WWW.LIVELAW.

IN
Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 673 OF 2012

SOUTH EAST ASIA MARINE                              ...APPELLANT
ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTIONS 
LTD. (SEAMEC LTD.) 

VERSUS

OIL INDIA LIMITED                                       …RESPONDENT

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 900 OF 2012

OIL INDIA LIMITED                                        ...APPELLANT

VERSUS

SOUTH EAST ASIA MARINE      …RESPONDENT
ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTIONS 
LTD. (SEAMEC LTD.) 

                                                      
J U D G M E N T

 N. V. RAMANA, J. 

Civil Appeal No. 673 of 2012
Signature Not Verified

1. The present appeal arises out of impugned judgment and order
Digitally signed by
GEETA AHUJA
Date: 2020.05.11
15:37:43 IST
Reason:

dated 13.12.2007 in Arbitration Appeal No. 11 of 2006 passed

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by  the  Gauhati  High  Court, wherein the High Court allowed

the  appeal preferred by the Respondent under Section 37 of

the   Arbitration   and   Conciliation   Act,   1996   (hereinafter  the

“Arbitration   Act”),   and   set   aside   the   arbitral   award   dated

19.12.2003.

2. Brief   facts   necessary   for   the   disposal   of   this   case   are   as

follows:   appellant   was   awarded   the   work   order   dated

20.07.1995 pursuant to a tender floated by the Respondent in

1994.   The   contract   agreement   was   for   the   purpose   of   well

drilling and other auxiliary operations in Assam, and the same

was effectuated from 05.06.1996. Although, the contract was

initially only for a period of two years, the same was extended

for   two   successive   periods   of   one   year   each   by   mutual

agreement, and finally the contract expired on 04.10.2000.

3. During   the   subsistence   of   the   contract,   the   prices   of   High­

Speed   Diesel   (“HSD”),   one   of   the   essential   materials   for

carrying   out   the   drilling   operations,   increased.  Appellant

raised a claim that increase in the price of HSD, an essential

component for carrying out the contract triggered the “change

in   law”   clause   under   the   contract   (i.e.,   Clause   23)   and   the

Respondent   became   liable   to   reimburse   them   for   the   same.

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When   the   Respondent   kept   on   rejecting   the   claim,   the

Appellant eventually invoked the arbitration clause  vide  letter

dated   01.03.1999.   The   dispute   was   referred   to   an   Arbitral

Tribunal comprising of three arbitrators. 

4. On 19.12.2003, the Arbitral Tribunal issued the award in A.P

No. 8 of 1999. The majority opinion allowed the claim of the

Appellant   and   awarded   a   sum   of   Rs.   98,89,564.33   with

interest @10% per annum from the date of the award till the

recovery   of   award   money.   The   amount   was   subsequently

revised   to   Rs.   1,32,32,126.36   on   11.03.2005.  The  Arbitral

Tribunal  held that while an increase in HSD price through a

circular issued under the authority of State or Union is not a

“law” in the literal sense, but has the “force of law” and thus

falls  within  the   ambit  of Clause 23. On the other  hand, the

minority held that the executive orders do not come within the

ambit of Clause 23 of the Contract.

5. Aggrieved by the award, the Respondent challenged the same

under   Section   34   of   the   Arbitration   Act   before   the   District

Judge. On 04.07.2006, the learned District Judge, upheld the

award   and   held   that   the   findings   of   the   tribunal   were   not

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without basis or against the public policy of India or patently

illegal and did not warrant judicial interference. 

6. The Respondent challenged the order of the District Judge by

filing an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, before

the High Court.   By the impugned judgment, the High Court,

allowed   the   appeal   and   set   aside   the   award   passed   by   the

Arbitral Tribunal.

7. The High Court held that the interpretation of the terms of the

contract by the Arbitral Tribunal is erroneous and is against

the public policy of India. On the scope of judicial review under

Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the High Court held that the

Court had the power to set aside the award as it was passed

overlooking the terms and conditions of the contract. Aggrieved

by the same, the appellant has filed this present appeal by the

way of special leave petition against the impugned judgment.

8. Learned   Counsel   for   the   Appellant   assailing   the   impugned

order contends that

a. The High Court has imparted its own personal view as to
the   intent   for   inclusion   of   Clause   23   and   has   sat   in
appeal   over   the   award   of   the   Arbitral   Tribunal.   The

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construction of Clause 23, he submitted, is a matter of
interpretation and has been correctly interpreted by the
Arbitral Tribunal based on the authorities cited before it. 

b.   If two views are possible on a question of law, the High
Court cannot substitute one view and deference should
be   given   to   the   plausible   view   of   the   Arbitral   Tribunal.
Learned counsel has relied upon a judgment of this Court
in McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co.
Ltd. [(2006) 11 SCC 181] to support his contention.

c. The  question of  law decided by the  Arbitral Tribunal  is

beyond judicial review and thus the High Court could not
have interfered with a reasoned award which was neither
against public policy of India nor patently illegal. 

9. In   response,   the   learned   counsel   for   the   Respondent,

supporting the findings of the High Court, submits that 

a. the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is contrary to
the   terms   of   the   contract   and   essentially   re­writes   the
contract.  The  Arbitral   Tribunal  has   to   adjudicate   the
dispute within the four corners of the contract and thus
awarding   additional   reimbursement   not   contemplated
under Clause 23 is perverse and patently illegal. 

b. Overlooking   the   terms   and   conditions   of   a   contract   is

violative of Section 28 of the Arbitration Act and thus the
tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction. 

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c. This is not a case where the Arbitral Tribunal accepted
one interpretation of the terms of the contract where two
interpretations   were   possible.   Findings   of   the   Tribunal
are   perverse   and   unreasonable  as  the   Tribunal  did  not
consider the contract as a whole and failed to follow the
cardinal principle of interpretation of contract. 

d. The  Arbitral Tribunal  has re­written the contract in the

guise  of   interpretation and such interpretation being  in
conflict with the terms of the contract, is in conflict with
the public policy of India. 

10. We   have   heard   the   learned   counsels   for   the   parties   and

perused the materials on record.

11. In order to answer the questions raised in this appeal we first

need   to   delve   into   the   ambit   and   scope   of   the   court’s

jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Section 34

of the Arbitration Act provides as under –

34.   Application   for   setting   aside   arbitral   award. —   (1)

Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made
only   by   an   application   for   setting   aside   such   award   in
accordance with sub­section (2) and sub­section (3).

(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if—

(a) the party making the application furnishes proof that—

(i) a party was under some incapacity, or

(ii)   the   arbitration   agreement   is   not   valid   under

the law to which the parties have subjected it or,

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failing any indication thereon, under the law for
the time being in force; or

(iii)   the   party   making   the   application   was   not

given   proper   notice   of   the   appointment   of   an
arbitrator   or   of   the   arbitral   proceedings   or   was
otherwise unable to present his case; or

(iv)   the   arbitral   award   deals   with   a   dispute   not

contemplated by or not falling within the terms of
the   submission   to   arbitration,   or   it   contains
decisions   on   matters   beyond   the   scope   of   the
submission to arbitration:

Provided   that,   if   the   decisions   on   matters

submitted   to   arbitration   can   be   separated   from
those   not   so   submitted,   only   that   part   of   the
arbitral   award   which   contains   decisions   on
matters not submitted to arbitration may be set
aside; or

(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, unless such agreement
was in conflict with a provision of this Part from
which   the   parties   cannot   derogate,   or,   failing
such agreement, was not in accordance with this
Part; or

(b) the Court finds that—

(i) the subject­matter of the dispute is not capable
of settlement by arbitration under the law for the
time being in force, or

(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public
policy of India.

Explanation.   —Without   prejudice   to   the   generality   of

sub­clause (ii) it is hereby declared, for the avoidance
of   any   doubt,   that   an   award   is   in   conflict   with   the
public policy of India if the making of the award was

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induced  or affected by fraud or corruption or was in
violation of section 75 or section 81.

(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after
three months have elapsed from the date on which the party
making that application had received the arbitral award or,
if a request had been made under section 33, from the date
on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral
tribunal:   Provided   that   if   the   Court   is   satisfied   that   the
applicant   was   prevented   by   sufficient   cause   from   making
the   application   within   the   said   period   of   three   months   it
may   entertain   the   application   within   a   further   period   of
thirty days, but not thereafter.

(4) On receipt of an application under sub­section (1), the
Court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by
a   party,   adjourn   the   proceedings   for   a   period   of   time
determined   by   it   in   order   to   give   the   arbitral   tribunal   an
opportunity   to   resume   the   arbitral   proceedings   or   to   take
such other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will
eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. 

12. It is a settled position that a Court can set aside the award

only   on   the   grounds   as   provided   in   the   Arbitration   Act   as

interpreted   by   the   Courts.   Recently,   this   Court   in  Dyna

Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd. [2019 SCC

Online SC 1656] laid down the scope of such interference. This

Court observed as follows­

“26. There  is  no dispute that Section 34 of

the   Arbitration  Act  limits  a  challenge  to  an
award only on the grounds provided therein
or as interpreted by various Courts. We need
to   be   cognizant   of   the   fact   that   arbitral

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awards should not be interfered with in a
casual   and   cavalier   manner,   unless   the
Court   comes   to   a   conclusion   that   the
perversity of the award goes to the root of
the   matter   without   there   being   a
possibility   of   alternative   interpretation
which   may   sustain   the   arbitral   award.
Section   34   is   different   in   its   approach   and
cannot   be   equated   with   a   normal   appellate
jurisdiction. The mandate under Section 34
is to respect the finality of the arbitral award
and the party autonomy to get their dispute
adjudicated   by   an   alternative   forum   as
provided under the law. If the Courts were to
interfere with the arbitral award in the usual
course   on   factual   aspects,   then   the
commercial   wisdom   behind   opting   for
alternate   dispute   resolution   would   stand
frustrated.”

 (emphasis supplied)

13. It   is   also   settled   law   that   where   two  views   are  possible,   the

Court   cannot   interfere   in   the   plausible   view   taken   by   the

arbitrator   supported   by   reasoning.   This   Court   in  Dyna

Technologies (supra) observed as under­

“27. Moreover, umpteen number of judgments
of   this   Court  have   categorically  held   that   the
Courts   should   not   interfere   with   an   award
merely   because   an   alternative   view   on   facts
and   interpretation   of   contract   exists.  The
Courts need to be cautious and should defer
to   the   view   taken   by   the   Arbitral   Tribunal
even if the reasoning provided in the award
is   implied   unless   such   award   portrays
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perversity   unpardonable   under   Section   34

of the Arbitration Act.”

(emphasis supplied)

14.   However,   the   question   in   the   present   case   is   whether   the

interpretation   provided   to   the   contract   in   the   award   of   the

Tribunal was reasonable and fair, so that the same passes the

muster under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act? 

15. In   the   present   case,   respondent   has   argued   that   the   view

taken   by   the   Arbitral   Tribunal   was   not   even   a   possible

interpretation,   therefore   the   award   being   unreasonable   and

unfair   suffers   from   perversity.   Hence,   the   respondent   has

pleaded that the award ought to be set aside. In this context,

we may state that usually the Court is not required to examine

the merits of the interpretation provided in the award by the

arbitrator,   if   it   comes   to   a   conclusion   that   such   an

interpretation was reasonably possible. 

16. We  begin   by   looking   at   the   clause,   i.e   Clause   23   which   is

extracted below: 

SUBSEQUENTLY ENACTED LAWS: ­

Subsequent to the date of price of Bid
Opening  if   there   is   a   change   in   or
enactment of any law or interpretation of
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existing law, which results in additional
cost/reduction in cost to Contractor on
account   of   the   operation   under   the
Contract,   the   Company/Contractor
shall   reimburse/pay
Contractor/Company   for   such
additional/reduced   cost   actually
incurred. 

17. The Arbitral Tribunal held that this clause must be liberally

construed and any circular of the Government of India would

amount to a change in law. The Arbitral Tribunal observed:

“According to Rule of Construction of any
document   harmonious   approach   should
be made reading or taking the document
as   a   whole   and   exclusion   should   not   be
readily inferred unless it is clearly stated
in the particular clause of the document.
This is according to Rule of Interpretation.
A   consistent   interpretation   should   be
given with a view to smooth working of the
system,   which  the  document   purports   to
regulate.   The   word,   which   makes   it
inconsistent   or   unworkable,   should   be
avoided.   This   is   known   as   beneficial
construction and a construction should be
made   which   suppress   the   mischief   and
advance the remedies. So, the increase in
the operational cost due to enhanced price
of the diesel is one of the subject matters
of the contract as enshrined in Cl. 23. It
may be said that Cl. 23 may be termed as
‘‘Habendum   Clause”.   In   the   deed   of   the
contract   containing   various   granting
clauses and the habendum signifying the
intention of, the grantor.

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That Cl. 23 requires liberal interpretation
for   interpreting   the   expression   ‘law’   or
change   in   law   etc.   will   also   be   evident
from   the   facts   that   the   respondents   Oil
India Ltd. through its witness Mr. Pasrija
has   clearly   stated   that   the   change   in
diesel   price   or   any   other   oil   price   was
never   done   and   by   way   of   any   statutory
enactment   either   by   Parliament   or   by
State Legislature So, it is clear that at the
time when the Cl. 23 was incorporated in
the agreement the Oil India Ltd. was very
much aware that change in oil price was
never   made   by   any   Statutory   Legislation
but   only   by   virtue  of   Government   Order,
Resolution,   Instruction,   as   the   case   may
be,   on   accepting   that   a   condition   of   the
appropriate committee namely O.P.C. it is
also clear to apply when there is change in
oil   price,   here   HSD,   by   the   Government
and  its statutory authority as enacted in
the above without resorting any statutory
enactment.   Therefore   that   the
interpretation   of   expression   ‘law’   or
change in law etc. requires this extended
meaning   to   include  the   statutory   law,   or
any   order,   instruction   and   resolution
issued   by   the   Central   Government   in   its
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas.”

The   majority   award   utilizes   ‘liberal   interpretation   rule’   to

construe   the   contract,   so   that   the   price   escalation   of   HSD

could be brought under the Clause 23 of the contract. Further

the   Arbitral   Tribunal   identifies   the   aforesaid   clause   to   be   a

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‘Habendum   Clause’,   wherein   the   rights   granted   to   the

appellant are required to be construed broadly.

18. On   the   other   hand,   the   High   Court   in   the   impugned   order,

interpreted the same clause as follows:

“27…I am of the firm view that clause 23
was   inserted   in   the   agreement   to   meet
such   uncertain   and   unforeseen
eventualities and certainly not for revising
a   fixed   rate   of   contract.   I   also   find   that
both   parties   had   agreed   to   keep   “force
majeure” clause in the agreement. Under
this   doctrine   of   commercial   law,   a
contract agreement can be rescinded for
acts of God, etc. Under clause 44.3 of the
agreement,   ‘force   majeure”   has   been
clearly   defined,  which   includes   acts  and
regulations of the Government to rescind
a contract. In this way, clause 23 is very
close   and   akin   to   the   “force   majeure
clause”. Besides this, I may also declare
that   clause   23   is   pari   materia   to   the
“doctrine   of   frustration   and   supervening
impossibility”.   In   other   words,   under
clause   23   rights and  obligations of  both
the   parties   have   been   saved   due   to   any
change in the existing law or enactment
of   a   new   law   or   on   the   ground   of   new
interpretation   of   the   existing   law.   In   my
opinion, clause 23 must have been made
a part of the agreement keeping in mind
section   56   of   the   Indian   Contract   Act,
1872 sans any other intention.”

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19. The High Court, in its reasoning, suggests that Clause 23 is

akin   to   a   force   majeure   clause.   We   need   to   understand   the

utility and implications of a force majeure clause. Under Indian

contract   law,   the   consequences   of   a  force   majeure  event   are

provided for under Section 56 of the Contract Act, which states

that   on   the   occurrence   of   an   event   which   renders   the

performance impossible, the contract becomes void thereafter.

Section 56 of the Contract Act stands as follows:

56.   Agreement   to   do   impossible   act.—An

agreement to do an act impossible in itself is
void.
Contract   to   do   act   afterwards   becoming
impossible or unlawful—A contract to do an
act which, after the contract is made, becomes
impossible, or, by reason of some event which
the   promisor   could   not   prevent,   unlawful,
becomes   void   when   the   act   becomes
impossible or unlawful.
 

20.  When the parties have not provided for what would take place

when an event which renders the performance of the contract

impossible, then Section 56 of the Contract Act applies. When

the act contracted for becomes impossible, then under Section

56, the parties are exempted from further performance and the

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contract becomes void. As held by this Court in  Satyabrata

Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., AIR 1954 SC 44:

“15. These   differences   in   the   way   of

formulating legal theories really do not concern
us so long as we have a statutory provision in
the  Indian Contract Act. In deciding cases in
India the only doctrine that we have to go by is
that of supervening impossibility or illegality as
laid   down   in   Section   56   of   the   Contract   Act,
taking   the   word   “impossible”   in   its   practical
and   not   literal   sense.  It   must   be   borne   in
mind, however, that Section 56 lays down a
rule of positive law and does not leave the
matter   to   be   determined   according   to   the
intention of the parties.”

(emphasis supplied)

However,   there   is   no   doubt   that   the   parties   may   instead

choose the consequences that would flow on the happening of

an uncertain future event, under Section 32 of the Contract

Act.

21. On the other hand, the common law at one point interpreted

the consequence of such frustration to fall on the party who

sustained loss before the frustrating event. The best example

of   such   an   interpretation   can   be   seen   in   the   line   of   cases

which came to be known as ‘coronation cases’. In Chandler v.

Webster,   [1904]  1   KB   493,  Mr. Chandler  rented space from

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Mr.   Webster   for   viewing   the   coronation   procession   of   King

Edward VII to be held on 26 th  June 1902. Mr. Chandler had

paid part consideration for the same. However, due to the King

falling   ill,   the   coronation   was   postponed.   As   Mr.   Webster

insisted on payment of his consideration, the case was brought

to the Court. The Court of Appeals rejected the claims of both

Mr. Chandler as well as Mr. Webster. The essence of the ruling

was that once frustration of contract happens, there cannot be

any   enforcement   and   the   loss   falls   on   the   person   who

sustained it before the force majeure took place.

22. This formulation was over­ruled by the House of Lords in the

historic   decision   of  Fibrosa   Spolka   Akcyjna   v.   Fairbairn

Lawson   Combe   Barbour   Ltd.,   [1942]   UKHL   4,   wherein   the

harsh consequences of frustration as per the old doctrine was

moderated   by   the   introduction   of   the   law   of   restitution.

Interestingly,   Lord   Shaw   in  Cantiare   San   Rocco   SA

(Shipbuilding   Company)   v.   Clyde   Shipbuilding   and

Engineering   Co.   Ltd.,   [1924]   AC   226,   had   observed   that

English   law   of   leaving   the   loss   to   where   it   fell   unless   the

contract   provided   otherwise   was,   he   said,   appropriate   only

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‘among  tricksters, gamblers and thieves’. The UK Parliament

took   notice   of   the   aforesaid   judgment   and   legislated  Law

Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943.

23. In  India,   the   Contract  Act  had already  recognized  the  harsh

consequences   of   such   frustration   to   some   extent   and   had

provided   for   a   limited   mechanism   to   ameliorate   the   same

under Section 65 of the Contract Act. Section 65 provides as

under:

65.   Obligation   of   person   who   has   received

advantage   under   void   agreement,   or
contract that becomes void

When an agreement is discovered to be void, or
when a contract becomes void, any person who
has   received   any   advantage   under   such
agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or
to make compensation for it to the person from
whom he received it.

The   aforesaid   clause   provides   the   basis   of   restitution   for

‘failure of basis’. We are cognizant that the aforesaid provision

addresses limited circumstances wherein an agreement is void

ab initio or the contract becomes subsequently void. 

24. Coming back to the case, the contract has explicitly recognized

force majeure events in Clause 44.3 in the following manner:

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For   purpose   of   this   clause   “Force   Majeure”

means an act of God, war, revolt, riots, strikes,
bandh,   fire,   flood,   sabotage,   failure   or
destruction   of   roads,  systems   and   acts   and
regulations of the Government of India and
other   clauses  (but   not   due   to   employment
problem   of   the   contractor)   beyond   the
reasonable control of the parties.

Further,   under   Clause   22.23,   the   parties   had   agreed   for   a

payment of  force majeure  rate to tide over any  force majeure

event, which is temporary in nature.

25. Having   regards   to   the   law   discussed   herein,   we   do   not

subscribe   to   either   the   reasons   provided   by   the   Arbitral

Tribunal   or   the   High   Court.   Although,   the   Arbitral   Tribunal

correctly held  that a  contract needs to be interpreted taking

into consideration all the clauses of the contract, it failed to

apply the same standard while interpreting Clause 23 of the

Contract.

26. We  also do not completely subscribe to the reasoning of the

High Court holding that Clause 23 was inserted in furtherance

of   the   doctrine   of   frustration.   Rather,   under   Indian   contract

law, the effect of the doctrine of frustration is that it discharges

all the parties from future obligations. In order to mitigate the

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harsh consequences of frustration and to uphold the sanctity

of   the   contract,   the   parties   with   their   commercial   wisdom,

chose to mitigate the risk under Clause 23 of the contract. 

27. Our   attention   was   drawn   to  Sumitomo   Heavy   Industries

Limited   v.   Oil   and   Natural   Gas   Corporation   Limited,

(2010) 11 SCC 296, where this Court interpreted an indemnity

clause   and   found   that   an   additional   tax   burden   could   be

recovered under such clause. Based on an appreciation of the

evidence, the Court ruled that additional tax burden could be

recovered   under   the   clause  as  such  an   interpretation  was  a

plausible   view   that   a   reasonable   person   could   take   and

accordingly   sustained   the   award.   However,   we   are   of   the

opinion that the aforesaid case and ratio may not be applicable

herein   as   the   evidence   on   record   does   not   suggest   that   the

parties had agreed to a broad interpretation to the clause in

question. 

28. In this context, the interpretation of Clause 23 of the Contract

by   the   Arbitral   Tribunal,   to   provide   a   wide   interpretation

cannot be accepted, as the thumb rule of interpretation is that

the document forming a written contract should be read as a

whole and so far as possible as mutually explanatory. In the
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case at hand, this basic rule was ignored by the Tribunal while

interpreting the clause. 

29. The   contract   was   entered   into   between   the   parties   in

furtherance of a tender issued by the Respondent herein. After

considering the tender bids, the Appellant issued a Letter of

Intent.  In   furtherance   of   the   Letter   of   Intent,   the   contract

(Contract No. CCO/FC/0040/95) was for drilling oil wells and

auxiliary operations. It is important to note that the contract

price   was   payable   to   the   ‘contractor’   for   full   and   proper

performance   of   its   contractual   obligations.   Further,   Clauses

14.7 and 14.11 of the Contract states that the rates, terms and

conditions   were   to   be   in   force   until   the   completion   or

abandonment of the last well being drilled.

30. From the aforesaid discussion, it can be said that the contract

was   based   on   a   fixed   rate.   The   party,   before   entering   the

tender process, entered the contract after mitigating the risk of

such an increase. If the purpose of the tender was to limit the

risks of price variations, then the interpretation placed by the

Arbitral Tribunal cannot be said to be possible one, as it would

completely   defeat   the   explicit   wordings   and   purpose   of   the

contract.  There   is   no   gainsaying   that   there   will   be   price

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fluctuations which a prudent contractor would have taken into

margin,   while   bidding   in the  tender. Such  price fluctuations

cannot be brought under Clause 23 unless specific language

points to the inclusion. 

31. The   interpretation   of   the   Arbitral   Tribunal   to   expand   the

meaning of Clause 23 to include change in rate of HSD is not a

possible   interpretation   of   this   contract,   as   the   appellant   did

not introduce any evidence which proves the same. 

32. The   other   contractual   terms   also   suggest   that   the

interpretation   of   the   clause,   as   suggested   by   the   Arbitral

Tribunal,   is   perverse.   For   instance,   Item   1   of   List   II

(Consumables)   of   Exhibit   C   (Consolidated   Statement   of

Equipment and Services Furnished by Contractor or Operator

for the Onshore Rig Operation), indicates that fuel would be

supplied   by   the   contactor,   at   his   expense.   The   existence   of

such a clause shows that the interpretation of the contract by

the   Arbitral   Tribunal   is   not   a   possible   interpretation   of   the

contract.

33. For the aforesaid reasons, we are not inclined to interfere with

the  impugned  judgment and order of the High Court setting

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aside   the   award.   The   appeal is accordingly  dismissed. There

shall be no order as to costs.

 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 900 OF 2012 

34. In view of the judgment pronounced in C.A. No. 673 of 2012,

the aforesaid matter is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

..............................................J.
(N.V. RAMANA)

 ..............................................J.
 (MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR)

..............................................J.
 (AJAY RASTOGI)

NEW DELHI;
MAY 11, 2020.

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