TITLE X:

Crimes against Property

PEOPLE v. RICHARD DILLATAN, SR. AND DONATO GARCIA

G.R. No. 212191, September 05, 2018 PERALTA, J.:
A conviction in robbery with homicide needs certainty that the robbery is the central purpose of
the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede
the taking of human life, but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.

Facts
Herein private complainants, the spouses Henry and Violeta Acob (Spouses Acob), were owners
of a market stall at the public market of Sta. Rosa, Aurora, Isabela. Around 6 o'clock in the
evening of February 7, 2010, the Spouses Acob, together with their son, Homer, closed their stall
and proceeded home by riding together on their motorcycle. Homer was the driver, Violeta sat at
the middle, while Henry sat behind her. They were approaching the entrance to
their barangay around 6:30 p.m. when they noticed two persons, whom they later identified as
herein accused-appellants, near a motorcycle. When they passed, accused-appellants rode the
motorcycle and tailed them. Accused-appellants eventually caught up with them, whereupon,
accused Dillatan forced them to stop and immediately declared a holdup. Violeta embraced
Homer, while Dillatan grabbed her belt bag which contained P70,000.00 cash. Thereafter,
Dillatan uttered, "barilin mo na." Garcia then fired at the victims hitting, first, the left hand of
Violeta. The bullet went through the left hand of Violeta and pierced Homer's chest causing the
latter to fall down together with the motorcycle. Henry, on the other hand, was able to get off the
motorcycle and tried to escape but Garcia also fired at him thereby hitting his right knee.
Accused-appellants, thereafter, fled through their motorcycle. Several people then came to the
aid of the private complainants and brought them to the hospital where Homer later expired by
reason of his gunshot wound. Violeta and Henry were treated for their wounds. Accused-
appellants were apprehended by police authorities later at night where they were subsequently
identified by Violeta at the police station as the ones who grabbed her belt bag and shot them. A
criminal complaint was subsequently filed against accused-appellants. On February 8, 2010, an
Information was filed against herein accused-appellants for the crime of robbery with homicide.


The RTC rendered its Decision finding accused appellants guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide. On appeal, the CA affimed the Decision of the RTC with modification by ordering
accused-appellants to further pay temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00.

Issue
Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery
with homicide

The Court’s Ruling

YES. The Court finds no reason to reverse accused-appellants' conviction. Robbery with
homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on occasion, of the

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robbery.To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the
following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or
intimidation against persons; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking is animo
lucrandi or with intent to gain; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of
homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed. A conviction needs certainty that the
robbery is the central purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental
to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the killing may occur
before, during or after the robbery. Under the given facts, the Court finds no error in the findings
of both the RTC and the CA that the prosecution was able to clearly establish that: (1) accused-
appellants forced Homer, Henry and Violeta to stop their motorcycle; (2) Dillatan declared the
holdup and grabbed the belt bag in Violeta's possession; and (3) thereafter, Garcia fired at the
victims in order to preserve their possession of the stolen item and to facilitate their escape.



The Court, likewise, finds no cogent reason to disturb the rulings of both the RTC and the CA in
giving credence to the testimonies of Henry and Violeta, especially, their positive and categorical
identification of accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. In this case, both the trial
and appellate courts found Violeta's and Henry's separate testimonies as credible. It is doctrinal
that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect and
will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing that the trial court had overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could
reverse a judgment of conviction. In fact, in many instances, such findings are even accorded
finality. This is so because the assignment of value to a witness' testimony is essentially the
domain of the trial court, not to mention that it is the trial judge who has the direct opportunity to
observe the demeanor of a witness on the stand, which opportunity provides him the unique
facility in determining whether or not to accord credence to the testimony or whether the witness
is telling the truth or not. The foregoing doctrine finds application in the instant case.



The lower courts, also, correctly ruled that accused-appellants acted in conspiracy with one
another. The coordinated acts and movements of accused-appellants before, during and after the
commission of the crime point to no other conclusion than that they have acted in conspiracy
with each other. When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those
who took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single
and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the
killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.



Lastly, accused-appellants' defenses of denial and alibi fail to cast doubt on the positive
identification made by Henry and Violeta and the continuous chain of circumstances established
by the prosecution. Alibi and denial being inherently weak cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. There is no cogent reason to depart
from the ruling of the lower courts that apart from their self-serving testimony that they were
someplace else at the time of the commission of the crime, accused-appellants were unable to
sufficiently show that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime when
it was committed.

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 PEOPLE vs. ARNEL BALUTE
G.R. No. 212932 January 21, 2015 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed
either by reason,or on the occasion, of the robbery.

Facts
On November 22, 2002, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Balute of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 (1) of the RPC. According to the prosecution, at
around 8 o’clock in the evening of March 22, 2002, SPO1 Raymundo B. Manaois (SPO1
Manaois) was on board his owner-type jeepney with his wife Cristita and daughter Blesilda, and
was traversing Road 10, Tondo, Manila. While the vehicle was on a stop position at a lighted
area due to heavy traffic, two (2) malepersons, later on identified as Balute and a certain Leo
Blaster (Blaster), suddenly appeared on either side of the jeepney, with Balute poking a gun at
the side of SPO1 Manaois and saying "putang ina, ilabas mo!" Thereafter, Balute grabbed SPO1
Manaois’s mobile phone from the latter’s chest pocket and shot him at the left side of his torso.
SPO1 Manaois reacted by drawing his own firearm and alighting from his vehicle, but he was
unable to fire at the assailants as he fell to the ground. He was taken to Mary Johnston Hospital
where he died despite undergoing surgical operation and medical intervention.

In his defense, Balute denied having any knowledge of the charges against him. He maintained,
inter alia, that on March 22, 2002, he was at the shop of a certain Leticia Nicol (Nicol) wherein
he worked as a pedicab welder from 8:00 o’clock in the morning until 10:00 o’clock in the
evening, and did not notice any untoward incident that day as he was busy working the entire
time. Nicol corroborated Balute’s story, and imputed liability on Blaster and a certain Intoy.

The RTC found Balute guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole. On appeal, the CA affirmed Balute’s
conviction with modification in that the aggravating circumstance of treachery was no longer
considered as the prosecution failed to allege the same in the Information.

Issue
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Balute’s conviction for Robbery with Homicide.

The Court’s Ruling

YES. The appeal is bereft of merit. Factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great
weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial
evidence on record. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court
overlooked material and relevant matters, that the Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual
findings of the court below. Guided by the foregoing principle, the Court finds no cogent reason
to disturb the RTC’s factual findings, as affirmed by the CA.

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The special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed
either by reason,or on the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with
homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property
belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against
a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as usedin its
generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main
purpose, and the objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery.
The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during
or after the robbery.” Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on occasion of
robbery if, for instance, it was committed: (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit;
(b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the
commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime.

In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTC’s finding that the prosecution was able to
establish the fact that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the latter’s mobile phone, and
thereafter, shot him, resulting in his death despite surgical and medical intervention. This is
buttressed by Cristita and Blesilda’s positive identification of Balute as the one who committed
the crime as opposed to the latter’s denial and alibi which was correctly considered by both the
RTC and the CA as weak and self-serving, as it is well-settled that alibi and denial are
outweighed by positive identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill
motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter. This is especially true when the
eyewitnesses are the relatives of the victim – such as Cristita and Blesilda who are the wife and
daughter of SPO1 Manaois, respectively – since the natural interest of witnesses, who are
relatives of the victim, in securing the conviction of the guilty would actually deter them from
implicating persons other than the true culprits.

In sum, the RTC and the CA correctly convicted Balute of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
as defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the RPC. 


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 PEOPLE vs. CHARLIE OROSCO
March 25, 2015 G.R. No. 209227 VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery,
with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit
robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or
after the robbery.

Facts
On May 16, 2006, about one o’clock in the afternoon, Arca went to the store of Lourdes Yap at
Purok 4, Barangay Rawis, Legazpi City. He was buying ice but it was not yet hardened (frozen)
so he went home. At around two o’clock, he was again sent on errand to buy ice at the same
store. After purchasing the ice, he noticed there was a verbal tussle between Yap and two male
customers. The men were arguing that they were given insufficient change and insisting they
gave a P500 bill and not P100. When Yap opened the door, the two men entered the store. From
outside the store and thru its open window grills, he saw one of the men placed his left arm
around the neck of Yap and covered her mouth with his right hand while the other man was at her
back restraining her hands. He recognized the man who was holding the hands of Yap as Charlie
Orosco (appellant), while he described the man who covered her mouth as thin, with less hair
and dark complexion. The latter stabbed Yap at the center of her chest. When they released her,
she fell down on the floor. Appellant then took a thick wad of bills from the base of the religious
icon or "santo" at the altar infront of the store’s window, after which he and the man who stabbed
Yap fled together with two other men outside who acted as lookouts. Arca went near the bloodied
victim but also left and went home afraid because he was seen by one of the lookouts.

Yap was brought to the Aquinas University Hospital but she was declared dead on arrival. Later,
at the NBI Legazpi City District office, Arca gave descriptions of the faces of appellant and the
dark thin man who stabbed Yap ("John Doe"). From a surveillance digital photo and video clip
shown to him, Arca positively identified Abner Astor (Astor) as one of the two men sitting beside
the store as lookouts. Consequently, warrants of arrest were issued against appellant and Astor.
But only appellant was arrested as Astor, John Doe and Peter Doe remained at large.

An information was thus filed against appellant, charging him of the crime of robbery with
homicide.

For his defense, appellant testified that on the date and time of the incident, he was at his house
in Bigaa taking care of his three-year-old child while his wife was washing clothes. He stayed in
the house until his wife finished the laundry at past 3:00 p.m. He denied knowing Yap and his co-
accused Astor. While he admitted that he was a resident of Purok 4, Bgy. Rawis, his family
transferred to their other house at Bigaa. He denied knowing Arca and he does not know of any
motive for Arca to testify against him. Appellant’s wife, Teresa Magdaong-Orosco also testified
to confirm that at the time of the incident he was at their house while she was doing the laundry
just adjacent to their house. On cross-examination, she was asked the distance between their
place and Bgy. Rawis and she replied that it will take less than one hour from Bigaa to Rawis.

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The trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant of the crime charged. On appeal, the CA
upheld his conviction as it found no compelling reason to deviate from the factual findings and
conclusions of the trial court.
Issue
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

The Court’s Ruling

YES. The appeal lacks merit. It is settled that witnesses are to be weighed not numbered, such
that the testimony of a single, trustworthy and credible witness could be sufficient to convict an
accused. The testimony of a sole witness, if found convincing and credible by the trial court, is
sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Corroborative evidence is
necessary only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth
or that his observation had been inaccurate. In this case, both the trial and appellate courts found
the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Arca, convincing notwithstanding that he was quite slow in
narrating the incident to the court and that he initially desisted from physically pointing to
appellant as the one who held Yap’s hands from behind and took her money at the store after she
was stabbed by appellant’s cohort (John Doe).

Incidentally, both Orosco and his wife stated that they do know neither Albert Arca nor Lourdes
Yap. Thus, it appears that there is no reason whatsoever for Arca to lie and attribute the crime to
Orosco. Following settled jurisprudence, Arca’s positive identification of Orosco prevails over
the latter’s alibi. We find no compelling or cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the trial
court on its evaluation of Arca’s testimony. The well-settled rule in this jurisdiction is that the
trial court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal without any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could affect the result of
the case.

Appellant repeatedly harped on the hesitation of Arca to point to him at the trial. However, as the
trial court’s firsthand observation of said witness’ deportment revealed, Arca’s fear of appellant
sufficiently explains his initial refusal to point to him in open court during his direct
examination. Arca was finally able to point to appellant as one of the perpetrators of the robbery
and killing of Yap during his additional direct examination when he had apparently mustered
enough courage to do so.

elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are: (1) the taking of personal property is
committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to
another; (3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the
occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is committed. Homicide is said to have
been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if it is committed (a) to facilitate the
robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to
prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses to the

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commission of the crime. In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the
malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may
take place before, during or after the robbery.

Here, the homicide was committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery as appellant
and John Doe had to kill Yap to accomplish their main objective of stealing her money. The
earlier verbal tussle where the two pretended to have paid a greater amount and asked for the
correct change was just a ploy to get inside the store where the victim kept her earnings. To
verify whether the cash payment was indeed a P500 or P100 bill, the victim let them enter the
store but once inside they got hold of her and stabbed her.

Appellant, however, argues that if he had committed any offense, it was only robbery since Arca
testified that it was John Doe, whom he described as a thin man, who stabbed the victim. We
disagree. The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly showed that appellant acted in
conspiracy with his co-accused. Appellant and John Doe first engaged the unsuspecting victim in
a verbal altercation until she allowed them to enter the store. Upon getting inside, they held the
victim with John Doe wrapping his arm around her neck while appellant held her hands at the
back. With the victim pressed between the two of them, John Doe stabbed her once in her chest
before releasing her. Once she fell down, appellant quickly took the money placed at the altar
inside the store and fled together with John Doe and the two lookouts outside the store. All the
foregoing indicate the presence of conspiracy between appellant and his co- accused in the
perpetration of robbery and killing of the victim.

It must be stressed that appellant played a crucial role in the killing of the victim to facilitate the
robbery. He was behind the victim holding her hands while John Doe grabbed her at the neck.
His act contributed in rendering the victim without any means of defending herself when John
Doe stabbed her frontally in the chest. Having acted in conspiracy with his co- accused, appellant
is equally liable for the killing of Yap.

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 PEOPLE vs. JUAN CABBAB, JR.
G.R. No. 173479 July 12, 2007 GARCIA, J.:
The negative findings of a paraffin test do not conclusively show that a person did not discharge
a firearm at the time the crime was committed. It is quite possible for a person to discharge a
firearm and yet exhibit no trace of nitrates: when, e.g., the assailant fired the weapon while
wearing gloves or where the assailant thoroughly washes his hands thereafter.

Facts
In the court of origin, appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr., along with his cousin-in-law Segundino
Calpito, was charged with the crimes of Double Murder and Attempted Murder with Robbery in
an Information. According to the prosecution, n the morning of 22 April 1988, father and son
Vidal Agbulos and Winner Agbulos, together with Eddie Quindasan, Felipe Abad and Police
Officer (PO) William Belmes, went to Barangay Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra to attend a
"fiesta" celebration. Upon arrival in the area, they found out that the fiesta celebration was
already over, thus, they decided to go home in Villaviciosa, Abra. Since it was already lunchtime,
the group took their lunch at Sitio Turod, located in the same area of Barangay Kimmalasag.
After taking their lunch and on their way home, they were met by accused-appellant Juan
Cabbab, Jr. and Segundino Calpito who invited them to play "pepito," a local version of the
game of "russian poker.” Only Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan played "pepito" with the
group of accused-appellant. About 3:30 p.m., Winner Agbulos’s group wrapped-up the game and
were set for home together with his group. Winner Agbulos won the game. While walking on
their way home from Sitio Turod, PO William Belmes, who was behind Winner Agbulos and
Eddie Quindasan picking-up guava fruits from a tree, saw accused-appellant, accused Segundino
Calpito and a companion running up a hill. Suddenly, he heard gunshots and saw Winner
Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan, who were then walking ahead of the group, hit by the gunfire. By
instant, PO William Belmes dove into a canal to save himself from the continuous gunfire of
accused-appellant. PO William Belmes ran towards Vidal Agbulos and Felipe Abad, who were
walking behind the group, and informed the two that Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan were
ambushed by accused-appellant and Segundino Calpito. The three (3) proceeded to the crime
scene where they saw the dead body of Winner Agbulos together with Eddie Quindasan whom
they mistook for dead. The three sought help from the police authorities of Pilar, Abra and
returned to the scene of the crime where they found Eddie Quindasan who was still alive and
who narrated that it was Juan Cabbab, Jr. and Segundino Calpito who ambused them and took
the money, estimated at ₱12,000.00, of Winner Agbulos which he won in the card game. Eddie
Quindasan was brought to the Abra Provincial Hospital but died the following day.

For the defense, appellant claimed that he went to Palao, Baddek, Bangued, Abra to visit his
friends Romeo, Demetrio and Restituto, all surnamed Borreta. He stayed there almost the entire
day and left only at around 5:00 p.m. He arrived home in Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra at
around 5:30 p.m. He declared that his co-accused Calpito was not with him that day. He likewise
averred that he did not know prosecution witnesses PO William Belmes and Vidal Agbulos nor
did he know of any motive for them to testify against him. Appellant’s co-accused Calpito denied

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having committed the crimes charged. He testified that at around 8:30 a.m. of April 22, 1988, he
went fishing at Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra until 4:00 a.m. of the following day.

George de Lara, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, testified that he conducted an examination on the
paraffin cast taken from appellant to determine the presence of gunpowder residue or nitrates on
appellant’s hands. The results of the said examination showed that appellant was negative of
nitrates. He opined that certain factors may affect the result of the test such as perspiration, wind
velocity, humidity or the type of gun used. He also theorized that a paraffin test would yield a
negative result if fertilizers or cosmetics are applied to the hands before the cast is taken.

The RTC acquitted Segundino Calpito but found appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty of two crimes,
i.e. (1) robbery with double homicide and (2) attempted murder. On appeal, the CA modified the
trial court’s decision and found appellant guilty of the special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA also affirmed
appellant’s conviction, as well as the penalty imposed, for the separate crime of attempted
murder.
Issue
Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt

The Court’s Ruling

No. Appellant’s contention that the witnesses for the prosecution failed to identify him as the
perpetrator of the crime is belied by the testimony of PO William Belmes, who was with the
victims when the incident happened. His testimony adequately showed that Belmes was able to
look at and see appellant at the time he perpetrated the crime. Belmes could not have made a
mistake with respect to appellant’s identity, what with the fact that just a few hours before the
incident, it was even appellant himself who invited Belmes and his group to play poker.
Jurisprudence recognizes that it is the most natural reaction of victims of violence to strive to see
the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and to observe the manner in which the crime was
committed. Belmes’ testimony was corroborated by that of Vidal Agbulos who was also with the
group when the robbery and shooting took place. Vidal Agbulos positively identified appellant as
the person who robbed his son, Winner, of his winnings. Just like Belmes, Agbulos could also
not have been mistaken as to appellant’s identity considering that it was appellant who personally
approached Agbulos’ group and invited them to play poker just a few hours prior to the
commission of the crime.

To be sure, the trial court which had the unique opportunity to observe at first hand the demeanor
of witnesses Belmes and Agbulos and asses whether they are telling the truth or not, gave full
faith and credence to their testimonies. Finding no facts and circumstances of weight and
substance that would otherwise warrant a different conclusion, the Court accords the highest
respect to the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of these witnesses.

Appellant likewise capitalizes on the results of the paraffin test showing that both his hands
yielded no trace of gunpowder residue. Unfortunately for appellant, the results of the paraffin test

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would not exculpate him. The negative findings of said test do not conclusively show that a
person did not discharge a firearm at the time the crime was committed. This Court has observed
that it is quite possible for a person to discharge a firearm and yet exhibit no trace of nitrates:
when, e.g., the assailant fired the weapon while wearing gloves or where the assailant thoroughly
washes his hands thereafter. As George de Lara of the NBI stated in his testimony before the trial
court, if a person applies cosmetics on his hands before the cast is taken, gunpowder residue
would not be found in that person’s hands. He also testified that certain factors could contribute
to the negative result of a paraffin test such as perspiration, humidity or the type of firearm used.
In fine, a finding that the paraffin test on the person of the appellant yielded negative results is
not conclusive evidence to show that he indeed had not fired a gun.

Appellant has not shown any evidence of improper motive on the part of prosecution witnesses
Belmes and Agbulos that would have driven them to falsely testify against him. Where there is
nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their
positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under the solemnity of an oath deserve
full faith and credence.

Interjected as a defense is alibi, appellant claimed that he went to Palao to visit his friends in the
morning of April 22, 1988 and returned home only at around 5:30 p.m. For alibi to prosper,
however, there must be a showing that the accused was at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the offense and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission. Here, the evidence shows that Palao was only 30 minutes
drive from where the crime was committed. In short, appellant failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime on the
date and time of its commission. The weakness of appellant’s alibi is heavily underscored by the
fact that appellant was positively identified by witnesses Belmes and Agbulos who were with the
victims at the time of the incident. For sure, appellant’s positive identification as the perpetrator
of the crime renders his defense of alibi unworthy of credit.

To warrant conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the prosecution is burdened to
prove the confluence of the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed
with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the
taking is characterized by intent to gain or animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on
the occasion thereof, homicide is committed. In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention
of the felon is to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. It is immaterial
that death would supervene by mere accident, or that the victim of homicide is other than the
victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. Once a homicide is committed by
reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is the special complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide. Here, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant, having lost to Winner Agbulos in the game of poker, intended to divest Agbulos of his
winnings amounting to ₱20,000.00. In pursuit of his plan to rob Agbulos of his winnings,
appellant shot and killed him as well as his companion, Eddie Quindasan.

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 PEOPLE VS. RODOLFO SUYU, et. al.
G.R. NO. 170191, August 16, 2006 CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Hymenal lacerations which are usually inflicted when there is complete penetration are not
essential in establishing the crime of rape as it is enough that a slight penetration or entry of the
penis into the lips of the vagina takes place. Partial penile penetration is as serious as full
penetration; the rape is deemed consummated in either case.

Facts
At around 7:15 in the evening on January 13, 1996, Clarissa Angeles, a third-year student of St.
Paul University, was with her boyfriend, William Ferrer. They were eating snacks inside a pick-
up truck parked in a vacant lot near the COA and DepEd in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, about fifteen
meters from the highway. Momentarily, a tricycle passed by the truck on its way to the COA
Building. Clarissa was seated on the passenger's side, while William was behind the wheel. The
two were alarmed when they saw shadows of persons near the truck. Clarissa suggested to
William that they leave. The latter opened the window on his side halfway to check if there were
persons outside. Suddenly, a man, who turned out to be Rommel Macarubbo, appeared in front
of the truck, pointed a gun at them and said: "This is a holdup. If you will start the engine of the
car, I will shoot you." Thereafter, another man, who turned out to be Willy Suyu, lifted the lock
on William's side and entered the pick-up. Clarissa told William to give everything so that they
would not be harmed. Willy Suyu then took Ferrer's wallet which contained around P150.00. A
third man, who turned out to be Francis Cainglet, took Clarissa's jewelry valued at around
P2,500.00 and cash amounting to PI0.00. Thereafter, Willy Suyu clubbed William and dragged
him out of the truck. Fortunately, William was able to escape and immediately went to the police
station to report the incident.

Meanwhile, Willy Suyu lifted the lock of the pick-up truck at Clarissa's side. Macarubbo then
opened the door. The two and Cainglet dragged the girl to a hilly place, not far away. Macarubbo
and Willy Suyu held her by the arms, while Cainglet poked a fan knife at her. She pleaded for
mercy as she was brought to a house near a muddy place. At that point, a man, who turned out to
be Rodolfo Suyu, the half-brother of Willy Suyu, came out of the house. Willy Suyu, Cainglet
and Macarubbo pushed Clarissa towards Rodolfo Suyu. Rodolfo Suyu then started molesting her.
She tried to run, but she stumbled and she was grabbed by the hair. He then punched her stomach
twice. Rodolfo Suyu passed Clarissa to Cainglet. Cainglet kissed her but she pushed him away.
She was forced to lie down on her back. Cainglet pinned her hands on the ground as Rodolfo
Suyu removed her pants and undergarments. Rodolfo Suyu then spread her legs apart, removed
his pants and undergarments, and proceeded to rape her.

Afterwards, Cainglet suggested that she be released for ransom. The two lookouts again yelled,
"They are coming." Then a beam of light illumined them and engines from vehicles became
audible. Thereafter, two vehicles arrived from about 10 to 15 meters away from the pick-up
truck. After pleading for mercy and promising not to report them to the police authorities, she
was allowed by the culprits to leave. Clarissa fled to a house nearby. Thereafter, the barangay
tanod was summoned. After 15 minutes, two police jeeps arrived and took her to the Cagayan

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Valley Regional Hospital. At the Don Domingo Police Station, Clarissa saw William. The
authorities asked her if she had been sexually abused, she declared that there was merely an
attempt to rape her.

On January 19, 1996, Clarissa signed and filed a criminal complaint for robbery and rape against
Rodolfo Suyu, Willy Suyu, Francis Cainglet and Rommel Bariuan (also known as Rommel
Macarubbo) with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tuguegarao City. Accused Macarubbo,
who was born on August 24, 1978, then, still a minor, moved to be released on recognizance.
Upon the recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare and Services, he was released on
recognizance. Meanwhile, Macarubbo, accompanied by an old woman, arrived at Clarissa's
boarding house. The woman offered that her son, Macarubbo, would testify for her case. Clarissa
was amenable to the idea because the authorities had earlier advised her to agree to Macarubbo
being a state witness. On April 2, 1996, Macarubbo, assisted by his counsel Atty. Gabriel O.
Valle and his mother, Angelina, signed a sworn statement, in the form of questions and answers
before Municipal Judge Elpidio Atal. He confessed to his participation and implicated Rodolfo
and Willy Suyu, and Cainglet, in the robbery and the rape of Clarissa.


Rodolfo Suyu denied the charge against him. He also interposed the defense of alibi. He declared
that, on January 13, 1996, he was in their house at Alimannao, Tuguegarao City, taking care of
his three young children, the youngest of whom was five months old. Cainglet declared that he
was brought to the police headquarters for investigation for robbery with rape Macarubbo denied
knowing any of his co-accused before his arrest on January 17, 1996. The policemen, led by
Capt. Salvador, maltreated him. He was forced to confess to the crime in Carig. After his wounds
were treated at the hospital, he was brought to the police station where he was detained. Willy
Suyu testified that on the day of the alleged robbery and rape, he was in their house at Dodan,
Penablanca, Cagayan, about 45 minutes by tricycle from Centro, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Willy,
moreover, admitted that Rodolfo Suyu was his half-brother. He, however, denied having known
Macarubbo and Cainglet prior to his detention as he met them only in jail. He also saw Clarissa,
for the first time, at the police station when she asked for him.

On February 10, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment finding all the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with rape. On appeal, the CA rendered judgment affirming, with
modification, the decision of the trial court.
Issue

Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged

The Court’s Ruling

NO. The accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In the absence of any clear
showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied facts or circumstances of
weight and substance, which would have affected the result of the case, the findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal. The trial court found Clarissa's testimony to be consistent, believable and credible,

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[hence, is worthy of full faith and credit. The CA reviewed Clarissa's testimony and found the
same to be clear, sincere and could have only come from the mouth of a victim. While it is true
that the victim initially did not reveal to the authorities the fact that she was raped after the
robbery, this does not cast doubt on her testimony for it is not uncommon for a rape victim right
after her ordeal to remain mum about what really transpired. Jurisprudence has established that
delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge, and the
same is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained. Besides, Clarissa
sufficiently explained her initial reluctance on cross-examination. Understandably, Clarissa was
reluctant to reveal, while at the police station, the fact that she was raped, considering that her
boyfriend was present when she. made her first statement before the police investigator. Further,
one of the investigating officers was her townmate. Indeed, the fear of social humiliation
prevented Clarissa from revealing, at the time, the details of her defilement. Certainly, no young
and decent Filipina would publicly admit that she was ravished and her honor tainted unless such
were true, for it would be instinctive for her to protect her honor and obtain justice for the
wicked acts committed upon her.



Appellants contend that Clarissa was coached by SPO4 Cudal during the police line-up, while
Rommel had to be pointed by the other detainees. The arguments of appellants do not persuade.
The victim recounted that there were lights emanating from the nearby DECS (now DepEd) and
COA buildings, and several residences.The place was bright enough for her to see the faces of
her assailants, only that she did not know their names. Familiarity with the physical features of a
person is an acceptable way for proper identification.

Appellants, in their brief, further fault the trial court in not declaring as inadmissible the alleged
extrajudicial confession of Macarubbo, as it was not affirmed in open court and the latter even
denied having executed the statement. The contention of appellants has no merit. The trial court
never admitted Macarubbo's sworn statement for the purpose offered by the prosecution, but only
as part of the testimony of SPO4 Cudal. Appellants were not convicted based on the said sworn
statement, but rather on the credible testimony of the victim, and her positive identification of the
culprits.



The claim of appellants that their arrest was irregular, which consequently rendered their
detention illegal, cannot be considered in this appeal as the matter was not raised at the
opportune time. Records reveal that warrants for the appellants' arrest were indeed issued on
January 19, 1996 and February 1, 1996. Appellants, likewise, entered their pleas without moving
for the quashal of the information. The rule is that an accused is estopped from assailing the
legality of his arrest if he failed to move to quash the information against him before his
arraignment. Even in the instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional
defect, and objection thereto is waived where the person arrested submits to arraignment without
objection. The subsequent filing of the charges and the issuance of the corresponding warrant of
arrest against a person illegally detained will cure the defect of that detention.

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Appellants also assert that the medical report issued by Dr. Pintucan does not conclusively
suggest that Clarissa was raped, for during the examination, her deportment was not of that of a
rape victim and the examination of her cervix did not even suggest forcible assault.The said
argument is, however, without merit. Hymenal lacerations which are usually inflicted when there
is complete penetration are not essential in establishing the crime of rape as it is enough that a
slight penetration or entry of the penis into the lips of the vagina takes place. Partial penile
penetration is as serious as full penetration; the rape is deemed consummated in either case. Dr.
Pintucan further found contusion and hematoma on the victim, which bolsters Clarissa's recount
that she was dragged, forced to lie down, and raped.



The common defense of alibi used by the appellants cannot, moreover, prevail over Clarissa's
clear and convincing narration of the events that transpired and her positive identification of her
assailants. It is a time-honored rule that alibi is a weak defense when unsubstantiated by credible
and plausible testimonies. Clear and convincing evidence must be adduced that the accused was
in a place other than the situs of the crime at the time the crime was committed, such that it was
physically impossible for him to have committed the crime.


To be convicted of robbery with rape, the following elements must concur: (1) the taking of
personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property
taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; (4)
the robbery is accompanied by rape. The intent to rob must precede the rape. In robbery with
rape, the intention of the felony is to rob and the felony is accompanied by rape. The rape must
be contemporaneous with the commission of the robbery. We note that aside from raping the
victim, appellant Rodolfo Suyu inserted his finger in her sexual organ. Appellant Suyu, thus,
committed sexual assault as defined and penalized in Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of Republic Act
No. 8353. Also, aside from Rodolfo Suyu, Cainglet raped the victim. Nevertheless, there is only
one single and indivisible felony of robbery with rape and any crimes committed on the occasion
or by reason of the robbery are merged and integrated into a single and indivisible felony of
robbery with rape.

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 PEOPLE vs. JOSEPH BARRA
G.R. No. 198020 July 10, 2013 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The elements of Robbery with Homicide as defined in Art. 297 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1)
There is an attempted or frustrated robbery. (2) A homicide is committed. In the present case, the
crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the victim refused to give his money to
appellant and no personal property was shown to have been taken.

Facts
On March 21, 2004, an information for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide was
filed against appellant. Dr. Peñafrancia N. Villanueva, Municipal Health Officer of Tigaon,
Camarines Sur, examined the corpse of Elmer Lagdaan and stated in her Postmortem Report and
testified that the victim sustained a gunshot wound due to the circular and inverted edges of the
point of entry. She concluded that since there was no point of exit, the victim was shot at close
range.

Ricardo de la Peña testified that he knew appellant for a long time. He stated that he was on his
way home to the neighboring barangay, when, at around 9:00 p.m. on October 9, 2003, in the
light of a bright moon, he saw appellant enter the house of Lagdaan, which was lit with a lamp,
and poked a gun to the victim’s right forehead and demanded money. De la Peña hid behind a
tree ten meters away. When the victim stated that the money was not in his possession, appellant
shot him. He went home and reported the incident the following morning.

Ely Asor testified that on the night of October 9, 2003, he was on his way to the victim’s house to
collect his daily wage when he saw appellant in the yard of the victim’s house. He inquired from
appellant if the victim was around. Appellant responded that the victim was not around. Asor
went home. It was while Asor was in his house that he heard a gunshot. It was the following
morning that he learned that the victim died. Asor then proceeded to report the incident. The
victim’s mother, Flora Lagdaan, testified that she spent for funeral and burial expenses in the
amount of ₱33,300.00.

In his defense, appellant denied the charges against him. Appellant claimed that he was in
Batangas City, with his brother Benjamin, visiting his sister when he was arrested and brought to
Camarines Sur and charged with the crime of "robbery with murder.” Appellant’s brother,
Benjamin, tried to corroborate his testimony.

The RTC, after taking into consideration all the evidence presented, found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. It stated that the affirmative
testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses deserved more weight than the appellant’s defense of
denial and alibi, thus, finding the prosecution’s witnesses to be credible and that the killing of the
victim to be by reason of the robbery. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals only found
appellant guilty of attempted robbery with homicide. It agreed with the observation of the OSG
that the only evidence introduced by the government to establish robbery is the statement of De
la Peña that when accused-appellant reached the victim’s place, the latter barged into the said

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residence, poked a gun at the victim’s forehead, demanded money and when the victim refused
to accede to his demand, fired a gun and shot the victim. Indeed, no iota of evidence was
presented to establish that accused-appellant took away the victim’s money or any property, for
that matter. The fact of asportation must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Since this fact
was not duly established, accused-appellant should be held liable only for the crime of attempted
robbery with homicide as defined and penalized under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue
Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged

The Court’s Ruling

YES. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with modification on the
award of damages. Findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration and assessment of the
probative weight of the testimonial evidence of the parties and its conclusions anchored on its
findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the
unique advantage of the trial court in observing at close range the demeanor, conduct and
deportment of the said witnesses as they testify, unless the trial court ignored, misunderstood and
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which if considered will change the outcome of
the case. In the present case, while appellant questions the credibility of the prosecution’s
witnesses, he does not present any sufficient evidence to prove that the RTC indeed ignored,
misunderstood and misinterpreted the facts and circumstances of the case. We also found, after
reviewing the records, nothing that would indicate any misinterpretation or misapprehension of
facts on the part of the appellate court that would substantially alter its conclusions.

Appellant in this case was charged with robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code. The elements are: (1) The taking of personal property is committed with violence or
intimidation against persons; (2) The property taken belongs to another; (3) The taking is animo
lucrandi; and (4) By reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed. In
the case at bar, appellant’s intention was to extort money from the victim. By reason of the
victim’s refusal to give up his personal property - his money - to appellant, the victim was shot in
the head, causing his death. We, however, agree with the Court of Appeals that the element of
taking was not complete, making the crime one of attempted robbery with homicide as opposed
to the crime appellant was convicted in the RTC. Appellant is, therefore, liable under Article 297
of the Revised Penal Code, not under Article 294 as originally held by the RTC.

The elements of Robbery with Homicide as defined in Art. 297 of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) There is an attempted or frustrated robbery. (2) A homicide is committed. In the present case,
the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the victim refused to give his money to
appellant and no personal property was shown to have been taken. It was for this reason that the
victim was shot. Appellant can only be found guilty of attempted robbery with homicide, thus
punishable under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the RTC and the Court of
Appeals found appellant's crime to be aggravated by disregard of dwelling, the Court of Appeals
correctly imposed the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua.

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 RAMON AMPARO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 204990, February 22, 2017 LEONEN, J.:
Robbery in band is committed when four (4) or more malefactors take part in the robbery. All
members are punished as principals for any assault committed by the band, unless it can be
proven that the accused took steps to prevent the commission of the crime.

Facts
An information was filed against Ahmed Alcubar, Roberto Guarino, Juanito Salmeo, and Ramon
Amparo for robbery. Raymond Gaa Ignacio testified that on April 26, 2007, he was riding a
jeepney going to Lawton when two (2) men boarded the jeepney along T. Mapua Street. One of
them sat beside him, pointed a knife at him and declared a hold-up. He was ordered to take his
necklace off and hand over his mobile phone. Ignacio then heard a gunshot, causing the robbers
to be rattled and drop their knives on the jeepney bench. A police officer arrived and ordered the
robbers to alight from the jeepney. Four (4) men, later identified as Alcubar, Guarino, Salmeo,
and Amparo, were handcuffed and taken to the police station. Ignacio identified Alcubar as the
man who poked a knife at him, and Guarino as the one who announced the hold-up. He also
identified Salmeo and Amparo as the ones who sat in the front seat beside the driver. He admitted
that he did not know what Salmeo and Amparo were doing at the time of the incident. However,
he testified that he saw them place their knives on the jeepney bench when the police fired the
warning shot. SPO3 Renato Perez testified that on the day of the incident, he was about to report
for work when he noticed a commotion inside a passenger jeepney. He then saw Alcubar
embracing a man later identified as Ignacio, while pointing a "stainless on-foot long double
bladed fan knife" at him. He followed the jeepney and fired a warning shot. Later, he arrested
Alcubar. SPO3 Perez ordered the other three (3) men to alight from the jeepney when the other
passengers pointed them out as Alcubar's companions. Another police officer arrived and helped
him make the arrest. Upon frisking the men, he recovered a balisong from Guarino, an
improvised kitchen knife from Salmeo, and a fan knife from Amparo. He also testified that he
invited the other passengers to the police station to give their statements but only Ignacio went
with him. Amparo, on the other hand, testified that on April 26, 2007, he was in Carriedo,
Quiapo, Manila, working as a parking attendant when a person he did not know arrived and
arrested him. Later, he was brought to the Philippine National Police Anti-Carnapping Unit
where he saw Ignacio for the first time.

The RTC found the accused guilty of robbery in band. All the accused appealed to the CA.
Amparo, in particular, argued that he and Salmeo should be acquitted since the witnesses for the
prosecution did not testify that they performed any act in furtherance of the robbery. On January
31, 2012, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. It noted that Amparo had abandoned his
earlier defense of alibi, and was arguing that there was no evidence that he actively participated
in the commission of the robbery. It found, however, that he was "caught red-handed" with a
weapon during the robbery, which was sufficient to establish that he had a common unlawful
purpose with the rest of the accused.



Petitioner argues that Ignacio did not implicate him as a co-conspirator in his testimony since he

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did not even witness how the weapon was allegedly recovered by the police. He points out that
the bank employee who allegedly pinpointed him as part of the group, and the police officer who
allegedly recovered the bladed weapon from him were not brought to court to testify. He asserts
that he was arrested, not for his participation during the robbery, but due to his alleged
possession of a bladed weapon, which was a violation of the city ordinance.


Issue
Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding that petitioner was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with band.

The Court’s Ruling

NO. The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable proof that petitioner was guilty of
robbery in band. Robbery is the taking, with the intent to gain, of personal property belonging to
another by use of force, violence or intimidation. Under Article 294 (5) in relation to Article
295, and Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code, robbery in band is committed when four (4) or
more malefactors take part in the robbery. All members are punished as principals for any assault
committed by the band, unless it can be proven that the accused took steps to prevent the
commission of the crime. Even if the crime is committed by several malefactors in a motor
vehicle on a public highway, the crime is still classified as robbery in band, not highway robbery
or brigandage under P.D. No. 532. It is highway robbery only when it can be proven that the
malefactors primarily organized themselves for the purpose of committing that crime. In the case
at bar, all the elements are present. Ignacio's failure to see what petitioner was doing during the
robbery is justified considering that the configuration of a jeepney bench makes it hard to see
precisely what passengers seated in the front seat are doing. Ignacio was also able to testify that
he saw both Salmeo and petitioner place their knives on the jeepney bench when the police fired
a warning shot. SPO3 Perez corroborated this, and testified that there were eight (8) other
passengers in the jeepney, who pointed out all four (4) of the accused. After making the arrests,
the four (4) accused were frisked, and a fan knife was recovered from petitioner.



Petitioner initially offered a defense of alibi before the trial court. He abandoned this defense on
appeal after the trial court concluded that petitioner's alibi was not enough to overcome Ignacio's
positive identification. He then argued before the Court of Appeals that while Ignacio might have
seen him at the scene of the crime, there was no evidence of petitioner's exact involvement. His
changing defenses, however, only show the weakness of his arguments.



The imposable penalty must be modified to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor minimum to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor medium as maximum.
However, petitioner's maximum sentence imposed by the trial court had already expired upon
adjustment of his sentence pursuant to Republic Act No. 10592. The service of the modified
penalty is rendered moot since the Bureau of Corrections certified that the adjusted penalty was
based on the maximum penalty imposed by the trial court. Thus, petitioner is ordered released
unless he is detained for some other lawful cause.


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 AURORA ENGSON FRANSDILLA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 197562, April 20, 2015 BERSAMIN, J.:
Conspiracy can be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense is perpetrated, or
can be inferred from the acts of the several accused evincing their joint or common purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interest.

Facts
On February 20, 1991 between 3 o'clock and 4 o'clock in the afternoon, at private complainants'
residence at Quezon City, private complainant Lalaine Yreverre saw appellant Aurora Engson in
front of their gate. Upon noticing Aurora, Lalaine went to the gate and asked Aurora what is their
purpose, as there were four (4) of them. Aurora then inquired about Cynthia Yreverre, Lalaine's
sister. The latter replied that Cynthia was in the Japanese Embassy and asked Aurora if there was
any other person whom she wanted to talk to. It was then that Aurora told Lalaine that she was
from the POEA. It was upon said pretension that Lalaine offered herself to instead talk to her and
allowed her to enter their house. When they were already having a conversation, Aurora asked
Lalaine if she could use the telephone, which the latter acceded to and handed her a cordless
telephone. Lalaine noticed that Aurora seemed to keep on dialing the telephone and even said
that the person she was calling did not know how to use the telephone. But still, Aurora kept on
dialing the telephone. Thereafter, appellant Aurora asked for a cigarette. After Lalaine gave
Aurora the cigarette, the four (4) other men outside the gate, who were with Aurora, suddenly
came inside the house. The four (4) men stood behind Aurora who was still dialing the telephone.
When Aurora told that she could not contact the person she was calling, she asked Lalaine if she
could use the comfort room, which the latter again permitted. Aurora stood up, put down the
telephone, got her bag and went to the comfort room. When Aurora came back, she sat down
again but in crossed-legs as she said she was having a menstrual period. At this juncture, accused
Edgardo Cacal poked a gun at Lalaine's neck and announced that it was a hold-up. While
appellant Edgardo Cacal was poking a gun at Lalaine's neck, accused Danilo Cuanang and the
two (2) other men proceeded to the kitchen. In the kitchen, Danilo and his two (2) other
companions herded their maids, private complainant's niece and cousin inside the bodega.


Accused Cacal who was still poking the gun at Lalaine's neck, thereafter, pulled Lalaine's hair
and dragged her upstairs and brought her inside Cynthia's room. The gun still being poked at
Lalaine, Cacal looked around the room and when he spotted upon the vault he dropped Lalaine,
opened the door and called for his companions to come along. Accused Cuanang came up and
the two carried the vault and brought it downstairs. But before they went downstairs, they
threatened Lalaine not to follow them and to just stay in the room, but Lalaine opened the door
and followed them. When Lalaine was halfway downstairs, accused Cacal turned his back and
saw her. Accused Cacal then brought her inside her room. Inside the room, Cacal pushed her
towards her bed and she fell. Cacal told her to just stay, and then he searched the room. Lalaine
managed to stand up but Cacal slapped her. While sitting, accused Cuanang came and tied her
arms at her back. While she was being tied, appellant Aurora Fransdilla peeped inside the room.
It was also at the time that accused Cacal and Cuanang searched the entire room and took all the
jewelries and things they saw.


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When Cuanang and Cacal left the room, Lalaine followed them. While in the middle downstairs,
she saw Cacal, Cuanang and their two other companions tucking their guns around their waists.
Appellants and their co-accused then left the house on board two (2) cars that were waiting for
them just outside the house, and one of which, a black Colt Mirage, was driven by accused
Manuel Silao, together with appellant Edgardo Silao who was seated at the front passenger seat.



At this point, Lalaine shouted for help, thereafter, a relative came by to help and untied her.
Lalaine then called her sister Cynthia and related the incident. Cynthia reported the incident to
the police authorities. Not too long thereafter, the police investigated the incident. On March 21,
1991, Lalaine went back to the PNP Station, where she was informed that they were able to
recover some money (dollar bills) from appellant Edgardo Silao. When these dollar bills were
shown to her, she recognized that these were the same dollar bills withdrawn by her sister
Cynthia from the RCBC Bank as the bills bear red markings. Fransdilla and her co-accused were
eventually charged with robbery.

The RTC convicted Fransdilla and her co-accused of robbery. As to Fransdilla, the RTC ruled
that several facts and circumstances either proved by the Prosecution or admitted by the Defense
established her having conspired with her co-accused in committing the offense charged. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of all of the accused, but modified the penalty imposed
by the RTC.
Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the conviction of accused-appellant

The Court’s Ruling

NO. The Court affirmed the decision of the CA. Conspiracy of Fransdilla with her co-accused
was established beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. For an accused to
be validly held to have conspired with her co-accused in committing the crime, her overt acts
must evince her active part in the execution of the crime agreed to be committed. The overt acts
of each of the conspirators must tend to execute the offense agreed upon, for the merely passive
conspirator cannot be held to be still part of the conspiracy without such overt acts, unless such
conspirator is the mastermind. Here, Fransdilla was satisfactorily shown not to have been a mere
passive co-conspirator, but an active one who had facilitated the access into the house by
representing herself as an employee of the POEA. In that respect, it is not always required to
establish that two or more persons met and explicitly entered into the agreement to commit the
crime by laying down the details of how their unlawful scheme or objective would be carried
out. Conspiracy can also be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense is
perpetrated, or can be inferred from the acts of the several accused evincing their joint or
common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. Once conspiracy is
established, the act of each conspirator is the act of all.



In establishing conspiracy, the State could rely on direct as well as circumstantial evidence.

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Lalaine's testimony against Fransdilla constituted both kinds of evidence. Lalaine's direct
testimony showed the latter's overt participation in the execution of the robbery, while the
following circumstances indicated the unity of action and common purpose or design to commit
the robbery among Fransdilla and her co-accused, specifically: (1) Fransdilla and her co-accused
went together to the complainants' house at around 3:00 to 4:00 p.m. of February 20, 1991; (2)
she talked to Joel to solicit information on the whereabouts of Cynthia; (3) upon learning that
Cynthia was not home, she stepped outside the gate and talked to two men sitting inside a vehicle
parked outside the house; (4) she pretended to be an employee of the POEA in order to gain entry
into the house; (5) she performed acts purposely aimed to distract Lalaine in order to give her
cohorts the opportunity to enter the house and commit the robbery; (5) during the robbery, she
was not tied up like the household members, but moved freely around the house, and at one point
Lalaine spotted her peeping into the bedroom where Lalaine was then being held; and (7) she and
the others fled together in two separate vehicles after the robbery.


The crime committed was the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by armed men
under Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code and robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the CA held that the penalty for the
complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code was that for the more serious offense,
to be imposed in its maximum period.

In Napolis v. Court of Appeals, the Court abandoned the doctrine that when the felonies of
robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and robbery with
violence against or intimidation of a person under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code are
committed, the penalty for the latter crime (although the lighter one) should be imposed because
the violence against or intimidation of a person was the "controlling qualification," on the theory
that "robbery which is characterized by violence or intimidation against the person is evidently
graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things, because where violence or
intimidation against the person is present there is greater disturbance of the order of society and
the security of the individual."

Indeed, one who, by breaking a wall, enters, with a deadly weapon, an inhabited house and steals
therefrom valuable effects, without violence against or intimidation upon persons, is punishable
under Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal. Pursuant to the above view,
adhered to in previous decisions, if, aside from performing said acts, the thief lays hand upon any
person, without committing any of the crimes or inflicting any of the injuries mentioned in
subparagraphs (1) to (4) of Art. 294 of the same Code, the imposable penalty - under paragraph
(5) thereof- shall be much lighter. Art. 294 applies only where robbery with violence against or
intimidation of a person takes place without entering an inhabited house, under the conditions set
forth in Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code.


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 AJOMAR ABLAZA vs. PEOPLE
September 26, 2018 G.R. No. 217722 DEL CASTILLO, J.:
‘Grab’ means to take or seize by or as if by a sudden motion or grasp; to take hastily. Clearly, the
same does not suggest the presence of violence or physical force in the act and the same cannot
be readily equated with the employment of violence or physical force.

Facts
Petitioner and Lauzon were charged in an Information for Robbery. The prosecution presented as
its lone witness the victim, Rosario S. Snyder (Snyder). Snyder narrated that at around 8:30 a.m.
of June 29, 2010, she was using her cellphone while walking along Jolo Street, Olongapo
City when a motorcycle with two male persons on board stopped beside her. The backrider then
suddenly grabbed her three necklaces: one big necklace worth ₱43,800.00 and two other
necklaces each with pendants worth ₱13,500.00 and ₱12,800.00, respectively, the prices of
which were evidenced by the receipts issued by Eleanor Pawnshop and Jewelry Store where she
bought them. Snyder further recounted that after grabbing her necklaces, the two male persons
moved a short distance and then looked back at her to check if all her necklaces were taken.
Recovering from shock, Snyder managed to shout and ask for help. A tricycle passed by and so
the male persons on board the motorcycle immediately sped away. Snyder asked the tricycle
driver to run after the snatchers but he unfortunately missed them. Thus, Snyder went to the
Police Station to report the incident. While at the police station, Snyder was shown some
pictures from which she identified petitioner as the driver of the motorcycle. Snyder was certain
about the identity of petitioner since she had a good look at the robbers' faces when they looked
back at her before speeding away and also because petitioner was not wearing any helmet at that
time. On the same day, a policeman accompanied Snyder to the house of petitioner who, when
asked, denied any involvement in the snatching incident and claimed that he was asleep at that
time. After a while, Snyder and the policeman discovered that Lauzon, whom Snyder earlier
learned to be the backrider, was also in petitioner's house hiding under the kitchen
sink. Unfortunately, Snyder was not able to recover her necklaces.

Petitioner served as the sole witness for the defense. Petitioner claimed that on the date and time
of the incident, he and Lauzon were asleep in his house in Purok 6, Lower Kalaklan in front of
Ocean View since they had a drinking spree the night before. Petitioner only woke up when a
policeman arrived asking him if he was Jomar Ablaza. Upon confirming that he was Jomar
Ablaza, the policeman told him that a woman wanted to see him. However, upon seeing
petitioner, the woman told the policeman that he was not the one since the person she was
looking for was "tisoy" with tattoo. Upon hearing this, the policeman reminded the woman that
petitioner already had a record with the police. The policeman and the woman then simply
left. After two months, however, petitioner was arrested in connection with this case.

The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime charged. It found the elements of the crime of
robbery, to wit: (1) that there is taking of personal property; (2) the personal property belongs to
another; (3) the taking is with animus lucrandi; and (4) the taking is with violence against or

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intimidation of persons or force upon things, to be present. Petitioner and Lauzon were likewise
found to have conspired with each other in committing the crime charged.

In his Brief, petitioner argued that the RTC erred in giving credence to Snyder's testimony which
was incredible and full of inconsistencies. Petitioner pointed out that it was unlikely that, after
grabbing the necklaces and speeding away, he and Lauzon would still look back at their alleged
victim, Snyder. According to him, logic and common experience dictate that they immediately
leave the crime scene and not look back. Second, Snyder herself admitted that she was shocked;
hence, it was highly unlikely that she would have the emotional stability and mental acuity to
accurately remember the robbers' facial features. Also, Snyder did not at the outset describe the
physical appearance of the persons who robbed her; instead, she identified petitioner only after
she was shown the pictures. Moreover, Snyder was looking for a mestizo who was sporting a
tattoo which thus rendered doubtful Snyder's identification of petitioner. Third, there were
several inconsistencies in the testimonies of Snyder which tended to demonstrate the fickleness
of her memory. Lastly, petitioner found it baffling why he was arrested only after two months
and not immediately after a policeman and Snyder went to his house on the day itself of the
incident. To petitioner, all these cast doubt on his supposed guilt. Petitioner likewise argued that,
even assuming he committed the acts imputed against him, the RTC should have convicted him
only of theft citing People v. Concepcion where the accused therein who snatched the victim's
bag was held guilty of theft and not robbery. The CA, however, was not swayed by petitioner's
asseverations and found no merit in the appeal.

Issue
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in convicting the petitioner of the crime charged

The Court’s Ruling

YES. There is partial merit in the petition. The Court shall not depart from the findings of the
RTC as affirmed by the CA on the matter of Snyder's credibility as witness and that of her
testimony identifying petitioner as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Nevertheless, the Court
finds that petitioner should be held liable only for theft. Indeed, the case of People v. Concepcion
is on all fours with the present case. The crime committed is therefore robbery and not theft,
because personal violence was brought to bear upon the offended party before he was definitely
deprived of his money. Snyder's testimony was bereft of any showing that petitioner and his co-
accused used violence or intimidation in taking her necklaces. She merely stated that the
perpetrators grabbed her necklaces without mentioning that the latter made use of violence or
intimidation in grabbing them.

The OSG argues that the use of the word "grabbed", by itself, shows that violence or physical
force was employed by the offenders in taking Snyders' necklaces. The Court, however,
disagrees. Grab means to take or seize by or as if by a sudden motion or grasp; to take
hastily. Clearly, the same does not suggest the presence of violence or physical force in the act
and the same cannot be readily equated with the employment of violence or physical force. Here,
it was probably the suddenness of taking that shocked Snyder and not the presence of violence or

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physical force since, as pointed out by petitioner, Snyder did not at all allege that she was pushed
or otherwise harmed by the persons who took her necklaces.

Besides, the use of force is not an element of the crime of simple robbery committed under
paragraph 5, Article 294 of the RPC. The elements of robbery are: (1) there is taking of personal
property; (2) the personal property belongs to another; (3) the taking is with animus lucrandi;
and (4) the taking is with violence against or intimidation of persons or with force upon things.

Note that while the fourth requisite mentions "with violence against or intimidation of persons"
or "force upon things", only the phrase "with violence against or intimidation of persons" applies
to the kinds of robbery falling under Section One, Chapter One, Title Ten of the RPC. The phrase
"with force upon things", on the other hand, applies to the kinds of robbery provided under
Section Two thereof.

As mentioned, the RTC convicted petitioner of simple robbery under paragraph 5, Article 294,
which article falls under Section One. Hence, in determining the existence of the fourth requisite
in cases of simple robbery under Article 294, courts should look into whether the taking of
personal property is with violence against or intimidation of persons and not on whether there
was force.

Intimidation is not encompassed under paragraphs one to four since no actual physical violence
is inflicted; evidently then, it can only fall under paragraph five. Clearly, for the requisite of
violence to obtain in cases of simple robbery, the victim must have sustained less serious
physical injuries or slight physical injuries in the occasion of the robbery. In this case, Snyder did
not sustain any kind of injury at all. And as already mentioned, her testimony was bereft of any
showing that violence was used against her by petitioner and his co-accused in that she was
pushed, or otherwise harmed on the occasion of the robbery. While one can only imagine how
pulling three necklaces at the same time from the victim's neck could not have caused any mark,
bruise, or pain to the latter, suffice it to state that such a matter must have been adequately
proved by the prosecution during trial as the Court cannot rely on mere assumptions, surmises,
and conjectures especially when it is the life and liberty of the petitioner which is at stake.

As to intimidation, its non-existence in this case is not in dispute. And even if otherwise, the
Court will just the same rule against it. Per the victim's testimony, the act of the perpetrators in
grabbing her necklace was so sudden. Hence, it could not have produced fear or duress in the
victim's mind as to deprive her of the exercise of her will.

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 HERMAN MEDINA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 182648 June 17, 2015 PERALTA, J.:
The accused cannot solely rely on her negative and self-serving negations, for denial carries no
weight in law and has no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters.

Facts
Henry Lim is the registered owner of a Sangyong Korando Jeep which was involved in an
accident that caused damage to its roof and door. On April 27, 2002, he engaged the services of
Medina, who is a mechanic and maintains a repair shop in Buenavista, Santiago City, Isabela. At
the time the jeep was delivered to Medina’s shop, it was still in running condition and
serviceable because the under chassis was not affected and the motor engine, wheels, steering
wheels and other parts were still functioning. A reasonable time elapsed, but no repairs were
made on the jeep. So, in the morning of September 4, 2002, Purita Lim, Lim’s sister, instructed
Danilo Beltran to retrieve the jeep from Medina’s shop on the agreement that he would instead
repair the vehicle in his own auto shop. Beltran, however, was not able to get the jeep since its
alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with rims worth ₱5,000.00, ₱5,000.00, ₱2,500.00, and
₱10,000.00, respectively, could not be found. Upon inquiry, Medina told him that he took and
installed them on Lim’s another vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up, which was also being repaired in the
shop. Beltran went back in the afternoon of the same day and was able to get the jeep, but
without the missing parts. He had it towed and brought it to his own repair shop. Before placing
the jeep therein, he reported the incident to Purita. Later, the jeep was fully repaired and put back
in good running condition. On September 12, 2002, a criminal complaint for simple theft was
filed by Purita, representing her brother. During the trial proper, Beltran and Lim were presented
as witnesses for the prosecution, while Medina and a certain Angelina Tumamao, a former
barangay kagawad of Buenavista, Santiago City, testified for the defense. Eventually, the case
was submitted for decision, but without the formal offer of evidence by the defense.

The trial court found Medina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the conviction of Medina.
Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in convicting accused-appellant of the crime charged

The Court’s Ruling

NO. The accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple theft. As
defined and penalized, the elements of the crime are: (1) there was taking of personal property;
(2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking was done with intent to gain; (4) the taking
was without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking was accomplished without the use of
violence against, or intimidation of persons or force, upon things. In this case, Medina
acknowledged without hesitation the taking of the jeep’s alternator, starter, battery, and two tires
with magwheels, but he put up the defense that they were installed in the pick-up owned by Lim.
With such admission, the burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove that the missing parts
were indeed lawfully taken. Upon perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes, the Court finds

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that Medina unsatisfactorily discharged the burden. Even bearing in mind the testimony of
Tumamao, he failed to substantiate, through the presentation of supporting documentary
evidence or corroborative testimony, the claims that: (1) Lim was the owner of the pick-up; (2)
the missing parts of the jeep were exactly the same items that were placed in the pick-up; (3) Lim
consented, expressly or impliedly, to the transfer of auto parts; and (4) Mendoza witnessed the
removal of the spare parts from the jeep and their placement to the pick-up. Neither did Medina
adduce any justifying or exempting circumstance to avoid criminal liability. On the contrary, Lim
firmly testified that when he entrusted to Medina the jeep’s repair it was still in running condition
and complete with alternator, starter, battery, and tires, which went missing by the time the
vehicle was recovered from the auto shop. Likewise, the testimony of Beltran is definite and
straightforward. He declared that he was not able to get the jeep in the morning of September 4,
2002 because its alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with rims could not be found, and that
when he asked Medina as to their whereabouts the latter told him that he took them, placed the
starter in Lim’s pick-up while the alternator was in the repair shop. Medina informed him that the
jeep’s missing parts were actually installed to Lim’s other vehicle which was also being repaired
at the time. However, Beltran did not know or had not seen other vehicles owned by Lim at
Medina’s shop. In the afternoon of the sameday, he was able to get the jeep but not its missing
parts. He concluded that they were lost because he inspected the jeep.

Abundo v. Sandiganbayan, which was relied upon by Medina, does not apply. In said case, the
element of lack of owner's consent to the taking of the junk chassis was absent since the records
showed that Abundo made a request in writing to be allowed to use one old jeep chassis among
the pile of junk motor vehicles. His request was granted. A memorandum receipt was issued and
signed. Pursuant thereto, the chassis was taken out. There was no furtive taking or unlawful
asportation. Medina cannot acquit himself on the basis of a purported acknowledgment receipt
that he and Tumamao identified during their presentation as witnesses for the defense. This is
due to his admission that Bardiaga, Pascual, and Bautista did not actually see him remove the
alternator, starter, battery, and tires with rims from the jeep and put the same to the pick-
up. Likewise, while Medina asserted that Mendoza came to his place and was shown that the
missing auto parts were transferred from the jeep to the pick-up, the latter was not presented as a
hostile witness to confirm such expedient claim. As against the positive and categorical
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Medina’s mere denials cannot prevail for being self-
serving and uncorroborated.

Denial does not prevail over an affirmative assertion of the fact. To be worthy of consideration at
all, denial should be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The accused cannot solely
rely on her negative and self-serving negations, for denial carries no weight in law and has no
greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters. Further, Medina did not demonstrate any evidence of ill motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses as to falsely testify against him. In the absence of any evidence that the
prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper motives, the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court.

26 of 82
 PEOPLE vs. MERA "JOY" ELEUTERIO NIELLES
G.R. No. 200308 February 23, 2015 DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Intent to gain is presumed from the act of unlawful taking.

Facts
Appellant Mera Joy Eleuterio Nielles was charged with the crime of Qualified Theft in an
Information. During the trial on the merits, the prosecution established that private complainant
Juanita Flores was engaged in the business of guaranteeing purchase orders and gift checks of
Shoemart and Landmark and disposing, selling or transferring them for consideration. Appellant
initially worked as Flores’ house help but was eventually hired to work at Flores’ office
performing clerical jobs like sorting invoices. When Flores’ business grew, appellant was
assigned to bill and collect from sub-guarantors, and to encash and deposit checks. On July 15,
2004, appellant collected ₱640,353.86 from the sub-guarantors. However, appellant did not remit
the amount to Flores or deposit it in her account. Instead, she issued 15 personal checks totaling
₱640,353.86 and deposited them to Flores’ account. All the checks were dishonored upon
presentment due to "account closed." Appellant thereafter absconded. For her part, appellant
denied having stolen the amount of ₱640,353.86.

In a Judgment dated March 26, 2008, the RTC found appellant guilty of the crime of qualified
theft. On appeal, appellant asserted that since private complainant Flores was abroad on July 15,
2004, she could not have personally known whether appellant indeed collected amounts from the
sub-guarantors. She posited that mere issuance of the 15 checks is not proof that she received
payments from the sub-guarantors or that she failed to remit the monies belonging to Flores. She
insisted that the prosecution failed to establish that she indeed collected monies from the sub-
guarantors amounting to ₱640,353.86. The CA, however, was not impressed by appellant’s
protestations. It held that the fact that Flores was out of the country during the commission of the
offense is irrelevant since the prosecution has satisfactorily established that upon her arrival in
the Philippines, she immediately investigated the matter and talked to the sub-guarantors. Flores
also confirmed that indeed appellant issued 15 personal checks in lieu of the amounts collected
and deposited the same to Flores’ account but were all dishonored upon presentment.
Significantly, the CA noted that aside from her bare denial, appellant did not present any
evidence to support her claim that she did not steal the amount of ₱640,353.86 from Flores. In
fine, the CA found all the elements for the crime of qualified theft to be present.

Issue
Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty as charged

The Court’s Ruling

YES. We concur with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the prosecution
satisfactorily established all the elements of qualified theft, to wit: 1) taking of personal property;
2) that said property belongs to another; 3) that the said taking was done with intent to gain; 4)
that it was done without the owner’s consent; 5) that it was accomplished without the use of

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violence or intimidation against persons, or of force upon things; and 6) that it was done with
grave abuse of confidence.

Private complainant testified that Accused-appellant took the amount of ₱640,353.86 from her
without her consent by failing to turn over the amount she collected from the former’s sub-
guarantors. Instead, she issued fifteen (15) personal checks and deposited the same to Private
Complainant’s account which however, all bounced for the reason "account closed". The taking
of the amount collected by Accused-appellant was obviously done with intent to gain as she
failed to remit the same to Private Complainant. Intent to gain is presumed from the act of
unlawful taking. Further, the unlawful act was accomplished by Accused-appellant without the
use of violence or intimidation against persons, or of force upon things as the payment to her of
the said amount was voluntarily handed to her by the sub-guarantors as she was known to be
entrusted with the collection of payments. The circumstance of grave abuse of confidence that
made the same as qualified theft was also proven. Accused-appellant herself testified that as a
cashier, her functions and responsibilities include billings and collections from their agents and
making of deposits and withdrawals in behalf of Private Complainant. Moreover, when the
payment for the purchase orders or gift checks becomes due, she would fill up the four (4) blank
checks given by the sub-guarantor with the knowledge and consent of Private Complainant. It is
beyond doubt that an employee like a cashier who comes into possession of the monies she
collected enjoys the confidence reposed in her by her employer, as in the instant case.

It is futile on the part of the appellant to belatedly claim in her Brief before the appellate court
that the prosecution should have presented these sub-guarantors so they could be cross-
examined. There is likewise no merit in her contention that the prosecution is guilty of
suppression of evidence when they did not present these sub-guarantors simply because the
defense, on its own initiative, could very well compel, thru the compulsory processes of the
court, the attendance of these sub-guarantors as witnesses. The appellant did not even attempt to
discredit the testimony of Flores to the effect that upon her arrival from Hongkong, appellant
went to Flores’ office and admitted to having committed the offense. Significantly, when
appellant was placed on the witness stand, she did not even make any attempt to explain her
issuance of the 15 checks. In fact, during her entire testimony, she never made any mention about
the personal checks that she issued and deposited in Flores’ account. All that appellant could
claim is that the issuance of the checks only proves that the same was for a consideration – but
omitted to explain what the consideration was.

We also concur with the findings of the trial court and the CA that the prosecution established
beyond reasonable doubt that the amount of ₱640,353.86 actually belonged to Flores; that
appellant stole the amount with intent to gain and without Flores’ consent; that the taking was
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, or of force upon
things; and that it was committed with grave abuse of confidence.

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 ENGR. ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 170863 March 20, 2013 BRION, J.:
When the date given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need not be proven as
alleged; the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any
date within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action.

Facts
In 2001, A. Mojica Construction and General Services undertook the Porta Vaga building
construction in Session Road, Baguio City. AMCGS subcontracted the fabrication and erection
of the building’s structural and steel framing to Anmar, owned by the Marigondon family. It
assigned the petitioner as project manager with general managerial duties, including the
receiving, custody, and checking of all building construction materials. On two occasions in
October 2001, the petitioner instructed Bernardo, Junio Trucking’s truck driver, and about 10
Anmar welders to unload about 10 to 15 pieces of 20 feet long wide flange steel beams at
Anmar’s alleged new contract project along Marcos Highway, Baguio City. Sometime in
November 2001, the petitioner again instructed Bernardo and several welders to unload about 5
to 16 pieces of 5 meters and 40 feet long wide flange steel beams along Marcos Highway, as well
as on Mabini Street, Baguio City. Sometime in January 2002, Engr. Nella Aquino, AMCGS’
project manager, informed Engr. Marigondon that several wide flange steel beams had been
returned to Anmar’s warehouse on October 12, 19, and 26, 2001, as reflected in the security
guard’s logbook. Engr. Marigondon contacted the petitioner to explain the return, but the latter
simply denied that the reported return took place. Engr. Marigondon requested Marcelo, her
warehouseman, to conduct an inventory of the construction materials at the project site. Marcelo
learned from Cano that several wide flange steel beams had been unloaded along Marcos
Highway. There, Marcelo found and took pictures of some of the missing steel beams. He
reported the matter to the Baguio City police headquarters and contacted Anmar to send a truck
to retrieve the steel beams, but the truck came weeks later and, by then, the steel beams could no
longer be found. The stolen steel beams amounted to ₱2,269,731.69. On April 26, 2002
Information was filed with the RTC charging the petitioner with the crime of qualified theft. In
his defense, the petitioner vehemently denied the charge against him. He claimed that AMCGS,
not Anmar, employed him, and his plan to build his own company had been Engr. Marigondon’s
motive in falsely accusing him of stealing construction materials. The RTC convicted the
petitioner of qualified theft. On appeal, the CA brushed aside the petitioner’s arguments and
affirmed the RTC’s decision.

The petitioner submits that, while the information charged him for acts committed "sometime in
the month of October, 2001," he was convicted for acts not covered by the information, i.e.,
November 2001, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. He further argues that the prosecution failed to establish the
fact of the loss of the steel beams since the corpus delicti was never identified.
Issue
Whether the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the RTC’s decision convicting the
petitioner of the crime of qualified theft.

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The Court’s Ruling
NO. The petition lacks merit. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which lays
down the guidelines in determining the sufficiency of a complaint or information, and Section
11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, essentially provide that when the date given in
the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged; thus, the
complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any date within
the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action. In this case,
the petitioner had been fully apprised of the charge of qualified theft since the information stated
the approximate date of the commission of the offense through the words "sometime in the
month of October, 2001." The petitioner could reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act
with which he was charged from a reading of the contents of the information, as well as gather
by such reading whatever he needed to know about the charge to enable him to prepare his
defense.

The crime of qualified theft was committed with grave abuse of discretion. The elements of
qualified theft are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs to another;
(c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owner's consent; (e) it
be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon
things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC,
i.e., with grave abuse of confidence. All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution’s
evidence proved, through the prosecution’s eyewitnesses, that upon the petitioner’s instruction,
several pieces of wide flange steel beams had been delivered, twice in October 2001 and once in
November 2001, along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street, Baguio City; the petitioner betrayed
the trust and confidence reposed on him when he, as project manager, repeatedly took
construction materials from the project site, without the authority and consent of Engr.
Marigondon, the owner of the construction materials.

The petitioner argues that his conviction was improper because the alleged stolen beams or
corpus delicti had not been established. He asserts that the failure to present the alleged stolen
beams in court was fatal to the prosecution’s cause. But corpus delicti refers to the fact of the
commission of the crime charged or to the body or substance of the crime. It does not refer to to
the stolen steel beams. Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, even a
single witness' uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a
conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial evidence. In
theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and
(2) that it was lost by felonious taking.

In this case, the testimonial and documentary evidence on record fully established the corpus
delicti. The positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly Bernardo, Cano and
Buen, stating that the petitioner directed them to unload the steel beams along Marcos Highway
and Mabini Street on the pretext of a new Anmar project, were crucial to the petitioner’s
conviction. The security logbook entry, delivery receipts and photographs proved the existence
and the unloading of the steel beams to a different location other than the project site.

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 PEOPLE vs. TRINIDAD A. CAHILIG
G.R. No. 199208 July 30, 2014 CARPIO, J.:
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, must be the result of the relation by
reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the accused &the offended party.

Facts
Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
(WPESLAI) from December 1992 until 7 November 2001. She was tasked with handling,
managing, receiving, and disbursing the funds of the WPESLAI. It was discovered that from 31
May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made withdrawals from the funds ofWPESLAI and
appropriated the same for her personal benefit. Cahilig would prepare disbursement vouchers, to
be approved by the WPESLAI president and Board of Directors, in order to withdraw funds from
one of WPESLAI’s bank accounts then transfer these funds to its other bank account. The
withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in her capacity as WPESLAI
cashier. This procedure for transferringfunds from one bank account to another was said to be
standard practice at WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not actually transfer the funds. Instead, she
made it appear in her personal WPESLAI ledger that a deposit was made into her account and
then she would fill out a withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said amount from her
capital contribution.

The trial court found that Cahilig employed the same scheme in each of the 30 cases of qualified
theft filed against her, allowing her to pilfer from WPESLAI’S funds a total of ₱6,268,300.00.
All 30 cases were consolidated and jointly heard. Upon agreement of the parties, only three of
the 30 cases went thru trial. The remaining 27 cases were the subject of a written stipulation of
facts, on the basis of which these were submitted for resolution. The stipulation stated, among
others: That for purposes of efficient and speedy administration of these cases, the parties herein
agreed, during the pre-trial conference and approved by the Honorable Court, that the actualtrial
and presentation of evidence will be done only on the first three (3) counts of the cases, i.e., on
Cases Numbers 03-2178 to 03-2180, with the understanding and agreement that after the
termination of the hearing on said three (3) cases, the parties shall adopt the results thereof in the
remaining twenty-seven (27) counts, considering that all the cases arose from similar
transactions with the same methods or modus operandi used in committing the crime charged,
and involving the same accused and the same offended party.

The RTC found Cahilig guilty of the crimes charged, in a Decision dated 16 June 2005. The RTC
held that Cahilig, as cashier of WPESLAI, was granted trust and confidence by the key officers
ofthe association. The RTC noted that Cahilig "enjoyed access to the funds and financial records
of the association, a circumstance that understandably facilitated her easy withdrawal of funds
which she converted to her personal use in the manner heretofore described. Undoubtedly, she
betrayed the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer.” On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC’s Decision. The CA held that all the elements of Qualified Theft were present
in every charge.

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 Issue
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty as charged

The Court’s Ruling

YES. The Court denies the petition. However, the penalties imposed by the trial court in six of
the 30 cases are incorrect and, therefore, must be modified. The elements of Qualified Theft,
committed with grave abuse of confidence, are as follows: 1. Taking of personal property; 2.
That the said property belongs to another; 3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain; 4.
That it be done without the owner’s consent; 5. That it be accomplished without the use of
violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; 6. That it be done with grave
abuse of confidence. It is clear that all the elements ofQualified Theft are present in these cases.
Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of her position. Her
intent to gain is clear in the use of a carefully planned and deliberately executed scheme to
commit the theft.

Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, must be the result of the relation by
reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party
that might create a high degree of confidence betweenthem which the appellant abused. Cahilig’s
position was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering that it involves "handling,
managing, receiving, and disbursing" money from WPESLAI’s depositors and other funds of the
association. Cahilig’s responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier required prudence and vigilance over
the money entrusted into her care.

However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the board of directors into
authorizing disbursements for money that eventually ended up in her personal account, a fact that
Cahilig did not deny.

The trial court, however, erred in the penalty imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2186, 03-2191,
03-2194, 03-2197, 03-2204, and 03-2206. To recall, the amounts involved in the aforesaid cases
are ₱20,000.00, ₱46,300.00, ₱25,000.00, ₱30,000.00, ₱40,000.00, and ₱35,000.00, respectively.
In the aforementioned six cases, none of the amounts are below ₱12,000.00. Hence, if the crime
charged had been simple theft, the penalty in any of these six cases would have been, at least,
prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since it was established that the crime was
qualified by grave abuse of confidence, Article 310 provides that the penalty to be imposed shall
be the one "next higher by two degrees," which in this case is reclusion perpetua. Accordingly,
the penalty in these six cases should be reclusion perpetua.

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 PEOPLE vs ENRILE DONIO
March 1, 2017 G.R. No. 212815 PERALTA, J.:
Failure to designate the offense by the statute or to mention the specific provision penalizing the
act does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite the facts constituting
the crime charged.

Facts
Accused-appellant Enrile Donio was charged with violation of R.A. No. 6539, otherwise known
as Anti Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The prosecution established that
on November 26, 2003, six police officers of the Concepcion Police Station, Tarlac City, headed
by SP04 Leodegario Taberdo conducted a checkpoint along the junction of MacArthur Highway
in relation to the campaign of the PNP against hijacking, camapping, and kidnapping, hailing
cargo trucks and closed vans, and issuing cards to southbound vehicles. At 2:30 in the morning
on November 26, 2003, a speeding tricycle abruptly stopped a few meters from the checkpoint
and caught the attention of the police officers. SP04 Taberdo and two others approached the
vehicle. When asked for his identity, he introduced himself as Raul Layug and then handed to
SP04 Taberdo a temporary license bearing the said name. The police officers asked the driver
and his companions, co-accused Paulino and Ryan, to bring the vehicle to the checkpoint when
they failed to produce its certificate of registration and the official receipt. Upon visual search of
the vehicle, they discovered a bloodstained mini jungle bolo inside. They seized the tricycle and
the bolo, and then brought the three to the police station. At 9 o'clock in the morning, Donio
asked permission to leave in order to get the registration papers. The officers allowed him,
however, he did not return. Meanwhile, around 6:30 in morning of the same date, Rodrigo
Layug was searching for his brother Raul, the victim, who has not returned home since last night.
Raul was the driver of the vehicle. Rodrigo met with his tricycle driver cousin from Mawaque to
ask him if he saw his brother. His cousin accompanied him to Barangay Madapdap where they
found the remains of Raul. Rodolfo, Raul and Rodrigo's other brother, went to the station where
he learned that Paulino and Ryan were released. Sometime in December 2003, the brothers
returned to the station upon learning that Donio was apprehended.

Defense's sole witness, Donio denied the accusations. As a sugarcane plantation worker, he has a
long palang for harvesting and cutting. It was not similar to the sharp and pointed mini jungle
bolo. As a stay-in plantation worker, he does not leave the workplace for six months. His wife
visits him instead. On November 24, 2003, he was harvesting sugarcane in Capas, Tarlac.
However, from the evening of November 25, 2003 until the next day, he was at home after his
wife fetched him to tend to their sick child.

The RTC convicted Donio of the crime of carnapping with homicide. On appeal, the CA denied
Donio's appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming Donio’s conviction

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The Court’s Ruling
NO. The Court found no cogent reason to reverse Donio' s conviction. At the outset, the CA
noted that the prosecution should have filed an Information for the special complex crime of
qualified carnapping in aggravated form. Failure to designate the offense by the statute or to
mention the specific provision penalizing the act does not vitiate the information if the facts
alleged therein clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged.The recital of the ultimate
facts and circumstances in the complaint or information determines the character of the crime
and not the caption or preamble of the information or the specification of the provision of the law
alleged to have been violated. In the case at bar, the acts alleged to have been committed by
Donio are averred in the Information, and the same described the acts defined and penalized
under Sections 2 and 14 of R.A. 6539, as amended.

The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under the R.A. No. 6539, as amended are
the following: (1) That there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) That the vehicle belongs to a
person other than the offender himself; (3) That the taking is without the consent of the owner
thereof; or that the taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things; and (4) That the offender intends to gain from the taking
of the vehicle. Under the last clause of Section 14 of the R.A. 6539, to prove the special complex
crime of camapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of
carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was
perpetrated in the course of the commission of the camapping or on the occasion thereof. All the
elements of camapping in the instant case are present and proven during the trial. The tricycle
was definitely ascertained to belong to Rodrigo, as evidenced by a Deed of Conditional Sale in
his favor. Donio was found driving the vehicle in the early morning of November 26, 2003, the
same day Rodrigo was looking for his missing brother Raul. Also, SP04 Taberdo positively
identified Donio as the driver he flagged down at the checkpoint in his testimony.

Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides the presumption that a person found in
possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the
whole act. Here, Donio failed to produce the vehicle's papers at the checkpoint. He impersonated
the victim before the police officers when his identity was asked, and left under the guise of
getting the said documents. It was also established that he and the others were strangers to
Rodrigo. Donio's unexplained possession, coupled with the circumstances proven in the trial,
therefore, raises the presumption that he was one of the perpetrators responsible for the unlawful
taking of the vehicle and Raul's death. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi, which is an internal act,
is presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant and the mere
use of the thing which was taken without the owner's consent constitutes gain. Donio's intent to
gain from the carnapped tricycle was proven as he and his companions were using it as means of
transportation when they were confronted by the Concepcion police officers.

The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the accused
can no longer be proved by any other evidence. Circumstantial, indirect or presumptive evidence,
if sufficient, can replace direct evidence as provided by Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of

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Court, which, to warrant the conviction of an accused, requires that: (a) there is more than one
(1) circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c)
the combination of all these circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, is the one who committed the crime.Hence, to justify a conviction based
on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way
as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.

Circumstantial evidence established Donio's guilt beyond reasonable doubt: First, Donio was
driving the tricycle when he, Paulino and Ryan were accosted during a checkpoint at the
MacArthur Highway; Second, his possession of the vehicle was not fully explained as he failed
to produce its registration papers; Third, he was in possession of the victim's temporary license.
He even presented it and introduced himself as Raul to the police; Fourth, a bloodstained mini
jungle bolo was found inside the tricycle; Fifth, Rodrigo ascertained that Raul was the driver of
his tricycle, and that he was looking for him on the same day that Donio and the others were
flagged down; Sixth, Raul was last seen driving the tricycle at 10:00 in the evening on November
25, 2003 when he passed by at the Mawaque Terminal at the comer of MacArthur Highway and
Mawaque Road. Seventh, the Bantay Bayan of Madapdap Resettlement found Raul's body at
around 6:30 in the morning on November 26, 2003 at a vacant lot towards the road to Sta. Lucia
Resettlement comer Barangay Dapdap. Eighth, Raul sustained multiple stab wounds caused by a
sharp instrument as depicted in the post-mortem examination. Thus, the only rational conclusion
that can be drawn from the totality of the foregoing facts and circumstances is that Donio and his
companions are guilty of carnapping the tricycle and of killing Raul in the course thereof.
Moreover, when Donio was brought to the police station, he asked permission from the officers
to get the registration papers but never returned. Undoubtedly, Donio's flight is an indication of
his guilt or of a guilty mind. Indeed, the wicked man flees though no man pursueth, but the
righteous are as bold as a lion.

As for Donio's defense of alibi, no jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than that alibi is
the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove, and for which
reason, it is generally rejected. For the alibi to prosper, the accused must establish the following:
(1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its commission. It must be
supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the
accused. The proximity of the area of Donio’s residence with the Barangay Dapdap and Sta.
Lucia Resettlement area where the victim was found dead is noted. Aside from his bare
allegations, he failed to present convincing evidence of the physical impossibility for him to be at
the scene at the time of carnapping. Similarly, this Court is unconvinced of his insistence that he
was tortured in view of lack of any evidence to validate the same. Thus, the uncorroborated alibi
and denial of Donio must be brushed aside in light of the fact that the prosecution has sufficiently
and positively ascertained his identity. Positive testimony prevails over negative testimony.

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 JAIME ONG vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 190475 April 10, 2013 SERENO, CJ.:
The third element of fencing is that the accused knew or should have known that the said article
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should know"
denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in
performance of his duty to another upon assumption that such fact exists.

Facts
Ong was charged in an Information dated 25 May 1995 for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.
Prosecution established that private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck
tires. He acquired the same for the total amount of ₱223,401.81 from Philtread Tire and Rubber
Corporation. Private complainant's acquisition was evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated
November 10, 1994 and an Inventory List acknowledging receipt of the tires specifically
described by their serial numbers. Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk
before storing them inside the warehouse in Sucat, Parañaque, owned by his relative Teody
Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker of the warehouse, was in charge of the tires. After
appellant sold six (6) tires sometime in January 1995, thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside the
warehouse. On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal that all
thirty-eight (38) truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly
opened. Private complainant, together with caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery to the Southern
Police District at Fort Bonifacio. Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed
from numerous business establishments in an attempt to locate the stolen tires. On February 24,
1995, private complainant chanced upon Jong's Marketing operated by appellant. Private
complainant inquired if appellant was selling any Firestone tires, to which the latter replied in the
affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire fitting the description, which private complainant
recognized as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the
serial number thereon. Private complainant asked appellant if he had any more of such tires in
stock, which was again answered in the affirmative. Private complainant then left the store and
reported the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the Southern Police District. On
February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation
on appellant's store in Paco, Manila.

On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team proceeded to appellant's store in Paco,
Manila. Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store while the rest of the team posted
themselves across the street. Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14
Firestone truck tires available. Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12)
more tires from his warehouse, which was located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck
tires were brought in, private complainant entered the store, inspected them and found that they
were the same tires which were stolen from him, based on their serial numbers. Private
complainant then gave the prearranged signal to the buy-bust team confirming that the tires in
appellant's shop were the same tires stolen from the warehouse. The buy-bust team went inside
appellant's store but appellant insisted that his arrest and the confiscation of the stolen truck tires
be witnessed by representatives from the barangay and his own lawyer. Resultantly, it was

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already past 10:00 in the evening when appellant, together with the tires, was brought to the
police station for investigation and inventory. Overall, the buy-bust team was able to confiscate
thirteen (13) tires, including the one initially bought by poseur-buyer Tito Atienza. The tires were
confirmed by private complainant as stolen from his warehouse.
For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had been engaged in the
business of buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24) years and denying that he had any
knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing. He further averred that on 18
February 1995, a certain Ramon Go (Go) offered to sell thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires
allegedly from Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City, for ₱3,500 each. Ong bought all the tires for
₱45,500, for which he was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18 February 1995 and with the letterhead
Gold Link Hardware & General Merchandise (Gold Link).

The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13) tires found
in the possession of Ong constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. Having failed to
overcome the presumption by mere denials, he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of P.D. 1612. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s findings with modification by
reducing the minimum penalty from ten (10) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision
correcional.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming accused-appellant’s conviction

The Court’s Ruling

NO. The Petition has no merit. The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1)
a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on
accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article,
item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4)
there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another. We agree with the
RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite quantum of evidence in proving that
all the elements of fencing are present in this case.

First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar, whose testimony was
corroborated by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the warehouse – testified that the crime of robbery
had been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar was able to prove ownership of the tires
through Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated 10 November 1994 and an Inventory List. Witnesses for
the prosecution likewise testified that robbery was reported as evidenced by their Sinumpaang
Salaysay taken at the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.

Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never
denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do not

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establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen
(13) out of thirty-eight (38) missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the
serial numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in Ong’s possession. Ong likewise
admitted that he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in the total amount of ₱45,500
where he was issued Sales Invoice No. 980.

Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of
value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should
know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the
fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that
such fact exists. Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past twenty-four
(24) years, ought to have known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown
seller. His experience from the business should have given him doubt as to the legitimate
ownership of the tires considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and the manner it
was sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the streets.

Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires. Section 6 of P.D. 1612
requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of any good, article,
item, object or anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to
secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National
Police in the town or city where that store, establishment or entity is located before offering the
item for sale to the public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining clearances from
the police station for some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this particular transaction, he was
remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman who should have exercised prudence.

In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go. Logically, and for
all practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate
transaction and may be raised as a defense in the charge of fencing; however, that defense is
disputable. In this case, the validity of the issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the
prosecution was able to prove that Gold Link and its address were fictitious. Ong failed to
overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of the
transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the prima facie presumption under Section 5 of P.D.
1612.

Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust
operation, Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing. Fencing
is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima fqcie presumption of fencing from evidence
of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the
property.

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 MEL DIMAT vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 181184 January 25, 2012 ABAD, J.:
Presidential Decree 1612 otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law is a special law and its
violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent.

Facts
The government charged the accused Mel Dimat with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law before
the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 03. Samson Delgado, together with Jose
Mantequilla and police officers Danilo Ramirez and Ruben Familara, testified in substance that
in December 2000 Delgado’s wife, Sonia, bought from accused Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari
bearing plate number WAH-569 for ₱850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the vehicle’s engine
number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553.

On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group spotted the
Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a suspicious plate number. After
stopping and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered that its engine number was actually
TD42-119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. They also found the particular Nissan
Safari on their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it to their Camp Crame office and there
further learned that it had been stolen from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla. Mantequilla
affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari that carried plate number JHM-818, which he
mortgaged to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. The vehicle was carnapped on May 25,
1998 at Robinsons Galleria’s parking area. He reported the carnapping to the TMG.

For his part, Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari
in good faith and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its
engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. Dimat later sold
the vehicle to Delgado. He also claimed that, although the Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and
the one which the police officers took into custody had the same plate number, they were not
actually the same vehicle.

On July 20, 2005 the RTC found Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. On appeal,
the CA, on October 26, 2007, affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that accused Dimat knowingly sold to Sonia Delgado for
gain the Nissan Safari that was earlier carnapped from Mantequilla.

The Court’s Ruling

YES. The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who
took no part in the robbery or theft, "buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken" during that
robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that
crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.

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Here, someone carnapped Mantequilla’s Nissan Safari on May 25, 1998. Two years later in
December 2000, Dimat sold it to Delgado for ₱850,000.00. Dimat’s defense is that the Nissan
Safari he bought from Tolentino and later sold to Delgado had engine number TD42-126134 and
chassis number CRGY60-YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of sale covering those transactions.
The Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla, on the other hand, had engine number TD42-119136
and chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. But Dimat’s defense is flawed.

First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped on the road and inspected by
the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from
Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct numbers of the vehicle’s
engine and chassis.

Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But Presidential Decree 1612
is a special law and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof
of criminal intent. The prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have known that
the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and
that he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts. Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the
Holiday Inn Casino where the latter gave the Nissan Safari to him as collateral for a loan.
Tolentino supposedly showed him the old certificate of registration and official receipt of the
vehicle and even promised to give him a new certificate of registration and official receipt
already in his name. But Tolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat insists that Tolentino’s failure
to deliver the documents should not prejudice him in any way. Delgado himself could not
produce any certificate of registration or official receipt.

Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly
documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official
receipt. But this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped,
Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to
produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an
illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to
check the papers covering her purchase. That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no
moment since she did not stand accused in the case.

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 NENITA CARGANILLO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 182424 September 22, 2014 September 22, 2014
For fraud to vitiate consent, the deception employed must be the causal inducement to the
making of the contract, and must be serious in character. It must be sufficient to impress or lead
an ordinarily prudent person into error, taking into account the circumstances of each case.

Facts
On September 23, 1998, Teresita Lazaro, a rice trader in Rizal, Nueva Ecija, gave the petitioner
the amount of ₱132,000.00 for the purpose of buying palay. The petitioner, who was alleged tobe
an "ahente" or agent in the buy-and-sell of palay, agreed to deliver the palayto the Lazaro Palay
Buying Station on or before November 28, 1998. According to the "Kasunduan" signed by the
petitioner, the parties agreed that for every kilo of palaybought the petitioner shall earn a
commission of twenty centavos (P0.20). But if no palayis purchased and delivered on November
28, the petitioner must return the ₱132,000.00 to Teresita within one (1) week after November
28. After failing to receive any palay or the ₱132,000.00 on November 28 and one (1) week
thereafter, respectively, Teresita made oral and written demands to the petitioner for the return of
the ₱132,000.00 but her demands were simply ignored. She thus filed an affidavit-complaint for
estafa against the petitioner before the Fiscal’s Office. Thereafter, an Information for the crime of
estafawas filed in court. The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime and denied that she
entered into a "principal-agent" agreement with, and received the ₱132,000.00 from, Teresita.
She alleged that she owedTeresita a balance of ₱13,704.32 for the fertilizers and rice that she
purchased from the latter in 1995 and 1996, and that, in November 1996, she was made to sign a
blank Kasunduan that reflected no written date and amount.She likewise denied personally
receiving any written demand letter from Teresita.

The RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime of estafa. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
petitioner’s conviction.

The petitioner maintains that she is not engaged in the business of buying and selling palay and
that the Kasunduan between her and Teresita does not contain their real agreement: a loan. She
argues that the prosecution failed to establish all the elements of estafa because she never
received the ₱132,000.00 from Teresita; that an element of the crime is that the offender receives
the money, or goods or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligations involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming accused-appellant’s conviction

The Court’s Ruling

NO. Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, the offense of estafa committed with abuse of
confidence requires the following elements: (a) that money, goods or other personal property is
received by the offender in trust or on commission, orfor administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (b) that there be

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misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part
of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.

All the elements of estafa are present in this case: that the petitioner received in trust the amount
of ₱132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palay and misappropriated it when she
failed to return the said amount to Teresita upon demand. The "Kasunduan" presented in
evidence by the prosecution that was admittedly signed by the petitioner and which contained the
terms of agreement between her and Teresita is worthy of credit. This document clearly stated
that the petitioner received in trust the amount of ₱132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of
buying palaywith the corresponding obligationsto (1) deliver the palay to the Lazaro Palay
Buying Station on or before November 28, 1998, and (2) return the ₱132,000.00 to Teresita one
week after November 28 in the event that the petitioner failed to make palay purchases. It is
settled that the agreement or contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties’
rights, duties, and obligations and is the best evidence of the parties’ intention.Thus, when the
terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

In this case, the petitioner alleges that the subject Kasunduan failed to express the real agreement
between her and Teresita; that theirs was a plain and simple loan agreement and not that of a
principal-agent relationship in the buy-and-sell of palay. The documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by the petitioner, however, fail to support her claims. The receipts presented
by the petitioner to prove her loan obligation with Teresita were vague, undated and unsigned.
Also, the witnesses who testified that they saw the petitioner sign the Kasunduan were not even
certain of the real transaction between the petitioner and Teresita. These findings of fact and
evidence, which were affirmed by the CA, are accorded respect and finality by this Court. Where
the factual findings of the trial court are affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, there is great
reason not to disturb these findings and to regard them not reviewable by this Court.

Also, we cannot sustain the petitioner’s claim that she had been the victim of a fraud because
Teresita deceived her into signing a blank document. For fraud to vitiate consent, the deception
employed must be the causal inducement to the making of the contract, and must be serious in
character. It must be sufficient to impress or lead an ordinarily prudent person into error, taking
into account the circumstances of each case. In this case, there is no vitiated consent on the part
of the petitioner. In her Memorandum to this Court, she narrated that after she signed the
Kasunduan, Teresita subsequently made her execute a deed of sale over her property, which deed
she refused to sign. This statement negates the petitioner’s self-serving allegation that she was
tricked by Teresita into signing a blank Kasunduan, as she was fully aware of the possible
implications of the act of signing a document.

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 LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014 PERALTA, J.:
The law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b). Demand under
this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. When the law does not qualify, We should not
qualify.

Facts
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in
Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of
lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry
for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said
pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he
turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet;
one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of ₱98,000.00, as
evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of
the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period
expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry.
When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will
pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail. Thus, an Information was filed
against petitioner for the crime of estafa.

The defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged
in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made, they
earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private complainant.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made
to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as
evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he
did not even see.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
Information. The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner
and affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issues
1. Whether or not the accused appellant is guilty as charged
2. Whether or not the court can adjust the penalties provided under the law to prevent
injustice

The Court’s Ruling

Ruling #1 - YES. According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court,
admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings,
although the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the
records show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it

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was identified, marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA also correctly
pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's
formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. The established
doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they
were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.

Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective Information
filed against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the period when the pieces
of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different
from the one testified to by private complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err
in finding that the Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to
the matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.
It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph
(b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice
of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the
exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the
Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.

The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that
there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on
his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice
of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party on
the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant
narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he gave
the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay
them. No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not
even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show
that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the
whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.

With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of
estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent with
regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b). When the law does not qualify, We
should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary, the law would have stated so.
Otherwise, the word "demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to include both
written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as
evidence is not fatal.

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In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the
existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of
jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an
obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation
when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took
place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period despite
demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.

Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner, the
same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court
gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe
the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the
appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case. The assessment by the trial court
is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA.

Ruling #2 - NO. There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties
that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the
amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this
Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation.
What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes
cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power
of another branch of the government. Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply
the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in
the course of such application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or
under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or
give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. The Court should apply the law in a
manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its
intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the
primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an
inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.

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 BELEN REAL vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 152065 January 29, 2008 AZCUNA, J.:
Disturbance of property rights is equivalent to damage and is in itself sufficient to constitute
injury within the meaning of Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.

Facts
Petitioner Belen Real was an agent of private complainant Benjamin Uy in his jewelry business.
On several occasions, Uy entrusted to petitioner pieces of jewelry with the obligation on the part
of the latter to remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the pieces of jewelry if unsold within a
specific period of time. On January 10, 1989, around 8:30 a.m., petitioner arrived at Uy’s house
at Nueva Villa Subdivision and requested Uy to lend her some pieces of jewelry as she had a
buyer at that time. Because petitioner is his "kumadre," since Uy was one of the sponsors in the
wedding of petitioner’s daughter, and because petitioner was his agent for quite a time, Uy
agreed. He showed petitioner some pieces of jewelry and allowed the latter to select from them.
Petitioner selected seven (7) pieces of jewelry. Uy prepared a receipt for the items selected by
petitioner and handed the same to the latter. After checking the receipt, petitioner wrote the name
Benjamin Uy at the upper portion thereof and affixed her signature at the lower portion including
her address. Ten days thereafter, Uy went to petitioner’s house and asked about their transaction.
Petitioner informed Uy that the pieces of jewelry were already sold but the payment was in the
form of check. Petitioner showed Uy five (5) pieces of checks all dated January 31, 1989 and
requested the latter to collect on said date. Uy acceded, but when he returned on January 31,
1989, petitioner again requested him to return the following day as she had not encashed the
checks yet. Uy again agreed but when he demanded the payment the following day, petitioner
called him "makulit" and "could not sleep for that matter." Petitioner further remarked that the
more she would not pay Uy. Constrained, Uy brought the matter to his lawyer, Atty. Dimayacyac,
who thereafter sent a demand letter to petitioner. Despite receipt thereof, petitioner failed to
make good her obligation. Consequently, an Information for estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b)
of the RPC was filed against petitioner before the RTC Batangas.

While admitting to have had several dealings with private complainant Uy, petitioner claimed
that her last transaction with him was on December 22, 1988. She denied the truth of
the Katibayan, alleging that there was a time, prior to January 10, 1989, when she got pieces of
jewelry from Uy that she was required by him to sign in a blank piece of paper.

The RTC rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa. On appeal, the CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner argues that a reading of the trial court’s decision reveals its total silence on the
presence of damage or prejudice caused to private complainant Uy; ergo, she could not be held
guilty of estafa. Moreover, petitioner advances that instead of imposing a straight penalty of
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, the trial court should have imposed a penalty with
minimum and maximum periods in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

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 Issue
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is in part meritorious. Petitioner’s conviction is affirmed but the penalty imposed to
him by the trial court should be modified.

The elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC are as follows: (1) that money,
goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return
the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or denial on his part of such receipt; and (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another. Although the trial court only mentioned in passing that
damage was caused to private complainant Uy, it cannot be denied that there exists a factual
basis for holding that petitioner’s refusal to account for or return the pieces of jewelry had
prejudiced the rights and interests of Uy. Certainly, disturbance of property rights is equivalent to
damage and is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of
the RPC. In this case, Uy, who is a businessman, not only failed to recover his investment but
also lost the opportunity to realize profits therefrom. Anxiety also set in as he ran the risk of
being sued by the person who likewise entrusted him the same pieces of jewelry. To assert his
legal recourse, Uy further incurred expenses in hiring a lawyer and in litigating the case.

While sustaining the conviction of petitioner of the crime charged, this Court rules, however, that
the penalty imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals was improper. Hence
the same was modified to the appropriate penalty which should range from four (4) years and
two (2) months of prisión correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusión temporal,
as maximum.

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 VILMA M. SULIMAN vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 190970 November 24, 2014 PERALTA, J.:
The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel’s acts, including even mistakes in the
realm of procedural technique. A recognized exception to the rule is when the reckless or gross
negligence of the counsel deprives the client of due process of law. For the exception to apply,
however, the gross negligence should not be accompanied by the client’s own negligence.

Facts
In six (6) Informations petitioner and one Luz P. Garcia were charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila with two (2) counts of illegal recruitment under Section 6, paragraphs
(a), (l) and (m) of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as well as four (4) counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Only petitioner was brought to trial as her co-accused, Garcia,
eluded arrest and remained at-large despite the issuance of a warrant for her arrest. The six cases
were consolidated and, after trial, the RTC of Manila, Branch 21, rendered judgment finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of illegal recruitment and three (3)
counts of estafa.

Petitioner then filed an appeal with the CA. On May 21, 2009, the CA promulgated its Decision.
Petitioner’s counsel received a copy of the CA Decision on May 26, 2009. However, neither
petitioner nor her counsel filed a motion for reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary
period for filing the said motion. Hence, on June 11, 2009, the subject CA Decision became final.

On July 3, 2009, petitioner, through her new collaborating counsel, filed a Motion to Admit
Attached Motion for Reconsideration praying that the same be admitted in the higher interest of
"substantial justice and due process." Petitioner contended that her former counsel committed
gross and inexcusable neglect of his duty as counsel in failing to immediately inform petitioner
about his receipt of the subject CA Decision, thereby depriving petitioner of her right to file a
motion for reconsideration which, in turn, is a violation of her right to due process. On July 21,
2009, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioner's Motion to Admit Attached Motion for
Reconsideration.
Issue
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not admitting the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Petitioner

The Court’s Ruling

NO. The Court is not persuaded by petitioner's contention that she should not be bound by her
counsel's gross neglect of duty in not informing her of the adverse decision of the CA. The Court
agrees with the observation of the CA that petitioner is not entirely blameless as she was not
vigilant in monitoring the progress of her case. Evidence of her negligence is the fact that she did
not make any effort to personally follow up her appeal with her counsel. Instead, she merely
relied on a certain Conrad Lucero, the person who referred her to her counsel, regarding updates
ofher appeal with the CA. The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel’s acts,

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including even mistakes in the realm of procedural technique. A recognized exception to the rule
is when the reckless or gross negligence of the counsel deprives the client of due process of law.
For the exception to apply, however, the gross negligence should not be accompanied by the
client’s own negligence or malice, considering that the client has the duty to be vigilant in
respect of his interests by keeping himself up-to-date on the status of the case. Failing in this
duty, the client should suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against him. Moreover, an
appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites
laid down in the Rules of Court. In any case, even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the
present petition, the Court finds that the lower courts did not commit any error in convicting
petitioner of the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa.

In the present case, both the RTC and the CA found that the prosecution has established that
petitioner and her co-accused committed the acts enumerated under the provisions of Section 6
(a), (l) and (m) of RA 8042 when: (1) they separately charged the private complainants the
amounts of ₱132,460.00, ₱120,000.00 and ₱21,400.00 as placement fees; (2) they failed to
actually deploy the private complainants without valid reasons, and; (3) they failed to reimburse
the said complainants after such failure to deploy.

The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following: (a) that there must be a false
pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent
representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means
and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended
party suffered damage. In the instant case, all the foregoing elements are present. It was proven
beyond reasonable doubt, as found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and her
co-accused misrepresented and falsely pretended that they had the capacity to deploy the private
complainants for employment either in South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Canada. The
misrepresentation was made prior toprivate complainants' payment of placement fees. It was the
misrepresentation and false pretenses made by petitioner and her co-accused that inducedthe
private complainants to part with their money. As a result of such false pretenses and
misrepresentations, the private complainants suffered damages as the promised employment
abroad never materialized and the various amounts of money they paid were never recovered.

Petitioner argues that she could not be held liable because she was not privy nor was she aware
of the recruitment activities done by her coaccused. Petitioner avers that when her co-accused
received several amounts of money from the private complainants, she acted in her personal
capacity and for her own benefit without the knowledge and consent of petitioner. The Court is
not persuaded. As owner and general manager, petitioner was at the forefront of the recruitment
activities of Suliman International. Undoubtedly, she has control, manage mentor direction of the
business of the said company. Petitioner's denial is an intrinsically weak defense, especially in
the face of positive assertions made by the private complainants who had no ill motive to falsely
testify against her.

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 PEOPLE vs. PALMY TIBAYAN and RICO Z. PUERTO
G.R. Nos. 209655-60 January 14, 2015 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts
Tibayan Group Investment Company,Inc. (TGICI) is an open-end investment company registered
SEC. Sometime in 2002, the SEC conducted an investigation on TGICI and its subsidiaries. In
the course thereof, it discovered that TGICI was selling securities to the public without a
registration statement in violation of RA No. 8799, otherwise known as "The Securities
Regulation Code," and that TGICI submitted a fraudulent Treasurer’s Affidavit before the SEC.
Resultantly, on October 21, 2003, the SEC revoked TGICI’s corporate registration for being
fraudulently procured. This led to the filing of multiple criminal cases for Syndicated Estafa
against the incorporators and directors of TGICI and herein accused-appellants. Consequently,
warrants of arrest were issued against all of them; however, only accusedappellants were
arrested, while the others remained at large. According to the prosecution, private complainants
were enticed to invest in TGICI due to the offer of high interest rates, as well as the assurance
that they will recover their investments. After giving their money to TGICI, private complainants
received a Certificate of Share and post-dated checks, representing the amount of the principal
investment and the monthly interest earnings, respectively. Upon encashment, the checks were
dishonored, as the account was already closed, prompting private complainants to bring the
bounced checks to the TGICI office to demand payment. At the office, the TGICI employees
took the said checks, gave private complainants acknowledgement receipts, and reassured that
their investments, as well as the interests, would be paid. However, the TGICI office closed
down without private complainants having been paid and, thus, they were constrained to file
criminal complaints against the incorporators and directors of TGICI.

In their defense, accused-appellants denied having conspired with the other TGICI incorporators
to defraud private complainants. Particularly, Puerto claimed that his signature in the Articles of
Incorporation of TGICI was forged and that since January 2002, he was no longer a director of
TGICI. For her part, Tibayan also claimed that her signature in the TGICI’s Articles of
Incorporation was a forgery,as she was neither an incorporator nor a director of TGICI.

The RTC issued six (6) separate decisions convicting Tibayan of 13 counts and Puerto of 11
counts of Estafa under Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC in relation to PD 1689.
The RTC found that accused-appellants conspired with the other directors/incorporators of
TGICI in misrepresenting the company as a legitimate corporation duly registered to operate as a
mutual fund to the detriment of the private complainants. However, it convicted accused-
appellants of simple Estafa only, as the prosecution failed to allege in the informations that
accused-appellants and the other directors/ incorporators formed a syndicate with the intention of
defrauding the public, or it failed to adduce documentary evidence substantiating its claims that
the accused-appellants committed Syndicated Estafa.

On appeal, the CA modified accused appellants’ conviction to that of Syndicated Estafa, and
accordingly, increased their respective penalties to life imprisonment for each count. It held that

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TGICI and its subsidiaries were engaged in a Ponzi scheme which relied on subsequent investors
to pay its earlier investors – and is what PD 1689 precisely aims to punish.The CA concluded
that as incorporators/directors of TGICI, accused-appellants conspired in making TGICI a
vehicle for the perpetuation of fraud against the unsuspecting public. As such, they cannot hide
behind the corporate veil and must be personally and criminally liable for their acts.

Issue
Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Syndicated Estafa
The Court’s Ruling
YES. The Court sustains the convictions of accused-appellants. The elements of Estafa by means
of deceit are the following: (a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as
to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the
false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or
property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. In relation thereto,
the elements of Syndicated Estafa defined under Item 2 (a) par. 4, Art. 315 of the RPC are: (a)
Estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed;
(b) the Estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c)
defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members
of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers’ associations, or of funds solicited
by corporations/associations from the general public.

In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals TGICI’s modus operandi of inducing the
public to invest in it on the undertaking that their investment would be returned with a very high
monthly interest rate ranging from three to five and a half percent (3%-5.5%). Under such
lucrative promise, the investing public are enticed to infuse funds into TGICI. However, as the
directors/incorporators of TGICI knew from the start that TGICI is operating without any paid-
up capital and has no clear trade by which it can pay the assured profits to its investors, they
cannot comply with their guarantee and had to simply abscond with their investors’ money. Thus,
the CA correctly held that accused-appellants, along with the other accused who are still at large,
used TGICI to engage in a Ponzi scheme, resulting in the defraudation of the TGICI investors.

In this light, it is clear that all the elements of Syndicated Estafa, committed through a Ponzi
scheme, are present in this case, considering that: (a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI
comprising more than five (5) people, including herein accused-appellants, made false pretenses
and representations to the investing public - in this case, the private complainants - regarding a
supposed lucrative investment opportunity with TGICI in order to solicit money from them; (b)
the said false pretenses and representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the
commission of fraud; (c) relying on the same, private complainants invested their hard earned
money into TGICI; and (d) the incorporators/directors of TGICI ended up running away with the
private complainants' investments, obviously to the latter's prejudice.

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 MA. GRACIA HAO and DANNY HAO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 183345 September 17, 2014 BRION, J.:
Simple estafa is a crime necessarily included in syndicated estafa. An offense is necessarily
included in another offense when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part
of those constituting the latter.

Facts
On July 11, 2003 private complainant Manuel Dy filed a criminal complaint against the
petitioners and Victor Ngo for syndicated estafa. Dy alleged that he was a long-time client of
Asiatrust Bank, Binondo Branch where Ngo was the manager. Because of their good business
relationship, Dy took Ngo’s advice to deposit his money in an investment house that will give a
higher rate of return. Ngo then introduced him to Ma. Gracia Hao, also known as Mina Tan Hao,
who presented herself as an officer of various reputable companies and an incorporator of State
Resources Development Corporation, the recommended company that can give Dy his higher
investment return. Relying on Ngo and Gracia’s assurances, Dy initially invested in State
Resources the approximate amount of Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00). This initial
investment earned the promised interests, leading Dy, at the urging of Gracia, toincrease his
investment to almost One Hundred Million Pesos (₱100,000,000.00). Dy increased his
investments through several checks he issued in the name of State Resources. In return, Gracia
also issued several checks to Dy representing his earnings for his investment. Gracia issued
checks in the total amount of One Hundred Fourteen Million, Two Hundred Eighty Six
Thousand, Eighty Six Pesos and Fourteen Centavos (₱114,286,086.14). All these checks were
subsequently dishonored when Dy deposited them. Dy sought the assistance of Ngo for the
recovery of the amount of the dishonored checks. Ngo promised assistance, but after a few
months, Dy found out that Ngo already resigned from Asiatrust Bank and could no longer be
located. Hence, he confronted Gracia regarding the dishonored checks. He eventually learned
that Gracia invested his money in the construction and realty business of Gracia’s husband,
Danny Hao (Danny). Despite their promises to pay, the petitioners never returned Dy’s money.

Thus, an information for syndicated estafa was filed against the petitioners and their six co-
accused. Consequently, petitioners immediately filed a motion to defer arraignment and motion
to lift warrant of arrest. In their twin motions, they invoked the absence of probable cause against
them and the pendency of their petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ).

The RTC denied the petitioners’ twin motions. On appeal, the CA affirmed the denial of the
petitioners’ motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant of arrest. In determining
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, a judge is mandated to personally evaluate
the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. The CA noted that Judge Marquez
only issued the warrants of arrest after his personal examination of the facts and circumstances of
the case. Since the judge complied with the Rules, the CA concluded that no grave abuse of
discretion could be attributed to him. The CA however opined that the evidence on record and
the assertions in Dy’s affidavits only show probable cause for the crime of simple estafa, not
syndicated estafa. Nevertheless, the CA found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of

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discretion in issuing the warrants of arrest against the petitioners as there was still probable cause
to believe that the petitioners committed the crime of simple estafa.

Issue
Did the CA correctly determine that there was no grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners’ motions to defer arraignment and lift warrant of arrest

The Court’s Ruling

YES. The petition lacks merit. Under the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a judge is mandated to personally determine the existence of probable cause after his
personal evaluation of the prosecutor’s resolution and the supporting evidence for the crime
charged. Section 5(a) of Rule 112, grants the trial court three options upon the filing of the
criminal complaint orinformation. He may: a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
failed to establish probable cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; or c)
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt
on the existence of probable cause. In the present case, the trial court chose to issue warrants of
arrest to the petitioners and their co-accused.To be valid, these warrants must have been issued
after compliance with the requirement that probable cause be personally determined by the
judge. Notably at this stage, the judge is tasked to merely determine the probability, not the
certainty, of guilt of the accused.In doing so, he need not conduct a hearing; he only needs to
personally review the prosecutor's initial determination and see if it is supported by substantial
evidence. The records showed that Judge Marquez made a personal determination of the
existence of probable cause to support the issuance of the warrants. The petitioners, in fact, did
not present any evidence to controvert this. Under this situation, we conclude that Judge
Marquez did not arbitrarily issue the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. As stated by him,
the warrants were only issued after his personal evaluation of the factual circumstances that led
him to believe that there was probable cause to apprehend the petitioners for their commission of
a criminal offense.

The crime of swindling or estafa has the following elements: 1) the existence of a false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; 2) the execution of the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; 3) the reliance by
the offended party on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, which induced him
to part withhis money or property; and 4) as a result, the offended party suffered damage.

As Dy alleged in his complaint-affidavit, Ngo and Gracia induced him to invest with State
Resources and promised him a higher rate of return. Because of his good business relationship
with Ngo and relying on Gracia’s attractive financial representations, Dy initially invested the
approximate amount of ₱10,000,000.00. This first investment earned profits. Thus, Dy was
enticed by Gracia to invest more so that he eventually advanced almost ₱100,000,000.00 with
State Resources. Gracia’s succeeding checks representing the earnings of his investments,
however, were all dishonored upon deposit. He subsequently learned that the petitioners used his
money for Danny’s construction and realty business. Despite repeated demands and the

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petitioners’ constant assurances to pay, they never returned Dy’s invested money and its
supposed earnings. These cited factual circumstances show the elements of estafa by means of
deceit. The petitioners inducedDy to invest in State Resources promising higher returns. But
unknown to Dy, what occurred was merely a ruse to secure his money to be used in Danny’s
construction and realty business. These circumstances all serve as indicators of the petitioners’
deceit. Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by
false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed,
which deceives or is intended to deceive another, so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.

Thus, had it not been for the petitioners’ false representations and promises, Dy would not have
placed his money in State Resources, to his damage. These allegations cannot but lead us to the
conclusion that probable cause existed as basis to arrest the petitioners for the crime of estafa by
means of deceit.

Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689, there is syndicated estafa if the following elements are present:
1) estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC was
committed; 2) the estafaor swindling was committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and
3) the fraud resulted inthe misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members
of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayons," or farmers associations or offunds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public. The factual circumstances of the present case
show that the first and second elements of syndicated estafa are present; however, the third
element of the crime is patently lacking. The funds fraudulently solicited by the corporation must
come from the general public. In the present case, no evidence was presented to show that aside
from Dy, the petitioners, through State Resources, also sought investments from other people. Dy
had no co-complainants alleging that they were also deceived to entrust their money to State
Resources. The general public element was not complied with. Thus, no syndicated estafa
allegedly took place, only simple estafa by means of deceit.

Despite this conclusion, we still hold that the CA did not err in affirming the trial court’s denial
of the petitioners’ motion to lift warrant of arrest. A warrant of arrest should be issued if the
judge after personal evaluation of the facts and circumstances is convinced that probable cause
exists that an offense was committed. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believethat an offense was committed by the person sought to be arrested. With our
conclusion that probable cause existed for the crime of simple estafa and that the petitioners have
probably committed it, it follows that the issuance of the warrants of arrest against the petitioners
remains to be valid and proper. Moreover, we note that simple estafa and syndicated estafa are
not two entirely different crimes. Simple estafa is a crime necessarily included in syndicated
estafa. An offense is necessarily included in another offense when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.

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 PEOPLE vs. GILBERT REYES WAGAS
G.R. No. 157943 September 4, 2013 BERSAMIN, J.:
The State has the burden of proof to show: (1) the correct identification of the author of a crime,
and (2) the actuality of the commission of the offense with the participation of the accused. All
these facts must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence
and without solace from the weakness of the defense.

Facts
Wagas was charged with estafa under an information. At the trial, the Prosecution presented
complainant Alberto Ligaray as its lone witness. Ligaray testified that on April 30, 1997, Wagas
placed an order for 200 bags of rice over the telephone; that he and his wife would not agree at
first to the proposed payment of the order by postdated check, but because of Wagas’ assurance
that he would not disappoint them and that he had the means to pay them because he had a
lending business and money in the bank, they relented and accepted the order; that he released
the goods to Wagas on April 30, 1997 and at the same time received Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI) Check No. 0011003 for ₱200,000.00 payable to cash and postdated May 8, 1997;
that he later deposited the check with Solid Bank, his depository bank, but the check was
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds; that he called Wagas about the matter, and the latter
told him that he would pay upon his return to Cebu; and that despite repeated demands, Wagas
did not pay him. On cross-examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not personally meet Wagas
because they transacted through telephone only; that he released the 200 bags of rice directly to
Robert Cañada, the brother-in-law of Wagas, who signed the delivery receipt upon receiving the
rice.

In his defense, Wagas admitted having issued BPI Check No. 0011003 to Cañada, his brother-in-
law, not to Ligaray. He denied having any telephone conversation or any dealings with Ligaray.
He explained that the check was intended as payment for a portion of Cañada’s property that he
wanted to buy, but when the sale did not push through, he did not anymore fund the check. On
cross-examination, the Prosecution confronted Wagas with a letter dated July 3, 1997 apparently
signed by him and addressed to Ligaray’s counsel, wherein he admitted owing Ligaray
₱200,000.00 for goods received. Wagas admitted the letter, but insisted that it was Cañada who
had transacted with Ligaray, and that he had signed the letter only because his sister and her
husband had begged him to assume the responsibility. On redirect examination, Wagas declared
that Cañada, a seafarer, was then out of the country; that he signed the letter only to
accommodate the pleas of his sister and Cañada, and to avoid jeopardizing Cañada’s application
for overseas employment.The Prosecution subsequently offered and the RTC admitted the letter
as rebuttal evidence.

The RTC convicted Wagas of estafa on July 11, 2002. Wagas filed a motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration, arguing that the Prosecution did not establish that it was he who had transacted
with Ligaray and who had negotiated the check to the latter; that the records showed that Ligaray
did not meet him at any time; and that Ligaray’s testimony on their alleged telephone
conversation was not reliable because it was not shown that Ligaray had been familiar with his

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voice. Wagas also sought the reopening of the case based on newly discovered evidence,
specifically: (a) the testimony of Cañada who could not testify during the trial because he was
then out of the country, and (b) Ligaray’s testimony given against Wagas in another criminal case
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. On October 21, 2002, the RTC denied the motion for
new trial and/or reconsideration, opining that the evidence Wagas desired to present at a new trial
did not qualify as newly discovered, and that there was no compelling ground to reverse its
decision. Wagas appealed directly to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal.

Issue
Whether or not the Prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the existence of all the
elements of the crime of estafa as charged, as well as the identity of the perpetrator of the crime

The Court’s Ruling

NO. The appeal is meritorious. Wagas must be acquitted. The essential elements of the crime
charged are that: (a) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the
time the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (c) damage to
the payee thereof. It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check that is punishable,
not the non-payment of a debt. Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the
drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three days
from receipt of the notice of dishonor.

The Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to Cañada because of the
postdated check the latter had given to him; and that the check was dishonored when presented
for payment because of the insufficiency of funds. In every criminal prosecution, however, the
identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was
Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.

Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom he was
transacting over the telephone. Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did not personally
see and meet whoever he had dealt with and to whom he had made the demand for payment, and
that he had talked with him only over the telephone.

Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. Under the Negotiable
Instruments Law, this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere
delivery without the need of an indorsement. This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had
issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like Cañada, his brother-in-law, who then
negotiated it to Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did not himself see or meet Wagas
at the time of the transaction and thereafter, and expressly stated that the person who signed for
and received the stocks of rice was Cañada.

It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the check in
order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere

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issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had
issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly show that it had
been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the check.

Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Cañada who received the rice from him and who delivered
the check to him. Considering that the records are bereft of any showing that Cañada was then
acting on behalf of Wagas, the RTC had no factual and legal bases to conclude and find that
Cañada had been acting for Wagas. This lack of factual and legal bases for the RTC to infer so
obtained despite Wagas being Cañada’s brother-in-law.

Finally, Ligaray’s declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him over the telephone
was not reliable because he did not explain how he determined that the person with whom he had
the telephone conversation was really Wagas whom he had not yet met or known before then. A
telephone conversation like that one Ligaray supposedly had with the buyer of rice must be first
authenticated before it could be received in evidence. Among others, the person with whom the
witness conversed by telephone should be first satisfactorily identified by voice recognition or
any other means. Without the authentication, incriminating another person just by adverting to
the telephone conversation with him would be all too easy. Ligaray’s statement that he could tell
that it was Wagas who had ordered the rice because he "knows" him was still vague and
unreliable for not assuring the certainty of the identification, and should not support a finding of
Ligaray’s familiarity with Wagas as the caller by his voice. It was evident from Ligaray’s
answers that Wagas was not even an acquaintance of Ligaray’s prior to the transaction. Thus, the
RTC’s conclusion that Ligaray had transacted with Wagas had no factual basis.

The State has the burden of proof to show: (1) the correct identification of the author of a crime,
and (2) the actuality of the commission of the offense with the participation of the accused. All
these facts must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence
and without solace from the weakness of the defense. The presumption of innocence dictates that
it is for the Prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused to establish innocence.
Indeed, the accused, being presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or her shoulders.

Considering that the circumstances of the identification of Wagas as the person who transacted
on the rice did not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not measure
up to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases. Therefore, he is
entitled to an acquittal.

Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable where the
preponderance of the established facts so warrants. Wagas as the admitted drawer of the check
was legally liable to pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due course. Consequently, we
pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay the amount of the dishonored check, plus legal
interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.

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 PEOPLE v. JULIE GRACE K. VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 163662, February 25, 2015 BERSAMIN, J.:
When there is an agreement between the parties at the time of the issuance and postdating of the
checks that the obligee shall not encash or present the same to the bank, the obligor cannot be
prosecuted for estafa because the element of deceit is lacking. When the payee was informed that
the checks are not covered by adequate funds, bad faith or estafa shall not arise. This, however,
was not present in this case.

Facts
Villanueva stands charged with estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph
2(d), of the RPC under an Information. In August 1994, Loreto Madarang met Villanueva
through a townmate. The latter was interested in buying jewelry. Being then engaged in the
business of selling jewelry, Madarang went to Villanueva’s residence at Galeria de Magallanes,
and was able to sell to Villanueva five sets of jewelry worth P1,010,000.00. Villanueva made out
nine checks drawn against Philippine National Bank (PNB), eight of which were postdated.
Villanueva signed a receipt. Madarang received the checks because of Villanueva’s assurance
that they would all be honored upon presentment. However, the drawee bank paid only PNB
Check No. 031501 and PNB Check No. 131531, the remaining seven checks being dishonored
either by reason of “Account Closed” or “Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.” Madarang tried to
call and see Villanueva at her residence to inform her of the dishonored checks, but Madarang
was barred by security guards from reaching Villanueva. Madarang resorted to sending demand
letters, but her effort to contact Villanueva proved futile. After Villanueva did not settle her
obligations, Madarang brought the criminal complaint for estafa and the corresponding
Information for estafa was ultimately filed in court on September 4, 1995.


Villanueva denied the accusation. She claimed that she met Madarang on three times. The first
was at the residence of a certain Cheng Diaz Davis, where Madarang was selling jewelry. The
second time was at her residence in Galeria de Magallanes where Madarang arrived without prior
notice at around 7:00 or 7:30 in the evening. Madarang was persistent that Villanueva buy
jewelry on credit, and even assured Villanueva that she could replace the same if she was
dissatisfied with her purchase. Madarang prevailed on Villanueva to buy six pieces of jewelry,
for which she issued six checks as payment, five of which were postdated. On August 16, 1994,
Villanueva saw Madarang for the last time to have the jewelry replaced. Villanueva retrieved the
checks she had previously issued and replaced them with another set of postdated checks that
were the subject of the criminal case against her. Villanueva maintained that the second set of
checks were issued as guarantee under the agreement taht they were not to be deposited until
Villanueva advised Madarang of the sufficiency of funds in her account. Villanueva insisted that
she did not received any notice from Madarang regarding the dishonor of the checks.

On January 24, 2002, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Villanueva guilty as charged. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction but differed on the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.

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Villanueva insists on the absence of fraud when she drew the postdated checks, averring that: (a)
the checks were issued as replacement; (b) the checks could only be deposited or encashed after
Madarang was notified of the sufficiency of fund; and (c) the receipt presented by the
Prosecution failed to embody the real intention of the parties. She argues that estafa under
paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the RPC was not committed because the checks were not
executed prior to our simultaneous with the alleged fraud; and because Madarang had instigated
her to issue the checks.
Issue
Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa punishable
under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code in issuing the seven postdated
checks

The Court’s Ruling


YES. We affirm the conviction. All the elements of estafa were present. The first element was
admitted by Villanueva, who confirmed that she had issued the checks to Madarang in exchange
for the jewelry she had purchased. There is no question that Madarang accepted the checks upon
the assurance of Villanueva that they would be funded upon presentment. It is clear that
Madarang would not have parted with and entrusted the pieces of valuable jewelry to Villanueva
whom she barely knew unless Villanueva gave such assurance to her. The second element was
likewise established because the checks were dishonored upon presentment due to insufficiency
of funds or because the account was already closed. The third element was also proved by the
showing that Madarang suffered prejudice by her failure to collect from Villanueva the balance
of P995,000.00.



In her defense, Villanueva posits that the receipt Prosecution presented in evidence did not
embody such agreement. This defense of Villanueva is actually anchored on the rule
that estafa will not lie when the parties waive the negotiable character of a check, and instead
treat the same as proof of an obligation. Villanueva does not impress. Her defense crumbles
because she did not present proof of the supposed agreement. The receipt signed by her proved
the transaction and her issuance of the postdated checks by listing the items bought and the
postdated checks issued as payment. If the parties really agreed for Madarang to deposit the
checks only after notice of the sufficiency of funds, then such agreement should have been
incorporated in the receipt as an integral part of the transaction, or simply written in another
document with Madarang's express conformity for Villanueva's protection. We simply cannot
accept that Villanueva signed the receipt despite not including the supposed agreement that
would shield her from probable criminal prosecution. In that regard, her being a
businesswoman presumably made her aware of the consequences of issuing unfunded
checks. All that she is claiming here is that the receipt did not express the true intention of the
parties, implying that no written document substantiated her alleged defense. She did not claim
at all that she had been coerced or intimidated into signing the receipt as written. Her self-
serving statements on the agreement were entirely inadequate to establish her assertions, for they
were not proof.

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 MARIETA DE CASTRO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 171672, February 02, 2015 BERSAMIN, J.:
The rights against self-incrimination and to counsel guaranteed under the Constitution are
applied only during the custodial interrogation of a suspect.

Facts
The petitioner, a bank teller of the BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Family) at its branch in
Malibay, Pasay City, appeals the affirmance of her conviction for four counts of estafa through
falsification of a commercial document. As culled from the evidence, Matuguina and Cornejo
left their savings account passbooks with the accused within the space of a week in October –
November 1993 when they went to the bank’s Malibay branch to transact on their accounts.
Matuguina, in particular, withdrew the sum of P500 on October 29 and left her passbook with the
accused upon the latter’s instruction. She had to return two more times before the branch
manager Cynthia Zialcita sensed that something wrong was going on. Learning of Matuguina’s
problem, Zialcita told the accused to return the passbook to her on November 8. On this day, the
accused came up with the convenient excuse that she had already returned the passbook.
Skeptical, Zialcita reviewed Matuguina’s account and found three withdrawal slips dated
October 19, 29 and November 4, 1993 containing signatures radically different from the
specimen signatures of the depositor and covering a total of P65,000. It was apparent that the
accused had intervened in the posting and verification of the slips because her initials were
affixed thereto. Zialcita instructed her assistant manager Benjamin Misa to pay a visit to
Matuguina, a move that led to the immediate exposure of the accused. Matuguina was aghast to
see the signatures in the slips and denied that the accused returned the passbook to her. When
she went back to the bank worried about the unauthorized withdrawals from her account, she met
with the accused in the presence of the bank manager. She insisted that the signatures in the slips
were not her, forcing the accused to admit that the passbook was still with her and kept in her
house. Zialcita also summoned Juanita Ebora, the teller who posted and released the November 4
withdrawal. When she was asked why she processed the transaction, Ebora readily pointed to
the accused as the person who gave to her the slip. Since she saw the accused’s initials on it
attesting to having verified the signature of the depositor, she presumed that the withdrawal was
genuine. On the same day, November 8, Zialcita instructed Misa to visit another depositor,
Milagrosa Cornejo, whom they feared was also victimized by the accused. According to Cornejo,
on November 3, she went to the bank to deposit a check and because there were many people
there at the time, she left her passbook with the accused. She returned days later to get it back,
but the accused told her that she left it at home. Misa now showed to her a withdrawal slip dated
November 4, 1993 in which a signature purporting to be hers appeared. Cornejo denied that it
was her signature. As with the slips affecting Matuguina, the initials of the accused were
unquestionably affixed to the paper.



Zialcita reported her findings posthaste to her superiors. The accused initially denied the claims
against her but when she was asked to write her statement down, she confessed to her guilt.
Since then, she executed three more statements in response to the investigation conducted by the
bank’s internal auditors. She also gave a list of the depositors’ accounts from which she drew

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cash and which were listed methodically in her diary. The employment of the accused was
ultimately terminated. The bank paid Matuguina P65,000, while Cornejo got her refund directly
from the accused.


On July 13, 1998, RTC found the petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the petitioner
contended in the CA that: (1) her conviction should be set aside because the evidence presented
against her had been obtained in violation of her constitutional right against self-incrimination;
(2) her rights to due process and to counsel had been infringed; and (3) the evidence against her
should be inadmissible for being obtained by illegal or unconstitutional means rendering the
evidence as the fruit of the poisonous tree. On August 18, 2005, the CA promulgated its decision
affirming the judgment of the RTC.
Issue
Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged

Ruling of the Court

YES. The guilt of the petitioner for four counts of estafa through falsification of a commercial
document was established beyond reasonable doubt. As a bank teller, she took advantage of the
bank depositors who had trusted in her enough to leave their passbooks with her upon her
instruction. Without their knowledge, however, she filled out withdrawal slips that she signed,
and misrepresented to her fellow bank employees that the signatures had been verified in due
course. Her misrepresentation to her co-employees enabled her to receive the amounts stated in
the withdrawal slips. She thereby committed two crimes, namely: estafa, by defrauding BPI
Family Savings, her employer, in the various sums withdrawn from the bank accounts of
Matuguina and Cornejo; and falsification of a commercial document, by forging the signatures
of Matuguina and Cornejo in the withdrawal slips to make it appear that the depositor concerned
had signed the respective slips in order to enable her to withdraw the amounts. Such offenses
were complex crimes, because the estafa would not have been consummated without the
falsification of the withdrawal slips.

The rights against self-incrimination and to counsel guaranteed under the Constitution are
applied only during the custodial interrogation of a suspect. In her case, she was not subjected to
any investigation by the police or other law enforcement agents. Instead, she underwent an
administrative investigation as an employee of the BPI Family Savings Bank, the investigation
being conducted by her superiors. She was not coerced to give evidence against herself, or to
admit to any crime. In this setting, the invocation of the right to remain silent or to counsel is
simply irrelevant.



The accused avers that she did not get effective legal representation from her former counsel who
was already old and feeble when the case was being heard. In fact, the records show, her counsel
died during the pendency of the case, an octogenarian at that. However, the accused was not so
poorly represented that it affected her fundamental right to due process. The evidence against the
accused was simply too overwhelming. The trial court even admonished the accused to replace
her counsel due to his absences, but she did not. She must live by that.

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 NORMA C. GAMARO and JOSEPHINE G. UMALI vs. PEOPLE
February 27, 2017 G.R. No. 211917 PERALTA, J.:
The failure to return upon demand the properties which one has the duty to return is tantamount
to appropriating the same for his own personal use. The essence of this kind of estafa is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the entity to whom
a return should be made.

Facts
Sometime in 2002, private complainant Joan Fructoza E. Fineza engaged in a business venture
with petitioner Norma C. Gamaro and her daughters - petitioners Josephine G. Umali and
accused Rowena Gamaro Fineza would buy any foreclosed pieces of jewelry from M. Lhuillier
Pawnshop whenever informed by Umali who was then the manager of the said pawnshop. The
pieces of jewelry would then be sold for profit by Norma Gamaro to her co-employees at the
SSS. The proceeds of the sale would then be divided among them, with fifty percent (50%) going
to Fineza, and the other fifty percent (50%) divided among Umali, Norma Gamaro and Rowena
Gamaro. As security for the pieces of jewelry which were placed in the possession of Norma
Gamaro and her daughter Rowena Gamaro, the two would issue several checks drawn from their
joint bank account in favor of Fineza reflecting the appraised amount of the pieces of jewelry.

The business venture was initially successful. However, when Fineza discovered that Norma
Gamaro, together with her daughters Rowena Gamaro and Umali, also engaged in a similar
business with other suppliers of pieces of jewelry, she decided to terminate the business. It was
agreed that Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro would just dispose or sell the remaining pieces
of jewelry in their possession. But when Fineza tried to encash the checks which were issued to
her by Rowena Gamaro, the same were dishonored because the account of the Gamaros had been
closed. Fineza then confronted petitioner Norma Gamaro about the dishonored checks, and the
latter confessed that she did not have enough money to cover the amount of the checks. Fineza
also learned that the pieces of jewelry were pawned to several pawnshops and private individuals
contrary to what they had agreed upon. Petitioner Norma Gamaro furnished Fineza with a list of
the pawnshops, such that, the latter was compelled to redeem the pieces of jewelry with her own
money. To settle the matter, Fineza asked Norma Gamaro to return the remaining pieces of
jewelry in her possession but the latter failed to do so, and instead, offered her house and lot as
payment for the pieces of jewelry. Fineza, however, did not accept the said offer. A demand letter
was then sent by Fineza to Umali, Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro, asking for the return of
the amount of ₱2,292,519.00 as payment for all the pieces of jewelry unreturned to her, including
the cash given by Fineza for the rediscounting business. The demand letter was left unanswered.
Thus, the petitioners were charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the Revised
Penal Code before Branch 3 2 of the RTC of San Pablo City.

The RTC found accused Norma Gamaro guilty of the crime of estafa under Sec. l (B), Art. 315 of
the RPC, instead of Art. 315 par. 2(a) as charged against her in the Information, and exonerated
accused Josephine Umali of any criminal liability. Both accused however were directed to pay
the private complainant damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC.

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 Issue
Whether a conviction for the crime of Estafa under a different paragraph from the one charged is
legally permissible.

The Court’s Ruling

YES. The constitutional provision requiring the accused to be "informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him" is for him to adequately and responsively prepare his defense. The
prosecutor is not required, however, to be absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its
formal name in the law. What determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an
accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or
preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, they being conclusions of law. Hence, the controlling words of the
information are found in its body.

In the instant case, the crime of estafa charged against petitioners is defined and penalized by
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the RPC. The elements of the said crime are as follows: (1)
there must be a false pretense, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means; (2) such false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent
act or fraudulent means and was thus induced to part with his money or property; and (4) as a
result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

However, the crime petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted of is estafa under Article 315,
paragraph l(b) of the RPC. The elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) are as
follows: (1) that money, goods, or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust,
or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of
such money or property by the offender or a denial of the receipt thereof; (3) that the
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a
demand made by the offended party on the offender.

The facts in the Information do indeed constitute the crime of which petitioner Norma Gamaro
was convicted. The Information filed sufficiently charges estafa through misappropriation or
conversion. Fineza entrusted petitioner Norma Gamaro with the pieces of jewelry amounting to
₱2,292,5l 9.00 on the condition that the same will be sold for profit. Petitioner Nonna Gamaro
was under obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sale to Fineza. However, instead of
complying with the obligation, she pawned the pieces of jewelry to M. Lhuillier Pawnshop
where petitioner Umali worked as Branch Manager and kept the proceeds thereof to the damage
and prejudice of Fineza.

Paragraph 1 (b) provides liability for estafa committed by misappropriating or converting to the
prejudice of another money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to

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make delivery of or to return the same, even though that obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property. This,
at least, is very clearly shown by the factual allegations of the Information. The factual
allegations therein sufficiently inform petitioners of the acts constituting their purported offense
and satisfactorily allege the elements of estafa by misappropriation. Therefore, petitioner Norma
Gamaro was not deprived of any constitutional right Fineza positively and categorically testified
on the transaction that transpired between her and petitioners and accused Rowena Gamaro. The
failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation. As mentioned, petitioner Norma Gamaro failed to account for, upon demand,
the jewelry which was received by her in trust. This already constitutes circumstantial evidence
of misappropriation or conversion to petitioner's own personal use. The failure to return upon
demand the properties which one has the duty to return is tantamount to appropriating the same
for his own personal use. The essence of this kind of estafa is the appropriation or conversion of
money or property received to the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made.

The argument raised by petitioners that the testimony of prosecution witness Atty. Baldeo
violated the rule on "privileged communication between attorney and client" also lacks merit.
The factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege are: (1) There exists an attorney-
client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this
relationship that the client made the communication; (2) The client made the communication in
confidence; (3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The
client must intend the communication to be confidential. The communication made by a client to
his attorney must not be intended for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal
advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must have been
transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice. In the case at bar,
the testimony of Atty. Baldeo consisted merely of observations that petitioner Norma Gamaro
was indeed engaged in the business of selling jewelry supplied by private complainant Fineza.
The testimony is merely corroborative to the testimony of private complainant Fineza. Atty.
Baldeo is an officemate of petitioner Norma Gamaro. Atty. Baldeo testified primarily on the fact
that she personally saw petitioner Gamaro, on several occasions, showing the jewelry for sale to
their officemates. As in fact, Atty. Baldeo was offered to buy the pieces of jewelry on some
instances, and she was told by petitioner Norma Gamaro that the pieces of jewelry came from
Fineza.

Lastly, the argument of petitioner Norma Gamaro that the RTC erred in finding that she was the
one who received the pieces of jewelry is a finding of fact. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that
factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded
the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the parties. Though
jurisprudence recognizes highly meritorious exceptions, none of them obtain herein which would
warrant a reversal of the court a quo ruling.

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 MARIA C. OSORIO vs. PEOPLE
JULY 2, 2018 G.R. No. 207711 LEONEN, J.:
As a rule, an accused can only be convicted of the crime with which he or she is charged. An
exception to this is the rule on variance which simply means that if there is a variance between
the offense charged and the offense proved, an accused may be convicted of the offense proved if
it is included in the offense charged.

Facts
In an Information, Osorio was charged with estafa, punished under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of
the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution presented as witnesses private complainant, Josefina O.
Gabriel, and Alberto G. Fernandez, head of Philam Life's Business Values and Compliance
Department.

Gabriel was a proprietor of a stall in Paco Market, Manila. In December 2000, Osorio visited
Gabriel's store and introduced herself as an agent of the Philippine American Life and Philam
Life. As proof, Osorio presented her company ID and calling card. During their meeting, Osorio
offered insurance coverage to Gabriel. Gabriel availed Philam Life's Tri-Life Plan and Excelife
Gold Package. Gabriel consistently paid the quarterly premiums from February 2001 to
November 2001. On November 19, 2001, Osorio offered Gabriel an investment opportunity with
Philam Life Fund Management. The proposed investment would be placed under a time deposit
scheme and would earn 20% annually. Enticed by the offer, Gabriel tendered ₱200,000.00 to
Osorio, who in turn issued Philam Life receipts. A few months later, Gabriel discovered that her
insurance policies had lapsed due to non-payment of premiums. When Gabriel confronted Osorio
about the matter, Osorio assured Gabriel that she would take responsibility. Meanwhile, in May
2002, Gabriel received a letter from Philippine Money Investment Asset Management (PMIAM),
thanking her for investing in the company. In the same letter, PMIAM informed Gabriel that her
investment would earn interest on a semi-annual basis starting June 20, 2002. Gabriel
confronted Osorio on why her investment was diverted to PMIAM. Osorio explained that
PMIAM investments would yield a higher rate of return. Displeased with what had happened,
Gabriel asked for a refund of her initial investment. On August 2, 2002, Gabriel received
₱13,000.00 from PMIA. In spite of this, Gabriel insisted on the refund. PMIAM informed
Gabriel that her initial investment and unpaid interest income would be released to her on May
14, 2004. Unfortunately, she was unable to recover it. She then visited the Philam Life office to
see Osorio but she was nowhere to be found. Fernandez testified that Osorio was a Philam Life
agent and that she was allowed to engage in other lines of work. He stated that Osorio should not
have issued Philam Life receipts for Gabriel's ₱200,000.00 investment. Although the receipts
were genuine, Fernandez claimed that they should only be issued for insurance premium
payments.

The defense presented Osorio as its sole witness. Osorio admitted that aside from being a Philam
Life agent, she was also a referral agent of PMIAM. She received ₱4,000.00 from the company
as commission for Gabriel's investment. She asserted that she initially planned to place Gabriel's
investment in Phil Am Life but decided later on to divert it to PMIAM since the latter offered a

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higher rate of return. When Osorio informed Gabriel of her decision, Gabriel allegedly gave her
consent.

The RTC rendered judgment finding Osorio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa. Osorio
appealed, arguing that her act of investing Gabriel's money with PMIAM was done in good
faith. However, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming Osorio's conviction.

Petitioner asserts that not all the elements of estafa under Article 3 15(2)(a) of the RPC were
established by the prosecution. Only damage on the part of the private complainant was proven.
Petitioner argues that she did not employ any deceit in soliciting private complainant's
investment as nothing in the records shows that she used a fictitious name or that she pretended
to possess power, agency, or certain qualifications. Fernandez, one of the prosecution's witnesses,
even admitted that she was a Philam Life agent.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner's acts constitute estafa as defined and punished under Article 315(2)(a)
of the Revised Penal Code.

The Court’s Ruling

NO. There is merit in the petition in that petitioner should not be held guilty of the crime of
estafa as defined and punished under Art. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, but rather Other
Deceits under Art. 318 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner was charged with estafa by means
of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. In sustaining a conviction under this
provision, the following elements must concur: (a) That there must be a false pretense or
fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was
made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the
offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced
to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage.

The false pretense or fraudulent representation referred to under the first element exists when the
accused uses a fictitious name, pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions, or when the accused commits other similar
deceits. There is no evidence to prove that petitioner committed any of these acts when she
obtained private complainant's money. Petitioner neither used a fictitious name nor
misrepresented herself as an agent of Philam Life. During her first meeting with private
complainant, petitioner presented her company ID and calling card as proof of her identity and
employment. Fernandez, head of Philam Life's Business Values and Compliance Department,
even admitted during trial that petitioner had been a Philam Life agent as of December 2000.
There is also no proof that petitioner pretended to possess the authority to solicit investments for
Philam Life Fund Management. All that Femandez stated was that the issuance of Philam Life
receipts to private complainant was improper because the receipts only cover insurance premium

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payments. Thus, in the absence of contrary evidence, it is presumed that petitioner was
authorized to solicit money for investment purposes.

In estafa by means of deceit under Article 315 (2)(a) of the RPC, the element of deceit consisting
of the false pretense or representation must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. In this case,
although there is no proof that petitioner used a fictitious name or pretended to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, or business in soliciting private complainant's
money, petitioner should nevertheless be held criminally liable for misrepresenting to private
complainant that the latter's money would be invested in Philam Life Fund Management and that
its proceeds may be utilized to pay for private complainant's insurance premiums. Private
complainant accepted the investment opportunity offered by petitioner due to the promise that
her money would be invested in Philam Life, a company with which she had existing insurance
policies. As a result of petitioner's representations, private complainant no longer saw the need to
pay for the succeeding insurance premiums as they fell due. Moreover, petitioner's issuance of
Philam Life receipts led private complainant to believe that her money was already as good as
invested in the company. The false representations committed by petitioner in this case fall
beyond the scope of "other similar deceits" under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

Nevertheless, petitioner may be held criminally liable for other deceits under Article 318 of the
RPC. For an accused to be held criminally liable under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code,
the following elements must exist: (a) The accused makes a false pretense, fraudulent act or
pretense other than those in Articles 315, 316, and 317; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or
pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice. All the elements of Article
318 are present in this case. Petitioner, in soliciting private complainant's money, falsely
represented that it would be invested in Philam Life and that its proceeds would be used to pay
for private complainant's insurance premiums. This false representation is what induced private
complainant to part with her funds and disregard the payment of her insurance premiums. Since
petitioner deviated from what was originally agreed upon by placing the investment in another
company, private complainant's insurance policies lapsed.

As a rule, an accused can only be convicted of the crime with which he or she is charged. This
rule proceeds from the Constitutional guarantee that an accused shall always be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him or her. An exception to this is the rule on variance
under Rule 120, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which simply means that
if there is a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved, an accused may be
convicted of the offense proved if it is included in the offense charged. An accused may also be
convicted of the offense charged if it is necessarily included in the offense proved.

In the present case, the crime of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is
necessarily included in the crime of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code. Therefore, petitioner may be convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of
the Revised Penal Code.

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 MA. ROSARIO P. CAMPOS vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 187401 September 17, 2014 REYES, J.:
To be liable under BP 22, proof of receipt of such notice of dishonor is important, although not
as an element of the offense, but as a means to establish that the issuer of a check was aware of
insufficiency of funds when he issued the check and the bank dishonored it.

Facts
On March 17, 1995, Campos obtained a loan, payable on installments, from respondent First
Women's Credit Corporation (FWCC) in the amount of ₱50,000.00. She issued several postdated
checks in favor of FWCC to cover the agreed installment payments. Fourteen of these checks
drawn against her Current Account No. 6005-05449-92 withBPI Family Bank-Head Office,
however, were dishonored when presented for payment. The checks were declared by the
draweebank to be drawn against a "closed account.” After Campos failed to satisfy her
outstanding obligation with FWCC despite demand, she was charged before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City, Branch 48, with violations of B.P. 22. Campos was tried in
absentia, as she failed to attend court proceedings after being arraigned.

On December 7, 1999, the MeTC rendered its decision convicting the accused of fourteen (14)
counts of violations of B.P. 22, sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months imprisonment
for each violation and to indemnify the complainant the sum of ₱46,666.62 representing the total
value of the checks, plus legal interest from date of default until full payment.

Feeling aggrieved, Campos appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On July 30, 2007, the
RTC of Pasay City, Branch108 rendered its decision upholding Campos’ conviction. A motion
for reconsideration filed by Campos was denied for lack of merit. Campos appealed to the CA,
which rendered on July 21, 2008 its decision affirming the ruling of the RTC.

Campos argues that the crime’s element requiring her knowledge at the time of the check’s
issuance that she did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank for the payment of the check
in full upon presentment was not established by the prosecution. She denies having received a
notice of dishonor from FWCC. Insisting on an acquittal, Campos discredits the MeTC’s reliance
on a supposed notice of dishonor that was sent to her by FWCC through registered mail. She also
invokes good faith as she allegedly made arrangements with FWCC for the payment of her
obligation after the subject checks were dishonored.

Issues
1. Whether or not a demand letter that was sent through registered mails is sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of B.P. 22 as to knowledge of the fact of the dishonor of the
subject checks
2. Whether or not Petitioner’s want of information of the fact of the checks’ dishonor and
her subsequent arrangements for their payment are tantamount to good faith

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The Court’s Ruling
Ruling #1 - NO. The Court has held that the mere presentation of registry return receipts that
cover registered mail was not sufficient to establish that written notices of dishonor had been sent
to or served on issuers of checks.The authentication by affidavit of the mailers was necessary in
order for service by registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of the giving of notices of
dishonor and to predicate the existence of the second element of the offense. However, Campos
would not have entered into the alleged arrangements beginning January 1996 until May 1998 if
she had not received a notice of dishonor from her creditor, and had no knowledge of the
insufficiency of her funds with the bank and the dishonor of her checks. Hence, this statement
was a confirmation that she actually received the required notice of dishonor from FWCC.

Ruling #2 - NO. To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be
present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to The presence of the first and third
elements is undisputed. In a line of cases, the Court has emphasized the importance of proof of
receipt of such notice of dishonor, although not as an element of the offense,but as a means to
establish that the issuer of a check was aware of insufficiency of funds when he issued the check
and the bank dishonored it, in relation to the second element of the offense and Section 2 of B.P.
22. Considering that the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish,
Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds.

Campos could have avoided prosecution by paying the amounts due on the checks or making
arrangements for payment in full within five ( 5) days after receiving notice. Unfortunately for
Campos, these circumstances were not established in the instant case. She failed to sufficiently
disclose the terms of her alleged arrangement with FWCC, and to establish that the same had
been fully complied with so as to completely satisfy the amounts covered by the subject checks.
Moreover, documents to prove such fact should have been presented before the MeTC during the
trial, yet Campos opted to be tried in absentia, and thus waived her right to present evidence.
While Campos blamed her former counsel for alleged negligence that led to her failure to be
present during the trial, it is settled that the negligence of counsel binds his or her client. Given
the circumstances, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA which
affirmed the conviction of Campos.


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 GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al
G.R. No. 129764. March 12, 2002 QUISUMBING, J.:
The Bouncing Checks Law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the
legitimate public checking account user. It was not designed to favor or encourage those who
seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and circumvention of the purpose of the law.

Facts
In 1985, Phelps Dodge Philippines, Inc. leased its lot and factory building to Lincoln Gerard, Inc.
for a term of two years at a monthly rental of P75,000. When Lincoln Gerard, Inc. incurred rental
arrearages, Geoffrey F. Griffith, in his capacity as president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., issued two
checks. The voucher for these checks contained the following instruction: These checks are not
to be presented without prior approval from this Corporation to be given not later than May 30,
1986. Also written on the face of the voucher was the following note: However, if written
approval of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. is not given before May 30, 1986, Phelps Dodge, Phils. shall
present the cheques for payment. This is final and irrevocable. On May 29, 1986, Griffith wrote
Phelps Dodge not to present the said checks for payment on May 30, 1986 because they could
not be funded due to a four-week labor strike that had earlier paralyzed the business operations
of Lincoln Gerard. Previously, in a letter dated May 20, 1986, Phelps Dodge, through its
treasurer Ricardo R. Manarang, advised Lincoln Gerard that it was transferring the contents of
the Lincoln Gerard warehouse in the leased premises since a new tenant was moving in. On June
2, 1986, when no further communication was received from Lincoln Gerard, Phelps Dodge
presented the two checks for payment but these were dishonored by the bank for having been
drawn against insufficient funds. Three days later, Phelps Dodge sent a demand letter to Lincoln
Gerard, apprising Griffith of the dishonor of the checks and asking him to fund them within the
time prescribed by law. Lincoln Gerard still failed to fund the checks but Griffith sent a letter to
Phelps Dodge, explaining Lincolns inability to fund said checks due to the strike. Subsequently,
on June 19, 1986, Phelps Dodge notified Lincoln Gerard that its properties would be foreclosed.
Phelps Dodge went ahead with the foreclosure and auction sale on June 20, 1986, despite
Lincoln Gerards protest.

On May 10, 1988, two informations for violation of B.P. 22 were filed against petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court. Meanwhile, on November 6, 1987, Lincoln Gerard lodged a complaint
for damages docketed as Civil Case No. 55276 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, against
Phelps Dodge and the notary public who conducted the auction sale. On July 19, 1991, the trial
court ordered Phelps Dodge to return to Lincoln Gerard the P1,072,586.88 as excess. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision, and this became final and executory.

On August 25, 1994, the criminal cases against Griffith pending before the RTC were remanded
to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), in view of Republic Act No. 7691 that expanded the
jurisdiction of the MeTC. On July 25, 1995, the MeTC, in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678 and
41679, found Griffith guilty on both counts for violation of B.P. 22, and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment for six months on each count, to be served consecutively.

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On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the lower courts decision. Petitioner then appealed his
conviction to the Court of Appeals. In a consolidated decision dated March 14, 1997, the
appellate court denied due course to the petition, finding absent any prima facie merit in it.
Issue
Whether petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith, president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., has been erroneously
convicted and sentenced for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22).

The Court’s Ruling

YES. The instant petition is meritorious. The Bouncing Checks Law was devised to safeguard
the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. It was not
designed to favor or encourage those who seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and
circumvention of the purpose of the law. Note that in the two criminal cases filed by Phelps
Dodge against petitioner, the checks issued were corporate checks that Lincoln Gerard allegedly
failed to fund for a valid reason duly communicated to the payee. Further, it bears repeating that
Phelps Dodge, through a notarial foreclosure and auction that were later on judicially declared
invalid, sold Lincoln Gerards property for cash amounting to P1,120,540 to satisfy Phelps Dodge
claim for unpaid rentals. The obligation of Lincoln Gerard to Phelps Dodge for said rentals was
only P301,953.12. Thus, by resorting to the remedy of foreclosure and auction sale, Phelps
Dodge was able to collect the face value of the two checks, totalling P215,442.65. In fact, it
impounded items owned by Lincoln Gerard valued far in excess of the debt or the checks.

That the money value of the two checks signed by petitioner was already collected, however,
could not be ignored in appreciating the antecedents of the two criminal charges against
petitioner. Because of the invalid foreclosure and sale, Phelps Dodge was ordered to pay or
return P1,072,586.88 to Lincoln Gerard, per decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 69, which became final after it was affirmed by the appellate court. We cannot, under
these circumstances, see how petitioners conviction and sentence could be upheld without
running afoul of basic principles of fairness and justice. For Phelps Dodge has, in our view,
already exacted its proverbial pound of flesh through foreclosure and auction sale as its chosen
remedy. While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is
the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we
should not apply penal laws mechanically. The creditor having collected already more than a
sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of rentals, via auction sale,
holding the debtors president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said
collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.

In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has already been
effectively paid two years before the informations against him were filed, we find merit in this
petition. We hold that petitioner herein could not be validly and justly convicted or sentenced for
violation of B.P. 22. Whether the number of checks issued determines the number of violations
of B.P. 22, or whether there should be a distinction between postdated and other kinds of checks
need no longer detain us for being immaterial now to the determination of the issue of guilt or
innocence of petitioner.

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 ARIEL T. LIM vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 190834 November 26, 2014 PERALTA, J.:
The spirit of the law which, for B.P. Blg. 22, is the protection of the credibility and stability of the
banking system, would not be served by penalizing people who have made amends for their
mistakes and made restitution for damages even before charges have been filed against them.

Facts
Records reveal that petitioner issued Bank of Commerce Check Nos. 0013813 and 0013814,
dated June 30, 1998 and July 15, 1998, respectively, payable to CASH, in the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (PI00,000.00) for each check. He gave the checks to Mr. Willie Castor
(Castor) as his campaign donation to the latter's candidacy in the elections of 1998. It was Castor
who ordered the delivery of printing materials and used petitioner's checks to pay for the same.
Claiming that the printing materials were delivered too late, Castor instructed petitioner to issue
a "Stop Payment" order for the two checks. Thus, the checks were dishonored by the bank
because of said order and during trial, when the bank officer was presented on the witness stand,
he admitted that said checks were drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF). Private complainant
Magna B. Badiee sent two demand letters to petitioner, dated July 20, 1998 and July 23, 1998
and, subsequently, private complainant filed a complaint against petitioner before the Office of
the Prosecutor. After the lapse of more than one month from receipt of the demand letters, and
after receiving the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner issued a replacement
check dated September 8, 1998 in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00).
Private complainant Magna B. Badiee was able to encash said replacement check.

Nevertheless, on March 19, 1999, or six (6) months after petitioner had paid the amount of the
bounced checks, two Informations were filed against him before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila (MeTC), for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

METC Ruling
On September 12, 2006, the MeTC promulgated its Decision finding petitioner guilty of two (2)
counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

RTC Ruling
The RTC modified the lower court decision with respect to criminal case no. 327138 because the
lower court of Manila has no jurisdiction to try and decide cases where the essential ingredients
of the crime charged happened in Quezon City. However, the lower court findings that accused is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of BP 22 with respect to criminal case no.
07-24992 was affirmed.

CA Ruling
The CA affirmed in toto the RTC judgment.

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 Issue
Whether or not the criminal case against petitioner should be dismissed on the ground that he has
fully paid the amount of the dishonored checks even before the Informations against him were
filed in court, as ruled in Griffith vs CA.

The Court’s Ruling

YES. The Court finds the petition meritorious. In Griffith, the Court acquitted the accused
therein due to the fact that two years before the filing of the Information for violation of B.P. No.
22, the accused had, in effect, paid the complainant an amount greater than the value of the
bounced checks. The CA held that the factual circumstances in Griffith are dissimilar from those
in the present case. The Court disagrees with such conclusion. Although the factual
circumstances in the present case are not exactlythe same as those in Griffith, it should be noted
that the same kind of confusion giving rise to petitioner's mistake very well existed in the present
case. Here, the check was issued by petitioner merely as a campaign contribution to Castor's
candidacy. As found by the trial court, it was Castor who instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop
Payment" order for the two checks because the campaign materials, for which the checks were
used as payment, were not delivered on time. Petitioner relied on Castor's word and complied
with his instructions, as it was Castor who was supposed to take delivery of said materials.
Verily, it is easy to see how petitioner made the mistake of readily complying with the instruction
to stop payment since he believed Castor's wordthat there is no longer any valid reason to pay
complainant as delivery was not made as agreed upon. Nevertheless, two monthsafter receiving
the demand letter from private complainant and just several days after receiving the subpoena
from the Office of the Prosecutor, accused issued a replacement check which was successfully
encashed by private complainant.

The CA also took it against petitioner that he paid the amount of the checks only after receiving
the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, which supposedly shows that petitioner was
motivated to pay not because he wanted to settle his obligation but because he wanted to avoid
prosecution. This reasoning is tenuous, because in Griffith, the accused therein did not even
voluntarily pay the value of the dishonored checks; rather, the complainant was paid from the
proceeds of the invalid foreclosure of the accused's property. In saidcase, the Court did not
differentiate as to whether payment was made before or after the complaint had been filed with
the Office of the Prosecutor. It only mattered that the amount stated in the dishonored check had
actually been paid before the Information against the accused was filed in court. In thiscase,
petitioner even voluntarily paid value of the bounced checks. The Court, therefore, sees no
justification for differentiating this case from that of Griffith. Records show that both in Griffith
and in this case, petitioner had paid the amount of the dishonored checks before the filing of the
Informations in court. Verily, there is no reason why the same liberality granted to the accused in
Griffith should not likewise be extended to herein petitioner.

Thus, although payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond the 5-day period
provided for in B.P. Blg. 22, would normally not extinguish criminal liability, the aforementioned
case shows that the Court acknowledges the existence of extraordinary cases where, even if all

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the elements of the crime or offense are present, the conviction of the accused would prove to be
abhorrent to society's sense of justice. Just like in Griffith and in Tan, petitioner should not be
penalized although all the elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are proven to bepresent. The fact
that the issuer of the check had already paid the value of the dishonored check after having
received the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor should have forestalled the filing of the
Information incourt. The spirit of the law which, for B.P. Blg. 22, is the protection of the
credibility and stability of the banking system, would not be served by penalizing people who
have evidently made amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages even before
charges have been filed against them. In effect, the payment of the checks before the filing of the
informations has already attained the purpose of the law.

It should be emphasized as well that payment of the value of the bounced check after the
information has been filed in court would no longer have the effect of exonerating the accused
from possible conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Since from the commencement of the
criminal proceedings in court, there is no circumstance whatsoever to show that the accused had
every intention to mitigate or totally alleviate the ill effects of his issuance of the unfunded
check, then there is no equitable and compelling reason to preclude his prosecution. In such a
case, the letter of the law should be applied to its full extent.

Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's ruling in this case should be well differentiated
from cases where the accused is charged with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code, where the fraud is perpetuated by postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment
of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were
not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. In said case of estafa, damage and deceit are the
essential elements of the offense, and the check is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud.
In such a case, paying the value of the dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal
liability. It will merely satisfy the civil liability of the crime but not the criminal liability.

In fine, the Court holds that herein petitioner must be exonerated from the imposition of penalties
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as he had already paid the amount of the dishonored checks six (6)
months before the filing of Informations with the court. Such a course of action is more in
keeping with justice and equity.

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 DANTE BUEBOS and SARMELITO BUEBOS vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 163938 March 28, 2008 REYES, R.T., J.:
Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis on which a court draws its
finding of guilt. Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind
intuitively or impel a conscious process of reasoning towards a conviction.

Facts
On January 1, 1994 around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, Adelina B. Borbe was in her house at
Hacienda San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay watching over her sick child and lying down when she
heard some noise around the house. She got up and looked through the window and saw the four
accused, Rolando Buela, Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr. in front of her
hut. When she went out, she saw the roof of her nipa hut already on fire. She shouted for help.
Instead of coming to her immediate succor, the four fled. At some distance away, Olipiano
Berjuela heard Adelina scream for help. Olipiano was then drinking with Pepito Borbe to
celebrate New Year’s Eve. Olipiano immediately ran to the place and saw a number of people
jumping over the fence. When he focused his flashlight on them, he was able to identify
Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr. He also saw Rolando Buela running
away. On complaint of Adelina, petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos, together with Rolando
Buela and Antonio Cornel, Jr., were indicted for arson in an Information. The prosecution
evidence portraying the foregoing facts was principally supplied by private complainant Adelina
Borbe and Olipiano Berjuela.

Upon the other hand, the defense contended that the accused were at different places at the time
of the incident; Rolando Buela claimed to be at sitio Tugon, Malictay, San Miguel, Tabaco,
Albay as there was a novena prayer at his parents’ house on occasion of the death anniversary of
his late grandfather; Dante Buebos also claimed to have been at Romeo Calleja’s having gone
there in the evening of December 30, 1993 and left the place at 12:00 o’clock noontime of
January 1, 1994; Sarmelito Buebos asserted that he was at his residence at sitio Malictay,
Hacienda, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay on the day the incident happened and that he never left his
house; Antonio Cornel, Jr. likewise claimed to be at his residence at Añgas after having visited
his in-laws.

On April 7, 1998, the RTC found all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson. In
their appeal, they contended that (1) the trial court erred in finding them guilty of the crime of
arson; (2) that the trial court erred in finding conspiracy; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to
give weight and credence to their defense of denial and alibi. On November 13, 2003, the CA
disposed of the appeal , affirming with modificiation as to the penalty the decision of the trial
court. In downgrading the penalty, the CA opined that the accused could only be convicted of
simple arson, punishable by prision mayor, and not for burning of an inhabited house, which is
punishable by imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. According to
the appellate court, the information failed to allege with specificity the actual crime committed.
Hence, the accused should be found liable only for arson in its simple form.

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 Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the trial court on the basis of
circumstantial evidence

The Court’s Ruling

NO. Their conviction of simple arson is affirmed. Direct evidence of the commission of a crime
is not the only basis on which a court draws its finding of guilt. Established facts that form a
chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of reasoning
towards a conviction. Verily, resort to circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Rule 133, Section
5 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence
to be sufficient for a conviction: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the
one who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence,
the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused.

We find that the circumstantial evidence extant in the records is sufficient to identify petitioners
as the authors of the burning of the hut of private complainant Adelina Borbe: (1) Private
complainant heard some noise emanating from outside her house at around 3:00 a.m.; (2) When
she went out to check the disturbance, private complainant saw petitioners, together with their
two other co-accused, standing in front of the house; (3) Moments later, the roof of her house
caught fire; (4) Petitioners and their cohorts absconded while private complainant desperately
shouted for help. These facts have been proved through positive testimony. Evidently, these
circumstances form an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair conclusion – the culpability
of petitioners for the burning of the hut. The Court is convinced that the circumstances, taken
together, leave no doubt that petitioner perpetrated the arson. Conspiracy was likewise evident
from the coordinated movements of petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos. Both of them stood
outside the house of private complainant Adelina. They were part of the group making boisterous
noise in the vicinity. Petitioners also fled together while the roof of Adelina’s house was ablaze.
These acts clearly show their joint purpose and design, and community of interest.

The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and
(b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements
concur in the case at bar. As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant was charged
with having intentionally burned the two-storey residential house of Robert Separa. Said
conflagration likewise spread and destroyed seven (7) adjoining houses. Consequently, if proved,
as it was proved, at the trial, she may be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of the crime
of simple arson. Such is the case notwithstanding the error in the designation of the offense in the
information, the information remains effective insofar as it states the facts constituting the crime
alleged therein. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the
offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violate, but the description of the
crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.

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 PEOPLE vs. ALAMADA MACABANDO
G.R. No. 188708 July 31, 2013 BRION, J.:
The appellant’s indifferent attitude to his burning house and his hostility towards the people who
tried to put out the fire, coupled with his preparedness to flee his burning house, belied his claim
of innocence.

Facts
The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of destructive arson under Article 320 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, before the RTC. The prosecution presented the facts
as follows: at around 4:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001, the appellant broke bottles on the road
while holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even ("manabla ko”). Afterwards, he
uttered that he would burn his house. At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his
neighbors shout that there was a fire. When Cornelio went out of his house to verify, he saw
smoke coming from the appellant’s house. He got a pail of water, and poured its contents into the
fire. Eric Quilantang, a neighbor whose house was just 10 meters from that of the appellant, ran
to the barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When Eric approached the burning house,
the appellant, who was carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not to interfere; the appellant
then fired three (3) shots in the air. The appellant also told the people around that whoever would
put out the fire would be killed. Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly went home to
save his nephews and nieces. Eric also returned to his house to save his belongings. Fire Officer
(FO) II Victor Naive and FOI Reynaldo Maliao conducted a spot investigation of the incident,
and concluded, among others, that the fire started in the appellant’s house; and that it had been
intentional. Barangay Chairman Modesto Ligtas stated that the fire gutted many houses in his
barangay, and that he assisted the City Social Welfare and Development Department personnel in
assessing the damage.

The defense, on the other hand, presented a different version of the events. The appellant
admitted that he felt angry at around 2:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001 because one of his radio
cassettes for sale had been stolen. The appellant claimed that he went to sleep after looking for
his missing radio cassette, and that the fire had already started when he woke up. He denied
making a threat to burn his house, and maintained that he did not own a gun. He added that the
gunshots heard by his neighbors came from the explosion of firecrackers that he intended to use
during the New Year celebration. Lomantong Panandigan, the appellant’s cousin, stated, among
others, that he did not see the appellant carry a revolver or fire a shot on December 21, 2001.
Dimas Kasubidan, the appellant’s brother-in-law, stated that he and the appellant lived in the
same house, and that the latter was asleep in his room at the ground floor before the fire broke
out.

In its judgment dated August 26, 2002, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto. It gave weight to the RTC’s factual findings
since these findings were based on unrebutted testimonial and documentary evidence. The CA

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held that the totality of the presented circumstantial evidence led to the conclusion that the
appellant was guilty of the crime charged.
Issue
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged

The Court’s Ruling

YES. The Court denied the appeal, but modified the crime committed by the appellant and the
penalty imposed upon him. Appellant Alamada Macabando is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of simple arson under Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613.

The trial and appellate courts resorted to circumstantial evidence since there was no direct
evidence to prove the appellant’s culpability to the crime charged. It is settled that in the absence
of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to sustain a conviction provided
that: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty
that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime. Thus, to
justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be
interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.

In the present case, the following circumstances produce the conclusion that the appellant, to the
set fire to his house: first, the appellant, while holding an iron lead pipe, acted violently and
broke bottles near his house at around 4:00 p.m. of December 21, 2001; second, while he was
still in a fit of rage, the appellant stated that he would get even, and then threatened to burn his
own house; third, Judith Quilantang saw a fire in the appellant’s room approximately two hours
after the appellant returned to his house; fourth, the appellant prevented Cornelio, Eric, and
several other people from putting out the fire in his house; fifth, the appellant fired shots in the
air, and then threatened to kill anyone who would try to put out the fire in his house; sixth, the
appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire; and finally, the investigation conducted by the
fire marshals of the Bureau of Fire Protection revealed that the fire started in the appellant’s
house, and that it had been intentional. The combination of these circumstances, indeed, leads to
no other conclusion than that the appellant set fire to his house.

We find it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to prevent his neighbors from putting
out the fire in his house, and threaten to kill them if they did, if he had nothing to do with the
crime. It is contrary to human nature, reason and natural order of things for a person to thwart
and prevent any effort to put out the fire in his burning property. By carrying (and firing) a gun
during the fire, the appellant showed his determination to repel any efforts to quell the fire.
Important to note, too, is the fact that the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire which,
to our mind, showed deliberate planning and preparedness on his part to flee the raging fire. The
appellant’s indifferent attitude to his burning house and his hostility towards the people who tried
to put out the fire, coupled with his preparedness to flee his burning house, belied his claim of
innocence.

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The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these
elements have been proven in the present case. The Information alleged that the appellant set fire
to his own house, and that the fire spread to other inhabited houses. These allegations were
established during trial through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which the trial and
appellate courts found credible and convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire
Protection which stated that damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had been
intentional. Moreover, the certification from the City Social Welfare and Development
Department likewise indicated that the burned houses were used as dwellings. The appellant
likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was used as a residence. That the appellant’s act
affected many families will not convert the crime to destructive arson, since the appellant’s act
does not appear to be heinous or represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness when
compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established evidence only
showed that the appellant intended to burn his own house, but the conflagration spread to the
neighboring houses.

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity
or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal
Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts
committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of
perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple
Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security
implications than Destructive Arson.

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 INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG,
REPRESENTED BY MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG,
AS ADMINISTRATRIX VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 181409 February 11, 2010 CORONA, J.:
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against property,
namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes,
whether simple or complex, are not affected by the said provision.

Facts
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix of petitioner
intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a
complaint-affidavit for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. She
alleged that after her appointment as Administratrix, she was able to learn that prior to the death
of their mother, their father William Sato, through fraudulent misrepresentations, was able to
secure the signature and thumbmark of their mother on a Special Power of Attorney whereby her
niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her attorney-in-
fact, to sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. Said Special Power of
Attorney was signed and thumbmarked by their mother because William Sato told her that the
documents she was being made to sign involved her taxes. At that time, her mother was
completely blind, having gone blind almost ten (10) years prior to November, 1992. Wendy
Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that the mother signed the document in the belief that they were
in connection with her taxes, not knowing, since she was blind, that the same was in fact a
Special Power of Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties. On the basis of the aforesaid Special
Power of Attorney, William Sato found buyers for the property and made her niece Wendy
Mitsuko Sato sign three (3) deeds of absolute sale in favor of (a) Anita Ng (b) Anita Ng and (c)
Ruby Lee Tsai. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold under the power of
attorney fraudulently secured from her mother, which total P22,034,000.00, William Sato failed
to account for the same and never delivered the proceeds to Manolita Carungcong until the latter
died on June 8, 1994. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting and to
deliver the proceeds of the sales to Mediatrix as Administratrix of my mother's estate, but he
refused to the damage and prejudice of the estate of the deceased Manolita Carungcong and of
the heirs which include his six (6) children with her sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato.

In a resolution, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the complaint. On appeal, however,
the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the resolution dated March 25, 1997 and directed
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an Information against Sato for violation of Article
315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Sato moved for the quashal of the Information,
claiming that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the person
allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting
circumstance. In an order dated April 17, 2006, the trial court granted Sato's motion and ordered
the dismissal of the criminal case.


Dissatisfied with the trial court's rulings, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of

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Appeals which, however, in a decision dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it. It ruled that the death
of Zenaida did not extinguish the relationship by affinity between her husband, private
respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita, and does not bar the application of the exempting
circumstance under Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code in favor of private respondent Sato.

Issue
If marriage gives rise to one's relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of one's spouse, does
the extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship by affinity?

The Court’s Ruling

NO. But the petition has merit. Sato is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public documents.

The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the offense is
determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the offense. A
reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged not with simple
estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. In
particular, the Information states that Sato, by means of deceit, intentionally defrauded Manolita.


The estafa was committed by attributing to Manolita (who participated in the execution of the
document) statements other than those in fact made by her. Manolita's acts of signing the SPA
and affixing her thumbmark to that document were the very expression of her specific intention
that something be done about her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark were the affirmation of
her statement on such intention as she only signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which
she could not have read) because of Sato's representation that the document pertained to her
taxes. In signing and thumbmarking the document, Manolita showed that she believed and
adopted the representations of Sato as to what the document was all about, i.e., that it involved
her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark, therefore, served as her conformity to Sato's proposal
that she execute a document to settle her taxes. Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato
made it appear that Manolita granted his daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for the
purpose of selling, assigning, transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolita's Tagaytay
properties when the fact was that Manolita signed and thumbmarked the document presented by
Sato in the belief that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the SPA, and
everything that it contained were falsely attributed to Manolita when she was made to sign the
SPA. Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was not
simple estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public documents (particularly, the special power
of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary means to commit the estafa.



Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the complex crime
of estafa through falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail himself of the absolutory
cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor. The absolutory cause
under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against property, namely, the simple crimes
of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or complex,

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are not affected by the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To apply the absolutory
cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of the component crimes of a complex
crime for the purpose of negating the existence of that complex crime is to unduly expand the
scope of Article 332.


The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal. When estafa is
committed through falsification of a public document, however, the matter acquires a very
serious public dimension and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of family members
among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to an act that breaches public interest
in the integrity of public documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family member,
he is removed from the protective mantle of the absolutory cause under Article 332.


The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the Revised Penal
Code are as follows: (1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document; (2) deceit
was employed to make the offended party sign the document; (3) the offended party personally
signed the document and (4) prejudice is caused to the offended party. While in estafa under
Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not require that the document be falsified
for the consummation thereof, it does not mean that the falsification of the document cannot be
considered as a necessary means to commit the estafa under that provision.



When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit another crime, like
estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same
Code. The falsification of a public, official or commercial document may be a means of
committing estafa because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another,
the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not
being an element of the crime of falsification of a public, official or commercial document. In
other words, the crime of falsification was committed prior to the consummation of the crime of
estafa. Actually utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another
is estafa. The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of
the document.



Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show that the
falsification of public document was consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA to
Manolita who signed the same as a statement of her intention in connection with her taxes. While
the falsification was consummated upon the execution of the SPA, the consummation of the
estafa occurred only when Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he had the
properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita
was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the property
rights of Manolita at the time she was made to sign the document) but by the subsequent use of
the said document. That is why the falsification of the public document was used to facilitate and
ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the commission of the estafa.

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