Sexuality As A National Idea: The Narratives of Homophobia and Homonationalism in The Netherlands
Sexuality As A National Idea: The Narratives of Homophobia and Homonationalism in The Netherlands
Sexuality As A National Idea: The Narratives of Homophobia and Homonationalism in The Netherlands
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Abstract
The thesis explores how the narratives of homophobia embody homonationalism in the Nether-
lands. Based on the interviews with the white Dutch gay men, the paper presents homonationalism
as a process which can be traced on three different levels: a public discourse, a political organiza-
tion, and a personal narrative. On the discursive level homonationalism is investigated through the
respondents’ images of Amsterdam’s gay scene. Further, a gay organization is studied to find out
how the practices, ideology and the language of the political movement practice homonationalism.
Finally, the research explores the personal narratives of coming out to illustrate that nowadays in
the Netherlands such narratives are incorporated in the discourse of homonationalism. All the three
levels illustrate that homonationalism is a complex process and has various modalities. It cannot be
reduced to a single political discourse only.
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Introduction............................................................................................................................... 5
Chapter 1. The nostalgic narrative. The Netherlands as a gay-friendly country and Amsterdam
as the worlds’ gay capital........................................................................................................ 21
Opinions .............................................................................................................................23
A bit of history of gay Amsterdam and the dynamics of Amsterdam’s gay scene.............25
Bart.....................................................................................................................................42
Felix ...................................................................................................................................44
Conslusion .............................................................................................................................. 48
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 51
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Introduction
Before I moved to the Netherlands from Russia to start the master’s program, I was thinking about
the topic of my future thesis. Back then I came across an article in the Russian independent media
Meduza. The article was called “Record appearance as the means against nationalism” and was
written by Carnegie Moscow Center; it reflected upon the results of the Dutch election which was
held in March 2017. The text starts with the mention of “Dutch Trump” Geert Wilders and the de-
scription of his political program which, among other articles, included “the protection of the ‘tradi-
tional minorities’ - Jews and homosexuals, the threat to which he sees first of all the immigrants of
from the East”1 . This piece surprised me. How come, I thought, a politician who is described in the
article by such words as “right-wing” or “populist” can talk about the protection of sexual minori-
ties? My idea was that it used to be mainly “left-wing”, more progressive parties which support
LGBT community, while conservative politicians of Western European countries would claim that
“traditional family values” are under threat nowadays. After reading this article and exploring the
issues a bit further I assumed that it might be the case for my thesis. I was curious about how the
acceptance and protection of sexual minorities in the Netherlands became a part of the nationalistic,
anti-globalist and anti-immigration discourse. Moreover, why is this the case of the Netherlands in
particular? What is so specific about this country, what is the context in which the acceptance of
homosexuality turns out to be not just the object of the populist manipulations but connected to the
national values and sometimes even nationalism?
During the further exploration of the topic I was curious if the links between the acceptance of
sexual minorities in the Netherlands and the Dutch values of tolerance and sexual freedom go be-
yond the “populist” or “right-wing” discourse. During fieldwork I talked with the gay men with var-
ious political views and experiences, including those who are the followers of a conservative anti-
immigrant organization as well as the members of the progressive political parties. Listening to the
stories and opinions of both sides, I found out that being open about one’s homosexuality in the
Netherlands is possible, according to the respondents I interviewed, because of what they call the
Dutch culture and the Dutch values. In the end, after listening to the stories of the informants, the
tolerant and friendly attitude to homosexuality is more rooted in the national context than I original-
ly imagined. When I came across the term “homonationalism” introduced by Jasbir Puar, it helped
me to understand this case better. For me the paradox of the whole situation consisted in the fact the
modern narratives about homosexuality and homophobia in the Netherlands, indeed, become a part
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of the “right-wing” discourse. At the same time, the articulation of these narratives specific for the
“right-wing”, anti-immigration policies, becomes common among the progressive, or “left-wing”
gay men.
To understand the case that interested me, I discussed with my informants homophobia in the
Netherlands. Even though the country has the image of one of the most gay-friendly nations, there
should be some cracks and tensions which worried Dutch gay men. The conversations I had nor-
mally started with a discussion of homophobia in the Netherlands in general and finished with per-
sonal experiences of dealing with homophobia. Almost every time we talked about the Netherlands
itself, its culture and traditions.
I decided to use the term “homonationalism” because it helps to trace the different ways in which
the narratives of homophobia become nationalized, whether it is a narrative of a discourse, a narra-
tive elaborated by the particular organization, or a personal narrative which involves coming out
experiences. The main research question of the study is the following: How is homonationalism
embodied in the Netherlands through the different narratives of homophobia? So, in my research I
will focus on three different levels of homonationalism. In the first chapter I will investigate how
homonationalism is practiced on the discursive level through the articulations of the images of Am-
sterdam and its gay scene. In the second chapter I will move to the embodiment of homonationalism
on the level of a particular organization. I will show how the practices, ideology and the statements
of the conservative organization invest to homonationalism. Finally, the third level of homonation-
alism is the personal narratives, which I study in the last chapter. These narratives not only tell
about coming out experiences, they are also placed within a particular cultural and political context.
I choose exactly these three levels to illustrate that homonationalism is not an abstract notion that
describes the current political situation in the Netherlands. Homonationalism is a process that can
be found not in the public discourse only, it can also be found in the private spheres of our lives
(e.g. the stories about personal experiences). Homonationalism in the Netherlands, I argue, is a part
of new nationalism which can be traced in everyday life (Verkaaik 2010). The focus on these three
levels also allows to see how homonationalism is practiced not only by the “right-wing” policies but
also by the people with more progressive views.
While Puar studies homonationalism within the context of the United States, the Netherlands is
one of the countries in which homonationalism can be well explored. What is the political and cul-
tural context of the Netherlands, in which the today’s narratives of homophobia become national-
ized, linked to what is described as typically Dutch?
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Political and cultural context
The Netherlands is one of the few countries that was the earliest to accept its sexual minorities and
to start their integration into society. But before the rise of the welfare state of the 1950s and the
emergence of sexual revolution, which in the 1960s embraced many Western European nations in-
cluding the Netherlands, the country was a deeply religious (both Catholic and Protestant) country.
Until then the Dutch society was divided into four so-called pillars, or communities. These included
Protestant, Catholic, socialist and liberal communities which were separated from each other.
“Everything in society was organized according to these pillars. The Dutch pride themselves on
their long tradition of tolerance, but this was part of a broader system of noninterference with other
pillars” (van der Veer 2006: 118). Each pillar used to have its own church, political party, schools,
shops, etc. The organization of the Dutch society by the four pillars meant that the people who
come from those different pillars had to look for compromises and manage to reach consensus to be
able to live together in one country. Thus, tolerance and the ability to negotiate, which later played a
significant role in the acceptance of the gay movement by the Dutch government, come from the
earlier period in the history of the Netherlands when the nation was divided into these pillars.
In the beginning of the 20th century the Catholic community of the Netherlands reintroduced
legal discrimination of gay people (after the law which criminalized sodomy was abolished in 1811
under the influence of the French Revolution) (Tielman 1987: 9-10). As a reaction to this new law,
the Dutch Scientific Humanitarian Committee was founded by a liberal lawyer Jacob Schorer, who
was inspired by the German scientist Magnus Hirschfeld and his Scientific-Humanitarian Commit-
tee which is considered as the world’s first organization created to support homosexual and trans-
gender people’s rights. The Dutch organization also sought for equality between homosexual and
heterosexual men and women.
During the World War II, an underground gay subculture was promoted by the periodical Leven-
srecht (Right to Live). After the war, in 1946, the world’s first LGBT organization - COC (Cultuur-
en OntspanningsCentrum) - was founded by the editors of Levensrecht in the Netherlands. After the
late 1960s, when sexual revolutions burst out around Western Europe, including in the Netherlands,
the Dutch government began to negotiate with the gay rights organization to integrate sexual mi-
norities. For example, sexuality was promoted to discuss by the society. Also, homosexual move-
ments of the students and intellectuals played a significant role in making gay people more visible
and accepted (Tielman 1987: 13-14). Tielman states that, although COC was mainly opposed by the
Roman Catholic church, the organization “was tolerated by the Dutch authorities, for the existence
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of that group enabled them to keep a better eye on the homosexual subculture”. In the end, “the
government treated COC more and more as a ‘mini-pillar’: the COC had a certain autonomy that
enabled them it to maintain order in the gay subculture” (Ibid.: 12).
During the 1960s, “in a relatively short period the Netherlands was transformed from a highly
religious to a highly secular society” (van der Veer 2006: 118). In 1971, article 248bis of the Dutch
law made the age of consent for same-sex partners the same as for opposite-sex partners - 16 years.
Moreover, homosexual people stopped being discriminated in the Dutch army in 1973 (Hekma
2006: 134-135). During the 1980s, more rights were provided for sexual minorities. In 1973, COC
was granted a legal status by the government. Later on, in the 1980s, other forms of discrimination
of sexual minorities were prohibited by the Dutch authorities. Tielman argues that, when AIDS was
discovered in early 1980s and when it became a major threat all over the world, the ability of the
Dutch gay movement to find compromises and to cooperate with other minority communities as
well as the Dutch authorities, homosexual people in the Netherlands avoided being discredited and
scapegoated (Tielman 1987: 16).
The legalization of same-sex marriage in 2001 made the Netherlands the first country to grant
marital rights to gay and lesbian couples (Hekma 2006: 134-135). All these processes and events
made sexual minorities more normative and inclusive into Dutch society. Mepschen, Duyvendak
and Tonkens argue that “the popular representation of gay identity has changed from a deviant other
to the mirror image of the ideal heterosexual” (Mepschen et al. 2010: 971). The authors note that
gay identity in the Netherlands exists in accordance with heteronormativity and does not threaten it
(Ibid., 2010). The rights of gay couples to create families and adopt children goes hand in hand with
heteronormative way of life. Such way of life is the opposite of the aims of the radical gay move-
ments of 1960-1970s. Those movements, in such countries as the USA or the UK, aimed at the
transformation of a heteronormative society itself. The processes which happened in the Nether-
lands in 1900-2000s have a completely different, assimilationist but not radical character.
For the better understanding of the population of my thesis - native Dutch gay men - it is also
important to note that the homonormative discourse is mainly attributed to homosexual men rather
than lesbians or transgenders (Ibid., 2010: 963). The homonormative discourse implies the assimila-
tionist strategies of the homosexual policies, capitalist consumerism of gay people, and its relation
to heteronormativity. Wekker states that all the above-mentioned achievements of the Dutch homo-
sexual movement concerned primarily assimilation of gay men with a heteronormative Dutch soci-
ety. “The gay movement - and white men have populated this movement more thickly and thus have
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been at the forefront here - has from its inception been more interested in equality: equal rights, gay
marriage, the right to adopt children, the right to copious consumption of all manner of material
goods, and has pursued a more assimilationist agenda with the social, political, and cultural powers
that be” (Wekker 2016: 115). Unlike the women’s movement, the white male homosexual move-
ment was less reflexive upon racial categories.
Thus “homonormativity” and assimilationist agenda of the Dutch gay movement were, among
others, the circumstances due to which sexual minorities became a part of the Dutch anti-immigrant
discourse. “Public visibility of gay life has its limitations. The dominant representation of homo-
sexuality after sixty years of intense postcolonial, labor, and refugee migration to the Netherlands
still is that gay and lesbians belong to the dominant racial group; that is, in public eye gays are
white” (Ibid.: 117). The public images of homosexuality in the Netherlands lacks diversity. Normal-
ly it does not include more marginalized identities, such as ethnic sexual minorities. This is impor-
tant for understanding why some gay movements against violent homophobia, for instance Dutch
GayServatives/De Roze Leeuw, which I discuss in the second chapter of the thesis, turn against
globalization, immigration from Muslim countries, and ethnic minorities who are presented as a
threat to white Dutch gay men.
Theoretical framework
- Homonationalism
To understand homonationalism, which is the key concept and the main analytical term of the the-
sis, Jasbir Puar introduces the term in her book “Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer
Times” and defines it as a “sexual exceptionalism”, national homosexuality. She claims that “this
brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or
homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects” (Puar
2007: 2). She states that heterosexuality and heteronormativity are constitutive parts of every na-
tional identity. Nowadays, when homosexuality is becoming normative in Western societies, white
gay men are no more excluded from the nationalistic discourse and opposed to it as the Other. On
the contrary, homosexuality becomes a part of the sexual exceptionalism. “…homosexual sexual
exceptionalism does not necessarily contradict or undermine heterosexual sexual exceptionalism; in
actually it may support forms of heteronormativity and the class, racial, and citizenship privileges
they require” (Ibid.: 9). Puar relates sexual exceptionalism of white homosexual people to the impe-
rialistic exceptionalism of the United States. “Produced in tandem with the ‘state of exception’, the
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demand for patriotic loyalty to the United States merely accelerates forms of sexual exceptionalism
that have always underpinned homonormativities” (Ibid.: 77). In her book the author uses a dis-
course analysis and introduces the term “homonationalism” as a critical tool to put into question the
modern political situation of the USA. Thus, in this work she places her notion within the context of
the leading position of the United States in the world.
Nevertheless, in her later article “Rethinking Homonationalism” Puar redefines the term that
makes it applicable to other countries in which homosexuality is becoming normative as well as
heterosexuality. She states that
“homonationalism, thus, is not simply a synonym for gay racism, or another way to
mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries;
it is not another identity politics, not another way of distinguishing good queers from bad
queers, not an accusation, and not a position. It is rather a facet of modernity and a histori-
cal shift marked by the entrance of (some) homosexual bodies as worthy of protection by
nation-states, a constitutive and fundamental reorientation of the relationship between the
state, capitalism, and sexuality” (Ibid.: 337).
The term homonationalism can be attributed to the national identity of the Netherlands. The nar-
ratives of homophobia which are explored in the chapters of the thesis involve the topics of
progress, modernity and backwardness; freedom and religious conservatism. The acceptance of
homosexuality becomes in the Netherlands the condition of being recognized as progressive and
secular, the kind of values which are today considered to be the key values of the country.
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ern or European culture) and in opposition to other cultural identities. Muslim culture usually be-
comes the main target. In this way, the populistic statements regarding specifically Dutch or French
values are given in the context of the broader Western culture.
Fassin proposes his notion of sexual democracy to illustrate how sexual liberties and gender
equality are instrumentalized in different national contexts. Opposing the expansionist logic of the
United States to the protectionist politics of France and the Netherlands, he discusses the various
approaches to supporting sexual liberties which are utilized to highlight a “clash of civilisations”
and legitimize an invasion of hostile nations or oppose immigration within the countries (Fassin
2010: 512-513). In this case “Frenchness” and “Dutchness” represent two slightly different models
of liberal nationalism (Fassin claims that the nationalism of France is more heterosexual). Neverthe-
less, the boundary mechanisms are the same. Populists of both countries use the values of sexual
freedom to oppose immigration. “If sexual democracy is about sexual freedom and equality be-
tween the sexes, its application to the exclusion of “others,” that is, its racialization, can eventually
transform these lofty ideals into a practice that hinders sexual liberty by racializing sexual discrimi-
nations” (Ibid.: 522-523). Indeed, when nationalistic politics employ the values of sexual freedom
and gender equality, it neglects the fact that the LGBT community, which is allegedly defended by
the populist parties, is very different and multi-layered within itself. Thus there is always a risk of
exclusion of the members of sexual minorities who are appealed to in order to justify nationalistic
views. For example, those who belong not only to a sexual minority but also to an ethnic minority
may be racially discriminated.
- Culturalization
The politics that sustain the dichotomy of “us/them” rely on a notion of culture which is described
as static and unchanging. In this view, the world is represented as consisting of many cultures which
are not just separate from each other but may also be threatening each other. Today the duscussion
of immigration in the Netherlands especially sustains such concept. Investigating this problem in
the context of the Netherlands, Uitermark, Mepschen and Duyvendak use the term “neoculturalism”
which indicates cultural protectionism and strictly opposes cultures against each other. The pragma-
tist policy preceded the neoculturalist policy and it was directed towards rather smooth and politi-
cally correct negotiation between the conflicting social actors. Today, the authors claim, neocultur-
alists began to manipulate with class issues and produce populism causing public exclusion of im-
migrant minorities. There there are two main features which are used by the neoculturalist way of
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thinking. “First, neoculturalists employ a populist schema to challenge the political establishment
and allegedly multicultural of leftist elites in particular. Dutch neoculturalists have used a trans-
posed class discourse that pits the white working class against a state-entrenched progressive
elite” (Uitermark, Mepschen and Duyvendak 2014: 236). Moreover, emancipated sexuality is used
to define European nations in opposition to conservative and homophobic Muslims. Thus, the val-
ues of sexual freedom become the instruments of neoculturalism. The authors also emphasise that
the ascent of such forms of populisms in Europe are treated my mistake as conservative. Neverthe-
less, “neoculturalists combine the framing of Dutch national culture as morally progressive with a
virulent anti-immigration agenda” (Ibid.: 251).
- Modernity
Another key symbolic resource that is used to construct national identities is the term “modernity”.
The values of sexual liberty, gender equality and open-mindedness suppose that they are all possible
due to the historical period which is called “modernity”. Van der Veer states that this period started
in the Netherlands (and also throughout Europe) when the sexual revolution and the student protests
of the late 1960s occurred. Before this, the country was highly religious and separated into several
ideological “pillars” which never intruded each other (van der Veer 2006: 118). Again, this analysis
displays how a nation can be redefined in public discourse in a relatively short period of time. By
examining the notion of modernity, Butler states that the culture which propagates progress and
sexual liberty is not just viewed as homogeneous and the one that should be protected from out-
siders but it is also hegemonic. “This uncritical domain of ‘culture’ that functions as a precondition
for liberal freedom, in turn, becomes the cultural basis for sanctioning forms of cultural and reli-
gious hatred and abjection” (Butler 2008: 6). The political message of Butler calling for considera-
tion of how “time” becomes instrumentalized geopolitically allows to see that the oppositions of
sexual politics and religious conservatism are displayed as essentialist and within the temporal
framework. The Dutch values are presented as dominant because they are modern and progressive
while the conservatism of Muslims indicates their historical and cultural “infancy”.
- Sexual freedom
Meanwhile, sexual freedom as a part of the discourse of modernity is also a concept worth investi-
gation. Sexual freedom relates to non-discrimination of homosexual people and depathologization
of homosexual practices. Magnus Hirschfeld (1868-1935) was one of the first scientists to study
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homosexuality and propagate its depathologization and decriminalization. However, the struggle for
sexual freedom became a distinctive political activity in the 1960-1970s, when sexual revolutions
spread around Western Europe and the USA. The generation of baby-boomers who were in conflict
with their parents - witnesses of the Second World War - was the generation which created the stu-
dent, feminist and the first homosexual movements. Thus, sexual freedom became the aim of the
radical social struggle of that period. Nowadays, when many rights and liberties are granted to sex-
ual minorities, especially gay men, sexual freedom became an instrument of the nationalist policies.
Sexual freedom, among other liberal values, becomes nationalized.
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article emphasises the usefulness of anthropologists’ ethnographical method along with Scott’s his-
torical and genealogical approach to understand populism and secularism in Europe.
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Setting and methodology
Amsterdam and Rotterdam were the main Dutch cities where I conducted interviews with the ma-
jority of my informants. As I myself live in Amsterdam, I already knew some gay men whom I
asked whether they would like to be interviewed or whether they know people who would be will-
ing to have a conversation. Moreover, Amsterdam has the largest gay scene in the Netherlands
which made it easier to find informants. Apart from the Dutch capital, I travelled to Rotterdam
twice to have talks with the members of Dutch GayServatives/De Roze Leeuw. I also travelled to
Rijswijk, the small town near The Hague, and unexpectedly found myself in Bergen op Zoom in the
province Noord-Brabant to meet with the other two followers of DGS/De Roze Leeuw.
For my research I preferred to meet with the people individually and conduct semi-structured
interviews which also included life histories. This method appeared to be the most feasible for my
work. Before the official start of fieldwork I went to an event that I thought might be helpful in
finding respondents. The event is called “Jongeheerenborrel” and is usually organised every two
months. It is a gathering of Dutch gay men that I discovered on UvA’s website. Although later I met
with several board members of this event and interviewed them, I did not manage to discuss the
topics relevant for my research with the others during the meeting itself. The main reason why it
was not feasible is because my research involved the issues (such as coming out or experiencing
discrimination and violence) that could be discussed more profoundly via private interviews. This
borrel was first of all an informal leisure event where people would have entertaining and relaxing
talks. Thus, later I contacted some of the organizers of “Jongeheerenborrel” to meet with them sepa-
rately.
There was also a conservative organization from Rotterdam called “Dutch Gayservatives/De
Roze Leeuw” which I discovered on Facebook and whose members I wished to meet with and po-
tentially do a participant observation. Unfortunately, this organization very rarely organises collec-
tive events. It operates mainly in the social media. Nevertheless, I met with its members individual-
ly and discovered the topics useful for my project.
During fieldwork I also attempted to meet with new informants in gay bars and clubs of Amster-
dam. However, in gay bars there was a problem for me to join a group of people hanging out with
each other. In those cases when I did manage to meet someone, the situation itself did not allow me
to elaborate the topics regarding politics or personal experiences and discuss them more profoundly.
Thus, I decided to focus instead on tête-à-tête semi-structured interviews. Already having some ac-
quaintances, including foreigners living in the Netherlands, I used a snowball sampling technique
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and asked them if they do not mind to be interviewed or whether they have any friends who are
Dutch gay men and who would wish and find time to meet separately and have a conversation. As
meeting with respondents combined walking around a city/park and going to a cafe/bar I decided
not to use a voice recorder and instead use my smartphone to write down the notes and quotes. I
think this fact made the conversations less formal. After each meeting I went home a wrote field
notes.
After the first two interviews I decided that I have to correct my interview questions listed in the
research proposal. As I was about to meet gay men with opposing political views I wanted to make
the new questions more politically neutral and appropriate for respondents with all political back-
grounds. After starting my fieldwork, I found the original interview questions mentioned in the re-
search proposal somewhat intrusive. Thus, the final questions were the following:
1. Can you tell something about yourself and your life? How old are you? Where were you
born? Where did you study, work? What do you do at present?
2. Can you tell something about your life as a gay man? (coming out, relations with rela-
tives, friends and co-workers in terms of acceptance of your homosexuality, gay scene, etc)
3. Is there homophobia in the Netherlands, in your opinion? If so, what are the forms of
homophobia in your country?
4. Which political party do you support? What is its stance on sexual minorities?
5. What do you think about other political parties’ attitudes towards sexual minorities (if you
are familiar with them)?
6. What do you think about the changes (positive or negative, in your opinion) in terms of
acceptance of gay people in the Netherlands?
Of course, as I was conducting semi-structured interviews, I did not ask all the questions in every
case. Sometimes, depending on the personality and background of my informant, I could skip some
question(s) and focus more on the other ones. There were also situations when a respondent himself
touched upon the topic mentioned in one of the questions so I did not have to voice them separately.
In other cases I asked some sub-questions to poke into the topic which was mentioned by my in-
formant and seemed relevant for my research.
Moreover, speaking of the methods and the ways I collected data, the topics I discussed with the
respondents depended on how I met with them. For example, for some reason it was easier for me
to walk around Rotterdam with the members of DGS/De Roze Leeuw and discuss rather political
issues existing in the Netherlands along with their activities as the followers of the organization.
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Thus, in their case I focused more on discussing discourse and politics rather than their own person-
al experiences of encountering homophobia and the aspects of coming out. On the contrary, when I
met with other Dutch gay men, we chose to meet either in the park or a cafe where we could sit
down and I could listen to their own personal stories.
Another source of data, apart from the semi-structired interviews, is the social media. I used
Facebook to analyze some of the posts published by the members of DGS/De Roze Leeuw. Such
posts, including the language used in them, along with the followers’ comments which I heard per-
sonally, contribute to the whole ideology of the organization and also say much about the main ac-
tivities of it. For example, I learned from their Facebook page that they attended Pim Fortuyn’s
monument on the anniversary of murder of the politician.
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I listened to his opinions on homophobia in the Netherlands, the acceptance of gay people and the
way he sees the current political situation.
Before the fieldwork period I planned to contact “COC Nederland” to find potential informants.
Later it seemed more appropriate to talk to the members of the organization because the topics relat-
ing to COC were mentioned by some of the people with whom I already talked. I sent emails to
several offices of COC (the ones in Amsterdam, Utrecht and Rotterdam) but, unfortunately, I did
not receive any response. Only the office in Amsterdam replied and suggested that I contact Dutch
political parties instead.
Below I list the profiles of the people I interviewed during my fieldwork. I purposely omit the
profiles of the members of Dutch GayServatives/De Roze Leeuw to maintain their anonymity. In
the chapter dedicated to DGS/De Roze Leeuw I use the pseudonyms instead of the real names of the
members. During fieldwork I asked my respondents about the political parties they support and/or
vote for. Although in some cases I did not use this for the analysis, I believe it is nevertheless im-
portant to mention the parties (along with their hometowns, education and current occupation) to
demonstrate the identities of the informants.
- Bart, 37 years old, born in Apeldoorn. Studied urban planning in Deventer. Moved to Ams-
terdam at 26. During the last several years worked as a freelancer. Currently lives in Southern
France and studies Buddhist practices in a monastery. A member of GroenLinks.
- Jan, 29 years old, born in the province of Gelderland, comes from farmers’ family and today
lives in Utrecht. Currently finishes master’s history program at University of Leiden. A member
of Christian Unie party.
- Bram, 39 years old, born in Harderwijk. Studied International business and Marketing. Works
at GreenPeace and lives in Amsterdam. Supports GroenLinks.
- Paul, 26 years old, born in Enschede, finished Catholic school in Almelo, studied hospitality
management in Berlin. Currently lives in Amsterdam, works as an account manager in a tailor
company. Supports GroenLinks.
- Matthijs, 19 years old, born and lives in Amsterdam. Finished school in Amsterdam. A mem-
ber of Forum voor Democratie. Also partially supports PVV.
- Gert, 32 years old, born in Zeist, finished school there. Studied hospitality management in
Leeuwarden. Works in a hotel and lives in Amsterdam. Supports VVD and D66.
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- Alex, 28 years old, from Maastricht, studied psychology and marketing there. Lives in Ams-
terdam and works at Heineken. One of the organisers of “Jongeheerenborrel”, a drinks event for
young gay men in Amsterdam. Does not support any political party, according to him.
- Jonas, 29 years old, born in Woerden, finished secondary school in his hometown. Studied
business administration in human resources in Rotterdam and at Vrije Universiteit in Amster-
dam. At the moment lives in Amsterdam. Jonas is one of the three organisers of “Jongeheeren-
borrel” I talked to. Votes for D66.
- Felix, 26 years old, born in Heiloo, studied at school there. Then moved to Amsterdam and
studied law at University of Amsterdam. Currently he is a PhD candidate at UvA’s department of
law. Organises “Jongeheerenborrel”. Supports D66.
- Jacob, 25 years old, Born in Zeist. Finished Theology bachelor’s program in Utrecht, current-
ly studies at master’s Spiritual care program at Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam. Supports PvDA.
- Rick, 30 years old, born in Nijmegen, after school moved to Amsterdam and studied Sociolo-
gy at UvA. Recently worked as a journalist for VolksKrant.
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Thesis structure and overview of the chapters
The three chapters of the thesis are organized in a way to show the different levels on which
homonationalism in the Netherlands is embodied. These levels are a discourse, an organization, and
personal stories.
In the first chapter I am showing how nostalgic feelings and narratives regarding the image of
Amsterdam as the world’s gay capital become a part of the current political discourse in which the
Netherlands is seen as threatened by conservative values and anti-gay violence. The places that used
to be safe for sexual minorities are nowadays dangerous for men walking hand in hand and drag
queens wearing make up. My argument is that such discourse is also a part of the Dutch homona-
tionalism.
The second chapter is dedicated to a young Rotterdam-based organization which was created
with the aim to stop gay bashing and punish the attackers who are claimed to be homophobic Mus-
lim immigrants. This section explores the ideology, the language and the practices of Dutch Gay-
Servatives/De Roze Leeuw to illustrate how activism against homophobia distinguishes and oppos-
es itself to social groups (such as ethnic minorities) and other movements and organizations (in this
case, COC along with the activism supporting multiculturalism) that become the Other of the Dutch
nationalistic discourse.
In the final chapter I tell the stories of gay men whose coming out experiences as well as the ex-
periences of being gay are evaluated by them in terms of how the see the Netherlands, their native
country, which is visualised as emancipated and progressive in relation to sexual minorities. This is
the chapter in which personal narratives are intertwined with the images which originate from the
modern Dutch sexual discourse.
In the conclusion I summarize all the chapters and argue that homonationalism is an ongoing
process and its forms and manifestations can be contradictory to each other even within one country
- the Netherlands. Particularly ethnography makes it possible to discover such kinds of contradic-
tions.
!20
Chapter 1. The nostalgic narrative. The Netherlands as a gay-friendly country
and Amsterdam as the worlds’ gay capital
Nostalgia as a concept
In this chapter I would like to introduce the examples of what the Dutch gay men whom I inter-
viewed think about Amsterdam and the way it is changing. Most of the respondents believe that the
capital of the Netherlands used to be the world’s centre of the gay scene but lost this status due to
the increasing number of anti-gay violence perpetrated by the Muslim population of the country.
However, the conservative reaction to the male homoerotic images, as I will show further, is com-
mon not only among the immigrants. Fundamentalist Protestant and Catholic Dutch activists also
express discontent with such images.
The term “nostalgia” reflects the feelings and opinions of the men I talked with while doing
fieldwork. Nostalgia can be defined as a “longing for an idealized past” and is essentially related to
the concept of loss (Pickering & Keightley 2006: 923). But the term does not mean only the desire
to go back to the past which is imagined as better than the present, it can also mean that those who
have nostalgic feelings want to use the images of the past for a brighter vision of the future. Thus,
Pickering and Keightley claim that
“we should perhaps reconfigure it in terms of a distinction between the desire to return
to an earlier state or idealized past, and the desire not to return but to recognize aspects of
the past as the basis for renewal and satisfaction in the future. Nostalgia can then be seen as
not only a search for ontological security in the past, but also as a means of taking one’s
bearings for the road ahead in the uncertainties of the present. (…) Nostalgia can be both
melancholic and utopian” (Ibid.: 921). The argument of the authors is that the term is not
always a direct opposite of progress. “In being negatively othered as its [progress’ - P.G.]
binary opposite, nostalgia became fixed in a determinate backwards-looking stance” (Ibid.:
920). To avoid such binary opposition (nostalgia - progress), they call for recognizing mul-
tiple nostalgias, or different modalities of nostalgia. “Nostalgia is neither an absolute nor
singularly universal phenomenon” (Ibid.: 934).
One of the key scholars who closely investigated the term is Svetlana Boym. In her book “The
Future of Nostalgia” she defines the concept (from “nostos” - return home, and “algia” - longing) as
“a longing for a home that no longer exists or has never existed. Nostalgia is a sentiment of loss and
!21
displacement, but it is also a romance with one’s own fantasy” (Boym 2001: 8). She also explores a
history of the term and reminds that originally it came from medicine:
Similar to the argument of Pickering and Keightley, Boym states that the term can sometimes be
related to the images of the future. “Nostalgia is not always about the past; it can be retrospective
but also prospective. Fantasies of the past determined by needs of the present have a direct impact
on realities of the future. Consideration of the future makes us take responsibility for out nostalgic
tales” (Ibid.: 11). Finally, exploring the history of the concept discussed by the intellectuals of the
modern era, she argues that “modern nostalgia is a mourning for the impossibility of mythical re-
turn, for the loss of an enchanted world with clear borders and values; it could be a secular expres-
sion of a spiritual longing, a nostalgia for an absolute, a home that is both physical and spiritual, the
edenic unity of time and space before entry into history” (Ibid.: 20).
Jan Willem Duyvendak in “The Politics of Home: Belonging and Nostalgia in Western Europe
and the United States” (Duyvendak 2011) investigates the case of Dutch nostalgia and associates
the latter with “homelessness”, or the debates about “the stolen home”. In the chapter dedicated to
the Netherlands, he argues the common idea the politics of multiculturalism caused such feelings of
homelessness among the native Dutch population. However, he states that there was no multicultur-
alist policy and the alienation of the white Dutch was triggered by a different process. “The 1970s
policy on cultural identity can easily be misunderstood as multiculturalist, for its central tenet was
that ‘guest workers’ should maintain their identities. The reason for this, however, was not to ac-
commodate pluralism in the Netherlands, but to facilitate guest workers’ return after they had ful-
filled their function as unskilled laborers in the Netherlands.” (Ibid.: 86). Later, in 1980s, it turned
out that these workers did not wish to go back to their homeland. Thus, it is irrelevant to speak
about a coherent multiculturalist policy in the Netherlands. The reason for the native Dutch people
feeling not at home anymore is the process of culturalization. Since the rapid secularization of the
nation in 1960s, the majority of the Dutch people believe in gender equality as well as the equality
of homosexual and heterosexual people. In this way, Dutch culture is portrayed as progressive and
modern. With such strong perception of what is called the Dutch culture and its progressive values,
there is a demand that the immigrants share the same values. “Pillarization may once have accom-
modated pluralism in the Netherlands. But pluralism today is a weak shadow; the growing consen-
sus about progressive values has created a wider values gap between the native majority and Mus-
lim immigrants than in countries with less progressive majority cultures” (Ibid.: 90). This means
that the newcomers who wish to stay in the Netherlands, must adopt such values and norms to be-
!22
come citizens. Such strict opposition between “we” (the progressive native Dutch) and “them” (the
newcomers, the bearers of the different (commonly backward) cultures) makes the former feel not
at home in their native country because of the immigrants who live in the same place but allegedly
not follow the norms and values of the former. “… people can only feel at home with those who
have been part of that home for a long time and who share the same norms and values” (Ibid.: 97).
“(…) ‘we’ emphathize with those who no longer feel at home in what was once their hopeful neigh-
bourhood and country. The native Dutch, it is argued, have become like foreigners in their own
country, feeling that foreigners should allegedly feel: not at home” (Ibid.: 98).
Below I will show how on a discursive level the images of Amsterdam presented by my infor-
mants differentiate the native Dutch population and its gay scene from the migrant Others who, ac-
cording to the respondents, are the main reason of the transformation of the gay capital. The feeling
of nostalgia and homelessness is frequently articulated by the gay men I interviewed.
Opinions
The stories about how Amsterdam used to be the most popular city of the world among gay people
were told by many informants. First I heard it from Lars, the member of DGS/De Roze Leeuw from
Rotterdam. When he was explaining to me why the cases of anti-gay violence increase in the
Netherlands (which I will disclose in the next chapter), he suddenly commented on the gay scene
which existed in Amsterdam in 1990s. Although he could not witness it himself, he told me how
flourishing and safe it used to be. “Drag queens could walk wearing make-up in the streets! Now
they would get beaten.” Lars stated that today gay people going to gay bars and clubs as well as
drag queens performing there used to feel safer but not today. Nowadays, according to the follower
of DGS/De Roze Leeuw, they are attacked by Muslim youngsters who are more violent today and
the streets are less safe than they used to be earlier. Another member of the Rotterdam organization,
Thomas, whom I met later after the interview with Lars, mentioned one of the gay venues of the
Dutch capital, Reguliersdwarsstraat. He confirmed Lars’ view that today the Dutch cities are much
less safe now. “Amsterdam used to be the gay capital of the world in 1960s.” But these years Reg-
uliers is “one of the most unsafe streets in Amsterdam” because of the “guys on scooters” who yell
swear words at the visitors of gay bars.
It is noteworthy that such nostalgia was expressed not only by the followers of conservative po-
litical organizations - such as members of DGS/De Roze Leeuw - but also by the supporters of more
liberal Dutch parties. When I talked to Gert, a gay man who votes for VVD and critisized Gert
!23
Wilders (PVV) and Thierry Baudet (FvD), said that “Amsterdam used to be more accepting but
maybe that’s because the city was different. It used to be a gay capital but not anymore. Muslims
also are not that tolerant.” Another informant, Paul, who supports the green party GroenLinks,
shared the very same words about Amsterdam that used to be the gay capital, but, according to his
view, it was in 1970s. The main gay venues, he stated, used to have more gay bars and clubs. He
admitted that the number of places for homosexual people is decreasing because of the acceptance
of sexual minorities today. The gay scene itself “is more mixed now”. But he also mentioned the
street violence which happens nowadays and linked it with the idea that ethnic minorities are not
integrated into the “Dutch culture”. “We live in a city with lots of immigrants. They live their own
rules. They’re from Syria, Afghanistan. And the government is not doing enough about integration.”
Another case related to the gay-friendly image of Amsterdam is worth mentioning. One of the
respondents, Alex, who organizes a drinks event Jongeheerenborrel along with the other two men,
briefly mentioned the Suitsupply case which dates from February 2018. When I arrived in the
Netherlands from Russia in early February 2018, I saw the posters of the two men kissing with each
other or touching each other. The banners were the advertising of the Amsterdam-based suit compa-
ny called Suitsupply. Looking at those posters while already having the image of the Netherlands as
one of the most LGBT-friendly countries of Western Europe, I thought that my expectations of the
place I moved to were certainly justified. However, later, when I started following the official page
of COC on Facebook, I came across the posts with the pictures of Suitsupply banners which were
either damaged or crossed out with a black tape in the parts where the two men were kissing. After
a while the advertising completely disappeared from the streets of Amsterdam. I was confused when
I found out that such reaction can be possible in the Netherlands.
Commenting on the accidents with these billboards, Alex said that he found that “disturbing”.
Again, the case was linked to today’s image of the Dutch capital. “Amsterdam positions itself as a
gay capital. But we are not there yet.” He claimed that recently the city “has become more multicul-
tural” and there are people different from each other who live in it. Nevertheless, he quickly turned
to the native Dutch who, in his opinion, “try to be more tolerant than they really are”. He brought
another example of erotically explicit advertising, the one of Radio 538 which depicted two half-
naked women kissing and touching each other and covering their faces with a boombox. Alex
claimed that while so many people were disturbed by the two men kissing on Suitsupply posters, no
one cared about the two women on Radio 548 advertising billboards, which appeared in the streets
of Dutch cities in summer 2018.
!24
Many of my respondents, when they spoke about Amsterdam which “used to be the world’s gay
capital”, including the followers of DGS/De Roze Leeuw, see the reason of the negative changes in
the city in the Muslim population of the Netherlands. The increasing numbers of anti-gay violence
are regularly linked to ethnic, Muslim minorities. However, as Alex mentioned, it is also the white
Dutch people who remain sensitive to such homoerotic images (particularly male) as the ones on
the posters of Suitsupply. In March 2018, young people from a Catholic organization Civitas Chris-
tiana held a demonstration in Nijmegen against the advertising of Suitsupply. The slogans on their
banners said "Stop Suitsupply" and "God's marriage = 1 man + 1 woman.” The Catholic movement,
founded in 2014, claims that its aim is to protect a tradition, family, and private property.2 “Follow-
ing the protest, Civitas Christiana announced the start of a new campaign called ‘Family in Danger.’
Campaign leader Hugo Bos stated its goals: ‘This protest was just the beginning. We now are going
to campaign intensively and persistently for the family. We will not stop until the family is com-
pletely protected from the sexual revolution.’”3 Although there are indeed existing cases of homo-
phobia among the native Dutch population, for example, the protest of the Catholics against the
Suitsupply billboards, the problem remains less visible and discussable. It is the Muslim population
which is normally triggered in the media as well as in the stories of my respondents. The dichotomy
“us/them”, which relies on neoculturalism and the ideas of progress, emphasizes first of all the ho-
mophobia of the migrant minorities.
Homophobia of the native Dutch population, in particular the fundamentalist Protestant and
Catholic parts of it, was discussed in the media not only in the case of Suitsupply. In the last chapter
of the thesis I will investigate the story of my respondent Bart, who personally experienced discrim-
ination by his conservative religious relatives.
A bit of history of gay Amsterdam and the dynamics of Amsterdam’s gay scene
The informants’ beliefs that the Dutch capital used to be the world’s centre of the gay scene are in-
deed justified. When the Dutch government took steps to achieve the emancipation of sexual mi-
norities in 1970-1980s, Amsterdam was the first municipality to assume measures. “These include
various issues such as education, social support for the elderly, better health care services particular-
ly for STDs, sport facilities, equal rights in city services, and the promotion of gay and lesbian visi-
bility. The City of Amsterdam promised to stop tearing down public toilets and ordered the police to
!25
stop harassing gay men who were cruising. Since the 1990s, special projects that enhance the eman-
cipation and visibility ethnic minority queers have been added to the list” (Hekma 2006: 134).
Moreover, in 1987 Homomonument was opened in the Dutch capital. It is situated right next to
Westerkerk and consists of the three pink triangles which form a larger triangle. A public toilet was
placed next to one of the triangles as they used to be a common spot for gay men to meet and
cruise. Homomonument is one of the world’s first monuments that commemorates the victims of
homophobia.4 In 2001, the first gay marriage was held in Amsterdam. So, all these events con-
tributed to the image of Amsterdam as a gay friendly city.
As some of my respondents mentioned the changing gay scene of the Dutch capital, it is worth
investigating what were the exact changes that influenced the city as a “gay capital”. Amsterdam
used to have (but from my own impressions it still has) many gay and lesbian venues all over the
city. The main streets full of LGBT clubs and bars are Reguliersdwarsstraat, Amstel, Kerkstraat,
Warmoesstraat, and Spuistraat. Reguliersdwarsstraat, the largest gay-friendly street of the city, has
its own history. In 1981, a very popular gay cafe called “Cafe April” was opened in that street. “Di-
rectly from the start April became famous for its big and fancy parties with spectacular decorations.
Gay people from all over the world came here on their trip to Amsterdam. When this bar was ex-
tended and a rotating bar was installed in 1996, it was the biggest gay bar in Europe.”5 When AIDS
reached Amsterdam and became a large problem, the owners of the cafe organized a fund to help
the diseased gay men. Other venues, where gay people could be open about their sexual orientation,
such as April’s Exit, Havana, Reality Bar, and Soho, were opened in Reguliersdwarsstraat during
the 1980-1990s. In 1996, the owners of Havana club organized Amsterdam Pride for the first time.
The Gay Games were held in 1998 and gathered thousands of athletes from many countries. “Ams-
terdam Pride and the Gay Games added to the self-confidence of the gay community and were new
impulses for the gay night life scene, for which Reguliersdwarsstraat, with flourishing venues like
April, Exit and Havana, acted as the flagship.”6
The beginning of the 21st century marked the decline of the gay venues of Amsterdam as it was
mentioned by my informants. With the appearance of the Internet and the fact that it became more
and more popular, there was less need for sexual minorities to meet in the special places like gay
bars. Around 2010, several bars and clubs in Reguliersdwarsstraat faced financial issues and had to
!26
close down. Besides, the appearance of the dating apps, such as GayRomeo or Grindr, made the gay
bars less attractive for homosexual people to meet with each other. Up until now online communi-
cation stays the most convenient way of dating for many gay men.
Moreover, some streets of Amsterdam lost their status of being gay streets due to the increasing
number of tourists from around the world. Warmoesstraat is an example of this process. From the
conversations I had not only with my “official” informants but also with my gay friends and ac-
quaintances living in Amsterdam, I had an image that this street, along with the bars and shops lo-
cated there, is loosing its gay visitors because of the tourists and the business and crowdedness they
cause in the area. Earlier in 2018, a gay fetish store MisterB has moved from Warmoesstraat to
Prinsengracht due to this reason. The owner of the shop claimed that in Warmoesstraat regular cus-
tomers did not feel comfortable at the shop when tourists came in just to laugh at the fetish products
and take selfies.7
7https://www.ad.nl/amsterdam/fetishwinkel-mister-b-verhuist-vanwege-overlast-toeristen~a575046d/ [ac-
cessed 21.01.19]
8 http://www.reguliers.net/history-gaypride.php [accessed 22.01.19]
!27
Moreover, in 1990s there were less political issues to fight with in Amsterdam because gay men
were less marginalized and more assimilated into the Dutch society. “The Amsterdam Pride was
unique, because instead of a march with trailers through the streets, there's a parade of boats over
some of the city's world famous canals.”9 Moreover, Pink Saturday was not attached exclusively to
the Dutch capital and was organized in other provinces of the Netherlands. Since 2012 Amsterdam
has its own march which has a political background - Pride Walk. This march was created as a reac-
tion to anti-gay violence in the Netherlands and abroad. Every year, one week before the canal pa-
rade of Amsterdam Pride, the marchers walk through the city starting from Homomonument near
Westerkerk to Vondelpark. When I talked with one of my respondents - Rick - in the end of the con-
versation he mentioned that he was going to participate in Pride Walk. He also characterized it as a
mainly political march and stated that he was taking part in the demonstration because the party he
was a member of - Dutch Labour Party - was one of the march’s organizers. He suggested that I
should better go to Milkshake dance festival (which was held on the same day as Pride Walk) be-
cause it was more fun than the demonstration.
Amsterdam Pride emerged at the time when it seemed that the main issues related to homopho-
bia were gone. Five years after the first canal parade same-sex marriage became legal in the Nether-
lands and gay men and women gained adoption rights. In this political context Amsterdam Pride
was and still remains predominantly a party, a celebration of emancipated sexuality. Moreover,
more and more heterosexual people join the parade. Paul, the informant whom I already mentioned
in this chapter, also stated that, in his opinion, the canal parade today is a party rather than a politi-
cal demonstration. He said that because of the special format of the event - the fact that the parade
is organized with boats sailing in the canal - there is no enough contact and interaction between the
participant of Amsterdam Pride and the viewers. Thus, political issues cannot be addressed properly
there. Having a conversation with me, Paul mentioned that, for example, the issue of homophobia in
Russia should be addressed better during the parade. He also said that, unlike in the Netherlands,
there are more political activists in Germany during the parades. For example, in Berlin, where Paul
used to live while studying there. When I attended Amsterdam Pride myself in August 2018, I also
had an impression that the parade is a huge party at which the few activist boats (like the ones of
COC or Amnesty International) did not look relevant sailing together with the party (Club Church,
MisterB) and commercial (Netflix, Phillips, Google) boats. In the next chapter dedicated to a con-
9 Ibid.
!28
servative gay organization one of the informants expressed discontent with such format of Amster-
dam Pride, so I will continue exploring this topic further.
The study of the gay scene of Amsterdam and its dynamics showed that there are indeed changes
happening in the city’s LGBT scene. Moreover, I explored the history of Amsterdam Pride as the
main gay event of the capital. Apparently it also affected the image of Amsterdam as well as the
feelings of loss expressed by the men I had conversations with. In one way or another, the image of
Amsterdam’s past becomes somewhat idealized by the respondents. First, the majority of the guys I
interviewed were too young to witness the gay scene personally. Second, although it is true that gay
bars, clubs, and stores close down or move to other streets of the city, Amsterdam Pride is getting
more and more popular and larger. Moreover, Seidman, cited by Duyvendak in one of his articles
(Duyvendak 1996: 421), states that “the dominant public spaces in Amsterdam are still very much
officially sanctioned as heterosexual. A lesbian and gay public presence seems confined to certain
spaces, e.g. bars, cafes, or sex shops… I am not suggesting that Amsterdam is as intolerant and as
homophobic a culture as the United States but that heterosexuality remains the organizing principle
of social life” (Seidman 1994: 70-1).
The opinions of the respondents speaking about the changing scene of Amsterdam and the fact
that the city is not the world’s capital anymore have, I argue, nostalgic character. The gay scene of
Amsterdam, indeed, has been changing through the years. Boym, Pickering and Keightley argue
that nostalgia is the term which involves not just our idealized images of the past but it also has to
do the vision of the future. The discontent expressed by my informants is connected with the idea of
the progressive and modern Dutch nation which nowadays is disturbed by the presence of the Mus-
lim immigrants who are claimed to be the bearers of the traditional, backward culture. As Duyven-
dak states, the idea of a culture as static, closed, and unchanging sustains such a strong opposition
between “we” - the native Dutch who feel homeless, who feel that Amsterdam is not like it used to
be anymore - and “them” - the newcomers who do not fit in the emancipated and progressive Dutch
culture and hence are destroying the image of the Dutch capital as a gay-friendly city. Such nostal-
gic narratives involve neoculturalist statements and the oppositions “we” - “them” is inevitably
present in them, despite the fact that the changes in Amsterdam’s gay scene are not always caused
by the influence of Muslim immigrants. One of the examples is Warmoesstraat which is transform-
ing with the increasing flow of tourists. Thus, the nostalgic discourse becomes a part of the
homonationalism in the Netherlands. The vision of the Netherlands as a country that brings progress
!29
and which is placed within the discourse of modernity coexists with the neoculturalist discourse
which strictly distinguishes (by the use temporal categories) the modern and progressive Nether-
lands and the backward and religiously conservative Muslim Others. Such strict opposition sustains
the tension between the two populations and causes the feelings of nostalgia, homelessness and fear
among the autochthonous part of the Dutch population. Such feelings of nostalgia and fear were
frequently expressed by the respondents.
Further, in the next chapter I move from a discursive modality of homonationalism to the partic-
ular community. I will explore the ideology, the practices and the language of a conservative and
anti-immigrant gay organization from Rotterdam and investigate how those embody homonational-
ism as well.
!30
Chapter 2. Dutch GayServatives/De Roze Leeuw: The narrative of homopho-
bia embodied in a conservative gay organization.
In this chapter I will explore how homonationalism is embodied on the level of a political organiza-
tion. I apply several concepts to the analysis of statements and the practices of DGS/De Roze
Leeuw. First of all, I use the concept “neoculturalism” (Uitermark, Mepschen and Duyvendak
2014), which describes the world as divided into static and opposed to each other cultures. This
term also denotes today’s political context of the Netherlands. In this context the progressive and
sexually emancipated Dutch culture is opposed to the backward Muslim culture which is depicted
as a threat to allegedly autochthonous population. Another important for this chapter concept is
“modernity”. Butler (2008) uses it to mark how the temporal categories are manipulatively exploit-
ed in the sexual politics by such politicians as Pim Fortuyn. The members of DGS/De Roze Leeuw
also present the values of sexual freedom and gender equality as specifically Dutch. Lægaard
(2007) states that the nationalisation of the liberal values is a form of nationalism. This process has
a normative function: it excludes from the nation the citizens who are not considered to be follow-
ing the liberal values. Finally, homonormativity plays a key role in the nationalisation of the liberal
values in the Netherlands. Homonormativity establishes the link between gay identity and capitalist
consumerism (Drucker 2015). In the Netherlands it also marks assimilationist policy of the gay
movement instead of the struggle for radical social changes (Mepschen et al., 2010). All these con-
cepts mark the processes which embody homonationalism. Nowadays in the Netherlands gay
movements and organizations can be well fitted within the neuculturalist and nationalist discourse. I
refer to DGS/De Roze Leeuw to illustrate how homonationalism is practiced on the lever of an or-
ganization.
When I discovered on Facebook a page of a Rotterdam-based conservative political organization
in May 2018, it was then called “Dutch GayServatives” (or shortly DGS). In July I met with a
member of DGS and he told me about their plans to change the name of their organization to make
it more “inclusive” and appealing not only among gay people, but also among other members of
LGBT community. He would not tell me which name he came up with by then. On October the 1st
a separate Facebook page was created and called “De Roze Leeuw”. The change of the name of the
organization reflects the transition in how its members identify themselves in the landscape of
LGBT activism in the Netherlands. The original name - Dutch GayServatives - represented a reac-
tionary position and activities of the followers and their opposition to one of the largest Dutch
LGBT organizations - COC. I will elaborate this in one of the sections below. The new name for the
!31
organization - De Roze Leeuw - employs one of the national symbols which is featured in the coat
of arms of the Netherlands - the lion. In my opinion, this is crucial in terms of how the members of
the organization visualise themselves politically and also symbolically. The new name, along with
the organization’s aims (which are listed below), contributes to the modern nationalistic discourse
in which the Netherlands is depicted as a progressive and tolerant country.
I had separate meetings with four members of the organization, including Lars. It was him who
later arranged for me the interviews with other three members of DGS/De Roze Leeuw. Although
very small, DGS/De Roze Leeuw is a political organization with a public Facebook page. All of the
members I talked to did not experience any violence because of their sexual orientation. I will focus
not on the members particularly but on the practices and the statements which the members shared
with me.
!32
based in The Hague and Utrecht, according to my informant. DGS/De Roze Leeuw was created
when the current members realized that they have to do something about anti-gay violence caused
mainly by Turkish and Moroccan youngsters. Lars saw the media reports about the attacks and
thought there is a lack of action among the existing LGBT organizations. The reason these organi-
zations do not take action, according to Lars, is because they are afraid of being labelled as racist,
fascist, or even Nazi. After this he insisted that he was not against immigrants or more specifically
Muslim immigrants. He stated that he was against aggressive behaviour of Muslim teenagers who
attack gay men in the streets of the Dutch cities. As reported by Lars, it was the third generation of
Muslims (which is mostly young Turkish and Moroccan people) who, because of not being born in
the native country of their grandparents, were looking for their national roots and opposed them-
selves to the Dutch progressive values. Hence anti-gay violence arises among them. That is why
Lars and other members want to have an organization that strongly opposes such cases of violence.
To do so, they want to legalize the use of pepper-spray in the Netherlands so that gay men who are
attacked are able to fight back or avoid the violence and run away. They also want to bring more
attention from the government and the police to the cases of violence.
I asked Lars about the name of his organization, back then called Dutch GayServatives. Ap-
parently GayServatives means Gay + Conservative. They chose this combination because, accord-
ing to them, many people think that gays cannot be conservative, so they wanted to demonstrate
that there are also conservative gay people. Lars pointed out that ‘conservative’ derives from ‘con-
serve’. By using this word he stated that he wishes to conserve what is already achieved for gay
men in the Netherlands, which is the acceptance of homosexuality. He pointed out that he likes
freedom, gay life and gay scene and he wants to keep it in the Netherlands. Moreover, Lars believes
that “conservatives tend to become more progressive”.
!33
First I asked Lars what he thinks about COC. He told me that it refuses to acknowledge that
there is a problem with homophobic Muslims. Instead, Lars claims, COC worries about gay jokes
on the TV which are allegedly homophobic. Another member of the organization in Rotterdam -
Gerard - told me that “COC was corrupted by the left-wing people. They don’t represent all the gay
people.” He insisted that the organization is left-wing and thus cannot deal with the issues homo-
sexual people encounter today. “COC are left-wing” and the gays are turning right.”
The phrase “symbolic politics” was associated with the activity of COC by the two members of
DGS/De Roze Leeuw I talked to. By calling “symbolic politics” what COC does they state that the
organization does not do anything against the cases gay bashing in the Netherlands. Instead, the
members believe, COC pretends to support and protect sexual minorities by, for example, financing
rainbow zebras in the street of Dutch cities. “Visibility is only symbolic politics” - Gerard com-
mented on the activity of the organization he critisizes mentioning rainbow-coloured crosswalks.
“We need more security, we need more police and the rights to secure ourselves”. He admitted that
COC - along with the left-wing parties - did a lot for the homosexual movement in the 1960’s. To-
day, on the contrary, the organization looses support from the community and their offices are being
closed down around the country. Another follower of DGS/De Roze Leeuw - Krijn, who identifies
as bisexual and decided to join the organization specifically for its stance against anti-gay violence -
told me the following: “COC failed in my eyes. They get money from the government. They are
afraid of the debates. The only thing they do is the rainbow crossroads. In my opinion they failed
the discussion.” The first LGBT organization of the Netherlands is associated first of all with the
establishment (noting the financial support COC gets from the government) and the left-wing polit-
ical agenda which is also rejected by the followers of DGS/De Roze Leeuw as “multicultural” and
not able to represent homosexual people nowadays.
!34
When I was talking with Lars he claimed that gay people in the Netherlands “are becoming more
right-wing”. According to him, this is connected with the fact that “they would like to preserve their
status quo”. Besides, he stated that the Dutch right-wing political parties are becoming more pro-
gressive towards sexual minorities nowadays. Lars also mentioned that it relates to the gay people
with different incomes. He believes that wealthier gay men support right-wing parties “to protect
their status quo” while those with low income vote for such parties as PVV and FvD as they live in
the neighbourhoods mainly populated by ethnic immigrants and are more exposed to anti-gay vio-
lence.
Lars himself is a member of a municipal Rotterdam party “Leefbar Rotterdam” and state “Forum
voor Democratie”. Thomas is a member of these parties as well and described them as right-wing
but not far right. Krijn also described the organization he is a member of as right-wing. Besides, he
claimed that he receives “more support from the right than from the left flank. The left parties total-
ly don’t understand the discussion. In the right parties you can have a discussion.”
During my interview with Gerard he started the conversation about DGS/De Roze Leeuw saying
that “we are too left-wing”. Nevertheless, he noted: “left wing and right wing is not a good way to
divide politics. It’s more globalist and anti-globalist”. However he kept using the former terms to
describe the politics in the Netherlands. He again mentioned 1960s, when “it was the left-wing par-
ties that fought for us”.
The terms “left-wing” and “right-wing” are actively exploited by the followers of this organiza-
tion. These categories have temporal connotations. My respondents, especially Gerard, claimed that
left-wing parties and organizations (such as COC) are not able to handle the current issues anymore
but used to be important in fighting for gay rights in 1960s. Moreover, the terms are also employed
to express the organization’s position on immigration.
!35
nization on Facebook and its preference over genderneutral toilets also creates the image that its
members wish to use force to fight back the perpetrators of anti-gay violence and do not want to be
seen as weak and feminine.
The Rotterdam organization, I argue, is homonormative. Mepschen, Duyvendak, and Tonkens
refer to Lisa Duggan and characterize the Dutch gay community by the term “homonormativity”.
“in the Netherlands, an ‘assimilationist’ strategy focusing on equal rights rather than ‘queerness’ or
radical social change characterized the movement almost from its inception.” “Queerness does not
necessarily challenge the national order (cf. Kuntsman, 2008b) but can be implicated in it and can,
in particular circumstances, even be mobilized to shape and reinforce (neo-)nationalist and Oriental-
ist projects and politics” (Mepschen et al., 2010: 971). The members of DGS/De Roze Leeuw act
within a neonationalist and neoculturalist political context. Their organization is based on the assim-
ilationist agenda of the Dutch gay movement and is not radical.
My assumptions that DGS/De Roze Leeuw is the organization focused on its masculine image
were later supported by the words of Krijn when I was interviewing him in Bergen op Zoom. De-
scribing DGS/De Roze Leeuw he opposed it not only to COC but also to the LGBT community in
general. He believes that “gays are accepted in their community which is feminine. But they’re not
accepted in a main world”. According to Krijn, LGBT community represents only a small number
of gay people but does not include all sexual minorities. “The way they are acting on boats [during
Gay Pride parade - P.G.] feeding them [perpetrators of gay bashing - P.G.].” He did not comment on
how exactly the behaviour of Gay Pride participants “feeds” those who perpetrate anti-gay violence.
Julien thinks that modern Pride parades are about the small community of mainly feminine gay
people. “This is not the nation-wide community.” That is why he joined DGS/De Roze Leeuw as he
thought that this organization is different from the ones he described.
In the previous chapter dedicated to the image of Amsterdam and the feelings of loss expressed
by the respondents I explored the history of Amsterdam Pride and characterized it as a large party
rather than a political demonstration. The canal parade was organized by the people from the club in
Reguliersdwarsstraat and already in the beginning saw it as as a celebration of emancipated sexuali-
ty, since in the end of the 1990s it seemed that the rights for the homosexual people were achieved.
That is why Amsterdam Pride has the image of the party crowded with queer men who are dressed
flamboyantly and sometimes provocatively. One of my Dutch friends once mentioned a saying
common in the Netherlands - “doe normaal” (act normal). He then said that Gay Pride is the the
only time of the year when this unspoken rule can be ignored. “During Pride you can do whatever
!36
you want.” However, it seems that the members of DGS/De Roze Leeuw, following the words of
Krijn, do not accept such image of Gay Pride and oppose themselves to it. The queerness and, as
Krijn stated, the femininity of Gay Pride community become in the eyes of DGS/De Roze Leeuw
members the images which do not represent the whole LGBT community, including the members
themselves. Instead, they have created and support their own image which, following their vision,
can demonstrate their willingness to actively fight gay bashing.
Pim Fortuyn
The first openly gay populist politician of the Netherlands - Pim Fortuyn - is a key political figure
for the members of DGS/De Roze Leeuw. Although most of the organization’s members are too
young enough to have witnessed the career of Fortuyn before he was murdered in May 2002, all of
them expressed their admiration for his position and political activities.
The time when Pim Fortuyn appeared in the political scene of the Netherlands and became popu-
lar for his populist statements against Muslims was the time of significant social changes within the
country. The problem of increasing immigration and the number of asylum seekers from Middle
Eastern countries became more evident. The immigrants, who arrived at the country as guest work-
ers in 1960s, as well as their children, could not integrate into the Dutch society. Among the reasons
were their Islamic religion and the involvement of the Turkish and Moroccan youth into petty
crimes. This led the immigration to being associated with criminal activities and caused xenophobic
sentiments among the native Dutch people (van der Veer 2006: 116). Besides, the decades that pre-
ceded 1990s were characterised by the rise of the welfare state with many social benefits spread
among the Dutch population. Youngsters became more independent from their parents and could
start living on their own from early years. This also led to the emergence of the feminist and homo-
sexual movements which started sexual revolution in 1960s. This, apart from other factors, turned
the Netherlands into a secular and tolerant country which before used to be one of the most reli-
gious and conservative in Western Europe. Van der Veer claims that the benefits of the welfare state
formed in 1950s along with progressive values caused by the sexual revolution of 1960s were by
the end of 1990s threatened by immigration of Muslims and globalization (Ibid.: 119). Fortuyn
challenged the political establishment of the Netherlands with the statements which were directed
against immigrants who seemed as a threat to the Dutch liberal values. He used his provocative im-
age and statements, his sexuality, as well as a flamboyant way of living to gain sympathy among the
white Dutch population. Keuzenkamp and Bos state that the government “coalition was put to the
!37
test in the autumn of 2001 by a newcomer to the Dutch political scene. Pim Fortuyn called for a re-
strictive immigration policy, a robust approach to crime and small government, though he could not
really be described as a true conservative: he was not only openly gay, but also talked publicly
about his sex life, which was far from monogamous or domesticated. Fortuyn described the ‘islami-
sation’ of the Netherlands as a threat to, among other things, the country’s gay-friendly
climate” (Keuzenkamp & Bos, 2007: 27).
Lars as well as Gerard and Thomas claimed that Pim Fortuyn could have become the first gay
prime minister of the Netherlands if he had not been killed by a radical animal rights activist (van
der Veer 2006: 113). “Dutch people loved him but his haters always labelled him as racist” - stated
Lars. When I was interviewing Thomas in Rotterdam I walked with him to Pim Fortuyn’s monu-
ment so he could show it to me. On the anniversary of Pim Fortuyn’s assassination the members of
DGS/De Roze Leeuw attended the monument to bring the flowers and commemorate the politician
whom they call “the country’s greatest GayServative”, and who talked about the dangers of the
multicultural society including for gay people11 .
This chapter explored the ideology and the activities of Dutch GayServatives/De Roze Leeuw and
how they invest to the process of homonationalism in the Netherlands. The key ideas promoted by
the members of this organization are essentially attached to the image of the Dutch nation which is
depicted as progressive and emancipated. The claim of the organization that anti-gay violence is
always caused by the young generation of Muslim immigrants who belong to and were raised in a
culture different from the Dutch culture and its values is a good example of cultural protectionism
which follows “modernity-versus-tradition paradigm” (Mepschen et al., 2010: 970): the progressive
values of the Netherlands are portrayed as belonging to modernity while the homophobic behaviour
of the perpetrators is described as backward.
The practices of DGS/De Roze Leeuw also contribute to homonationalism in the Netherlands:
the organization emerged with the opposition to COC which is viewed by the members as too mul-
ticultural and not caring enough about the Dutch sexual minorities. Moreover, the activists of the
Rotterdam-based organization participated in Rotterdam Pride walking with the national flag of the
Netherlands as well as their new logo which used one of the Dutch national symbols - a lion. An-
other important practice is the visit of the monument of Pim Fortuyn - the populist politician who
!38
was notorious for his loud anti-immigrant statements and his critics of the idea of multiculturalism
in the Netherlands. The followers of DGS/De Roze Leeuw call Pim Fortuyn the great GayServative.
And finally, the language, meaning the categories and terms, the followers use demonstrate their
affiliation to the nationalistic discourse. This language includes the new name (De Roze Leeuw),
which exploits the national symbol of the Netherlands; the use of the categories “left-wing” and
“right-wing”, where the former is associated by the members with multiculturalism and avoidance
of the problem of anti-gay violence and the latter is used by themselves denote their own position in
the political discourse of the Netherlands. Lastly, DGS/De Roze Leeuw created the mottos which
are provocatively masculine and intended to oppose the organization to a more mainstream LGBT
community which is considered feminine and not able to solve the issues of gay bashing.
The final chapter of the thesis tells the personal stories of the two respondents and explores how
the coming out narrative intertwined with the Dutch discourse of homophobia becomes national-
ized, i.e. embodying homonationalism.
!39
Chapter 3. Coming out narratives and personal experiences
Nowadays personal narratives of the Dutch gay men, who tell about growing up being gay and their
coming out experiences, may also embody homonationalism. I will tell the stories of my two infor-
mants, Bart and Felix. Although both men do not support conservative parties and movements, their
narratives nevertheless include the statements which relate to the discourse of homonationalism.
Thus, the personal narratives also embody homonationalism today in the Netherlands. Besides, the
storytellers do not necessarily have to belong to a conservative, or what is called “right-wing”, dis-
course. As I will show further, to explain why the experiences of Bart and Felix are exactly the way
they are, they both appeal to the Dutch values and the idea of the Dutchness.
Sexual stories
The stories of Bart and Felix are their personal sexual narratives. For the analysis of these stories I
use the work of Ken Plummer “Telling Sexual Stories” (Plummer 1995). For the sociologist person-
al stories which mention sexual experiences construct the reality of those who tell them. Thus, in
his book Plummer adheres to symbolic interactionism.
“Story telling can be placed at the heart of our symbolic interactions. The focus here is
neither on the solitary individual life (which is in principle unknown and unknowable), nor
on the text (which means nothing standing on its own), but on the interactions which
emerge around story telling. Stories can be seen as joint actions. (…) People may be seen
as engaged in fitting together lines of activity around stories; they are engaged in story ac-
tions.” (Ibid.: 20)
Moreover, what is important in the case of the stories of my respondents, the stories are not only
symbolic actions which construct the reality, they are also a “part of the political process. Sexual
stories ooze through the political stream. (…) Sexual stories live in this flow of power. The power
to tell a story, or indeed to not tell a story, under the conditions of one’s own choosing, is part of the
political process” (Ibid.: 26).
Another important feature of sexual stories is that they include a social memory. “This is a mem-
ory which is attached to social groups—the common stories talked about and heard within particu-
lar groups that often come to have a life of their own” (Ibid.: 41). In the case of Bart and Felix and
considering the topic of my thesis, it is the social memory attached to the native Dutch gay men as a
social group. Plummer, who wrote his book in the UK in the early 1990s, claims that suffering is the
major motive of the coming out narratives of gay and lesbian people. However, as I will show fur-
!40
ther, it seems that the stories of Bart and Felix do not include experiences of severe cases of homo-
phobia (Ibid.: 52).
Although the stories about sexual experiences might have a universal character, “the notion of
‘the homosexual’ is a very modern thing” (Ibid.: 52).
“Stories of ‘homosexuality’ have recently changed. Once upon a time, in the western
world, there were the Greeks and their loves. Then came the ganymedes, ingles, buggers
and catamites. A little later found the mollies; and then the inverts, urnings, homosexuals
5
and queers. The male gay, the clone, the macho man appeared from the 1970s onwards.
During the 1980s, the post-Stonewall ‘Aids’ gay has appeared, and even now as I write in
6
the early 1990s, the story of the new Postmodern/New Age queer is in the making. Les-
bians too have their own ‘mother tongue’: stories of Amazons, Sapphos, romantic friend-
ships, boarding school loves, mythic mannish lesbians, women-identified women, radical
lesbians and lipstick lesbians. Throughout time and space the pleasures and displeasures of
erotic experience between the same genders have certainly existed; but in every culture
such experiences both create and respond to a wider set of cultural meanings” (Ibid.: 81).
Thus, the stories which we hear nowadays, are linked to the current era and, more specifically, to
today’s discourse. In the Netherlands, the stories of homosexual people often embody homonation-
alism. The stories about the experiences of being gay are explained and supported by the argument
that there is a long Dutch tradition of tolerance and (sexual) freedom. Also, today’s kind of personal
narratives concerning gayness and coming out originated in 1970s, when the private and the public
intertwined with each other. At that time, mass student, feminist and homosexual protests spread
around the Western European countries and the United States. The modern feminist and gay move-
ments appeared exactly in 1960s-1970s. Back then one of the main slogans of those movements
was “The personal is political”. This slogan basically meant that the issues of the private sphere of
people’s lives, such as patriarchy within a nuclear family, domestic violence, homophobia, and oth-
ers, are now the political issues that must be discussed openly and in public. These problems which
before were normally kept private were since the end of the 1960s the core problems which were
addressed by the second-wave feminist and homosexual organizations. “The personal is political”,
thus, became their key argument. “The full cycle of private, personal, public and political tellings
has become possible. Thus, not only have gays and lesbians started to tell the story of their lives to
themselves, they have started to tell their stories face to face to each other - in bars, in rap groups, in
!41
lesbian and gay centres” (Ibid.: 82). So, the personal stories always refer to a community and the
particular political context.
Further I will show how the two coming out narratives not only tell us about the personal mo-
ments, worries, events, and so on, but also incorporate the political. In this case, the narratives in-
cest to homonationalism in the Netherlands.
Bart
I will start with the story of Bart, a 37 years old gay man who was introduced by one of my friends.
He sent me a text in early August and then we agreed to meet in the end of the month because he
was not in the Netherlands yet. When I first saw him in the Hague he told me that he currently lives
in Southern France and studies Buddhist practices in a monastery.
Bart was born in Apeldoorn which he later described as “the edge of the Bible Belt of the
Netherlands”. After graduating from high school he travelled to Australia for one year and then
started a bachelor’s program in urban planning in Deventer. The parents of my respondent are polit-
ically left-wing, as he himself told me. Today he supports GroenLinks and he is also a member of
the party. He comments it the following way: “The social aspect for me is very important. I trying
to live by inclusivity and fairness”. According to Bart, when he started to realize that he was gay
when he was 15-16 years old, he had bad feelings about this. “I’d rather die than be gay” - he told
me about the way he felt at that age. At that time, he said, the schoolchildren called each other gay
when they did not like each other”. This was hurtful for Bart. Later, when he started his bachelor’s
program, he came out and “everybody was okay with that”. He admitted that his classmates were
“more being annoying than being homophobic”. They regularly wondered about Bart’s homosexu-
ality and talked about it. For some time he worked in a bookstore in his hometown and his cowork-
ers “kind of celebrated my coming out”. Although Bart parents also accepted the fact that he is gay
and did not see it as a problem, he told me that his grandparents could never accept it. “They kind
of pushed me away.” Bart’s grandparents were Jehovah’s witnesses and later became Protestant.
And although he did not see them often, he acknowledged that it was disturbing for him.
He also shared with me two more cases of homophobia he experienced later after he moved to
Amsterdam at the age of 26. When he was walking with his boyfriend near Reguliersdwarsstraat,
one of the main gay streets of the capital with several gay bars and clubs, “Moroccan youngsters”
almost attacked them. One of the youngsters looked at them and demonstratively spat on the ground
in front of them. “I have been yelled at and shouted. There was a fatty Moroccan in a hat who
!42
yelled: hit the gay, hit the gay!” Bart said they also used such offensive Dutch words as “nicht” and
“flikker”. In the end he and his boyfriend managed to avoid the violence. Bart was 28 when this
happened. Another accident happened 3-4 years later near Amstel station. Bart was alone when
three or four, as he claims, Moroccan guys shouted the words “pussy” and “faggot” to him. He
wanted to report about what happened to a policeman on a motorcycle nearby but “did not bother”
in the end.
Recalling these experiences, the ones related to his religious grandparents and the verbal dis-
crimination in Amsterdam, Bart began to reflect on them. He started to compare homophobia he
experienced while seeing his conservative family members to encountering young people from eth-
nic minority in the Dutch capital. Commenting on the latter, he admitted: “I don’t think it’s homo-
phobia. It wasn’t maybe about me, it was more about team building.” After this he recalled his
grandparents: “There’s even more nasty shit. I think those cases are more severe. That’s hypocrite.
From my own experience it’s far more severe.” So, he looked more worried about homophobic be-
haviour of his white Dutch grandparents rather than verbal discrimination of the Moroccan, as he
himself described them, young people. It seems that Bart took more personally the homophobic be-
haviour of his grandparents. At the same time he thought that the guys who yelled at him could also
find a different target, that case was not about him particularly. Besides, it looks like it is more ob-
vious to be discriminated by the Muslim youngsters rather than face homophobia when he sees his
white Dutch grandparents.
After talking about his experiences with me, we discussed more generally the issues related to
homophobia in the Netherlands. Considering his poor relationships with the conservative and reli-
gious grandparents and the two accidents that happened in Amsterdam several years ago, Bart
shared some of his thoughts about homophobic Muslims as well as homophobic white Dutch peo-
ple: “The other thing, it’s coming from the culture of homophobia, it’s rooted in their religion [Is-
lam - P.G.]. It’s not even allowed to even ask about this. Most times when you get discriminated in
Amsterdam they are Moroccans. It’s true that if there are some Moroccans approaching and I’m
holding my boyfriend’s hand, I’ll loose hands. But those Christian groups, they attack you from the
back.” Having told this, he mentioned anti-Muslim gay people who are concerned gay bashing and
see young people of ethnic background as the main perpetrators: “Racism from the gays and homo-
phobia from the Moroccans - it’s like a battle. Now it’s this group that’s excluded [Muslims - P.G.]
and which group will be next?.. I can think they made a link: these kind of people attack us and
these kind of people don’t belong here - they need to go. They call it a Jewish-Christian tradition
!43
[which, according to Bart, made Europe friendly towards sexual minorities - P.G.], that’s a lie. They
mean a non-Muslim tradition.”
Felix
The second story is the story of Felix, whom I met for the first time at Jongeheerenborrel in April.
Jongeheerenborrel is an event for young gay men who gather to have drinks and spend time togeth-
er. I discovered on the website of UvA and one day decided to visit it. I interviewed Felix in mid
August. We were sitting on Roeterseiland campus, in one of its offices. Felix works at the university
as a PhD candidate. From the window of the office you can see Amsterdam’s city centre. He
showed me the towers of the churches and then pointed at Rijksmuseum. Then we sat down at the
table and I briefly described my research so we could turn to the first interview questions concern-
ing his personal experiences.
Felix is 26. He moved to Amsterdam in 2011. He was born in a small town called Heiloo, which
is close to Alkmaar. He described it as a wealthy town. He came out already at the age of 14, at the
4th grade of high school. Felix’s parents are from Amsterdam. He told me that they expected that he
was gay. Besides, his grandparents already knew some gay people. “It was in my favour” - he said.
Felix says that he didn’t face homophobia with his schoolmates. Nevertheless, after this he asked
me if I am familiar with the Dutch system of high school education and then claimed that he “only
encountered homophobia with the students from lower level. Mostly yelling.” Nevertheless, being
the only openly gay pupil at high school, he made a big musical about homosexuality. It was spon-
sored by COC. According to him, since then there is a special educational program about homosex-
uality at his school. It seemed to me that Felix didn’t take verbal discrimination he heard other
schoolchildren seriously as he excitedly described the success of his own musical. Then I asked him
if there is homophobia in the Netherlands. “I’m sure about that, there is.” Felix said that almost
every week you can read about the attacks on gay men. “I have the feeling that the most of the ho-
mophobia is coming from the people of ethnic background”. He sounded as if he was cautiously
choosing the words while turning to this topic. “The boys that are the third generation that were
born here… It is increasing” [the cases of violence - P.G.].
But then he quickly turned to reflecting on the homophobia among the Dutch. “The problem is
also the Dutch people who are not tolerant. It’s okay to be gay but I don’t want to see gay people
kissing.” He later recalled that some years ago he decided not to apply for a membership in a frater-
nity because of his homosexuality. Considering the masculine culture of fraternities, he suspected
!44
that he would not feel comfortable there. I also asked Felix about his living in Amsterdam, going
out with friends, etc. I already knew that he was the organizer of Jongeheerenborrel and at least
every two months he and his other friends have drinks in gay bars. He replied that he heard yelling
from the “people with an ethnical background”. Once it happened when he was with his gay friends
near Albert Heijn close to Reguliersdwarsstraat. They heard the word “kankerhomo” yelled to them.
However, he admitted, he feels safe in the city. “I’m in a kind of a bubble.”
After discussing Felix’s coming out and experiences of being gay, I naively wondered why he
was lucky to have accepting family and classmates, why he could stage a large musical at high
school and are there any circumstances he believes for which he feels safe in Amsterdam. He told
me that it has to do with a long tradition of tolerance in the Netherlands and it dates back to several
centuries ago. “It’s been an open and tolerant country for a long period. This has always been a
country of the immigrants. And it’s a small country. A country of trade. That’s why we have to be
open, we are a small country.”
These two narratives respond to the national and political context of the Netherlands. As Plummer
states that personal stories can be “joint actions”. In this way the stories or Bart and Felix relate to
the particular discursive narrative, according to which the Netherlands is traditionally a tolerant,
modern, progressive country. At first the story of Bart may seem contradictory to such narrative be-
cause his native Dutch grandparents were homophobic. However, he talks about his family in such
an evaluative way that his grandparents’ behaviour is not typically Dutch and should be different,
proper. He also brings up the events when he was verbally discriminated by the Muslim youngsters.
While he cannot accept homophobia from his family, the behaviour of the non-native Dutch young-
sters, as it seems to me, was apparent for him.
In the second story, Felix told me that he never experienced homophobia in his family. He also
was not discriminated severely by his classmates at school. To explain why he was so lucky, he ap-
pealed to the “long tradition of tolerance in the Netherlands”. Again, speaking about anti-gay vio-
lence, he mentioned the Muslim population and stressed that the perpetrators come from the immi-
grant families. Such opposition of the native Dutch population to the immigrant minorities men-
tioned in both personal stories, I believe, also embody homonationalism. These stories use neocul-
turalist narratives, in which the two cultures - the white Dutch culture and the Muslim culture - are
displayed as opposing each other. Furthermore, both stories involve interpretations of what the
Dutchness is and what the traditional Dutch values are.
!45
The narratives of Bart and Felix also suppose that there should be a community which hears their
stories. They both include the scenarios which are common when telling about one’s own growing
up being a homosexual: personal worries during the realization of one’s homosexuality, relation-
ships with family, friends, and classmates; discovering the gay scene, etc. However, the modern
Dutch gay men’s personal narratives about coming out have one more characteristic which is absent
in Plummer’s pre-1990’s stories. Both Bart and Felix use the image of the Netherlands as a modern
and tolerant country which means it should not be a big issue to be a homosexual. When Bart told
he was not accepted by his religious grandparents he saw it as something that should not exist in
such country. The story of Felix who, as he said, did not encounter homophobia from his family and
friends, explained it by the existence of the tradition of tolerance in the Netherlands. So, the modern
stories about coming out can also include something that was not common in the earlier stories of
gay men: the modern personal narratives (at least in the case of the Netherlands) are put within the
national context and linked to the common national narratives and images of the country. Thus, the
personal stories of the Dutch gay men, along with the discourse and communities, also practice
homonationalism.
Doing a research about naturalization ceremony for immigrants in the Netherlands, Verkaaik also
mentions “the culturalization of citizenship” (Verkaaik 2010: 69). Seeing the ceremony, during
which the newcomers receive a Dutch passport, as a disciplinary ritual, the author of the article
states that this event is one of the expressions of “new Dutch nationalism” (Ibid.: 70). Verkaaik de-
fines it as “a major discursive change that took many people by surprise: the sudden outburst of na-
tionalism, including the definition of an “autochthonous culture” and a fear of “foreign” cultures
and religions (especially Islam), in a society known - to outsiders and to itself - as tolerant and mul-
ticultural (Ibid.: 70). The main difference of new nationalism from its older versions is that “it is
primarily directed against internal migrant Others, especially Muslims” (Ibid.: 71). Another crucial
characteristic of new Dutch nationalism is that it is “attractive to many people. (…) On the one
hand, new nationalism is discursively thin and one-dimensional, based on a simplified orientalism
in which secular freedom stands in opposition to religious doctrine. On the other hand, its social
elasticity makes it serve many projects and desires” (Ibid.: 71).
The author investigates the diversity of natularization ceremonies which are organized by the
local municipalities around the Netherlands and discovers that in some cases these ceremonies are
treated by local bureaucrats with a sense of irony or embarrassment when having to think how the
“Dutchness” is defined and characterized. However, he argues, “the nationalist discourse on culture
!46
can be contested, ridiculed, and undermined but that new nationalism, as institutionalized in ritual
form, is much more difficult to resist. The form is subtler and more seductive precisely because it
allows for discursive ambiguity” (Ibid.: 80). It is exactly such subtlety and discursive ambiguity that
can also be traced in the two stories I investigated. In Bart’s narrative homophobia of the Muslim
youngsters is something that seems evident and has to do with their culture. Bart states that homo-
phobia is rooted in their religion, which is why it was more shocking for him to be discriminated by
his native Dutch grandparents. Felix’s narrative also employs neoculturalist scenario which opposes
the non-homophobic native Dutch population to the homophobic Muslim Others.
To investigate the Dutch neoculturalist nationalism, Mepschen uses Oudenampsen’s term “post-
progressivism” and states that today “cultural nationalists abstract liberal achievements in gender
and sexual emancipation from the processes in which they were embedded and understand them not
as products of an ongoing contingent, historical, progressive social struggle but as inherently Dutch.
That is to say, they naturalize them” (Mepshcen 2018: 26). The values of progress, as in the case of
almost all the respondents, be it the members of anti-immigrant DGS/De Roze Leeuw, or Bart and
Felix who support green and liberal parties, become pulled out of and employed without their origi-
nal, emancipatory political context. In such neocultiralist discourse the migrant population is de-
picted as “pre-progressive” (Ibid.: 27), meaning it has not yet achieved sexual emancipation and
gender equality. What is important is that such “culturalization of citizen ship (…) is not confined to
the neonationalist or populist Right. Discourses of sexual nationalism fit well with progressive ar-
ticulations of culturalism” (Ibid.: 31). Post-progressivism along with the neoculturalism are parts of
the Dutch homonationalism. In this way, as I have studied above, the subjects of this homonational
discourse are not only the right-wing and anti-immigrant organizations (such as DGS/De Roze
Leeuw). Its subjects are also such people as Bart and Felix, who oppose themselves to the public
nationalist discourse but whose personal stories nevertheless practice homonationalism.
!47
Conslusion
In my research, I investigated the different modalities and manifestations of homonationalism in the
Netherlands. In researching how the opinions and ideas about homosexuality and homophobia be-
come linked to new nationalism and the images of “Dutchness”, I moved along the three levels of
homonationalism: first, in the discourse, then I turned to an organization, and finalized the research
studying the personal narratives. The research question of the thesis is “How is homonationalism
embodied in the Netherlands through the different narratives of homophobia?” Thus, in the three
chapters I studied three kinds of narratives: a discursive narrative, an organization’s narrative, and a
personal (coming out) narratives.
In chapter 1 dedicated to the images of Amsterdam as a gay capital I showed how on a discursive
level the opinions on homophobia in the Netherlands involve the opposition of the so-called au-
tochthonous population to Muslim immigrants. The newcomers as well those who were born in the
country but identify themselves with Islam are clearly depicted as the bearers of a different and for-
eign culture. This foreign culture is in turn opposed to the Dutch culture which is seen as progres-
sive and modern. The informants’ stories about the changing gay scene of the Dutch capital and the
increasing numbers of anti-gay violence involve nostalgic feelings. This kind of nostalgia is a defin-
ing part of the progressive and at the same time nationalist discourse. The native Dutch people’s
feelings of not belonging anymore to their country as well as the feeling of losing the country’s lib-
eral and tolerant values due to the religiously conservative Others are what essentially invests to
homonationalism in the Netherlands. It is the fear that was articulated throughout the interviews,
whether it is the members of a conservative, anti-immigrant organization, or the gay men with the
opposite political views. In all their cases nostalgia is fed by the feelings of loss and fear that one
day the Netherlands will not be as sexually emancipated and tolerant as it used to be.
The second chapter was dedicated to a Dutch conservative organization which was created to
oppose and discuss the cases of gay bashing in the Dutch cities. The organization regularly critisizes
the younger generation of the Muslim population and also employs the native Dutch population -
progressive and secular - to immigrant perpetrators of homophobic violence. In this opposition cul-
tural differences the exploitation of the nationalistic symbols and language are in the centre of the
political arguments of DGS/De Roze Leeuw. In this chapter I described the main practices, the lan-
guage its anti-establishment agenda. The anti-establishment statements express the opposition of
organization to COC, which, in their opinion, cannot solve the problem of gay bashing. Moreover,
Although the members of this organization describe themselves as right-wing, I argue that nowa-
!48
days the political categories such as right-wing and left-wing become problematic. One of the rea-
sons which interests me is that those politicians who are called right-wing today claim to defend
progressive values and fight against homophobia. These issues before 1990s (in the Netherlands it
was before the appearance of Pim Fortuyn in the political scene) traditionally were addressed by the
left-wing parties and movements. Homonationalism in the Netherlands is particularly embodied by
such process in which conservatism becomes associated with the support of progressive values and
sexual freedom against the religious (often specifically Muslim) Others and the employment of the
nationalistic discourse.
Finally, in the last chapter I give the two personal stories about growing up being gay, coming
out and experiencing homophobia in the country which is internationally known as tolerant and
gay-friendly. The first story, the story of Bart, tells about homophobia within the native Dutch popu-
lation. The storytellers not just share his memories about his teenager years and adulthood but also
evaluates his experiences of homophobia from the perspective which involves the ideas of what the
Dutch nation is and what are its key values. Thus, Bart believes that homophobic behaviour of his
family does not fit what is claimed to be a proper, non-homophobic, behaviour of the white Dutch
population. At the same time he mentions homophobia and verbal discrimination when he was en-
countered two times by the Muslim youngsters. Discussing their behaviour, he did not question
them being homophobic like he questioned his religious grandparents. In the second story the re-
spondent says that he did not experience homophobia when he was young and explains it that there
is an old tradition of tolerance in the Netherlands and it defines the Dutch culture. I think that these
two personal narratives are what defines homonationalism but from the other perspective. This
modality of homonationalism is not related to the “right-wing” discourse but still remains homona-
tionalism because of the close linkages of being gay to the images of “Dutchness” and its values.
Neoculturalist categories as parts of the homonational discourse are also employed by both Bart and
Felix in their stories.
Jasbir Puar defines the modern form of homonationalism as a “fundamentally a deep critique of
lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses and how those rights discourses produce narratives of
progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to citizenship—cultural
and legal—at the expense of the delimitation and expulsion of other populations” (Puar 2013). De-
scribing the three modalities of homonationalism in the Netherlands one can see that all of them
employ neoculturalist scenarios: today’s Dutch culture is necessarily defined as modern, progres-
sive and gay friendly. At the same time its definition is based on the opposition to the conservative
!49
and backward culture of Others who in some cases are seen as a threat to the native Dutch popula-
tion and its cultural identity. The exclusion of others who do not fit this identity is one of the fea-
tures of the modern Dutch nationalism.
In my research, I showed how this kind of new nationalism, more particularly, homonationalism
is supported by the Dutch gay men with different political standpoints. Indeed, in most cases the
“culturalization of citizenship” appears to be in the centre of the discussion on homophobia in the
Netherlands. All three kinds of the narratives of homophobia included two subjects culturally op-
posed to each other: the modern autochthonous population on the one side and religious and con-
servative population on the other side. With the ethnographic research which I conducted I managed
to describe not only how this neoculturalist opposition is manifested on the three different narrative
levels but also showed that sometimes the native population also does not fit in the common image
of the Netherlands (take, for example, the case of homophobia of Bart’s religious grandparents).
However, the immigrant minorities appear to be the most targeted and visible population when ho-
mophobia is publicly discussed. Such contradictions could mean that not only new Dutch national-
ism (Verkaaik 2010) but also homonationalism as one of the sides of new nationalism cannot be de-
scribed in one way only. It has various definitions and manifestations which sometimes might even
seem contradictory to each other. It cannot be reduced to the right-wing discourse only.
Although the main and the official source of the data I collected were the interviews which I
arranged during the fieldwork period, I should say that during the whole year of my living in the
Netherlands I had experiences, meetings, talks and discoveries which helped me to understand the
topic I have explored in this thesis. Apart from tête-à-tête conversations with the Dutch gay men in
summer, I had unexpected acquaintances and experiences while I was yet working on the research
proposal and still while I was writing the thesis. That is why I could say that, in a way, the research
is not based purely on the semi-structured interviews organized in advance. It is also based on my
personal impressions, feelings and discoveries. I believe this is what defines (at least in part) the
ethnographic research.
!50
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