(PDF) St. Scholastica&#39 S College vs. Torres, G.R. No. 100158, June 29, 1992

SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE,

Petitioner,
-verSuS- G.R. No. 100158

June 29, 1992
HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his capacity

as SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, and SAMAHAN NG
MANGGAGAWANG PANG-
EDUKASYON SA STA.
ESKOLASTIKA- NAFTEU,
ReSpondentS.
x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The principal issue to be resolved in this recourse is whether striking

union members terminated for abandonment of work after failing to
comply with return-to-work orders of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment (SECRETARY, for brevity) should by law be
reinstated.
On 20 July 1990, petitioner St. Scholastica’s College (COLLEGE, for

brevity) and private respondent Samahan ng Manggagawang Pang-
Edukasyon sa Sta. Eskolastika — NAFTEU (UNION, for brevity)
initiated negotiations for a first-ever collective bargaining agreement.
A deadlock in the negotiations prompted the UNION to file on
4 October 1990 a Notice of Strike with the Department of Labor
and Employment (DEPARTMENT, for brevity), docketed as NCMB-
NCR- NS-10-826-90. chanroblespublishingcompany
On 5 November 1990, the UNION declared a strike which

analyzed the operations of the COLLEGE. Affecting as it did the
interest of the students, public respondent SECRETARY
immediately assumed
jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued on the same day,
5 November 1990, a return-to-work order. The following day,
6 November 1990, the UNION was served the Order. On 7
November 1990, instead of returning to work, the UNION filed a
motion for reconsideration of the return-to-work order questioning
inter alia the assumption of jurisdiction by the SECRETARY over the
labor dispute.
On 9 November 1990, the COLLEGE sent individual letters to

the striking employees enjoining them to return to work not
later than 8.00 o’clock A.M. of 12 November 1990 and, at the same
time, giving notice to some twenty-three (23) workers that their
return would be
without prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against them. In
response, the UNION presented a list of six (6) demands to the
COLLEGE a dialogue conducted on 11 November 1990. The most
important of these demands was the unconditional acceptance back
to work of the striking employees. But these were flatly rejected.chanroblespubl ishingc ompany
Likewise, on 9 November 1990, respondent SECRETARY denied

reconsideration of his return-to-work order and sternly warned
the striking employees to comply with its terms. On 12 November
1990, the UNION received the Order.
Thereafter, particularly on 14 and 15 November 1990, the parties held

conciliation meetings before the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board where the UNION pruned down its demands to three (3), viz.:
that striking employees be reinstated under the same terms and
conditions before the strike; that no retaliatory or disciplinary action
be taken against them; and, that CBA negotiations be continued.
However, these efforts proved futile as the COLLEGE remained
steadfast in its position that any return-to-work offer should be
unconditional.
On 16 November 1990, the COLLEGE manifested to respondent
SECRETARY that the UNION continued to defy his return-to-
work order of 5 November 1990 so that “appropriate steps under
the said circumstances” may be undertaken by him. [1] chanroblespublishingcompany
On 23 November 1990, the COLLEGE mailed individual notices

of termination the striking employees, which were received on
26 November 1990, or later. The UNION officers and members
then tried to return to work but were no longer accepted by the
COLLEGE.
On 5 December 1990, a Complaint for Illegal Strike was filed against

the UNION, its officers and several of its members before
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as
NLRC Case No. 00-12-06256-90. chanroblespublishingcompany
The UNION moved for the enforcement of the return-to-work order

before respondent SECRETARY, citing “selective acceptance of
returning strikers” by the COLLEGE. It also sought dismissal of the
complaint. Since then, no further hearings were conducted.
Respondent SECRETARY required the parties to submit their

respective position papers. The COLLEGE prayed that respondent
SECRETARY uphold the dismissal of the employees who defied his
return-to-work order. chanroblespublishingcompany
On 12 April 1991, respondent SECRETARY issued the assailed Order

which, inter alia directed the reinstatement of striking
UNION members, premised on his finding that no violent or
otherwise illegal act accompanied the conduct of the strike and that a
fledgling UNION like private respondent was “naturally expected to
exhibit unbridled if inexperienced enthusiasm, in asserting its
existence”.[2] Nevertheless, the aforesaid Order held UNION officers
responsible for the violation of the return-to-work orders of 5
and 9 November 1990 and, correspondingly, sustained their
termination.
Both parties moved for partial reconsideration of the Order, with

petitioner COLLEGE questioning the wisdom of the reinstatement of
striking UNION members, and private respondent UNION, the
dismissal of its officers.
On 31 May 1991, in a Resolution, respondent SECRETARY denied
both motions. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. chanroblespublishingcompany
On 26 June 1991, We restrained the SECRETARY from enforcing his

assailed Orders insofar as they directed the reinstatement of the
striking workers previously terminated. chanroblespublishingcompany
Petitioner questions the assumption by respondent SECRETARY of

jurisdiction to decide on termination disputes, maintaining that such
jurisdiction is vested instead in the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Art. 217
of the Labor Code, thus —
“Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.

— (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor
Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days
after the submission of the case by the parties for
decision without extension, the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: 2.
Termination disputes. 5. Cases arising from any violation
of Article 264 of this Code, including questions on the
legality of strikes and lock-outs.”
In support of its position, petitioner invokes Our ruling in PAL vs.

Secretary of Labor and Employment[3] where We held: chanroblespublishingcompany
“The Labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he

restrained PAL from taking disciplinary measures against
its guilty employees, for, under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, all
that the Secretary may enjoin is the holding of the strike but
not the company’s right to take action against union
officers who participated in the illegal strike and committed
illegal acts.”
Petitioner further contends that following the doctrine laid down

in Sarmiento vs. Tuico[4] and Union of Filipro Employees vs.
Nestle’ Philippines, Inc., [5] workers who refused to obey a return-
to-work order are not entitled to be paid for work not done, or to
reinstatement to the positions they have abandoned by reason of
their refusal to return thereto as ordered.
Taking a contrary stand, private respondent UNION pleads for
reinstatement of its dismissed officers considering that the act of the
UNION in continuing with its picket was never characterized as a
“brazen disregard of successive legal orders”, which was readily
apparent in Union Filipro Employees vs. Nestle’ Philippines, Inc.,
supra, nor was it a willful refusal to return to work, which was the
basis of the ruling in Sarmiento vs. Tuico, supra. The failure of
UNION officers and members to immediately comply with the
return- to-work orders was not because they wanted to defy said
orders; rather, they held the view that academic institutions were not
industries indispensable to the national interest. When respondent
SECRETARY denied their motion, for reconsideration, however, the
UNION intimated that efforts ware immediately initiated to fashion
out a reasonable return-to-work agreement with the COLLEGE,
albeit, it failed.
chanroblespublishingcompany
The issue on whether respondent SECRETARY has the power to

assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute and its incidental
controversies, causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national interest, was already settled in
International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Secretary of Labor and
Employment.[6] Therein, We ruled that: chanroblespublishingcompany
“[T]he Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the

Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a
labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout
in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and
decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority
to assume
jurisdictional over the said labor dispute must include and
extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom,
including cases over which the Labor Arbiter has exclusive
jurisdiction.” chanroblespublishingcompany
And rightly so, for, as found in the aforesaid case, Article 217 of
the Labor Code did contemplate of exceptions thereto where
the SECRETARY is authorized to assume jurisdiction over a labor
dispute otherwise belonging exclusively to the Labor Arbiter. This is
readily evident from its opening proviso reading “(e)xcept as
otherwise provided under this Code.” chanroblespublishingcompany

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SUPREME COURT

ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE,

-verSuS- G.R. No. 100158

HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his capacity

The principal issue to be resolved in this recourse is whether striking

On 20 July 1990, petitioner St. Scholastica’s College (COLLEGE, for

On 5 November 1990, the UNION declared a strike which

On 9 November 1990, the COLLEGE sent individual letters to

Likewise, on 9 November 1990, respondent SECRETARY denied

Thereafter, particularly on 14 and 15 November 1990, the parties held

On 23 November 1990, the COLLEGE mailed individual notices

On 5 December 1990, a Complaint for Illegal Strike was filed against

The UNION moved for the enforcement of the return-to-work order

Respondent SECRETARY required the parties to submit their

On 12 April 1991, respondent SECRETARY issued the assailed Order

Both parties moved for partial reconsideration of the Order, with

On 26 June 1991, We restrained the SECRETARY from enforcing his

Petitioner questions the assumption by respondent SECRETARY of

“Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.

In support of its position, petitioner invokes Our ruling in PAL vs.

“The Labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he

Petitioner further contends that following the doctrine laid down

The issue on whether respondent SECRETARY has the power to

“[T]he Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the

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