G.R. No.

213847               August 18, 2015

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Facts:

petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the resolutions... issued by
the Sandiganbayan... where he has been charged with plunder along with several others.

Enrile insists that the resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For
Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack... or excess of
jurisdiction.

the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on
the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the
Priority Development Assistance Fund

Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion... and Supplemental Opposition... raying, among others,
that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found... against him.

Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion,... particularly on the matter of bail, on the
ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been
placed under the custody of the law

On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered... nd was later
on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General

Hospital following his medical examination

Enrile filed... his Motion to Fix Bail... nrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail becaus...
rosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong;... although he was charged
with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion... temporal, not reclusion perpetua... he was
not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be seriously considered.

Sandiganbayan issued its... assailed resolution denying Enrile’s

It is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.

[F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into consideration. These
circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after trial should the
accused be found guilty of the offense charged.

it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing that... the evidence of
guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.

Sandiganbayan issued its second assailed resolution to deny Enrile’s motion for reconsideration

Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it
is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the
exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail;... that the Prosecution has failed to
establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the
presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution
has not come forward with proof... showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he
should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his
medical condition, and his social standing.

Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense;
that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is
strong evidence... of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable
penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.

Issues:

whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial... an incident of the judicial power to
hear and determine his criminal case.

a good measure of the accused’s propensity... for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to
the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.

Ruling:

petition for certiorari is meritorious.

We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already... evinced a similar personal disposition of
respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not
seen as a flight risk.

With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years... of public service, and
history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.

The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his admission
to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his
medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the
hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his... defense but, more
importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.

There may be... circumstances decisive of the issue of bail – whose existence is either admitted by the
Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice – that the courts can already consider in
resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.

The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring
his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due
process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven... guilty.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the
fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan... gravely abused its discretion in
denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari, connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack
of... jurisdiction.

The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and... despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

Principles:

The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required
by the trial court. The amount of bail should... be high enough to assure the presence of the accused
when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose

Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his...
provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the societ... y’s interest in assuring the accused’s
presence at trial.

The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is... strong. Hence, from the moment he is
placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of
his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a
capital offense, or... with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong.

Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.

ll criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right because these courts
have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or... offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment... ail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even prior to... conviction
for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is
not strong... bail is discretionary... upo... n conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment... if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
six years,... provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114

That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by
the circumstance of reiteration;

(b)

That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of
his bail without valid justification;

(c)

That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d)

That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if re... l... eased on ba... l
;... r

(e)

That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in
criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court.

such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the
accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty... bail cannot be
allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a
hearing with notice to the Prosecution.

It is, therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that has bearing and not the possibility of
mitigating circumstances being... appreciated in the accused’s favor.

The Court is further mindful of... the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising
from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person
to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings
before a court, to enable it to decide... without delay on the legality of the detention and order their
release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to
every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies... include the right to be admitted to bail.

FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile, 90 years of age, and several others with plunder in
the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Upon voluntary surrender,
Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, and his Motion to Fix Bail. Enrile claims
that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it is the duty
and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception
and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that
Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two
mitigating circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come
forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be
considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition,
and his social standing. In its Comment, the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is
discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail
hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and
that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.
ISSUE: Is Enrile entitled to bail? If YES, on what ground(s)?

HELD: YES, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right based on humanitarian grounds.

The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of
the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution’s case, albeit
a good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to
the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.

The Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further
mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore,
has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words,
the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail.

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal
proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not
be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances.

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities
upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly
unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has
demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an
earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes,
and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his
solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s
judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.

N.B.

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and
life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
 G.R. No. 213847,     Aug. 18, 2015

Juan Ponce Enrile

vs.
Sandiganbayan ( 3  division ) and People of the Philippines
rd

Facts:
Year 2014, Sen. Enrile was charged with plunder before the Sandiganbayan
for their alleged involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriation
under the PDAF. When his warrant was issued, Sen. Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to the CIDG and was later confined and detained at the PNP
General Hospital, he then filed a motion to fix bail where he argued that:

1. He should be allowed to post bail as a matter of right;

2. Although charged with plunder his penalty would only be reclusion temporal
considering that there are two mitigating circumstances, his voluntary surrender
and that he is already at the age of 90;
3. That he is not a flight risk and his medical condition must be seriously
considered.
The Sandiganbayan however, denied his motion on the grounds that:

1. He is charged with a capital offense;

2. That it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of his bail because the
prosecution have not yet presented its evidences.
Sen. Enrile then filed a certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue:  
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for denying his motion to fix bail?

Ruling:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the
objective of bail and unwarrantedly disregarded Sen. Enrile’s fragile health
and advanced age. Bail is a matter right and is safeguarded by the
constitution, its purpose is to ensure the personal appearance of the accused
during trial or whenever the court requires and at the same time recognizing
the guarantee of due process which is the presumption of his innocence until
proven guilty. The Supreme Court further explained that Bail for the
provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged should be
allowed independently of the merits charged, provided his continued
incarceration is injurious to his health and endanger his life. Hence, the
Sandiganbayan failed to observe that if Sen. Enrile be granted the right to bail
it will enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and
attended, which will then enable him to attend trial therefore achieving the true
purpose of bail.

A. F. TRILLANES IV v . HON. O. PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY, et al . 556 SCRA 471 (2008)

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law.

On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded
the resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series of negotiations, military soldiers
surrendered that evening. In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner
Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four
years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting his term,
Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions
and Related Requests. Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his
functions as senator. The RTC however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the
Supreme Court to set aside orders of the RTC.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Trillanes‘ case is different from that of the Jalosjos case
2. Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work and
serve his mandate as senator
3. Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of detention
prisoners who are held without bail

HELD:

No distinction between Trillanes’ case and that of Jalosjos case

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election
to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of
the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also state that no person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the
cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both being punishable by reclusion
perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable
penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in
the crime charged. In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for
release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty.
This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is “regardless of the stage
of the criminal action.” 
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to
detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The Court in People v.
Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can
not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or
appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no “prior term” to speak of. In a
plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply
to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge.
Petitioner’s electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate,
“they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action with the knowledge that he
could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering mis impression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of
the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by
jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of
the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule
of law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly
restrained by law.
Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner
failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December
2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as
senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the
hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on
these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.

Trillanes v. Pimentel

ANTONIO TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL SR. (D)

G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008

FACTS:
  July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati
City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.

 On the same day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the
rebellion. 

 Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat defined
under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the RTC of Makati.

 4 years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in the political arena and
won a seat in the Senate with a 6-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.

 Petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to
be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests".

 The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which
apply to validly incarcerated persons in general

HELD:

 No, it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the
purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their
constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more
limited than those of the public.

 When a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the
law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against
him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.

 Presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.

 Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days
or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

FELICIDAD M, ROQUE and PRUDENCIO N. MABANGLO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; HON.
OMBUDSMAN ANIANO DESIERTO; and HON. MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR., G.R. No. 129978 May 12,
1999 Panganiban, J.: DOCTRINE: Consistent with the rights of all persons to due process of law and to
speedy trial, the Constitution commands the Office of the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints
filed against public officials. Thus, the failure of said office to resolve a complaint that has been pending
for six years is clearly violative of this mandate and the public officials' rights. In such event, the
aggrieved party is entitled to the dismissal of the complaint. BRIEF FACTS: Felicidad M. Roque was a
Schools Division Superintendent of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), assigned in
Koronadal, South Cotabato, until her compulsory retirement on, May 17, 1991. Prudencio N. Mabanglo
was likewise a Schools Division Superintendent of the DECS, assigned in Tagum, Davao Province, until his
compulsory retirement on May 8, 1997.

As a result of an audit, auditors Laura S. and Carmencita Eden T. Enriquez of the COA found some major
deficiencies and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019), violations
of COA Circular Nos. 78-84 and 85-55A, DECS Order No. 100 and Section 88 of Presidential Decree No.
1445. Consequently, affidavits of complaint were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
against several persons, including Prudencio Mabanglo on May 7, 1991, and against Felicidad Rogue.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Roque and Mabanglo instituted the instant petition for mandamus
premised on the allegation that "[a]fter the initial Orders finding the cases proper for preliminary
investigation were issued on June[,] 1991 and the subsequent submission of their counter-affidavits,
until the present[,] or, more than six (6) years, no resolution has been issued by the Public Respondent
[and no] case [has] been filed with the appropriate court against the herein Roque and Mabanglo "
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS: Office of the Ombudsman, Hon. Aniano Desierto and Hon. Margarito
Gervacio, Jr. argue that Roque and Mabanglo cannot, by this special action for mandamus, compel the
ombudsman to dismiss the criminal charges filed against them, since such dismissal involves a
discretionary, not a ministerial, duty. The Petition for Mandamus became moot and academic when the
Complaints were resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao and the Informations were
filed. ISSUE: Whether or not there was undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving [the] complaints
against Roque and Mabanglo (respondents therein) which violated their constitutional right to [a]
speedy disposition of cases. HELD: As a general rule, the performance of an official act or duty, which
necessarily involves the exercise of discretion or judgment, cannot be compelled by mandamus. This
Court, however, has held that the rule does not apply "in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion,
manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority." Ordinarily, mandamus will not prosper to compel a
discretionary act. But where there is "gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of
authority" equivalent to denial of a settled right to which petitioner is entitled, and there is "no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy, the writ shall issue." The exceptions cited apply to this case. It is
undisputed that there has already been a long and unwarranted delay in the resolution of the graft
charges against the two petitioners. The Complaint against Mabanglo was filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman in Mindanao way back on May 7, 1991, and that against Roque on May 16, 1991.
Signficantly, no action was taken until after the lapse of almost six years. Constitutional Rights Clearly,
the delay of almost six years disregarded the ombudsman's duty, as mandated by the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6770, to act promptly on complaints before him. More important, it violated the Roque
and Mabanglos' rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against them.
Although respondents attempted to justify the six months needed by Ombudsman Desierto to review
the recommendation of Deputy Ombudsman Gervasio, no explanation was given why it took almost six
years for the latter to resolve the Complaints Similarly, in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, the court states:
Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary
investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the
resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally
guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but
under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill
of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the
petitioner's constitutional rights The Court declared that long and unexplained delay in the resolution of
the criminal complaints against petitioners was not corrected by the eventual filing of the Informations.
(Villanueva)

People v Judge Ayson 175 SCRA 216 (1989)

Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines and was allegedly involved in
irregularities in the sales of plane tickets.  The PAL management notified him of an investigation to be
conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline,
and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association
(PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the
amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused
proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a
compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against
Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’ written admission and
statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being
represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded
of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by
the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission
and statement of accused.

Held: No. The judge should admit the evidence in court as the accused was not under custodial
investigation when his statements were taken. One cannot invoke violation of the right to counsel in
administrative proceeding. The right to self incrimination and custodial investigation are accorded only
when the accused is subjected to custodial inquest which involves the questioning initiated by police
authorities after a person is taken in custody or deprived of his freedom in any way. Because the
statements were obtained beyond the purview of custodial investigation the evidence should be
admitted in court.

---------------
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include:

1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. 

2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him.

3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if
he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and
intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such
warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result
of interrogation can be used against him.

The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated

atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights."

--------------------------

PEOPLE VS. JUDGE AYSON

175 SCRA 216; G.R. NO. 85215; 7 JUL 1989

Facts:

Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station. It
was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management
notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with
PAL’s Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the
Philippine Airlines Employees’ Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by
Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given
to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from
settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime
of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained
Ramos’ written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken
without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that
accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission
and statement of accused.

Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to
witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not present
in case at bar).

This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of
subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to “be compelled to be a
witness against himself.” It prescribes an “option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a
prohibition of inquiry.” the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in
character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a
witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed,
or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it and
could be waived.

Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include:

1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.

2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him.

3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial,
no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.

PEOPLE VS. JUDGE AYSON [175 SCRA 216; G.R. NO. 85215; 7 JUL 1989]

Tuesday, February 10, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City
station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL
management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in
accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed
by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was
sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team
were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was
prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two
months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the
prosecution contained Ramos’ written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the
confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not
admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission
and statement of accused.

Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to
witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not present
in case at bar).

This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of
subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a
witness against himself.” It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a
prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in
character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a
witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed,
or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it and
could be waived.

Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include:

1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial,
no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.