CHAVEZ VS GONZALES

MARCH 30, 2013  ~ VBDIAZ

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and NTC
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008
FACTS: Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the parties to the
conversation discussed “rigging” the results of the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6 June 2005,
Presidential spokesperson Bunye held a press conference in Malacañang Palace, where he played before the
presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye identified
the woman in both recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second compact disc had been
“spliced” to make it appear that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano.
However, on 9 June 2005, Bunye backtracked and stated that the woman’s voice in the compact discs was not
President Arroyo’s after all.3 Meanwhile, other individuals went public, claiming possession of the genuine copy of the
Garci Tapes. Respondent Gonzalez ordered the NBI to investigate media organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for
possible violation of Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and television stations that airing the Garci Tapes is a ”
cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations” issued to them. On 14 June
2005, NTC officers met with officers of the broadcasters group KBP, to dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP
issued a joint press statement expressing commitment to press freedom
On 21 June 2005, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as citizen, filed this petition to nullify the “acts, issuances,
and orders” of the NTC and respondent Gonzalez (respondents) on the following grounds: (1) respondents’ conduct
violated freedom of expression and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern under Section 7,
Article III of the Constitution, and (2) the NTC acted ultra vires when it warned radio and television stations against airing
the Garci Tapes.
ISSUE: The principal issue for resolution is whether the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005
constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression.
1. Standing to File Petition
Petitioner has standing to file this petition. When the issue involves freedom of expression, as in the present case, any
citizen has the right to bring suit to question the constitutionality of a government action in violation of freedom of
expression, whether or not the government action is directed at such citizen. Freedom of expression, being fundamental
to the preservation of a free, open and democratic society, is of transcendental importance that must be defended by
every patriotic citizen at the earliest opportunity.

2. Overview of Freedom of Expression, Prior Restraint and Subsequent Punishment

Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic society. Freedom of expression is an
indispensable condition8 to the exercise of almost all other civil and political rights. Freedom of expression allows
citizens to expose and check abuses of public officials. Freedom of expression allows citizens to make informed choices
of candidates for public office.
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of any law curtailing freedom of expression:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or censorship because the Constitution commands
that freedom of expression shall not be abridged. Over time, however, courts have carved out narrow and well defined
exceptions to this rule out of necessity.

The exceptions, when expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four categories of
expression, namely:

pornography,
false or misleading advertisement,
advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
danger to national security.
All other expression is not subject to prior restraint.

Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value expression. Any content-based prior
restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without exception. A protected expression means what it says – it is
absolutely protected from censorship. Thus, there can be no prior restraint on public debates on the amendment or
repeal of existing laws, on the ratification of treaties, on the imposition of new tax measures, or on proposed
amendments to the Constitution.
If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is content-neutral even if it burdens
expression. A content-neutral restraint is a restraint which regulates the time, place or manner of the expression in
public places without any restraint on the content of the expression. Courts will subject content-neutral restraints to
intermediate scrutiny. An example of a content-neutral restraint is a permit specifying the date, time and route of a rally
passing through busy public streets. A content-neutral prior restraint on protected expression which does not touch on
the content of the expression enjoys the presumption of validity and is thus enforceable subject to appeal to the courts.

Expression that may be subject to prior restraint is unprotected expression or low-value expression. By definition, prior
restraint on unprotected expression is content-based since the restraint is imposed because of the content itself. In this
jurisdiction, there are currently only four categories of unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. This
Court recognized false or misleading advertisement as unprotected expression only in October 2007.

Only unprotected expression may be subject to prior restraint. However, any such prior restraint on unprotected
expression must hurdle a high barrier. First, such prior restraint is presumed unconstitutional. Second, the government
bears a heavy burden of proving the constitutionality of the prior restraint.
Prior restraint is a more severe restriction on freedom of expression than subsequent punishment. Although subsequent
punishment also deters expression, still the ideas are disseminated to the public. Prior restraint prevents even the
dissemination of ideas to the public.

While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, such expression may be subject to subsequent
punishment,27 either civilly or criminally. Similarly, if the unprotected expression does not warrant prior restraint, the
same expression may still be subject to subsequent punishment, civilly or criminally. Libel falls under this class of
unprotected expression.
However, if the expression cannot be subject to the lesser restriction of subsequent punishment, logically it cannot also
be subject to the more severe restriction of prior restraint. Thus, since profane language or “hate speech” against a
religious minority is not subject to subsequent punishment in this jurisdiction, such expression cannot be subject to prior
restraint.

If the unprotected expression warrants prior restraint, necessarily the same expression is subject to subsequent
punishment. There must be a law punishing criminally the unprotected expression before prior restraint on such
expression can be justified.
The prevailing test in this jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of government action imposing prior restraint on
three categories of unprotected expression – pornography,31 advocacy of imminent lawless action, and danger to
national security – is the clear and present danger test.32 The expression restrained must present a clear and present
danger of bringing about a substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent, and such danger must be
grave and imminent.

Prior restraint on unprotected expression takes many forms – it may be a law, administrative regulation, or
impermissible pressures like threats of revoking licenses or withholding of benefits.34 The impermissible pressures
need not be embodied in a government agency regulation, but may emanate from policies, advisories or conduct of
officials of government agencies.

3. Government Action in the Present Case

The government action in the present case is a warning by the NTC that the airing or broadcasting of the Garci Tapes
by radio and television stations is a “cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations” issued to radio and television stations. The NTC warning, embodied in a press release, relies on two
grounds. First, the airing of the Garci Tapes “is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of
the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to radio and TV stations.” Second, the Garci Tapes have
not been authenticated, and subsequent investigation may establish that the tapes contain false information or willful
misrepresentation.

The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected expression that may be
subject to prior restraint. The NTC does not specify what substantive evil the State seeks to prevent in imposing prior
restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes. The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil, of grave and imminent character, that the State has a right and duty to
prevent.

The NTC did not conduct any hearing in reaching its conclusion that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a
continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. There is also the issue of whether a wireless cellular phone
conversation is covered by the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

Clearly, the NTC has no factual or legal basis in claiming that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a violation of the
Anti-Wiretapping Law. The radio and television stations were not even given an opportunity to be heard by the NTC.
The NTC did not observe basic due process as mandated in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.

The NTC concedes that the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated as accurate or truthful. The NTC also concedes
that only “after a prosecution or appropriate investigation” can it be established that the Garci Tapes constitute “false
information and/or willful misrepresentation.” Clearly, the NTC admits that it does not even know if the Garci Tapes
contain false information or willful misrepresentation.

4. Nature of Prior Restraint in the Present Case

The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-based prior restraint because it is directed at the
message of the Garci Tapes. The NTC’s claim that the Garci Tapes might contain “false information and/or willful
misrepresentation,” and thus should not be publicly aired, is an admission that the restraint is content-based.

5. Nature of Expression in the Present Case

The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under any of the four existing
categories of unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci Tapes is essentially a
political expression because it exposes that a presidential candidate had allegedly improper conversations with a
COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of voting in the last presidential elections.

Obviously, the content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public discussion on the sanctity of
the ballot is indisputably a protected expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint. In any event, public discussion
on all political issues should always remain uninhibited, robust and wide open.

The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression.
On this ground alone, the NTC press release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts determine that the subject
matter of a wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers the security of the State, the public airing of the tape becomes
unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. However, there is no claim here by respondents that the
subject matter of the Garci Tapes involves national security and publicly airing the tapes would endanger the security of
the State.
The airing of the Garci Tapes does not violate the right to privacy because the content of the Garci Tapes is a matter of
important public concern. The Constitution guarantees the people’s right to information on matters of public concern.
The remedy of any person aggrieved by the public airing of the Garci Tapes is to file a complaint for violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Law after the commission of the crime. Subsequent punishment, absent a lawful defense, is the remedy
available in case of violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, there can be subsequent punishment for protected
expression under libel, tort or other laws. In the present case, the NTC action seeks prior restraint on the airing of the
Garci Tapes, not punishment of personnel of radio and television stations for actual violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Law.

6. Only the Courts May Impose Content-Based Prior Restraint

The NTC has no power to impose content-based prior restraint on expression. The charter of the NTC does not vest
NTC with any content-based censorship power over radio and television stations.

In the present case, the airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression that can never be subject to prior restraint.
However, even assuming for the sake of argument that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected
expression, only the courts have the power to adjudicate on the factual and legal issue of whether the airing of the Garci
Tapes presents a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to
prevent, so as to justify the prior restraint.

Any order imposing prior restraint on unprotected expression requires prior adjudication by the courts on whether the
prior restraint is constitutional. This is a necessary consequence from the presumption of invalidity of any prior restraint
on unprotected expression.

7. Government Failed to Overcome Presumption of Invalidity

Respondents did not invoke any compelling State interest to impose prior restraint on the public airing of the Garci
Tapes. The respondents claim that they merely “fairly warned” radio and television stations to observe the Anti-
Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC circulars on program standards. Respondents have not explained how and why the
observance by radio and television stations of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC circulars constitutes a
compelling State interest justifying prior restraint on the public airing of the Garci Tapes.

Violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, like the violation of any criminal statute, can always be subject to criminal
prosecution after the violation is committed. Respondents have not explained how the violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Law, or of the pertinent NTC circulars, can incite imminent lawless behavior or endanger the security of the State.

8. The NTC Warning is a Classic Form of Prior Restraint

The NTC press release threatening to suspend or cancel the airwave permits of radio and television stations constitutes
impermissible pressure amounting to prior restraint on protected expression. Whether the threat is made in an order,
regulation, advisory or press release, the chilling effect is the same: the threat freezes radio and television stations into
deafening silence. Radio and television stations that have invested substantial sums in capital equipment and market
development suddenly face suspension or cancellation of their permits. The NTC threat is thus real and potent.

9. Conclusion
In sum, the NTC press release constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected expression. There can be no
content-based prior restraint on protected expression. This rule has no exception.

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Adiong Vs Com
ADIONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992
FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347
pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code,
Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws. Section 15(a) of the
resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. â€” The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals… Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.
It is unlawful:…
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or
private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards…
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections
assails the COMELEC’s Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and
stickers in “mobile” places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such
prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a)
of Republic Act No. 6646.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers
on “mobile” places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the
authorized posting areas that it fixes.

HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No.
2347 of the COMELEC providing that “decals and stickers may be posted only in any
of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof” is
DECLARED NULL and VOID. The COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and
stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private except in designated areas
provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. The
prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen’s fundamental right of free speech
enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of
expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the
candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual
to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree
with him.

Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in
the resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and
stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private
property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing
regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in
the privacy of one’s living room or bedroom.) In consequence of this prohibition,
another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1,
Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law. (The right to property may be subject to a greater degree
of regulation but when this right is joined by a “liberty” interest, the burden of
justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and
irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.)

Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate
equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by
Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of
the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other
private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on
cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the
owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind
of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.

In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether
public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes
censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.

G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992

BLO UMPAR ADIONG, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The specific issue in this petition is whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may prohibit the
posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the
authorized posting areas that it fixes.

On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.

Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:

Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda:

(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other written or
printed materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14)
inches in length. Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized
posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.

Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:

Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. —

It is unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place,
whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas
and/or billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party, organization
or coalition, or at the candidate's own residential house or one of his residential houses, if he has
more than one: Provided, that such posters or election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet
by three (3) feet in size. (Emphasis supplied)

x x x           x x x          x x x

The statutory provisions sought to be enforced by COMELEC are Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code on
lawful election propaganda which provides:

Lawful election propaganda. — Lawful election propaganda shall include:

(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed materials of a size not
more than eight and one-half inches in width and fourteen inches in length;
 (b) Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any particular candidate;

(c) Cloth, paper or cardboard posters, whether framed or posted, with an area not exceeding two
feet by three feet, except that, at the site and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, or in
announcing the holding of said meeting or rally, streamers not exceeding three feet by eight feet
in size, shall be allowed: Provided, That said streamers may not be displayed except one week
before the date of the meeting or rally and that it shall be removed within seventy-two hours after
said meeting or rally; or

(d) All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by this Code as the Commission may
authorize after due notice to all interested parties and hearing where all the interested parties
were given an equal opportunity to be heard: Provided, That the Commission's authorization
shall be published in two newspapers of general circulation throughout the nation for at least
twice within one week after the authorization has been granted. (Section 37, 1978 EC)

and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 which provides:

Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. — In addition to the forms of election propaganda

prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful: (a) to draw, paint,
inscribe, write, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether
private, or public, except in the common poster areas and/or billboards provided in the
immediately preceding section, at the candidate's own residence, or at the campaign
headquarters of the candidate or political party: Provided, That such posters or election
propaganda shall in no case exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in area: Provided, Further, That
at the site of and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, streamers, not more than two (2)
and not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) feet each may be displayed five (5) days before the
date of the meeting or rally, and shall be removed within twenty-four (24) hours after said
meeting or rally; . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's
Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving
vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section
11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print
political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury
with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last
medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the
petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition) he has not received any notice from any
of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas."

The petition is impressed with merit. The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile"
places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void
on constitutional grounds.

First — the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the
Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction
involved in this case.

There are various concepts surrounding the freedom of speech clause which we have adopted as part and
parcel of our own Bill of Rights provision on this basic freedom.

All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important but we have accorded to free speech the
status of a preferred freedom. (Thomas v. Collins, 323 US 516, 89 L. Ed. 430 [1945]; Mutuc v. Commission on
Elections, 36 SCRA 228 [1970])

This qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the matrix, the indispensable
condition of nearly every other freedom. (Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 [1937]; Salonga v. Paño, 134
SCRA 438 [1985]) It is difficult to imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free
elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is denied and taken away.

We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and
that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials. (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 686 [1964]; cited in the concurring opinion of
then Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Babst v. National Intelligence Board, 132 SCRA 316 [1984]) Too many
restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate, the generating of interest essential
if our elections will truly be free, clean and honest.

We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what
may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.
(Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, supra)

The determination of the limits of the Government's power to regulate the exercise by a citizen of his basic
freedoms in order to promote fundamental public interests or policy objectives is always a difficult and delicate
task. The so-called balancing of interests — individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on
the other — is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific
authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections.

We recognize the fact that under the Constitution, the COMELEC during the election period is granted regulatory
powers vis-a-vis the conduct and manner of elections, to wit:

Sec. 4. The Commission may, during the election period supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities,
media of communication or information, all grants special privileges, or concessions granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation
shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable equal rates therefore, for public information campaigns and forms among candidates
in connection with the object of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
(Article IX(c) section 4)

The variety of opinions expressed by the members of this Court in the recent case of National Press Club v.
Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1991) and its companion cases underscores how difficult
it is to draw a dividing line between permissible regulation of election campaign activities and indefensible
repression committed in the name of free and honest elections. In the National Press Club, case, the Court had
occasion to reiterate the preferred status of freedom of expression even as it validated COMELEC regulation of
campaigns through political advertisements. The gray area is rather wide and we have to go on a case to case
basis.

There is another problem involved. Considering that the period of legitimate campaign activity is fairly limited
and, in the opinion of some, too short, it becomes obvious that unduly restrictive regulations may prove unfair to
affected parties and the electorate.

For persons who have to resort to judicial action to strike down requirements which they deem inequitable or
oppressive, a court case may prove to be a hollow remedy. The judicial process, by its very nature, requires time
for rebuttal, analysis and reflection. We cannot act instantly on knee-jerk impulse. By the time we revoke an
unallowably restrictive regulation or ruling, time which is of the essence to a candidate may have lapsed and
irredeemable opportunities may have been lost.

When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on
the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the
police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of
the citizen and the State's power to regulate are not antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if in
the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.

There were a variety of opinions expressed in the National Press Club v. Commission on Elections (supra) case
but all of us were unanimous that regulation of election activity has its limits. We examine the limits of regulation
and not the limits of free speech. The carefully worded opinion of the Court, through Mr. Justice Feliciano, shows
that regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not
limited in time and scope in its application, if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's opinion
of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory measure bears no clear
and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective.

Even as the Court sustained the regulation of political advertisements, with some rather strong dissents,
in National Press Club, we find the regulation in the present case of a different category. The promotion of a
substantial Government interest is not clearly shown.
 A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. (Id., at 377, 20 L Ed 2d 672, 88 S Ct 1673. (City Council v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 466
US 789, 80 L Ed 2d 772, 104 S Ct 2118 [1984])

The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any
substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the
curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger
rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be
so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled:

The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on the Court to say where the
individual's freedom ends and the State's power begins. Choice on that border, now as always
delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by
the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedom
secured by the first Amendment . . . That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction
not permitting dubious intrusions and it is the character of the right, not of the limitation, which
determines what standard governs the choice . . .

For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear public interest,
threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger. The rational connection
between the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other context might support
legislation against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest on firmer
foundation. Accordingly, whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at
appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public danger, actual or impending. Only
the greatest abuses, endangering permanent interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.
(Thomas V. Collins, 323 US 516 [1945]). (Emphasis supplied)

Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the
candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference
and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate
but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by
the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. If, in the National Press Club case, the Court was careful
to rule out restrictions on reporting by newspapers or radio and television stations and commentators or
columnists as long as these are not correctly paid-for advertisements or purchased opinions with less reason
can we sanction the prohibition against a sincere manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by an
individual person who pastes a sticker or decal on his private property.

Second — the questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for
overbreadth.

A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." (Zwickler v.
Koota, 19 L ed 2d 444 [1967]).

In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental purpose be
legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of
legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same
basic purpose.

In Lovell v. Griffin, 303 US 444, 82 L ed 949, 58 S Ct 666, the Court invalidated an ordinance
prohibiting all distribution of literature at any time or place in Griffin, Georgia, without a license,
pointing out that so broad an interference was unnecessary to accomplish legitimate municipal
aims. In Schneider v. Irvington, 308 US 147, 84 L ed 155, 60 S Ct. 146, the Court dealt with
ordinances of four different municipalities which either banned or imposed prior restraints upon
the distribution of handbills. In holding the ordinances invalid, the court noted that where
legislative abridgment of fundamental personal rights and liberties is asserted, "the courts should
be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or
beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other
personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to
 the maintenance of democratic institutions," 308 US, at 161. In Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US
296, 84 L ed 1213, 60 S Ct. 900, 128 ALR 1352, the Court said that "[c]onduct remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society," but pointed out that in each case "the power to regulate
must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected
freedom." (310 US at 304) (Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US 479 [1960]

The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in
width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile places whether public or private except in
areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted
is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned
vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be
violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law:

Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns, it includes the right to acquire, use,
and dispose of it; and the Constitution, in the 14th Amendment, protects these essential
attributes.

Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the
right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Constitution protects these essential attributes of
property. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391, 41 L. ed. 780, 790, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. Property
consists of the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of a person's acquisitions without control or
diminution save by the law of the land. 1 Cooley's Bl. Com. 127. (Buchanan v. Warley 245 US 60
[1917])

As earlier stated, we have to consider the fact that in the posting of decals and stickers on cars and other
moving vehicles, the candidate needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. In such a case, the prohibition
would not only deprive the owner who consents to such posting of the decals and stickers the use of his property
but more important, in the process, it would deprive the citizen of his right to free speech and information:

Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive it is so clearly

vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting aside reasonable police and health
regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved. The danger of
distribution can so easily be controlled by traditional legal methods leaving to each householder
the full right to decide whether he will receive strangers as visitors, that stringent prohibition can
serve no purpose but that forbidden by the constitution, the naked restriction of the dissemination
of ideas." (Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141; 87 L. ed. 1313 [1943])

The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a "liberty"
interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and
irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.

Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and invasive that it prohibits the posting or display of election
propaganda in any place, whether public or private, except in the common poster areas sanctioned by
COMELEC. This means that a private person cannot post his own crudely prepared personal poster on his own
front door or on a post in his yard. While the COMELEC will certainly never require the absurd, there are no
limits to what overzealous and partisan police officers, armed with a copy of the statute or regulation, may do.

The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the
privacy of one's living room or bedroom. This is delegation running riot. As stated by Justice Cardozo in his
concurrence in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (293 U.S. 388; 79 L. Ed. 446 [1935), "The delegated power is
unconfined and vagrant . . . This is delegation running riot. No such plentitude of power is susceptible of
transfer."

Third — the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the
electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to
Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other
private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any
financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance.

Under section 26 Article II of the Constitution, "The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service, . . . while under section 1, Article XIII thereof "The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment
of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good." (Emphasis supplied)

It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving
vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in
this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate. Whether the candidate is rich and,
therefore, can afford to doleout more decals and stickers or poor and without the means to spread out the same
number of decals and stickers is not as important as the right of the owner to freely express his choice and
exercise his right of free speech. The owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on his
personal property. To strike down this right and enjoin it is impermissible encroachment of his liberties.

In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in
the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the
Constitution:

. . . The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the
validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is
a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority
accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments
of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to
yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the
enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, either
substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore
or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases,
the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its
power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the
course of adjudication is a logical. corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is
paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby
there is a recognition of its being the supreme law. (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, supra)

The unusual circumstances of this year's national and local elections call for a more liberal interpretation of the
freedom to speak and the right to know. It is not alone the widest possible dissemination of information on
platforms and programs which concern us. Nor are we limiting ourselves to protecting the unfettered interchange
of ideas to bring about political change. (Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, supra) The big number of candidates
and elective positions involved has resulted in the peculiar situation where almost all voters cannot name half or
even two-thirds of the candidates running for Senator. The public does not know who are aspiring to be elected
to public office.

There are many candidates whose names alone evoke qualifications, platforms, programs and ideologies which
the voter may accept or reject. When a person attaches a sticker with such a candidate's name on his car
bumper, he is expressing more than the name; he is espousing ideas. Our review of the validity of the
challenged regulation includes its effects in today's particular circumstances. We are constrained to rule against
the COMELEC prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the
Commission on Elections providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting
areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL and VOID.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero and Nocon, J.J., concur.

Feliciano and Bellosillo, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions
  
CRUZ, J.: concurring:

I join Mr. Justice Gutierrez and reiterate the views expressed in my dissent in National Press Club v.
Commission on Elections. The stand taken by the Court in the case at bar is a refreshing change from its usual
deferential attitude toward authoritarianism as a persistent vestige of the past regime. After the disappointing
decision in the ad ban case, I hope that the present decision will guide us to the opposite direction, toward liberty
and the full recognition of freedom of expression. This decision is a small step in rectifying the errors of the past,
but it is a step just the same, and on the right track this time.

Regarding the sticker ban, I think we are being swamped with regulations that unduly obstruct the free flow of
information so vital in an election campaign. The Commission on Elections seems to be bent on muzzling the
candidates and imposing all manner of silly restraints on their efforts to reach the electorate. Reaching the
electorate is precisely the purpose of an election campaign, but the Commission on Elections obviously believes
that the candidates should be as quiet as possible.

Instead of limiting the dissemination of information on the election issues and the qualifications of those vying for
public office, what the Commission on Elections should concentrate on is the education of the voters on the
proper exercise of their suffrages. This function is part of its constitutional duty to supervise and regulate
elections and to prevent them from deteriorating into popularity contests where the victors are chosen on the
basis not of their platforms and competence but on their ability to sing or dance, or play a musical instrument, or
shoot a basketball, or crack a toilet joke, or exhibit some such dubious talent irrelevant to their ability to
discharge a public office. The public service is threatened with mediocrity and indeed sheer ignorance if not
stupidity. That is the problem the Commission on Elections should try to correct instead of wasting its time on
much trivialities as where posters shall be allowed and stickers should not be attached and speeches may be
delivered.

The real threat in the present election is the influx of the unqualified professional entertainers whose only asset
is the support of their drooling fans, the demagogues who drumbeat to the clink of coins their professed present
virtues and past innocence, the opportunists for whom flexibility is a means of political survival and even of
financial gain, and, most dangerous of all, the elements of our electorate who would, with their mindless ballots,
impose these office-seekers upon the nation. These are the evils the Commission on Elections should try to
correct, not the inconsequential and inane question of where stickers should be stuck. I have nothing but praise
for the zeal of the Commission on Elections in pursuing the ideal of democratic elections, but I am afraid it is
barking up the wrong tree.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I join Mr. Justice Gutierrez and reiterate the views expressed in my dissent in National Press Club v.
Commission on Elections. The stand taken by the Court in the case at bar is a refreshing change from its usual
deferential attitude toward authoritarianism as a persistent vestige of the past regime. After the disappointing
decision in the ad ban case, I hope that the present decision will guide us to the opposite direction, toward liberty
and the full recognition of freedom of expression. This decision is a small step in rectifying the errors of the past,
but it is a step just the same, and on the right track this time.

Regarding the sticker ban, I think we are being swamped with regulations that unduly obstruct the free flow of
information so vital in an election campaign. The Commission on Elections seems to be bent on muzzling the
candidates and imposing all manner of silly restraints on their efforts to reach the electorate. Reaching the
electorate is precisely the purpose of an election campaign, but the Commission on Elections obviously believes
that the candidates should be as quiet as possible.

Instead of limiting the dissemination of information on the election issues and the qualifications of those vying for
public office, what the Commission on Elections should concentrate on is the education of the voters on the
proper exercise of their suffrages. This function is part of its constitutional duty to supervise and regulate
elections and to prevent them from deteriorating into popularity contests where the victors are chosen on the
basis not of their platforms and competence but on their ability to sing or dance, or play a musical instrument, or
shoot a basketball, or crack a toilet joke, or exhibit some such dubious talent irrelevant to their ability to
discharge a public office. The public service is threatened with mediocrity and indeed sheer ignorance if not
stupidity. That is the problem the Commission on Elections should try to correct instead of wasting its time on
much trivialities as where posters shall be allowed and stickers should not be attached and speeches may be
delivered.

The real threat in the present election is the influx of the unqualified professional entertainers whose only asset
is the support of their drooling fans, the demagogues who drumbeat to the clink of coins their professed present
virtues and past innocence, the opportunists for whom flexibility is a means of political survival and even of
financial gain, and, most dangerous of all, the elements of our electorate who would, with their mindless ballots,
impose these office-seekers upon the nation. These are the evils the Commission on Elections should try to
correct, not the inconsequential and inane question of where stickers should be stuck. I have nothing but praise
for the zeal of the Commission on Elections in pursuing the ideal of democratic elections, but I am afraid it is
barking up the wrong tree.

CASE DIGEST : Ayer Vs Capulong

G.R. No. 82380 April 29, 1988 AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. and McELROY & McELROY FILM
PRODUCTIONS, petitioners,  vs. HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents. G.R. No.
82398 April 29, 1988 HAL MCELROY petitioner,  vs. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134 and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.

Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned,
sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of
the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB
as and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. It is
designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four
fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. David
Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American
historian have developed a script. Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or
exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or
other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile
was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a
complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and
making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which
nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.

 Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated

HELD : The Court would once more stress that this freedom includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures
and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television The respondent Judge should
have stayed his hand, instead of issuing an ex-parte Temporary Restraining Order one day after filing of a complaint
by the private respondent and issuing a Preliminary Injunction twenty (20) days later; for the projected motion picture
was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial
Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present
danger" of any violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert. The subject matter, as set
out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and certainly not
to the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile The extent of that intrusion, as this Court understands the
synopsis of the proposed film, may be generally described as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that
film a truthful historical account. Private respondent does not claim that petitioners threatened to depict in "The Four
Day Revolution" any part of the private life of private respondent or that of any member of his family. His participation
therein was major in character, a film reenactment of the peaceful revolution that fails to make reference to the role
played by private respondent would be grossly unhistorical. The right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily
narrower than that of an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not retired into the seclusion of simple private
citizenship. he continues to be a "public figure." After a successful political campaign during which his participation in
the EDSA Revolution was directly or indirectly referred to in the press, radio and television, he sits in a very public
place, the Senate of the Philippines. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the
constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a
requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events
 ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp v. COMELEC
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp v. COMELEC
January 28, 2000

FACTS:   

          COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS CBN or any other groups, its
agents or representatives from conducting exit surveys.  The Resolution was issued by
the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with
PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make an exit survey of the vote during the elections for
national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be broadcasted immediately.”  The
electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count
of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to
undertake the exit survey.

          Two days before the elections on May 11, 1998, the Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by
petitioner ABS-CBN. The  Comelec was directed to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed
Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and
reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

ISSUE:                   W/N the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, can absolutely ban exit polls

ABS-CBN:              The holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results are valid exercises of the freedoms
of speech and of the press

EC:           

1)The issuance thereof was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a clean, honest, orderly and
credible May 11, 1998 elections"; and "to protect, preserve and maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot."

2)It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys might unduly confuse and influence the voters," and that the surveys were
designed "to condition the minds of people and cause confusion as to who are the winners and the losers in the election,"
which in turn may result in "violence and anarchy."

3)"exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of the ballots," as the "voters are
lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution and relevant provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code.  It submits that the constitutionally protected freedoms invoked by petitioner "are not immune to
regulation by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power," such as in the present case.

4) "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof creates a clear and present danger to the community or it has a
dangerous tendency." It then contends that "an exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of
selecting interviewees, which further make[s] the exit poll highly unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit
poll may not be in harmony with the official count made by the Comelec x x x is ever present. In other words, the exit poll
has a clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process."

SUPREME COURT:            The COMELEC Resolution on exit polls ban is nullified and set aside.

1) Clear and present danger of destroying the integrity of electoral processes

 Speculative and Untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at
random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the
community or group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant  to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It
consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the
limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections,
which are exercises that are separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of
exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one
can only be indicative of the other.

2) Overbroad
The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls -- disorder and confusion in the
voting centers -- does not justify a total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad, since its
application is without qualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or not.[44] Concededly, the Omnibus Election
Code prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting centers.[45] There is no showing, however, that exit polls or the
means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving that the
presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters.  Moreover, the
prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose. The valuable information
and ideas that could be derived from them, based on the voters' answers to the survey questions will forever remain
unknown and unexplored. Unless the ban is restrained, candidates, researchers, social scientists and the electorate in
general would be deprived of studies on the impact of current events and of election-day and other factors on voters'
choices.

3)  Violation of Ban Secrecy

The contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of the ballot
is off-tangent to the real issue. Petitioner does not seek access to the ballots cast by the voters. The ballot system of voting
is not at issue here.

The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter identification. Thus, voters
are prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their official ballots to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from
putting distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified. Also proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast by
particular voters or disclosing those of disabled or illiterate voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is
the association of voters with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in
accordance with the instructions of a third party. This result cannot, however, be achieved merely through the voters'
verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of whom they have voted for.

In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whom an
elector has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed,
narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress incidental problems
in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of our people.##

An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an
election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The results of the survey are
announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate
voted. In our electoral history, exit polls had not been resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998 elections.
Torts And Damages Case Digest: Fernando V. CA
(1992)
G.R. No. 92087 May 8, 1992

Lessons Applicable: Experts and Professionals (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:

 November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a
requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-
emptying of the septic tank in Agdao wherein Bascon won
 November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito
Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside
the septic tank. 
 The bodies were removed by a fireman.
 The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken
to the Regional Hospital but he expired there. 
 The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned they entered the septic
tank without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master. 
 Since the septic tank was found to be almost empty, they were presumed to be
the ones who did the re-emptying.
 Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found them to have died from "asphyxia" -
diminution of oxygen supply in the body and intake of toxic gas
 November 26, 1975: Bascon signed the purchase order 
 RTC: Dismissed the case
 CA: Reversed - law intended to protect the plight of the poor and the needy, the
ignorant and the indigent
ISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the proximate cause therefore can be
liable for damages

HELD: NO. CA affirmed.

 test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case:

 Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence
 standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet pater familias of the Roman law
 Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor
would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable warrant
his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences
 The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a
given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and
in view of the facts involved in the particular case
 Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of
this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist
 Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury
 Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining
factors, he can not recover
 Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury,
he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for
such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence
 Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the New
Civil Code which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public
 While the construction of these public facilities demands utmost compliance with
safety and sanitary requirements, the putting up of warning signs is not one of those
requirements
 accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless
one removes its covers
 Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has
not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of
the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old
hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure,
therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the
proximate cause of the accident.
 proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their own
negligence. Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages from the public respondent.
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v CA 348 SCRA 265
December 15, 2000
Facts: The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundation’s school paper were subjected
to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after letters of complaint were filed before the
Board following the publication of the school paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit
contents. Prior to the disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to submit a written
statement to answer the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants, instead
of doing so wrote to the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged to have the
jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through with the investigation ex parte the Committee found the
defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions. Defendants filed before the court for
prohibition with preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee questioning the jurisdiction of said
Discipline Board over the defendants.

Issue: WON the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the defendants.

Held: The court resolved the issue before it by looking through the power of DECS and the Disciplinary
Committee in imposing sanctions upon the defendants. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution
guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom
includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain
them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for
some restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to discipline its students and inculcate upon them
good values, ideals and attitude. The right of students to free speech in school is not always absolute. The
court upheld the right of students for the freedom of expression but it does not rule out disciplinary actions
of the school on the conduct of their students. Further, Sec. 7 of the of the Campus Journalism Act provides
that  the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles they write EXCEPT
when such article materially disrupts class work of involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others. Therefore the court ruled that the power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to
suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the
maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That power, like the
power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning
guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the
cases filed against respondent students.1âwph
Title : DE LA CRUZ VS COURT OF APPEALS

Citation : G.R. No. 126183

March 25, 1999

Ponente : BELLOSILLO, J.:

Facts :

Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were simultaneously
charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in October 1990 by the Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) in connection with the administrative complaints filed before its office by their
respective principals for participating in a mass action/strike and subsequently defying the return-to-work order by
DECS constituting grave misconduct., gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations
and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and absence without official leave (AWOL), in violation of Presidential Decree 807,
otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. Petitioners contend they are merely participating in a
peaceful assembly to petition the government for redress of their grievances in the exercise of their constitutional
right and insist their assembly does not constitutes as a strike as there is no actual disruption of classes.

Issue :

Whether or not the petitioners’ exercise of their right to freedom to assembly and petition were valid.

Held :

The court held that previous jurisprudence laid down a rule that public teachers in the exercise of their right
to ventilate their grievances by petitioning the government for redress should be done within reasonable limits so as
not to prejudice the public welfare. The conduct of mass protests during school days while abandoning classes is
highly prejudicial to the best interest of public service. The court stresses that teachers are penalized not because
they exercised their right to peaceably assemble but because of the manner by which such right was exercised, i.e.,
going on unauthorized and unilateral absences thus disrupting classes in various schools in Metro Manila which
produced adverse effects upon the students for whose education the teachers were responsible.
GSIS and GARCIA vs. KMG DIGEST
DECEMBER 19, 2016  ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. 170132             December 6, 2006

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F.

GARCIA, in his capacity as GSIS President & General
Manager, petitioners, 
vs.
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, respondents.
FACTS: Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action
participants were GSIS personnel, among them members of the herein
respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS (“KMG” or the “Union”),
a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file employees.
On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit
issued a memorandum directing 131 union and non-union members to show
cause why they should not be charged administratively for their
participation in said rally. In reaction, KMG’s counsel, Atty. Manuel Molina,
sought reconsideration of said directive on the ground, among others, that
the subject employees resumed work on October 8, 2004 in obedience to
the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea for reconsideration was,
however, effectively denied by the filing, on October 25, 2004,
of administrative charges against some 110 KMG members for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
KMG filed a petition for prohibition with the CA against these charges. The
CA granted the petition and enjoined the GSIS from implementing the issued
formal charges and from issuing other formal charges arising from the same
facts and events.
CA equated the right to form associations with the right to engage in strike
and similar activities available to workers in the private sector. In the
concrete, the appellate court concluded that inasmuch as GSIS employees
are not barred from forming, joining or assisting employees’ organization,
petitioner Garcia could not validly initiate charges against GSIS employees
waging or joining rallies and demonstrations notwithstanding the service-
disruptive effect of such mass action.
ISSUE: WON the strike conducted by the GSIS employees were valid
HELD: NO
The 1987 Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of
government personnel to self-organization to complement the provision
according workers the right to engage in “peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law.”. It was against the
backdrop of the aforesaid provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the Court
resolved Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals. In it, we held, citing MPSTA v.
Laguio, Jr., that employees in the public service may not engage in
strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the
right of government employees to organize is limited to the
formation of unions or associations, without including the right to
strike.
Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively
recognized in Association of Court of Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja.
But, as in the exercise of the rights of free expression and of
assembly, there are standards for allowable limitations such as the
legitimacy of the purpose of the association, [and] the overriding
considerations of national security.
As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise
with the provision “in accordance with law.” This is a clear manifestation
that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny
certain sectors such right. Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for
the exercise of the right of government workers to organize, for instance,
implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which “enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from
staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of
mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public
service” by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in government service shall be observed.
Public employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join
concerted mass actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. 
With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7, 2004,
what respondent’s members launched or participated in during that time
partook of a strike or, what contextually amounts to the same thing, a
prohibited concerted activity. The phrase “prohibited concerted activity”
refers to any collective activity undertaken by government employees, by
themselves or through their employees’ organization, with the intent of
effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their
demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass
leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature. Indeed, for four straight
days, participating KMG members and other GSIS employees staged a walk
out and waged or participated in a mass protest or demonstration right at
the very doorstep of the GSIS main office building. The record of
attendance for the period material shows that, on the first day of the
protest, 851 employees, or forty eight per cent (48%) of the total number of
employees in the main office (1,756) took to the streets during office hours,
from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.,leaving the other employees to fend for themselves in
an office where a host of transactions take place every business day. On the
second day, 707 employees left their respective work stations, while 538
participated in the mass action on the third day. A smaller number, i.e., 306
employees, but by no means an insignificant few, joined the fourth day
activity.
In whatever name respondent desires to call the four-day mass action in
October 2004, the stubborn fact remains that the erring employees, instead
of exploring non-crippling activities during their free time, had taken a
disruptive approach to attain whatever it was they were specifically after. As
events evolved, they assembled in front of the GSIS main office building
during office hours and staged rallies and protests, and even tried to
convince others to join their cause, thus provoking work stoppage and
service-delivery disruption, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the
prohibition against strikes by government personnel.
To petitioner Garcia, as President and General Manager of GSIS, rests the
authority and responsibility, under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8291,
the GSIS Act of 1997, to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS
personnel for cause. At bottom then, petitioner Garcia, by filing or causing
the filing of administrative charges against the absenting participants of the
October 4-7, 2004 mass action, merely performed a duty expected of him
and enjoined by law. Regardless of the mood petitioner Garcia was in when
he signed the charge sheet, his act can easily be sustained as legally correct
and doubtless within his jurisdiction.
 

Baguio Midland Courier, Represented by its President and General Manager, Oseo Hamada and Cecille Afable,
Editorin-Chief, Petitioners,

Vs.

The Court of Appeals and Ramon Labo, Jr., respondents,

Facts:

- Oseo Hamada, President & General Manager of Baguio Midland Courier and Cecille Afable, Editor in
Chief petitioned the ruling of C.A against them on January 07, 1992. That the time the article in question
was published, Mr. Labo was not a public official but a private citizen seeking an elective office and
petitioner Afable’s article was intended to impeach his honesty, virtue or reputation and to make him
appear in the eyes of the public as unfit for public office.
- Mr. Ramon Labo Jr. was among the mayoralty candidates in Baguio City for the 18 January 1988 local
elections.
- Jan 10, 1988, Ms. Afable commented in the article about Mr. Labo about “Dumpty in the egg” is
campaigning for Cortes. That Mr. Labo can’t settle P27,000.00 to their company and yet donated millions
of pesos.
- Mr. Labo filed criminal and civil actions for libel dated 26 December 1988.
- On June 14, 1990, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The article in question was
privileged and constituted fair comment on matters of public interest as it dealt with the integrity,
reputation, and honesty of private respondent who was a candidate for local elective office at that time.

Issues:

- Whether or not the CA was erred in concluding that plaintiff-appellant Ramon Labo Jr. was the one
referred to as the “Dumpty in the egg”.
- Whether or not the CA was erred in holding that “there is good reasons and reasonable ground to
assume that the publication of the libelous articles was a manifestation to demerit a candidate in Baguio
City.
- Whether or not the CA was erred in holding that there was malice in publishing that article.

Ruling:

- That the named referred in the article “dumpty in the egg” on January 10, 1988 was to another named
candidate.
- That “dumpty in the egg” was someone who was campaigning for a certain Atty. Reynaldo Cortes- one of
the mayoralty candidate in Baguio City at that time.
- The petitioners Hamada & Afable were siblings and not spouses. It lacks factual support.
- The private respondent was unable to prove that petitioner Afable’s column was tainted with actual
malice. Verily, the records are replete with evidence that, indeed, private respondent incurred an
obligation which had remained unpaid.
- Afable’s article constituted a fair comment on a matter of public interest as it dealt with the character of
private respondent who was running for the top elective post in Baguio City.
- The petition is granted. The decision of CA was reversed and set aside.