ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. vs. MALAYAN INSURANCE, CO., INC.

Facts:

On November 14, 1995, Shandong Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the vessel MV "Jinlian I"
60,000 plastic bags of soda ashdense from China to Manila.

The shipment, with an invoice value of US$456,000.00, was insured with respondent Malayan Insurance
Company, Inc.,and covered by a Bill of Lading issued by Tianjin Navigation Company with Philippine
Banking Corporation as the consignee and ChemphilAlbright and Wilson Corporation as the notify party.
On November 21, 1995, upon arrival of the vessel in Manila,

the stevedores of petitioner AsianTerminals, Inc., a duly registered domestic corporation engaged in
providing arrastre and stevedoring services, unloaded the 60,000 bags of soda ashdense from the vessel
and brought them to the open storage area of petitioner for temporary storage and safekeeping. When
the unloading of the bagswas completed on November 28, 1995, 2,702 bags were found to be in bad
order condition. On November 29, 1995, the stevedores of petitioner began loading the bags in the
trucks of MEC Customs Brokerage for transport and delivery to the consignee. On December 28, 1995,
after all the bags were unloaded in the warehouses of the consignee, a total of 2,881 bags were in bad
order condition due to spillage, caking, and hardening of the contents. On April 19, 1996, respondent, as
insurer, paid the value of the lost/ damaged cargoes to the consignee in the amount of P643,600.25.On
November 20, 1996, respondent, as subrogee of the consignee, filed before the RTC of Manila a
complaint for damages against petitioner (Asian Terminals, Inc.), the shipper (Inchcape Shipping
Services), and the cargo broker (MEC Customs Brokerage). The RTC rendered adecision finding petitioner
liable for the damage/loss sustained by the shipment but absolving the other defendants - Inchcape
Shipping Services andMEC Customs Brokerage. The RTC found that the proximate cause of the
damage/loss was the negligence of petitioner’s stevedores who handled theunloading of the cargoes
from the vessel. The RTC emphasized that despite the admonitions of Marine Cargo Surveyors not to use
steel hooks inretrieving and picking-up the bags, petitioner’s stevedores continued to use such tools,
which pierced the bags and caused the spillage. The RTC,thus, ruled that petitioner, as employer, is
liable for the acts and omissions of its stevedores and is ordered to pay plaintiff Malayan
InsuranceCompany, Inc.Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA but the appeal was denied. The CA
agreed with the RTC that the damage/loss was caused by thenegligence of petitioner’s stevedores in
handling and storing the subject shipment. The CA likewise rejected petitioner’s assertion that it
received thesubject shipment in bad order condition as this was disproved by the Marine Cargo
Surveyors who testified that the actual counting of bad order bagswas done only after all the bags were
unloaded from the vessel and that the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes (TOSBOC) upon which
petitioner anchors its defense was prepared only on November 28, 1995 or after the unloading of the
bags was completed. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in a Resolution
for lack of merit. Petitioner contends that respondent has no cause of action because it failed to present
the insurance contract or policy covering the subjectshipment. Petitioner argues that the Subrogation
Receipt presented by respondent is not sufficient to prove that the subject shipment wasinsured and
that respondent was validly subrogated to the rights of the consignee. Thus, petitioner submits that
without proof of a validsubrogation, respondent is not entitled to any reimbursement.2.Petitioner
likewise puts in issue the finding of the RTC, which was affirmed by the CA, that the proximate cause of
the damage/loss to theshipment was the negligence of petitioner’s stevedores. Petitioner avers that
such finding is contrary to the documentary evidence, i.e., theTOSBOC, the Request for Bad Order
Survey (RESBOC) and the Report of Survey. According to petitioner, these documents prove that
itreceived the subject shipment in bad order condition and that no additional damage was sustained by
the subject shipment under itscustody. Petitioner asserts that although the TOSBOC was prepared only
after all the bags were unloaded by petitioner’s stevedores, thisdoes not mean that the damage/loss
was caused by its stevedores.

Petitioner also claims that the amount of damages should not be more than P5,000.00, pursuant to its
Management Contract for cargohandling services with the PPA. Petitioner contends that the CA should
have taken judicial notice of the said contract since it is an officialact of an executive department subject
to judicial cognizance.

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy
was not raised in the trial court. Thus, itcannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Respondent
likewise contends that under prevailing jurisprudence, presentation of theinsurance policy is not
indispensable.

Respondent further avers that "the right of subrogation has its roots in equity - it is designed to promote
and to accomplish justice and is the mode which equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a
debt by one who in justice,equity and good conscience ought to pay."

Respondent likewise maintains that the RTC and the CA correctly found that the damage/loss sustained
by the subject shipment was caused by the negligent acts of petitioner’s stevedores. Such factual
findings of the RTC, affirmed by the CA, are conclusive and should no longer be disturbed. In fact, under
Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
oncertiorari.

As to the Management Contract for cargo handling services, respondent contends that this is outside
the operation of judicial notice. Andeven if it is not, petitioner’s liability cannot be limited by it since it is
a contract of adhesion.

Issues:

(1) Whether the non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is fatal to respondent’s cause of
action;(2) Whether the proximate cause of the damage/loss to the shipment was the negligence of
petitioner’s stevedores;
(3) Whether the court can take judicial notice of the Management Contract between petitioner and the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) in determining petitioner’s liability.

Ruling:

The petition is bereft of merit.(1)Whether or not the respondent’s non-presentation of the insurance
contract or policy between the respondent and the consignee is fatal to its cause of action. – NO.

Non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is not fatal in the instant case.

First of all, this was never raised as an issue before the RTC. Basic is the rule that "issues or grounds not
raised below cannot be resolved on review by the Supreme Court, for to allow the parties to raise new
issues is antithetical to the sporting idea of fair play, justice and due process."Besides, non-presentation
of the insurance contract or policy is not necessarily fatal.

In Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

the presentation in evidence of the marine insurance policy is not indispensable before the insurer may
recover from the common carrier the insured value of the lost cargo in the exercise of its subrogatory
right. Thesubrogation receipt, by itself, is sufficient to establish not only the relationship of the insurer
and the assured shipper of the lost cargo of industrial fuel oil, but also the amount paid to settle the
insurance claim. The right of subrogation accrues simply upon payment by theinsurance company of the
insurance claim.

In Home Insurance Corporation v. CA,

the presentation of the insurance policy was necessary because the shipment therein (hydraulicengines)
passed through several stages with different parties involved in each stage. In the absence of proof of
stipulations to the contrary,the hauler can be liable only for any damage that occurred from the time it
received the cargo until it finally delivered it to the consignee.Ordinarily, it cannot be held responsible
for the handling of the cargo before it actually received it.However, as in every general rule, there are
admitted exceptions. In Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that the
presentation of the insurance policy was not fatal because the loss of the cargo undoubtedly occurred
while on board the petitioner’s vessel, unlike inHome Insurance in which the cargo passed through
several stages with different parties and it could not be determined when the damage to the cargo
occurred, such that the insurer should be liable for it. As in Delsan, there is no doubt that the loss of the
cargo in the present case occurred while in petitioner’s custody.

Similarly, in this case, the presentation of the insurance contract or policy was not necessary. Although
petitioner objected to the admission of the Subrogation Receipt in its Comment to respondent’s formal
offer of evidence on the ground that respondent failed to present the insurance contract or policy, a
perusal of petitioner’s Answer and Pre-Trial Brief shows that petitioner never questioned respondent’s
right to subrogation, nor did it dispute the coverage of the insurance contract or policy. Since there was
no issue regarding the validity of the insurance contract or policy, or any provision thereof, respondent
had no reason to present the insurance contract or policy as evidence during the trial. Hence, the factual
findings of the CA, affirming the RTC, are binding and conclusive.

(2)Whether or not the proximate cause of the damage/loss to the shipment was the negligence of
petitioner’s stevedores. – YES.

Both the RTC and the CA found the negligence of petitioner’s stevedores to be the proximate cause of
the damage/loss to the shipment. In disregarding the contention of petitioner that such finding is
contrary to the documentary evidence, the CA had this to say: ATI, however, contends that the finding
of the trial court was contrary to the documentary evidence of record, particularly, the Turn Over Survey
of Bad Order Cargoes dated November 28, 1995, which was executed prior to the turn-over of the cargo
by the carrier to the arrastre operator ATI, and which showed that the shipment already contained
2,702 damaged bags. However, contrary to ATI’s assertion, the witnesses – marine cargo surveyors of
Inchcape for the vessel Jinlian I which arrived on November 21, 1995 and up to completion of
discharging on November 28, 1995, testified that it was only after all the bags were unloaded from the
vessel that the actual counting of bad order bags was made.

There is no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the trial court that ATI should be made liable for
the 2,702 bags of damaged shipment. Needless to state, it is hornbook doctrine that the assessment of
witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, which had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor, conduct or attitude of the witnesses. The findings of the trial
court on this point are accorded great respect and will not be reversed on appeal, unless it overlooked
substantial facts and circumstances which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the case.
The proximate cause of the damage (i.e., torn bags, spillage of contents and caked/hardened portions of
the contents) was the improper handling of the cargoes by ATI’s stevedores; and ATI has not
satisfactorily rebutted plaintiff-appellee’s evidence on the negligence of ATI’s stevedores in the handling
and safekeeping of the cargoes .Indeed, from the nature of the damage caused to the shipment, i.e.,
torn bags, spillage of contents and hardened or caked portions of the contents, it is not difficult to see
that the damage caused was due to the negligence of ATI’s stevedores who used steel hooks to retrieve
the bags from the higher portions of the piles thereby piercing the bags and spilling their contents, and
who piled the bags in the open storage area of ATI within sufficient cover thereby exposing them to the
elements and [causing] the contents to cake or harden. Clearly, the finding of negligence on the part of
petitioner’s stevedores is supported by both testimonial and documentary evidence. Hence, we see no
reason to disturb the same.
(3)Whether the court can take judicial notice of the Management Contract between petitioner and the
Philippine Ports Authority(PPA) in determining petitioner’s liability. – NO.

Finally, petitioner implores us to take judicial notice of Section 7.01, Article VII of the Management
Contract for cargo handling services it entered with the PPA, which limits petitioner’s liability to
P5,000.00 per package. Unfortunately for the petitioner, it cannot avail of judicial notice.

The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is not among the matters which the
courts can take judicial notice of. It cannot be considered an official act of the executive department.
The PPA, which was created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 857, as amended, is a government-
owned and controlled corporation in charge of administering the ports in the country. Obviously, the
PPA was only performing a proprietary function when it entered into a Management Contract with
petitioner. As such, judicial notice cannot be applied.
BETTY B. LACBAYAN, Petitioner, v. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR., Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime in 1978. Despite
respondent being already married, their relationship developed. During their illicit relationship,
petitioner and respondent, together with three more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower
services company.Five parcels of land were also acquired during the said period and were registered in
petitioner and respondents names, ostensibly as husband and wife.

Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decidedto part ways sometime in 1991.In
1998, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and terminate their business partnership by
executing a Partition Agreement. Initially, respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that the properties
in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three
other properties will go to respondent.However, when petitioner wanted additional demands to be
included in the partition agreement, respondent refused. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint
for judicial partition of the said properties before the RTC in Quezon City on May 31, 1999.

On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she is thepro indivisoowner of one-
half of the properties in dispute. Petitioner argued that the trial courts decision subjected the
certificates of title over the said properties to collateral attack contrary to law and jurisprudence.
Petitioner also contended that it is improper to thresh out the issue on ownership in an action for
partition. Her appeal was denied.

ISSUES:

1. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on ownership;

2. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally attacked in the action for
partition

3. Whether respondent is estopped from contesting the Partition Agreement

HELD:
The petition is bereft of merit.

CIVIL LAW: Existence of co-ownership in an action for partition.

First issue: In Municipality of Bin v. Garcia, the Court explained that the determination as to the
existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition. While it is true that
the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-existence
of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real
estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties.
Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is
definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.
More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not
even have any rightful interest over the subject properties.

Second issue: There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but
that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title
and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds
known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than
not, represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title
as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such
ownership although both are interchangeably used

REMEDIAL LAW: Admissions.

Third issue: An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to
the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him. To be admissible,
an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c) be
knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the admitters interests, otherwise it would be
self-serving and inadmissible.

A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the document
involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a
determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject
properties. Moreover, to follow petitioners argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit
against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-
ownership over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his
lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties.

DENIED.
G.R. No. 175991; August 31, 2011

JOSE R. CATACUTAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

Petitioner Jose Catacutan was held guilty before the Sandiganbayan for the violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for his refusal to implement the promotion and
appointments of Georgito Posesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational Supervisors III despite
the directive of CHED and the Civil Service commission. Catacutan questioned the judgment, contending
that he was denied due process when he was not allowed to present the CA judgment, dismissing the
adiminstrative case against him.

Issue:

Whether or not the judgment, finding petitioner guilty of violating RA 3019, was well founded despite
the refusal of the trial court to admit the dismissal of the administrative case as evidence.

Held:

The stubborn defiance by petitioner in carrying out the memorandum issued by CHED was attended by
ill motive and bad faith. Such factual finding by the Trial courts, which was affirmed by the
sandiganbayan, was based on the evidence presented before it. The non-admittance of the dismissal of
the administrative case did not violate petitioner’s right to due process where such dismissal was not
relevant to the adjudication of the criminal case. After all, administrative proceedings require a different
quantum of proof compared to criminal proceedings, the judgment in one is not dependent on the
other.

Present in the case were the elements to find the petitioner guilty of violating Sec3(e) of RA 3019, to wit:
1.that the accused was a public officer performing an official function; 2) that he acted in bad faith; and
3) that injury was caused to another party because of such act.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 189834, March 30, 2011, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS. JAY MANDY MAGLIAN Y REYES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT

Facts:

Atty. Mary Jay and Jay are husband and wife. The couple had a son, Mateo Jay. On January 4, 2000,
Mary and Jay were having dinner when they got into an argument. Jay did not want her husband to
attend a party. When Jay got angry, he collected the clothes that Mary had given him for Christmas and
told Mary he would burn them all. He started to pour kerosene. Mary started to wrestle with Jay for
possession of the gas, at the same time warning him not to pour gas on her. Despite her pleas, Jay still
poured gas on her, setting the clothes and her wife on fire. Jay brought her to the hospital, and later
transferred her to another hospital which did not have a burn unit. When her situation did not improve,
her mother transferred her to the Philippine General Hospital where she eventually expired. Before she
died, she told her mother what happened to her, declaring, “Si Jay Mandy ang nagsunog sa akin”. In his
defense, Jay alleged that the burning was completely accidental. They wrestled for possession of the
kerosene, and both of them got wet. To avoid provoking her, he went upstairs to look for his son. He
heard Mary saying “Mandy, Mandy, nasusunog ako”. He ran downstairs and saw the blaze already
spread to the kitchen. He embraced his wife and tried to put out the fire. He then rushed Mary Jay to
the hospital.

After being charged with the crime of parricide, and a warrant of arrest issued against him, he
voluntarily surrendered to the police. During trial, the dying declaration of Mary Jay was presented as
evidence thru the testimony of Mary Jay’s mother and the househelp, Norma. Jay alleged that Lourdes,
his mother-in-law had an axe to grind against him. She also presented the testimony of his friend, a
police officer, who took another declaration of Mary Jay in the presence of another visitor, a lawyer.

The Regional Trial Court convicted him for parricide and sentenced him accordingly to a penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death.

The Court of Appeals denied his appeal, hence he elevated his case to the Supreme Court.

Issues: Whether or not he raised in his appeal was the failure of the trial court to appreciate the dying
declaration made by Mary Jay in the presence of the police officer and the lawyer, and its appreciation
of the dying declaration made by Mary Jay in the presence of her mother and the house help.

Ruling:
“The Rules of Court states that a dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following
circumstances are present: “(a) it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the
declarant’s death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a
consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or
she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves
the declarant’s death.” The question to be answered is which dying declaration satisfies the
aforementioned circumstances, the one made by Mary Jay to Lourdes and Norma, or the one she made
before Atty. Duque and PO3 San Jose.

Accused-appellant contends that his late wife’s dying declaration as told to the defense witnesses Atty.
Duque and PO3 San Jose effectively absolved him from any wrongdoing. However, it is the dying
declaration presented by the prosecution that satisfies all the requisites provided in the Rules. In
contrast, the dying declaration for the defense did not show that Mary Jay’s death at the time of said
declaration appeared to be imminent and that she was under a consciousness of impending death.

Moreover, We defer to the factual finding that the witnesses for the prosecution were more credible.
Mary Jay’s dying declaration to her mother Lourdes and to Norma showed that accused-appellant was
the one who set her in flames. Lourdes and the Maglians’ laundrywoman Norma both testified that
Mary Jay, moments before her actual death, told them that it was accused-appellant who was
responsible for burning her. Lourdes and Norma both testified that at the time of May Jay’s declaration,
she was lucid and aware that she was soon going to expire. Furthermore, the so-called dying
declaration made by Mary Jay to defense witnesses Atty. Duque and PO3 San Jose suffers from
irregularities. The dying declaration allegedly made to Atty. Duque and PO3 San Jose was handwritten
by the latter but he did not have it sworn under oath. We reiterate too that it was not clear that it was
executed with the knowledge of impending death since the statements were made more than a month
before Mary Jay died.

We agree with the trial and appellate courts that Lourdes and Norma were both credible witnesses and
had no motive to lie about Mary Jay’s dying declaration. The appellate court correctly pointed out that
although Lourdes was Mary Jay’s mother, this relationship did not automatically discredit Lourdes’
testimony. And while accused-appellant alleged that Lourdes as his mother-in-law did not approve of
him, he could not give any improper motive for Norma to falsely accuse him. Between the two
competing statements of the two sets of witnesses, the one presented by the prosecution should clearly
be given more weight as it satisfies the requisites of an admissible dying declaration.”
JOSE T. TUBOLA, JR., PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.

Jose Tubola, Jr. (petitioner) appeals the December 7, 2000 Decision[1] and June 10, 2002 Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 12015 which found him guilty of Malversation of Public Funds
penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner was the cashier of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA)-Aganan, Sta. Barbara River
Irrigation System in Iloilo City. On November 8, 1982, Commission on Audit (COA) State Auditing
Examiners Yvonne Gotera (Gotera) and Theresita Cajita (Cajita) conducted an audit examination of
petitioner's account which indicated a shortage of P93,051.88.

Gotera and Cajita thus sent a letter of demand dated November 23, 1982 to petitioner directing him to
account for the shortage. Petitioner refused to receive the letter, however, hence, Gotera and Cajita
sent it by registered mail.

Petitioner was thereupon charged of committing malversation of public funds before the Sandiganbayan
to which he pleaded "not guilty."

By the account of Gotera, the lone witness for the prosecution, petitioner had an account balance of
P30,162.46 prior to June 25, 1982; that from June 25 to November 8, 1982, the date petitioner's
account was audited, his cash collections totaled P347,995.64; that his remittances from June 25 to
November 8, 1982 totaled P285,105.41; and that the total collections less total remittances amounted
to P93,051.88 as of November 8, 1982.

Still by Gotera's account, the audit team found in petitioner's drawer "vales/chits" or promissory notes
or receivables signed by NIA employees involving the total amount of P79,044.51.

Petitioner, who claimed that he was assigned as cashier since 1978 and was also in charge of payment of
salaries of more than 2,000 field employees in the NIA Jalaur Project, declared that his task of keeping
the collected irrigation fees was temporarily assigned to Editha Valeria (Valeria) upon instruction of his
superior, Regional Director Manuel Hicao,[9] for he (petitioner) was also handling the payroll of around
2,000 employees.
Petitioner further declared that no accounting of the collected fees was undertaken since he trusted
Valeria, who directly remitted them to the bank, after he signed the statement of collection without
reading the contents thereof.

Petitioner presented "vales" and "chits" involving the total amount of P115,661.66 representing loans
extended by Valeria to certain NIA employees and even COA auditors.[11] And he identified "chits" and
"vales" dated 1975 to 1981 inclusive representing loans extended prior to the audit period.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT CONCLUDING THAT HE HAS COMMITTED INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE IN DELEGATING

Held:

The court held that the guilt of the accused, JOSE TUBOLA, JR., having been proven beyond reasonable
doubt, the Court hereby convicts him of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds penalized under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same, and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TEN (10) years
and ONE (1) day of Prision Mayor as Minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) months of Reclusion
Temporal as Maximum, and the accessory penalties provided for by law.

He is likewise ordered to indemnify the Republic of the Philippines the amount of Ninety Three
Thousand Fifty One Pesos and Eighty Eight Centavos (P93,051.88); to pay a fine in the same amount,
which is the amount of money malversed and the costs of suit, and finally to suffer perpetual
disqualification to hold public office.
SPOUSES SUR AND RITA VILLA AND LETICIA GOREMBALEM VALENZUELA VS. PRESIDING JUDGE
ROBERTO L. AYCO, ET AL.

Facts:

Before the Court is an administrative matter against Presiding Judge Roberto L. Ayco, OIC Clerk of Court
Virginia Bartolome and Sheriff IV Crispin S. Calsenia, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Surallah,
South Cotabato. In the Decision dated July 13, 2011, the Court found, among others, Sheriff Calsenia Jr.
guilty of simple misconduct and suspended him from service for three months without pay and other
fringe benefits.

Thereafter, Sheriff Calsenia, Jr. filed the subject "Motion for Reduction of 3-Month Period of
Suspension" dated August 24, 2011. In said motion, respondent recited the following grounds:

(a) That the offense charged upon him is the very first offense that he has ever committed due to honest
unintentional inadvertence;

(b) That his job as a court employee is the sole source of income of his family;

(c) That the long period of three (3) months of receiving no salaries and other fringe benefits will
certainly mean starvation and penury on his family that completely depends on his compensation as a
court employee with nothing to augment the same as his wife, who is jobless, has been suffering from
the chronic ailment of Diabetes and Kidney Disorder and every so often confined in the hospital,
exacerbated by the fact that his three (3) grandchildren, one of whom is now in the elementary school
and whose parents are also unemployed, are under his care and custody, and all of their basic daily
necessities in life totally rely on his meager income;

(d) That the undersigned hereby earnestly states that the offense complained of will never be repeated
as he hereby promises to be circumspect at all times in the performance of his duties as Deputy Sheriff
IV.

Issue:

Whether or not the penalty against Sheriff IV Crispin S. Calsenia, Jr. is hereby MODIFIED from
suspension of three (3) months to one (1) month from the service without pay, with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Held:

The Court RESOLVES to GRANT the motion on humanitarian grounds, considering that respondent was
charged with the offense for the first time and that his employment as an officer of the court is the sole
source of income for his family. The penalty against Sheriff IV Crispin S. Calsenia, Jr. is hereby MODIFIED
from suspension of three (3) months to one (1) month from the service without pay, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
RIZALINA L. GEMINA, A.C. No. 6689

Complainant,

- versus -

ATTY. ISIDRO S. MADAMBA, August 24, 2011

Respondent.

Facts:

We review Resolution No. XVIII-2008-101 dated March 6, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), dismissing the complaint filed by Rizalina L. Gemina
(complainant). The complaint charged Atty. Isidro S. Madamba (respondent) with deceit, malpractice
and gross negligence, and prayed for his suspension/disbarment.

The complainant alleged that she is an heir of the registered owner of several parcels of land located in
Laoag City.These parcels of land were unlawfully sold by Francisco Eugenio in connivance with the
respondent. The documents pertaining to the transactions over these lands were notarized by the
respondent either without the presence of the affiants or with their forged signatures.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Isidro S. Madamba GUILTY of violating the Notarial Law, the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice

Held:

The IBP resolution, based wholly on Commissioner Maalas Report and Recommendation, totally missed
and disregarded the submitted evidence and the respondents testimony during the hearing of the
complaint. The IBP apparently had treated the respondent with exceptional leniency. In our view, the
respondents age and sickness cannot be cited as reasons to disregard the serious lapses he committed in
the performance of his duties as a lawyer and as a notary public. The inaccuracies in his Notarial Register
entries and his failure to enter the documents that he admittedly notarized constitute dereliction of
duty as a notary public. He cannot escape liability by putting the blame on his secretary. The lawyer
himself, not merely his secretary, should be held accountable for these misdeeds.

A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the
acknowledgement and affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of these notarial
acts, the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal affixed on documents. The
notarial seal converts a document from a private to a public instrument, after which it may be presented
as evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due execution. Thus, notarization should not
be treated as an empty, meaningless or routinary act. A notary public exercises duties calling for
carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most
importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal transactions.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law and legal processes. The Notarial Law and
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, moreover, require a duly commissioned notary public to make the
proper entries in his Notarial Register and to refrain from committing any dereliction or any act which
may serve as cause for the revocation of his commission or the imposition of administrative sanctions.

Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the respondents failure to make the proper entry or entries
in his Notarial Register of his notarial acts, his failure to require the presence of a principal at the time of
the notarial acts, and his failure to identify a principal on the basis of personal knowledge by competent
evidence are grounds for the revocation of a lawyers commission as a notary public.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Isidro S. Madamba GUILTY of violating the Notarial Law,
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility, and hereby orders the
REVOCATION of his notarial commission, if still existing. He is further SUSPENDED indefinitely from
reappointment as a Notary Public. Considering the seriousness of his violations, he deserves disbarment
from the practice of law but taking into account his old age and sickness, the Court, for humanitarian
reasons, hereby orders his SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
People vs. Santiago

FACTS:

Petitioner Gregorio Santiago caused the death of a 7year old boy by striking himwith an automobile that
he was driving. Santiago was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, Santiago does
not agree with the courts sentence,questioning the constitutionality of act no. 2886 amending order no.
58 stating thatall prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the U.S... Act no. 2886stating
that all prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of thePhilippine islands.

ISSUE:

Whether the procedure in criminal matters is incorporated in the constitution of thestate?

HELD:

NO, procedure in criminal matter is not incorporated in the constitution of thestates, but it is left in the
hand of the legislature, so that it falls within the realm of public statutory law.It is limited to criminal
procedure and its intention is to give to its provision theeffect of law in criminal matters.In pursuance of
the constitution of the US each state has the authority, under itspolice power rule to define and punish
crimes and to lay down the rules of criminalprocedure. The delegation to our government needs no
demo, the crimes committed w in ourterritory even before sec 2 of general orders no.58 was amended,
were prosecutedand punish jurisdiction .Act no. 2886 (feb 24 1920) criminal complainant was filed may
10 1920. The silenceof congress regarding those laws amendatory of the said general orders must
beconsidered as an act of the approval.
BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner,

vs.

GOODMAN FIELDER INTERNATIONAL PHILIPPINES, INC. Respondent.

Facts:

Goodman Fielder International Philippines, Inc. (respondent), a corporation duly registered and existing
under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, is engaged in marketing of fats and oil shortening.

Keraj Marketing Company (Keraj), represented by its purported owner Sunil K. Amarnani (Amarnani),
sought a distributorship agreement from respondent. As a pre-requisite to respondent's consent, a
credit line/bank guaranty in the amount of P500,000.00 was required from Keraj. Amarnani thus applied
for a credit line/bank guaranty with the Bacolod branch of Bank of Commerce (petitioner).

Aragon subsequently issued a similar letter (dated October 18, 20004) in favor of Bacolod RK
Distributors and Co., (Bacolod RK), an entity also allegedly owned by Amarnani, attesting to the
arrangement by Keraj for a credit line in the amount of P2,000,000.00, to be utilized for the settlement
of Keraj's accounts with respondent.

Both letters of Aragon contain a "check write" on the left side indicating the amount applied for as credit
line.1avvphil Keraj and Bacolod RK did not pursue their application for a credit line, however, despite
follow-up advice from petitioner.

A year later, respondent informed petitioner, by letter of October 24, 2001,5 its intent to claim against
the bank guaranty issued to settle Keraj and Bacolod RK's unpaid accounts. By another letter dated
November 20, 2001,6 respondent advised petitioner its intent to collect the amount of P1,817,691.30
representing Keraj and Bacolod RK's unpaid obligations.

Negotiations for the settlement of Keraj and Bacolod RK's obligations having failed, respondent filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money against Keraj, Amarnani, Bacolod RK, and petitioner and its
manager Aragon before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig.

In defense, petitioner and Aragon claimed that the letters merely certified that Keraj and Bacolod RK
applied for the issuance of a bank guaranty, but no actual bank guaranty was approved, both companies
having failed to present the required documents for processing the application.

Bacolod RK, on the other hand, denied any involvement in the transaction between Keraj and
respondent.Only petitioner presented evidence.

Issue:

THE DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE

The resolution of the case hinges on what Aragon's statement in the letters sent to respondent that "…
we are pleased to inform you that said Corporation has arranged for a credit line " conveys.

Section 13, Rule 130, Rules of Court on interpretation of an instrument provides:

SEC. 13. Interpretation according to circumstances - For the proper construction of an instrument, the
circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties
to it, may be shown so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose language he is to
interpret. (underscoring supplied)

A consideration of the circumstances under which Aragon's letter-certifications were issued is thus in
order.

Amarnani's letter-request of August 21, 2000 for a conditional certification from Aragon was granted
two days later when Aragon issued the letter-certification addressed to respondent. Within that period,
it could not have been possible for petitioner to even process the application, given that Amarnani had
not even complied with the requirements as he, himself, indicated in his letter-request to Aragon to
"please tell [him] the requirements for the credit line so [he] c[ould] apply."

The Distributorship Agreement between respondent and Keraj was forged on October 2, 2000 or 39
days after the issuance of the letter-certification, long enough for respondent to verify if indeed a bank
guaranty was, to its impression, granted.

By respondent's finance manager Leonora Armi Salvador's testimony, upon receipt of the two letter-
certifications,11 she concluded that they were bank guarantees considering their similarity with other
bank guarantees in favor of respondent by other distributors; and she made inquiries with petitioner
only after Keraj defaulted in the payment of its obligation to respondent.12

In light of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner could not have conveyed that it was issuing a bank
guaranty in favor of Amarnani.
Respondent's reliance on Aragon's use of a "check writer," a machine used to input a numerical or
written value impression in the "payment amount field" of a check that is very difficult to alter, on the
left side of each letter- certification, was misplaced, what prevails being the wordings of the letter-
certifications.13

The challenged Court of Appeals Decision of June 17, 2009 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of
respondent, Goodman Fielder International Philippines, Inc. is, with respect to petitioner, Bank of
Commerce, DISMISSED.
ESTRADA V DESIERTO

Facts:

After Estrada’s impeachment proceedings were aborted and his resignation from the Presidential post, a
cluster of legal problems started appearing. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman were set in motion including among others, bribery and graft and corruption, plunder,
perjury, serious miscounduct, malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds. A special panel of
investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against
the petitioner.Petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further
proceedings in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of
petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted Petitioner also contends that the respondent
Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him due to
the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has
developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in violation of his right to due process.

Issue:

Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity

Held:

No. Then and now, we now rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free
press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused’s right to a fair trial for, as well pointed
out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish information about
trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial
processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the
trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the
publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. Our judges are learned
in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a
litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their
impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the
barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. To warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced,
not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show
that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media
coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove
that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of
change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias
and he has not discharged the burden. The court recognizes that pervasive and prejudicial publicity
under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. However,
petitioner needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Thus the petition was dismissed.
HEIRS OF SEVERA P. GREGORIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RICARDO SANTOS, ROSALINA PALOMO,
SPOUSES WILSON TAN and BENITA LUI TAN

Facts:

Spouses Wilson Tan and Benita Lui Tan are the registered owners of a 1,381.1 square meter lot located
along Quezon Blvd., Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 349788 issued by the register of Deeds of Quezon
City. The lot was previously owned by Severa Gregorio as evidenced by TCT No. 8787 issued to her on
January 4, 1949. Sometime in 1965, Shell company leased the lot from Severa for a period of twenty (20)
years. On September 20, 1976, Severa died intestate leaving behind three (3) legitimate children -
Buenconsejo Vivar, Jesusa aGalang and Cecilio Pineda. On March 9, 1982, Cecilio died. Buenconsejo was
shocked to find that her brothers title, TCT No. 8787, was cancelled and that in lieu thereof, TCT No.
349787 was issued to spouses Tan.

With respect to the remaining 1/3 portion, it appears that in 1978, spouses Felicisimo and Rosalina
Palomo filed with the then Court of First Instance of Caloocan City an action for a sum of money against
Jesusa Galang (Severas daughter) and her husband Victoriano Galang. The court decided the case in
favor of the Palomos. On December 20, 1978, the 1/3 undivided share of Jesusa in the lot was sold on
execution to the Palomos, being the highest bidders. The Galangs failed to redeem the property within
one year. Hence, a final deed of sale in favor of the Palomos was confirmed by the court and recorded in
the Quezon City Registry of Deeds.

On October 30, 1986, the heirs of Severa Gregorio filed with the trial court the instant complaint against
spouses Tan for cancellation of title and/or reconveyance with damages alleging that the deeds of
conveyance were forged and are therefore void.

Thereafter, or on June 11, 1988, a fire gutted the Quezon City Hall Building. The entire records of this
case were destroyed. The key documents, such as the original copy of the deed of sale between Severa
Gregorio and Ricardo Santos dated July 14, 1971 covering 2/3 portion of the lot; the original copy of the
deed of sale between Ricardo Santos and spouses Tan covering the same portion dated September 17,
1986; the original copy of the deed of assignment from spouses Palomo to spouses Tan covering 1/3
portion of the same lot dated September 18, 1986; and the original copy of TCT No. 349788 in the
names of spouses Tan were all burned.

On July 10, 1989, the trial court issued an order for the reconstitution of the records. The parties had
hardly started the reconstitution when, on September 29, 1989, the heirs of Gregorio filed an amended
and/or supplemental complaint which was admitted by the court. The supplemental matters revolved
around the signature of Severa Gregorio affixed to the July 14, 1971 deed of sale between her and
Ricardo Santos. On February 12, 1990, spouses Tan filed an answer to the amended complaint alleging
that the deed of sale was genuine and that they purchased the property in good faith.
Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE NBI HANDWRITING EXPERT FOR THE REASON THAT WHAT HE TESTIFIED ON IN
COURT WAS A MERE XEROX COPY OF THE QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE

Held:

The assignment of rights by the spouses Palomo to respondent spouses Tan over a 1/3 portion of
subject property sold on execution to the Palomos in satisfaction of a final judgment is not raised as an
issue in this appeal.

Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for not giving credence to the testimony of NBI handwriting expert
Bienvenido Albacea, who examined the deed of sale in question and concluded that the signature
thereon purporting to be that of the late Severa Gregorio, is forged. They contend that, as borne out by
the records, (1) on September 10, 1987, Albacea conducted an examination of the original copy of
subject deed of sale dated July 14, 1971 at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City; (2) on the
basis of such examination, he arrived at the conclusion that the signature appearing thereon was forged;
(3) unfortunately, as a result of the fire of June 11, 1988, which destroyed the Quezon City Hall, the
records of the case were all burned including the original copy of the aforesaid deed of sale; and (4) the
said original copy of the deed of sale could not be produced in court thereby necessitating the
presentation of a certified true xerox copy thereof.

Following the ruling in U.S. vs. Gregorio[5] and Borje vs. Sandiganbayan[6], the Court of Appeals
reversed the findings by the trial court and ruled out the testimony of the NBI handwriting expert,
holding that when the genuineness of signatures on a document is sought to be proved or disproved
through comparison of standard signatures with the questioned signatures, a xerox copy or photo copy
cannot be used by the expert witness in lieu of the original. It disregarded the expert testimony of the
said witness who presented during his testimony in court only a mere photostat (xerox) copy of the
subject deed of sale. The petition is not impressed with merit.

Basic is the rule of evidence that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
is admissible other than the original document itself except in the instances mentioned in Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. Mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to
the best evidence rule. This is especially true when the issue is that of forgery.

As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence
and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in an
instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be
established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine
signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon to have been forged. Without the original
document containing the alleged forged signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison which
would establish forgery. A comparison based on a mere xerox copy or reproduction of the document
under controversy cannot produce reliable results.
ERNESTO M. PUNZALAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND D. MENESES

Facts:

Danilo Manalastas, Ferdinand Meneses and Ernesto Punzalan were among the four (4) candidates for
mayor of the municipality of Mexico, Pampanga during the May 8, 1995 elections.

On May 24, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Ferdinand Meneses as the duly
elected mayor, having garnered a total of 10,301 votes against Danilo Manalastas 9,317 votes and
Ernesto Punzalans 8,612 votes.

On May 30, 1995, Danilo Manalastas filed an election protest docketed as Election Case No. E-005-95
before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, challenging the results of the elections in
the municipalitys forty-seven (47) precincts. In due time, Ferdinand Meneses filed his answer with
counter protest impugning the results in twenty-one (21) precinctsof the 47 protested by Manalastas.

On June 2, 1995, Ernesto Punzalan filed his own election protest docketed as Election Case No. E-006-95,
also before the RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga, questioning the results of the elections in one hundred
and fifty seven (157) precincts. Meneses, on his part, filed an answer with counter-protest with respect
to ninety-six (96) precincts of the 157 protested by Punzalan.

Since the two (2) election protests involved the same parties and subject matter, they were ordered
consolidated and were jointly tried by the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44.

Issue:

Whether or not an expert witness genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots

Held:

On the issue of the genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots, it is observed that the specimens
examined by Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, presented by Punzalan as an expert witness, were mere certified
true copies of the ballots and documents concerned. This fact raised a cloud of doubt and made the
findings suspect. Consequently, the examination of the ballots themselves by the COMELEC should not
be brushed aside. Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court the COMELEC
in this case to make itself the comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings admitted as genuine
by the party whom the evidence is offered.

Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive in the sense that they must be accepted as true on the
subject of their testimony, but are generally regarded as purely advisory in character; the courts may
place whatever weight they choose upon such testimony and may reject it, if they find that it is
consistent with the facts in the case or otherwise unreasonable.
In the same manner, whether or not certain ballots were marked had been addressed by the COMELEC
by personally and actually examining the ballots themselves. We find no compelling reasons to disturb
its findings.

In closing, we would like to stress a well-founded rule ensconced in our jurisprudence that laws and
statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the
end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical
infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel
uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ARTURO MENDOZA, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

On August 5, 1936, the appellant and Jovita de Asis were married in Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941,
during the subsistence of the first marriage, the appellant was married to Olga Lema in the City of
Manila. On February 2, 1943, Jovita de Asis died. On August 19, 1949, the appellant contracted another
marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna. This last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for
and conviction of the crime of bigamy.

The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941 is null and void and,
therefore, non-existent, having been contracted while his first marriage with Jovita de Asis August 5,
1936 was still in effect, and that his third marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on August 19, 1949 cannot be
the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place after the death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor
General, however, argues that, even assuming that appellant's second marriage to Olga Lema is void, he
is not exempt from criminal liability, in the absence of a previous judicial annulment of said bigamous
marriage; and the case of People vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, is cited.

Issue:

Whether or not Jose Cotas, impeached the validity of his first marriage for lack of necessary formalities

Held:

The decision invoked by the Solicitor General, rendered by the Court of Appeals, is not controlling. Said
case is essentially different, because the defendant therein, Jose Cotas, impeached the validity of his
first marriage for lack of necessary formalities, and the Court of Appeals found his factual contention to
be without merit.

In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted during
the existence of his first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in force
at the time the appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as follows:

Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:

(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void
by a competent court.

This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the
lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages. There is here no pretence that
appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de
Asis, has been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said
marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent court.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de
officio so ordered.
PEOPLE V. ADOVISO

Facts:

Adoviso was charged with double murder. He offered in evidence the testimony a NBI polygraph
examiner who conducted a test on him. The examiner’s report revealed that “there were no specific
reactions indicative of deception to pertinent questions relevant to the investigation of the crime.”

Issue:

Whether or not polygraph is not conclusive

Held:

The Court held that are not bound to submit to expert testimony. Faith and credit must not be vested
upon the lie detector test, which is not conclusive as the polygraph has not yet attained scientific
acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception.
SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CA

Facts:

Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of
marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage
license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone
conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence. However, the trial court
admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence and later on denied her motion for
reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the admission
in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.

These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the
military to wire tap his home telephone.

CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other
variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented
and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and the even
handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a
supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory;
neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal
from the judgment on the merits and not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error,
assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by
appeal and not by certiorari.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence

Whether or not the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by
the petitioner in the Court of Appeals
Held:

1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described. . . .

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning
of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by any
person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the
same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory
order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment,
incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.

However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would
not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress
JAO VS COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 128314. May 29, 2002.

Facts:

Petitioner (Rodolfo Jao) and Private Respondent (Perico Jao) were the sons of the deceased Spouses
Ignacioand Andrea Jao who died intestate in 1988 and 1989.Private respondent filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration in the RTC of Quezon City over theestate of his parents. Pending the
appointment of a regular administrator, private respondent Perico moved that he beappointed as
special administrator, alleging that petitioner Rodolfo was dissipating the assets of the estate. Petitioner
moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue. He alleged that his parents did
not reside in Quezon City during their lifetime but in Angeles City, Pampanga. He submitted
documentary evidence showing that his deceased parents were residents of Angeles City, Pampanga.
Private respondent Perico countered that his parents resides in Quezon City and in fact, actually resided
inpetitioner’s house as shown in the death certificate presented before the court. Petitioner argued that
his parents stay in Quezon City was merely transitory and that the death certificates could not be
deemed conclusive evidence of the decedents’ residence. The trial court ruled in favor of private
respondent Perico. The CA affirmed in to the trial court’s decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the settlement proceeding was properly laid in Quezon City.

Held:

Yes. The settlement proceeding was properly laid in Quezon City.As provided for under the Rules of
Court, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration granted
in the proper court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death. The
Rules of Court refers to residence at the time of death, not to the permanent residence or domicile. In
the case of it was held that the term resides connotes ex vi termini “actual residence” as distinguished
from legal residence or domicile. xxx resides should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence and also an
intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time is required; however, the residence
must me more than temporary. In the case at bar, it was found that the decedents’ have been living in
Quezon City at the time of their death and sometime prior thereto, and as was also shown in the death
certificate presented by private respondent. Thus, the venue for the settlement of the decedents’
intestate was properly laid in the Quezon City.
PEOPLE V. LEONCIO ALIVIANO G.R. NO. 133985

Facts:

Accused was convicted of raping a 7 year old girl. He interposed denial and assails the admissibility of
the medical certificate since the doctor who prepared it was not presented.

Issue:

Whether or not medical certificate is not indispensable to prove the commission of rape. It is merely a
corroborative evidence

HELD:

Concededly, the subject medical certificate cannot be given any probative value. It is settled that since a
medical certificate involves an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it
could not be given weight nor credit unless the doctor who issued it be presented in court to show his
qualifications. In any case, medical certificate is not indispensable to prove the commission of rape. It is
merely a corroborative evidence. The lone testimony of the complainant which is credible and free from
serious and material contradictions is sufficient to warrant the conviction of appellant.
PEOPLE V. VALLEJO

Facts:

Vallejo was charged with rape with homicide. The prosecution submitted DNA evidence gathered from
the body of the victim which matched the DNA profile of Vallejo. He assailed the DNA analysis, claiming
that it failed to show that the samples submitted for DNA testing were not contaminated after having
been soaked in smirchy water before being submitted to the laboratory.

Issue:

Whether or not assessing the probative value of DNA evidence

Held:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, among other things, the
following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.
TIJING VS CA

FACTS:

Edgardo Tijing and Bienvenida Tijing, husband and wife, have six children. The youngest is Edgardo
Tijing, Jr.Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of Angelita Diamante.According to
Bienvenida, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgentlaundry job. Since Bienvenida was on
her way to do some marketing, she askedAngelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-
month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under her care, as she usually let Angelita take care of the child
whileBienvenida was doing laundry.When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo,
Jr., weregone. She was told that her employer went out for a stroll and was told to comeback later. She
returned to Angelita's house after three days, only to discover thatAngelita had moved to another
place.Bienvenida and her husband looked for their missing son in other places.However, despite their
serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.Four years later, Bienvenida read in a tabloid
about the death of TomasLopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita. Thus, she wen to
toHagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first timeafter four years. She
claims that the boy was already named John Thomas Lopez.She avers that Angelita refused to return to
her the boy despite her demand to doso. The spouses filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial
court in orderto recover their son. To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented twowitnesses.
One of whom is Benjamin Lopez, the brother of Tomas Lopez. He,declared that his brother, could not
have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez asthe latter was sterile. The trial court concluded that since
Angelita and her common-law husbandcould not have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez
is an impossibility. The Court of Appeals however reversed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and thesame person and is the son
of petitioners?

HELD:

YES. A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidencepresented by Bienvenida is
sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actuallyher missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.First, there is
evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children.
People vs Yatar

FACTS:

On June 30, 1998, Kathylyn Uba stayed in her grandmother Isabel Dawang house, despite her intention
to go forth Tuguegarao City, as her other former’s housemate-relatives left in the morning. At 10:00 am,
accused-appellant Joel Yatar was seen at the back of the same house where Kathylyn stayed during said
date. At 12:30 pm, Judilyn, Kathylyns first cousin saw Yatar, who was then wearing a white shirt with
collar and black pants, descended from the second floor and was pacing back and forth at the back of
Isabel Dawangs house, Judilyn didn’t find this unusual since Yatar and his wife used to live therein. At
1:30 PM, Yatar called upon Judilyn, telling the latter that he would not be getting the lumber he had
been gathering. This time, Judilyn noticed that Yatar is now wearing a black shirt (without collar) and
blue pants; and noticed that the latters eyes were reddish and sharp. Accused-appellant asked about the
whereabouts of Judilyns husband, as the former purports to talk with the latter. Then, Yatar
immediately left when Judilyns husband arrived. In the evening, when Isabel Dawang arrived home, she
found the lights of her house turned off, the door of the ground floor opened, and the containers, which
she asked Kathylyn to fill up, were still empty. Upon ascending the second floor to check whether the
teenage girl is upstairs, Isabel found that the door therein was tied with rope. When Isabel succeeded
opening the tied door with a knife, and as she groped in the darkness of the second level of her house,
she felt Kathylyns lifeless and naked body, with some intestines protruding out from it. Soon after,
police came to the scene of the crime to provide assistance. Therein, they found Kathylyns clothes and
undergarments beside her body. Amongst others, a white collared shirt splattered with blood was also
found 50-meters away from Isabels house. Meanwhile, semen has also been found upon examination of
Kathylyns cadaver. When subjected under DNA testing, results showed that the DNA comprising the
sperm specimen is identical to Yatars genotype. Yatar was accused of the special complex crime of Rape
with Homicide and was convicted for the same by the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga. Thereafter,
he made an appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court in order to assail the court a quos decision. On
appeal, Yatar avers that: (1) the trial court erred in giving much weight to the evidence DNA testing or
analysis done on him, in lieu of the seminal fluid found inside the victim’s (cadaver) vaginal canal; (2) the
blood sample taken from is violative of his constitutional right against self-incrimination; and the
conduct of DNA testing is also in violation on prohibition against ex-post facto laws.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the result of the DNA testing done on the sperm specimen may be used as evidence for
Yatar’s conviction?

HELD :

Noteworthy is the fact this case was decided on 2004, which was three (3) years before the Rules on
DNA evidence took effect. The Supreme Court in this case ruled based on the US case of Daubert vs.
Merrell Dow as a precedent. In the said US jurisprudence, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on
scientifically valid principles could be used, so long as the same is RELEVANT and RELIABLE. Hence, it was
called then as the DAUBERT TEST. At present, SECTION 7, RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE may be used as the
legal basis. Sec. 7 of the Rules on DNA evidence,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. BENJAMIN C. MAGPAYO, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

Appellant Benjamin C. Magpayo was charged with Rape, Robbery, Robbery with Hold-up and Forcible
Abduction with Rape before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon in four (4) separate complaints and
informations allegedly committed. He was charged for the (1) rape of a minor, Lilibeth Bobis, on April 10,
1988; (2) robbery of the Lilibeth’s cash money on the same date; (3) robbery with hold-up on an 8-year-
old Jacquiline Yutuc-Jaime of her earrings and gold ring on February 1988; and (4) forcible abduction
with rape of Mara N. Chico on November 1987.

Magpayo entered a plea of not guilty to all charges. However, after trial, he was found guilty of all
offenses charged in a joint decision rendered by the trial court.

In the first case of rape, victim Lilibeth was able to provide a description of her rapist to the NBI artist,
who, on the basis thereof, made a sketch of the rapist’s face. She also clearly identified the accused as
her rapist, after referring to the shape of his nose as “matangos” and the eyes as “singkit”, in the police
station. Simarly on the case for forcible abduction with rape, the victim Mara also gave a description to
an NBI artist who drew the suspect’s face. On May 22, 1998, the victims Lilibeth, Mara and Jacquiline
(case for robbery hold-up) were able to positively identify the appellant as the perpetrator of the crimes
when the latter was arrested by the police and brought to the police station.

Appellant vehemently questions the trial court’s decision finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt
because the prosecution witnesses allegedly failed to positively identify him. He avers that when he was
arrested to answer for an alleged wrongdoing on May 22, 1988, complainants were hesitant to point at
him and kept on looking at their parents.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT IN THE FOUR CHARGES, DESPITE ABSENCE OF PROOF THAT HE IS THE
PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.

RULING: NO.
Under the circumstances, the Court is of the opinion that the lingering shock caused by such harrowing
experience at the hands of appellant could have caused the minor complainants to hesitate in directly
identifying him. Hence, the fact that complainants kept on looking at their parents is of no moment.
They were simply scared, looked at their parents for assurance, and such initial hesitation could by no
means indicate that complainants were guilty of fabrication.

Although Lilibeth Bobis admitted that she was not able to immediately identify the appellant at the
police station after his arrest, she declared that she thought it over very carefully if the appellant was
indeed the offender. The crime was committed on April 10, 1988 or one (1) month before Lilibeth Bobis
was again confronted with the man who had sexually abused her.

Appellant points out, however, that his actual physical features vary with the sketches prepared by the
NBI artists based on the description of the offender given by complainants Bobis and Chico. But this is
beside the point. Given the immaturity of complainants, it is of course natural that the sketches of
appellant based on the descriptions given by them would somehow differ with appellant’s actual
physical features.

What is important is that Bobis remembered the square shape of appellant’s face, his eyes to be
“singkit” and his nose as “matangos”. Indeed, familiarity with the physical features, particularly those of
the face, is actually the best way to identify the person (People v. Reception, 198 SCRA 670 [1991]).

JUDGMENT OF TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED.

Facts:

That on or about August 16, 2001, in the Municipality,Province and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, JESUS BALIGOD Y PINEDA, with lewd design and by the use of force
and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
the offended party, [AAA],6 against her will.

Based on the testimonies of AAA, the victim herself, and BBB, the wife of AAA's nephew, the
prosecution established that at around 9:00 p.m. on August 16, 2001, AAA, 67 years old, was on her way
to her sister's place in xxx, Cagayan. While she was at the roadside looking for a tricycle, Baligod came
from behind, grabbed her and held her neck. She struggled but she fell to the ground. Baligod dragged
her towards the inner portion of the roadside and continuously boxed her on the chest and mouth. Then
he forced her to lie down. He threatened to kill her. When she got weak, Baligod removed her shorts
and underwear, went on top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina. After satisfying his lust,
Baligod ran away. AAA cried for help.

BBB was at her residence around 9:30 p.m. and heard AAA's cry for help. She and her husband went
outside and saw AAA sitting at the roadside naked from waist down. AAA's mouth was bleeding, her face
was swollen and she was having difficulty breathing. When they asked AAA what happened, AAA
narrated that she was sexually molested by "Kisut" Baligod. BBB sought the help of DDD, AAA's brother,
who reported the incident to the police authorities. AAA was brought to xxx District Hospital.

Issue:

Whether or not appellant's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling but modified the award of moral damages. It
regarded AAA as a credible witness and accorded full credence to AAA's testimony because it was
categorical, straightforward and consistent. It also ruled that appellant's acts of grabbing AAA, holding
her neck, boxing her several times on the chest and mouth and threatening to kill her are strongly
suggestive of force or at least intimidation sufficient to bring her to submission. The decretal portion of
the decision the appealed decision in Criminal Case is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellant Jesus Baligod y Pineda is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is
further ordered to indemnify the private complainant the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC of Cebu, Br.
19, BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM SHIPPING, INCORPORATED

Facts: On april 20, 1996, M/V DibenaWinm being operated and owned by the herein private respondent
Bangpai shipping company under its hip agent Wallen shipping Inc., accidentally bumped the power
barge of the herein petitioner, NAPOCOR. The latter filed a complaint for damages on april 26, 1996
before the sala of the herein public respondent judge. During the presentation of evidence, the
petitioner presented as pieces of evidence Xerox copies, to which such was admitted by the court.
Hoever, a motion to strike out the evidence was filed before the court to which the court ordered that
such pieces of evidence be stricken out of the records but has to be attached to the documents for
proper disposition by the appellate in case of appeal before the latter. The petitioner aver that such
documents be admitted for the basic reason that such is within the purview of the electronic evidence.

Issue: Whether or not thepeices of evidence submitted by the petitioner be regarded within the
purview of the electronic evidence for the court be compelled to admit?

Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following?

Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence as follows:

"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures,
symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes
digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects
the electronic data message or electronic document. For the purpose of these Rules, the term
"electronic document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data message".

On the other hand, an "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information,
data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by
which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and
affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means
which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document.

The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document
is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other document which is
presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an electronic document
from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the
information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically.

A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all
of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents,
may be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a person’s signature
affixed manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts
were produced through an electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as
defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous,
interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to
electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional
equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.

Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. — There can be no evidence of a writing the
contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the following
cases:

(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;

(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a public officer;

(d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a certified copy of which is made evidence
by law;

(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general
result of the whole."

When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror,
upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part,
may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the
predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of
documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable
inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and
bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place or places.
However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary
evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was made in accordance with the exceptions as
enumerated under the abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the court a quo
denying admissibility of the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.

Indeed the documents presented by the petitioner as evidence before the court were not within the
purview electronic document or electronic data message. It will be highly unacceptable to regard an
information manually written down to be regarded as electronic message. The petitioner cannot aver
now to submit the original copies of the documents since they were given enough time to submit such
but they refused to do so and insist that the photocopies be admitted instead. The high court denied
such petition.
MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SSANGYONG CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its
suppliers is the responded, an international trading company with head office in Seoul, South Korea and
regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations conducted business through
telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Respondent would send the pro forma invoices
containing the details of the steel product order to petitioner; if the latter conforms thereto, its
representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to the respondent, again by fax.

Respondent filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint, respondent alleged that defendants breached their
contract when they refused to open the letter of credit in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the
remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.

After respondent rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that respondent failed
to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. Petitioner
contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent Ssangyong to prove
the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the
ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the best evidence the original fax transmittal.
On the other hand, respondent posits that, from a reading of the law and the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, the original facsimile transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence since it is
an electronic document and, therefore, the best evidence under the law and the Rules. Respondent
further claims that the photocopies of these fax transmittals (specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-
POSTS0401-2) are admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the respondent sufficiently explained
the non-production of the original fax transmittals.

Issue:

Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and
admissible as such?

Held:

Electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rule, as long as it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, showing to reflect
the data accurately. Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be
considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the
writing must foremost be an “electronic data message” or an “electronic document.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792 defines the “Electronic Data Message”
refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means, but not
limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.

The phrase “but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy” in the IRR’s definition of “electronic data message” is copied from the Model Law on
Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), from which majority of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792 were taken. While Congress deleted
this phrase in the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR reinstated it. The deletion by
Congress of the said phrase is significant and pivotal.

Moreover, when Congress formulated the term “electronic data message,” it intended the same
meaning as the term “electronic record” in the Canada law. This construction of the term “electronic
data message,” which excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with
the Electronic Commerce Law’s focus on “paperless” communications and the “functional equivalent
approach” that it espouses. Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, “paperless,” but verily are
paper-based.

[I]n an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that is
scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. … [I]n a virtual or paperless
environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality
are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law’s definition of
“electronic data message,” which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with “electronic document,” could
not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-
based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal
effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in communications and computer technology
when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy
(except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as compared to the ordinary fax
machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term “electronic data message.” The terms
“electronic data message” and “electronic document,” as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be
considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best
Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DELILAH VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS, COURT OF APPEALS, Complainant, vs. CIELITO M.
SALUD, CLERK IV, COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.

Facts:

Respondent is charged and held liable for offenses on inefficiency and incompetence of official duty;
conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and directly and indirectly having financial
and material interest in an official transaction considering his undue interest in the service of the order
of release and actual release of Melchor Lagua.

Lagua was found guilty of homicide and was then detained at the Bureau of Prisons National
Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City. Lagua’s petition for bond was approved in a Resolution where the
appellate court directed the issuance of an order of release in favor of Lagua. The resolution was
brought to the office of Atty. Madarang, Division Clerk of Court, for promulgation.

Respondent served the resolution and order of release of Lagua at the National Penitentiary, where
Lagua was detained for homicide.Meanwhile, Atty. Madarang received a call from a certain Melissa
Melchor, who introduced herself as Lagua’s relative, asking how much more they had to give to facilitate
Lagua’s provisional liberty, and that they sought the help of a certain Rhodora Valdez of RTC Pasig, but
was told that they still had a balance. When Atty. Madarang was able to get the mobile number of
respondent, he represented himself as Lagua’s relative and exchanged text messages with said
respondent for a possible pay-off for the Lagua’s provisional liberty. Atty. Madarang later discovered
that the respondent did not properly serve the copies of the Resolution and Order of Release upon the
accused-appellant and his counsel. but gave them to a certain Art Baluran, allegedly Lagua’s relative.

Later on, Complainant called the respondent to her office. When confronted, the respondent denied
extorting or receiving money for Lagua’s release, or in any other case. He, however, admitted serving
the copies of resolution and order of release intended for Lagua and his counsel to Art Baluran.
Complainant then lodged the complaint against the respondent in a Letter dated November 14, 2003.

Issue:

Whether or not the admission of text messages as evidence constitutes a violation of right to privacy of
the accused?

Held:
No. The respondent’s claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him constitutes
a violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been classified as “ephemeral
electronic communication” under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and “shall be
proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof.”
Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and academic, as the respondent
himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of the first three messages on
Atty. Madarang’s cell phone.

This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao. In that case,
the Court, in finding the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, considered text
messages addressed to the complainant asking for a million pesos in exchange for a favorable decision in
a case pending before the CA. The Court had the occasion to state:

The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by
Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which provides:

“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text messages … and other
electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.”
RAMCAR, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v. HI-POWER MARKETING, LEONIDAS D. BOHOL, and RHODORA
A. BOHOL, Respondents.

Facts:

Respondent Leonidas Bohol (Bohol) is a distributor of Ramcar products in Quezon City and San Pablo
City using the business name Hi-Power Marketing. On 4 March 1982, Ramcar and Bohol entered into a
loan agreement whereby Ramcar allotted P300,000.00 as a trade credit line for the batteries to be
distributed by Bohol, and released another P300,000.00 as a straight loan to the latter. To secure the
payment of the loan, Bohol executed a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land and its improvements
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 285976. Bohol also signed an undated promissory note
stipulating the schedule of payments and the breakdown of the principal amount and the interest to be
paid.

Subsequently, on the premise that Bohol had defaulted on his loan, Ramcar petitioned the sheriff of
Quezon City to foreclose the mortgage to satisfy an indebtedness plus interest. The auction sale was set
on 6 July 1984.

On 3 July 1984, Bohol and his wife (spouses Bohol) filed a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 101, docketed as Special Civil
Action No. Q-42032, to prevent the sheriff from conducting the auction sale. The RTC issued a status quo
order on 4 July 1984, thereby temporarily averting the scheduled sale.

After trial, finding that Bohol had defaulted in the performance of his obligation, the RTC rendered its
decision dismissing the petition for prohibition. The spouses Bohol filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and For New Trial which was denied by the RTC on 4 November 1985.

Issue:

Whether or not evidence provides the procedure on how to present documentary evidence

Held:

The Court ruled that on evidence provides the procedure on how to present documentary evidence
before the court, as follows: firstly, the documents should be authenticated and proved in the manner
provided in the rules of court; secondly, the documents should be identified and marked; and thirdly, it
should be formally offered to the court and shown to the opposing party so that the latter may have the
opportunity to object thereto.

We have carefully examined the documentary evidence presented by the parties in the RTC and the CA
and found that the documents now being presented by Ramcar, the purchases of Hi-Power Marketing,
payments of battery account, and credit memos issued by Ramcar applied to Hi-Power Market thru
offsetting were not part of the records in the lower court or the appellate court. They were submitted
for the first time to this Court. This being the case, we shall not take them into account.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals committed neither grave abuse of discretion
nor any error in judgment in rendering the assailed Decision. The instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 June 2002 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
ANTONIO LITONJUA and ARNOLD LITONJUA, petitioners vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

On 10 January 1985, pursuant to its by-laws, respondent club posted the monthly list of delinquent
members on its premises. Included therein was petitioner Antonio Litonjua.On 13 January 1985, after
Antonio Litonjua discovered that his name was on the January 1985 deliquent list, he proceeded to the
Cashiers Office of the club and was informed therein that the reason behind his deliquency was his
failure to pay his November 1984 dues (which should have been paid before the end of December 1984
as provided in the corporate by-laws). Antonio Litonjua alleged that he was not able to pay his monthly
bill on time because he has not received his statement of account for November 1984. As proof, he
presented a sealed enveloped which he allegedly presumed to be the November 1984 bill (but was
actually the December 1984 statement of account) and explained that he received it only on 12 January
1985.

A check with the accounting office , however, revealed that the November 1984 statement of account
had already been delivered to Antonio Litonjuas office and was received by his employees allegedly
named Aquino. Petitioner asserted that he did not receive said account and had no employee by the
name of Aquino.

On 13 February 1985, Antonio Litonjua was advised of another outstanding balance in the amount of
P9,414.00. Again, he issued a check in payment thereof. As a result, his name was deleted from the
February 1985 list of deliquent members.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS WERE
VALIDLY SUSPENDED DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.

Held:

The court ruled that it is Well-settled is the rule that the finding of the facts of administrative bodies will
not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said
agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial evidence. In a long
string of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently adhered to the rule that decisions of administrative
officers are not to be disturbed by the courts except when the former have acted without or in excess of
their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that Finding of fact by an
administrative board of official, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be
disturbed except where the board or official has gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised
unconstitutional power or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of
discretion.
ROSARIO FELICIANO VDA. DE RAMOS, MIGUEL DANILA, RAYMUNDO A. DANILA, CONSOLACION
SANTOS, MIGUEL G. DANILA, AMOR DANILA, MOISES MARTINEZ, MIGUELA GAVINO, MELITON NISTA,
PRIMITIVA NISTA, HEIRS OF DANIEL NISTA, MOISES NISTA, DOMINGO NISTA and ADELAIDA NISTA,
petitioners,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, MARCELINA (MARTINA) GUERRA and THE HEIRS OF BUENAVENTURA GUERRA,
respondents.

Facts:

It appears that on June 2, 1966, Adelaida Nista who claimed to be one of the instituted heirs, filed a
petition for the probate of the alleged will and testament dated March 9, 1963 (Exhibit H) and codicil
dated April 18, 1963 (Exhibit L) of the late Eugenia Danila who died on May 21, 1966. The petitioner
prayed that after due notice and proper hearing, the alleged will and codicil be probates and allowed
and that she or any other person be appointed as administrator of the testatrix's estate. She also prayed
that in case no opposition thereto be interposed and the value of the estate be less than P10,000.00,
said estate be summarily settled in accordance with the Rules.

Buenaventura and Marcelina (Martina) both surnamed Guerra filed an opposition on July 18, 1966 and
an amended opposition on August 19, 1967, to the petition alleging among others that they are the
legally adopted son and daughter of the late spouses Florentino Guerra and Eugenia Danila (Exhibit 1);
that the purported will and codicil subject of the petition (Exhibits H and L) were procured through fraud
and undue influence; that the formalities requited by law for the execution of a will and codicil have not
been complied with as the same were not properly attested to or executed and not expressing the free
will and deed of the purported testatrix; that the late Eugenia Danila had already executed on
November 5, 1951 her last will and testament (Exhibit 3) which was duly probated (Exhibit 4) and not
revoked or annulled during the lifetime of the testatrix, and that the petitioner is not competent and
qualified to act as administration of the estate.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED GRAVELY IN NOT HAVING GIVEN WEIGHT TO THE
MANIFESTATION CLAUSES IN THE TESTAMENT AND CODICIL ANNEX B (PETITION) AND INSTEAD IT GAVE
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OR BIASED WITNESSES OVER THEIR OWN ATTESTATION CLAUSES AND
THE TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AND NOTARIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE NOTARY PUBLIC

Held:

Petitioners argue that the attestation clauses of the win and codicil which were signed by the
instrumental witnesses are admissions of due execution of the deeds, thus, preventing the said
witnesses from prevaricating later on by testifying against due execution. Petitioners further maintain
that it is error for respondent court to give credence to the testimony of the biased witnesses as against
their own attestation to the fact of due execution and over the testimonial account of the Notary Public
who was also present during the execution and before whom right after, the deeds were acknowledged.

Private respondents, on the other hand reiterate in their contention the declaration of the two surviving
witnesses, Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz, that the win was not signed by the testatrix before their
presence, which is strengthened by two photographic evidence showing only the two witnesses in the
act of signing, there being no picture of the same occasion showing the testatrix signing the will.
Respondent court holds the view that where there was an opportunity to take pictures it is not
understandable why pictures were taken of the witnesses and not of the testatrix. It concludes that the
absence of the latter's picture to complete the evidence belies the testimony of Atty. Barcenas that the
testatrix and the witnesses did sign the will and the codicil in the presence of each other.

The oppositors' argument is untenable. There is ample and satisfactory evidence to convince us that the
will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities required by law. It appears positively
and convincingly that the documents were prepared by a lawyer, Atty. Manuel Alvero The execution of
the same was evidently supervised by his associate, Atty. Ricardo Barcenas and before whom the deeds
were also acknowledged. The solemnity surrounding the execution of a will is attended by some
intricacies not usually within the comprehension of an ordinary layman. The object is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of the will and testament, and to guarantee their truth
and authenticity.