Co v.

Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood
REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents. in the province of Samar.
En Banc As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he
Doctrine: citizenship absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As
Date: July 30, 1991 the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two
Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr. fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948.
Facts: Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
was held. On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring
legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may
Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a
of Northern Samar. certificate of naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his elementary education in the province of
following grounds: Samar.
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent. After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989. Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Hence, these petitions for certiorari. Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent
looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an
Issue: examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila.
WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the
Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed. Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to
derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly
Ratio: declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The
The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship
Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.
Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work. The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the
then Spanish colonial administration. SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the through a direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of
Constitution; Philippine citizenship to respondent’s father as null and void would run against the
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those
who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who
elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been
born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question
was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father
and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen
while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect
Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the
status of a natural-born
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords
natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they
elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he
came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not
only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when
the respondent was only nine (9) years old.
He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution Tecson vs. Commission on Elections [GR
would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing
citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. 151434, 3 March 2004]
In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 151434, 3 March 2004]
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old
In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.
the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the
citizenship Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
established his life here in the Philippines. natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald
Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of
Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003)
his premature taking of the oath of citizenship. before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due
SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondent’s father course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
of his citizenship after his death. An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino
citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may
being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier
prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample
even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove
year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in
for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and
reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. willful. The petitions were dismissed.
On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the
Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of
preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution
of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824,
would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve
the basic issue on the case.

Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of
the President of the Philippines.

Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be
elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be
20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four
modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis –
had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to
being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the
reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood
relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the
reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth
certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that
could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The
parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20
August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 Mercado v. Manzano G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999
September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of
his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage Facts:
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death
certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public Petitioners filed for respondent’s disqualification for election alleging that respondent
is a dual citizen, and under the Local Government Code, dual citizens cannot run for declared the winner.
public office.
Respondent is a son of both Filipinos but was born in the U.S which follows the On October 25, 2007, respondent Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial
principle of jus soli, hence, considered an American citizen as well. Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of Lopez
because he was ineligible from running for any public office.
COMELEC allowed Manzano to run because he was considered natural-born because of
the vrtue that he is a son of both Filipino citizens but petitioners assail this. Lopez argued that he is a Filipino-American, by virtue of the Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003. He said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for
Issue: Is respondent Manzano a dual citizen and cannot run for public office? Barangay Chairman.

Ruling: The Court first defined dual citizenship and compared it to dual allegiance. On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the Resolution granting the petition for
disqualification of Lopez from running as Barangay Chairman. COMELEC said, to be able
Dual citizenship arises when a person whose parents are citizens of a state that follows to qualify as a candidate in the elections, Lopez should have made a personal and
jus saguinis and was born in a state that follows jus soli, hence, resulting to a sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.
concurrent application of different two laws or more.
On the other hand, dual allegiance is a situation whre a person simultaneously owes His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Lopez resorted to petition for
loyalty to two or more states. certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for
In this case, Respondent, though dual citizen, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy disqualifying him from running and assuming the office of Barangay Chairman.
tantamount to his election of Phil. citizenship – meaning he forswears allegiance to the
other country and thereby terminating their status as dual. ISSUE:
The Court stressed that participating in the election is an express renunciation of
American citizenship. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for
disqualifying petitioner.

Lopez v COMELEC (DIGEST) RULING:

Eugenio Eusebio Lopez vs. COMELEC (DIGEST)
No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The COMELEC committed no grave
23 July 2008 abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner as candidate for Chairman in the
Barangay elections of 2007.
GR No. 182701
Lopez was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and
TOPIC: renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring
Loss and Re-Acquisition of Citizenship Filipino citizenship.

R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired
Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines.
FACTS:
Section 5 of the said law states:
Petitioner Lopez, a dual citizen, was a candidate for the position of Chairman of
Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City held on October 29, 2007. He was eventually Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the 27 November 2008
Philippines and the following conditions:
GR No. 179848
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the TOPIC:
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn Loss and Re-Acquisition of Citizenship
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. FACTS:

Lopez was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution dated 28 September 2007 of the ,
when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division,
General’s Office in Los Angeles, California; the same is not enough to allow him to run disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin in
for a public office. the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a
personal renouncement of his US citizenship.
Lopez’s failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an
affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized
comply with the positive mandate of law. citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act.

He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The
Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval of petitioner’s request,
and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. On 27 September 2006, the Bureau of
Immigration issued and Identification Certificate, recognizing petitioner as a citizen of
the Philippines.

Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
Position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin.

In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor.

On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution11
disqualifying the petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman,
Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship
Jacot v Dal (CASE DIGEST)
NESTOR A. JACOT V. ROGEN T. DAL and COMELEC (CASE DIGEST) ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the citizenship requirement as required
by law for persons seeking public office.

HELD:

Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy Consti II case digest: EDISON SO, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn Respondent.
renunciation of foreign citizenship, because these are distinct requirements to be
complied with for different purposes. Facts:
He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives an
Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the average annual income of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other
following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain benefits; he is single, able to speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is
their Philippine citizenship. exempt from the filing of Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of the
Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473.
By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order8 setting the petition for hearing at 8:30
Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. a.m. of December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons concerned were enjoined
to show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The entire petition and
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either its annexes, including the order, were ordered published once a week for three
retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of general circulation
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered that copies of the petition and notice be
to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of posted in public and conspicuous places in the Manila City Hall Building.9
candidacy. During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to
know petitioner in 1991 as the legal consultant and adviser of the So family’s business.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have He would usually attend parties and other social functions hosted by petitioner’s
been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their family. He knew petitioner to be obedient, hardworking, and possessed of good moral
Philippine citizenship character, including all the qualifications mandated by law.
Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner
(1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and for ten (10) years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner were
classmates at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy.
(2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, Petitioner was a member of some school organizations and mingled well with friends.
The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003.
to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of (OSG), appealed the decision to the CA on the following grounds:
their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. Issue:
W/N Edison So did meet all the qualification needed to be a naturalized Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body reglementary period despite its failure to oppose the petition before the lower court.
of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen.44 Under current and
existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial
naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization
in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.
First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws – the former covers
all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in
the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought
that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines
and affinity to the customs and traditions.52 To reiterate, the intention of the
legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine
citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is administrative
rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,
need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which vs.
it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON
No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE,
acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only respondents.
implication is that, a native born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or
administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and
disqualifications. FACTS : Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of
In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988.
own good moral character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its
must be credible persons.56 Within the purview of the naturalization law, a "credible President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the
person" is not only an individual who has not been previously convicted of a crime; Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo
who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not perjured in the
past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must be credible is not the
declaration made but the person making it. This implies that such person must have a In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the
good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had
reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos
value, as a good warranty of the applicant’s worthiness.
e do not agree with petitioner’s argument that respondent is precluded from Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the
questioning the RTC decision because of its failure to oppose the petition. A respondent Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988,
naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision to set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was denied in
rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may be another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition for
cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set aside on the ground that
the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the
cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by
subsequent to the granting of the certificate.59 If the government can challenge a final the COMELEC and at the same time required comments from the respondents.
grant of citizenship, with more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the
ISSUE : WON Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine
on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
this petition are merely secondary to this basic question. repatriation.

HELD : The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by
Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively
"allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law
Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply
of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant
117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by
other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable legislative or judicial proceedings.
requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to
himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is
subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing
as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election
States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator
California, U.S.A. were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or omission acquires his
nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply because the challenge to
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution her title may no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been
that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was
all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code discovered only eight months after his proclamation and his title was challenged
that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines shortly thereafter.
and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the
Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was
suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary
rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate
as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack
States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe
Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to
California, U.S.A. any other state.

If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is
citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be
treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is
is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz
welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning the duly elected Representative in the said election.
renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and
love. ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD: petition dismissed

YES

BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
G.R. No. 142840 manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine
May 7, 2001 citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the 1. by naturalization,
constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the House of 2. by repatriation, and
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.” 3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of
Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As to:
a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing
for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1. desertion of the armed forces;
1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or 2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.” 3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased 5. political economic necessity
by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S.
Marine Corps. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
[(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status
Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of as a natural-born Filipino.
the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd
District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was R.A. No. 2630 provides:
then running for reelection. Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the candidacy for a mayoralty position but before the elections. Petitioner’s repatriation
Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he retroacted to the date he filed his application and was, therefore, qualified to run for a
resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections.
renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered
the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the
aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-
born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears
stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014

G.R. No. 163256, 10 Nov 2004 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]

FACTS: PONENTE: Peralta

Private respondents filed with the COMELEC to disqualify and deny due course or
cancel the certificate of candidacy of Ciceron P. Altarejos, on the ground that he is not TOPIC: Freedom of expression, of speech and of the press, airtime limits
a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his COC that he was not a
permanent resident of the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate, the town he's running
for as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Altarejos answered that he was already
issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization in
FACTS:
December 17, 1997.
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged
ISSUE:
unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the
Whether or not the registration of petitioner’s repatriation with the proper civil
broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national
registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation.
election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one
hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive
RULING:
regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the
Yes. The registration of certificate of repatriation with the proper local civil registry and
people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of
with the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting repatriation. Petitioner
their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections
completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of
 Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous Governor of Ilocos Sur, he was proclaimed by the provincial board of canvassers as the
“per station” airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior governor. A petition for quo warranto was filed by the petitioner on the ground of
COMELEC approval for candidates’ television and radio guestings and appearances. respondent's ineligibility for the said office because of alleged lack of residence. The
petitioner relies on the fact that the respondent registered as voter in Pasay City in
ISSUE: 1946 and 1947.

Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime ISSUE:
limits violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press. Whether or not respondent's acts, activities, and utterances constitute abandonment
or loss of his residence of origin.

RULING:
HELD: NO. The Court ruled out that mere absence from one's residence or origin - domicile -
to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to
YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.
is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of
candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures" to improve his
the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the lot. When election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot
playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or
a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to business reason, he may not be absent himself from the place of his activities; so there
communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, he registers as voter. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to
this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a his domicile or residence of origin, he has not forsaken him. Thus, registration of a
prohibitive measure. voter in another place has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or
loss of such residence.
It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-
based time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only
composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken
among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really NICOLAS-LEWIS vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006 Dual Citizenship Law
reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary NOVEMBER 24, 2017
that he conveys his message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that FACTS:
the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in
different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to themselves as
– a form of suppression of his political speech. “duals” or dual citizens, pray that they and others who retained or reacquired
Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
FAYPON VS QUIRINO of 2003, be allowed to avail themselves of the mechanism provided under the
G.R. No. L-7068 December 22, 1954 Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 1 (R.A. 9189) and that the COMELEC accordingly
be ordered to allow them to vote and register as absentee voters under the aegis of
FACTS: R.A. 9189.
Respondent was born in Caoayan, Ilocos Sur; came to Manila to pursue his studies;
went to United States for the same purpose; returned to the Philippines; and engaged ISSUE:
in the newspaper work in Manila, and Iloilo. When he ran for the office of Provincial
Does RA 9225 require “duals” to actually establish residence and physically stay in the
Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote?
HELD:
RULING:
The Supreme Court could not compel Comelec to conduct a special registration of new
No. There is no provision in the dual citizenship law requiring “duals” to actually voters. The right to suffrage is not absolute and must be exercised within the proper
establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise bounds and framework of the Constitution. Petitioners failed to register, thus missed
their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” their chance. However, court took judicial notice of the fact that the President issued a
are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as proclamation calling Congress to a Special Session to allow the conduct of special
that granted an absentee voter under RA 9189. By the doctrine of necessary registration for new voters and that bills had been filed in Congress to amend Republic
implication in statutory construction, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that Act No. 8189
the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency
requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same
Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997 - Case Digest
may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997

Akbayan vs comelec FACTS:

July 08, 2013 In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend Constitution, to lift
GR No. 147066, March 26 2001 term limits of elective officials, by people’s initiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to
control and supervise said people’s initiative the signature-gathering all over the
FACTS: country. The proposition is: “Do you approve of lifting the term limits of all elective
government officials, amending for the purpose Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article VI, Section
Petitioner Akbayan Youth seek to direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article 8 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine
conduct a special registration before May 2001 General Elections for new voters ages Constitution?” Said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after
18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or it is signed by at least 12% total number of registered voters in the country, it will be
before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under formally filed with the COMELEC.
Republic Act No. 8189.
COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition. Petitioners Sen. Roco et
A request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17 al moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory
and 18, 2001 was passed but it was denied by the COMELEC. Section 8 of Republic Act petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
No. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period a. Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed.b.
Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities. Republic Act No. 6735 provides for 3 systems on initiative but failed to provide any
subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. This
ISSUE: deliberate omission indicates matter of people’s initiative was left to some future
law.c. COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of
Whether or not the Court can compel respondent COMELEC, to conduct a special people’s initiative. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
registration of new voters during the period between the COMELEC’s imposed implementing law.d. People’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution,
December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections. not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision.e.
Congress nor any government agency has not yet appropriated funds for people’s are: [1] Delegation of tariff powers to the President; [2] Delegation of emergency
initiative. powers to the President; [3] Delegation to the people at large; [4] Delegation to local
ISSUE: governments; and [5] Delegation to administrative bodies.
Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the Constitution COMELEC
through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi judicial functions,
HELD: to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority. In
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself
It was intended to include or cover people’s initiative on amendments to the is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy
Constitution but, as worded, it does not adequately cover such intiative. Article XVII to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard –
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution providing for amendments to Constitution, is not the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable – to which the
self-executory. While the Constitution has recognized or granted the right of the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Republic Act No. 6735
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution via PI, the people cannot failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the
exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation. power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300
FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word “Constitution” Insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
therein was a delayed afterthought. The word is not relevant to the section which is amendments to the Constitution is void. COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and
silent as to amendments of the Constitution. regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that
SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide power under Republic Act No. 6735.
for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition
include the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of solely intended to obtain an order: (a) fixing the time and dates for signature
initiative on the Constitution. gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin’s movement and
volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the
THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous publication of the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. The argument that the initiative on DELFIN PETITION
amendments to the Constitution is not accepted to be subsumed under the subtitle on
National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Under Subtitle II and COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
III, the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be conceded ex gratia that RA 6735 is a
nature and character. full compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate
National initiative – what is proposed to be enacted is a national law, or a law which constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power
only Congress can pass. of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the
Local initiative – what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance or COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining
resolution which only legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous the Delfin Petition.
regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass.
Potestas delegata non delegari potest The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters.
Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated. The
What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognized exceptions to the rule COMELEC requires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The
petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
COMELEC, sitting en banc. Referendum Act.

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735 and COMELEC The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each
The petition was merely entered as UND, meaning undocketed. It was nothing more legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered
than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified
December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
the oppositors to file their memoranda to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so
dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying
and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources. Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
(Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.”
These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 did not apply to constitutional amendment. Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC
indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their
initiative.

The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
“incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement
the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and

Lambino vs COMELEC G.R. No. 174153 - Case Digest HELD:

Lambino vs COMELEC
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006 Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

FACTS: Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that
allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a states:
plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An
number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition.
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied) Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735
does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative
The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional clause on amendments to the Constitution.
amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such
proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a draft
shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the
proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it around
for signature.”

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means
two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign
the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an
initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments
is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete
proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains
the full text of the proposed amendments.

There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional

requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving
that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures –
that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the
proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of
the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group
submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26
September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006.

2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic
requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of
a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s