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    Quimiguing V Icao PDF

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    paolo ricaforte
    This document is a summary of a Supreme Court of the Philippines case from 1970. It discusses whether a woman can sue the father of her unborn child for support. The Court held that under Philippine law, an unborn child has certain legal rights and is entitled to support from its parents. Thus, the woman's original complaint alleging the defendant was the father of her unborn child stated a valid cause of action. The Court also found the woman herself could sue for damages resulting from the non-consensual sexual acts that led to the pregnancy. The lower court's orders dismissing the complaint and denying amendment were reversed.

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    Quimiguing V Icao PDF

    Uploaded by

    paolo ricaforte
    74 views2 pages
    This document is a summary of a Supreme Court of the Philippines case from 1970. It discusses whether a woman can sue the father of her unborn child for support. The Court held that under Philippine law, an unborn child has certain legal rights and is entitled to support from its parents. Thus, the woman's original complaint alleging the defendant was the father of her unborn child stated a valid cause of action. The Court also found the woman herself could sue for damages resulting from the non-consensual sexual acts that led to the pregnancy. The lower court's orders dismissing the complaint and denying amendment were reversed.

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    This document is a summary of a Supreme Court of the Philippines case from 1970. It discusses whether a woman can sue the father of her unborn child for support. The Court held that under Philippine law, an unborn child has certain legal rights and is entitled to support from its parents. Thus, the woman's original complaint alleging the defendant was the father of her unborn child stated a valid cause of action. The Court also found the woman herself could sue for damages resulting from the non-consensual sexual acts that led to the pregnancy. The lower court's orders dismissing the complaint and denying amendment were reversed.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    74 views2 pages

    Quimiguing V Icao PDF

    Uploaded by

    paolo ricaforte
    This document is a summary of a Supreme Court of the Philippines case from 1970. It discusses whether a woman can sue the father of her unborn child for support. The Court held that under Philippine law, an unborn child has certain legal rights and is entitled to support from its parents. Thus, the woman's original complaint alleging the defendant was the father of her unborn child stated a valid cause of action. The Court also found the woman herself could sue for damages resulting from the non-consensual sexual acts that led to the pregnancy. The lower court's orders dismissing the complaint and denying amendment were reversed.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    of 2

    7/26/2016 G.R. No.

     26795

    Today is Tuesday, July 26, 2016

    Republic of the Philippines
    SUPREME COURT
    Manila

    EN BANC

    G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970

    CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs­
    appellants, 
    vs.
    FELIX ICAO, defendant­appellee.

    Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs­appellants.

    Godardo Jacinto for defendant­appellee.

    REYES, J.B.L., J.:

    Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison
    Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another order
    denying amendment of the same pleading.

    The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:

    Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it was
    averred  that  the  parties  were  neighbors  in  Dapitan  City,  and  had  close  and  confidential  relations;  that  defendant
    Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation,
    and  without  her  consent;  that  as  a  result  she  became  pregnant,  despite  efforts  and  drugs  supplied  by  defendant,
    and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.

    Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that
    the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed
    the complaint.

    Thereafter,  plaintiff  moved  to  amend  the  complaint  to  allege  that  as  a  result  of  the  intercourse,  plaintiff  had  later
    given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable,
    since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.

    We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given
    by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the
    Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of
    the defendant­appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the
    said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as
    prescribed  by  Article  742  of  the  same  Code,  and  its  being  ignored  by  the  parent  in  his  testament  may  result  in
    preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after
    the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).

    ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who
    would legally represent them if they were already born.

    ART.  854.  The  preterition  or  omission  of  one,  some,  or  all  of  the  compulsory  heirs  in  the  direct  line,
    whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
    the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

    If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
    prejudice to the right of 'representation.

    http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1970/jul1970/gr_26795_1970.html 1/2
    7/26/2016 G.R. No. 26795

    It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of
    parents  and  illegitimate  children  "does  not  contemplate  support  to  children  as  yet  unborn,"  violates  Article  40
    aforesaid,  besides  imposing  a  condition  that  nowhere  appears  in  the  text  of  Article  291.  It  is  true  that  Article  40
    prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further
    "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time
    it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of
    the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa,
    in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this out:

    Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico que la
    moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados
    'derechos en estado de pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30,
    no determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano), sino que se trata de
    un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)

    A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to
    yield  to  his  lust  (as  averred  in  the  original  complaint  in  this  case)  constitutes  a  clear  violation  of  the  rights  of  his
    victim  that  entitles  her  to  claim  compensation  for  the  damage  caused.  Says  Article  21  of  the  Civil  Code  of  the
    Philippines:

    ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
    good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

    The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:

    ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

    (3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:

    xxx xxx xxx

    (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....

    Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for
    damages  under  the  terms  of  the  complaint;  and  the  order  dismissing  it  for  failure  to  state  a  cause  of  action  was
    doubly in error.

    WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin
    for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

    Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

    The Lawphil Project ­ Arellano Law Foundation

    http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1970/jul1970/gr_26795_1970.html 2/2

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