FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-1630. July 23, 1949.]

ANTONIO NARVAEZ , petitioner, vs . DIONISIO DE LEON, Judge of First

Instance of Manila, LADISLAO PASICOLAN, Sheriff of Manila, and
CENTRAL SURETY INSURANCE COMPANY, as plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 2255 in the Court of First Instance of Manila , respondents.

Adolfo Garcia for petitioner.

Alberto M. Meer for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; SOLIDARY OBLIGATION; SOLIDARY

DEBTOR'S RIGHT TO INTERPOSE DEFENSES AGAINST THE CLAIM OF CREDITOR. —
The creditor may sue either any of the solidary debtors or all of them simultaneously,
but whether only one or all of the solidary debtors are sued jointly "any solidary debtor
may interpose against the claim of the creditor all defenses arising from the nature of
the obligation," as well as those "personal to the other solidary debtors . . . with respect
to the share of the debt for which the former may be liable."
2. ID.; ID.; EXTENT OF RIGHT AND LIABILITY OF SOLIDARY DEBTOR. —
Although a solidary debtor is bound to perform not only his share in the solidary
obligation but also that of his solidary co-debtor since a solidary is also a joint
obligation, if any one of the other solidary debtors had already paid or transferred his
property to the creditor to secure the payment of his share, the defendant solidary
debtor has the right to have that payment or the property given as security by the other
debtors sold and the proceeds applied to the satisfaction of the latter's shares in the
obligation for which the defendant may be liable, pursuant to article 1148 of the Civil
Code.

DECISION

FERIA , J : p

Ramon P. Bernal was indebted to the Central Surety Co. in the sum of P3,000 and
together with the petitioner Antonio Narvaez signed, as co-makers, a promissory note
for said amount in favor of the creditor. Besides, the debtor Bernal executed a chattel
mortgage on certain personal properties belonging to him that had an inventory value
of about P7,000 to secure the payment of his said debt. On April 8, 1947, the
respondent Central Surety Insurance Co. instituted an action against R. Bernal and the
petitioner for the recovery of the aforementioned sum of P3,000, and obtained a writ of
attachment on the same properties mortgaged to the plaintiff to secure the payment of
said amount, according to the veri ed allegation in the petition led in the present case
and not denied under oath by the respondents.

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 Sometime before the rendition of the judgment, the plaintiff and the defendant
Bernal, without the knowledge of the petitioner Narvaez, entered into an extrajudicial
agreement whereby Bernal assigned and transferred to the plaintiff Central Surety and
Insurance Co. the same personal properties that were mortgaged to the plaintiff and
subsequently attached upon the latter's petition to secure the payment of the debt,
authorizing the plaintiff "to keep and preserve it or sell it with my consent, the proceeds
of which shall be applied to whatever judgment may be rendered against me in the civil
case of which I am the defendant" (Annex A, respondent's answer.)
After the rendition of the judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants had become nal and before any action had been taken by the plaintiff on
the personal properties of Bernal that were rst attached and afterwards delivered to
the plaintiff for the purpose above mentioned, a writ of execution was, upon plaintiff's
motion, issued against the properties of petitioner Narvaez. The petitioner led a
motion to set it aside on the ground that, by the plaintiff's acceptance of Bernal's
chattels or personal properties, delivered by the latter to the plaintiff to be sold and the
proceeds of the sale applied to the payment of the judgment, the petitioner was only
liable for the balance of the judgment that would remain unsatis ed. The petitioner's
motion was denied, and hence this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner's contention in the present case is that the judgment creditor having
already secured possession of the property of the other solidary debtor Bernal by
attachment and voluntary surrender, to be kept and sold by the said judgment creditor
to satisfy the judgment, the respondent judge abused his discretion in ordering the
execution of the petitioner's property, citing article 1148 of the Civil Code in support of
his contention. And the respondents, on the other hand, maintain that they have the right
to proceed against the petitioner without previously disposing of the properties of
Ramon P. Bernal, because the petitioner is a joint and solidary debtor according to the
nal decision of the respondent judge, in accordance with article 1144 of the Civil Code,
which provides that the creditor may proceed against any of the solidary debtor or
against all of them simultaneously.
It is true that said article 1144 provides that the creditor may sue either any of
the solidary debtors or all of them simultaneously, but whether only one or all of the
solidary debtors are sued jointly "any solidary debtor may interpose against the claim
of the creditor all defenses arising from the nature of the obligation," as well as those
"personal to the other solidary debtors . . . with respect to the share of the debt for
which the former may be liable." As the surrender of the personal properties of the
defendant Bernal to the plaintiff in order that the latter may preserve and sell them and
apply the proceeds thereof to the satisfaction of the judgment, was made after trial and
a short time before the rendition of the judgment, the petitioner could not have set it up
as a defense in his pleading or before the trial of the case, but he may plead it against
the execution of the whole judgment against him. Because, although a solidary debtor
is bound to perform not only his share in the solidary obligation but also that of his
solidary co-debtor since a solidary is also a joint obligation, if any one of the other
solidary debtors had already paid or transferred his property to the creditor to secure
the payment of his share, the defendant solidary debtor has the right to have that
payment or the property given as security by the other debtors sold and the proceeds
applied to the satisfaction of the latter's shares in the obligation for which the
defendant may be liable, pursuant to the above quoted article 1148 of the Civil Code.
In the present case, before the levy of the execution on the petitioner's property,
the petitioner can not tell whether or not he is to be made to pay the whole amount of
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 the judgment, without previously selling the property of the defendant Bernal in the
hands of the plaintiff and applying the proceeds thereof to the payment of Bernal's
share (one-half) in the solidary obligation, or only petitioner's share plus Bernal's
unsatis ed share. Therefore, it is premature to contend that the court has acted
contrary to the provision of article 1144 of the Civil Code in ordering merely the
execution of the judgment on the petitioner's property, since the latter, as solidary co-
debtor, is liable to pay at least his own share in the solidary obligation, as well as that of
his co-debtor's Bernal which would remain unpaid.
If the respondent judge or court would not allow the petitioner to set up in due
time such defense he shall commit an error, but not exceed the court's jurisdiction and
much less abuse a discretion which the court does not have, in view of the express
provision of the law on the matter, and therefore certiorari would not lie.
Should the court insist, after the execution of the petitioner's property, on
applying the proceeds of the sale thereof to the payment of the whole judgment
without ordering the sale and applying the proceeds of the sale of Bernal's property in
the hands of the judgment creditor to the satisfaction of the latter's share, the
petitioner may appeal from the court's order denying his petition to that effect, because
it would be a nal order that affects a substantial right of the petitioner rendered after
the judgment has become nal. In the same way as appeal is allowed from an order
allowing or disallowing costs, a rming or disapproving a sale in a foreclosure
proceeding, or an order of the court on a report submitted by a commissioner
appointed to determine a question of fact in order to carry a judgment or order into
effect.
"In many States the statutes allow an appeal for a nal order, or from an order or
nal order affecting a substantial right made after judgment, order or decree, or made
on a summary application in an action after judgment" (3 C. J., sec. 269). "Under
express statutory provisions in many jurisdictions, varying somewhat in language, an
appeal will lie from 'any special order made after nal judgment,' or from 'an order' or a
' nal order', or an order or nal order 'affecting a substantial right,' 'in an action after
judgment' etc." (3 C.J., sec. 352). And section 2, Rule 4 of Rules of Court provides that
appeal lies against a final judgment or order.
In view of all the foregoing, the petition for certiorari is denied with costs against
the petitioner. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PARAS , J., concurring :

The petitioner, Antonio Narvaez, and Ramon P. Bernal were solidary co-makers of
a note for P3,000 in favor of the respondent Central Surety Insurance Company. As a
security for said note, Ramon P. Bernal executed a chattel mortgage in favor of the
company on certain personal properties belonging to Ramon P. Bernal, valued,
according to the inventory attached to the mortgage, at about P7,000. For failure to pay
the obligation on time, the company instituted on April 8, 1947, a personal action in the
Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 2255) against Ramon P. Bernal and the
petitioner, Antonio Narvaez, for the recovery of the sum of P3,000. Upon the
commencement of said action, the company obtained from the court a writ of
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 attachment against Ramon P. Bernal with a view to levying upon the same personal
properties already covered by the chattel mortgage. From the pleadings it does not
de nitely appear that said properties were actually levied upon in pursuance of said
attachment. Indeed, on May 6, 1947, Ramon P. Bernal assigned to the company the
properties, for the company "to keep, and preserve it or sell it with my consent, the
proceeds of which shall be applied to whatever judgment may be rendered against me
in the Civil Case of which I am the defendant, and the Central Surety & Insurance
Company is the plaintiff." (Annex A of answer.) Judgment in civil case No. 2255 in favor
of the company was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila on May 31, 1947.
After this judgment had become nal and executory, the company obtained a writ of
execution directed against the petitioner Antonio Narvaez. Efforts to quash this writ of
execution against the petitioner having failed, the latter has come to this Court for the
purpose of preventing its enforcement against the petitioner.

It is contended for the petitioner that the lifting of the attachment obtained by
the company against the properties of Ramon P. Bernal, without notice to the Court of
First Instance of Manila, was illegal, and that before the petitioner could be bound to
pay anything to the company, there must be a showing that the company has sold the
properties mortgaged by Bernal and later sought to be attached by the company, and
that the proceeds of the sale were not sufficient to pay off the obligation of P3,000.
There is no merit in the contention. It is true that the properties in question were
covered by a mortgage in favor of the company, and that the latter really intended to
attach the same upon the commencement of civil case No. 2255. But there is no
indication in the record that the company ever proceeded to foreclose the chattel
mortgage or that actual levy was made on said properties. On the contrary, it appears
that the properties were turned over by Ramon P. Bernal to the company for the latter
to preserve it or sell it with the consent of Bernal. Under these conditions, the company
was not bound to sell said properties; as a matter of fact, it is not pretended that they
were sold by the company. The latter has every right to waive any advantage accruing
under the mortgage, the attachment, and the voluntary surrender of said properties by
Ramon P. Bernal. It appearing that the petitioner is a solidary debtor, it is elementary
that the company may proceed against him independently of his co-maker Ramon P.
Bernal. As long as the solidary obligation, now the subject matter of a nal and
executory judgment, is not paid, the company may go against the petitioner alone. The
latter of course has his legal remedies against the co-maker Ramon P. Bernal.
The petitioner has called attention to a letter of Bernal dated August 5, 1947,
informing the petitioner that the company had taken all the personal chattels valued at
more than P7,000 which Bernal mortgaged to the company, by reason of which Bernal
considered the loan of P3,000 fully settled. If there was such a letter, the same cannot
overcome the force and effect of Annex A of the answer of respondent company, which
speci cally authorized the company merely to keep and preserve said properties or sell
them with the consent of Ramon P. Bernal.
Wherefore, I vote for the dismissal of this petition for certiorari, with costs
against the petitioner.

PERFECTO , J.:

We concur in the above concurring opinion.

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