Rolando N. Canet, Petitioner, vs. Mayor Julieta A. DECENA, Respondent
Rolando N. Canet, Petitioner, vs. Mayor Julieta A. DECENA, Respondent
Rolando N. Canet, Petitioner, vs. Mayor Julieta A. DECENA, Respondent
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
municipality, it was noted that the Ordinance does not contain rules and
regulations on cockfighting and other related game fowl activities and a
separability clause. The Ordinance was returned to the Sangguniang
Bayan. In Resolution No. 078, Series of 1999, Sangguniang Bayan resolved
to withdraw, set aside and shelf indefinitely Ordinance No. 001, Series of
1999. [3]
Therefore, she cannot issue the said permit inasmuch as there was no
ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan authorizing the same.
On July 26, 1999, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent Mayor
[5]
with the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch XXXI, which was
docketed as Special Civil Action No. P-84-99, for Mandamus and Damages
with Application for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Respondent moved for
the dismissal of the complaint.
A Resolution was issued by the trial court on January 27, 2000, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
SO ORDERED. [6]
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 57797. On April 3, 2000, the Court of
[8]
presiding judge to temporarily cease and desist from enforcing the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issued on February 1, 2000 in Special Civil
Action No. P-84-99.
On June 3, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the questioned January 27, 2000
Resolution and February 1, 2000 writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by
respondent Judge are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE while the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued by this Court on July 10, 2000 is made permanent. No
costs.
SO ORDERED. [10]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied for lack of
merit in a Resolution dated August 2002. [11]
xxx xxx xxx.
xxx xxx xxx.
(v) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, authorize and license the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cockpits and regulate cockfighting and commercial
breeding of gamecocks: Provided, That existing rights should not be prejudiced.
the Sangguniang Bayan.
Hence, there being in effect no ordinance allowing the operation of a
cockpit, Resolution No. 049, S. 1998, authorizing petitioner to establish,
operate and maintain a cockpit in Bula, Camarines Sur cannot be
implemented. Suffice it to state in this regard that to compel respondent to
issue the mayors permit would not only be a violation of the explicit provisions
of Section 447 of the Local Government Code of 1991, but would also be an
undue encroachment on respondents administrative prerogatives.
Along the same vein, to read into the ordinances relied upon by petitioner
objects which were neither specifically mentioned nor enumerated would be to
run afoul of the dictum that where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited
to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to
other matters. In other words, it is a basic precept of statutory construction
[13]
that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes
all others, as expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expression unius est
exlusio alterius. Elsewise stated, expressium facit cessare tacitum what is
[14]
expressed puts an end to what is implied. The rule proceeds from the
[15]
premise that the legislative body would not have made specific enumerations
in a statute, if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its
terms to those expressly mentioned.
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by
such an omission, neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the
details thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat.
Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a
[16]
statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the
lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment, whether careless or
calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later wisdom may
recommend the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law
[17]
what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature
would have supplied if its attention has been called to the omission. [18]
Courts should not, by construction, revise even the most arbitrary and
unfair action of the legislature, nor rewrite the law to conform with what they
think should be the law. Nor may they interpret into the law a requirement
[19]
which the law does not prescribe. Where a statute contains no limitations in
[20]
its operation or scope, courts should not engraft any. And where a provision
[21]
of law expressly limits its application to certain transactions, it cannot be
extended to other transactions by interpretation. To do any of such things
[22]