Nigerian Democracy and Electoral Process Since Amalgamation: Lessons From A Turbulent Past
Nigerian Democracy and Electoral Process Since Amalgamation: Lessons From A Turbulent Past
Nigerian Democracy and Electoral Process Since Amalgamation: Lessons From A Turbulent Past
I. Introduction
Democracy is underpinned by three essential components: healthy competition among political parties,
political participation by the populace in electing their leaders, and a credible electoral process. In a democracy,
power and significant decisions in a society is distributed among the population which is carried out by the
elected representatives of the people. Viable political parties and credible elections are essential components of
a democracy. Electoral systems in civilised societies permit the co-existence of different units, tribes, nations
and diverse schools of political ideologies and religious beliefs to live in peace and harmony by surrendering
their rights to the people they have elected to govern and manage their resources for a given period of time.
An effective democracy and electoral system is founded upon the ability to hold free and fair elections,
independent and effective electoral umpire, effective policing, and incorruptible and responsive judiciary. This
paper sadly notes that since independence, Nigeria has experienced a “horrific cycle of corrupt, inept and
despotic civilian and pseudo-civilian rules”1. The reason is not far-fetched. The Nigerian political leadership
came to power through flawed electoral systems that are always marred by poor organisation, lack of
transparency, widespread procedural irregularities, and significant evidence of fraud, banditry, and unequal
playing field. Other vices commonly experienced in the Nigerian electoral process include unjust
disqualification of candidates, stealing of data capturing machines, politically bias police and until recently a
biased umpire, INEC.
This paper begins with a brief introduction and highlight of the general features of the Nigerian
democracy since amalgamation, political process and electoral process. In part two, the focus of the paper is on
conceptual clarifications to give context to various terminologies that are engaged in the paper. Part three
interrogates the Nigerian democracy and political systems from amalgamation to contemporary times. The paper
gives a summary account of Nigerian‟s constitutional and democratic development, this discourse, and lessons
learnt from the various flawed general elections underpin the recommendations in the concluding part. The
study engages the electoral process in part four, while part five, concludes the discourse.
* Dr. Abiodun Odusote is with the Public Law Department, University of Lagos, Akoka
1
O.O. Olarinmoye, “Godfathers, political parties and electoral corruption in Nigeria” African Journal of Political Science and International
Relations Vol. 2 (4), pp. 066-073, December 2008 Available online at http://www.academicjournals.org/AJPSIR; Adeyemi SW (2004).
“Godfatherism and Political Development: Understanding its Impact on Nigeria's Emerging Democracy”, Essence, Interdisciplinary- Int. J.
Philo., 1(1) : 72-80.
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Nigerian Democracy and Electoral Process since Amalgamation: Lessons from a Turbulent Past*.
Abraham Lincon defined democracy as government by the people and for the people. 2 Zach-Wiiliams
posits that democracy has to do with the ability of the people to control decision making process. 3 Robert A.
Dahl defines democracy as “a society in which ordinary citizens exert a relatively high degree of control over
leaders”4.
Samuel Huntington, views democracy as a political system in which:
Its most powerful decision-makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic, elections
in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population
is eligible to vote5
Oyebode put the icing on the cake by asserting that democracy comes with some “appurtenances-
separation of powers, adult suffrage, and freedom of speech and of the press, equality before the law,
independent judiciary, and right of dissent.”6
Electoral Process
Ariwoola JSC held in N.D.P v INEC7 that electoral process is the method, “by which a person is elected to
public office in a democratic society8”. Nwabueze observed that a credible electoral process must include:
...the suffrage, the registration of voters, delimitation of constituencies, the right to contest
elections, electoral competition between rival parties, the body charged with the conduct
and supervision of election, the method of electing candidates within the political parties,
nomination of candidates, method of voting, the actual conduct of elections, the
determination of results, trial and determination of election disputes, electoral malpractices
and their consequences9.
In the opinion of Boix, electoral systems... are the composite, of different rules regulating the access of
citizens to suffrage, the number and use of votes by voters, the number and size of electoral districts, the
introduction of thresholds and bonuses, and the allocation mechanisms used to transform votes into seats10
Crush in a comprehensive and all-embracing definition of the electoral process stated:
Electoral systems are the „most powerful lever of political engineering for conflict
resolution‟... it determines how votes translate into seats in the legislature... and thereby
determining many aspects of the functioning of democracy: what the parties look like, who
is represented and by whom, and „ultimately who govern‟ ... Therefore, the electoral
system is the gateway to power in a democracy. It can be manipulated to foster
accommodative behaviour by ensuring that groups are included in the political process by
decreasing the incidence of zero-sum outcomes... Furthermore, by changing the incentives
available to those seeking election, electoral rules can make some types of behaviour more
politically rewarding than others, making it possible to incentivise inclusiveness and
moderation...Thus, the electoral system is fundamental to the political culture in a
society... While getting this right is only one part of the quest for stability, getting it wrong
can make stability impossible.11
We agree with all the scholars above in their robust and diverse perception of democracy, political
process, and electoral process. The terminologies accommodate diverse views and prejudices. The common
denominator is that a democratic rule is a government by the people of their chosen and freely elected
representative. It is a government based on the rule of law, free and fair elections, and credible electoral process.
There is an obvious matrix between democracy and electoral process. If there is no credible election, there
cannot be a credible democracy. Democracy is anchored on a credible electoral system because if there are no
elections, there cannot be political office holders that will exercise the peoples‟ sovereignty. When politicians
rig elections to get into public offices they truncate the wish of the people. Hence, public office holders wear the
garment of impunity and treat the people with brazen disdain and contempt because they are not accountable to
2
He was the President of the U.S. between 1861-65. He made the statement as part of his Gettysburg Address on Thursday November 19,
1963.
3
Zach-Wiiliams A B, “ No Democracy, No Development: Reflections of Democracy and Development in Africa” Review of African
Political Economy Vol. 28, pp213-223
4
Robert A. Dahl, A reference to Democratic Theory, (Chicago, 1956)
5
Adejumobi Said, “Traditional Rulers and the Democratisation Process in Nigeria: 1985-1995. Being a paper presented to the Conference
on Democratisation and Corruption in Nigeria organized by Prof. Alex Gboyega, University of Ibadn in conjuction with Friedreich Ebert
Foundation, September 1995, University of Ibadan
6
Oyebode, “Constitutional Reform and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria” http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com
7
(2013) 20 WRN 1
8
Ibid PP 25-26
9
O. Sanusi, Election Administration in Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis with the United States of America‟
cdra.org.ng/home/?page_id=131
10
Carles Boix, „Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies‟, American Political Science
Review, Vol. 93, No. 3 (September, 1999) pp. 609-624
11
J Crush, „Electoral Systems and Stability in Divided Societies,‟ e-international relations, http://www.e-ir.info/2013/05/10/electoral-
systems-and-stability-in-divided-societies.
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Nigerian Democracy and Electoral Process since Amalgamation: Lessons from a Turbulent Past*.
the people. Votes do not count. On the other hand, a credible electoral system presents a responsive, transparent
and accountable government, because the votes of the electorates count. Failure of the elected public office
holder to be responsive and transparent will be visited during the elections.
12
At the moment, the conditions precedents to registration of political parties are set out in Section 222 of the Constitution as follows:
(a) the names and addresses of its national officers are registered with the Independent National Electoral Commission;
(b) the membership of the association is open to every citizen of Nigeria irrespective of his place of origin, circumstance of birth, sex,
religion or ethnic grouping;
(c) a copy of its constitution is registered in the principal office of the Independent National Electoral Commission in such form as may be
prescribed by the Independent National Electoral Commission;
(d) any alteration in its registered constitution is also registered in the principal office of the Independent National Elect oral Commission
within thirty days of the making of such alteration
(e) the name of the association, its symbol or logo does not contain any ethnic or religious connotation or give the appearance that the
activities of the association are confined to a part only of the geographical area of Nigeria; and
(f) the headquarters of the association is situated in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja
Other conditions are stated in S. 78 (1) of the Electoral Act 2011 and essentially that application to be registered
13
Banfield EC, Wilson JA (1965). City Politics, Cambridge, Harvard University Press ;Scott JC (1973). Comparative Political Corruption,
Prentice-Hall, Inc, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey
14
This section on Pre-Independence and post-independence Democracy and Electoral Process benefitted hugely from the scholarly work of
Abass, “The Nigerian Electoral Process in Perspective” and the work of Hon. Temi Harriman, “Is there a Future for Democracy in Nigeria”
Being the text of a public lecture delivered at the Department of International Development, Oxford University, Uk on 05 June, 2006.
15
The election only took place in Lagos and Calabar. Election was based on limited franchise and only British citizens residing in the cities
and British protected persons earning a minimum gross income of 100 pounds could vote. The National Democratic Party and the Calabar
Improvement League respectively won three seats in Lagos and the only seat in Calabar.
16
Indirect electoral system was adopted. Regional and Central legislatures were 45 members in all, 28 members were Nigerians, 4 were
elected and 24 were nominated
17
General Election was by Electoral College. Greater Regional Autonomy was guaranteed.
18
Electoral Collegiate system was replaced with direct elections
19
Led by Ahmadu Bello
20
Led by by Obafemi Awolowo
21
Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe
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Nigerian Democracy and Electoral Process since Amalgamation: Lessons from a Turbulent Past*.
Federal Government. Also, Chief Obafemi Awolowo22, the leader of the opposition was alleged to have
conspired to overthrow the federal government. He was found guilty with some prominent members of the AG
and was sentenced to terms of imprisonment.
In 1963, Nigeria became a Republic, the 1963 Constitution was enacted. The Constitution embraced
the rule of law, fundamental rights, and the principle of derivation.
The 1964 elections witnessed the emergence of a two-party system: The Nigerian National Alliance
(NNA) and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). This election was boycotted in the East and some
other part of the country. It was characterised by intimidation, violence and arson. The NNA was called upon to
form a new national broad based government.
The 1965 Western election was also characterised with increased political violence, arson, intimidation
and killing of political opponents. The ruling party was alleged to have massively rigged the elections. The
result announced was greeted with pandemonium and mass revolt. The Prime Minister refused to intervene in
the region.
The uncertain situation resulted in the intervention of the military through coup d‟etat on 15 January,
1966. The Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No.1, 1966 was promulgated and the 1963
Constitution was suspended and political activities banned.
(b) 1979-1983
After 13 years of military rule, the Murtala/Obasonjo military regime lifted the ban on political parties
in September 1978. The then Head of State, Gen Olusegun Obasonjo signed Decree No.25 to usher in the 1979
Constitution. The essential features of the 1979 Constitution include: the introduction of the presidential system
of governance, the doctrine of separation of powers and checks and balances, there was elaborate provisions of
human rights, duties and rights of citizens and independence of the judiciary. Also the executive president was
both the head of government and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
It was the requirement of the Constitution that registered political parties must have national spread and
acceptance. Five political parties23 were registered to contest the elections. However, as the elections
approached, it was obvious noting really has changed as the politicians manifested ethnic, and religious
sentiments. Elections outcome also confirmed that electorate pandered to ethnic-religious sentiments in their
pattern of voting.24
The presidential candidate of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) was declared the winner of the
election. The election was challenged by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the candidate of the Unity Party of Nigeria,
(UPN). The Supreme Court was called upon to interpret two-thirds of 19 states because Alhaji Shehu Shagari
did not win the Constitutional requirement of 25 per cent of votes in13 states of the Federation. The NPN
contested the suit and argued that the constitutional requirement related to two-third of the votes and not the
states. The issue was resolved in favour of Alhaji Shehu Shagari25 of the NPN and he was subsequently sworn in
as president.
There was a huge expectation after the return of power to civilian elected government in 1979, after
over a decade of military misadventure in politics. However, the democratic and electoral process collapsed as a
result of grand corruption, mass looting, electoral violence and political intolerance as reflected in the Shugaba‟s
case, where an opposing political opponent was deported from Nigeria26. It was also alleged that the 1983
elections were massively rigged by the NPN. Toyin Abe vividly captured the violence in the federal elections of
1983 when he poignantly asserted that:
During the federal elections of 1983, violence was promoted to an unimaginable level
where states sponsored thugs, arsonists and assassins unrestrainedly unleashed terror and
fear on both opponents and voters alike27
Overall, the country was drifting towards the brinks again. On 31 December, 1983, the military again
took over the reins of government.
22
Adegbenro v Akintola (1962) All NLR 462
23
National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP),
Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) and in the Nigeria Advance Party was registered to contest the 1983 elections.
24
The NPN was dominant in the North. The UPN was the party of choice in the South West. The NPP was popular in Anambra and Imo.
The PRP was popular in Kano and Kaduna and the GNPP reigned in Borno and Gongola States.
25
Obafemi Awolowo v Shehu Shagari (1979) 6-9 S.C. 51
26
Shugaba v Minister of Internal Affairs (1981) 2 NCLR 459
27
Abe, T. (2008). 2007 Elections and Electoral Violence in Nigeria‟s Fourth Republic,
Journal of Contemporary Politics, Vol. 1. No. 1.
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(c) 1989-1993
The 1983 military intervention was headed by Gen. Muhammadu Buhari. The regime was reputed for
fiscal discipline and the war it waged against general indiscipline in the society. However, the regime had no
immediate plan to return the country to democratic rule. Gen. Ibrahim Babangida toppled the military regime of
Gen. Muhammadu Buhari in August 1985.
Babangida then embarked on a seemingly endless transition to civilian rule, continuously shifting the
hand over date as it suited him. Babangida inaugurated a Constitution Review Committee (CRC) to examine the
1979 Constitution and make possible recommendations. The recommendations were then incorporated into the
aborted 1989 Constitution. Included in the 1989 constitutions are: provisions for a two party system, and
additional fundamental rights i.e. right to free education, right to property and right to healthcare. The
Constitution came into effect in phases but was aborted after the annulment of the June 12 elections by
Babangida.
Prior to the elections of June 12, Babangida had created a two party system he foisted on Nigerians. He
proposed that the parties will have equal founders and equal joiners (an attempt to depart from the experience of
the past, where political parties revolved around individuals and ethnic alliance), which were a little to the left
and a little to the right (an attempt to depart from classical and parallel ideologies). The parties were named
Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republican Party (NRC). The Babangida military government
provided the Secretariat, needed fund, provided logistics and gave directions.
As we have mentioned earlier Babangida‟s transition was in phases, civilian governments had been
installed at the local government level, at the state level, and at the National Assembly, all pandering to the self-
styled President. The presidential election was held as scheduled on June 12 1993 but general Babangida
annulled the results. The two parties created by Babangida had contested the election which was generally
agreed to have been won by the muslim-muslim candidates of the SDP; Chief M.K.O Abiola and his running
mate Alhaji Babagana Kingibe. It was a golden opportunity lost. It was an election that was thought would erase
religious and ethnic sentiments in Nigerian politics. The SDP enjoyed overwhelming support that cut across
religious sentiments and ethnic divide. It was not to be. The election was aborted and the crisis that followed led
to the famously stepping aside of Gen Babangida. Interim National Government (ING) of Ernest Shonekan was
sworn in on 27 August 1993. The ING only lasted for about three months. It was swept aside by Gen. Sani
Abacha on 27 November, 1993. Abacha aborted the 1989 Constitution in transition.
(d) 1999-2007
The news of Abacha‟s death was received with shock and bewilderment on 08 June, 1998. The military
regime was immediately taken over by Gen. Abdulsalami Abubaka. The 1999 Constitution was promulgated by
Abubaka‟s regime through Decree No.24 of May, 1999. The Constitution embraced multi-party system.
However, there were three dominant parties. The three dominant parties that participated in the elections
conducted by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) are: Alliance for democracy (AD), All
Peoples Party (APP), and the Peoples Democratic Party. Chief Olusegun Obasonjo of the PDP won the
presidential elections against Chief Olu Falae of the AD-APP alliance. It should be noted that there was a
general apathy to the election as the electorates had become disillusioned about democracy and were weary of
the antics of the military.
In 2003, another general election was scheduled. The 2003 elections were generally regarded as
landmark because it was the first time since independence that political leadership successfully changed hands
from one civilian to the other. The elections were however, regarded as more fraudulent than the 1999 elections.
The period preceding the elections also witnessed the assassination of two gubernatorial candidates and political
banditry.
In making general assessment of the 2003 elections Awopeju observed:
US-based Carter Center concluded that “it is not possible for us to make an accurate
judgement about the outcome of the presidential election” It had been tagged by the
Human Rights Watch as an “abject failure.” The elections were more pervasively and
openly rigged than the flawed 1999 elections. …“It is doubtful whether […the] elections
can only be considered to be reflective of the will of the people” 28.
Out of the 30 registered political parties, only 20 fielded candidates for the presidential election. The
election was again won by Chief Olusegun Obasonjo of the PDP. The other main contenders were, Alhaji
Mohammed Buhari of the All Nigeria People‟s party, Chief Odumegwu Ojukwu of the All Progressive Grand
Alliance and Chief Gani Fawehinmi of National Conscience Party.
A. Awopeju, “Election Rigging And The Problems Of Electoral Act In Nigeria Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences Volume 2, No. 2.4
28
Again, the election was characterised by rigging, millions of people voted several times, in many cases
election did not hold but votes were pre-filled.
The 2007 Gubernatorial and state assembly elections were held on 14 April 2007, while the
Presidential and National elections were held on 21 April, 2007. Umaru Yar‟Adua of the PDP won the
presidential election. Main opponents were Alhaji Mohammed Buhari of the All Nigeria‟s Peoples Party
(ANPP), and Alhaji Atiku Abubakar of the Action Congress. Atiku had earlier cross-carpeted to the Action
Congress after his numerous problems with President Obasanjo and the PDP. He was accused of being
fraudulent and he was caused to be disqualified by INEC. However, in Alhaji Atiku Abubakar v INEC29 the
Supreme Court held that INEC does not have the power to disqualify any candidate from contesting an election,
and equally lacks the capacity to remove the Vice-President from office or declare his seat vacant. The VP can
only be removed by the National Assembly. The Court also held that the VP can cross-carpet without losing his
seat.
The election was described by the EU Observers as the worst they had ever seen anywhere in the
world. There was rampant vote rigging, violence, arson, and theft of ballot papers.
It would be recalled that President Umaru Yar‟Adua died in office and President Jonathan Goodluck
(the then Vice President) was sworn in as president to conclude his term in office.
On 16 April 2011, the presidential elections were held. It was won by Dr. Jonathan Goodluck of the
PDP. Other main contenders were Gen. Mohammed Buhari of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) and
Alhaji Nuhu Ribadu of the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN). There were 17 candidates in all. The elections
were heralded as among the fairest in Nigeria‟s history but it recorded the worst post-election violence ever in
the history of Nigeria.
The aftermath of the elections witnessed the death of up to 800 people in Northern Nigeria30; among
them were members of the National Youth Service Corp (NYSC) who had been engaged as INEC officials. The
election manifested religious and ethnic sentiments as none before it. The majority of the southern Nigerian with
predominately Christian majority voted for Dr. Jonathan Goodluck, a Christian, while the majority of the
Northern Nigerian with predominantly Muslim population, voted for Alhaji Mohammed Buhari, a Muslim. It
was a very disturbing electoral outcome.
29
(2007) 6 NWLR Pt. 1029 p.142
30
Human Rights Watch, “Nigeria: Post Election Violence killed 800” Available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/16/nigeria-post-
election-violence-killed-800 Accessed on 01 May, 2014
31
O.O. Olarinmoye, “Godfathers, political parties and electoral corruption in Nigeria” African Journal of Political Science and International
Relations Vol. 2 (4), pp. 066-073, December 2008 Available online at http://www.academicjournals.org/AJPSIR; Adeyemi SW (2004).
“Godfatherism and Political Development: Understanding its Impact on Nigeria's Emerging Democracy”, Essence, Interdisciplinary- Int. J.
Philo., 1(1) : 72-80.
32
Ibid
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Nigerian Democracy and Electoral Process since Amalgamation: Lessons from a Turbulent Past*.
v. Lack of intra-party democracy. All the political parties in Nigeria exhibit undemocratic dictatorial tendencies
in their intra-party affairs. Oguntade JSC noted this much in the case of Ugwu & Anor v Ararume & Anor33:
An observer of the Nigerian political scene today easily discovers that the failure of the
parties to ensure intra-party democracy and live by the provisions of their constitutions as
to the emergence of candidates for election is one of the major causes of serious problems
hindering the enthronement of a representative government in this country
Political parties in Nigeria hardly conduct primaries. Candidates are either nominated by the godfathers or
selected by those occupying political positions. These often result to intra-party conflicts, splitting and division.
A recent example is the New PDP, which eventually „merged‟ with the APC.
These features arise because party formations are based on caucus formations34. Parties are not formed based on
common good or the need to address common problems, rather a few educated elites, politicians, and
businessmen form caucus to finance and dominate political parties. The formation of the two leading political
parties; the PDP and the APC share similar elitist history in their formations.
(a) organise, undertake and supervise all elections to the offices of the President and Vice-
President, the Governor and Deputy Governor of a State, and to the membership of the
Senate, the House of Representatives and the House of Assembly of each State of the
Federation;
(b) register political parties in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution and an
Act of the National Assembly;
(c) monitor the organisation and operation of the political parties, including their finances;
(d) arrange for the annual examination and auditing of the funds and accounts of political
parties, and publish a report on such examination and audit for public information;
(e) arrange and conduct the registration of persons qualified to vote and prepare, maintain
and revise the register of voters for the purpose of any election under this Constitution;
(f) monitor political campaigns and provide rules and regulations which shall govern the
political parties;
(g) ensure that all Electoral Commissioners, Electoral and Returning Officers take and
subscribe the Oath of Office prescribed by law;
(h) delegate any of its powers to any Resident Electoral Commissioner; and
(i) carry out such other functions as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National
Assembly
The powers and functions of INEC are also guaranteed under and S. 1 and 2 of the Electoral Act 2011,
which establishes and confers INEC with the electoral functions set out below: the Commission shall have
power to:(a) conduct voter and civic education, (b) promote knowledge of sound democratic election processes,
(c) conduct any referendum required to be conducted pursuant to the provision of the 1999 Constitution or any
other law or Act of the National Assembly. INEC is required to be independent.
The 2011 Act has not only added more responsibility to INEC‟s Constitutional responsibilities as the
electoral umpire, it also has new provisions to address recurring political problems. For example:
S. 33 provides, “a political party shall not be allowed to change or substitute its candidate whose name has been
submitted pursuant to section 31 of this Act, except in the case of death or withdrawal by the candidate".
While section S. 141 provides “An election tribunal or court shall not under any circumstance declare
any person a winner at an election in which such a person has not fully participated in all the stages of the said
election”.
These provisions are made to cure the general complaints that followed the Supreme Court decision in
Amaechis‟s case.
33
(2007) 12 NWLR (pt.1048) 365
34
Olarinmoye OO (2006) “Perverse Brokerage: Godfathers and Politics in Nigeria”, The Constitution, 7 (2): 33 -43.
35
Dennis-Nwatu, Electoral Process and Democracy in Nigeria
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In Rotimi Amaechi v INEC & Ors36 Amaechi was initially nominated by the PDP as the party‟s
gubernatorial candidate for Rivers state. However, following a politically motivated allegations of corruption
against him (which has not be proven in a court of law), the PDP substituted his name with Omehia‟s name as
the PDP gubernatorial candidate, in violation of S. 34 (2) of the Electoral Act. Omehia did not win the
primaries. Amaechi challenged this in court. Meanwhile, while the case was still in court, the gubernatorial
election was conducted and Omehia won on the platform of PDP. The SC held that the legitimate candidate for
PDP was Amaechi, as his name was wrongfully removed, in the eyes of the law, Amaechi remained the PDP
candidate, and must be deemed to have won. Amaechi was declared entitled to the gubernatorial seat in Rivers
State and Omehia was ordered to vacate his seat
Hence, the new provisions set out above, no one can be declared a winner of any election, except he
has taken part in all the electoral processes leading to the conduct of the election. It is also the law now that a
political party cannot substitute or withdraw the name of a candidate, except the candidate is dead or
personally withdraws from the race.
The Electoral Act also attempts to cure the infusion of dirty money into politics with the inclusion of
S.14. Research has shown that candidates invest large amount of dirty money (drug money, money derived from
kidnappings, proceeds of corruption) and borrowed money to contest elections, some sell their houses, while
others borrow from banks and god fathers. Only individuals that are willing to spend lots of money become
candidates. The amount of money spent informs the choice of candidate and largely influences who wins the
elections37. The result of a research conducted among 23 out of the 27 members of the House of Assembly in
Oyo, Enugu, and Kaduna states and 28 officials from different political parties indicates as follows:
1. 89% of the interviewed members of the Assembly indicated that campaign funds played a major role in
securing their elections.
2. 47% of the respondents believe that money in politics helps win elections
3. Only 47% are aware of spending limits for campaigns that are imposed by the electoral regulations. 38
To arrest the influence of dirty money in politics and to prevent a situation where foreign organizations, or
individuals with ulterior motives will hijack the electoral system S.91 provides:
(1) Election expenses shall not exceed the sum stipulated in subsection (2) – (7) of this
section.
(2) The maximum election expenses to be incurred by a candidate at a Presidential election
shall be one billion naira (N1,000,000,000).
(3) The maximum election expenses to be incurred by a candidate at a Governorship
election shall be two hundred million naira (N200,000,000).
(4) The maximum amount of election expenses to be incurred in respect of Senatorial seat
by a candidate at an election to the National Assembly shall be forty million naira
(N40,000,000) while the seat for House of Representatives shall be twenty million naira
(N20,000,000)
(5) In the case of State Assembly election, the maximum amount of election expenses to
be incurred shall be ten million naira (N10,000,000).
(6) In the case of a chairmanship election to an Area Council, the maximum amount of
election expresses to be incurred shall be ten million naira (N10,000,000).
(7) In the case of councillorship election to an Area Council, the maximum amount of
election expenses to be incurred shall be one million naira (N1,000, 000
36
(2008) 5 NWLR Pt. 1080 227
37
IiG, “Campaign finance distorts Nigerian elections” available at http://www.iig.ox.ac.uk
38
Ibid.
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Nigerian Democracy and Electoral Process since Amalgamation: Lessons from a Turbulent Past*.
candidates are busy scheming to ensure a favourable outcome for themselves, by hook or
crook, in the coming elections39
Elaigwu also looks at the trends of electoral process since 1999 when he posited that:
The electoral process has been crises-ridden since 1999. It seems each successive election
since then has been worse than earlier ones. The result is that governments emerge with a
baggage of crises of legitimacy, which often complicates the dynamics of federalism. This
was what happened after the 2003 and 2007 elections.41
There are various factors responsible for flawed election in Nigeria. Chief among the
factors are incompetent of electoral commission which serves as an umpire in the electoral
process, do-or-die syndrome of the political parties to capture political power by all means,
widespread procedural irregularities, numerous incidence of violence, intimidation of the
electorate, stuffing of the electoral box, poverty on the part of the electorate, etc. The
outcomes of many elections have been so fiercely contested that the survival of the country
and democracy has been jeopardized. This sad history of election fraud has serious
implications for Nigeria‟s political future because the phenomenon rather than declining,
keeps growing and becoming more sophisticated with every succeeding elections42
Aside from the challenges set out above, other challenges include:
(a) Delay in Electoral Justice
The judiciary by virtue of S.6 of the CFRN has the power to settle and determine disputes arising from
the electoral process. However, the judiciary will not interfere in the internal affairs of the parties, though the
judiciary will not allow the violations of the principles of rule of law and fair hearing by parties. Hence, under
Sections 66, 107, 137 and 182 of the 1999 Constitution as amended the judiciary generally has the power to
intervene in pre-election conflicts. For example, the courts generally have the jurisdiction to determine whether
a candidate is qualified for an election and the validity of the nomination of a candidate for an election.
S.285 CFRN as amended however specifically spelt out the courts that have jurisdiction on post electoral
matters43, particularly as regards whether or not a candidate had validly won an election, or whether an election
was validly contested. In such a situation, S. 143 of the electoral Act allows the person elected to remain in
office pending appeal once the notice of appeal has been filed within the time limit. S.142 of the Electoral Act
provides for accelerated hearing of election petitions, and S.285 (5)-(7) provides for time limit within which to
file election petition.
Delay in resolving electoral disputes is a significant challenge to election petitions in Nigeria. For
example, the election petition of General Mohammed Buhari against the re-election of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo
took over two years to be concluded.44 It also took about three years for the court to decide the case of Peter
Obi v Chris Ngige.45 Ike Ekweremadu, posited that "protracted electoral cases in our courts/election tribunals
which extend deep into the term of office of elected officers, is a serious embarrassment to our electoral
process.” Electoral grievances should be addressed quickly, promptly and with dispatch.
Efforts to cure the delay in the administration of Justice by the introduction of time limit within which
to file an electoral petition have proved significant. Its strict application has also resulted in the dispensation of
technical justice. It is likely to be an infringement of the right to fair hearing as guaranteed under the 1999
Constitution.
39
A. Jega an O. Ibeanu, (2007), “Elections and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria” Nigeria Political Science Association, Nigeria
40
Edoh, H. ((2004). “Corruption: Political Parties and the Electoral Process in Nigeria,” in Jibo, M. and Simbine, A.T. (eds.), Contemporary
Issues in Nigerian Politics, Ibadan: JODAD Publication
41
Elaigwu, J.I. (2007). Nigeria: The Current State of the Federation: Some Basic Challenges, Paper presented at International Conference
on Federalism in Honour of Professor Ronald Watts, Organized by the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queens University,
Kingston, Canada, October 18-21, 2007.
42
A. Awopeju, “Election Rigging And The Problems Of Electoral Act In Nigeria Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences Volume 2, N o. 2.4
Quarter IV 2011 ISSN 2229 - 5313
43
“The Supreme Court is now the final appellate court on Gubernatorial elections by virtue of S. 233 (2) (e) (iv) of the 1999 Constitution as
amended, while by S. 239 (1) (a) the Court of Appeal is the Court with original jurisdiction to hear matters arising from Presidential
elections. States also have responsibility to create electoral tribunal to deal with Local Government elections by virtue of S. 7 (1) of the 1999
Constitution “ Fagboun
44
Buhari v Obasanjo (2003) 11 S.C. 74.
45
(2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 999) 1
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Nigerian Democracy and Electoral Process since Amalgamation: Lessons from a Turbulent Past*.
It is our suggested opinion that elections to the Office of the President and Governors should be held at least 9
months to the expiration of their tenure and no one should be sworn in before the conclusion of his case.
Nation‟s need was actually the political will to deal with electoral offenders in the interest
of all and sundry. We have heard that in the past. But will political will to persecute them
be there? It is one thing to make laws; it is another thing to ensure compliance.50
46
Guardian Newspapers Tuesday, June 23, 1993 p.1
47
New Nigerian Newspapers Thursday June 24 1993 p.1
48
Daily Sketch Newspapers, Saturday June 19, 1993
49
Ibid at p.3
50
Nigerian Compass, Thursday, September, 2, 2010.
51
Sarah Sewall, the US Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights said this while appearing before a
hearing of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday 14 May, 2014. Available at: http://www.punchng.com Accessed on 15
May, 2014
52
For further discussion on this see Bello and Odusote “The Matrix of Bad Governance: Corruption And Insecurity In Nigeria” Being paper
presented at the Nigerain Law Teachers Conference, held at the University of Ilorin, 2013 pages 3 -23
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functionaries, the anti-graft agencies have been unable to act. On the face of it, and by reason of admissions,
some of the top government functionaries are culpable, yet the police and the anti-graft agencies are not acting.
We agree no less with the erudite scholar that prisoners, particularly those that have not been
condemned to death, and awaiting trial inmates should not be disenfranchised. As is it amounts to double
jeopardy for the awaiting trial inmates. This set of Nigerian should be made to feel part of the system by way of
encouragement and reorientation. This is the practice in other part of the world.
VI. Conclusion
In sum, from the discourse above, it is incontrovertible that there is a huge disconnect between the
political elite and the people by reason of the fact that the Nigerian electoral system has been far from being
credible. Voters have no form of control or influence over their political representatives. It is also sad to note
the disconnect between the Nigerian political leadership and the citizenry, there is so much apathy to the needs,
53
Lunatics, people of unsound mind, prisoners sentenced to death, and minors are generally excluded from voting.
54
Fagbohun, “Nigeria‟s Democracy and the Crisis of Political Instability: An Audit of the Electoral System” Being text of paper delivered at
the June 12 Anniversary Lecture organized by the Political and Legislative Powers Bureau of Lagos State Government in conjunction with
the June 12 Coalition on 12th June 2013 on the theme Electoral System, the Bane of Political Instability in Nigeria
55
Prof. T. Osipitan, SAN “The Search for Credible Elections in Nigeria: Electoral Laws and Functional Education” being a text of the paper
presented at the 15th Annual Lecture, award of honours and postgraduate scholarships of Stephen Oluwole Awokoya Foundation for Science
Education at the AGIP Recital Hall, Muson Centre, Onikan, Lagos on 16 March, 2010.
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Nigerian Democracy and Electoral Process since Amalgamation: Lessons from a Turbulent Past*.
common good and the general welfare of the citizenry. Corruption, grand corruption, kidnapping, untimely
deaths, political thuggery and banditry, pervasive insecurity across the country have now become common
place.
56
IiG, “Campaign finance distorts Nigerian elections” available at http://www.iig.ox.ac.uk Accessed on 12 February, 2014
57
Sections 117-131 Electoral Act 2010
58
S. 2 Electoral Act, 2010
59
IiG, “Campaign finance distorts Nigerian elections” available at http://www.iig.ox.ac.uk
60
Other provisions being violated include S.92 (2) and (3) to the effect that election expenses incurred by a political party shall be
determined by INEC in consultation with the political parties. It is also a requirement of the Electoral Law that election expenses be
submitted to INEC by the political parties in a separate audited return within six months after an election.
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Nigerian Democracy and Electoral Process since Amalgamation: Lessons from a Turbulent Past*.
viii. The Federal Government should ensure INEC compiles, maintains and update the Voters‟ register on a
continuous basis in accordance with Section 9(1) of the Electoral Act 2010. Early preparation and continuous
update of the Voters register will prevent the chaotic polling stations of the 2011 elections.
We want to conclude by asserting that Nigerian democracy still has a long road to cover, and there are
many potholes. We need to state emphatically that until political and electoral distortions highlighted above are
removed, and the suggested recommendations giving effect, all efforts to deepen democracy and the clamour for
good governance in Nigeria will amount to a chimera.
61
Bello and Odusote, “The Matrix of Bad Governance: Corruption And Insecurity In Nigeria” Being paper presented at the Nigerain Law
Teachers Conference, held at the University of Ilorin, 2013. P.36
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