRANT–CODY.” Designate the route
for a movement by listing a sequence of grids from the start point to the release point. Otherwise, list the
sequence of points from left to right or front to rear, facing the enemy.
E-38. Identify riverbanks as north, south, east, or west. In gap-crossing operations, identify riverbanks as
either near or far.
E-39. Describe boundaries and phase lines by terrain features easily distinguishable from the ground or air
or on a map. When designating boundaries between units, state which unit has responsibility and authority
for the place, feature, or location to which the description refers. State each location along a boundary as
either inclusive or exclusive to a unit. For example, “1st Brigade, exclusive crossroad 18PV621352.” List
boundaries and phase lines from left to right or front to rear, facing the enemy.
NAMING CONVENTIONS
E-40. Unit SOPs normally designate naming conventions for graphics. Otherwise, planners select them.
For clarity, avoid multiword names, such as “Junction City.” Simple names are better than complex ones.
To ensure operations security, avoid assigning names that could reveal unit identities, such as the
commander’s name or the unit’s home station. Do not name sequential phase lines and objectives in
alphabetical order. For memory aids, use sets of names designated by the type of control measure or
subordinate unit. For example, the division might use colors for objective names and minerals for phase
line names.
CLASSIFICATION MARKINGS
E-41. AR 380-5 contains a detailed description of marking, transmitting procedures, and other
classification instructions. Place classification markings at the top and bottom of each page. All paragraphs
must have the appropriate classification marking immediately following the alphanumeric designation of
the paragraph (preceding the first word if the paragraph is not numbered). If the entire plan or order is
unclassified, no classification markings are required.
E-43. C-, D-, and M-days end at 2400 hours, Universal Time (ZULU time). They are assumed to be 24-
hours long for planning. Plans and orders state the letters used and their meanings. If a plan mentions more
than one event, refer to the secondary event in terms of the time of the primary event. Refer to days
preceding or following C-, D-, or M-day by using a plus or minus sign and an Arabic number after the
letter. For example, D – 3 is three days before D-day; D + 7 is seven days after D-day. When using a time
element other than days, spell it out. For example, D + 3 months.
E-44. Refer to hours preceding or following (H- or L-hour) by a plus or minus sign and an Arabic number
after the letter. For example, H – 3 is three hours before H-hour; H + 7 is seven hours after H-hour. When
using a time element other than hours, spell it out. For example, H + 30 minutes.
E-45. Where it is necessary to identify a particular operation or exercise, place a nickname or code words
before the letter, such as BALD EAGLE (D-day) or ANVIL EXPRESS (M-day).
EXPRESSING TIME
E-46. The effective time for implementing the plan or order is the same as the date-time group of the order.
Express the date and time as a six-digit date-time group. The first two digits indicate the day of the month;
the last four digits indicate the time. The letter at the end of the time indicates the time zone. Add the month
or the month and year to the date-time group when necessary to avoid confusion. For example, a complete
date-time group appears as 060140Z August 20XX.
E-47. If the effective time of any portion of the order differs from that of the order, identify those portions
at the beginning of the coordinating instructions (in paragraph 3). For example, “Effective only for
planning on receipt” or “Task organization effective 261300Z May 20XX.”
E-48. Express all times in a plan or order in terms of one time zone, for example ZULU (Z) or LOCAL.
(Note: Do not abbreviate local time as [L]. The abbreviation for the LIMA time is L.) Include the
appropriate time zone indicator in the heading data and mission statement. For example, the time zone
indicator for Central Standard Time in the continental United States is SIERRA. When daylight savings
time is in effect, the time zone indicator for Central Standard Time is ROMEO. The relationship of local
time to ZULU time, not the geographic location, determines the time zone indicator to use.
E-49. Express dates in the sequence day, month, and year (6 August 20XX). When using inclusive dates,
express them by stating both dates separated by an en dash (6–9 August 20XX or 6 August–6 September
20XX). Express times in the 24-hour clock system by means of four-digit Arabic numbers. Include the time
zone indicator.
IDENTIFYING PAGES
E-50. Identify pages following the first page of plans and orders with a short title identification heading.
Include the number (or letter) designation of the plan or order and the issuing headquarters. For example,
OPLAN 09-15—23d AD (base plan identification) or Annex B (Intelligence) to OPLAN 09-15—23d AD
(annex identification).
NUMBERING PAGES
E-51. Use the following convention to indicate page numbers:
z Number the pages of the base order and each attachment separately beginning on the first page
of each attachment. Use a combination of alphanumeric designations to identify each
attachment.
z Use Arabic numbers only to indicate page numbers. Place page numbers after the alphanumeric
designation that identifies the attachment. (Use Arabic numbers without any proceeding
alphanumeric designation for base order page numbers.) For example, the designation of the
third page to Annex C is C-3. Assign each attachment either a letter or Arabic number that
corresponds to the letter or number in the attachment’s short title. Assign letters to annexes,
Arabic numbers to appendixes, letters to tabs, and Arabic numbers to exhibit. For example, the
designation of the third page to Appendix 5 to Annex C is C-5-3.
z Separate elements of the alphanumeric designation with hyphens. For example, the designation
of the third page of exhibit 2 to Tab B to Appendix 5 to Annex C is C-5-B-2-3.
E-56. When an attachment required by doctrine or an SOP is unnecessary, indicate this by stating, “[Type
of attachment and its alphanumeric identifier] not used.” For example, “Annex R not used.”
E-57. Refer to attachments by letter or number and title. Use the following convention:
z Annexes. Designate annexes with capital letters. For example, Annex D (Fires) to OPORD
09-06—1 ID.
z Appendixes. Designate appendixes with Arabic numbers. For example, Appendix 1
(Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 09-06—1 ID.
z Tabs. Designate tabs with capital letters. For example, Tab B (Target Synchronization Matrix)
to Appendix 3 (Targeting) to Annex D (Fires) to OPORD 09-06—1 ID.
z Exhibits. Designate exhibits with Arabic numbers; for example, Exhibit 1 (Traffic Circulation
and Control) to Tab C (Transportation) to Appendix 1 (Logistics) to Annex F (Sustainment) to
OPORD 09-06—1 ID.
E-58. If an attachment has wider distribution than the base order or is issued separately, the attachment
requires a complete heading and acknowledgment instructions. When attachments are distributed with the
base order, these elements are not required.
[CLASSIFICATION]
Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the OPLAN/OPORD. Place the
classification marking (TS), (S), (C), or (U) at the front of each paragraph and subparagraph in
parentheses. Refer to AR 380-5 for classification and release marking instructions.
Copy ## of ## copies
Issuing headquarters
Place of issue
Date-time group of signature
Message reference number
The first line of the heading is the copy number assigned by the issuing headquarters. A log is
maintained of specific copies issued to addressees. The second line is the official designation of the
issuing headquarters (for example, 1st Infantry Division). The third line is the place of issue. It may be
a code name, postal designation, or geographic location. The fourth line is the date or date-time group
that the plan or order was signed or issued and becomes effective unless specified otherwise in the
coordinating instructions. The fifth line is a headquarters internal control number assigned to all plans
and orders in accordance with unit standing operating procedures (SOPs).
OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)] [(classification of title)]
Number plans and orders consecutively by calendar year. Include code name, if any.
(U) References: List documents essential to understanding the OPLAN/OPORD. List references
concerning a specific function in the appropriate attachments.
(a) List maps and charts first. Map entries include series number, country, sheet names, or
numbers, edition, and scale.
(b) List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown.
(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD: State the time zone used in the area of
operations during execution. When the OPLAN/OPORD applies to units in different time zones, use
Greenwich Mean (ZULU) Time.
(U) Task Organization: Describe the organization of forces available to the issuing headquarters and
their command and support relationships. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization) if long or complicated.
1. (U) Situation. The situation paragraph describes the conditions of the operational environment that
impact operations in the following subparagraphs:
a. (U) Area of Interest. Describe the area of interest. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.
b. (U) Area of Operations. Describe the area of operations (AO). Refer to the appropriate map by
its subparagraph under references, for example, “Map, reference (b).” Refer to the Appendix 2
(Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations).
(1) (U) Terrain. Describe the aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Annex B
(Intelligence) as required.
(2) (U) Weather. Describe the aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Annex B
(Intelligence) as required.
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
[CLASSIFICATION]
OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]
Place the classification and title of the OPLAN/OPORD and the issuing headquarters at the top of the
second and any subsequent pages of the base plan or order.
c. (U) Enemy Forces. Identify enemy forces and appraise their general capabilities. Describe the
enemy’s disposition, location, strength, and probable courses of action. Identify known or potential
terrorist threats and adversaries within the AO. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.
d. (U) Friendly Forces. Briefly identify the missions of friendly forces and the objectives, goals, and
missions of civilian organizations that impact the issuing headquarters in following subparagraphs:
(1) (U) Higher Headquarters’ Mission and Intent. Identify and state the mission and
commander’s intent for headquarters two levels up and one level up from the issuing headquarters.
(a) (U) [Higher Headquarters Two Levels Up]. Identify the higher headquarters two levels
up the paragraph heading (for example, Joint Task Force-18).
1 (U) Mission.
2 (U) Commander’s Intent.
(b) (U) [Higher Headquarters]. Identify the higher headquarters one level up in the
paragraph heading (for example, 1st (U.S.) Armored Division).
1 (U) Mission.
2 (U) Commander’s Intent.
(2) (U) Missions of Adjacent Units. Identify and state the missions of adjacent units and other
units whose actions have a significant impact on the issuing headquarters.
e. (U) Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and state the
objective or goals and primary tasks of those non-Department of Defense organizations that have a
significant role within the AO. Refer to Annex V (Interagency Coordination) as required.
f. (U) Civil Considerations. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact
operations. Refer to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.
g. (U) Attachments and Detachments. List units attached to or detached from the issuing
headquarters. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order, on
commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the OPLAN/OPORD. Do not repeat
information already listed in Annex A (Task Organization).
h. (U) Assumptions. List assumptions used in the development of the OPLAN/OPORD.
2. (U) Mission. State the unit’s mission—a short description of the who, what (task), when, where, and
why (purpose) that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so.
3. (U) Execution. Describe how the commander intends to accomplish the mission in terms of the
commander’s intent, an overarching concept of operations, schemes of employment for each
warfighting function, assessment, specified tasks to subordinate units, and key coordinating instructions
in the subparagraphs below.
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
[CLASSIFICATION]
OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]
a. (U) Commander’s Intent. Commanders develop their intent statement personally. The
commander’s intent is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force
must establish with respect to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations that represent the desired end
state. It succinctly describes what constitutes the success of an operation and provides the purpose and
conditions that define that desired end state. The commander’s intent must be easy to remember and
clearly understood two echelons down.
b. (U) Concept of Operations. The concept of operations is a statement that directs the manner in
which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions
the force will use to achieve the end state. It is normally expressed in terms of decisive, shaping, and
sustaining operations. It states the principal tasks required, the responsible subordinate units, and how
the principal tasks complement one another. Normally, the concept of operations projects the status of
the force at the end of the operation. If the mission dictates a significant change in tasks during the
operation, the commander may phase the operation. The concept of operations may be a single
paragraph, divided into two or more subparagraphs, or if unusually lengthy, summarized here with
details located in Annex C (Operations). If the concept of operations is phased, describe each phase in
a subparagraph. Label these subparagraphs as “Phase” followed by the appropriate Roman numeral,
for example, “Phase I.” If the operation is phased, all paragraphs and subparagraphs of the base order
and all annexes must mirror the phasing established in the concept of operations. The operation
overlay and graphic depictions of lines of effort help portray the concept of operations and are located
in Annex C (Operations).
c. (U) Scheme of Movement and Maneuver. Describe the employment of maneuver units in
accordance with the concept of operations. Provide the primary tasks of maneuver units conducting the
decisive operation and the purpose of each. Next, state the primary tasks of maneuver units conducting
shaping operations, including security operations, and the purpose of each. For offensive operations,
identify the form of maneuver. For defensive operations, identify the type of defense. For stability
operations, describe the role of maneuver units by primary stability tasks. If the operation is phased,
identify the main effort by phase. Identify and include priorities for the reserve. Refer to Annex C
(Operations) as required.
(1) (U) Scheme of Mobility/Countermobility. State the scheme of mobility/countermobility
including priorities by unit or area. Refer to Annex G (Engineer) as required.
(2) (U) Scheme of Battlefield Obscuration. State the scheme of battlefield obscuration,
including priorities by unit or area. Refer to Appendix 9 (Battlefield Obscuration) to Annex C
(Operations) as required.
(3) (U) Scheme of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Describe how the
commander intends to use intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to support the concept
of operations. Include the primary reconnaissance objectives. Refer to Annex L (Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) as required.
(Note: Army forces do not conduct ISR within the United States and its territories. For domestic
operations, this paragraph is titled “Information Awareness and Assessment” and the contents of this
paragraph comply with Executive Order 12333.)
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
[CLASSIFICATION]
OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]
d. (U) Scheme of Intelligence. Describe how the commander envisions intelligence supporting the
concept of operations. Include the priority of effort to situation development, targeting, and assessment.
State the priority of intelligence support to units and areas. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.
e. (U) Scheme of Fires. Describe how the commander intends to use fires (lethal and nonlethal) to
support the concept of operations with emphasis on the scheme of maneuver. State the fire support tasks
and the purpose of each task. State the priorities for, allocation of, and restrictions on fires. Refer to
Annex D (Fires) as required. If Annex D is not used, use subparagraphs for fires categories (for
example, field artillery and command and control warfare) based on the situation.
f. (U) Scheme of Protection. Describe how the commander envisions protection supporting the
concept of operations. Include the priorities of protection by unit and area. Include survivability.
Address the scheme of operational area security, including security for routes, bases, and critical
infrastructure. Identify tactical combat forces and other reaction forces. Use subparagraphs for
protection categories (for example, air and missile defense and explosive ordnance disposal) based on
the situation. Refer to Annex E (Protection) as required.
g. (U) Stability Operations. Describe how the commander envisions the conduct of stability
operations in coordination with other organizations through the primary stability tasks. (See FM 3-07.)
If other organizations or the host nation are unable to provide for civil security, restoration of essential
services, and civil control, then commanders with an assigned AO must do so with available resources,
request additional resources, or request relief from these requirements from higher headquarters.
Commanders assign specific responsibilities for stability tasks to subordinate units in paragraph 3.i
(Tasks to Subordinate Units) and paragraph 3.j (Coordinating Instructions). Refer to Annex C
(Operations) and Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required.
h. (U) Assessment. Describe the priorities for assessment and identify the measures of effectiveness
used to assess end state conditions and objectives. Refer to Annex M (Assessment) as required.
i. (U) Tasks to Subordinate Units. State the task assigned to each unit that reports directly to the
headquarters issuing the order. Each task must include who (the subordinate unit assigned the task),
what (the task itself), when, where, and why (purpose). Use a separate subparagraph for each unit. List
units in task organization sequence. Place tasks that affect two or more units in paragraph 3.j
(Coordinating Instructions).
j. (U) Coordinating Instructions. List only instructions and tasks applicable to two or more units
not covered in unit SOPs.
(1) (U) Time or condition when the OPORD becomes effective.
(2) (U) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements. List commander’s critical
information requirements (CCIRs) here.
(3) (U) Essential Elements of Friendly Information. List essential elements of friendly
information (EEFIs) here.
(4) (U) Fire Support Coordination Measures. List critical fire support coordination or control
measures.
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
[CLASSIFICATION]
OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]
(5) (U) Airspace Coordinating Measures. List critical airspace coordinating or control
measures.
(6) (U) Rules of Engagement. List rules of engagement here. Refer to Appendix 12 (Rules of
Engagement) to Annex C (Operations) as required.
(Note: For operations within the United States and its territories, title this paragraph “Rules for the
Use of Force”).
(7) (U) Risk Reduction Control Measures. State measures specific to this operation not
included in unit SOPs. They may include mission-oriented protective posture, operational exposure
guidance, troop-safety criteria, and fratricide prevention measures. Refer to Annex E (Protection) as
required.
(8) (U) Personnel Recovery Coordination Measures. Refer to Appendix 2 (Personnel Recovery)
to Annex E (Protection) as required.
(9) (U) Environmental Considerations. Refer to Appendix 6 (Environmental Considerations) to
Annex G (Engineer) as required.
(10) (U) Information Themes and Messages. List themes and messages.
(11) (U) Other Coordinating Instructions. List additional coordinating instructions and tasks
that apply to two or more units as subparagraphs at this level as required.
4. (U) Sustainment. Describe the concept of sustainment, including priorities of sustainment by unit or
area. Include instructions for administrative movements, deployments, and transportation—or
references to applicable appendixes—if appropriate. Use the following subparagraphs to provide the
broad concept of support for logistics, personnel, and Army health system support. Provide detailed
instructions for each sustainment subfunction in the appendixes to Annex F (Sustainment) listed in table
E-2.
a. (U) Logistics. Refer to Appendix 1 (Logistics) to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.
b. (U) Personnel. Refer to Appendix 2 (Personnel Services Support) to Annex F (Sustainment) as
required.
c. (U) Health System Support. Refer to Appendix 3 (Army Health System Support) to Annex F
(Sustainment) as required.
5. (U) Command and Control.
a. (U) Command.
(1) (U) Location of Commander. State where the commander intends to be during the
operation, by phase if the operation is phased.
(2) (U) Succession of Command. State the succession of command if not covered in the unit’s
SOPs.
(3) (U) Liaison Requirements. State liaison requirements not covered in the unit’s SOPs.
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
[CLASSIFICATION]
OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]
b. (U) Control.
(1) (U) Command Posts. Describe the employment of command posts (CPs), including the
location of each CP and its time of opening and closing, as appropriate. State the primary controlling
CP for specific tasks or phases of the operation (for example, “Division tactical command post will
control the air assault”).
(2) (U) Reports. List reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required.
c. (U) Signal. Describe the concept of signal support, including location and movement of key
signal nodes and critical electromagnetic spectrum considerations throughout the operation. Refer to
Annex H (Signal) as required.
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
[CLASSIFICATION]
OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]
ACKNOWLEDGE: Include instructions for the acknowledgement of the OPLAN/OPORD by
addressees. The word “acknowledge” may suffice. Refer to the message reference number if necessary.
Acknowledgement of a plan or order means that it has been received and understood.
[Commander’s last name]
[Commander’s rank]
The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy. If the representative signs the
original, add the phrase “For the Commander.” The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in
the headquarters’ files.
OFFICIAL:
[Authenticator’s name]
[Authenticator’s position]
Use only if the commander does not sign the original order. If the commander signs the original, no
further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff
officer requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the
signature block.
ANNEXES: List annexes by letter and title. If a particular annex is not used, place “not used” beside
that annex letter.
A– Task Organization
B – Intelligence
C – Operations
D– Fires
E – Protection
F – Sustainment
G– Engineer
H– Signal
I – not used
J – Public Affairs
K– Civil Affairs Operations
L – Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
M– Assessment
N– Space Operations
O– not used
P – Host-Nation Support
Q– not used
R – Reports
S – Special Technical Operations
T – not used
U– Inspector General
V– Interagency Coordination
W– not used
X– not used
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
[CLASSIFICATION]
OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]
Y – not used
Z – Distribution
DISTRIBUTION: Furnish distribution copies either for action or for information. List in detail those
who are to receive the plan or order. Refer to Annex Z (Distribution) if lengthy.
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
[CLASSIFICATION]
(Change from verbal orders, if any)
Copy ## of ## copies
Issuing headquarters
Place of issue
Date-time group of signature
Message reference number
Include heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment.
[Attachment type and number/letter] [(attachment title)] TO [higher-level attachment type and
number/letter, if applicable] [(higher-level attachment title, if applicable)] TO OPERATION
PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)] [(classification of title)]
References:
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order:
1. (U) Situation. Include information affecting the functional area that paragraph 1 of the
OPLAN/OPORD does not cover or that needs to be expanded.
a. (U) Area of Interest. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.
b. (U) Area of Operations. Refer to Appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations).
(1) (U) Terrain. List all critical terrain aspects that impact functional area operations. Refer to
Tab A (Terrain) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.
(2) (U) Weather. List all critical weather aspects that impact functional area operations. Refer
to Tab B (Weather) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.
c. (U) Enemy Forces. List known and templated locations and activities of enemy functional area
units for one echelon up and two echelons down. List enemy maneuver and other area capabilities that
will impact friendly operations. State expected enemy courses of action and employment of enemy
functional area assets.
d. (U) Friendly Forces. Outline the higher headquarters’ plan as it pertains to the functional area.
List designation, location, and outline of plan of higher, adjacent, and other functional area assets that
support or impact the issuing headquarters or require coordination and additional support.
e. (U) Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and describe
other organizations in the area of operations that may impact the conduct of functional area operations
or implementation of functional area-specific equipment and tactics.
f. (U) Civil Considerations. Refer to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required.
g. (U) Attachments and Detachments. List units attached or detached only as necessary to clarify
task organization.
h. (U) Assumptions. List any functional area-specific assumptions that support the annex
development.
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
[CLASSIFICATION]
[Attachment type and number/letter] [(attachment title)] TO [higher-level attachment type and
number/letter, if applicable] [(higher-level attachment title, if applicable)] TO OPERATION
PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]
2. (U) Mission. State the mission of the functional area in support of the base plan or order.
3. (U) Execution.
a. (U) Scheme of Support. Describe how the functional area supports the commander’s intent and
concept of operations. Establish the priorities of support to units for each phase of the operation. Refer
to Annex C (Operations) as required.
b. (U) Tasks to Subordinate Units. List functional area tasks assigned to specific subordinate units
not contained in the base order.
c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. List only instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units
not covered in the base order. Identify and highlight any functional area-specific rules of engagement
(ROE), risk reduction control measures, environmental considerations, and CCIRs and EEFIs that
pertain to the functional area.
(Note: For operations within the United States and its territories, title this paragraph “Rules for the
Use of Force.”)
4. (U) Sustainment. Identify priorities of sustainment for functional area key tasks and specify
additional instructions as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.
5. (U) Command and Control.
a. (U) Command. State the location of key functional area leaders.
b. (U) Liaison Requirements. State the functional area liaison requirements not covered in the base
order.
c. (U) Signal. Address any functional area-specific communications requirements or reports. Refer
to Annex H (Signal) as required.
ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order.
OFFICIAL:
[Authenticator’s name]
[Authenticator’s position]
Either the commander or coordinating staff officer responsible for the functional area may sign
attachments.
ATTACHMENT: List lower level attachments.
DISTRIBUTION: Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments.
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
[CLASSIFICATION]
(Change from verbal orders, if any) (Optional)
[Heading data is the same as for OPLAN/OPORD]
WARNING ORDER [number]
(U) References: Refer to higher headquarters’ OPLAN/OPORD and identify map sheets for operation
(Optional).
(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD: (Optional).
(U) Task Organization: (Optional).
1. (U) Situation. The situation paragraph describes the conditions and circumstances of the
operational environment that impact operations in the following subparagraphs:
a. (U) Area of Interest. Describe significant changes to the area of interest.
b. (U) Area of Operations. Describe significant changes to the area of operations.
c. (U) Enemy Forces. Include significant changes to enemy composition, disposition, and courses
of action. Information not available may be included in subsequent WARNOs.
d. (U) Friendly Forces. Address only if essential to WARNO.
e. (U) Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Address only if
essential to WARNO.
f. (U) Civil Considerations. (Optional) Address only if essential to WARNO.
g. (U) Attachments and Detachments. Provide initial task organization that identifies major unit
changes.
h. (U) Assumptions. List any significant assumptions for order development.
2. (U) Mission. State the issuing headquarters’ mission.
3. (U) Execution.
a. (U) Commander’s Intent. Provide brief commander’s intent statement.
b. (U) Concept of Operations. This may be “to be determined” for an initial WARNO.
c. (U) Scheme of Movement and Maneuver. Provide information on tasks to units for execution;
movement and maneuver; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities; or security to
initiate.
d. (U) Scheme of Intelligence. Provide information to units for intelligence tasks to execute.
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
[CLASSIFICATION]
(Change from verbal orders, if any) (Optional)
[Heading data is the same as for OPLAN/OPORD]
WARNING ORDER [number]
e. (U) Scheme of Fires. Provide information to units for fires tasks to execute.
f. (U) Scheme of Protection. Provide information to units for protection tasks to execute.
g. (U) Stability Operations. Provide information to units for stability tasks to execute.
h. (U) Assessment. Provide information to units for assessment tasks to execute.
i. (U) Tasks to Subordinate Units. Include any known tasks at time of issuance of WARNO.
j. (U) Coordinating Instructions.
4. (U) Sustainment. Include any known logistics, personnel, or Army health system preparation tasks.
5. (U) Command and Control. Include any changes to the existing order or state “no change.”
ACKNOWLEDGE:
[Commander’s last name]
[Commander’s rank]
OFFICIAL:
[Authenticator’s name]
[Authenticator’s position]
ANNEXES:
DISTRIBUTION:
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
[CLASSIFICATION]
(Change from verbal orders, if any) (Optional)
Copy ## of ## copies
Issuing headquarters
Place of issue
Date-time group of signature
Message reference number
FRAGMENTARY ORDER [number]
(U) References: Refer to higher the order being modified.
(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD:
1. (U) Situation. Include any changes to the existing order or state “No change.” For example, “No
change to OPORD 03-XX.”
2. (U) Mission. State “No change.”
3. (U) Execution. Include any changes or state “No change.”
a. (U) Commander’s Intent. Include any changes or state “No change.”
b. (U) Concept of Operations. Include any changes or state “No change.”
c. (U) Scheme Movement and Maneuver. Include any changes or state “No change.”
d. (U) Scheme of Intelligence. Include any changes or state “No change.”
e. (U) Scheme of Fires. Include any changes or state “No change.”
f. (U) Scheme of Protection. Include any changes or state “No change.”
g. (U) Stability Operations. Include any changes or state “No change.”
h. (U) Assessment. Include any changes or state “No change.”
i. (U) Tasks to Subordinate Units. Include any changes or state “No change.”
j. (U) Coordinating Instructions. State “Current overlay remains in effect” or “See change 1 to
Appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations).” Mark changes to control measures on
overlay or issue new overlay.
4. (U) Sustainment. Include any changes or state “No change.”
5. (U) Command and Control. Include any changes or state “No change.”
ACKNOWLEDGE:
[Commander’s last name]
[Commander’s rank]
OFFICIAL:
[Authenticator’s name]
[Authenticator’s position]
ANNEXES:
DISTRIBUTION:
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
TASK ORGANIZATION
TF Control A/2-22 IN B/2-22 IN C/2-22 AR D/2-22 AR
Sniper Sqd/HHC/2-22 1/A/2-22 IN 1/B/2-22 IN 1/C/2-22 AR 1/D/2-22 AR
2/A/2-22 IN 2/B/2-22 IN 2/C/2-22 AR 2/D/2-22 AR
3/C/2-22 AR 3/D/2-22 AR 3/A/2-22 IN 3/B/2-22 IN
FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
F-1. A task organization is a temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission
(FM 3-0). Task organizing is the act of designing an operating force, support staff, or logistic package of
specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission. Characteristics to examine when task
organizing the force include, but are not limited to: training, experience, equipage, sustainability, operating
environment, enemy threat, and mobility. For Army forces, it includes allocating available assets to
subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships (FM 3-0). Command
and support relationships provide the basis for unity of command in operations.
Note: Army command relationships are similar but not identical to joint command authorities
and relationships. (See FM 3-0.) Differences stem from the way Army forces task organize
internally and the need for a system of support relationships between Army forces. Another
important difference is the requirement for Army commanders to handle the administrative
control requirements.
F-2. Military units consist of organic components. Organic parts of a unit are those forming an essential
part of the unit and are listed in its table of organization and equipment. Commanders can alter
organizations’ organic unit relationships to better allocate assets to subordinate commanders. They also can
establish temporary command and support relationships to facilitate exercising command and control.
F-3. Establishing clear command and support relationships is fundamental to organizing for any
operation. These relationships establish clear responsibilities and authorities between subordinate and
supporting units. Some command and support relationships (for example, tactical control) limit the
commander’s authority to prescribe additional relationships. Knowing the inherent responsibilities of each
command and support relationship allows commanders to effectively organize their forces and helps
supporting commanders to understand their unit’s role in the organizational structure.
F-4. Commanders designate command and support relationships to weight the decisive operation and
support the concept of operations. Task organization also helps subordinate and supporting commanders
support the commander’s intent. These relationships carry with them varying responsibilities to the
subordinate unit by the parent and gaining units as listed in table F-1 and table F-2, pages F-3 and F-4
respectively. Commanders consider two organizational principles when task organizing forces:
z Maintain cohesive mission teams.
z Do not exceed subordinates’ span of control capabilities.
F-5. When possible, commanders maintain cohesive mission teams. They organize forces based on
standing headquarters, their assigned forces, and habitual associations when possible. When not feasible
and ad hoc organizations are created, commanders arrange time for training and establishing functional
working relationships and procedures. Once commanders have organized and committed a force, they keep
its task organization unless the benefits of a change clearly outweigh the disadvantages. Reorganizations
may result in a loss of time, effort, and tempo. Sustainment considerations may also preclude quick
reorganization.
F-6. Commanders carefully avoid exceeding the span of control capabilities of subordinates. Span of
control refers to the number of subordinate units under a single commander. This number is situation
dependent and may vary. As a rule, commanders can effectively command two to six subordinate units.
Allocating subordinate commanders more units gives them greater flexibility and increases options and
combinations. However, increasing the number of subordinate units increases the number of decisions to be
made in a timely fashion. This slows down the reaction time among decisionmakers, resulting in an
unwieldy command and control process.
F-7. Running estimates and course of action (COA) analysis of the military decisionmaking process
provide information that help commanders determine the best task organization. An effective task
organization—
z Facilitates the commander’s intent and concept of operations.
z Retains flexibility within the concept of operations.
z Adapts to conditions imposed by mission variables.
z Accounts for the requirements to conduct essential stability tasks for populations within an area
of operation.
z Creates effective combined arms teams.
z Provides mutual support among units.
z Ensures flexibility to meet unforeseen events and support future operations.
z Allocates resources with minimum restrictions on their employment.
z Promotes unity of command.
z Offsets limitations and maximizes the potential of all forces available.
z Exploits enemy vulnerabilities.
F-8. Creating an appropriate task organization requires understanding—
z The mission, including the higher commander’s intent and concept of operations.
z The fundamentals of full spectrum operations (see FM 3-0), basic tactical concepts (see
FM 3-90), and the fundamentals of stability (see FM 3-07).
z The roles and relationships among the warfighting functions.
z The status of available forces, including morale, training, and equipment capabilities.
z Specific unit capabilities, limitations, strengths, and weaknesses.
z The risks inherent in the plan.
F-9. During COA analysis, commanders identify what resources they need, and where, when, and how
frequently they will need them. Formal task organization and the change from generic to specific units
begin after COA analysis when commanders assign tasks to subordinate commanders. Staffs assign tasks to
subordinate headquarters and determine if subordinate headquarters have enough combat power,
reallocating combat power as necessary. They then refine command and support relationships for
subordinate units and decide the priorities of support. Commanders approve or modify the staff’s
recommended task organization based on their evaluation of the factors (listed in paragraphs F-7 and F-8)
and information from running estimates and COA analysis. (Appendix B defines and describes the military
decisionmaking process.)
F-10. In allocating assets, the commander and staff consider the—
z Task organization for the ongoing operation.
z Potential adverse effects of breaking up cohesive teams by changing the task organization.
z Time necessary to realign the organization after receipt of the task organization.
z Limits on control over supporting units provided by higher headquarters.
As As required
Gaining Parent Gaining required by gaining Gaining TACON;GS
TACON Parent unit
unit unit unit by gaining unit and unit GSR; R; DS
unit parent unit
Note: 1 In NATO, the gaining unit may not task organize a multinational force. (See TACON.)
ADCON administrative control HQ headquarters
AO area of operations N/A not applicable
ASCC Army Service component command NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
DS direct support OPCON operational control
GS general support R reinforcing
GSR general support–reinforcing TACON tactical control
support relationships when subordination of one unit to another is inappropriate. They assign a
supportrelationship when—
z The support is more effective if a commander with the requisite technical and tactical expertise
controls the supporting unit rather than the supported commander.
z The echelon of the supporting unit is the same as or higher than that of the supported unit. For
example, the supporting unit may be a brigade, and the supported unit may be a battalion. It
would be inappropriate for the brigade to be subordinated to the battalion; hence, the echelon
uses an Army support relationship.
z The supporting unit supports several units simultaneously. The requirement to set support
priorities to allocate resources to supported units exists. Assigning support relationships is one
aspect of mission command.
Table F-2. Army support relationships
Then inherent responsibilities:
Can
impose on
Are
If Have May be Receive assigned
Establish/
Have
gaining
relation- maintain unit
command task sustain- position or Provide priorities
ship is: communi- further
relation- organized ment an area of liaison to: established
cations command
ship with: by: from: operations by:
with: or support
by:
relation-
ship by:
Parent unit;
Direct Parent Parent Parent Supported Supported Supported 1
1 supported See note
support unit unit unit unit unit unit
unit
Parent unit; Reinforced
Reinforc- Parent Parent Parent Reinforced Reinforced Not
reinforced unit; then
ing unit unit unit unit unit applicable
unit parent unit
General Reinforced Reinforced Parent unit;
support– Parent Parent Parent unit and as unit and as then Not
Parent unit
reinforc- unit unit unit required by required by reinforced applicable
ing parent unit parent unit unit
As required As required
General Parent Parent Parent Not
Parent unit by parent by parent Parent unit
support unit unit unit applicable
unit unit
1
Note: Commanders of units in direct support may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units and
elements of the supported unit after coordination with the supported commander.
F-14. Army support relationships allow supporting commanders to employ their units’ capabilities to
achieve results required by supported commanders. Support relationships are graduated from an exclusive
supported and supporting relationship between two units—as in direct support—to a broad level of support
extended to all units under the control of the higher headquarters—as in general support. Support
relationships do not alter administrative control. Commanders specify and change support relationships
through task organization.
Figure F-1. Sample outline format for a task organization (52d Infantry Division)
Figure F-1. Sample outline format for a task organization (52d Infantry Division) (continued)
F-16. List subordinate units under the command and control (C2) headquarters to which they are assigned,
attached, or in support. Place direct support (DS) units below the units they support. Indent subordinate and
supporting units two spaces. Identify relationships other than attached with parenthetical terms—for
example, (GS) or (DS).
F-20. When the effective attachment time of a nonorganic unit to another unit differs from the effective
time of the plan or order, add the effective attachment time in parentheses after the attached unit—for
example, 1-80 IN (OPCON 2 HBCT Ph II). List this information either in the task organization in the base
order or in Annex A (Task Organization). For clarity, list subsequent command or support relationships
under the task organization in parentheses following the affected unit—for example, “...on order, OPCON
to 2 HBCT” is written (O/O OPCON 2 HBCT).
F-21. Give the numerical designations of units in Arabic numerals, even if shown as Roman numbers in
graphics—for example, show X Corps as 10th Corps.
F-22. During multinational operations, insert the country code between the numeric designation and the
unit name—for example, show 3rd German Corps as 3d (GE) Corps. (FM 1-02 contains authorized country
codes.)
F-23. Use abbreviated designations for organic units. Use the full designation for nonorganic units—for
example, 1-52 FA (MLRS) (GS) rather than 1-52 FA. Specify a unit’s command or support relationship
only if it differs from that of its higher headquarters.
F-24. Designate task forces with the last name of the task force commander (for example, TF
WILLIAMS), a code name (for example, TF WARRIOR), or a number (for example, TF 47 or TF 1-77
IN).
F-25. For unit designation at theater army level, list major subordinate maneuver units first, placing them
in alphabetical or numerical order, followed by fires, intelligence, maneuver enhancement, sustainment,
and any units under the C2 of the force headquarters. For each function following maneuver, list
headquarters in the order of commands, groups, brigades, squadrons, and detachments.
to account for the mission variables. The updated running estimates then support COA analysis (war-
gaming) in which the strengths and weaknesses of each COA are identified. The staff relies on its updated
running estimate to provide input to the war game. Following COA analysis, the staff compares the
proposed COAs against each other and recommends one of them to the commander for approval. During all
these activities, each staff section continues to update and refine its running estimate to give commanders
the best possible information available at the time to support their decisions. The selected COA provides
each staff section an additional focus for its estimates and the key information it will need during orders
production. Key information recorded in the running estimate is included in orders, particularly in the
functional annexes.
ASSESSMENT STEPS
H-2. Commanders and staffs develop assessment plans during planning using six steps:
z Step 1 – Gather tools and assessment data.
z Step 2 – Understand current and desired conditions.
z Step 3 – Develop assessment measures and potential indicators.
z Step 4 – Develop the collection plan.
z Step 5 – Assign responsibilities for conducting analysis and generating recommendations.
z Step 6 – Identify feedback mechanisms.
Once commanders and their staffs develop the assessment plan, they apply the assessment process of
monitor, evaluate, and recommend or direct continuously throughout preparation and execution.
H-5. Understanding current and desired conditions requires explicitly acknowledging the underlying
assumptions. Assumptions identified during planning are continually challenged during the evaluation
phase of the assessment process. If the assumptions are subsequently disproven, then reframing the
problem may be appropriate.
H-6. Following mission analysis, commanders issue their initial commander’s intent, planning guidance,
and commander’s critical information requirements. The end state in the initial commander’s intent
describes the desired conditions the commander wants to achieve. The staff section charged with
responsibility for the assessment plan identifies each specific desired condition mentioned in the
commander’s intent. These individual desired conditions focus the overall assessment of the operation.
Monitoring focuses on the corresponding conditions in the current situation. If the conditions that define
the end state change during the planning process, the staff updates these changes for the assessment plan.
H-7. To measure progress effectively, the staff identifies both the current situation and the desired end
state. For example, the commander provides the end state condition “Essential services restored to
prehostility levels.” The staff develops a plan to obtain indicators of this condition. These indicators also
identify the current and prehostility levels of essential services across the area of operations. By taking
these two actions, the staff establishes a mechanism to assess progress toward this condition.
H-14. Commanders include MOEs from differing relevant causal chains for each condition whenever
possible. When MOEs have a cause and effect relationship with each other, either directly or indirectly, it
decreases their value in measuring a particular condition. Measuring progress towards a desired condition
by multiple means adds rigor to the assessment. For example, in figure H-1 under condition 1, MOE 1 and
MOE 3 have no apparent cause and effect relationship with each other although both are valid measures of
the condition. This adds rigor and validity to the measurement of that condition. MOE 2 does have a cause
and effect relationship with MOE 1 and MOE 3 but is a worthwhile addition because of the direct
relevancy and mathematical rigor of that particular source of data.
Condition 1: Enemy Division X forces prevented from interfering with corps decisive operation.
MOE 1: Enemy Division X forces west of phase line blue are defeated.
• Indicator 1: Friendly forces occupy OBJ Slam (Yes/No).
• Indicator 2: Number of reports of squad-sized or larger enemy forces in the division area of
operations in the past 24 hours.
• Indicator 3: Current G-2 assessment of number of enemy Division X battalions west of phase
line blue.
MOE 2: Enemy Division X forces indirect fire systems neutralized.
• Indicator 1: Number of indirect fires originating from enemy Division X’s integrated fires
command in the past 24 hours.
• Indicator 2: Current G-2 assessment of number of operational 240mm rocket launchers within
enemy Division X’s integrated fires command.
MOE 3: Enemy Division X communications systems disrupted.
• Indicator 1: Number of electronic transmissions from enemy Division X detected in the past 24
hours.
• Indicator 2: Number of enemy Division X battalion and higher command posts destroyed.
H-23. An indicator is relevant if it provides insight into a supported MOE or MOP. Commanders must ask
pertinent questions. They might include the following: Does a change in this indicator actually indicate a
change in the MOE? (Which is the cause and which is the effect is not the point here; what matters is that a
correlation exists.) What factors unrelated to the MOE could cause this indicator to change? How reliable is
the correlation between the indicator and the MOE? For example, the indicator “Decrease in monthly
weapons caches found and cleared in the division area of operations” is not relevant to the MOE “Decrease
in enemy activity in the division area of operations.” This indicator could plausibly increase or decrease
with a decrease in enemy activity. An increase in friendly patrols, particularly in areas not previously
patrolled on a regular basis, could result in greater numbers of caches found and cleared. It may also be
difficult to determine when the enemy left the weapons, raising the question of when the enemy activity
actually occurred. These factors, unrelated to enemy activity, could artificially inflate the indicator, creating
a false impression of increased enemy activity within the assessment framework. In this example, enemy
activity levels can be reliably measured without considering weapons caches, and the indicator should not
be used for this MOE.
collect the associated indicator and must remove it from the plan. Adjustments are then made to the
assessment framework to ensure that the MOE or MOP is properly worded.
REHEARSAL OVERVIEW
I-1. Rehearsals allow leaders and their Soldiers to practice executing key aspects of the concept of
operations. These actions help Soldiers orient themselves to their environment and other units before
executing the operation. Rehearsals help Soldiers to build a lasting mental picture of the sequence of key
actions within the operation.
I-2. Rehearsals are the commander’s tool to ensure staffs and subordinates understand the commander’s
intent and the concept of operations. They allow commanders and staffs to identify shortcomings (errors or
omissions) in the plan not previously recognized. Rehearsals also contribute to external and internal
coordination as additional coordinating requirements are identified.
I-3. Effective and efficient units habitually rehearse during training. Commanders at every level routinely
train and practice various rehearsal types and techniques. Local standing operating procedures (SOPs)
identify appropriate rehearsal types, techniques, and standards for their execution. All leaders conduct
periodic after action reviews to ensure their units conduct rehearsals to standard and correct substandard
performances. After action reviews also enable leaders to incorporate lessons learned into existing plans
and orders or into subsequent rehearsals.
I-4. Adequate time is essential when conducting rehearsals. The time required varies with the complexity
of the mission, the type and technique of rehearsal, and the level of participation. Rehearsals are conducted
at the lowest possible level, using the most thorough technique possible, given the time available. Under
time-constrained conditions, leaders conduct abbreviated rehearsals, focusing on critical events determined
by reverse planning. Each unit will have different critical events based on the mission, unit readiness, and
the commander’s assessment.
I-5. Whenever possible, rehearsals are based on a completed operation order. However, a unit may
rehearse a contingency plan to prepare for an anticipated deployment. The rehearsal is a coordination event,
not an analysis. It does not replace war-gaming. Commanders war-game during the military
decisionmaking process to analyze different courses of action to determine the optimal one. Rehearsals
practice that selected course of action. Commanders avoid making major changes to operation orders
during rehearsals. They make only those changes essential to mission success and risk mitigation.
REHEARSAL TYPES
I-6. Each rehearsal type achieves a different result and has a specific place in the preparation timeline.
The four types of rehearsals are—
z Backbrief.
z Combined arms rehearsal.
z Support rehearsal.
z Battle drill or SOP rehearsal.
BACKBRIEF
I-7. A backbrief is a briefing by subordinates to the commander to review how subordinates intend
to accomplish their mission. Normally, subordinates perform backbriefs throughout preparation. These
briefs allow commanders to clarify the commander’s intent early in subordinate planning. Commanders use
the backbrief to identify any problems in the concept of operations.
I-8. The backbrief differs from the confirmation brief (a briefing subordinates give their higher
commander immediately following receipt of an order) in that subordinate leaders are given time to
complete their plan. Backbriefs require the fewest resources and are often the only option under time-
constrained conditions. Subordinate leaders explain their actions from start to finish of the mission.
Backbriefs are performed sequentially, with all leaders reviewing their tasks. When time is available,
backbriefs can be combined with other types of rehearsals. Doing this lets all subordinate leaders
coordinate their plans before performing more elaborate drills.
SUPPORT REHEARSAL
I-10. The support rehearsal helps synchronize each warfighting function with the overall operation. This
rehearsal supports the operation so units can accomplish their missions. Throughout preparation, units
conduct support rehearsals within the framework of a single or limited number of warfighting functions.
These rehearsals typically involve coordination and procedure drills for aviation, fires, engineer support, or
casualty evacuation. Support rehearsals and combined arms rehearsals complement preparations for the
operation. They may be conducted separately and then combined into full-dress rehearsals. Although these
rehearsals differ slightly by warfighting function, they achieve the same result.
REHEARSAL TECHNIQUES
I-13. Techniques for conducting rehearsals are limited only by the commander’s imagination and available
resources. Generally, six techniques are used. (See figure I-1.) Resources required for each technique range
from broad to narrow. As listed, each successive technique takes less time and fewer resources. Each
rehearsal technique also imparts a different level of understanding to participants.
FULL-DRESS REHEARSAL
I-15. A full-dress rehearsal produces the most detailed understanding of the operation. It includes every
participating Soldier and system. Leaders rehearse their subordinates on terrain similar to the AO, initially
under good light conditions, and then in limited visibility. Small-unit actions are repeated until executed to
standard. Full-dress rehearsals help Soldiers to clearly understand what is expected of them. It helps them
gain confidence in their ability to accomplish the mission. Supporting elements, such as aviation crews,
meet with Soldiers and rehearse with them to synchronize the operation.
I-16. The unit may conduct full-dress rehearsals. They also may be conducted and supported by the higher
headquarters. The full-dress rehearsal is the most difficult to accomplish at higher echelons. At those levels,
commanders may develop an alternate rehearsal plan that mirrors the actual plan but fits the terrain
available for the rehearsal.
I-17. Full-dress rehearsals have the following implications:
z Time. Full-dress rehearsals consume more time than any other rehearsal type. For companies
and smaller units, full-dress rehearsals most effectively ensure all units in the operation
understand their roles. However, brigade and task force commanders consider how much time
their subordinates need to plan and prepare when deciding whether to conduct a full-dress
rehearsal.
z Echelons involved. All echelons involved in the operation participate in the full-dress rehearsal.
z Operations security risk. Moving a large part of the force may attract unwanted enemy
attention. Commanders develop a plan to protect the rehearsal from enemy surveillance and
reconnaissance. One method is to develop an alternate plan, including graphics and radio
frequencies, which rehearses selected actions without compromising the actual operation order.
Commanders take care not to confuse subordinates when doing this.
z Terrain. Terrain management for a full-dress rehearsal can be difficult. The rehearsal area must
be identified, secured, cleared, and maintained throughout the rehearsal.
REDUCED-FORCE REHEARSAL
I-18. Circumstances may prohibit a rehearsal with all members of the unit. A reduced-force rehearsal
involves only key leaders of the organization and its subordinate units. It normally takes fewer resources
than a full-dress rehearsal. Terrain requirements can be the same as a full-dress rehearsal, even though there
are fewer participants. The commander first decides the level of leader involvement. Then the selected
leaders rehearse the plan while traversing the actual or similar terrain. Often commanders use this
technique to rehearse fire control measures for an engagement area during defensive operations. A reduced-
force rehearsal may be used to prepare key leaders for a full-dress rehearsal. It may require developing a
rehearsal plan that mirrors the actual plan but fits the terrain of the rehearsal.
I-19. Often, smaller scale replicas of terrain or buildings substitute for the actual AO. Leaders not only
explain their plans, but also walk through their actions or move replicas across the rehearsal area or sand
table. This is called a rock drill. It reinforces the backbrief given by subordinates since everyone can see the
concept of operations and sequence of tasks.
I-20. Reduced-force rehearsals have the following implications:
z Time. A reduced-force rehearsal normally requires less time than a full-dress rehearsal.
Commanders consider how much time their subordinates need to plan and prepare when
deciding whether to conduct a reduced-force rehearsal.
z Echelons involved. A small unit can perform a full-dress rehearsal as part of a larger
organization’s reduced-force rehearsal.
z Operations security risk. A reduced-force rehearsal is less likely to present operations security
vulnerabilities than a full-dress rehearsal because it has fewer participants. However, the number
of radio transmissions required is the same as for a full-dress rehearsal and must be considered.
z Terrain. Terrain management for the reduced-force rehearsal can be as difficult as for the
full-dress rehearsal. The rehearsal area must be identified, secured, cleared, and maintained
throughout the rehearsal.
TERRAIN-MODEL REHEARSAL
I-21. The terrain-model rehearsal is the most popular rehearsal technique. It takes less time and fewer
resources than a full-dress or reduced-force rehearsal. (A terrain-model rehearsal takes a proficient brigade
between one to two hours to execute to standard.) An accurately constructed terrain model helps
subordinate leaders visualize the commander’s intent and concept of operations. When possible,
commanders place the terrain model where it overlooks the actual terrain of the AO. However, if the
situation requires more security, they place the terrain model on a reverse slope within walking distance of
a point overlooking the AO. The model’s orientation coincides with that of the terrain. The size of the
terrain model can vary from small (using markers to represent units) to large (on which the participants can
walk). A large model helps reinforce the participants’ perception of unit positions on the terrain.
I-22. Terrain-model rehearsals have the following implications:
z Time. Often, constructing the terrain model is the most time-consuming part of this technique.
Units require a clear SOP that states how to build the model so it is accurate, large, and detailed
enough to conduct the rehearsal. A good SOP also establishes staff responsibility for building
the terrain model and a timeline for its completion.
z Echelons involved. Because a terrain model is geared to the echelon conducting the rehearsal,
multiechelon rehearsals using this technique are difficult.
z Operations security risk. This rehearsal can present operations security vulnerabilities if the
area around the rehearsal site is not secured. Assembled commanders and their vehicles can
draw enemy attention. Units must sanitize the terrain model after completing the rehearsal.
z Terrain. Terrain management is less difficult than with the previous techniques. A good site is
easy for participants to find yet concealed from the enemy. An optimal location overlooks the
terrain where the unit will execute the operation.
I-23. With today’s digital capabilities, users can construct terrain models in virtual space. Units drape high
resolution imagery over elevation data thereby creating a fly-through or walk-through. Holographic
imagery produces the view in three dimensions. Often, graphics, detailed information, unmanned aircraft
systems, and ground imagery are hot linked to key points in the model providing more insight into the plan.
Digital terrain models reduce the operations security risk because real terrain is not used. The unit
geospatial engineers or imagery analysts can assist in digital model creation. Detailed city models already
exist for many world cities.
I-24. Digital terrain-model rehearsals have the following implications:
z Time. The time it takes to create the three-dimensional model depends on the amount of
available data on the terrain being modeled.
z Echelons involved. This type of rehearsal best suits small units, although with a good local area
network, a wider audience can view the graphics. All echelons may be provided copies of the
digital model to take back to their headquarters for a more detailed examination.
z Operations security risk. If not placed on a computer network, there is limited security risk
because no site is secured and the rehearsal can be conducted under cover. However, if placed on
a computer network, digital terrain models can be subject to enemy exploitation due to inherent
vulnerabilities of networks.
z Terrain. This space requires the least space of all rehearsals. Using tents or enclosed areas
conceal the rehearsal from the enemy.
SKETCH-MAP REHEARSAL
I-25. Commanders can use the sketch-map technique almost anywhere, day or night. The procedures are
the same as for a terrain-model rehearsal except the commander uses a sketch map in place of a terrain
model. Effective sketches are large enough for all participants to see as each participant walks through
execution of the operation. Participants move markers on the sketch to represent unit locations and
maneuvers.
I-26. Sketch-map rehearsals have the following implications:
z Time. Sketch-map rehearsals take less time than terrain-model rehearsals and more time than
map rehearsals.
z Echelons involved. Because a sketch map is geared to the echelon conducting the rehearsal,
multiechelon rehearsals using this technique are difficult.
z Operations security risk. This rehearsal can present operations security vulnerabilities if the
area around the rehearsal site is not secured. Assembled commanders and their vehicles can
draw enemy attention. Units must sanitize, secure, or destroy the sketch map after use.
z Terrain. This technique requires less space than a terrain-model rehearsal. A good site is easy
for participants to find yet concealed from the enemy. An optimal location overlooks the terrain
where the unit will execute the operation.
MAP REHEARSAL
I-27. A map rehearsal is similar to a sketch-map rehearsal except the commander uses a map and operation
overlay of the same scale used to plan the operation.
I-28. Map rehearsals have the following implications:
z Time. The most time-consuming part is the rehearsal itself. A map rehearsal is normally the
easiest technique to set up since it requires only maps and graphics for current operations.
z Echelons involved. Because the operation overlay is geared to the echelon conducting the
rehearsal, multiechelon rehearsals using this technique are difficult.
z Operations security risk. This rehearsal can present operations security vulnerabilities if the
area around the rehearsal site is not secured. Assembled commanders and their vehicles can
draw enemy attention.
z Terrain. This technique requires the least space of all rehearsals. A good site is one that is easy
for participants to find yet concealed from the enemy. An optimal location overlooks the terrain
where the unit will execute the operation.
NETWORK REHEARSAL
I-29. Network rehearsals are conducted over wide-area networks or local area networks. Commanders and
staffs practice these rehearsals by talking through critical portions of the operation over communications
networks in a sequence the commander establishes. The organization rehearses only the critical parts of the
operation. These rehearsals require all information systems needed to execute that portion of the operation.
All participants require working information systems, the operation order, and overlays. Command posts
can rehearse battle tracking during network rehearsals.
I-30. Network rehearsals have the following implications:
z Time. This technique can be time efficient if SOPs are clear. However, if the organization has
unclear SOPs, has units not operating on the network, or has units without working
communications, this technique can be time-consuming.
z Echelons involved. This technique lends itself to multiechelon rehearsals. Participation is
limited only by the commander’s intent and the capabilities of the command’s information
systems.
z Operations security risk. If a network rehearsal is executed from current unit locations, the risk
may be higher. The enemy may monitor the increased volume of transmissions and potentially
compromise information. The organization should use different frequencies from those planned
for the operation. Using wire systems is an option but does not exercise the network systems,
which is the strong point of this technique.
z Terrain. If a network rehearsal is executed from unit locations, terrain considerations are
minimal. If a separate rehearsal area is required, considerations are similar to those of a
reduced-force rehearsal.
REHEARSAL RESPONSIBILITIES
I-31. This discussion addresses responsibilities for conducting rehearsals. It is based on the combined arms
rehearsal. Responsibilities are the same for support rehearsals.
PLANNING
I-32. Commanders and chiefs of staff (executive officers at lower echelons) plan rehearsals.
Commander
I-33. Commanders provide certain information as part of the commander’s guidance during the initial
mission analysis. They may revise the following information when they select a course of action:
z Rehearsal type.
z Rehearsal technique.
z Location.
z Attendees.
z Enemy course of action to be portrayed.
PREPARATION
I-35. Everyone involved in executing or supporting the rehearsal has responsibilities during preparation.
Commander
I-36. Commanders prepare to rehearse operations with events phased in proper order, from start to finish.
Under time-constrained conditions, this often proves difficult. Commanders—
z Identify and prioritize key events to rehearse.
z Allocate time for each event.
z Perform personal preparation, including reviews of—
Task organization completeness.
Personnel and materiel readiness.
Organizational level of preparation.
Subordinate Leaders
I-38. Subordinate leaders complete their planning. This planning includes—
z Completing unit operation orders.
z Identifying issues derived from the higher headquarters’ operation order.
z Providing a copy of their unit operation order with graphics to the higher headquarters.
z Performing personal preparation similar to that of the commander.
z Ensuring they and their subordinates bring all necessary equipment.
EXECUTION
I-40. During execution, the commander, chief of staff, assistants, subordinate leaders, recorder, and staff
from the conducting headquarters all have specific responsibilities.
Commander
I-41. Commanders command the rehearsal just as they will command the operation. They maintain the
focus and level of intensity, allowing no potential for subordinate confusion. Although the staff refines the
operation order, it belongs to the commander. The commander uses the order to conduct operations. An
effective rehearsal is not a commander’s brief to subordinates. It validates synchronization—the what,
when, and where—of tasks that subordinate units will perform to execute the operation and achieve the
commander’s intent.
z Disciplines leader movements, enforces brevity, and ensures completeness. The operation order,
decision support template, and execution matrix are the chief of staff’s tools.
z Keeps within time constraints.
z Ensures that the most important events receive the most attention.
z Ensures that absentees and flank units receive changes to the operation order. Transmits changes
to them as soon as practical.
z Communicates the key civil considerations of the operation.
Subordinate Leaders
I-45. Subordinate unit leaders, using an established format—
z Effectively articulate their units’ actions and responsibilities.
z Record changes on their copies of the graphics or operation order.
Recorder
I-46. The recorder is normally the G-3 (S-3) or a representative from the operations cell. During the
rehearsal, the recorder—
z Captures all coordination made during execution.
z Notes unresolved problems.
I-47. At the end of the rehearsal, the recorder—
z Presents any unresolved problems to the commander for resolution.
z Restates any changes, coordination, or clarifications directed by the commander.
z Estimates when a written fragmentary order codifying the changes will follow.
ASSESSMENT
I-49. The commander establishes the standard for a successful rehearsal. A properly executed rehearsal
validates each leader’s role and how each unit contributes to the overall operation—what is done, when it is
done relative to times and events, and where it is done to achieve desired effects. An effective rehearsal
ensures commanders have a common vision of the enemy, their own forces, the terrain, and the relationship
among them. It identifies specific actions requiring immediate staff resolution and informs the higher
commander of critical issues or locations that the commander, chief of staff (executive officer), or G-3
(S-3) must personally oversee.
I-50. The commander (or rehearsal director in the commander’s absence) assesses and critiques all parts of
the rehearsal. Critiques center on how well the operation achieves the commander’s intent and on the
coordination necessary to accomplish that end. Usually, the internal execution of tasks within the rehearsal
is left to the subordinate unit commander’s judgment and discretion.
CONDUCTING A REHEARSAL
I-51. All participants have responsibilities before, during, and after a rehearsal. Before a rehearsal, the
rehearsal director states the commander’s expectations and orients the other participants on details of the
rehearsal as necessary. During a rehearsal, all participants rehearse their roles in the operation. They make
sure they understand how their actions support the overall operation and note any additional coordination
required. After a rehearsal, participants ensure they understand any changes to the operation order and
coordination requirements, and they receive all updated staff products.
I-52. Commanders do not normally address small problems that arise during rehearsals. Instead, these are
recorded. This ensures the rehearsal’s flow is not interrupted. If the problem remains at the end of the
rehearsal, the commander resolves it then. However, if the problem can wait until the end of the rehearsal,
it may not have been a real problem. If the problem jeopardizes mission accomplishment, the staff
accomplishes the coordination necessary to resolve it before the participants disperse. Identifying and
solving such problems is a major reason for conducting rehearsals. If corrections are not made while
participants are assembled, the opportunity to do so may be lost. Coordinating among dispersed participants
and disseminating changes to them is more difficult than accomplishing these actions in person.
Orientation
I-56. The rehearsal director orients the participants to the terrain or rehearsal medium. Orientation is
identified using magnetic north on the rehearsal medium and symbols representing actual terrain features.
The director explains any graphic control measures, obstacles, and targets and then issues supplemental
materials, if needed.
Rehearsal Script
I-57. An effective technique for controlling rehearsals is to use a script. It keeps the rehearsal on track. The
script provides a checklist so the organization addresses all warfighting functions and outstanding issues. It
has two major parts: the agenda and the response sequence.
Agenda
I-58. An effective rehearsal follows a prescribed agenda that everyone knows and understands. An
effective rehearsal includes—
z Roll call.
z Participant orientation to the terrain.
z Location of local civilians.
z Enemy situation brief.
z Friendly situation brief.
z Description of expected adversary actions.
z Discussion of friendly unit actions.
z A review of notes made by the recorder.
I-59. The execution matrix, decision support template, and operation order outline the rehearsal agenda.
These tools, especially the execution matrix, both drive and focus the rehearsal. The commander and staff
use them to control the operation’s execution. Any templates, matrixes, or tools developed within each of
the warfighting functions (for example an intelligence synchronization matrix or fires execution matrix)
should tie directly to the supported unit’s execution matrix and decision support template.
I-60. An effective rehearsal requires the enemy force and other variables of the operational environment to
be portrayed realistically and quickly without distracting from the rehearsal. One technique for doing this
has the G-2 (S-2) preparing an actions checklist. It lists a sequence of events much like the one for friendly
units but from the enemy or civilian perspective.
Response Sequence
I-61. Participants respond in a logical sequence: either by warfighting function or by unit as the
organization is deployed, from front to rear. The commander determines the sequence before the rehearsal.
It is posted at the rehearsal site, and the rehearsal director may restate it.
I-62. Effective rehearsals allow participants to visualize and synchronize the concept of operations. As the
rehearsal proceeds, participants talk through the concept of operations. They focus on key events and the
synchronization required to achieve the desired effects. The commander leads the rehearsal. The
commander gives orders during the operation. Subordinate commanders enter and leave the discussion at
the time they expect to begin and end their tasks or activities during the operation. This practice helps the
commander assess the adequacy of synchronization. They do not “re-war-game” unless absolutely
necessary to ensure subordinate unit commanders understand the plan.
I-63. The rehearsal director emphasizes integrating fires, events that trigger different branch actions, and
actions on contact. The chief of fires (fire support officer) or fires unit commander states when fires are
initiated, who is firing, from where the firing comes, the ammunition available, and the desired target
effect. Subordinate commanders state when they initiate fires per their fire support plans. The rehearsal
director speaks for any absent staff section and ensures all actions on the synchronization matrix and
decision support template are addressed at the proper time or event.
I-64. The rehearsal director ensures that key sustainment and protection actions are included in the
rehearsal at the times they are executed. (See table I-1 on page I-12.) Failure to do so reduces the value of
the rehearsal as a coordination tool. The staff officer with coordinating staff responsibility inserts these
items into the rehearsal at appropriate times. Special staff officers should brief by exception when a
friendly or enemy event occurs within their area of expertise. Summarizing these actions at the end of the
rehearsal can reinforce coordination requirements identified during the rehearsal. The staff updates the
decision support template and gives a copy to each participant. Under time-constrained conditions, the
conducting headquarters staff may provide copies before the rehearsal and rely on participants to update
them with pen-and-ink changes.
Table I-1. Example sustainment and protection actions for rehearsals
• Casualty evacuation routes • Support area displacement times and locations
• Ambulance exchange point locations • Enemy prisoner of war collection points
• Refuel-on-the-move points • Aviation support
• Class IV and class V resupply points • Military police actions
• Logistics release points
Ground Rules
I-65. After discussing the rehearsal script, the rehearsal director—
z States the standard (what the commander will accept) for a successful rehearsal.
z Ensures everyone understands the parts of the operation order to rehearse. If the entire operation
will not be rehearsed, the rehearsal director states the events to be rehearsed.
z Quickly reviews the rehearsal SOP if all participants are not familiar with it. An effective
rehearsal SOP states—
Who controls the rehearsal.
Who approves the rehearsal venue and its construction.
When special staff officers brief the commander.
The relationship between how the execution matrix portrays events and how units rehearse
events.
z Establishes the timeline; it designates the rehearsal starting time in relation to H-hour. For
example, begin the rehearsal by depicting the anticipated situation one hour before H-hour. One
event executed before rehearsing the first event is deployment of forces.
z Establishes the time interval to begin and track the rehearsal. For example, specify a ten-minute
interval equates to one hour of actual time.
z Updates friendly and adversary activities as necessary, for example, any ongoing
reconnaissance.
The rehearsal director concludes the orientation with a call for questions.
this will usually be after the decisive action (such as committing the reserve or striking force), the final
destruction or withdrawal of the enemy, and casualty evacuation is complete. In a stability operation, this is
usually when targeted progress within a designated line of effort is achieved.
Step 6 – Reset
I-77. At this point, the commander states the next branch to rehearse. The rehearsal director resets the
situation to the decision point where that branch begins and states the criteria for a decision to execute that
branch. Participants assume those criteria have been met and then refight the operation along that branch
until they attain the desired end state. They complete any coordination needed to ensure all participants
understand and can meet any requirements. The recorder records any changes to the branch.
I-78. The commander then states the next branch to rehearse. The rehearsal director again resets the
situation to the decision point where that branch begins, and participants repeat the process. This continues
until all decision points and branches the commander wants to rehearse have been addressed.
I-79. If the standard is not met and time permits, the commander directs participants to repeat the
rehearsal. The rehearsal continues until participants are prepared or until the time available expires.
(Commanders may allocate more time for a rehearsal but must assess the effects on subordinate
commanders’ preparation time.) Successive rehearsals, if conducted, should be more complex and realistic.
I-80. At the end of the rehearsal, the recorder restates any changes, coordination, or clarifications the
commander directed and estimates how long it will take to codify changes in a written fragmentary order.
INFORMATION BRIEFING
J-2. An information briefing presents facts in a form the audience can easily understand. It does not
include conclusions or recommendations nor does it result in decisions. (See figure J-1.)
1. Introduction
• Greeting. Address the audience. Identify yourself and your organization.
• Type and Classification of Briefing. Identify the type and classification of the briefing. For
example, “This is an information briefing. It is classified SECRET.”
• Purpose and Scope. Describe complex subjects from general to specific.
• Outline or Procedure. Briefly summarize the key points and general approach. Explain any
special procedures (such as demonstrations, displays, or tours). For example, “During my
briefing, I will discuss the six phases of our plan. I will refer to maps of our area of operations.
Then my assistant will bring out a sand table to show you the expected flow of battle.” The key
points may be placed on a chart that remains visible throughout the briefing.
2. Main Body
• Arrange the main ideas in a logical sequence.
• Use visual aids to emphasize main points.
• Plan effective transitions from one main point to the next.
• Be prepared to answer questions at any time.
3. Closing
• Ask for questions.
• Briefly recap main ideas and make a concluding statement.
DECISION BRIEFING
J-4. A decision briefing obtains the answer to a question or a decision on a course of action. The briefer
presents recommended solutions from the analysis or study of a problem or problem area. (Chapter 2
discusses Army problem solving.) Decision briefings vary in formality and level of detail depending on the
commander’s or decisionmaker’s knowledge on the subject.
J-5. If the decisionmaker is unfamiliar with the problem, the briefing format adheres to the decision
briefing format. (See figure J-2.) Decision briefings should include all facts and assumptions relevant to the
problem, a discussion of alternatives, analysis-based conclusions, and any coordination required.
1. Introduction
• Greeting. Address the decisionmaker. Identify yourself and your organization.
• Type and Classification of Briefing. Identify the type and classification of the briefing. For
example, “This is a decision briefing. It is UNCLASSIFIED.”
• Problem Statement. State the problem.
• Recommendation. State the recommendation.
2. Body
• Facts. Provide an objective presentation of both positive and negative facts bearing upon the
problem.
• Assumptions. Identify necessary assumptions made to bridge any gaps in factual data.
• Solutions. Discuss the various options that can solve the problem.
• Analysis. List the criteria by which the briefer will evaluate how to solve the problem (screening
and evaluation). Discuss relative advantages and disadvantages for each course of action.
• Comparison. Show how the courses of action rate against the evaluation criteria.
• Conclusion. Describe why the recommended solution is best.
3. Closing
• Ask for questions.
• Briefly recap main ideas and restate the recommendation.
• Request a decision.
MISSION BRIEFING
J-9. Mission briefings are informal briefings that occur during operations or training. Briefers may be
commanders, staffs, or special representatives. (See appendix B for a discussion of a mission briefing
within the military decisionmaking process.)
J-10. Mission briefings serve to convey critical mission information not provided in the plan or order to
individuals or smaller units. Mission briefings—
z Issue or enforce an order.
z Provide more detailed instructions or requirements.
z Instill a general appreciation for the mission.
STAFF BRIEFING
J-12. Staff briefings are used to inform the commander and staff of the current situation to coordinate and
synchronize efforts within the unit. The individual convening the staff briefing sets the briefing agenda.
Each staff element presents relevant information from their functional areas. Staff briefings facilitate
information exchange, announce decisions, issue directives, or provide guidance. The staff briefing format
may include characteristics of the information briefing, decision briefing, and mission briefing.
J-13. Staff briefings commonly include the commander; deputies or assistants; chiefs of staff or executive
officers; and coordinating, personal, and special staff officers. Representatives from major subordinate
commands may also be present. The chief of staff or executive officer often presides over the briefing. The
commander may take an active role during the briefing and normally concludes the briefing.
FOLLOW UP AS REQUIRED
J-22. When the briefing is over, the briefer must follow up as required. To ensure understanding, the
briefer prepares a memorandum for record (MFR). This MFR records the subject, date, time, and location
of the briefing as well as the ranks, names, and positions of audience members. The briefing’s content is
concisely recorded to help ensure understanding. The briefer records the decision. Recommendations and
their approval, disapproval, or approval with modification are recorded as well as instructions or directed
actions. Recommendations can include who is to take action. When a decision is involved and any
ambiguity exists about the commander’s intent, the briefer submits a draft of the MFR for correction before
preparing the final document. Lastly, the briefer informs proper authorities. The briefer distributes the final
MFR to staff sections and agencies required to act on the decisions or instructions, or whose plans or
operations may be affected.
SECTION I – ACRONYMS
AAR after action review
ACOS assistant chief of staff
AO area of operations
ARFOR See ARFOR under terms.
C2 command and control
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
COA course of action
COS chief of staff
CP command post
CRM composite risk management
DA Department of the Army
DS direct support
EEFI essential element of friendly information
FM field manual
FMI field manual–interim
FRAGO fragmentary order
G-1 assistant chief of staff, personnel
G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations
G-4 assistant chief of staff, logistics
G-5 assistant chief of staff, plans
G-6 assistant chief of staff, signal
G-7 assistant chief of staff, information engagement
G-8 assistant chief of staff, financial management
G-9 assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations
GS general support
INFOSYS information systems
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IR information requirement
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication
SECTION II – TERMS
ARFOR
The Army Service component headquarters for a joint task force or a joint and multinational force.
assessment
(Army) The continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation, particularly the enemy, and
progress of an operation. (FM 3-0)
assumption
(joint) A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either
or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the
process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of
action. (JP 1-02)
avenue of approach
(joint) An air or ground route of an attacking force of a given size leading to its objective or to key
terrain in its path. (JP 2-01.3)
*backbrief
A briefing by subordinates to the commander to review how subordinates intend to accomplish their
mission.
battle rhythm
(joint) A deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current
and future operations. (JP 3-33)
*board
(Army) A grouping of predetermined staff representatives with delegated decision authority for a
particular purpose or function.
branch
(joint) The contingency options built into the base plan. A branch is used for changing the mission,
orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated
events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. (JP 5-0)
campaign plan
(joint) A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or
operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 5-0)
civil considerations
The influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the
civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an AO on the conduct of military operations.
(FM 6-0)
*collaborative planning
Commanders, subordinate commanders, staffs, and other partners sharing information, knowledge,
perceptions, ideas, and concepts regardless of physical location throughout the planning process.
combat power
(Army) The total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military
unit/formation can apply at a given time. Army forces generate combat power by converting potential
into effective action. (FM 3-0)
command and control
(Army) The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and
attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Commanders perform command and control
functions through a command and control system. (FM 6-0)
*command group
The commander and selected staff members who accompany commanders and enable them to exercise
command and control away from a command post.
*command post
(Army) A unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities.
*command post cell
A grouping of personnel and equipment organized by warfighting function or by planning horizon to
facilitate the exercise of command and control.
commander’s intent
(Army) A clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must
establish with respect to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations that represent the desired end
state. (FM 3-0)
commander’s visualization
The mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and
envisioning the broad sequence of events by which the force will achieve that end state. (FM 3-0)
concealment
(joint) Protection from observation and surveillance. (JP 1-02)
concept of operations
(Army) A statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the
mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state. It is
normally expressed in terms of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. (FM 3-0)
*constraint
(Army) A restriction placed on the command by a higher command. A constraint dictates an action or
inaction, thus restricting the freedom of action of a subordinate commander.
control measure
A means of regulating forces or warfighting functions. (FM 3-0)
cover
(Army) Protection from the effects of fires. (FM 6-0)
decision point
(joint) A point in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision
concerning a specific course of action. (JP 5-0)
*decision support matrix
A written record of a war-gamed course of action that describes decision points and associated actions
at those decision points.
decision support template
(joint) A combined intelligence and operations graphic based on the results of wargaming. The
decision support template depicts decision points, timelines associated with movement of forces and
the flow of the operation, and other key items of information required to execute a specific friendly
course of action. (JP 2-01.3)
decisive point
(joint) A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows
commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving
success. (JP 3-0)
*design
A methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe
complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them.
*early-entry command post
A lead command and control element of a headquarters designed to control operations until the
remaining portions of the headquarters are deployed and operational.
*essential task
(Army) A specified or implied task that must be executed to accomplish the mission.
*evaluating
Using criteria to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of
progress exists.
exceptional information
Information that would have answered one of the commander’s critical information requirements if the
requirement for it had been foreseen and stated as one of the commander’s critical information
requirements. (FM 6-0)
execution
Putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational
understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions. (FM 3-0)
*execution matrix
A visual and sequential representation of the critical tasks and responsible organizations by time.
field of fire
(joint) The area which a weapon or a group of weapons may cover effectively with fire from a given
position. (JP 1-02)
fragmentary order
(joint) An abbreviated form of an operation order issued as needed after an operation order to change
or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order. (JP 5-0)
full spectrum operations
Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as
part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to
create opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action—lethal and
nonlethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of
the operational environment. Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects
of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces. (FM 3-0)
*implied task
(Army) A task that must be performed to accomplish a specified task or mission but is not stated in the
higher headquarters’ order.
*indicator
(Army) In the context of assessment, an item of information that provides insight into a measure of
effectiveness or measure of performance.
information requirements
(Army) All information elements the commander and staff require to successfully conduct operations;
that is, all elements necessary to address the factors of METT-TC. (FM 6-0)
key terrain
(joint) Any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either
combatant. (JP 2-01.3)
leadership
The process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation, while operating to
accomplish the mission and improving the organization. (FM 6-22)
*main command post
A command and control facility containing the majority of the staff designed to control current
operations, conduct detailed analysis, and plan future operations.
main effort
The designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall
mission success. It is usually weighted with the preponderance of combat power. (FM 3-0)
measure of effectiveness
(joint) A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment
that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an
effect. (JP 3-0)
measure of performance
(joint) A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment.
(JP 3-0)
METT-TC
A memory aid used in two contexts: 1. In the context of information management, the major subject
categories into which relevant information is grouped for military operations: mission, enemy, terrain
and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations. (FM 6-0) 2. In the con-
text of tactics, major variables considered during mission analysis (mission variables). (FM 3-90)
operational art
(joint) The application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill,
knowledge, and experience—to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and
employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war.
(JP 3-0)
operational environment
(joint) A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of
capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)
operational initiative
The setting or dictating the terms of action throughout an operation. (FM 3-0)
operational limitation
(joint) An action required or prohibited by higher authority, such as a constraint or a restraint, and
other restrictions that limit the commander’s freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, rules
of engagement, political and economic conditions in affected countries, and host nation issues. (JP 5-0)
order
(joint) A communication, written, oral, or by signal, which conveys instructions from a superior to a
subordinate. (JP 1-02)
*parallel planning
Two or more echelons planning for the same operation nearly simultaneously.
*persistent conflict
The protracted confrontation among state, nonstate, and individual actors that are increasingly willing
to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.
phase
(Army) A planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity. A change in
phase usually involves a change of mission, task organization, or rules of engagement. Phasing helps in
planning and controlling and may be indicated by time, distance, terrain, or an event. (FM 3-0)
planning
The process by which commanders (and the staff, if available) translate the commander’s visualization
into a specific course of action for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected results.
(FM 3-0)
*planning horizon
A point in time commanders use to focus the organization’s planning efforts to shape future events.
preparation
Activities performed by units to improve their ability to execute an operation. Preparation includes, but
is not limited to, plan refinement; rehearsals; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
coordination; inspections; and movement. (FM 3-0)
*priority of support
A priority set by the commander to ensure a subordinate unit has support in accordance with its
relative importance to accomplish the mission.
*rehearsal
A session in which a staff or unit practices expected actions to improve performance during execution.
restraint
(joint) Requirement placed on the command by a higher command that prohibits an action, thus
restricting freedom of action. (JP 5-0)
*running estimate
The continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is
proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable.
sequel
(joint) A major operation that follows the current major operation. In a single major operation, a sequel
is the next phase. Plans for a sequel are based on the possible outcomes (success, stalemate, or defeat)
associated with the current operation. (JP 5-0)
situational understanding
The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships
among the mission variables to facilitate decisionmaking. (FM 3-0)
*specified task
(Army) A task specifically assigned to a unit by its higher headquarters.
*staff section
A grouping of staff members by area of expertise under a coordinating, special, or personal staff
officer.
supporting plan
(joint) An operation plan prepared by a supporting commander, a subordinate commander, or an
agency to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander’s plan. (JP 5-0)
*synchronization matrix
A tool the staff uses to record the results of war-gaming and helps them synchronize a course of action
across time, space, and purpose in relationship to potential enemy and civil actions.
*tactical command post
A command and control facility containing a tailored portion of a unit headquarters designed to control
portions of an operation for a limited time.
task
A clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and organizations. (FM 7-0)
task organization
(Army) A temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission. (FM 3-0)
task organizing
(Army) The act of designing an operating force, support staff, or logistic package of specific size and
composition to meet a unique task or mission. Characteristics to examine when task organizing the
force include, but are not limited to: training, experience, equipage, sustainability, operating
environment, enemy threat, and mobility. For Army forces, it includes allocating available assets to
subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships. (FM 3-0)
*terrain management
The process of allocating terrain by establishing areas of operation, designating assembly areas, and
specifying locations for units and activities to deconflict activities that might interfere with each other.
*troop leading procedures
A dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an
operation.
troop movement
The movement of troops from one place to another by any available means. (FM 3-90)
understanding
Knowledge that has been synthesized and had judgment applied to it in a specific situation to
comprehend the situation’s inner relationships. (FM 6-0)
unity of effort
(joint) Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not
necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action. (JP 1)
variance
A difference between the actual situation during an operation and what the plan forecasted the situation
would be at that time or event. (FM 6-0)
warning order
(joint) A preliminary notice of an order or action that is to follow. (JP 3-33)
*working group
(Army) A grouping of predetermined staff representatives who meet to provide analysis, coordinate,
and provide recommendations for a particular purpose or function.
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.
FM 1-02 (101-5-1). Operational Terms and Graphics. 21 September 2004.
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 12 April 2001.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online:
<https://akocomm.us.army.mil/usapa/doctrine/Active_FM.html>. Army regulations are produced only
in electronic media. Most are available online: < http://www.army.mil/usapa/index.html>.
AR 380-5. Department of the Army Information Security Program. 29 September 2000.
AR 380-10. Foreign Disclosure and Contacts with Foreign Representatives. 22 June 2005.
FM 2-0. Intelligence. 17 May 2004.
FM 2-01.3. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace. 15 October 2009.
FM 3-0. Operations. 27 February 2008.
FM 3-05.401. Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 5 July 2007.
FM 3-07. Stability Operations. 6 October 2008.
FM 3-24. Counterinsurgency. 15 December 2006.
FM 3-37. Protection. 30 September 2009.
FM 3-52 (FM 100-103). Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone. 1 August 2002.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
MCWP 5-1. Marine Corps Planning Process. 5 January 2000.
RECOMMENDED PUBLICATIONS
This bibliography is a tool for Army leaders to help them increase their knowledge of the
exercise of command and control. Reading what others have written provides a foundation
that leaders can use to assess situations and make appropriate decisions. The books and
articles that follow are not the only good ones on these subjects. The field is vast and rich.
They are, however, some of the more useful readings for Soldiers.
DECISIONMAKING
Gilovich, Thomas, Dale Griffin and Daniel Kahneman, eds. Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of
Intuitive Judgment. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Greenfield, Kent Roberts, ed. Command Decisions. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2000.
Hart, Paul ‘t, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds. Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics
and Foreign Policy-making. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1997.
Janis, Irving L. and Leon Mann. Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and
Commitment. New York: The Free Press, 1977.
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky. “Part I: Introduction–Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases.” In Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, edited by Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Klein, Gary. Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998.
Leedom, Dennis K., James Murphy, Bill Killam, and Leonard Adelman. Final Report: Cognitive
Engineering of the Human-Computer Interface for ABCS. Andover, MA: Dynamics Research
Corporation, 1998.
Neustadt, Richard E. and Ernest R. May. Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers.
New York: Free Press, 1986.
Simon, Herbert A. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative
Organization. New York: Free Press, 1997.
__________. The Sciences of the Artificial, 3d ed. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996.
Turner, Marlene E. and Anthony R. Pratkanis. “Twenty-Five Years of Groupthink Theory and
Research: Lessons from the Evaluation of a Theory.” Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes 73 (February–March 1998): 105–115.
Mintzberg, Henry. The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, Plans,
Planners. New York: Free Press, 1994.
Rein, Martin and Donald A. Schön. “Frame-Reflective Policy Discourse.” In Social Sciences and
Modern States: National Experiences and Theoretical Crossroads, edited by Peter Wagner,
Carol H. Weiss, Björn Wittrock, and Hellmut Wollmans. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1991.
Rittel, Horst W. J. “On the Planning Crisis: Systems Analysis of the ‘First and Second Generations’.”
Bedriftsøkonomen 8 (1972): 390–396.
Rittel, Horst W. J. and Melvin M. Weber. “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning.” Policy
Sciences 4 (1973): 155–169.
DESIGN
Banach, Stefan J. “Educating by Design: Preparing Leaders for a Complex World.” Military Review
(March–April 2009): 96–104.
Banach, Stefan J. and Alex Ryan. “The Art of Design: A Design Methodology.” Military Review
(March–April 2009): 105–115.
Berger, Warren. Glimmer: How Design Can Transform Your Life, and Maybe Even the World. New
York: Penguin Press, 2009.
Brown, Tim. Change by Design: How Design Thinking Transforms Organizations and Inspires
Innovation. New York: Harper Business, 2009.
Checkland, Peter and John Poulter. Learning for Action: A Short Definitive Account of Soft Systems
Methodology and Its Use for Practitioner, Teachers and Students. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2006.
Cross, Nigel. “Forty Years of Design Research.” Design Research Quarterly (January 2007): 3–5.
Denning, Stephen. The Leader’s Guide to Storytelling: Mastering the Art and Discipline of Business
Narrative. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, a Wiley imprint, 2005.
Dodge, Jennifer, Sonia M. Ospina, and Erica Gabrielle Foldy. “Integrating Rigor and Relevance in
Public Administration Scholarship: The Contribution of Narrative Inquiry.” Public
Administration Review (May/June 2005): 286–300.
Jones, J. Christopher. Design Methods: Seeds of Human Futures. New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970.
Kem, Jack D. Design: Tools of the Trade. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2009.
Lawson, Bryan. How Designers Think: The Design Process Demystified. Boston: Architectural Press,
1997.
Ospina, Sonia M. and Jennifer Dodge. “It’s About Time: Catching Method Up to Meaning—The
Usefulness of Narrative Inquiry in Public Administration Research.” Public Administration
Review (March 2005): 143–157.
Schön, Donald A. The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action. New York: Basic
Books, 1983.
Schwarz, Roger, Anne Davidson, Peg Carlson, and Sue McKinney. The Skilled Facilitator Fieldbook:
Tips, Tools, and Tested Methods for Consultants, Facilitators, Managers, Trainers, and
Coaches. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2005.
CRITICAL THINKING
Archer, Margaret, Roy Bhaskar, Andrew Collier, Tony Lawson, and Alan Norrie, eds. Critical
Realism: Essential Readings. New York: Routledge, 1998.
Checkland, Peter. Systems Thinking, Systems Practice. New York: J. Wiley, 1981.
Gharajedaghi, Jamshid. Systems Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity: A Platform for
Designing Business Architecture. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1999.
Paul, Richard and Linda Elder. Critical Thinking: Tools for Taking Charge of Your Learning and Your
Life. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001.
Plato. Theaetetus, translated by Robin A. H. Waterfield. New York: Viking Penguin, 1987.
Vasquez, John A. “The Post-Positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific Enquiry and International
Relations Theory After Enlightenment’s Fall.” In International Relations Theory Today,
edited by Ken Booth and Steve Smith. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania University
Press, 1995.
White, Hayden. The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation.
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987.
__________. Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1978.
COMPLEXITY
Axelrod, Robert and Michael D. Cohen. Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a
Scientific Frontier. New York: Free Press, 1999.
Bar-Yam, Yaneer. Making Things Work: Solving Complex Problems in a Complex World. Cambridge,
MA: Knowledge Press, 2004.
Beyerchen, Alan. “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War.” International Security
(Winter 1992): 59–90.
DeLanda, Manuel. A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity. New
York: Continuum, 2006.
Holland, John H. Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley
Publishing Co., 1995.
Waldrop, M. Mitchell. Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos. New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1992.
LEARNING ORGANIZATIONS
Hatch, Mary Jo. Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997.
Schön, Donald A. Educating the Reflective Practitioner: Toward a New Design for Teaching and
Learning in the Professions. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1987.
Senge, Peter M. The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization. New York:
Currency Books, published by Doubleday, a division of Random House, 1990.
Weick, Karl E. Making Sense of the Organization. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001.
__________. Sensemaking in Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995.
ASSESSMENT
Fiss, Peer C. and Paul M. Hirsch. “The Discourse of Globalization: Framing and Sensemaking of an
Emerging Concept.” American Sociological Review (February 2005): 29–52.
Jullien, Francois. A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking, translated by Janet
Lloyd. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2004.
Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1996.
Pearl, Judea. “Epilogue: The Art and Science of Cause and Effect.” In Causality: Models, Reasoning,
and Inference. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Quade, E. S., ed. Analysis for Military Decisions. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964.
Salmon, Wesley C. Causality and Explanation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics: New York: Cambridge University Press,
1999.
SOURCES USED
This source is quoted in this publication.
Eisenhower, Dwight D. “Remarks at the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference,”
14 November 1957, edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency
Project [online]. Santa Barbara, CA. Available from World Wide Web:
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10951> (accessed 26 February 2010).
PRESCRIBED FORMS
None
REFERENCED FORMS
DA forms are available on the APD website: <www.apd.army.mil>.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
box method, B-146–B-147 refine and validate, 5-58–5-60 operations and, 1-61
brainstorming, B-83, C-41 COA analysis, 5-64 RDSP and, 5-67
branch, defined, 2-29 actions of, B-134–B-166 combined arms rehearsal,
resources and, F-9 4-38–4-39, I-9, I-31–I-49
briefing. See specific briefings. running estimate and, F-7 command and control. See C2.
broad concept, develop, 1-57, staff and, B-110–B-111
B-95–B-100 troop leading procedures, C-48 command and control cell, A-23
war-gaming and, B-107–B-166 command and control warfighting
C function, D-12
COA approval, B-176–B-179
C2, 1-14–1-45 command group, A-10–A-13
commander and, 1-15 COA briefing, B-105
defined, A-10
defined, 1-14 COA comparison, MDMP and, members, A-11
effective, 1-39 B-167–B-175 mobile, A-12
exercise of, 1-1, 1-46 troop leading procedures, C-49
planning and, 2-51 command post. See CP.
COA decision briefing, B-175
SOP, A-35–A-48 command post cell, defined, A-15
staff sections and, A-2 COA development, 1-35, 1-53, staff section and, A-15–A-33
5-53–5-57 types, A-16
C2 system, 1-16 limiting, B-195
campaign, plans for, 2-10 MDMP and, B-73–B-106 command relationships, Army,
purpose of, C-39 F-12
campaign plan, E-14 support relationships, F-1–F-4,
defined, 2-11 troop leading procedures and,
C-39–C-47 F-11–F-14
cause and effect, 6-40–6-44, H-14 commander’s critical information
COA sketch,
caution, cause and effect, requirement. See CCIR.
develop, B-102–B-104
6-40–6-44 commander’s initial guidance,
troop leading procedures and,
RDSP and, 5-67–5-69 B-23
C-46–C-47
CCIR, develop, B-43–B-46 commander’s intent, 1-40, 1-53,
COA statement,
monitoring and, 6-9 2-88, 2-90–2-91, 2-104
develop, B-102–B-104
chance, uncertainty and, 1-9 troop leading procedures and, COA and, 5-54
change, adapting to, 2-24–2-30 C-46–C-47 defined, 2-90
anticipating, 3-11–3-12 collaboration, assessment, 1-36 mission and, 2-89
design and, 3-12 battle rhythm, A-50 commander’s visualization, 2-31,
civil conditions, 1-12, 4-30 benefits of, 1-35–1-36 2-53–2-56, 4-10
commanders and, 1-42, 5-65, broad concept and, B-95
civil considerations, B-19, B-30,
6-39, B-2 defined, 2-53
B-129, C-42
critical and creative thinking expressed as, 2-56
defined, C-38
and, 1-32 mission narrative and, 3-66
civilian, 2-14, 2-29, 3-62, design and, 2-42, 3-21, 3-35, planning guidance and, B-68
4-30–4-32, B-129, B-151, 3-37 commander(s). See also leader.
B-154. See also population. execution and, 1-36 actions by, 3-13, 3-32, 3-35,
considerations, B-92, B-94, planning and, 1-35, B-197 3-42, 3-45, 4-10, 4-11, 4-15,
B-108, I-60 preparation and, 1-36 4-17, 4-30, 4-42, 4-5, 4-8,
organizations, 1-25, 1-34,
collaboration and dialog, 5-3, 5-30, 5-49, 5-5, 5-55,
4-11, 4-27–4-29
1-31–1-36, 1-65, 2-42 5-57, A-54, B-25,
civil support operations, 1-61, B-176–B-178
2-57, 2-100, 2-103, B-79, C-40 collaborative planning, B-197
defined, 2-68 anticipation and, 2-77
classifications, in OPLAN and MDMP and, B-2 as planners, 2-51–2-56
OPORD, E-41 parallel and, 2-68–2-70 assessment and, 1-55, 6-2,
COA, conditions, 5-53 6-32–6-34
collection plan, H-33 battle command, 1-46, 1-49
considerations of, 5-59
criteria, B-75 combat power, analysis of, C-40 C2 and, 1-15, 1-17
development, B-84, C-6 assess, B-77–B-81 CCIR and, B-44
evaluation criteria, B-70–B-71 civil considerations and, B-92 characteristics, 3-9
feasible, B-173 defined, B-77 collaboration and dialog, 1-31,
implement, 5-61–5-66 execution and, 1-61 1-35, 1-42
modify, B-106, B-159 identification of, C-42 combatant, 2-9
intellectual power into, 3-34 communications from, 2-4
order. See also FRAGO and activities, 2-37 planning horizon, 2-7, 2-24, 2-72
WARNO. anticipation from, 2-28 defined, A-24
adjustments, 5-62 approach, 2-40 plans and, E-13
base, E-27–E-30 art of, 2-97 tactical-level planning, 2-13
defined, E-18 assessment, H-3 plans, 4-4, 5-2, C-53. See also
examples and procedures for, challenges of, 2-24 individual plans.
E-59–E-64 collaborative, 1-35, 2-68–2-70, action and, 2-35–2-36
format, E-59–E-64 B-197 analysis of, B-27–B-28
headings, E-28 commander and, 2-51–2-56, assessment of, 1-65, 4-40,
location for, C-55 B-194 6-35–6-36
production of, B-180–B-181 conceptual, 1-57, 2-37–2-49, build, 6-35
techniques, E-23–E-26 2-41 campaign, E-14
troop leading procedures and, considerations of, 2-71 complex, 2-74
C-54–C-55 continuous, 2-2, 2-64 components of, 2-87–2-109
types, E-18–E-26 decisive points and, 2-101 examples and procedures for,
verbal, 5-62, B-196, C-54, defined, 2-1 E-59–E-64
E-21, E-23, E-24 detailed, 1-57, 2-37–2-49 flexibility of, 2-73–2-80, 4-41
versus plan, 2-5 flexibility of, 2-85 full spectrum operations and,
written, E-25–E-26 focus of, 2-51–2-56, B-182 2-57–2-58
overlay order, E-21 fundamentals, 2-50–2-86, 3-2 higher headquarters,
example, E-64 learning and, 2-14 B-27–B-28
levels of war and, 2-6–2-13 military briefing, J-15–J-18
P MDMP and, 2-43–2-45 mission command and, 1-41
page identification, in OPLAN and methodology, 2-40 planning and, 2-1–2-5
OPORD, E-50 operations process, 1-57–1-58 questions for, 2-87
parallel, 2-68–2-70, B-196 revise and refine, 4-40–4-41
page numbering, in OPLAN and
partnerships and, 4-31 risk and, 2-87
OPORD, E-51
pitfalls, 2-81–2-86 running estimate and, 1-70
parallel planning, B-196 plans and, 2-1–2-5 simple, 2-73–2-80
collaborative and, 2-68–2-70 preparation and, 4-12-4-13 tentative, C-20–C-49
defined, 2-69 product of, 2-4 types, E-13–E-17
MDMP and, B-2 progression, 2-39 update, B-54–B-55
troop leading procedures, C-9 ratios, B-89–B-90 versus order, 2-5
participants, war game and, B-152 rehearsal responsibility,
I-32–I-34 plans cells, A-26–A-27
partners, building design, 3-62
requirements, 2-52, 2-70 polls, 6-50–6-51
collaboration and dialog, 1-31
understanding, 1-25 results of, 1-58 population. See also civilian and
running estimate and, G-8 society.
partnerships, building, 4-30–4-32 situational understanding, 1-20 during preparation, 4-11
perception, problems and, 2-20 strategic level and, 2-8 motivation of, 1-8
persistent conflict, 3-18–3-19 structure of, 2-3
potentials, tendencies and, 3-51
defined, 3-19 task organizing and, 4-6
teams and, 4-31 preoperations, checks and
problems and, 3-8
time and, 2-48, 2-65, inspections, 4-7, 4-53
perspectives, 1-8, 1-34, 2-71–2-72, B-182–B-198 preparation, activities of,
1-37–1-38, 4-10, B-19, B-168 understanding and, 1-57, 2-14 1-59–1-60, 4-16–4-53
design and, 3-3, 3-25–3-26, value of, 2-14–2-36 assessment and, 4-15
3-44, 3-68 variances during, 5-46 backbrief and, I-7
phase (phasing), benefits of, 2-99 planning guidance, B-177–B-178 collaboration and, 1-36
defined, 2-98 assessment and, 6-55, H-1 defined, 4-1
sequencing, 2-96–2-99 by warfighting function, during execution, 4-14
places, in OPLAN and OPORD, D-5–D-12 during planning, 4-12–4-13
E-32–E-39 commander’s intent and, B-68 functions of, 4-1–4-7
planners. See also commander(s), design and, D-2 ISR, 4-17–4-19
leader(s), and staff. detail, D-4 MDMP and, B-3
combat power and, B-78–B-81 development of, D-1 operations process and,
focus of, 4-51 MDMP and, D-1–D-4 1-59–1-60, 4-8–4-15
visualization and, 1-53 protection and, 4-21–4-25
planning, C-10
Official:
JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1006104
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the United States Army Reserve: To be distributed in
accordance with the initial distribution number 110412, requirements for FM 5-0.
PIN: 082115-000