How Violence Affects Protests

Zachary C. Steinert-Threlkeld1 , Alexander Chan2 , and Jungseock Joo3

1 University of California, Los Angeles. Email: [email protected]

2 University of California, Los Angeles. Email: [email protected]
3 University of California, Los Angeles. Email: [email protected]

ABSTRACT
A key determinant of whether social movements achieve their policy goal is how many people
protest. How many people protest is in turn partially determined by violence from protesters and
state agents. Previous work finds mixed results for violence. This paper reconciles the mixed results
for violence by distinguishing between the timing of repression and its severity: low levels of state
repression increase protest size while high levels decrease it, conditional on preventative repression
failing. It evaluates the role of violence by applying deep learning techniques to geolocated images
shared on social media. Across more than 4,300 observations of twenty-four cities from five
countries, we find that protester violence is always associated with subsequently smaller protests,
while low (high) levels of state violence correlate with increased (decreased) protest size. The
paper ends with a discussion of situations in which to prefer images or text for studying protests;
ethical concerns; and improving data collection in order to apply the analysis to poorer or less
populous environments.

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1 INTRODUCTION
This paper develops and tests an argument that low levels of state violence lead to larger
protests, while high levels decrease it; protester violence leads to smaller protests. Pre-emptive
state repression decreases protests (Sullivan, 2016). Once protests start, however, the effect of state
violence depends on its severity. The importance of the severity of state repression may explain
varying effects that the literature identifies for state repression (Carey, 2006; Ritter, 2013), though
it contradicts the backlash hypothesis (Francisco, 2004).
Protests are more likely to shift policy the larger they are (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011;
Fassiotto and Soule, 2017; Wouters and Walgrave, 2017). In turn, their size is affected by the
level and source (protesters or state agents) of violence at a protest. While protester violence
has consistently been found to correlate with smaller protests (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008;
Feinberga et al., 2017; Murdie and Purser, 2017), the protest-repression literature consistently finds
inconsistent results (Davenport, 2007). This paper suggests a solution to this protest-repression
puzzle rooted in the timing and severity of state violence.1
This argument is tested using protest images shared in geolocated tweets. This measurement
occurs using three convolutional neural networks (CNN). We first develop a CNN to recognize
protest images, and we have verified that this classifier outperforms Google Vision on our images
(see Figure A8). From a corpus of six years of geolocated tweets, we identify 55.6 million from
protest waves across fourteen countries, 5.4 million of which contain an image. The protest
detection classifier identifies over 115,000 of these images as very likely to contain a protest, and
we build a second CNN to measure protester and state violence as well as the presence of fire or
uniformed police officers. Figure A8 also shows that this scene classifier identifies police better
than Google Vision. This scene classifier is complemented with the third CNN, a face classifier.
This classifier counts the number of faces per photo and estimates the race, gender, and age of each
face, allowing us to control for well-known correlations between these demographic features and
protest participation. While many off the shelf face classifiers exist, only one codes race precisely
1Violence should be conceived of as “perceived violence”, a point to which we return later.

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enough (Kärkkäinen and Joo, 2019). Sections 3 and S1 detail how these models and verify their
output.
Section 4 discusses the resulting data, concerns about selection bias, and validates the dependent
variable. It shows that users who tweet geolocated protest images are likely to be more representative
of normal Twitter users than those who tweet geolocated non-protest images, and there are strong
reasons to expect social media to be no more biased than newspapers in covering protests. That
section also shows that using images to measure protest size correlates with estimates of protest
size from newspapers and records changing activity that matches events as reported in newspapers.
Section 5 presents the main results. It also shows three sets of robust checks, two explicitly de-
signed to account for possible bias. Restricting results to users of moderate popularity; non-verified
users; non-bots; and tweets in a country’s lingua franca do not change inferences. Deduplicating
images also does not change inferences. To the extent we find evidence for bias, it is against the
main results: dropping bots and restricting tweets based on language both produce better model fit
than the full datasets.
Finally, Section 6 concludes, discussing why images, instead of text, are necessary for this
project; the ethical concerns raised by computer vision approaches, especially in the context of
contentious politics; and why the results presented in this paper should be considered a lower bound
on what these techniques can achieve.

2 PROTEST DYNAMICS
Protesters aim to convince bystanders to mobilize, increasing pressure for policy change
(McAdam and Su, 2002). The state works to convince bystanders to remain on the sidelines
and existing protesters to disengage. Protesters and the state each choose amounts of violence to
employ. Protester violence should always lead to smaller protests, while state violence will have
differential effects depending on its timing and severity.

2.1 The Importance of Large Protests

Three assumptions lead to the conclusion that large protests are more likely to change policy
than small ones. If (1) the purpose of a protest is to convince political leaders to change a policy,

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(2) a leader cares about the median voter (Downs, 1957) or his or her winning coalition exhibits
some response to the median person (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), and (3) a large protest’s
policy preference is closer to the median individual than a small one’s, then a large protest is more
likely to change policy than a small one.
This argument can also be obtained without assuming a leader aims for the median individual’s
policy preference. If a leader only desires to stay in power and a large protest means the probability
of remaining in power is lower than the leader previously believed, a large protest is still more likely
to lead to policy change than a small one. While a large protest is not necessarily successful, all
successful protests are large.
Protest size is important regardless of a country’s political institutions. In democracies, voting
is the most common method of policy change. The aggregation of preferences through defined
rules, and the willingness of those in power to heed the result, has many advantages. It is a
low-cost endeavor for participants, as the only costs are transaction and opportunity. Voting occurs
infrequently, however, and is a blunt method of feedback because it collapses all political dimensions
into one. Protests, however, can occur at any time and usually have a clear policy goal (Battaglini,
2017).
In authoritarian regimes, however, voting is a less significant act. In countries where policy
feedback comes from an insider population drawn from the larger populace (Bueno de Mesquita
et al., 2003), those belonging to the outsider population provide policy feedback through protest
(or rebellion). While protest is unlikely to change an autocrat’s policy, it nonetheless provides a
key signal of discontent to which a government can respond (Bratton and Walle, 1992). This signal
is especially pertinent if opinion polling is unreliable (Robertson, 2007) or the media are not free
(Qin et al., 2017).
The importance of large protests has not escaped notice. Lohmann (1994a) argues that unprece-
dented numbers of people rallying in the German Democratic Republic in the beginning of 1989
were a key reason the protest movement grew and eventually toppled Erich Honecker’s government.
The gradual growth of protest size in Iran in 1979 also made it increasingly difficult for the Shah

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to remain in power (Rasler, 1996). Kuran (1989)’s canonical model of bandwagoning implicitly
means a revolution follows large protests. Understanding the threat posed by large crowds, regimes
often raise the cost of protesting by killing protesters, yet killing protesters has an indeterminate
effect on the size of subsequent protests (Francisco, 2004). Indeed, if there is a law like regularity
to the study of protest mobilization, it is that “size matters” (Biggs, 2016).
The importance of size applies to social movements as well, of which protests are a tactic they
can employ (Tilly and Wood, 2012). Large social movements are more likely to lead to policy change
than small ones for several reasons. Because large social movements tend to be nonviolent, they
increase the domestic and international cost of repression, especially when movements maintain
their own media (Sutton et al., 2014). They decrease the cost of participation, making individuals
more likely to join, and making them more likely to join as movements grow (DeNardo, 1985).
It also increases the probability that individuals within the winning coalition defect, making it
more difficult for the state to continue repression (Goldstone, 2001). For a fuller exposition of the
importance of size for social movements, see Chenoweth and Stephan (2011).

2.2 Violence

Though scholars understand the importance of large protests, less is understood about why
protests become large, and most existing work is qualitative, cross-sectional, or focuses on structural
variables. For example, Biggs (2003) argues for a positive feedback loop but does not specify
when an initial protest is more likely to generate that process. Large protests in one country
may occur because large protests in a similar country succeeded, but contagion does not explain
why the initiating country experienced large protests (Weyland, 2012). The structure of built
environments may also encourage protest participation: one reason initial marches to Tiananmen
Square succeeded is because universities in Beijing are in the same neighborhood and have internally
dense configurations, encouraging mobilization both within and between campuses (Zhao, 1998).
The occurrence of electoral fraud is also a common source of large protest events (Tucker, 2007).
This paper focuses on mechanisms affecting protest size once a protest starts. The only kind
of repression that can occur in this situation is overt repression, often called “protest policing”

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(Earl, 2003; Davenport and Soule, 2009). This concept refers to repressive behaviors that occur
during a protest, such as blocking roads, impeding pedestrian movement, arresting protesters, and
using subfatal weapons such as tear gas, water cannons, or sound guns. Protest policing contrasts
with preventative repression, such as the targeting of dissident organizations or arresting particular
individuals (Sullivan, 2016).

Protester Violence

If violent protests are more costly to the individual than nonviolent ones, regardless of the
source, then violence should decrease protest size (Moore, 1995). Empirically, however, there
appears to be differential effects based on the source of the violence.
When violence originates from protesters, it should always decrease the size of protests because
it decreases the number of people to which protest appeals, and it increases the cost of protesting
to the remaining bystanders who may protest.
One method by which bystanders determine whether or not to join a protest is to compare
protesters’ ideological distance to their own (Lohmann, 1993). Since most individuals do not
support violence or receive consumption value from it (Feinberga et al., 2017), violence originating
from protesters signals that protesters, and therefore the policy changes for which they agitate, are
far from mainstream. Survey research has found that the more activists differ from the population
they try to mobilize, the less likely individuals are to protest (Bashir et al., 2013). Being far from
the mainstream, bystanders continue to stand by because the new policy the violent protesters seek
is inferred to not be beneficial.
Protester violence decreases the likelihood of regime defections, decreasing the number of
non-protesters available to mobilize. Peaceful protest convinces regime agents of their physical
safety should they defect, increasing the probability that police, members of the armed forces,
or legislators, for example, switch allegiances (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008). Violent protests,
however, induce fear in these agents that they will meet the same fate if they do not remain loyal.
Violence therefore reduces the pool of those willing to protest, making the state stronger than an
equivalent peaceful protest.

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 Since protester violence decreases the legitimacy of protests, the state can pursue high levels of
repression and face less risk of backlash. Peaceful protests enjoy high domestic and international
legitimacy, so state violence against them risks generating a backlash that increases subsequent
protests’ size (Francisco, 2004). But since violent protesters can be framed as rioters, terrorists, or
foreign agitators (Benford and Snow, 2000), bystanders are more supportive of repressing violent
protests than nonviolent ones. Survey work across eighteen countries finds that violent protests
decrease future support for the peaceful right to protest (Murdie and Purser, 2017). For the same
reasons, the state is also less likely to receive international sanction when repressing violent protests.
The converse of these arguments is that protester non-violence increases the probability that a
protest grows in size, especially when states repress. Because non-violence increases the legitimacy
of protests, it decreases the probability that a state represses, as the state will pay large reputation
costs. The lower probability of repression induces more bystanders to mobilize, generating a
positive feedback loop (Lohmann, 1994b). In Morocco, for example, attempts to repress non-
violent protesters at the start of the Arab Spring led to larger crowd sizes (Lawrence, 2016), and
government violence in Tunisia did not prevent the spread of those protests.
Since protester violence alienates bystanders, increases the resolve of state agents, and invites
high levels of state repression, we expect that:

H1: There should exist a negative relationship between protester violence and the subsequent
size of a protest.

This hypothesis extends earlier work that finds the same relationship at the movement level,
using a movement’s reported maximum participation rate. As far as we are aware, existing work
on protester violence and outcomes is cross-sectional (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008; Celestino
and Gleditsch, 2013; Chenoweth and Schock, 2015) or focused on its interaction with state tactics
(Shellman et al., 2013). It is therefore unclear if protester violence decreases participation, less
participation causes protesters to result to violence, or a smaller movements results from another
feature. By developing a logic for protester violence and individual participation, we directly link

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these two and explain how the former should affect the latter’s fluctuation.

State Violence

While the negative relationship between protester violence and movement success is a regular
finding, the literature on state repression and protest has not found consistent effects. In Peru and
Sri Lanka, repression decreased subsequent protests (Moore, 2000). The same has been found in
West Germany (Koopmans, 1993), South Africa (Olzak et al., 2003), Iran in the short-term (Rasler,
1996), and the Middle East and North Africa during the Arab Spring (Steinert-Threlkeld, 2017).
On the other hand, repression may have increased protest in West Germany and Ireland (Francisco,
1996) and Iran with a six-week lag (Rasler, 1996), and many cross-national studies find repression
increases protest (Gurr and Moore, 1997; Davenport and Armstrong II, 2004; Francisco, 2004;
Hess and Martin, 2006). In can also increase protest based on the emotional reaction of individuals
connected to those targeted (Siegel, 2011; Pearlman, 2013). On the third hand, there is sometimes
no correlation between repression and protest levels (Gupta et al., 1993; Ritter, 2013; Ritter and
Conrad, 2016).
These contradictory findings are resolved by considering the timing of repression and the sever-
ity of it. When mobilization is the result of social movement organizations’ planning, repression
focusing on those organizations should decrease protest size (Sullivan, 2016). This preemptive
repression attacks the infrastructure of protests, making it harder for them to occur, much less grow
(Danneman and Ritter, 2013; Sutton et al., 2014). This line of reasoning then argues that repression
of protests as they occur leads to backlash (Sullivan, 2016). Repression of protests as they occur,
commonly called protest policing (Della Porta and Reiter, 1998; Davenport and Soule, 2009; Earl
et al., 2013), leads to the differential effects discussed earlier.
Light repression will generate backlash for two reasons. First, they may signal that the cost of
protesting is lower than bystanders believed. Now aware that protesting is a net positive, bystanders
join those already protesting. Second, repression can generate emotions such as anger, joy, or
pride. Acting on these emotions provides intrinsic benefit to the former bystander, regardless of
instrumental calculations (Pearlman, 2013). Incorporating emotions into theories does not require

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avoiding rationality assumptions, as protesting in anger at repression can be individually rational
(Siegel, 2011).
Severe repression, however, should lead to smaller protests, for similar reasons. Severe re-
pression may signal that state actors are more resolved than protesters expected. Facing a higher
cost to protest, protesters become bystanders. Severe repression also generates fear, sadness, and
shame, causing protesters to deactivate and bystanders to remain where they are (Pearlman, 2013).
This emotional effect has also received recent support in a series of lab-in-the-field experiments in
Zimbabwe (Young, 2019).2
For an earlier exposition of a similar argument, see Gurr (1970). For a formal derivation of
this relationship, see DeNardo (1985). Observational studies which distinguish types of repression
by the cost they impose also find that severe repression decreases mobilization (Muller, 1985;
Khawaja, 1993). In other words, the contradictory effects may be due more to measurement error
than theoretical inconsistencies. Since it appears that apparently contradictory effects of repression
are resolved by stipulating the severity of repression, conditional on observing protest, we expect
that:

H2: There is an n-shaped relationship between between state repression and the subsequent
size of a protest.

H2 should apply in democracies and autocracies. For example, the Occupy Wall Street move-
ment in the United States did not grow large until New York City police arrested over 700 partic-
ipants, in a manner many perceived as unjust, marching on the Brooklyn Bridge. The movement
waned six weeks later, in the middle of November 2011, once local police forcibly dismantled
protesters’ main encampment at Zuccotti Park and forbade them from spending the night (White,
2016). in a m This effect should occur in democracies and autocracies. In Egypt, the protests
starting on January 25th were met with initial state resistance and some casualties; 18 days later,
2Francisco (2004) finds that state massacres increase mobilization. This result is due to an expansive definition of
mobilization: the majority of the backlash events are substitutes for mobilization because they are harder to repress
(Moore, 2000). Our focus is on mobilized protesters, not all forms of mobilization.

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the Armed Forces forced President Hosni Mubarak to abdicate. Two years later, the Armed Forces
launched a coup against the elected president, Mohamed Morsi. Large pro-Morsi protests erupted
and continued for six weeks. The Armed Forces initial attempts to demobilize them caused them
to grow in size; morning massacres on August 14th at the two main encampments killed at least
1,000 protesters and injured even more (Shakir, 2014).
H2 at first appears inconsistent with the backlash hypothesis substantiated in Francisco (1995),
Francisco (1996), and Francisco (2004). It is not. That body of work argues against an “inverse-u"
relationship between state repression and protest. Instead, evidence of backlash is found: when
states engage in severe repression, the response is more collective action. That work, however,
broadens protest to include other forms of collective action such as strikes, building occupations,
or guerrilla action. Moreover, the substitution that does occur most often does not occur the day
immediately following the repression. In other words, when the state meets protesters with severe
repression, they initially reduce their protest; after some delay, they backlash by substituting away
from direct confrontation with the state.
The argument put forth in this subsection is that severe repression decreases protest. It does
not make a claim about whether other types of dissent increase. Works such as Francisco (1995),
Francisco (1996), and Francisco (2004) define backlash in a more encompassing method than we
do. This different definition is why they initially appear to have different expectations about, and
different results for, backlash. H2 is not inconsistent with that backlash hypothesis because it is
focused on a narrower window and action repertoire.

3 AUTOMATED CODING OF SOCIAL MEDIA IMAGES

To test the aforementioned hypotheses, we need to measure many variables, such as protester
age or gender. For this task, we turn to images shared with geolocated tweets, explanation of which
is provided in Sections 4 and S4. Since the target dataset is very large, we develop three automated
classifiers based on convolutional neural networks to automatically code the variables of interest:
one to identify protest images, a scene classifier to extract data (primarily about violence) from

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protest images, and a face classifier to generate cleavage and size information.3 Table 1 provides
an overview of the steps required in this pipeline, and the rest of this section provides a very brief
introduction. The rest of this section describes the two classifiers we developed and one already
existing one we used. For a high-level overview of how convolutional neural networks works, see
Section S1. For validation of the classifiers’ results, see Section S1.3 as well as Section 4.3.

Table 1: Protest Data Pipeline

Input Source Output

Steps
Collecting Images for Training Set
1. Image search Keywords Google 100,000 images
2. Train a protest image classifier Images from Step 1 Self Initial CNN
3. Protest images from Twitter corpus Model from Step 2 Twitter 40,764 images
Developing Protest and Scene Classifier
4. Manual annotation Images from Step 3 Amazon Mechanical 13 ground-truth
Turk labels
5. Train a CNN Training data from Step 4 Self Protest and scene
classifier
Face Attribute Classification
6. Face classification - (Kärkkäinen and Joo, Gender, age, and
2019) race estimates

3.1 Image Collection for Protest Classification by Weakly-supervised Learning

Step 1. As typically done in supervised machine learning, our approach in model development
begins with collecting training data: images and target classification labels. Images in a training
set should exhibit diverse visual traits of protest events and also include a range of negative (non-
protest) images such that the trained classifier generalizes well to unseen images. In addition, it is
desirable that the set also contains many difficult images, hard negatives, i.e. non-protest images
which look like protest scenes, to make the classifier more robust.
The efficiency of manual annotation to collect target labels is another important consideration.
For example, sampling general images and providing them to annotators would create a training set
of mostly non-protest images. This approach is not cost effective. Therefore, we take a combination
3The first two classifiers are in fact partially combined in implementation such that one integrated classifier can
generate two sets of outputs, although they differ conceptually. This is called multi-task learning (Girshick, 2015). We
still discuss two classifiers separately because they are trained on different data and used in different steps.

11
of weakly-supervised and supervised learning. In weakly-supervised learning, the ground-truth
labels on the target variable are not directly available but can be inferred from other variables
(Bergamo and Torresani, 2010). For instance, we can use any online image search service to query
images with a particular keyword (e.g., “protest”), and this step will furnish a large quantity of
relevant images. While this sample set will contain some noisy data, it is still useful to train a rough
initial model which can be used to fetch better samples. These samples can be manually annotated
as in typical supervised learning.
Specifically, we first collected about 10,000 protest images from Google Image Search by using
manually selected keywords such as “protest,” “riot,” “Black Lives Matter,” “Venezuela Protest,”
“Hong Kong protest” and many others, as well 90,000 non-protest, hard-negative images by using
keywords including “concert,” “stadium,” or “airport crowd.” These negative examples are called
hard-negatives because they look similar to protest images (e.g., crowded), and classifiers can easily
misassign their labels. Since these images are simply outputs of search queries, their assigned labels
are not accurate. For example, the query of “protest” may return a few photographs of politicians.
However, we did not verify the correct classification labels of these images because the main
purpose of this first step is to train a rough classifier with the assumption that the majority of labels
are still correct.
Step 2. Using these data, we trained a convolutional neural network (CNN) whose only
output denotes whether an image captures a protest event or not. We then applied this classifier to
geolocated images from Twitter and obtained the classification scores. Each score can be considered
as the confidence about the output, the probability of the input image containing protesters. Section
S1.1 provides detail of how CNNs work and the specific architecture of this paper’s, and Joo and
Steinert-Threlkeld (2018) provides a detailed explanation of their relevance to political science.4
Step 3. Twitter provides tweets in real time through its streaming application programming
interface (API). Since late 2013, one of the authors has used this interface to collect tweets with
longitude and latitude coordinates. Because tweets with GPS coordinates represent 2%-3% of
4See as well (Cantu) for an application of this methodology to vote fraud detection.

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all tweets and Twitter delivers tweets matching a request’s parameters up to a 1% ceiling, we
receive one-third to one-half all of tweets with precise location information (Morstatter et al., 2013;
Leetaru, 2014).5 We have collected these tweets in real-time, approximately five million per day,
since August 26, 2013. For more information on working with Twitter data, see Steinert-Threlkeld
(2018).
We then query the stored tweets to extract those from countries and days of interest. These
tweets could be used for text or social network analysis, but we further select only those tweets that
contain images. Twitter provides a field in each tweet called media_url and a flag indicating if
that link is for an image. If a downloaded tweet contains an image, we retrieve it. These images
form the raw material from which we generate our protest data.
We apply the protest classifier to images from periods and countries during which protest
occurred. These periods, shown in Table 2, generated 42,579,188 tweets containing 4,456,981
images. The classifier is applied to all 5.48 million plus the 100,000 from Google, and all images
with a classification score less than .6 are dropped as they are most likely easy negatives, i.e., non-
protest images. The remaining 115,060 potential protest images were then stratified based on their
classification scores and sampled to ensure that the chosen images capture diverse visual features,
i.e., to avoid redundant inclusion of very similar images in the dataset. This process resulted in
40,764 images that form our training set; the training set contains geolocated images from Twitter
and images from Google.

3.2 Protest and Scene Classification

Step 4. Amazon Mechanical Turk provided the labor to manually annotate these 40,764 images.
We asked the workers to identify the features detailed in Table A8.
Figure A1 provides examples of our AMT annotation pages. In the first task, each annotator
was presented with an image and asked to judge if the image captures a protest. We assigned two
workers to each image and if the two workers did not agree, the image was sent to a third judge for
5For example, requesting tweets with the keyword “Microsoft" will return every tweet with that word, assuming
fewer than 1% of all tweets are about Microsoft. If, however, 2% of all tweets contain that word, then Twitter will
.01
return all tweets containing that keyword until the 1% ceiling is reached. .02 = .5, and the same calculation is how we
conclude that our corpus contains one-third to one-half of all tweets with GPS coordinates.

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a final verification. 11,659 of the training images contain a protest. Similarly, in the second task,
annotators label the attributes listed in Table A8 that are not related to faces or violence, such as
“police”, “fire”, “children”, “flag”, and so on.
As violence is a subjective and continuous variable, we used pairwise comparison annotation
to generate an estimate of the perceived violence in an image. Among the 11,659 protest images,
we randomly sampled image pairs such that each image is paired ten times. Therefore the number
of pairs to be annotated was 58,295 (11, 659 × 10 ÷ 2). We then assigned ten workers for each pair
and asked them to select which image looks more violent than the other. To assign the continuous
violence score to each image, we use the Bradley-Terry model (Bradley and Terry, 1952) and
scaled the scores to the range of [0, 1]. Such a pairwise comparison method usually requires
more annotations but can produce more reliable and consistent ratings for subjective assessment of
photographs (Kovashka et al., 2012; Joo et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2016). The resulting estimate for
violence is therefore better conceived of as perceived violence.
Step 5. With 40,764 annotated images, we train a CNN which produces outputs for twelve
variables. We used 80% of the images as the training set and the rest as the validation set. For the
labels that are not face or violence related, we use a binary cross entropy (BCE) loss:

N
1 X
L BCE (p, y) = − [yn log(pn ) + (1 − yn ) log(1 − pn )] (1)
N n=1

where p is the probability predicted by the model (CNN output for the attribute), y is the ground
truth binary label (0 or 1), and N is number of images. pn and yn are the prediction and label for
the nth image, respectively.
For protester and state violence, a continuous variable, we use mean squared error (MSE) loss:

N
1 X
L M SE (p, y) = − [(yn − pn ) 2 ] (2)
N n=1

where p is the model prediction, y is the ground truth value, and N is number of images. These
are standard loss functions that are typically used in training CNNs. Note that state-violence

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and protester-violence are binary attributes and thus trained with a BCE loss in Eq. 1. Violence
measures the degree of violence on a continuous scale, and state- and protester-violence identify
the type of violence and are treated as binary variables. We use stochastic gradient descent with
backpropagation to train the model. For more technical details in model training, see Won et al.
(2017).

3.3 Face Classification

Step 6. We use the FairFace model developed by Kärkkäinen and Joo (2019) to classify gender,
race, and age of people in images. This new model is preferred over current leading models, such as
FaceNet (Schroff et al., 2015) or Face++, because it better captures race, gender, and age. Existing
public face datasets and commercial APIs have been criticized for their unbalanced representation
of race, as the vast majority of their face images are from people of white ethnicity (more than
80%). This results in inferior classification accuracy, especially on non-white people (Buolamwini
and Gebru, 2018). Moreover, the FairFace model is trained on a large corpus of images of varying
resolution, perspective, and lighting, the YFCC100M dataset (Thomee et al., 2016). This dataset
is in contrast to other datasets whose images tend to be high quality, well-lit, and from the same
perspective (Liu et al., 2015).
Kärkkäinen and Joo (2019) samples 102,218 of the 100 million YFCC100m images, with an
explicit focus on balancing users across seven racial categories. In contrast, Liu et al. (2015) uses
only three. Many other face models use skin color, but skin color is sensitive to lighting conditions.
In addition, there is no other large-scale face dataset or model offers the racial category of Latino,
which is critical in our study. On an external validation test, the model significantly outperforms
models trained on other large-scale datasets in gender, age, and race classification.
Figure A3 shows an image from South Korea from our Twitter corpus with the face classifier
applied.

4 RESEARCH DESIGN

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4.1 Data

We initially attempted to download all images from tweets during protest periods across the
world since September 1, 2013, when our data collection started. The quantity of these images
overwhelmed our bandwidth and storage capacity. Instead, we identified five protest periods from
polities with diverse population, income, and institutional characteristics. These polities are Hong
Kong, Pakistan, South Korea, Spain, and Venezuela. The primary criteria is to construct a sample
from different types of regimes, which we measure with the Polity4 score. Hong Kong, as a part of
China, has a score of -7; Venezuela, 4, Pakistan, 7, South Korea, 8, and Spain 10. We also consulted
the Varieties of Democracy dataset to ensure these countries contain different media environments
(e_v2xme_altinf_5C) and civil society freedom (e_v2xcs_ccsi_5C) (Coppedge et al., 2019).
Table 2 details the cities we are able to include, the issues driving protest, and the density of
protest images per city. For each period, we searched from one week prior to the first reported protest
and one week after the last one. This process identifies 42,579,188 tweets containing 4,456,981
images. To determine which to keep, we chose the lowest threshold that would maximize recall
with a precision of .85. Figure A2 shows this threshold is .849, and recall is .22. This process
results in 26,142 images, about one-fifth of all protest images and 85% of them are of protest.
We then aggregate tweets to their city of origin and the day they were created. Cities are kept for
1
analysis when at least 7 of their days contain a protest image. Table 2 shows these 24 cities, which
account for 6,303 protest images. (Most images do not have a location resolution more precise than
the country.) These 6,303 protest images spread across 4,401 city days in Hong Kong, Pakistan,
Spain (Catalonia only), South Korea, and Venezuela are the input for the subsequent models. 1,467
of these city days contain a protest photo, so we treat the missing dates as true zeroes. A robustness
check shows that this interpolation does not change results.

4.2 Bias

Using social media data frequently raises concerns about selection bias (Tufekci, 2014). If
bias exists, it would come from accounts sharing images from protest activity not representative of
overall protest activity. We expect that Twitter users are not representative samples of their respective

16
 Table 2: Protest Periods

City Country Start End Issue Protest Images/Day Protest Images/Day

if >0
1 Central Hong Kong 2014.09.18 2014.12.23 China reforms 1.96 5.00
2 Kowloon Hong Kong 2014.09.18 2014.12.23 China reforms 1.29 2.92
3 Lahore Pakistan 2017.11.07 2017.11.23 Blasphemy .18 1
4 Kimhae South Korea 2016.10.20 2017.03.14 Anti-incumbency .47 1.92
5 Seoul South Korea 2016.10.20 2017.03.14 Anti-incumbency 2.40 3.76
6 Citutat Vella Spain 2017.09.01 2017.12.31 Secession .94 4.95
7 Barcelona Spain 2017.09.01 2017.12.31 Secession 3.07 11.60
8 Girona Spain 2017.09.01 2017.12.31 Secession 1.10 3.26
9 Granera Spain 2017.09.01 2017.12.31 Secession .62 2.33
10 Granollers Spain 2017.09.01 2017.12.31 Secession .23 1.25
11 Lleida Spain 2017.09.01 2017.12.31 Secession .42 1.88
12 Mataro Spain 2017.09.01 2017.12.31 Secession .51 2.33
17

13 Reus Spain 2017.09.01 2017.12.31 Secession .35 1.68

14 Sabadell Spain 2017.09.01 2017.12.31 Secession .96 2.66
15 St. Cugat d. Valles Spain 2017.09.01 2017.12.31 Secession .31 2.06
16 St. Feliu d. Pallerols Spain 2017.09.01 2017.12.31 Secession .61 2.19
17 St. Salvador d. Guardiola Spain 2017.09.01 2017.12.31 Secession .48 2.15
18 Tarragona Spain 2017.09.01 2017.12.31 Secession .57 1.94
19 Terrassa Spain 2017.09.01 2017.12.31 Secession .57 2.22
20 Boca del Rio Venezuela 2014.03.27 12.17.2017 Anti-Maduro .26 1.34
21 Caracas Venezuela 2014.03.27 12.17.2017 Anti-Maduro 4.82 7.63
22 Caucagua Venezuela 2014.03.27 12.17.2017 Anti-Maduro .53 1.72
23 Maracaibo Venezuela 2014.03.27 12.17.2017 Anti-Maduro .39 1.49
24 Valencia Venezuela 2014.03.27 12.17.2017 Anti-Maduro .41 1.62
countries, but we do not think the protest images they share not representative. Moreover, if the
protest images are biased, structural features of the data generating process should make them less
biased than any other cross-national data source. Space constraints limit us from substantiating
these assertions here; see Section S2 for that substantiation.
In addition, three robustness checks presented in Section 5.2 for bias. First, we drop all tweets
from “verified" accounts, which are accounts belonging to prominent individuals or organizations
that Twitter has verified belong to those people or groups. Assuming they would have the most
incentive to filter what they publish, removing them removes a potential source of bias. Second,
we only look at tweets from accounts between the 25th -75th percentile of their country’s follower
distribution. Accounts below this range are likely to be bots or accounts which use Twitter
sporadically, while accounts above this range are more likely to be strategic with their posts. Third,
we remove tweets not in the lingua franca of their country, under the assumption that those are
aimed at international audiences and so are more likely to represent a protest differently than tweets
in the main language (Bruns et al., 2013).

4.3 Operationalization

The dependent variable is Log10 (Protest Size)i,t , the logarithm of the sum of the number of
faces in all protest photos from city i on day t. Other studies have found that activity on Twitter
correlates with verified estimates of crowd size for airports, stadiums, and protests (Botta et al.,
2015). Those estimates require either more data than were available to us or use text analysis
to identify protesters. Text analysis does not scale as easily as image analysis because it requires
domain expertise, so counting faces is preferred. For a verification of Log10 (Protest Size)i,t against
protest size as recorded from cell phone location records and newspapers, see Sobolev et al. (2019).
Figure 1 shows that this approach correlates with the size of protests in Russia and South Korea,
as reported in newspapers (Russia) or by activists and the police (South Korea).6, 7. Small protests
reported in other sources corresponds closely with, and without bias to the size of the protest, as
6Wikipedia provides the three sets of estimates.
7The Russian protests refer to anti-corruption ones started by Alexei Navalny in March 2017. This paper does not
study them because they primarily took place on one day.

18
what Log10 (Protest Size)i,t estimates.
Figure 2 shows how the protest size varies over time in Barcelona, Seoul, Caracas, and Hong
Kong, with important events marked. There are clear spikes that correspond to major events.

Figure 1: Verifying Protest Size, Cross-section

(a) Russia (b) South Korea

The violence variables to test Hypothesis 1 are Perceived Protester Violencei,t−1 , Perceived
State Violencei,t−1 , Policei,t−1 , and Firei,t−1 . The violence measures are the average of the classifier
estimate for all protest photos per city-day. The police and fire variables are the sum of images
containing a police officer or fire, respectively, based on the thresholds identified in Table A9.
We describe the violence variables as “perceived" for three reasons. First, the true amount of
violence is unknown because violence is not a physical entity directly measurable, like temperature
or pressure. Second, the images people share may be strategically chosen. This possible selection
effect is true of any event data that relies on secondary sources, which is to say almost all event
data. For a longer discussion of bias that these measures may introduce, see Section 4.2. Third,
the main analysis does not deduplicate images, meaning images which are shared often will have a
greater impact on people’s decision making process than those only tweeted once. Deduplicating

19
 Figure 2: Verifying Protest Size, Time Series

(a) Barcelona (b) Seoul

(c) Caracas (d) Hong Kong

20
images to more closely approximate the “true" violence at events does not change results, as Table
7 shows.
Figure 3 shows the mean state violence recorded in protest photos for the same four cities. The
cross-city trends match expectations: Caracas and Hong Kong show the most frequent repression
activity, followed by Seoul and Barcelona. Spanish police, which are federal, did often employ
violence, to the surprise of the international community.
A society with greater gender equality is more likely to see nonviolent than violent action
(McCammon et al., 2001; Schaftenaar, 2017), and the same is true at the movement level (Asal
et al., 2013). Even when excluded from high-level leadership positions, women can play important
roles as bridges between that level and the broader movement (Robnett, 1996). Women were also
integral actors, as activists and participants, during the Arab Spring, a dynamic often overlooked in
accounts of those events (Newsom and Lengel, 2012; Rizzo et al., 2012). The percent of protesters
who are male, Male Percent i,t−1 , is therefore a variable for which we control.
Students in democracies and autocracies often spearhead mass protests (Zhao, 1998; Gonzalez,
2019). The young are more likely to lack jobs, have little wealth to lose, and view protest
participation as its own end. These effects are amplified when there are many of them, a phenomenon
commonly called the “youth bulge" (Urdal, 2006). Knowing that youth often make protests
more intense (Hollander and Byun, 2015), states with large youth populations engage in more
preventative repression (Nordås and Davenport, 2013). The percent of participants aged 20-29,
Y oung Adult Percent i,t−1 , is therefore a variable for which we control.
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of these variables.

4.4 Model

In addition to the operationalizations detailed in the previous section, we include two control
variables. T weetsi,t−1 is the number of protest images per country-day and proxies for the amount
of information available to protesters. This variable captures any effect general knowledge about
a protest will have on protest size (Little, 2015). We also include a lagged dependent variable to
account for autocorrelation as well as any regression to the mean.

21
 Figure 3: State Violence Time Series

(a) Barcelona (b) Seoul

(c) Caracas (d) Hong Kong

22
 Table 3: Summary Statistics

Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.

Protest Sizei,t 4,401 2.42 14.87 0 627
Perceived Protester Violencei,t−1 4,376 0.03 0.12 0.00 1.00
Perceived State Violencei,t−1 4,376 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.94
Policei,t−1 4,376 0.001 0.04 0.00 1.00
Firei,t−1 4,376 0.07 0.41 0.00 7.00
Male Percenti,t−1 4,376 0.03 0.11 0.00 1.00
Young Adult Percenti,t−1 4,376 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00

We build three models. The first uses only covariates that measure violence, testing H1. The
second focuses on the demographic control variables. The final model combine the three sets of
variables. All independent variables are lagged one day. All models include city fixed effects
and city-clustered standard errors, though we run robustness checks with different fixed effects and
clustering.
To facilitate interpretation, ordinary least squares is the estimator. Since the dependent variable
is a logarithm, the interpretation of a coefficient is the percent change in protest size as the result
of a one unit increase in the independent variable. Since Perceived Protester Violencei,t−1 and
Perceived State Violencei,t−1 range from 0 to 1, their coefficient is the percent change in protest size
when moving from no to maximal violence. Finally, to guard against overfitting, we use five-fold
cross-validation: each model is run on five different subsamples of the data and the results are
averaged.

5 RESULTS

5.1 Main Results

Our models most strongly confirm the expectations for protester and state violence. Racial
diversity has a signalling effect while gender diversity supports critical mass interpretations.
When protesters engage in violence, subsequent protest is smaller. Low amounts of state
violence correlate with larger subsequent protests, though severe enough violence will decrease the
size of protests. In addition, the more photos that show fire or police at protest, the more people

23
mobilize. Protester violence has a much smaller slope than either state violence variable, with the
largest effect occurring when states engage in high levels of violence.
We find no statistically significant correlation between racial or gender diversity and subsequent
protest size. In other models, shown soon in the robustness section and in the Supplementary
Materials, gender diversity attains statistical significance with a negative slope and racial diversity
does the same in the opposite direction.

Table 4: Main Result

DV: Log10 (Sum o f Faces)i,t

Violence Demographics Combined
(1) (2) (3)
Perceived Prtstr. Violencei,t−1 −.1824∗∗∗ −.1818∗∗∗
(.0714) (.0720)
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 1.2850∗∗∗ 1.3134∗∗∗
(.3152) (.3343)
2
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 −2.0956∗∗∗ −2.1375∗∗∗
(.3586) (.3586)
Policei,t−1 .7566∗ .7607∗
(.4568) (.4553)
Firei,t−1 .1099∗∗∗ .1065∗∗∗
(.0203) (.0202)
Male Percenti,t−1 −.2242∗∗ −.2127∗∗
(.0925) (.1014)
Young Adulti,t−1 .1029 .0698
(.1209) (.1007)
Tweetsi,t−1 .0093∗∗∗ .0106∗∗∗ .0090∗∗∗
(.0034) (.0041) (.0033)
DVi,t−1 .1753∗∗∗ .2341∗∗∗ .2013∗∗∗
(.0722) (.0848) (.0778)
Intercept .1227∗∗∗ .1271∗∗∗ .1239∗∗∗
(.0158) (.0159) (.0157)
N 4,376 4,376 4,376
City FE Y Y Y
Cluster SE Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 .2435 .2278 .2461
∗p < .1; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗∗∗ p < .01
City-clustered standard errors shown in parentheses.

24
 Figure 4 shows marginal effects of protester and state violence. From values of [0-3), state
violence increases protest, reaching a maximum at .3. At that amount of violence, protest size the
next day is 137% higher than if there was no state violence. Moreover, state repression usually
leads to larger protests: only 77 of 1,467 city-days of protest contain average state violence greater
than .3. Protester violence, on the other hand, monotonically correlates with smaller protest. The
change, however, is much smaller than for state violence: moving from no protester violence to
its mean (.035) decreases protest size by just over 2%, while the difference between state violence
and its mean is an increase of just over 17%. A one standard deviation increase of state violence
from 0 increases protests size by approximately 63%; a one standard deviation increase in protester
violence from the same point decreases protest size by just over 12%.

Figure 4: Marginal Effects

100

100
50
Percent Change of Protest Sizei,t

Percent Change of Protest Sizei,t

50
0

0
−50

−50
−100

−100

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

Protester Violencei,t−1 State Violencei,t−1

(a) Protester Violence (b) State Violence

25
5.2 Robustness Checks

Two primary issues could drive the state violence effect. (The following tests are performed for
protester violence, and the Supplementary Materials shows those results.) First, images with more
violence could contain fewer faces, causing the regression results to be driven by measurement
problems and not a true relationship. Figure 5 shows that no relationship exists between the
violence an image records and the number of faces contained therein. Second, the n-shaped
relationship between state violence and the next day’s protest size could be an artifact of fitting
a parametric model with a square term. Figure 6 shows the results of tests demonstrating this
persistence. Whether fitting a local average of the relationship between Perceived State Violencei,t−1
and Log10 (Sum o f Faces)i,t or a spline with 50 knots, binning Perceived State Violencei,t−1 into ten
evenly spaced groups, or regressing Perceived State Violencei,t−1 on partial residuals, the n-shaped
relationship between state violence and subsequent protest size holds.

Figure 5: State Violence Does Not Cause Fewer Faces per Photo

Note: No correlation exists between state violence in an image and the number of faces. A linear fit suggests a slight
positive relationship, and restricting the relationship to images with fewer than ten faces does not change results.

In addition, a vector autoregression (VAR) may better capture complex temporal dynamics
(Zeitzoff, 2011), so Model 3 of Table 4 was replicated with a VAR, using 41 lags. Figure 7 shows

26
 Figure 6: State Violence Results Remain in Flexible Operationalizations

(a) LOESS (Span = .2) (b) Spline, 50 Knots

100
50
Percent Change of Protest Sizei,t

0
−50
−100

0 2 4 6 8 10

State Violence Bucketi,t−1

(c) Binned Marginal Effects (d) LOESS on Partial Residuals

Note: The n-shaped relationship holds in a non-parametric relationship (a, b). Generating fixed effects for state
violence in bins of width of .1 finds the same relationship (c). Regressing state violence on the partial residuals of
Model 3 from Table 4.

the resulting impulse response plot: the curvilinear relationship holds.

Three sets of robustness checks confirms the results in Table 4. The first set introduces additional
fixed effects and does not cluster standard errors. The second set subsets the raw data to rule out
strategic behavior of Twitter users driving the results. The third set removes bots and duplicate
images to confirm that results are not due to malfeasance or virality. In all presented results, the
first model is the full model from Table 4.

27
 Figure 7: Vector Auto Regression, Log10 (Sum o f Faces)i,t Response to State Violence

(a) Perceived Stt. Violencei, t−1 2

(b) Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1
Note: Impulse response plots using Model 3 from Table 4 shows no change in interpretation of the state violence
correlation. 41 lags are included, and results do not change if one or seven lags are used instead. The x-axis is the
number of days after the state violence.

Table 5 shows that the main findings are robust to alternate model specifications. A rule of
thumb is to not cluster standard errors when there are fewer than 30, and we have 23 (Cameron
et al., 2008; King and Roberts, 2015). Model 2 therefore does not cluster standard errors. Without
clustering standard errors, Gender Diver sit yi,t−1 and Race Diver sit yi,t−1 are statistically signif-
icant. Model 3 includes a fixed effect for Saturdays and Sundays, the most popular protest days.
Gender Diver sit yi,t−1 is once again statistically significant, while Race Diver sit yi,t−1 is not.
Model 4 includes a day of week fixed effect, since some countries (primarily Venezuela and Pak-
istan) have larger protests outside of the weekend; results match Models 2 and 3. In case unobserved
country heterogeneity drives results, we include country fixed effects. Now, Gender Diver sit yi,t−1
just barely loses statistical significance while Race Diver sit yi,t−1 just barely obtains it. In none of
the extra checks does inference about perceived protester or state violence change.
The next set of robustness checks verify that neither strategic behavior nor data pollution drive
the results. Table 6 uses different subsets of the raw data to attempt to rule out strategic behavior

28
 Table 5: Robust to Alternate Specifications

DV: Log10 (Sum o f Faces)i,t

Original Model Original Model Weekend FE Day-of-week FE Country FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Perceived Prtstr. Violencei,t−1 −.1818∗∗ −.1818∗∗∗ −.1824∗∗ −.1843∗∗ −.1750∗∗
(.0800) (.0553) (.0802) (.0803) (.0786)
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 1.3134∗∗∗ 1.3134∗∗∗ 1.3169∗∗∗ 1.3305∗∗∗ 1.4196∗∗∗
(.3654) (.2160) (.3650) (.3655) (.3655)
2
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 −2.1375∗∗∗ −2.1375∗∗∗ −2.1387∗∗∗ −2.1582∗∗∗ −2.3065∗∗∗
(.6498) (.3586) (.6482) (.6492) (.6388)
Policei,t−1 .7607∗ .7607∗∗∗ .7666∗ .7710∗ .7778∗
(.4687) (.1488) (.4691) (.4676) (.4560)
Firei,t−1 .1065∗∗∗ .1065∗∗∗ .1071∗∗∗ .1073∗∗∗ .1161∗∗∗
(.0370) (.0159) (.0369) (.0369) (.0375)
Male Percenti,t−1 −.2127∗∗∗ −.2127∗∗∗ −.2114∗∗∗ −.2097∗∗∗ −.2276∗∗∗
(.0620) (.0522) (.0620) (.0619) (.0611)
Young Adult Percenti,t−1 .0698 .0698 .0684 .0684 .0484
(.0903) (.0676) (.0908) (.0904) (.0904)
Tweetsi,t−1 .0090∗∗∗ .0090∗∗∗ .0090∗∗∗ .0090∗∗∗ .0088∗∗∗
(.0032) (.0009) (.0032) (.0032) (.0033)
DVi,t−1 .2013∗∗∗ .2013∗∗∗ .2009∗∗∗ .2010∗∗∗ .2462∗∗∗
(.0346) (.0190) (.0345) (.0345) (.0345)
Intercept .1239∗∗∗ .1239∗∗∗ .1170∗∗∗ .1259∗∗∗ .0861∗∗∗
(.0186) (.0157) (.0185) (.0216) (.0088)
N 4,376 4,376 4,376 4,376 4,376
Adjusted R2 .2461 .2461 .2468 .2468 .2250
City FE Y Y Y Y N
Weekend FE N N Y N N
Weekday FE N N N Y N
Clustered SE Y N Y Y Y
∗p < .1; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗∗∗ p < .01
City-clustered standard errors shown in parentheses for Models 1, 3, and 4. Model 5 uses country-clustered standard errors.

of individuals driving the results. The patterns hold.

One source of bias in newspaper based event data is that newspapers tailor their reporting for
their intended audience. The same could be true of Twitter users, and it is more likely to be true
the more likely they are to have an audience. Model 2 shows the result when keeping only tweets
from accounts that fall within the 25th -75th percentile of their country’s follower distribution. The
coefficient on Gender Diver sit yi,t−1 remains the same, but it is not statistically significant because
of a smaller standard error. Other results are not susceptible to keeping users based on their follower
count. Model 3 restricts the sample to only users who Twitter has not verified; for public figures
such as celebrities or politicians (and even some academics), Twitter verifies that the account

29
actually belongs to the person it purports to. Since these users should be more likely to engage
with Twitter strategically, we drop their tweets from analysis. This process takes away 447 tweets
and 5 city-days, which is enough to reduce the coefficient of Policei,t−1 below traditional thresholds
of statistical significance; all other results match the full model.
The results when keeping tweets only in a country’s lingua franca, shown in Model 4 of Table
6, are particularly interesting. Many Twitter users change their language depending on political
context (Metzger et al., 2015), often as a method of attracting foreign audiences (Bruns et al.,
2013). For the violence and demographic variables except Race Diver sit yi,t−1 , the coefficients are
much larger than the original model. In addition to violence now being estimated to have a stronger
effect, Gender Diver sit yi,t−1 is 80% larger and its standard error is halved, making it statistically
significant. Race Diver sit yi,t−1 ’s coefficient decreases, but its standard error decreases by even
more, making it statistically significant as well. The most noticeable change is to Age Diver sit yi,t−1 ,
whose point estimate triples while its standard error remains the same. In only two other models,
shown in the Supplementary Materials, is this variable statistically significant. Overall, restricting
by language produces a model with a 22.5% better fit than the original. This better fit, larger
coefficients, and more precise estimates of those coefficients suggests that language use may be one
of the most common ways users behave strategically on social media.
Table 7 presents two attempts to ensure that results are not driven by quirks in the data generation
process. The prevalence of bots - social media accounts controlled by computer code - has raised
concerns about the veracity of studies relying on social media data (Ferrara and Bessi, 2016).
Though other work has found few bots in geolocated tweets (Driscoll and Steinert-Threlkeld,
2018), we nonetheless submit every user to the Botometer service and remove tweets with a
complete automation probability ≥ .4, the threshold which has been found to produce the most
accurate classification of bots (Varol et al., 2017). Model 2 presents these results, and findings do
not change. See Table A10 in the Supplementary Materials for the percent of accounts and tweets
that are from bots, by country; no more than 6.5% of tweets in any country are from bots.
To confirm that repetition of images do not drive results, we remove duplicate images. Models

30
 Table 6: Robust to Strategic Behavior

DV: Log10 (Sum o f Faces)i,t

Original Normal Users No Verified Accounts Country’s Language
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Perceived Prtstr. Violencei,t−1 −.1818∗∗∗ −.1625∗∗∗ −.1566∗∗ −.2083∗∗∗
(.0720) (.0430) (.0704) (.0469)
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 1.3134∗∗ 1.2504∗∗∗ 1.3440∗∗∗ 1.4791∗∗∗
(.3343) (.3208) (.3617) (.4645)
2
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 −2.1375∗∗∗ −2.0912∗∗∗ −2.1109∗∗∗ −2.4094∗∗∗
(.6498) (.5411) (.6142) (.8960)
Policei,t−1 .7607∗∗∗ .8584∗∗ .6376 .4828
(.4553) (.3708) (.3985) (.3106)
Firei,t−1 .1065∗∗∗ .0625∗ .0928∗∗∗ .0772∗∗∗
(.0202) (.0341) (.0203) (.0270)
Male Percenti,t−1 −.2127∗∗ −.0383 −.2014∗ −.0974
(.1014) (.0475) (.1065) (.1147)
Young Adult Percenti,t−1 .0698 .2068∗ .0678 .0451
(.1007) (.1063) (.1056) (.0723)
Tweetsi,t−1 .0090∗∗∗ .0151∗∗ .0120∗∗ .0256∗∗∗
(.0033) (.0060) (.0049) (.0044)
DVi,t−1 .2013∗∗∗ .1001∗∗∗ .1781∗∗ .1127
(.0778) (.0382) (.0772) (.0740)
Intercept .1239∗ .1283∗∗∗ .1164∗∗∗ .0699∗∗∗
(.0778) (.0156) (.0154) (.0138)
N 4,376 3,715 4,371 3,614
Adjusted R2 .2461 .1769 .2466 .2969
City FE Y Y Y Y
Cluster SE Y Y Y Y
∗p < .1; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗∗∗ p < .01

3 and 4 from Table 7 shows these results. While our data do not contain retweets because Twitter
does not assign coordinates to retweets, they do contain replies, and replies contain the image
of the original tweet. (Section S5.2 details this methodology, and Table A11 show the percent
of tweets per city that are duplicates.) This process removes 2,920 images from the periods in
question, and Model 3 presents the results. Results for the violence and demographic variables do
not change. Model 4 weights these data by the number of protest tweets per city-day. In this model,
the coefficients for the the perceived violence variable are up to twice as large as the original model,
though the coefficients for the demographic variables shrink.8 Model 4 also produces the best fit
of any model we build. The violence and demographic conclusions are not affected by bots or the
8Note as well that Race Diversityi, t−1 becomes negative, but with a small p-value, in the deduplicated models.

31
reproduction of images: our model’s original measurements do not appear to measure perception
as much as they do actual effects.

Table 7: Robust to Pollution

DV: Log10 (Sum o f Faces)i,t

Original No Bots Deduplicate Images Deduplcate Images,
Weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Perceived Prtstr. Violencei,t−1 −.1818∗∗∗ −.1730∗∗ −.1677∗ −.4081∗∗∗
(.0720) (.0684) (.0920) (.1505)
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 1.3134∗∗ 1.2763∗∗∗ 1.2655∗∗ 2.2843∗∗∗
(.3343) (.3309) (.5027) (.4746)
2
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 −2.1375∗∗∗ −2.0823∗∗∗ −2.0613∗∗ −4.0647∗∗∗
(.6498) (.5840) (.8878) (.8634)
Policei,t−1 .7607∗ .6513∗ .9480∗ 1.3947∗∗∗
(.4553) (.3825) (.5249) (.2182)
Firei,t−1 .1065∗∗∗ .0981∗∗∗ .0721 .0206
(.0202) (.0238) (.0610) (.0206)
Male Percenti,t−1 −.2127∗∗ −.1918∗ −.1408 −.2276∗∗
(.1014) (.0995) (.0886) (.0902)
Young Adult Percenti,t−1 .0698 .0731 .1297 .3327∗∗∗
(.1007) (.1060) (.1570) (.1118)
Tweetsi,t−1 .0090∗∗∗ .0123∗∗ .0173∗∗ .0066∗∗∗
(.0033) (.0049) (.0074) (.0008)
DVi,t−1 .2013∗∗∗ .1758∗∗ .1483∗ .1355∗∗∗
(.0778) (.0767) (.0838) (.0359)
Intercept .1239∗ .1196 .1335 .5063∗∗∗
(.0778) (.0156) (.0169) (.0586)
N 4,376 4,376 2,786 2,786
Adjusted R2 .2461 .2513 .1930 .4554
City FE Y Y Y Y
Cluster SE Y Y Y Y
∗p < .1; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗∗∗ p < .01

The Supplementary Materials present seven additional sets of robustness checks in Tables A12
through A18. The first set changes the operationalization of the dependent variable. The second
uses 15 lags of the dependent variable, as suggested by a partial autocorrelation plot. The third
set uses count models, and the fourth weights city-days by their number of tweets. The fifth set
increases the probability that tweets are from a protest by discarding those not from mobile devices
or from non-protest hours. The sixth runs the full model separately by country, and the seventh
investigates how Policei,t−1 and Firei,t−1 correlate with the perceived violence measures.

6 DISCUSSION

32
6.1 Images and Measurement

Emphasizing the severity of repression during protest policing is not new (Muller, 1985;
Khawaja, 1993); measuring repression as a continuous variable is. For example, the Social Conflict
Analysis Database (SCAD), Urban Social Disorder, and Armed Conflict Locations and Event Data
(ACLED) dataset record repression during an event as occurring or not (Raleigh et al., 2010;
Salehyan et al., 2012; Urdal and Hoelscher, 2012). Repression is sometimes coded as ordinal or
nominal as well (Goldstein, 1992; Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008; Clark and Regan, 2016), and
machine-coded event data like the Integrated Conflict Early Warning System use this approach
(Gerner et al., 2002; Boschee et al., 2015).
As far as we are aware, all previous approaches generate nominal or ordinal repression variables
from primary or secondary sources. This process, completely understandable given how violence
is recorded in texts, creates an implicit mapping of a latent quantity onto discrete categories. This
mapping is problematic because each researcher has its own mental model, so different studies
are likely to map the same latent quantity onto different discrete categories (values of the ordinal
variable). Measuring repression on a continuous scale may therefore provide a clearer understanding
of how it affects protest dynamics. It also facilitates the inclusion and interpretation of interaction
terms for violence, allowing us to test for nonlinear effects (Moore, 1998; Shellman et al., 2013).
The results presented here suggest that measuring violence as a continuous variable may help
resolve the repression-dissent puzzle. Mapping violence into discrete bins may be especially
pernicious with panel data, explaining why those studies tend to find no correlation between
repression and protest. We avoid this pitfall by presenting human coders with over 10,000 pairs
of images to label and training a deep learning computer vision model on this training set; the
model outputs continuous estimates of protester and state violence, mitigating concerns that a
result for repression or protester violence is due to researcher effects. The results presented here
are continuous measurements based on primary sources.
Using images generated from social media also allows for more precise temporal measurement.
A difficulty testing protest dynamics is that action occurs on a timescale difficult to measure with

33
newspaper reports, the primary source of data for these types of studies (Earl et al., 2004). Most
research has therefore analyzed protest dynamics with coarse time scales such as weekly (Lohmann,
1994a; Rasler, 1996) or, usually in the case of surveys, without a time component (Opp and Gern,
1993; Beissinger, 2013). Recent research takes advantage of new datasets, including social media
data, to measure protest dynamics at a daily level (Larson et al., 2016; Ritter and Conrad, 2016;
Hsuan et al., 2017; Steinert-Threlkeld, 2017). Combining this high level of resolution with the
additional information that can be extracted from images has only been attempted twice before (Won
et al., 2017; Zhang and Pan, 2019), as far as we are aware, though there is work at scale analyzing
how the emotional content of images affects online mobilization (Casas and Webb Williams, 2018)
or how different news outlets portray Black Lives Matter protests (Torres, 2018).9

6.2 Ethics

The advances in scholarly understanding that the combination of computer vision and social
media enable also raises serious ethical concerns. We briefly discuss some and point the reader to
(Joo and Steinert-Threlkeld, 2018) for a longer analysis.
Like any measurement, the results are only as good as the input data. Many off the shelf
computer vision programs reproduce racial biases, and the leading datasets used to train race
classifiers have relatively small corpuses of images (Grush, 2015; Lam et al., 2018). The model we
use, FairFace, is less biased than other ones, however, because its training data were constructed
on racially balanced images whose quality more closely resembles social media photographs than
previous datasets’.
Treating race as a distinct category around which people may organize is itself problematic.
We simply note that in many countries, race encapsulates a multitude of historic power imbalances.
While we do not mean to reify race, ignoring it would also do a disservice to its importance in
many countries’ politics.
Protesters may not be as anonymous as they think. Though these data are observational
and publicly available, individuals in photographs may not have consented to appear in those
9See Cowart et al. (2016) for an example of manual protest image analysis.

34
photographs. While true of any images of public spaces, the concern is heightened when individuals
are engaged in risky behavior. Authorities could monitor images shared on social media to identify
people who protested, much as some do with cell phone location data (Davenport, 2014).10 Foreign
governments and parts of the United States law enforcement already monitor faces in crowds
(Purdy, 2018; Shaban, 2018). This concern about facial recognition also means that individuals
who appear in photos but who did not take the photo may not realize they can be implicated in
protest.11 To prevent the identification of individuals in our data, we have chosen not to release the
tweet identification number or image URL for the raw data.

6.3 Lower Bounds

This paper’s findings are appealing because the precision and resolution of its measures allows
for deeper theoretical understanding of protest dynamics. Moreover, the precision of these results
should be considered a lower bound, as the number of protest images located to the city level is
quite small. Researchers can increase the number of images available, and therefore analyze more
events with more precision, using five tactics.
First, the easiest approach would be to accept a less rigorously defined measure of location,
users’ self-reported location. Twitter profiles contain a location field that individuals can populate
with any phrase, e.g. “Los Angeles, CA" or “A Server Somewhere". Approximately 75% of
Twitter users have information in this field, but only 8% of users (in the United States) have a string
1
that Google can resolve to a specific location (Mislove et al., 2011). (Globally, 3 of accounts have
location or profile information in English (Leetaru et al., 2013).) In the United States, approximately
3.4% of accounts enable GPS coordinates, so using the location field at least doubles the number
of images available (Sloan and Morgan, 2015). This increase will be more pronounced the less
frequently a country’s users geotag: only .3% and .9% of tweets in Korean and Arabic, respectively,
contain GPS coordinates (Sloan and Morgan, 2015).
Second, one could purchase tweets from a vendor or download past tweets of users who tweet
10The logic works in reverse. Shared protest images can be used to identify incriminating state behavior that would
otherwise be denied (Lim, 2013).
11The UCLA IRB approved this study. We emphasize again that we only use publicly available data.

35
from protest events.
Third, newspapers and television channels maintain Twitter accounts and share the same stories
there that are used in event datasets. While their accounts are not, in our experience, geolocated, it
is theoretically feasible to incorporate the articles they share into an event data generating pipeline.
Doing so would allow the researcher to determine the sensitivity of event records to source type,
more precisely measure bias from sources, and determine if events recorded from traditional media
have different effects than those from social media.
Two other approaches would move beyond Twitter to collect images. The fourth approach
should look to other online platforms, especially Instagram, to collect images. Instagram provides
much less data through its application programming interface than Twitter does, so one will have to
crawl it. Crawling is a more technically difficult procedure and is actively discouraged. Instagram
tends to be used for apolitical postings as well. Flickr has been used to track protests, but it is not
a widely used platform (Alanyali et al., 2016). The fifth approach would be to partner with a news
images provider, such as The Associated Press or Getty Images.

6.4 Conclusion

We have presented results on a relatively small number of protests, and future work should
increase the number of protests analyzed. Doing so will rely on luck, as protests will have to occur
in countries use Twitter, or other platforms, heavily. Developing infrastructure to collect more
tweets with images will decrease the role luck plays in directing research.
Because images contain more information than text, they hold much promise for the study of
phenomena of interest to political scientists. For generating event data, images hold particular
promise in measuring magnitude, both in terms of crowd size and severity of an event, as well as
reducing bias from newspaper data (Sobolev et al., 2019). For explanations of how these data can
contribute to subfields like political behavior, communication, or international relations, see Joo
and Steinert-Threlkeld (2018). The techniques for generating useful data are similar and different to
text-as-data approaches, and this paper demonstrates one area in which computer vision techniques
benefit political scientists. Future work should expand on the data and variables introduced in this

36
paper.

37
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 Supplementary Materials for

How Violence Affects Protests

APPENDIX S1. DETAIL

S1.1 Convolutional Neural Networks

We use convolutional neural networks (CNN) to identify and analyze protest images. A CNN
is a type of artificial neural network, a machine learning algorithm inspired by the human brain
(Rosenblatt, 1958), that has gained widespread adoption in the field of computer vision. It has
been successful in various applications including face recognition (Sun et al., 2014; Parkhi et al.,
2015; Baltrušaitis et al., 2016), object detection (Girshick et al., 2014; Ren et al., 2015; Redmon
et al., 2016), and self-driving cars (Huval et al., 2015; Bojarski et al., 2016; Xu et al., 2017). For
methodological detail on computer vision for political scientists, see Joo and Steinert-Threlkeld
(2018).
A CNN is a function whose outputs are computed through a series of sequential operations from
the input values. For example, in image classification, the input is an image (i.e., an array of color
intensities at pixels) and the output is the class that the image belongs to, e.g., an object category
such as "police" or "male". A CNN transforms the given input through many operations until it
reaches the final step which produces the output. Each operation is also called a layer, and a CNN
usually has multiple “convolutional” layers. A convolutional layer performs convolution, which
consists of an element-wise multiplication between pixel12 values and filter values (connection
strengths) and a summation over adjacent pixels: this essentially measures how well the appearance
of an input image matches the “template” that the model learned in training. A CNN, as well as other
artificial neural networks, is trained to minimize a loss function, a measure of difference between
the model prediction and ground truth label. This optimization is typically done by stochastic
gradient descent.
12A CNN contains many layers and the output of a layer becomes the input of the next layer. The input to the
first layer is the original input image’s pixel intensities. For non-first layers, their inputs are given from nodes on two
dimensional grid in the previous layer, not from the image pixels.

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 Each CNN is defined by its architecture – the structural configuration specifying the number
of layers, the order of their placement, and the types of non-linear transformations used. There
exist many different CNN architectures with different properties. The architecture of our model is a
“Residual Network” (ResNet) (He et al., 2016b) and has 50 convolutional layers. ResNet has been
used in many of the state-of-the-art computer vision applications such as object detection (Ren
et al., 2015) and human pose estimation (Güler et al., 2018). We use a ResNet model pre-trained
on ImageNet data and finetune it with our data.
This paper does not use tweet text because they do not measure violence, identity, or free riding
as precisely as images. Decades of construction of event data, via hand and computer coding, has
not been able to generate a measure of state or protester violence more refined than an ordinal
measure; images allow for violence to be measured as a continuous variable. Measuring cleavages
from text requires knowing the identity of accounts and would require orders of magnitude more
user data; this exercise would not produce time varying measures because they would be about
the account, not other protesters (Mislove et al., 2011; Sloan et al., 2013). Event datasets that
measure cleavage spanning use newspaper text, which often does not report protester demographic
information, and so measures are fixed at the movement level (Heaney and Rojas, 2008; Kern, 2011;
Wilson et al., 2012; Fisher et al., 2017); images permit the measurement of the mass of protesters
and their daily change. Measuring free riding from tweet text would require building a classifier,
for each language in our dataset, for specific statements such as “I am not going to protest because
it will not make a difference"; images that can induce free riding are easier to identify than specific
tweets because visual language is universal (Graber, 1996).

50
S1.2 Classifier Calibration

For binary variables in our analysis, we need to transform continuous outputs from CNN to
binary values (0 or 1) by choosing a decision threshold such that we can determine if an image
contains the variable of interest. The optimal decision threshold needs to be chosen so that it can
balance good true positive and true negative rates, evaluated on the target data distribution (i.e., not
the distribution in our development set). To this end, we chose 3,000 protest images from additional
random samples from our Twitter pipeline and used Amazon Mechanical Turk to annotate them. We
then generated a precision-recall curve for each attribute and chose the threshold at the minimum
precision of .85.13 For each image and each attribute, our model therefore produces a probability
estimate (a real number) via the classifier as well as a binary output (0 or 1). Figure A2 shows
the precision-recall curve for each attribute, providing the threshold value for each. The twelve
attributes and their thresholds are shown in Table A9.

13One could also use another method such as F-measure to choose the optimal decision threshold. In our study, it is
more important to maintain the minimum precision (true positive rate) at a high point for every attribute, rather than
trying to detect more relevant images while making more mistakes.

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 Table A8: List of visual attributes.

Attribute Description Hypothesis Expectation

1. Protester Violence How violent protesters are. Violence (H1) −
2. State Violence How violent the state is. Violence (H1) +, −
3. Police Police or troops are present in the scene. Violence (H1) −
4. Fire There is fire or smoke in the scene. Violence (H1) −
5. Gender Is the face male or female? Cleavages (H2) +, −
6. Race Is the face White, Middle Eastern, East Cleavages (H2) +, −
Asian, Southeast Asian, Black, Indian, or
Latino?
7. Age 0-2, 3-9, 10-19, [...], 70 Cleavages (H2) +, −
8. Face Presence of a face. Protest size
9. Group 20 There are roughly more than 20 people in the Future: free riding
scene.
10. Group 100 There are roughly more than 100 people in the Future: free riding
scene.
## Children Children are in the scene. N/A N/A
## Shout One or more people shouting. N/A N/A
## Photo Protesters holding signs or a photograph of a N/A N/A
person (politicians or celebrities).
## Flag There are flags in the scene. N/A N/A
## Night It is at night. N/A N/A
## Sign Protesters holding a visual sign (on paper, panel, N/A N/A
or wood).
NB: Attributes without numbers could not be classified precisely enough to be included in regression models.
NB: Attributes in bold are generated using the face classifier.

Table A9: Attributes and Thresholds

Attribute Threshold
Protester Violence .021
State Violence .01
Police .937
Fire .37
Child .15
Small Group .725
Large Group .509
Shout .355
Photo .815
Flag .187
Night .359
Sign .744

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Figure A1: Examples of Our Annotation Interface (in Amazon Mechanical Turk)

53
Figure A2: Precision-Recall Curves For Binary Attributes. AP stands for average precision, which
is the standard accuracy measure for binary classification. AP is also equal to the area under the
precision-recall curve.

54
Figure A3: Example Results of Our Face Model

55
S1.3 Evaluating the CNN

Figure A4 shows the model performance measured on the validation set. The Receiver-Operator
Curve (ROC) documents the relationship between false-positive and true-positives, with a higher
area-under-curve (AUC) corresponding to a better accuracy. Visually, the closer the curve is to the
upper-left corner, the better the classifier for that label.
Figure A5 shows a scatterplot of the classifier’s output for violence against the rating recovered
from the Bradley-Terry model. It also shows the ROC curve for protester violence and state violence.
All three subfigures demonstrate strong performance of our classifier’s ability to measure perceived
violence.
To intuitively visualize how the classifier works, we use Gradient-weighted Class Activation
Mapping (Grad-CAM) (Selvaraju et al., 2016). Grad-CAM highlights important regions for classi-
fying the concept in an image. Grad-CAM highlights such regions by tracing back the classification
outcome to the input image through passing gradients. The results are shown in Figure A6, with
red color indicating more important regions. For technical details, see Selvaraju et al. (2016).
Figure A7 arrays images from each category by the classification scores from the CNN. As the
classification score approaches 1 for each category, images more closely exhibit the visual concept.

56
Figure A4: Model Performance

57
 Figure A5: Validating Violence Measurement

Figure A6: Visualization of Region Importance in Classification Using Grad-CAM: Important

regions which more contribute to the classification for each attribute are highlighted in red.

58
Figure A7: Sample Classifier Estimates by Category: Images are ordered by their classification
scores. (Blue lines mark the exact classification scores of corresponding images)

59
Figure A7: Sample Classifier Estimates by Category (Continued)

60
 Finally, to compare the classification performance of existing commercial classifiers against
our own classifier, we used Google Vision’s label detection on the test set of UCLA Protest Image
Database (Won et al., 2017) and measured the classification accuracy. This dataset has 11,000
test images with various labels related to protest activity such as the presence of protesters or
police officers in images. Since Google’s label detection automatically identifies visual concepts
and objects in many categories, including protest and police, from an input image, we directly
compared its accuracy with our model accuracy. As shown in Figure A8, the protest and scene
models classified protest and police more accurately than the Google Vision API. The superior
result is most likely due to the fact that we specifically collected diverse protest images and hard-
negatives (i.e., non-protest images which look like protest) from many sources. The Google Vision
API may perform better on general image classification and can be very useful when one does not
have any training data.

Figure A8: Classification performance comparison between our model and the public model from
Google’s Vision API.

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APPENDIX S2. BIAS
In the United States, Twitter users who geotag are richer, more likely to live in cities, young, and
non-white (Malik et al., 2015). In the United Kingdom, Twitter users are younger, more educated,
more likely to be male, and more politically engaged (but less likely to vote) than others (Mellon
and Prosser, 2017). Once on Twitter, geotagging users are slightly older than non-geotaggers, there
is some difference in rates of geotagging across profession, and there is large variation by tweet
language in the percentage of users who geotag (a low of 0.4% for Arabic accounts to a high of
8.3% for Turkish, with an average of 3.1%) (Sloan and Morgan, 2015).
Though Twitter users differ from non-Twitter users and those who assign locations to their
tweets differ from those who do not, there is no a priori reason to expect that they differ in the type
of protest images they share. Conditional on being at a protest, there is no reason to think that the
contents of a geotagged protest image should systematically differ from a protest image that is not
geotagged. Of anything, the importance of social media for tactical coordination of protests means
that geotagged tweets should be more likely to represent a protest than one that is not (Gunitsky,
2015; Little, 2015).
Section S4 compares users who tweet protest images to those who tweet non-protest images.
More accounts share protest images than non-protest images, and they have fewer followers than
those tweeting non-protest images. There is no statistically significant difference in the account
age or frequency of tweeting. While this comparison does not prove that the protest images are
an unbiased representation of the protest itself, it at least appears to be the case that the accounts
themselves do not appear to be any more biased, and are probably actually more representative,
than the larger Twittersphere. The protest photos appear to come from more “normal" users than
those who normally tweet images.
If bias in protest data from geolocated images shared on Twitter exists, it should nonetheless be
less than that which exists from relying on any text that is not a police archive. The main source
of information for existing event data, newspapers, have large, well-known biases that result from
incentives that are much weaker on social media. Newspapers are much more likely to cover large

62
events than small ones (Mccarthy et al., 1996) as well as events perceived to be of interest to their
subscribers (Myers and Caniglia, 2004; Baum and Zhukov, 2015). Events away from urban centers
are less likely to receive coverage (Kalyvas, 2004; Weidmann, 2014), as are ones that are parts of a
larger wave of events (Hellmeier et al., 2018). Given the increasing consolidation of the newspaper
industry, these biases are likely to have become more consistent across sources (Baum and Zhukov,
2018).
These biases exist because newspapers have to maximize readership (advertising, newsstand,
and subscription revenue) while constrained by space. This constraint puts an emphasis on reporting
novel or unexpected events such as violent attacks or large protests. Even if readership is national
- and most newspapers have local or, at best, regional circulation - events are still selected based
on their appeal to the readers. The need to daily attract readers means coverage of events quickly
tapers regardless of the event duration (Hellmeier et al., 2018). For a more extensive explanation
of bias in news coverage, see Earl et al. (2004).
Social media platforms do not face these same pressures. While their business model is
more focused on attracting eyeballs than newspapers are, because they do not have subscribers or
newsstand sales, there is essentially zero restriction on the space in which to publish.14 Whether or
not the platforms, such as Twitter or Facebook, should be treated as media companies is a separate
issue, but one way in which they are not like other media is that they do not employ people to
create the information featured on their platform, the way newspapers pay journalists. Given the
essentially infinite supply of posts and the lack of control over content providers, there should
therefore be much less selection pressure on what appears on social media.15 Because newspapers
face scarcity constraints that social media do not, the latter should be much more likely to provide
a less biased account of the world than newspapers. In providing orders of magnitude more posts
than newspapers do articles, social media are closer in scope to government archives than they are
14Each new post imposes a marginal cost - server space and electricity - on the platform that is much smaller than
article for a newspaper.
15Social media platforms increase user engagement by selectively presenting posts to users. While this algorithmic
process may present users with biased interpretations of events, that process is not used to decide which tweets to send
to the API (Pfeffer and Mayer, 2018).

63
newspapers (Sullivan, 2016). See Sobolev et al. (2019) for a more extensive comparison of bias in
newspaper and social media event data.

APPENDIX S3. CORRECTING TWEET LOCATION AND TIME

We make two corrections to the metadata that arrives with each tweet. First, the timestamp of
each tweet is given in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), regardless of the location of the tweet author.
We therefore create a local timestamp based on the time difference between GMT and the tweet
location. Second, we assign a city to the approximately 15% of tweets that arrive with a bounding
box but a location name that is only the state. We use the centroid of the bounding box to assign a
city.

APPENDIX S4. COMPARING IMAGE SHARERS TO PROTEST IMAGE SHARERS

Interested in whether or not those who tweet images of protests differ from those who tweet
images, we analyzed account covariates by country-photo type (protest or not protest). For each set
of photos, we kept each user only once, which discarded about 40% of tweets in each set. For users
who tweeted the same image type multiple times, we randomly keep one tweet, and an account
can appear in both samples. The account characteristics we analyze are the number of followers,
following, statuses, and account age (days on Twitter). We also count the number of unique users
in each country by image type. The points estimates and 95% confidence intervals are shown in
Figure A9.
More, less popular people share protest images than non-protest images. In all countries, there
are more accounts that tweet protest images than non-protest images, though the difference is only
statistically significant in Venezuela. These extra accounts have fewer followers on average than
those tweeting non-protest images, though the difference is not statistically significant in Ukraine.
The two sets of users do not differ in how engaged they are on Twitter. In no country do the
protest and non-protest accounts follow different numbers of users. They have each been on Twitter
the same amount of time. (In Russia only, these accounts have been on Twitter longer, an average
of 43.21 days more.) In Venezuela, the protest users are slightly less active on Twitter, but in Russia
they are more active; there is no statistically significant difference for Ukraine.

64
 Figure A9: Users Tweeting Protests vs. Not

●
Unique Users ●
●

Hong Kong
Avg. Tweets ●
●
Avg. Following ●
●
Avg. Followers ●
●
Avg. Age ●

●
Unique Users ●
●
Avg. Tweets

Pakistan
●
●
Avg. Following ●
●
Avg. Followers ●
●
Avg. Age ●

●
Unique Users ●

South Korea
●
Avg. Tweets ●
Images
●
Avg. Following ●
● No Protest
●
Avg. Followers ●
● Protest
●
Avg. Age ●

●
Unique Users ●
●
Avg. Tweets ●
Spain
●
Avg. Following ●
●
Avg. Followers ●
●
Avg. Age ●

●
Unique Users ●
●
Venezuela

Avg. Tweets ●
●
Avg. Following ●
●
Avg. Followers ●
●
Avg. Age ●

0 10000 20000 30000

65
APPENDIX S5. ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

S5.1 Bot Distribution

Table A10 compliments Table 7. No more than 6.7% of accounts are from bots, and no more
than 6.5% of tweets.

Table A10: Distribution of Bots by City

City Avg. Bot Score Max. Bot Score SD Bot Score Percent Tweets Percent Accounts
from Bots of Bots
Ciutat Vella 0.131 0.948 0.297 0.108 0.040
Lahore 0.067 0.559 0.173 0.100 0.143
Sant Salvador de Guardiola 0.066 0.611 0.155 0.083 0.094
Granera 0.053 0.812 0.156 0.054 0.065
Valencia 0.063 0.921 0.145 0.052 0.058
Tarragona 0.058 0.829 0.172 0.052 0.079
Central 0.050 0.845 0.156 0.051 0.133
Maracaibo 0.050 0.685 0.115 0.039 0.037
Seoul 0.145 0.905 0.170 0.035 0.056
Barcelona 0.029 0.939 0.110 0.024 0.022
Caucagua 0.054 0.905 0.118 0.020 0.027
Boca del Rio 0.032 0.829 0.117 0.020 0.047
Girona 0.034 0.637 0.088 0.019 0.038
Sant Feliu de Pallerols 0.040 0.661 0.086 0.018 0.048
Caracas 0.043 0.942 0.103 0.010 0.025
Granollers 0.011 0.084 0.019 0 0
Kimhae 0.052 0.054 0.009 0 0
Kowloon 0.021 0.355 0.062 0 0
Lleida 0.018 0.355 0.058 0 0
Mataró 0.007 0.054 0.009 0 0
Reus 0.018 0.297 0.051 0 0
Sabadell 0.018 0.355 0.044 0 0
Sant Cugat del Vallè 0.015 0.270 0.047 0 0
Terrassa 0.005 0.030 0.006 0 0

S5.2 Deduplicating Images

To deduplicate images, we extracted 1,000 features from a pre-trained ResNet50 model (He
et al., 2016a). Conventional image preprocessing methods for deep learning models were used.
Each image was resized to 256 x 256 pixels. Then, a center-crop of 224 x 224 pixels was performed.
Finally, the cropped images were normalized to the mean and standard deviation of the ImageNet
dataset (Deng et al., 2009). The 1,000 feature vector of each sample was normalized to unit norm.
The L2 distance among the normalized data is computed, and images are considered matches if the

66
distance is less than a threshold of 0.2. The histogram of the distribution of distances in shown in
Figure A10.

Figure A10: Distribution of Pairwise Image Distances

Two manual checks verify these results. The largest 90 clusters were manually inspected and
no images were misidentified as duplicates. The 220 most common images identified as duplicates,
shared 2,500 times, were inspected, and none were misidentified as duplicates.
Table A11 shows the percentage of tweets per city that are duplicates.
Figure A11 shows the number of times each image appears in the dataset.
Figure A12 shows the distribution of the percentage of images per city that are duplicates.
Except for Kimhae, the spike at 1 is cities with 1 image.

67
 Table A11: Duplicate Images

City Percentage Duplicates Total Tweets

Kimhae 0.957 46
Sant Feliu de Pallerols 0.621 58
Girona 0.500 108
Caracas 0.463 2, 105
Mataró 0.425 40
Sant Cugat del Vallè 0.424 33
Caucagua 0.281 224
Tarragona 0.274 62
Valencia 0.269 167
Sant Salvador de Guardiola 0.250 40
Maracaibo 0.243 152
Terrassa 0.237 59
Boca del Rio 0.227 66
Sabadell 0.187 75
Reus 0.184 38
Barcelona 0.182 1, 338
Granera 0.154 65
Granollers 0.150 20
Lleida 0.116 43
Ciutat Vella 0.100 40
Seoul 0.052 326
Central 0 41
Kowloon 0 66
Lahore 0 5

68
Figure A11: Distribution of Number of Duplicates

69
Figure A12: Percentage of Duplicates by City

70
S5.3 Different Dependent Variable

Table A12 repeats the main model using three different operationalizations of the dependent
variable. The first, shown in Model 2, does not log-transform the number of protesters. The results
for the violence and free-riding variables are the same, except the number of photos containing
police is now statistically significant; its sign matches the original model. Race Diversityi,t−1 no
longer correlates with subsequent changes in protest size.
The third and fourth models measure the size of protest using the number of users who share
a protest photo per city-day. The third uses the raw count, the fourth logged. This quantity is
smaller than the number of protest photos per day because users often share multiple photos.
Results for violence and racial diversity are the same when not taking the logarithm, though they
lose significance when log-transformed. Large Groupi,t−1 switches signs and is significant in both
2
models, while Large Groupi,t−1 supports the same inference in Model 3 but not Model 4. Of all
robustness checks in the manuscript and supplementary materials, these two differ the most from
the original model.
These results differ the most from the rest of the paper’s for two reasons. Most importantly, they
embody a different data generating process then the other operationalizations of protest size. They
do so because counting individual images provides less information about the size of a protest than
counting the faces in an image. It provides less information because the photos are equivalent to
randomly sampling a protest space and the surrounding protesters, akin to the leading methodology
of in-person protest size measurement (Schweingruber and McPhail, 1999). Other work has shown
that counting the number of protest photos less accurately recovers true protest size than summing
the number of faces in those photos (Sobolev et al., 2019). Second, there is much less variation in
this measure than in the sum of faces. The maximum value is 158, third quartile 1; when restricted
to days with protest photos, the third quartile is 3.

S5.4 Accounting for Autocorrelation

Table A13 shows that the inclusion of lagged dependent variables up to 15 days old do not
change the results for the violence or free riding variables already significant in the original model

71
 Table A12: Different Measures of Protest Size

Original No Log Number Users Log10 (NumberU ser s)

(1) (2) (3) (4)
Perceived Prtstr. Violencei,t−1 −.1674∗∗ −9.8923∗∗∗ −3.4252∗∗ −.1724∗∗∗
(.0677) (2.8933) (1.7108) (.0552)
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 1.2820∗∗∗ 86.4146∗∗ 24.2096∗ .4030∗
(.3327) (37.2147) (13.1782) (.2269)
2
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 −2.1030∗∗∗ −168.2910∗∗ −45.4816∗ −.6696∗
(.6093) (79.2780) (25.5827) (.4007)
Policei,t−1 .7626∗ 125.1103∗ 31.9542 .2401
(.4493) (74.2665) (19.9307) (.2776)
Firei,t−1 .1009∗∗∗ 3.5316∗∗∗ 1.2606∗ .0690∗∗∗
(.0236) (.5783) (.7297) (.0242)
Gender Diversityi,t−1 −.1126 −9.8651 −2.0632∗∗∗ −.0972∗∗∗
(.0939) (7.3636) (.7160) (.0350)
Race Diversityi,t−1 .0683 7.8310∗∗∗ 1.0215∗ .0518
(.0440) (2.6819) (.5586) (.0348)
Age Diversityi,t−1 .0203 1.6471 .6294 .0209
(.0289) (1.9407) (.5215) (.0212)
Tweetsi,t−1 .0095∗∗∗ .2254∗ .0112 .0040∗∗
(.0033) (.1340) (.0432) (.0021)
DVi,t−1 .1578∗∗ .0910∗∗∗ .2729∗∗∗ .3725∗∗∗
(.0682) (.0348) (.0310) (.0973)
Intercept .1260∗∗∗ 3.5931∗∗∗ 1.5215∗∗∗ .1063∗∗∗
(.0237) (.6761) (.1740) (.0106)
N 4,376 4,376 4,376 4,376
Adjusted R2 .2450 .2051 .2741 .3710
City FE Y Y Y Y
∗p < .1; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗∗∗ p < .01

(Model 1). (A partial autocorrelation plot suggested serial dependence for up to fifteen days.)
The presence of police is now positively correlated with subsequent protest size. More noticeably,
neither Race Diversityi,t−1 nor Any Childi,t−1 remain significant. This updated result supports
the interpretation provided in the main paper of the cleavage variables: they are endogenous
to the protests themselves, so controlling for enough previous protests removes those variables’
significance.

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 Table A13: Robust to Additional Lagged Dependent Variables

DV: Log10 (Sum o f Faces)i,t

Original Model 15 Lags
(1) (2)
Perceived Prtstr. Violencei,t−1 −.1674∗∗ −.0750
(.0677) (.0788)
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 1.2820∗∗∗ .7844∗∗
(.3327) (.3186)
2
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 −2.1030∗∗∗ −1.3370∗∗
(.6093) (.5303)
Policei,t−1 .7626∗ .6663∗
(.4493) (.3987)
Firei,t−1 .1009∗∗∗ .0365
(.0236) (.0332)
Gender Diversityi,t−1 −.1126∗ −.0592
(.0939) (.0616)
Race Diversityi,t−1 .0683 .0279
(.0440) (.0430)
Age Diversityi,t−1 .0203 .0130
(.0289) (.0338)
Tweetsi,t−1 .0095∗∗∗ .0062∗∗∗
(.0033) (.0022)
DVi,t−1 .1578∗∗∗ .0588
(.0682) (.0360)
Intercept .1260∗∗∗ .0314∗∗
(.0237) (.0129)
N 4,376 4,033
Adjusted R2 .2450 .3220
15 Lags of DV N Y
City FE Y Y
Country Fe N N
∗p < .1; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗∗∗ p < .01

S5.5 Accounting for Days with No Protests

Table A14 shows attempts to account for days with no protest. Model 2 drops all days with
no protest images. Model 3 is a Poisson model. Model 4 is a negative binomial, and Model 5
is a zero-inflated negative binomial model. To converge, Model 5 excludes city fixed effects and
clustered standard errors; it does use country fixed effects.

73
 Table A14: Count Models

DV: Log10 (Sum o f Faces)i,t DV: Sum o f Facesi,t

Original No Zero Days Poisson Negative Zero-inflated
Binomial Negative Binomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Perceived Prtstr. Violencei,t−1 −0.167∗∗ −0.209∗ −0.798∗∗∗ 0.082 −0.775
(.0677) (0.121) (0.120) (0.641) (0.504)
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 1.282∗∗∗ 1.175∗∗∗ 9.587∗∗∗ 10.271∗∗∗ 7.575∗∗∗
(.3327) (0.447) (0.343) (2.569) (2.089)
2
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 −2.103∗∗∗ −1.834∗∗ −17.328∗∗∗ −15.779∗∗∗ −12.593∗∗∗
(.6093) (0.768) (0.811) (4.462) (3.629)
Policei,t−1 0.763∗ 1.519∗∗∗ 2.631∗∗∗ 1.843 2.121∗
(.4493) (0.345) (0.057) (1.799) (1.122)
Firei,t−1 0.101∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗ 0.272∗∗
(.0236) (0.025) (0.011) (0.181) (0.118)
Gender Diversityi,t−1 −0.113 −0.135∗ −1.315∗∗∗ −0.285 −0.792∗∗∗
(.0939) (0.078) (0.045) (0.479) (0.300)
Race Diversityi,t−1 0.068 0.073 0.513∗∗∗ 0.168 0.684∗∗∗
(.0440) (0.050) (0.027) (0.321) (0.206)
Age Diversityi,t−1 0.020 0.025 0.666∗∗∗ 0.345 0.094
(.0289) (0.045) (0.024) (0.244) (0.170)
Tweetsi,t−1 0.009∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.012
(.0033) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010)
DVi,t−1 0.158∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.002
(.0682) (0.046) (0.0003) (0.004) (0.003)
Intercept 0.126∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 1.221∗∗∗ 1.018∗∗∗ 2.150∗∗∗
(.0237) (0.045) (0.024) (0.181) (0.117)
N 4,376 1,442 4,376 4,376 4,376
City FE Y Y Y Y N
Cluster SE Y Y Y Y N
Adjusted R2 0.245 0.199
Log Likelihood −19,104.240 −4,387.215 −4,220.237
∗p < .1; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗∗∗ p < .01

S5.6 Weighted Results

Weighting each city-day observation by the number of protest photos shared from it strengthens
the paper’s results. Race and gender support critical mass theory. The free riding dynamics are
more pronounced. The violence coefficients are much larger than the unweighted models, and
model fit is almost 50% better than the paper’s main models.

S5.7 Most Likely Protest Tweets

The last two models select tweets based on features that increase the probability they come
from a protest. Model 5 restricts tweets to those only from mobile devices, based on the source

74
 Table A15: Results Weighted by Protest Tweets per City

.outcome
Original Violence Demographics Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Perceived Prtstr. Violencei,t−1 −.1674∗∗ −.3383∗∗ −.3214∗∗
(.0677) (.1379) (.1357)
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 1.2820∗∗∗ 2.1774∗∗∗ 2.4331∗∗∗
(.3327) (.3740) (.3725)
2
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 −2.1030∗∗∗ −3.9986∗∗∗ −4.4522∗∗∗
(.6093) (.6880) (.6827)
Policei,t−1 .7626∗ 1.3091∗∗∗ 1.2754∗∗∗
(.4493) (.1440) (.1438)
Firei,t−1 .1009∗∗∗ .0198∗∗∗ .0108∗∗∗
(.0236) (.0140) (.0139)
Gender Diversityi,t−1 −.1126 −.2087∗∗∗ −.2538∗∗∗
(.0939) (.0517) (.0499)
Race Diversityi,t−1 .0683 .1434∗∗∗ .1289∗∗∗
(.0440) (.0326) (.0318)
Age Diversityi,t−1 .0203 −.0626∗∗ −.0388
(.0289) (.0311) (.0298)
Tweetsi,t−1 .0095∗∗∗ .0026∗∗∗ .0027∗∗∗ .0030∗∗∗
(.0033) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004)
DVi,t−1 .1578∗∗ .2564∗∗∗ .2986∗∗∗ .2791∗∗∗
(.0682) (.0276) (.0332) (.0328)
Intercept .1260∗∗∗ .3940∗∗∗ .5721∗∗∗ .4906∗∗∗
(.0237) (.0474) (.0494) (.0490)
N 4,376 4,376 4,376 4,376
City FE Y Y Y Y
Cluster SE Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 .2450 .5533 .5253 .5675
∗p < .1; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗∗∗ p < .01

field Twitter provides with each tweet. If that field contains “Twitter Web Client" or “Hootsuite",
the tweet is discarded; this paring leaves 3,743 tweets and 3,129 city days. The results for state
violence and large groups match the full model, though with less statistical significance; the other
covariates of interest lose statistical significance. The mobile model also fits the data less than
half as well as the full model. Finally, we keep only tweets issued between 10 a.m. and 10 p.m.,
the most likely protest windows. Model 6 shows the results from these 4,664 tweets and 3,134
city-days. The result is a mixture of Models 4 and 5: the violence variables are larger and more
precisely estimated, but none of the social cleavage variables are statistically significant, and the
results for free-riding do not change.

75
 Table A16: Most Likely Protest Tweets

DV: Log10 (Sum o f Faces)i,t

Original Source Mobile Protest Time
(1) (2) (3)
Perceived Prtstr. Violencei,t−1 −.1674∗∗ −.0438 −.2242∗∗∗
(.0677) (.1005) (.0586)
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 1.2820∗∗ .6405∗∗ 1.3883∗∗∗
(.3327) (.3113) (.4637)
2
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 −2.1030∗∗∗ −1.0014∗∗ −2.1913∗∗∗
(.6093) (.4587) (.8201)
Policei,t−1 .7626∗ −.0026 .6971∗
(.4493) (.1366) (.4005)
Firei,t−1 .1009∗∗∗ .0578∗∗∗ .1162∗∗∗
(.0236) (.0214) (.0278)
Gender Diversityi,t−1 −.1126 .0168 −.0933
(.0939) (.0466) (.0800)
Race Diversityi,t−1 .0683 −.0126 .1058∗
(.0440) (.0338) (.0603)
Age Diversityi,t−1 .0203 −.0066 .0088
(.0289) (.0246) (.0285)
Tweetsi,t−1 .0095∗∗∗ .0097∗∗∗ .0100∗∗∗
(.0033) (.0015) (.0033)
DVi,t−1 .1578∗∗ .1121∗∗ .1078
(.0682) (.0534) (.0661)
Intercept .1260∗∗∗ .1374∗∗∗ .1381∗∗∗
(.0237) (.0144) (.0161)
N 3,164 3,063 3,067
City FE Y Y Y
Cluster SE Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 .2450 .1091 .2101
∗p < .1; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗∗∗ p < .01

S5.8 Models by Country

Pakistan is not included because it has too few observations.

S5.9 Investigating Fire, Police Variables

76
 Table A17: Tables by Country

DV: Log10 (Sum o f Faces)i,t

Spain Hong Kong South Korea Venezuela Venezuela
2014-2015 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Perceived Prtstr. Violencei,t−1 .3920∗∗ −.4626∗ −.6093∗ .1124 −.0955
(.1941) (.2711) (.3254) (.1231) (.0681)
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 .7175∗∗ 3.7867∗∗∗ −1.3734 .7740 .6684∗
(.3446) (1.4235) (1.4230) (.5308) (.3534)
2
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 −1.6441∗∗∗ −8.2571∗∗ 2.6850 −1.1302 −.9714
(.5217) (4.1648) (3.3816) (.8877) (.6119)
Policei,t−1 1.2854∗∗∗ .0876 −.1225
(.1970) (.4707) (.2208)
Firei,t−1 .0178 .0715 .3637∗∗ −.0451∗ .0355
(.0496) (.0948) (.1457) (.0242) (.0317)
Gender Diversityi,t−1 .0642 −.0201 −.0101 −.1568∗ .0172
(.0777) (.1480) (.1195) (.0866) (.0855)
Race Diversityi,t−1 −.0781 .1521 −.1716 −.0885 .0340
(.0607) (.1221) (.1198) (.0612) (.0600)
Age Diversityi,t−1 .0032 −.1156 .0316 .1542∗∗∗ −.0456
(.0372) (.0908) (.0665) (.0525) (.0490)
Tweetsi,t−1 .0047∗∗∗ .0098 −.0003 .0153∗∗∗ .0171∗∗∗
(.0011) (.0072) (.0035) (.0033) (.0038)
DVi,t−1 .0680 .0763 −.0795 .0771 .0190
(.0430) (.1200) (.0751) (.0583) (.0353)
Intercept .5900∗∗∗ .1034∗∗∗ .0004 .0322 .0164
(.0369) (.0261) (.0333) (.0357) (.0168)
N 1,412 257 365 573 1,752
Adjusted R2 .2861 .1083 .1185 .6110 .0962
City FE Y Y Y Y Y
Cluset SE N N N N N
∗p < .1; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗∗∗ p < .01

77
 Table A18: Fire and Police Variables on Their Own

DV: Log10 (Sum o f Faces)i,t

(1) (2) (3) (4)
Policei,t−1 .4894 .4932
(.5121) (.5071)
Firei,t−1 .1011∗∗∗ .0945∗∗∗
(.0184) (.0206)
Gender Diversityi,t−1 −.1148 −.1358
(.0875) (.0978)
Race Diversityi,t−1 .0708∗ .0968∗∗
(.0410) (.0449)
Age Diversityi,t−1 .0217 .0208
(.0288) (.0315)
Perceived Prtstr. Violencei,t−1 .0237 .0227
(.0627) (.0649)
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 1.0602∗∗∗ 1.0529∗∗∗
(.3149) (.3342)
2
Perceived Stt. Violencei,t−1 −1.6560∗∗∗ −1.6396∗∗∗
(.5213) (.5458)
Tweetsi,t−1 .0095 .0096∗∗∗ .0107∗∗∗ .0108∗∗∗
(.0035) (.0034) (.0040) (.0037)
DVi,t−1 .1926 .1728∗∗ .1954∗∗ .1684∗∗
(.0743) (.0704) (.0805) (.0711)
Intercept .1239 .1275 .1224 .1273
(.0158) (.0158) (.0159) (.0159)
N 4,376 4,376 4,376 4,376
Adjusted R2 .2373 .2389 .2304 .2334
∗p < .1; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗∗∗ p < .01

78
APPENDIX S6. INTER-CODER RELIABILITY
We used Fleiss’ Kappa to measure the inter-coder reliability of our training image annotations.
In many cases, the inter-coder reliability is typically measured on the coding data on which the
actual analysis is conducted. In our study, the manual coding was performed on the training data,
and the reliability was measured for the annotations to ensure that the models are trained in a
consistent manner. Table A19 shows the estimated reliability statistics.

Table A19: Inter-coder reliability

Label Kappa

Perceived Violence .316

Perceived Protester Violence .566

Perceived State Violence .473

Large Group .434

Small Group .388

Police .564

Fire .702

Child .457

79