POLITICAL LAW

LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT

Under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112, the Provincial Budget Officer must be recommended by
the Governor. Since Josefa Kalayon was not recommended by the Governor, her appointment is not
valid. As held in San Juan v. Civil Service Commission, 196 SCRA 69, if the person recommended by
the Governor is not qualified, what the Secretary of Budget and Management should do is to ask him to
recommend someone who is eligible.
DBM Local Budget Circular No. 31 is not valid, since it is inconsistent with Executive Order No. 112,
which requires that the appointee for Provincial Budget Officer be recommended by the Governor.
(Under the Local Government Code, it is now the local chief executive who is empowered to appoint the
budget officer).
Boundary disputes between local government units should, as much as possible, be settled amicably.
After efforts at settlement fail, then the dispute may be brought to the appropriate Regional Trial Court
in the said province. Since the Local Government Code is silent as to what body has exclusive
jurisdiction over the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent
component city of the same province, the Regional Trial Courts have general jurisdiction to adjudicate
the said controversy. (Mun. of Kananga v. Madrona, G.R. No. 141375, April 30, 2003)

Under Section 118(b) of the Local Government Code, boundary disputes involving two or more
municipalities within the same province shall be settled by the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.

Under Section 118(d) of the Local Government Code, boundary disputes involving two or more highly
urbanized cities shall be settled by the sangguniang panlungsod of the parties.

A plebiscite is necessary, because this is required for the creation of a new municipality. (Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution.) The voters of both Madako and Masigla should participate in the
plebiscite, because both are directly affected by the creation of Masigla. The territory of Madako will be
reduced. (Tan v. COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727 [1986).

Although the municipality cannot be considered as a de facto corporation, because there is no valid law
under which it was created, the acts of the municipality and of its officers will not be invalidated,
because the existence of the law creating it is an operative fact before it was declared unconstitutional.
Hence, the previous acts of the municipality and its officers should be given effect as a matter of fairness
and justice. (Municipality ofMalabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533 [1969]

Section 17(e) of the Local Government Code defines devolution as the act by which the National
Government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific
functions and responsibilities.

It has been held that where a ferry operation lies entirely within the municipality, the prior approval of
the Municipal government is necessary. Once approved, the operator must then apply with the LTFRB
for a certificate of public convenience and shall be subject to LTFRB supervision, (Municipality of
Echague v. Abellera, supra)
The law is invalid. Under Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution, "the term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms." The law clearly goes against the
aforesaid constitutional requirement of three year terms for local officials except for barangay officials.

The cancellation of the lease and the removal of the stalls are valid. As held in Macasiano vs. Diokno,
212 SCRA 464, the lease of public streets is void, since they are reserved for public use and are outside
the commerce of man.

The petition should be granted. In accordance with Macasiano v. Diokno. 212 SCRA 464 [1992], since
public streets are properties for public use and are outside the commerce of man, the City Mayor and the
City Engineer cannot lease or license portions of the city streets to market stallholders.

The ordinance appropriating P300,000.00 for the heirs of the victims of Johnny is void. This amounts to
appropriating public funds for a private purpose. Under Section 335 of the Local Government Code, no
public money shall be appropriated for private purposes.

The ordinance is valid. The charge on the business establishments is not a tax but a SPECIAL
ASSESSMENT. Hence, the holding in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960), that
public funds cannot be appropriated for the construction of roads in a private subdivision, does not
apply. As held in Apostolic Prefect v. City Treasurer of Baguio, 71 Phil. 547 (1941), special assessments
maybe charged to property owners benefited by public works, because the essential difference between a
tax and such assessment is precisely that the latter is based wholly on benefits received.

However, if the ordinance levies a tax on all business establishments located outside the private
subdivision, then it is objectionable on the ground that it appropriate private funds for a public purpose.
(Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, supra)

The ordinance is valid. In Velasco v, Villegas, 120 SCRA 658 (1983) such ordinance was upheld on the
ground that it is a means of enabling the City of Manila to collect a fee for operating massage clinics and
of preventing immorality which might be committed by allowing the construction of separate rooms in
barber shops.

The ordinance is valid insofar as it requires owners, administrators, or tenants of buildings and premises
to keep and maintain them in sanitary condition and provides that should they fail to do so, the
municipality shall cause them to be cleaned and the cost shall be assessed against the owner,
administrator, or tenant and shall be a lien against the property. This is expressly authorized by Sec.
149(kk) of the Local Government Code.

However, the penalty for the violation of the ordinance is invalid, because it is excessive. The penalty in
this case is a fine not exceeding P1,000 or imprisonment for one year, in the discretion of the court.
Under Sec. 149 (c) of the Local Government Code, however, the penalty for the violation of a municipal
ordinance can not exceed a fine of P1,000.00 or Imprisonment for six months, or both at the discretion
of the court.

Under Sections 54 (a) and 55 (c) of the Local Government Code, the local legislative assembly can
override the veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds vote of all its members.
Under Section 55[a] of the Local Government Code, the local chief executive may veto an ordinance on
the ground that it is ULTRA VIRES or PREJUDICIAL TO THE PUBLIC WELFARE.

Pursuant to Section 54(b) of the Local Government Code, an ordinance vetoed by the local chief
executive shall be deemed approved if he does not communicate his veto to the local legislative
assembly within 15 days in the case of a province and 10 days in the case of a city or a municipality.
Likewise, if the veto by the local executive has been overridden by the local legislative assembly, a
second veto will be void. Under Section 55(c) of the Local Government Code, the local chief executive
may veto an ordinance only once.

No, the Municipality of Binangonan cannot invoke its police power. According to Laguna Lake
Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 292, under Republic Act No, 4850, the Laguna
Lake Development Authority is mandated to promote the development of the Laguna Lake area,
including the surrounding Province of Rizal, with due regard to the prevention of pollution. The Laguna
Lake Development Authority is mandated to pass upon and approve or disapprove all projects proposed
by local government offices within the region.

The Laguna Lake Development Authority can justify its order. Since it has been authorized by
Executive Order No. 927 to make orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution, its power to issue the
order can be inferred from this. Otherwise, it will be a toothless agency. Moreover, the Laguna Lake
Development Authority is specifically authorized under its Charter to issue cease and desist orders.

The city council is not empowered to issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of the operators of the
fun-houses In the Ermita district. There is no provision in the Constitution, the Local Government Code,
or any law expressly granting local legislative bodies the power to subpoena witnesses. As held in
Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete, 155 SCRA
421, such power cannot be implied from the grant of delegated legislated power. Such power is Judicial.
To allow local legislative bodies to exercise such power without express statutory basis would violate
the doctrine of separation of powers.

The city council does not have the power to cite for contempt. There is likewise no provision in the
Constitution, the Local Government Code, or any other laws granting local legislative bodies the power
to cite for contempt. Such power cannot be deemed implied in the delegation of legislative power to
local legislative bodies, for the existence of such power poses a potential derogation of individual rights.

Under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, the power of eminent domain is explicitly granted to the
municipality, but must be exercised through an ordinance rather than through a resolution.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Sur was without the authority to disapprove Resolution No. 1
as the municipality clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang
Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution. The only ground upon which a provincial board may
declare any municipal resolution, ordinance or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance or order
is beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same. Such is not the situation
in this case. (Moday v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107916, February 20, 1997)

The question of whether there is genuine necessity for the expropriation of Christina's lot or whether the
municipality has other and better lots for the purpose is a matter that will have to be resolved by the
Court upon presentation of evidence by the parties to the case.
The Barangay Assembly cannot exercise any police power. Under Section 398 of the Local
Government Code, it can only recommend to the Sangguniang Barangay the adoption of measures for
the welfare of the barangay and decide on the adoption of an initiative.

The Liga ng Mga Barangay cannot exercise legislative powers. As stated in Bito-Onon v. Fernandez.
350 SCRA 732 [2001], it is not a local government unit and its primary purpose is to determine
representation of the liga in the sanggunians; to ventilate, articulate, and crystallize issues affecting
barangay government administration; and to secure solutions for them through proper and legal means.

The following are the legal requisites for the validity of a contract to be entered into by the Municipality
of Sibonga, which involves the expenditure of public funds:

(1) The contract must be within the power of the municipality;

(2) The contract must be entered into by the proper officer, i.e., the mayor, upon resolution of the
Sangguniang Bayan pursuant to Section 142 of the Local Government Code;
(3) In accordance with Sec. 606 of the Revised Administrative Code, there must be an appropriation of
the public funds; and in accordance with Sec. 607, there must be a certificate of availability of funds
issued by the municipal treasurer; and
(4) The contract must conform with the formal requisites of written contracts prescribed by law.

In National Development Company v. Cebu City, 215 SCRA 382, the Supreme Court held that the
National Development Company was not liable for real estate tax on the property belonging to the
government which it occupy. However, Section 234 of the Local Government Code subsequently
withdrew the exemption from real property taxes of government-owned or controlled corporations. If I
were the Judge, I would hold the National Development Company liable for real estate taxes.

The following are the main sources of revenues of local government units under the Constitution:

1. Taxes, fees, and charges. (Section 5, Article X)

2. Share in the national taxes. (Section 6, Article X)
3. Share in the proceeds of the utilizations and development of the national wealth within their areas.
(Section 7, Article X}

Yes, the City of Dagupan may lawfully convert the park into prawn ponds and lease them. A city may
close a park and plaza and once the property has been withdrawn from public use, it falls within the
commerce of man and may be leased. Section 10 of the Local Government Code provides: "A local
government unit may likewise, through its head acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian and in
accordance with existing law and the provisions of this Code, close any barangay, municipal, city or
provincial road, street, alley park or square. No such way or place or any part thereof shall be closed
without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. A property thus withdrawn from public use may
be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned
might be lawfully used or conveyed."

Since the City of Dagupan has the power to convert the park into prawn ponds it can also lease it to
XYZ even though XYZ is a 100%foreign corporation. The operation of a prawn hatchery does not
involve exploitation of natural resources within the meaning of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. (Secretary of Justice, Op. No. 3, s. 1988) Since the portion of the park had been withdrawn
from public use, it could be disposed for any lawful purpose including leasing it to a foreign corporation.
In exempting provinces composed of one or more islands from both the contiguity and land area
requirements, Article 9 of the IRR cannot be considered inconsistent with the criteria under Section 461
of the Local Government Code. Far from being absolute regarding application of the requirement of a
contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified by the Land Management Bureau,
Section 461 allows for said exemption by providing, under paragraph (b) thereof, that (t)he territory
need not be contiguous if (the new province) comprises two or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. For as long as there is
compliance with the income requirement, the legislative intent is, after all, to the effect that the land area
and population requirements may be overridden by the established economic viability of the proposed
province.

The suit of AM will not prosper. The removal of the billboards is not an exercise of the power of
eminent domain but of police power (Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580 11915D). The abatement of a
nuisance in the exercise of police power does not constitute taking of property and does not entitle the
owner of the property involved to compensation (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 [1989]).

The ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. The right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights
of the public and defers to the exercise of police power. The ordinance is not prohibiting the disco pub
owners and the hospitality girls from pursuing their calling or business but is merely regulating it (Social
Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, 570 SCRA 410 [2008]) The ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power, because its purpose is to safeguard public health (Beltran vs. Secretary of Health, 476
SCRA 168 [2005]).

The city government has no power to stop tile operations of the plant. Since its operations is not a
nuisance per se, the city government cannot abate it extra judicially. A suit must be filed in court (AC
Enterprises, Inc. v. Frabelle Properties Corporation, 506 SCRA 625 [2006]).

The disapproval of the ordinance is not correct. Under Section 56(c) (Local Government Code), the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Leyte can declare the ordinance invalid only if it is beyond the power of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Bulalakaw. In the instant case, the ordinance is well within the power of the
Sangguniang Bayan. The disapproval of the ordinance by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Leyte was
outside its authority having been done on a matter pertaining to the wisdom of the ordinance which
pertains to the Sangguniang Bayan [Moday v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 586 [1997]).

The motion to dismiss should be denied. Under Section 24 of the Local Government Code and Article
2189 of the Civil Code, the Municipality of Pinatukdao is liable for damages arising from injuries to
person by reason of negligence of local government units or local officers of the defective condition of
the municipal hall, which is under their control and supervision.

As held in Farinas v. Barba, 256 SCRA 396 (1996), neither of the appointments is valid. Under Section
45 of the Local Government Code, in case of a permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan created by
the cessation in office of a member who does not belong to any political party, the Governor shall
appoints qualified person recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan. Since A was not recommended by
the Sangguniang Bayan, his appointment by the Governor is not valid. Since B was not appointed by the
Governor but by the Municipal Mayor, his appointment is also not valid.
In accordance with Section 45 of the Local Government Code, the vacancy should be filled by
appointment by the President of the nominee of the political party of Benito since his elevation to the
position of Vice-Governor created the last vacancy in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. If Benito does not
belong to any political party, a qualified person recommended by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan should
be appointed (Navarro v. Court of Appeals, 355 SCRA 672 [2001]).

In accordance with Section 69 of the Local Government Code, the Governor can be recalled for loss of
confidence.

Under Section 70 of the Local Government Code, the recall may be initiated by a resolution adopted by
a majority of all the members of the preparatory recall assembly, which consists of all the mayors, the
vicemayors, and the sangguniang members of the municipalities and component cities, or by a written
petition signed by at least twenty-five per cent (25%) of the total number of registered voters in the
province.

According to Section 72 of the Local Government Code, the recall of an elective local official shall take
effect upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the
highest number of votes cast during the election on recall.