Week 6, Lesson-1, Module-11

Realism and Idealism- Indian Perspective

Dr. SONIA MEHTA
(University of Delhi, Delhi, India)
mailto: [email protected]

1. Introduction
Most of the controversy in perception during the past century has to do with exactly, what it is
that we see, hear, taste, smell, and so on. We might say we see trees, tables, chairs, and so
forth. At first, perception may seem quite simple, for example, right now I perceive my pen. I
open my eyes, look at the pen and see it. Common sense may say that there is nothing
between me and the pen to prevent me from seeing it, but an opponent like Buddhist on this
matter has led to the view that my mind itself gets in between me and the pen and that I never
actually perceive the pen in itself. (i.e., a thing given independently of my mind). So, the
question that really concerns us is: What exactly is it that we are immediately aware of in our
perception? That is, what is given in perception? (What can we know?). There is no doubt
that the problems are connected with the nature of what is ‘given’ and what we ‘construct’ or
‘manipulate’ out of this given. That is why; there is a need to have a deeper understanding of
the nature of the reality and its perception. Therefore, the paper propose to explain, ‘the
given’ in perception and try to answer the following questions related to the issue:

1. What is it that we perceive?

2. What is the relationship among things-in-themselves, our sensation of them and our
understanding?
3. Is there any difference between what we see and what is given?
4. Whether the tangible world that we perceive and experience really exists or is it a
mere construction of mind?
5. Is reality independent of perception, or does perception define reality?
6. What is the status of what appears in our perception?
7. Is there any contribution of our mind to our knowledge of the external world?

It is within the framework of such metaphysical questions, concerning existence and non-
existence of what we perceive and experience, that the various philosophical schools have
developed their respective viewpoints and interpretations. Besides, the paper’s intention here
is not to address to each of these questions mentioned above separately, but they are certainly
taken care of in the following discussion. In order to show this, the procedure will be the
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following: Firstly, the paper will describe the contrast between realism and idealism;
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secondly, it will explain the three theories of perception, namely: direct realism, indirect
realism, and idealism, and lastly, it will focus on the difference between the given and the
constructed.

2. Realism versus Idealism

Broadly speaking, there are two main philosophical traditions, namely: Realism and idealism.
To be a realist in the philosophical sense of the term about something is to hold that thing
exists independently of our perceiving mind. Moreover, realism holds that substances are real
and have nothing to do with ideas and their properties (qualities) are not subjective, they
belong to the thing, not to our subjective feelings or mind. Now, to be an idealist about
something is not to deny the existence of that thing, but instead to assert that the things
existence is mind-dependent. They are not ready to bestow any degree of reality to things
independent of the mind. And about properties, the common maxim that beauty is in the eye
of the beholder is an expression of idealism about beauty. It does not deny that any one or
anything is beautiful, but instead asserts that whether something is beautiful depends on
someone’s mind, i.e., whether some one perceives it as beautiful or not.
The role that the notions of realism and idealism play in theories of perception concerns the
objects we take ourselves to perceive and the properties we take those objects to have. In the
history of these philosophical debates, we may discern three main kinds of philosophical
theories of perception, namely: Direct realism, indirect realism, and idealism, which can be
illustrated through the following diagram.

Theories of Perception
P Direct Realism(Sarvastivada) E
E X
R T
C E
R
E N
I A
V I L
I N
N T O
Indirect Realism(Sautrantika) E B
G R J
N E
S A C
U L T
B
J S
U
E
2

B
C
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Idealism(Yogacara) J
T E
C
T
3. Direct Realism (Common sense realism or naïve realism)
For direct realist, the objects external to us that we typically take ourselves to perceive, for
examples, tables, chairs, trees are both directly perceived and retain their perceived properties
even when unperceived. Moreover, the object that is perceived by the senses and cognized by
the mind is not a figment of imagination nor is it the construction/projection of mind. The
object exists in its own right and is a real entity. The advocates of this theory among Buddhist
are Sarvāstivādins and among non-Buddhist is Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. According to the former,
every thing (sarvaṃ) exists (asti) and we can directly cognize the external world through
perception.1 According to the latter, reality of the external world is accessible to reason. That
is, it accepts the world as it is, at the face value as we see it. Thus, according to this theory,
the world is there for us to see directly and we are capable of seeing it for what it really is.
And the way we see it is the way it is even when we are not looking. But there is a problem:
The existence of illusions, hallucinations, and perceptual errors are normally held to
constitute a problem for direct realism. For example, I misperceive a carpet sample to be
purple when it is really brown; I mistakenly see a stick in the water to be bent or broken when
it is really straight; I see a patch of water ahead on the road that turns out to be only a mirage.
Most significant is the possibility of flat-out hallucination: When drunk or drugged one might
see a pink elephant. Now, from the point of view of the perceiver, there may be no difference
in hallucinating that there is a coffee mug in front of you and having the accurate perception
that there is a coffee mug in front to you. In both cases the contents of your mind are the
same. What makes one accurate and the other hallucinating is the state of the external world.
In an attempt to explain this, the Sautrāntika philosophy came up with their theory of
representationism.

4. Indirect Realism (Representationism)

The world comes from the idea that we don’t perceive the world directly but its representation
in our mind only. We cannot be sure that the world really is how we think it to be; our mind is
therefore receiving impression and creative image of the world. We know only that
representation. There is an internal reality, or an internal aspect. That is the mind, the subtle
aspect of matter, and it is out of harmony with the external reality because it gets attached.
The propounder of this view is the Sautrāntika. The Sautrāntika, began its career by
examining critically the realism as propounded by the Sarvāstivādins and attempted to rectify
the short comings that thing found to be too glaring and self-evident in the realism. Its critical
attitude becomes quite evident, when the Sautrāntikas cut short the Sarvāstivādins list of 75
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dharmas to 43 by saying that the remaining 32 were subjective (prajñaptisat).2 An external

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object, according to them, is perceived indirectly on account of its momentary nature. An

object that is momentary can never be reached during the moment it is being perceived. The
object ceases to be, the moment perception of the object occurs (time-lag argument). The
assertion concerning the perception of the object, as being direct would imply that the object
persists at least for two moments, i.e., when the object becomes the cause or stimulus for
perception, and when it actually is perceived. According to Sautrāntikas, a moment
disappears as soon as it appears.3 The object that is presented to perception is really the
successor member in the series, and thereby becomes the cause of perception. The member in
the series that has ceased leaves its impression on the mind that perceives. It is from this
impression or idea (ākāra) that the prior existence of the corresponding member in the series
is inferred. This means that what is cognized in perception exists actually, but the perception
of the object does not take place at the time of its actual existing. This view is known as the
theory of representation of idea.
Further, regarding the problem of illusion, hallucination and perceptual error which constitute
a serious problem for direct realism, indirect realist reply as follows: Whenever we perceive
something we are in some mental state; a state of awareness. We are aware of something. If
we are aware of nothing then we would be unaware or unconscious. But, we are not unaware
or unconscious. So, whenever we perceive something, say a blue mug, whatever state we are
in could be replicated under conditions in the mug isn’t blue or there is no mug at all. The
external object is unnecessary for us to be that state; the mug may have ceased to exist prior
to the onset of that state as per the time-lag argument, or never existed at all as per the
hallucination argument. Thus, what we are aware of is whatever it is that is necessary for us
to be in that mental state. The external object is unnecessary. The internal state is necessary.
Thus, what we are aware of is a state internal to us, a state of our own mind. The only way in
which we are aware of thing external to our mind is indirectly.
But, there is a weakness in the Sautrāntika arguments. Inference from blue form to blue
object is unjustifiable, as it is a jump from known to unknowable, from empirical to non-
empirical. That is, the way direct theorist can explain the perceptual error is largely the same
way in which the indirect theorist does it. What the direct realist denies is that what one is
aware of in either case (hallucination and accurate perception) is necessarily the
representation itself. Thus, this paved the way for subjective idealism of the Yogācāra-
Vijñānavāda school.

5. Idealism
The major school of Buddhist thought to appear was the school of idealism known as
Vijñānavāda or Yogācāra. One of the most illustrious personalities who are credited with
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having systematized the teaching of this school is Vasubandhu. His monumental work, the
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Vijñaptimātratāsiddḥi, consisting of two parts: the Viṃśatika, which is devoted to a refutation

of the realistic theories, and the Triṃśika, where the tenets of the idealistic school are clearly
set out. In these two parts, he argues that one can never have direct awareness of external
objects, but can be aware only of images within consciousness. However, the crucial point to
be noted is that Yogācāra’s idealistic position has been described differently by different
philosophers like David. J. Kalupahana who describes its position as Metaphysical idealist;
C.D. Sharma describes it as Absolute idealist; Th. Stcherbatsky as Spiritual monism; T.R.V.
Murti as Idealism-par-excellence; J.N Sinha as Subjective idealist; H.S. Prasad as
Scripturalist idealist, and Dan Lusthaus says Yogācāra at times resembles epistemological
idealism.
Now, in order to bring to lime light the Yogācāra’s idealistic position, we have to study in
detail the chief tenets/key concepts of his idealism, namely: vijñaptimātratā,
sahopalambhanīyama, externality, subject-object dichotomy, trisvabhāvatā.
The problem confronting us, according to Yogācāra, is the claim that we habitually and
incessantly misinterpret our own experience, due to lack of insight into the conditions of
experience. That is, we mistake our own interpretations/projections of the world for the world
itself. Those interpretations, which are projections of our desires and anxieties, become
obstructions (āvaraṇa) preventing us from seeing what is actually the case. That is, we do not
at all apprehend the object in the manner it is in itself, because there exists disparities between
the way things appears and the way they are. And it is the school of Yogācāra, which invites
us to erase the mirror that blocks our view through their chief tenets of idealism as follows:

5.1 Chief Tenets of Yogācāra Idealism

5.1.1 Vijñaptimātratā
The doctrine of vijñapti-mātra teaches that there are no real self (pudgalanairātmya) or
real things (dharmanairātmya). Everything phenomenal (saṃskṛta) and noumenal
(asaṃskṛta), everything appearing as real and false is not separable from consciousness.
But, this does not mean that consciousness alone exists, but rather that all our efforts to
get beyond ourselves are nothing but projections of our consciousness. It means to
mistake one’s projections for that onto which one is projecting. 4 Moreover, vijñaptimātra
does not at all refer to the absolute reality, or to the final mode of existence. On the
contrary, the perception of vijñaptimātra is presented only as the first step towards the
realization of the unreality of graspable or grasper duality. 5 So, Yogācārins treat the term
vijñaptimātra as an epistemic caution, not an ontological pronouncement. Because
nothing cognized within consciousness can be declared in and by consciousness to be
otherwise than consciousness. Since, by definition, everything knowable through
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consciousness, nothing knowable can be declared to be real apart from consciousness.

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5.1.2 Sahopalambhanīyama
Vasubandhu introduces the positive argument of Sahopalambhanīyama6, which supplies
an epistemological refutation of realism, by demonstrating that there is no external object
apart from consciousness. Consciousness diversifies into indefinite modes
(transformation of consciousness-vijñāna-pariṇāma), which owing to the presence of
transcendental illusion are taken to be as external objects. Actually what happened,
according to Vasubandhu is that the consciousness undergoes three stratifications. The
first stratification is ālaya-vijñāna or store-consciousness, the repository of all vāsanās
(traces of past experience). It is the realm of potentiality. The second stratification of
consciousness is manas or thought-consciousness. It is the transformation of these
potentialities into actual thoughts. The third stratification is pravṛtti-vijñāna or active-
consciousness, which manifests itself in the contents of various mental states and the
alleged external objects. These stratifications of consciousness create the mistaken belief
that there are objects such as trees, tables, etc., that exist independently of consciousness.
But in reality external objects are not something different from consciousness; they are
mere-concepts/representations of consciousness. So both the so-called object and
consciousness of object are identical and this identity is inferred from simultaneous
perception of them. That is, the blue (concept or idea of blue) and the consciousness of
blue are identical.7 The difference between the two is only epistemic and not ontological.
Moreover, Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita also discuss the law of simultaneous
apprehension (sahopalambhanīyama). Dharmakīrti in his Pramāṇavārttika, discusses this
concept in the verses 388-3898 and Śāntarakṣita does not use the word together (saho)
which implies non-difference. He says that the apprehension of the cognition of blue and
the apprehension of blue are one and the same.

5.1.3 Externality
In order for appropriation to appropriate there must be that which is appropriable, i.e.,
‘external’. Thus, in the positing of external objects what, for Yogācāra, is problematic is
not the positing of objects as such (Vasubandhu does not deny the existence of external
world/reality i.e., things-in-themselves, they exist). The problem lies in positing
externality, the idea or notion of the external. Externality is the necessary condition for
appropriation. The questions that really concern us are: When do Yogācārarins deny
external objects? What are they rejecting and what, if anything, are they affirming? That
is, what does the denial of externality entail? Yogācārins deny the existence of external
objects in two senses:
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a. In terms of conventional experience they do not deny objects such as chairs,

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colors, and trees, but they reject the claim that such things appear anywhere
 else than in consciousness. It is externality, not objects per se, that they
challenge.
b. While such objects are admissible as conventionalism, in more precise terms
there are no chairs, trees, etc. These are merely words and concepts by which
we gather and interpret discrete sensations that arise moment by moment in a
constant flux. These words and concepts are mental projections. The point is
not to elevate consciousness, but to warn us not to be fooled by our own
cognitive narcissism.9
The crux of the problem lies in our inability/incapacity to distinguish the unreal
(pratibhā, interpretation of the world) from the real (world itself). According to Yog ācāra
our mental experience is changing, altering (pariṇama, pravṛtti) every moment. In this
fluctuating stream (vijñāna-santāna) we tend to posit two constants: Ātman (an
independent, unchanging observer or witness) and dharma (affective, thetic and objective
circumstances) against which and through which we cognize and evaluate all that we
experience. Forgetting that these posited constants are constructions fabricated
(parikalpita) through our attempt to suppress the anxieties and fears, we invert our
invented constants with ultimate sanctity and significance.10 That is, we take our own
mental construction to be the reality. Moreover, when Yogācārins discuss objects, they
are talking about cognitive objects, not metaphysical entities. Thus, the motive behind the
denial of external objects is to negate the object, and the self is also negated.

5.1.4 Subject-object Dichotomy

According to Yogācāra, every consciousness essentially and automatically bifurcates
itself into the dichotomy of subject (svabhāsa ātma) and object (arthabhāsa, dharma),
i.e., between grahākatva and grāhyatva respectively. But, actually the appearance of
duality, the given and the receiving, the apprehended and the apprehension, are all our
doing, results of our manipulation, construction, or representation of consciousness. So,
there is no duality, but only idea of duality, like the idea of an illusory elephant. Hence, it
is concluded that: (i) The terms subject and object do not refer to anything ontological
(vastu), but only to the epistemological concepts of subjectivity and objectivity. (ii)
Moreover, the denial of existence of subject and object does not amount to the denial of
the concepts of subjectivity and objectivity as something more than mere imagination.

5.1.5 Is Yogācāra metaphysical or epistemological idealism?

Yogācāra is not a metaphysical idealism, because the key term vijñaptimātratā does not
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imply the claim that mind alone is real and that everything else is created by the mind.
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However, the Yogācārin writings themselves argue something very different.

 Consciousness (vijñāna) is not the ultimate reality or solution, but rather the root
problem. This problem emerges in ordinary mental operations, and it can only be solved
by bringing those operations to an end. Thus, at times it resembles epistemological
idealism, which does not claim that this or any world is constructed by mind, but rather
that we are usually incapable of distinguishing our mental constructions and
interpretations of the world from the world itself. This narcissism of consciousness,
Yogācāra calls vijñāptimātratā, nothing but conscious construction.

5.1.6 Doctrine of three natures

Vasubandhu in his Triṃśatika, verses 20, 21, and 22 explains the three natures of reality
(trisvabhāva) and in verses 23, 24, and 25 explains the three fold naturelessness of the
same three realities (niḥsvabhāvatā). It is worth noting that Vasubandhu distinguishes
among three natures or realms, namely: (i) Parikalpita-svabhāva - the imagined nature,
which is imagined but appears to be real, i.e. , ubiquitously imputes unreal conceptions
especially permanent selves into whatever it experiences, including oneself; (ii)
Paratantra-svabhāva - the other dependent nature, when mixed with the constructed
realm, leads one to mistake impermanent occurrences in the flux of causes and conditions
for fixed, permanent entities, and (iii) Pariniṣpanna-svabhāva - the absolutely
accomplished nature which acts as an antidote (pratipakṣa), that purifies all delusional
constructions out of the causal realm. And the three-fold naturelessness is, namely: (i)
Lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā - Naturelessness by definition, which applies to parikalpita-
svabhāva, because it lacks a definition by its own characteristics, and whatever
characteristics it is believed to have, are all imaginary ones. For example, fictitious flower
blooming in the sky (khapuṣpa); (ii) Utpatti-niḥsvabhāvatā - Naturelessness with
reference to origin, applies to paratantra-svabhāva, which lacks the power of self-origin
and self-existence and depends upon other conditions. For example, the illusion created
by a magician; (iii) Paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā - Naturelessness of elements in their
absolute state of existence. Moreover, it is the very essence of the accomplished nature. 10
In this way, what clearly comes out of from the preceding discussion is that, for
Vasubandhu, the extra-mental world, which consists of things-in-themselves, is ineffable
(anabhilāpya), and therefore beyond all human formulations. What one can think of and
speak of is one’s own mental construction (parikalpita=kalpita-ātma), which has little
correspondence with the extra-mental world, Therefore, it would be unreasonable to think
that Vasubandhu’s criticism of realism is meant to deny the existence of an extra-mental
world.
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6. Transcendental Idealism (theory of immaterialism)
Now, another form of idealism situated between subjective idealism and absolute
idealism, and yet different from both also indirectly develops out of phenomenalism,
namely: Transcendental idealism. Transcendental idealism also holds that we do not
directly perceive objects as they are in themselves; rather, we only perceive the
phenomenal appearance of object. This phenomenal appearance consists of raw
perceptual data as well as certain conceptually constructed elements fused with sense
data. Transcendental idealist holds that our cognitive make-up is that conceptual
construction forms an integral part of all mental events, including perception. The
advocates of this idealistic position are Dignāga and Dharamkīrti. Moreover, the kind of
idealism advocated by Dignāga is known as Svatantravijñānavāda. Besides, more than a
bridge between the absolute idealism of Vasubandhu and the critical realism of the
Sautrāntikas, Dignāga’s theory appears to us to be a fresh analysis of the epistemological
problems, which ultimately led him to the acceptance of a theory of immaterialism rather
than a theory of absolute idealism. Dignāga propounded the theory of immaterialism in
his short treatise, namely: Ālambanaparīkṣā, where he denied only the materiality of the
object of perception and not its externality (as already discussed at greater length in the
chapter of Ālambanaparīkṣā: Dignāga’s Phenomenalism).
Moreover, the point to be noted is that while Vasubandhu denied not only the substantial
reality of matter, but also the efficacy and even the possibility of mere sense experience,
Dignāga only denied the substantial reality of matter, but not the efficacy or the
possibility of sense- experience. This difference in the treatment of sense-perception is
also reflected in their definition of perception. Thus, we may conclude that comparing the
two texts, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi of Vasubandhu and the Ālambanaparīkṣā of
Dignāga, we find that the former employs metaphysical arguments against the acceptance
of a substantially real external world, while the latter contains epistemological arguments
against the knowability of the reality of matter.
So far we have discussed the contrast between realism and idealism and the three
different theories of perception: Direct realism, indirect realism, and idealism, now we are
in a position to discuss our main question: Whether the nature of reality is given or
constructed? In order to answer this, firstly, I will explain the process of perception from
Nyāya perspective, and then a critique by the Buddhist, which will help to establish a
Buddhist view.
As already explained above that the Naiyāyikas being utter realist advocate of the theory
of direct realism accepts three criteria of reality, namely: (i) Objectivity (prameyatva), (ii)
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knowability (jñeyatva), and (iii) nameability (abhidheyatva). In other words, whatever is

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real and existent should be knowable and nameable. Therefore, the world is real because
 it can be known and it can be verbalized. With this background in brief, we can
diagrammatically sketch the whole process of perception from Nyāya perspective.

Nyaya Process of Perception

Dharma
Dharma
(Atman + Manas + Indriya + Artha) Relation
Dharmin
Dharmin
Nirvikalpaka

Dharma
Sentence is samavaya
uttered Dharmin

Savikalpaka

In the process of perception according to Naiyāyikas, first the ātman (self) comes in contact
with the manas (mind), then the manas with the indriyas (sense-organ). And then finally
indriyas come in contact with the artha (object) which is technically known as sannikarṣa.
Furthermore, all these factors are given to us in the process of perception and they are called
sāmagrī (collection of factors). Although, among these factors some are cognitive (like
indriyas and artha) and some are non – cognitive (like ātman and manas), but they all are
padārthas and have ontological existence. Now this sāmagrī leads to the first stage of
perception, i.e., nirvikalpaka (non- verbalized), in which lies the content but the structure and
relation of dharma and dharmin is not clear. So it cannot be verbalized, i.e., no conceptual
activity of naming and relating takes place in it. This leads to the second stage of perception,
i.e., savikalpaka, where the structure and relation between dharma and dharmin is clear,
which is the minimum requirement for naming something, according to Nyāya. For example,
when we see a pot, then the minimum structure of ghaṭatvā, ghaṭa and the relation of
samavāya must get reflected in the cognition for the utterance/naming of the word pot.
Finally, in this stage, we are in a position to verbalize and the process of perception
terminates here.
Now, before venturing to explain the process of perception from Buddhist perspective and to
delineate the pros and cons of the aforesaid view, it is essential to bring to lime light the
difference between what is given and what is constructed. According to Buddhist, we can
never directly know the external world and it is possible for us to have experience even in the
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absence of external stimuli, because there exists a discrepancy between the nature of the
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object as perceived in our awareness and the nature of the external object as it is. According
to Buddhist, reality is dynamic, functional, momentary, and in a continuous flux. Further,
they believed in a two tiered level of reality, namely: (i) Ultimate (paramārtha) – the world of
svalakṣaṇa or events, which are given in pure perception and (ii) Empirical (saṃvṛti) – the
world of sāmānyalakṣaṇa or continuants, which are given by understanding. Moreover, we
can never know the ultimate reality (thing-in-itself), because in reality what actually causes a
sensation to arise is never that about which we have awareness, so there seems to be an
unbridgeable gap between reality and appearance. All that is available to us is a bare
sensation and we cannot transcendent our sensation and catch the reality. Actually, the
following diagram, originally illustrated by H.S Prasad, which the paper is paraphrasing here,
can explain what happened.

step 2

constructed & projected object

. step 1
c o o1 falsely seen as 'Given'
cognizer
step 3
'Given' object

According to Buddhist, reality (o) is constantly emanating data and these data stimulates the
cognizer’s senses (c) and get transformed and structured as an idea or image in the mind of
the cognizer, which is only an appearance of the given object. That is, object is constructed
and structured at the mental level, so subjective, but because of the inherent nature of
intentionality (viṣayomukhata) it is projected outside as an external object (o 1). So, what is
input to him is never known by him (step-1). He knows only what is output by his mind. The
problem is that he does not know this output as output, but as input as shown in the third step.
He is totally unaware of the first (original input) and second steps and takes the third step as
the first one. So, we mistake our own interpretation/projection of the reality for the reality
itself. This is because of our cognitive failure to see the difference (bhedāgraha), we are not
able to make the distinction between the two. Now, after knowing this fact it would be quite
appropriate at this juncture to explain the Buddhist process of perception through the
following diagram.
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 Buddhist Process of Perception

mind continuant events

L M2 M1
structuring samanya-laksana svalaksana Object (o)
(kalpana) (Functional atoms)
concept

nama guna
jati
stage 2 stage 1
savikalpaka nirvikalpaka

For both Buddhist and Naiyāyikas, external object is atomic in nature. But, for Buddhist
object is unified because of functional atoms, which are functionally holding each other and
not because of unifying principle of ‘whole’ as believed by Naiyāyikas. Further, it is only the
‘patch’ of color and not the whole that is grasped by our sense-organs, say eye (s), because
eye is capable of receiving the data in that form only. It is the stage 1 of pure perception
(nirvikalpaka, indeterminate perception), which is free from verbalization. Then this patch is
the content (viṣaya) for the activity of the mind. It is only in the stage 2 of process of
perception (savikalpaka, determinate perception) when the mind starts functioning,
structuring and the concept is formed. Thought and language are concerned with the latter
stage and not with the former.
1. From the preceding discussion, it is evident that we habitually and incessantly
misinterpret our own experience, due to lack of insight into the conditions of
experience. Moreover, realist gives explanation at ontological level, whereas
according to Buddhist there is no need of externality or ontological commitment,
even without it we can have explanation. The Buddhists are not interested in
disproving or proving as to what reality is or not as much they are in disclosing that
reality per se is not amenable to linguistic discourse or conceptualization. They have
recognized the limits of human knowledge and so accordingly came to the conclusion
that conceptual knowledge does not exactly depict as to what reality is in itself. Thus,
the advantage of Buddhism is that they try to get rid of unwanted crowding of
ontological things.
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7. Notes and References
1. S, 4.52-53.
2. Ibid., 3.46.
3. yatraiva utpattiḥ tatraiva vināśaḥ
cf. Abhidharmakośabhāṣya-vyākhyā, pp. 43, 20-21.
4. For detail, see Lusthaus, D, (2002), p. 535.
5. For detail, see Kochumuttam, T.A. (1982), P. 203.
6. Sahopalambhanīyama- The availability of the object invariably along with its
consciousness, thus refuting its independence.
7. Pramāṇaviniscaya of Dharamkīrti, I. 55a sahopalambhanīyamād abhedo
nīlataddhiyo.
8. Pramāṇavārttika, verses 388-389:
sakṛtsaṃvedyamānasya niyamena dhiyāsaha/
viṣayasya tato’ nyattvaṃ kenākārena siddyati//
bhedaścaya bhrānti vijñānairdṛ śyetendāvivādvayaṃ/
saṃvitti niyamo nāsti bhinnayo rnilapitayo//
See Chaterjee, A.K. (1975), P. 45.
9. For detail, see Lusthaus, Dan, (2002), p. 538.
10. Ibid., p. 539.
11. Further, the traditional Hindu illustration of the rope and snake is well used by
Buddhist idealism. A nescient and unaware person believes he sees a snake and gets
frightened; a wise man takes this person close to the apparent snake (parikalpita) and
makes him realize that it is just a rope (paratantra) and that, after all the rope is
nothing more than a transitory formation of ‘hemp’ (pariniṣpanna). This gradual
realization illustrates the steps to be taken by the unlighted in order to perceive the
ultimate nature of reality and thus attain his final release from bondage and from
ignorance. For detail see, Conze, (1996), P. 258.
8.Bibliography
1. Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya by Vasubandhu with Vyākhyā by Yaśomitra, see AK,
AKB, AKV.
2. AK, AKB, AKV, Abhidharmakośa (AK) and Bhāṣya (AKB) by Vasubandhu with
Vyākhyā (AKV) by Yaśomitra, ed. D.D. Shastri, Varanasi, Baudha Bharti, 4
Volumes, 1970- 1973.
3. Ālambanaparīkṣā and Vṛtti by Dignāga with the commentary by Dharmapāla,
restored into Sanskrit and tr. By M. Aiyaswami Sastri, Madras, The Adyar Library,
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4. Brandt, R.B. (1957), `The Language of Realism and Nominalism’ Philosophical and
Phenomenological 17, pp. 516-535.
5. Chatterjee, A.K. (1970), Readings on Yogācāra Buddhism, Varanasi, Banaras Hindu.
6. ………………... (1975), The Yogācāra Idealism, Varanasi, Motilal Banarsidass,
second edition.
7. Conge, Edward (1996), Buddhist Thought in India, Munshiram Manoharlal
Publishers Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi.
8. Dasgupta, S. (1962), Indian Idealism, The Syndies of the Cambridge University
Pores, New York.
9. Dasgupta, S.N. (1875), A History of Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi.
10. Hattori, M. (1968), Dignāga on Perception, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard
University Press.
11. Kochumuttam, T.A. (1982), A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience, Motilal. Banarsidass,
Delhi.
12. Lusthaus, Dan, (2002), Buddhist Phenomenology, Routledge Curzon Taylor and
Francis Group, London and New York.
13. Matilal, B.K. (1986), Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of
Knowledge, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
14. Pradhan, R.C. (1996), Philosophy of Meaning and Representation, D.K. Print World
(P) Ltd., New Delhi.
15. Pramāṇasamuccaya and its Vṛtti by Dignāga, see Hattori (1968).
16. Shastri, P.S. (1975), Indian Idealism (Epistemology and Ontology), Vol. - I, II,
Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Delhi.
17. Ślokavārtika of Kumārila (1946), (ed.) Kunhan, Raja, Madras University Press,
Madras.
18. Sinha, J.N. (1972), Indian Realism, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi.
19. Vasubandhu Vijñaptimātratā Siddhi, (ed.) Swami Maheswarananda, Varanasi:
Gitadharma Karyalaya, 1962.
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