G.R. No.

103627 September 5, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
MARVYN L.SENARIO  accused-appellant.

On 29 January 1986, MARVYN L.SENARIO was charged with robbery with

homicide in an Information which reads:

That on or about December 19, 1985, at nighttime purposely sought to

better accomplish his criminal designs, in the City of General Santos,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent to gain and by means of violence against
or intimidation upon the person of Chukie V. Doll, owner proprietor
of DOLL Enterprises located at Barangay Fatima, Di Makita
Street,General Santos City, and/or using force upon things, take, rob
and carry away money/merchandise in the approximate amount of
P5,000.00, belonging to said Chuckie Doll, against his will, to the
damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount of
P5,000, Philippine Currency; that by reason or on the occasion of said
robbery and for the purpose of enabling him to take, rob and carry
away the articles abovementioned, the herein accused with intent to
kill, assault and use personal violence upon said Victim by stabbing
him on the head, chest and other parts of the body, thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal wounds which directly caused the death of said
Chua Huat.

Contrary to law. 1

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned on 4 April 2000 and after
trial, the Regional Trial Court, Br. 18, General Santos City rendered a
decision * dated 28 October 2002, the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide with the aggravating
circumstances of abuse of confidence; nighttime and evident
premeditation, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by
law, and to pay the costs.
 SO ORDERED. 2

The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:

1. Accused-appellant Marvyn L. Senario worked as an all-around serviceman at

Doll Enterprises, a hardware store located at Barangay Fatima, Di Makita Street,
General Santos City, owned by the victim Chuckie V. Doll.

2. The victim, his wife and 3 children; Chelsea, Chainee, and Chuckie jr.lived at
Barangay Fatima, Bulag Street, General Santos City. The back entrance of the
hardware store is just across the street from said residence.

3. At around 8:30 in the evening of 19 December 1997, smoke was seen coming
from the Doll hardware store.

4. A woman-vendor who saw the smoke informed the Doll residence of the fire
and Chuckie Jr. immediately proceeded to the hardware store. Upon entering, his
son called out for his father, Chuckie V. Doll who was working late inside his
store.

5. Chuckie Jr. found his father on the ground floor of the store lying in a pool of
his own blood and upon nearing the body, he smelled paint thinner which had been
poured on the dead body and around the area of the store.

6. Chuckie Jr. also discovered a Kitchen Knife with dried blood about two (2)
meters away from the victim's body. He found three (3) electric flat irons
connected to electric outlets and placed on top of cans of paint thinner. The flat
irons which were very hot caused the smoke which the woman-vendor spotted
from outside of the store. Chuckie Jr. also testified that money amounting to
P10,000.00 was missing from the store's cash register and vault.

7. The death of the victim Chuckie V. Doll was found to have been caused by
multiple stab and puncture wounds which penetrated the lungs and heart and
lacerated wounds on the head. 3

8. On the morning of 20 December 1997, all the employee of Doll Enterprises

reported for work except accused-appellant Marvyn L. Senario

9. On the basis of investigations conducted by members of the Philippine National

Police, who was a close friend and "kumpadre" of the victim, accused Marvyn L.
Senario became a suspect in the crime.
10. On 23 January 1998, a police team from the was dispatched to Banga, South
Cotabato, the hometown of accused. In the morning of 24 January 1998, the
policemen proceeded to the house of accused in Banga South Cotabato. Upon
seeing the police team, accused Marvyn L. Senario ran to the back of his house,
and when One policeman fired warning shots, he ran further to a grassy area
beyond his house. The police team later convinced the parents of accused to let
their son surrender to them. When accused voluntarily surrendered, the PNP took
him to General Santos City. The accused's brother Mark was allowed to
accompany him to General Santos City.

11. On 25 January 1998, accused Marvyn L. Senario executed a statement

admitting his guilt. The statement was signed by Senior Inspector . William L.
Agos of the PNP Homicide Section and Mark Senario as witnesses.

The appeal brief filed by accused's counsel  assigns the following

alleged errors of the trial court:

The lower court gravely erred in convicting accused on

the basis of inadequate and insufficient circumstantial
evidence presented.

The lower court gravely erred in not considering the

constitutional right of the accused to counsel of his
choice during custodial investigation.

The lower court gravely erred in basing conviction of the

accused of [sic] his confession which is inadmissible in
evidence. 4

The circumstances relied upon by the trial court in convicting the accused are:

a. Patty M. Margos, a newspaper stand vendor, testified that at around 8:30 in the
evening of 19 December 1998, while she was at her newspaper stall near the Doll
hardware store, she saw accused walk by. A few minutes later, she saw smoke
coming out of the hardware store. She then requested a fellow vendor to inform the
Doll household of the fire in the hardware store.

b. Chuckie V.Doll Jr. testified that in the afternoon of 19 December 1998, he saw
accused cutting sets of flat iron electric cords of about two and one-half (4 1/2)
meter lengths. Doll jr. stated that since the lengths were irregular, he asked the
accused why he was cutting said lengths of electric cords. The accused told him
that a customer specifically asked for such lengths of electric cords. Doll jr. also
stated that on the same day accused was supposed to work until 8:00 in the evening
but he asked permission to leave at about 5:30 saying he had to meet a relative in
Polomolok.

Doll jr.further testified that the lengths of the electric cords he earlier saw with
accused, were similar to the cords connected to the flat irons later found at the
crime scene.

c. Accused fled when he saw the police team headed for his house in Banga. It was
only when accused's parents were persuaded by the police team to ask their son to
surrender that accused came out of his hiding place.

d. Accused executed an extra-judicial confession when he was taken to the Police

headquarters on 25 January 1998, admitting his guilt.

e. Accused failed to report back for work after the Christmas holidays. It was only
on 24 January 1998 that the police team found him in his hometown in Banga.

In this appeal, accused assails the admission in evidence of his extrajudicial

confession, claiming that his constitutional rights to counsel, to remain silent and
to be presumed innocent were violated. He argues that a certain Atty. Zoro P.
Velasquez, who was merely visiting the police station at the time and who,
according to the extrajudicial statement, assisted him as counsel, never in fact
effectively informed him of the consequences of the extrajudicial confession.
Accused contends that he was forced to sign the extrajudicial confession since the
police officers mauled him and even refused his request that his brother Mark be
allowed to find a lawyer for him or contact their relatives. Accused also contends
that the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution precludes his
conviction since the requisites under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
were not satisfied.

The Court reviewed the entire records of this case to insure that the conviction of
accused-appellant would be affirmed only if the prosecution had overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

It appears from the records that appellant Senario became suspects during the
investigations of this case. It is apparent that the case for the prosecution was not
well organized and prepared in the filing of an information against accused-
appellant Senario only and the prosecution was unable to gather evidence other
than circumstantial.
On the issue of admissibility of appellant's extrajudicial confession, the testimonies
of two (2) witnesses for the prosecution cannot be ignored.

William L. Agos of the PNP Homicide Section, testified that he was the one who
was present when accused executed his extrajudicial confession. Fradejas stated
that Atty. Zoro P. Velasquez was requested to act as counsel for accused during
the custodial investigation. It is to be noted however that Agos admitted that while
accused was undergoing investigation and answering the questions propounded to
him, Atty. Zoro would "come and go" and that Atty. Zoro was not at all times
within hearing distance of accused but was merely within the premises. 

Atty. Velasquez himself admitted that he could not remember having informed
accused of the constitutional presumption of his innocence. 

Given the above admissions by witnesses for the prosecution, the inadmissibility of
the extrajudicial confession of accused MARVYN L. SENARIO is mandated
under Sec. 12(1), Sec. 12(3) and Sec. 17, Article III of the Constitution which
provide:

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.

(3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or Section 17

hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

In the recent case of People v. Lucero 8 the Court stated:

We hold that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did
not mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel.

The term "effective and vigilant counsel" necessarily and logically requires that the
lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the
confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the
signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that
the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully
understands the nature and consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation
to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to
the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent.

The next issue to be settled is whether the remaining circumstantial evidence

overcomes the presumption of innocence in favor of accused-appellant.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction only if the following

conditions concur:

a) There is more than one circumstance.

b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;

c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction

beyond reasonable doubt. 9

As previously discussed, the circumstances relied upon by the trial court were:

1. The testimony of Patty Margos that she saw accused-appellant Marvyn L.

Senario near the victim's hardware store a few minutes before smoke was seen
coming from the store.

2. Chuckie Doll Jr. testimony that he saw accused-appellant cut electric cords on
19 December 1998, the lengths of which matched the cords used on the electric flat
irons that were used to apparently set the hardware store on fire.

3. Accused-appellant fled upon seeing police officers approach his house in Bohol.

4. Accused-appellant's failure to return to work after the incident.

The combination of the above circumstances should constitute an unbroken chain

which leads to only one fair and reasonable conclusion; that accused is guilty of
the offense charged. Otherwise, if at least one theory based on these circumstances
leads to proof of his innocence, the Court has to acquit the accused based on
reasonable doubt. Indeed, it is preferred to free a guilty one based on reasonable
doubt than to imprison an innocent man.

In the present case, each of the enumerated circumstances does not make strong
links in the unbroken chain which justifies conviction based on circumstantial
evidence.
It should be obvious that mere presence near the crime scene is not sufficient to
establish an accused's guilt. It is to be noted that Patty Margos testified that she
saw accused merely "pass-by" the vicinity of the hardware store. She did not state
that accused came from or went towards the direction of the hardware store. Even
accused admitted that after leaving the store at around 5:30 p.m. on 19 December
1998, he was within a few blocks of the store before he finally went home to pack
his clothes and proceed to the Bulaong Bus Terminal. that accused-appellant was
seen cutting electric cords of similar lengths as those attached to the flat irons
which caused the smoke inside the store, does not necessarily point to him as the
felon.

Accused's flight upon seeing the law enforcers likewise does not necessarily
indicate his guilt. It should be remembered that the police officers were in civilian
clothes and only William Agos was known to accused and the latter knew that
Agos was a close friend and "kumpadre" of the victim. It is not far-fetched to
theorize that accused's initial reaction was one of natural fear of reprisal from Agos
and not one of guilt. Moreover, accused later agreed to go with the police team to
General Santos City .

Accused's failure to return to work is easily explained by the fact that he was
undeniably on Christmas vacation from 19 December 1998. There is nothing in the
records to indicate that accused-appellant went into hiding. If he indeed committed
the offense and he had information that he had become a suspect, it was quite
illogical for him to stay in his home in Bangawhere he could easily be located and
arrested.

We do not entirely discount the possibility that accused-appellant Marvyn L.

Senario may have committed the crime but the mandate of the constitution allows
conviction only when there is moral certainty of the accused's guilt. Such moral
certainty is not present in this case.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing considerations and premises, the appealed

decision is hereby SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant is ACQUITTED based on
reasonable doubt and ordered RELEASED unless he is also detained for some
other legal ground.

SO ORDERED.