G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922 . . .

No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction

over an offense or crime committed on the high seas or
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff- within the territorial waters of any other country, but
appellant, when she came within three miles of a line drawn from
vs. the headlands, which embrace the entrance to Manila
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee. Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of
principles became applicable. (Wheaton, International
Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int.,
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.
secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.
and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the
territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have
ROMUALDEZ, J.: been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper
political agency. . . .
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the
order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, sustaining the It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed,
demurrer presented by the defendant to the information that as in Mali and Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U.., 1),
initiated this case and in which the appellee is accused of having wherein it was said that:
illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of
English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila
Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city. . . . The principle which governs the whole matter is
this: Disorder which disturb only the peace of the ship
or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those
lower court, which so held and dismissed the case. which disturb the public peace may be suppressed,
and, if need be, the offenders punished by the proper
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy
such ruling is erroneous or not; and it will or will not be at all times to determine which of the two jurisdictions
erroneous according as said court has or has no jurisdiction over a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will
said offense. undoubtedly depend on the attending circumstances
of the particular case, but all must concede that
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have felonious homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction,
jurisdiction over crime, like the one herein involved, committed and that if the proper authorities are proceeding with
aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters. the case in the regular way the consul has no right to
interfere to prevent it.
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in
connection with International Law; to wit, the French rule, Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court
according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign held that:
merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the
country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were Although the mere possession of an article of
committed, unless their commission affects the peace and prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard a
security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a
territorial principle and followed in the United States, according general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of
to which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in the Islands, such vessels being considered as an
general triable in the courts of the country within territory they extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not
were committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited
in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and in the Islands, is landed from the vessels upon
jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the
authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the laws of the land is committed with respect to which, as
United States. it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of
the commission of the crime, no court other than that
In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 established in the said place has jurisdiction of the
Cranch [U. S.], 116), Chief Justice Marshall said: offense, in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty.
. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of
trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or
dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to otherwise to renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we
continual infraction, and the government to find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to
degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not which nation the ship where the crime in question was
owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions,
amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. . . . etc.," volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the following:

In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held: There shall be between the territories of the United
States of America, and all the territories of His Britanic
 Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. opium," and that "he had been surprised in the act of selling
The inhabitants of the two countries, respectively, shall 1,000 pesos worth prepared opium."
have liberty freely and securely to come with their
ships and cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers, The defense presented a demurrer based on two grounds, the
in the territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners second of which was the more than one crime was charged in
are permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to the complaint. The demurrer was sustained, as the court found
remain and reside in any parts of the said territories, that the complaint contained two charges, one, for the unlawful
respectively; also to hire and occupy houses and possession of opium, and the other, for the unlawful sale of
warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; and, opium, and, consequence of that ruling, it ordered that the fiscal
generally, the merchants and traders of each nation should separated one charge from the other and file a complaint
respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection for each violation; this, the fiscal did, and this cause concerns
and security for their commerce, but subject always to only the unlawful possession of opium. It is registered as No.
the laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively. 375, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and as No. 5887 on
(Art. 1, Commerce and Navigation Convention.) the general docket of this court.

We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a The facts of the case are contained in the following finding of the
foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or trial court:
courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to
protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous
The evidence, it says, shows that between 11 and 12
effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in
o'clock a. m. on the present month (stated as August
such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being
19, 1909), several persons, among them Messrs. Jacks
about in the said territory those effects that our statute
and Milliron, chief of the department of the port of
contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not
Cebu and internal-revenue agent of Cebu, respectively,
considered a disturbance of the public order.
went abroad the steamship Erroll to inspect and search
its cargo, and found, first in a cabin near the saloon,
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though one sack (Exhibit A) and afterwards in the hold,
aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the another sack (Exhibit B). The sack referred to as Exhibit
public order here established, because it causes such drug to A contained 49 cans of opium, and the other, Exhibit B,
produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously the larger sack, also contained several cans of the same
contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in substance. The hold, in which the sack mentioned in
enacting the aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as the Exhibit B was found, was under the defendant's
Attorney-General aptly observes: control, who moreover, freely and of his own will and
accord admitted that this sack, as well as the other
. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on referred to in Exhibit B and found in the cabin,
board a foreign vessel at anchor in the port of Manila belonged to him. The said defendant also stated, freely
in open defiance of the local authorities, who are and voluntarily, that he had bought these sacks of
impotent to lay hands on him, is simply subversive of opium, in Hongkong with the intention of selling them
public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that, as his
imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come hold had already been searched several times for
into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese opium, he ordered two other Chinamen to keep the
residents to smoke opium on board. sack. Exhibit A.

The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered It is to be taken into account that the two sacks of opium,
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in designated as Exhibits A and B, properly constitute the corpus
accordance with law, without special findings as to costs. So delicti. Moreover, another lot of four cans of opium, marked, as
ordered. Exhibit C, was the subject matter of investigation at the trial, and
with respect to which the chief of the department of the port of
G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910 Cebu testified that they were found in the part of the ship where
the firemen habitually sleep, and that they were delivered to the
first officer of the ship to be returned to the said firemen after
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
the vessel should have left the Philippines, because the firemen
vs.
and crew of foreign vessels, pursuant to the instructions he had
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.
from the Manila custom-house, were permitted to retain certain
amounts of opium, always provided it should not be taken
Thos. D. Aitken for appellant. shore.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
And, finally, another can of opium, marked "Exhibit D," is
ARELLANO, C. J.: also corpus delicti and important as evidence in this cause. With
regard to this the internal-revenue agent testified as follows:itc-
The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of alf
First Instance of Cebu, stated that he "carried, kept, possessed
and had in his possession and control, 96 kilogrammes of FISCAL. What is it?
 WITNESS. It is a can opium which was bought from The court sentenced the defendant to five years' imprisonment,
the defendant by a secret-service agent and taken to the to pay a fine of P10,000, with additional subsidiary
office of the governor to prove that the accused had imprisonment in case of insolvency, though not to exceed one
opium in his possession to sell. third of the principal penalty, and to the payment of the costs. It
further ordered the confiscation, in favor of the Insular
On motion by the defense, the court ruled that this answer might Government, of the exhibits presented in the case, and that, in
be stricken out "because it refers to a sale." But, with respect to the event of an appeal being taken or a bond given, or when the
this answer, the chief of the department of customs had already sentenced should have been served, the defendant be not
given this testimony, to wit: released from custody, but turned over to the customs
authorities for the purpose of the fulfillment of the existing laws
on immigration.
FISCAL. Who asked you to search the vessel?

From this judgment, the defendant appealed to this court.

WITNESS. The internal-revenue agent came to my
office and said that a party brought him a sample of
opium and that the same party knew that there was The appeal having been heard, together with the allegations
more opium on board the steamer, and the agent asked made therein by the parties, it is found: That, although the mere
that the vessel be searched. possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard
a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a
general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this
The defense moved that this testimony be rejected, on the
country, on account of such vessel being considered as an
ground of its being hearsay evidence, and the court only
extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply
ordered that the part thereof "that there was more opium, on
when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine
board the vessel" be stricken out.
Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the
vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation
The defense, to abbreviate proceedings, admitted that the of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation
receptacles mentioned as Exhibits A, B, and C, contained opium of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the
and were found on board the steamship Erroll, a vessel of crime, only the court established in that said place itself had
English nationality, and that it was true that the defendant competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an
stated that these sacks of opium were his and that he had them international treaty.
in his possession.
It is also found: That, even admitting that the quantity of the
According to the testimony of the internal-revenue agent, the drug seized, the subject matter of the present case, was
defendant stated to him, in the presence of the provincial fiscal, considerable, it does not appear that, on such account, the two
of a Chinese interpreter (who afterwards was not needed, penalties fixed by the law on the subject, should be imposed in
because the defendant spoke English), the warden of the jail, the maximum degree.
and four guards, that the opium seized in the vessel had been
bought by him in Hongkong, at three pesos for each round can
Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to
and five pesos for each one of the others, for the purpose of
six months and P1,000, respectively, we affirm in all other
selling it, as contraband, in Mexico and Puerto de Vera Cruz;
respects the judgment appealed from, with the costs of this
that on the 15th the vessel arrived at Cebu, and on the same day
instance against the appellant. So ordered.
he sold opium; that he had tried to sell opium for P16 a can; that
he had a contract to sell an amount of the value of about P500;
that the opium found in the room of the other two Chinamen G.R. No. L-13005 October 10, 1917
prosecuted in another cause, was his, and that he had left it in
their stateroom to avoid its being found in his room, which had THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
already been searched many times; and that, according to the vs.
defendant, the contents of the large sack was 80 cans of opium, AH SING, defendant-appellant.
and of the small one, 49, and the total number, 129.
Antonio Sanz for appellant.
It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
nationality, that it came from Hongkong, and that it was bound
for Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and Cebu. MALCOLM, J.:

The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
that the court had no jurisdiction to try the same and the facts of Cebu finding the defendant guilty of a violation of section 4
concerned therein did not constitute a crime. The fiscal, at the of Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law), and sentencing him to two
conclusion of his argument, asked that the maximum penalty of years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P300 or to suffer subsidiary
the law be imposed upon the defendant, in view of the imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
considerable amount of opium seized. The court ruled that it did
not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed The following facts are fully proven: The defendant is a subject
within its district, on the wharf of Cebu.
of China employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang.
The Shun Chang is a foreign steamer which arrived at the port of
Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from the port of The importation was complete, to say the least, when
Saigon. The defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, the ship carrying it anchored in Subic Bay. It was not
brought them on board the steamship Shun Chang, and had necessary that the opium discharged or that it be taken
them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. from the ship. It was sufficient that the opium was
When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on April 25, brought into the waters of the Philippine Islands on a
1917, the authorities on making a search found the eight cans of boat destined for a Philippine port and which
opium above mentioned hidden in the ashes below the boiler of subsequently anchored in a port of the Philippine
the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was the Islands with intent to discharge its cargo.
owner of this opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He
did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. Resolving whatever doubt was exist as to the authority of the
He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited views just quoted, we return to an examination of the applicable
drug into the Philippine Islands. No other evidence direct or provisions of the law. It is to be noted that section 4 of Act No.
indirect, to show that the intention of the accused was to import 2381 begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring
illegally this opium into the Philippine Islands, was introduced. any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands." "Import" and
"bring" are synonymous terms. The Federal Courts of the United
Has the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine States have held that the mere act of going into a port, without
Islands been proven? breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of importation.
(The Mary [U. S.], 16 Fed. Cas., 932, 933.) And again, the
Two decisions of this Court are cited in the judgment of the trial importation is not the making entry of goods at the custom
court, but with the intimation that there exists inconsistently house, but merely the bringing them into port; and the
between the doctrines laid down in the two cases. However, importation is complete before entry of the Custom House. (U.
neither decision is directly a precedent on the facts before us. S. vs. Lyman [U. S.], 26, Fed. Cas., 1024, 1028; Perots vs. U. S., 19
Fed. Cas., 258.) As applied to the Opium Law, we expressly hold
that any person unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited
In the case of United States vs. Look Chaw ([1910], 18 Phil., 573),
drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is
in the opinion handed down by the Chief Justice, it is found —
found under this person's control on a vessel which has come
direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdictional
That, although the mere possession of a thing of limits of the Philippine Islands. In such case, a person is guilty
prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in of illegal importation of the drug unless contrary circumstances
transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, exist or the defense proves otherwise. Applied to the facts
constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on herein, it would be absurb to think that the accused was merely
account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its carrying opium back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the
own nationality, the same rule does no apply when the mere pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be impossible to
article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine conceive that the accused needed so large an amount of opium
Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed for his personal use. No better explanation being possible, the
from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an logical deduction is that the defendant intended this opium to
open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to be brought into the Philippine Islands. We accordingly find that
which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the there was illegal importation of opium from a foreign country
place of the commission of the crime, only the court into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate any possible
established in the said place itself has competent misunderstanding, let it be said that these statements do not
jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an relate to foreign vessels in transit, a situation not present.
international treaty.1awphil.net
The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty
A marked difference between the facts in the Look Chaw case beyond a reasonable doubt as charged and the sentence of the
and the facts in the present instance is readily observable. In the trial court being within the limits provided by law, it results that
Look Chaw case, the charge case the illegal possession and sale the judgment must be affirmed with the costs of this instance
of opium — in the present case the charge as illegal importation against the appellant. So ordered.
of opium; in the Look Chaw case the foreign vessel was in transit
— in the present case the foreign vessel was not in transit; in the
January 11, 2018
Look Chaw case the opium was landed from the vessel upon
Philippine soil — in the present case of United States vs. Jose
([1916], 34 Phil., 840), the main point, and the one on which G.R. No. 212448
resolution turned, was that in a prosecution based on the illegal
importation of opium or other prohibited drug, the Government AAA, Petitioner
must prove, or offer evidence sufficient to raise a presumption, vs.
that the vessel from which the drug is discharged came into BBB, Respondent
Philippine waters from a foreign country with the drug on board.
In the Jose case, the defendants were acquitted because it was DECISION
not proved that the opium was imported from a foreign country;
in the present case there is no question but what the opium came
TIJAM, J.:
from Saigon to Cebu. However, in the opinion in the Jose case,
we find the following which may be obiter dicta, but which at
least is interesting as showing the view of the writer of the May Philippine courts exercise jurisdiction over an offense
opinion: constituting psychological violence under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9262,1 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against On November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for
Women and their Children Act of 2004, committed through the Accused With Omnibus Motion to Revive Case, Quash
marital infidelity, when the alleged illicit relationship occurred Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest
or is occurring outside the country? was filed on behalf of BBB. Granting the motion to quash on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction and thereby dismissing the case,
The above question is addressed to this Court in the present the trial court reasoned:
Petition2 for the issuance of a writ of certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, to nullify the Resolutions dated February 24, Here, while the Court maintains its 28 October 2011 ruling that
20143 and May 2, 20144 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of probable cause exists in this case and that [BBB] is probably
Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case No. 146468. The guilty of the crime charged, considering, however, his
assailed resolutions granted the motion to quash the subsequent clear showing that the acts complained of him had
Information5 which charged respondent BBB under Section 5(i) occurred in Singapore, dismissal of this case is proper since the
of R.A. No. 9262, committed as follows: Court enjoys no jurisdiction over the offense charged, it having
transpired outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
On or about April 19, 2011, in Pasig City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [BBB], being then legally xxxx
married to [AAA], caused herein [AAA] mental and emotional
anguish by having an illicit relationship with a certain Lisel Mok The Court is not convinced by .the prosecution's argument that
as confirmed by his photograph with his purported paramour since [AAA] has been suffering from mental and emotional
Lisel Mok and her children and the e-mailed letter by his mother anguish "wherever she goes'', jurisdiction over the offense
mentioning about the said relationship, to the damage and attaches to this Court notwithstanding that the acts resulting in
prejudice of [AAA], in violation of the aforecited law. said suffering had happened outside of the Philippines. To the
mind of the Court, with it noting that there is still as yet no
Contrary to law. jurisprudence on this score considering that Republic Act 9262 is
relatively a new law, the act itself which had caused a woman
We briefly recount the antecedents. to suffer mental or emotional anguish must have occurred
within the territorial limits of the Court for it to enjoy
jurisdiction over the offense. This amply explains the use of the
Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in
emphatic word "causing" in the provisions of Section 5(i),
Quezon City. Their union produced two children: CCC was
above, which denotes the bringing about or into existence of
born on March 4, 2007 and DDD on October 1, 2009. 6
something. Hence, the mental or emotional anguish suffered by
a woman must have been brought about or into existence by a
In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, criminal act which must logically have occurred within the
where he acquired permanent resident status in September of territorial limits of the Court for jurisdiction over the offense to
2008. This petition nonetheless indicates his address to be in attach to it. To rule otherwise would violate or render nugatory
Quezon City where his parents reside and where AAA also one of the basic characteristics of our criminal laws -
resided from the time they were married until March of 2010, territoriality.
when AAA and their children moved back to her parents' house
in Pasig City.7
In the listing provided in the law itself - "repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of
AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB minor children of (sic) access to the woman's child/children" -
sent little to no financial support, and only sporadically. This it becomes clear that there must be an act which causes the
allegedly compelled her to fly extra hours and take on "mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation",
additional jobs to augment her income as a flight attendant. and it is such act which partakes of a criminal nature. Here, such
There were also allegations of virtual abandonment, act was the alleged maintenance of "an illicit relationship with a
mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical and sexual certain Liesel Mok" - which has been conceded to have been
violence. To make matters worse, BBB supposedly started committed in Singapore.
having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok
with whom he allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things
Granting, without conceding, that the law presents ambiguities
came to a head on April 19, 2011 when AAA and BBB had a
as written, quashal of the Information must still be ordered
violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore during her visit
following the underlying fundamental principle that all doubts
with their kids.8 As can be gathered from the earlier cited
must be resolved in favor of [BBB]. At best, the Court draws the
Information, despite the claims of varied forms of abuses, the
attention of Congress to the arguments on jurisdiction spawned
investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB
by the law.12 (Emphasis in the original)
with causing AAA mental and emotional anguish through his
alleged marital infidelity.9
Aggrieved by the denial of the prosecution's motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the case, AAA sought direct
The Information having been filed, a warrant of arrest was
recourse to this Court via the instant petition on a pure question
issued against BBB. AAA was also able to secure a Hold-
of law. AAA posits that R.A. No. 9262 is in danger of becoming
Departure Order against BBB who continued to evade the
transmogrified into a weak, wobbly, and worthless law because
warrant of arrest. Consequently, the case was archived.10
with the court a quo's ruling, it is as if husbands of Filipino
women have been given license to enter into extra-marital
affairs without fear of any consequence, as long as they are In Morillo v. People of the Philippines, et al., where the Court
carried out abroad. In the main, AAA argues that mental and entertained a Rule 45 petition which raised only a question of
emotional anguish is an essential element of the offense charged law filed by the private offended party in the absence of the
against BBB, which is experienced by her wherever she goes, OSG's participation, we recalled the instances when the Court
and not only in Singapore where the extra-marital affair takes permitted an offended party to file an appeal without the
place; thus, the RTC of Pasig City where she resides can take intervention of the OSG. One such instance is when the interest
cognizance of the case. of substantial justice so requires.

In support of her theory, AAA draws attention to Section 7 of Morillo, also differentiated between dismissal and acquittal,
R.A. No. 9262, which provides: thus:

Sec. 7. Venue - The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is
Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendant's
of violence against women and their children under this law. In guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not
the absence of such court in the place where the offense was decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty.
committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is
where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not
option of the complainant. (Emphasis ours) show that the offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not
As to the ambiguity in the law hypothetically referred to in the valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc. The only case in
assailed order, AAA directs us to: which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used,
instead of the proper term acquittal, is when, after the
prosecution has presented all its evidence, the defendant moves
Section 4. Construction.- This Act shall be liberally construed to
for the dismissal and the court dismisses the case on the ground
promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against
that the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that
women and their children.
the defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality
an acquittal because the case is decided on the merits. If the
In his Comment filed on January 20, 2015, BBB contends that the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within
grant of the motion to quash is in effect an acquittal; that only the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed,
the civil aspect of a criminal case may be appealed by the private the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the
offended party; and. that this petition should be dismissed defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court of
outright for having been brought before this Court by AAA competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the
instead of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as counsel defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before
for the People in appellate proceedings. BBB furthermore avers a court of competent jurisdiction.20(Citation omitted and
that the petition was belatedly filed. emphasis in the original)

We tackle first the threshold issue of whether or not this Court The grant of BBB's motion to quash may not therefore be viewed
should entertain the petition. as an acquittal, which in limited instances may only be
repudiated by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 upon
It must be stated beforehand that BBB is plainly mistaken in showing grave abuse of discretion lest the accused would be
asserting that the instant petition was belatedly filed. The date twice placed in jeopardy.21
erroneously perceived by BBB as the date of AAA's Motion for
Extension14 was filed - June 2, 2014 - refers to the date of receipt Indubitably, "the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from
by the Division Clerk of Court and not the date when the said filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only questions
motion was lodged before this Comi. The motion was in fact of law are raised or involved."22 "There is a question of law when
filed on May 27, 2014, well within the period that AAA had the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value
under the Rules of Court to file the intended petition. Thus, of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts
considering the timeliness of the motion, this Comi in a being admitted, and the doubt concerns the c01Tect application
Resolution15 dated June 9, 2014, granted AAA an additional of law and jurisprudence on the matter."23
period of thirty (30) days or until June 26, 2014 to file a petition
for review.
Further, the question of whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction
in view of the peculiar provisions of R.A. No. 9262 is a question
In AAA's motion for extension of time, it was mentioned that of law. Thus, in Morillo,24 the Court reiterated that:
she was awaiting the OSG's response to her Letter 16dated May
26, 2014 requesting for representation. Since, the OSG was
[T]he jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of
unresponsive to her plea for assistance in filing the intended
the complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at
petition, AAA filed the present petition in her own name before
the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the
the lapse of the extension given her by this Court or on June 25,
penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its
2014.
commission. Thus, when a case involves a proper interpretation
of the rules and jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction of
We find that under the circumstances, the ends of substantial courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a
justice will be better served by entertaining the petition if only
to resolve the question of law lodged before this Court.
question of law that can be properly brought to this Court under A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or
Rule 45.25 (Citations omitted) physical harm;

We are not called upon in this case to determine the truth or B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature,
falsity of the charge against BBB, much less weigh the evidence, committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not
especially as the case had not even proceeded to a full-blown limited to:
trial on the merits. The issue for resolution concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of xxxx
circumstances, i.e., whether or not Philippine courts are
deprived of territorial jurisdiction over a criminal charge of
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or
psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 when committed
likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such
through marital infidelity and the alleged illicit relationship
as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage
took place outside the Philippines.
to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal
abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the
The novelty of the issue was even recognized by the RTC when victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of
it opined that there is still as yet no jurisprudence on this score, a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to
prompting it to quash the Information even as it maintained its witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury
earlier October 28, 2011 ruling that probable cause exists in the to pets or to unlawful or .unwanted deprivation of the right to
case.26 Calling the attention of Congress to the arguments on custody and/or visitation of common children.
jurisdiction spawned by the law,27 the RTC furnished copies of
the assailed order to the House of Representatives and the
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make
Philippine Senate through the Committee on Youth, Women
a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not
and Public Relations, as well as the Committee on Justice and
limited to the following:
Human Rights.28

xxxx
The issue acquires special significance when viewed against the
present economic reality that a great number of Filipino families
have at least one parent working overseas. In. April to As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined
September 2016, the number of overseas Filipino workers who by the allegations in the complaint or information, threshing out
worked abroad was estimated at 2.2 million, 97.5 percent of the essential elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No.
which were comprised of overseas contract workers or those 9262 is crucial. In Dinamling v. People,31 this Court already had
with existing work contract while 2.5 percent worked overseas occasion to enumerate the elements of psychological violence
without contract.29 It is thus necessary to clarify how R.A. No. under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, as follows:
9262 should be applied in a question of territorial jurisdiction
over a case of psychological abuse brought against the husband Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The
when such is allegedly caused by marital infidelity carried on crime of violence against women and their children is
abroad. committed through any of the following acts:

Ruling of the Court xxxx

There is merit in the petition. (i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
"Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of
Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic financial support or custody of minor children or access to the
isolation of women, is also common."30 In this regard, Section 3 woman's child/children.
of R.A. No. 9262 made it a point to encompass in a non-limiting
manner the various forms of violence that may be committed From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of
against women and their children: R[.]A[.] No. 9262, the elements of the crime are derived as
follows:
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, (a) "Violence
against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of (1) The offended paiiy is a woma.J.1 and/or her
acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, child or children;
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a (2) The woman is either the wife or former
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or wife of the offender, or is a woman with
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in whom the offender has or had a sexual or
or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or dating relationship, or is a woman with
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, whom such offender has a common child. As
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of for the woman's child or children, they may
liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts: be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within
or without the family abode;
 (3) The offender causes on the woman and/or of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial
child mental or emotional anguish; and shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the
court should dismiss the action for want of
(4) The anguish is caused through acts of jurisdiction.34 (Emphasis in the original)
public ridicule or humiliation, repeated
verbal and emotional abuse, denial of In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to
financial support or custody of minor jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7
children or access to the children or similar· provides that the case may be filed where the crime or any of its
such acts or omissions. elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
Which the psychological violence as the means employed by the
xxxx perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the offense,
equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional
anguish which is personal to the complainant. The resulting
It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of
mental or emotional anguish is analogous to the indispensable
psychological violence that are inflicted on victims who are
element of damage in a prosecution for estafa, viz:
women and children. Other forms of psychological violence, as
well as physical, sexual and economic violence, are addressed
and penalized in other subparts of Section 5. The circumstance that the deceitful manipulations or false
pretenses employed by the accused, as shown in the vouchers,
might have been perpetrated in Quezon City does not preclude
xxxx
the institution of the criminal action in Mandaluyong where the
damage was consummated. Deceit and damage are the basic
Psychological violence is an. element of violation of Section 5(i) elements of estafa. The estafa involved in this case appears to be
just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim. a transitory or continuing offense. It could be filed either in
Psychological violence is the means employed by the Quezon City or in Rizal. The theory is that a person charged
perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect with a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where
caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To the offense is in part committed. In transitory or continuing
establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is offenses in which some acts material and essential to the crime
necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and
enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish some in another, the court of either province has jurisdiction to
mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the try the case, it being understood that the first court taking
testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this cognizance of the case will exclude the others x x x[.]35
party. x x x.32 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the
Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 law contemplates that acts of violence against women and their
criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but the children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes;
psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and
the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or
said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital
infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by
territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court
which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover,
wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been
depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad
committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being
of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same
causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife. Thus, the
excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or
mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and
transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or
distinct element in the commission of the offense.
territory where the offense was in part committed.36

In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Trenas v.

It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when
People,33 the Court explained that:
the abusive conduct or act of violence under Section 5(i) of R.A.
No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was
The place where the crime was committed determines not only committed outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a
the venue of the action but is an essential element of resident of the place where the complaint is filed in view of the
jurisdiction.1âwphi1 It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In the
to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent
have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients husband are residents of Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence,
should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.
court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the
Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under
offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it
the information relates to BBB's marital infidelity must be
cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging
allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
the husband, and to establish the same beyond reasonable doubt
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
for purposes of conviction. It likewise remains imperative to
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.
acquire jurisdiction over the husband. What this case concerns
And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance
itself is simply whether or not a complaint for psychological
abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may even be filed within the
Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say
that even if the alleged extra-marital affair causing the offended
wife mental and emotional anguish is committed abroad, the
same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262
absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition

is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated February 24, 2014 and
May 2, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
158, in Criminal Case No. 146468 are SET ASIDE.Accordingly,
the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 146468 is
ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 3086 February 23, 1988 Franc, Australian Dollar, Singapore Dollar, HFL Guilder, French
Franc, U.S. Dollar, English Pound, Malaysian Dollar, Deutsche
ALEXANDER PADILLA, complainant, Mark, Canadian Dollar and Hongkong Dollar, without any
vs. authority as provided by law. At the time the accused was
THE HON. BALTAZAR R. DIZON, Presiding Judge of the apprehended, he was able to exhibit two currency declarations
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City Branch 113, respondent. which he was supposed to have accomplished upon his arrival
in Manila in previous trips, namely, CB Currency Declaration
No. 05048, dated May 4, 1986 for US$39,600.00 and Japanese Yen
RESOLUTION
4,000,000.00, and CB Currency Declaration No. 06346, dated
June 29, 1986 for Japanese Yen 6,600,000.00.
PER CURIAM:

An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai, with the RTC of

This is an administrative complaint, dated August 6, 1987, filed Pasay City for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960,
by the then Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, as follows:
against respondent Baltazar R. Dizon, RTC Judge, Branch 115,
Pasay City, for rendering a manifestly erroneous decision due,
at the very least, to gross incompetence and gross ignorance of That on or about the 9th day of July, 1986, in
the law, in Criminal Case No. 86- 10126-P, entitled "People of the the City of Pasay, Metro Manila, Philippines
Philippines vs. Lo Chi Fai", acquitting said accused of the offense and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
charged, i.e., smuggling of foreign currency out of the country. Court, the above-named accused, Mr. LO CHI
FAI, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attempt to take out of the
Required by the Court to answer the complaint, the respondent Philippines through the Manila International
judge filed an Answer, dated October 6, 1987, reciting his Airport the following foreign currencies in
"commendable record as a fearless prosecutor" since his cash and in checks:
appointment as Assistant City Fiscal of Manila on December 4,
1962, until his appointment eventu
Japanese Yen Y 32,800,000.00
ally as RTC Judge on February 18, 1983; that at in the
reorganization of the judiciary after the February 26, 1986 Swiss Franc SW. FR 6,9000.00
revolution, he was reappointed to his present position; that his
length of service as prosecutor and judge is "tangible proof that Australian Dollar A$ 17,425.00
would negate the allegations of the petitioner" (should be
complainant), whereas the latter did not last long in the service Singapore Dollar S$ 9,945.00
for reasons only known to him; that the decision involved in the
Deutsche Marck DM 18,595.00
complaint was promulgated by respondent on September 29,
1986, but the complaint against him was filed only on August 6,
Canadian Dollar CS 13,330.00
1987, a clear indication of malice and ill-will of the complainant
to subject respondent to harassment, humiliation and
Hongkong Dollar HK$ 15,630.00
vindictiveness; that his decision, of which he submits a copy
(Annex A) as part of his Answer, is based on "fundamental
HFL Guilder HFL 430.00
principles and the foundation of rights and justice" and that if
there are mistakes or errors in the questioned decision, they are French Franc F/6,860.00
committed in good faith. Accordingly, respondent prays for the
dismissal of the petition (should be complaint). US Dollar US$ 73,950.00

The issue before the Court is whether or not the respondent English Pound 5,318.00
judge is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the
law in rendering the decision in question. A judge can not be Malaysian Dollar M$. 14,760.00
held to account or answer, criminally, civilly or
administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by him in (in checks)
good faith.
Australian Dollar A$ 7,750.00
The case in which the respondent rendered a decision of
British Pound 700.00
acquittal involved a tourist, Lo Chi Fai, who was caught by a
Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while
US Dollar US$ 17,630.00
attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange
instruments out of the country. Lo Chi Fai, was apprehended by Canadian Dollar C$ 990.00
a customs guard and two PAFSECOM officers on July 9, 1986,
while on board Flight PR 300 of the Philippine Air Lines bound
for Hongkong. At the time of his apprehension, he was found without authority from the
carrying with him foreign currency and foreign exchange Central Bank.
instruments (380 pieces) amounting to US$ 355,349.57, in
various currency denominations, to wit: Japanese Yen, Swiss Contrary to Law.
The case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 86-10126-P, get a confirmation as to the source of the money, for which
was subsequently raffled to Branch 113, presided by herein reason he contacted his bank in Hongkong and a telex was sent
respondent Judge Baltazar A. Dizon. to him on April 3,1986 (Exh. 4). He also brought in with him
US$39,000.00 and 4,000,000.00 Japanese Yen when he arrived on
Section 6 of Circular No. 960 of the Central Bank provides as May 4,1986 which he declared (Exh. 1). Again, he declared
follows: 8,600,000.00 Japanese Yen when he arrived on June 28, 1986
(Exh. 2). He also testified that his business associates, as per their
agreement to invest in some business with him in the
Sec. 6. Export, import of foreign exchange;
Philippines, started putting their money for this purpose in a
exceptions. — No person shall take out or
common fund, hence, every time anyone of them came to the
transmit or attempt to take out or transmit
Philippines, they would declare the money they were bringing
foreign exchange in any form, out of the
in, and all declarations were handed to and kept by him; these
Philippines directly, through other persons,
currency declarations were presented at the trial as exhibits for
through the mails or through international
the defense. When asked by the court why he did not present all
carriers except when specifically authorized
of these declarations when he was apprehended at the airport,
by the Central Bank or allowed under existing
his answer was that he was not asked to present the declaration
international agreements or Central Bank
papers of his associates, and besides, he does not understand
regulations.
English and he was not told to do so. He also testified on cross-
examination that the reason he was going back to Hongkong
Tourists and non-resident visitors may take bringing with him all the money intended to be invested in the
out or send out from the Philippine foreign Philippines was because of the fear of his group that the
exchange in amounts not exceeding such "revolution" taking place in Manila might become widespread.
amounts of foreign exchange brought in by It was because of this fear that he was urged by his associates to
them. For purposes of establishing the come to Manila on July 8, 1986 to bring the money out of the
amount of foreign exchange brought in or out Philippines.
of the Philippines, tourists and non-resident
temporary visitors bringing with them more
The respondent judge, in his decision acquitting the accused,
than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other
stated:
foreign currencies shall declare their foreign
exchange in the form prescribed by the
Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival The factual issue for this Court to determine
in the Philippines. is whether or not the accused wilfully
violated Section 6 of Circular No. 960. The fact
that the accused had in his possession the
The penal sanction is provided by Section 1, P.D. No. 1883,
foreign currencies when he was about to
which reads as follows:
depart from the Philippines did not by that
act alone make him liable for Violation of
Section 1. Blackmarketing of Foreign Section 6.
Exchange .— That any person who shall
engage in the trading or purchase and sale of
What is imperative is the purpose for which
foreign currency in violation of existing laws
the act of bringing foreign currencies out of
or rules and regulations of the Central Bank
the country was done the very intention. It is
shall be guilty of the crime of blackmarketing
that which qualifies the act as criminal or not.
of foreign exchange and shall suffer the
There must be that clear intention to violate
penalty of reclusion temporal, (minimum of 12
and benefit from the act done. Intent is a
years and I day and maximum of 20 years)
mental state, the existence of which is shown
and a fine of no less than fifty thousand
by overt acts of a person.
(P50,000.00) Pesos.

The respondent proceeded to analyze the evidence which,

At the trial, the accused tried to establish that he was a
according to him, tended to show that the accused had no
businessman from Kowloon, Hongkong, engaged in the
wilfull intention to violate the law. According to the respondent
garment business, in which he had invested 4 to 5 million
in his decision:
Hongkong Dollars; that he had come to the Philippines 9 to 1 0
times, although the only dates he could remember were April 2,
1986, May 4, 1986, June 28,1986, and July 8, 1986; that the reason ... this Court is persuaded to accept the
for his coming to the Philippines was to invest in business in the explanation of the defense that the currencies
Philippines and also to play in the casino; that he had a group of confiscated and/or seized from the accused
business associates who decided to invest in business with him, belong to him and his business associates
namely: Wakita Noboyuki, Kobayashi Nabuo, Lee Shiang Pin, abovenamed. And from the unwavering and
Lee Chin and Cze Kai Kwan, who had their own businesses in unequivocal testimonies of Mr. Templo and
Japan and Hongkong; that when he came to the Philippines on all of currencies in question came from
April 2,1986, he brought US$50,000.00 and 8,500,000.00 Japanese abroad and not from the local source which is
Yen which he tried to declare but the Central Bank what is being prohibited by the government.
representative refused to accept his declaration, until he could Yes, simply reading the provisions of said
circular will, readily show that the currency
 declaration is required for the purpose of as he and his alleged business associates were afraid that the
establishing the amount of currency being "attempted revolution" which occurred on July 6,1986 might
brought by tourist or temporary non-resident spread. Such fantastic tale, although totally irrelevant to the
visitors into the country. The currency matter of the criminal liability of the accused under the
declarations, therefore, is already (sic) information, was swallowed by the respondent-judge "hook,
intended to serve as a guideline for the line and sinker." It did not matter to the respondent that the
Customs authorities to determine the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments found in the
amounts actually brought in by them to possession of the accused when he was apprehended at the
correspond to the amounts that could be airport-380 pieces in all-and the amounts of such foreign
allowed to be taken out. Indeed, this Court is exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency
amazed and really has its misgivings in the declarations presented by the accused at the trial. It did not
manner currency declarations were made as matter to the respondent that the accused by his own story
testified to by the Central Bank employees. admitted, in effect, that he was a carrier" of foreign currency for
Why the Bureau of Customs representative other people. The respondent closed his eyes to the fact that the
never took part in all these declarations very substantial amounts of foreign exchange found in the
testified to by no less than five (5) Central possession of the accused at the time of his apprehension
Bank employees? Seemingly, these consisted of personal checks of other people, as well as cash in
employees are the favorites of these various currency denominations (12 kinds of currency in all),
travellers. It is the hope of this Court that the which clearly belied the claim of the accused that they were part
authorities must do something to remedy the of the funds which he and his supposed associates had brought
evident flaw in the system for effective in and kept in the Philippines for the purpose of investing in
implementation of the questioned Central some business ventures. The respondent ignored the fact that
Bank Circular No. 960. most of the CB Currency declarations presented by the defense
at the trial were declarations belonging to other people which
But even with a doubtful mind this Court could not be utilized by the accused to justify his having the
would not be able to pin criminal foreign exchange in his possession. Although contrary to
responsibility on the accused. This is due to ordinary human experience and behavior, the respondent judge
its steadfast adherence and devotion to the chose to give credence to the fantastic tale of the accused that he
rule of law-a factor in restoring the almost lost and his alleged business associates had brought in from time to
faith and erosion of confidence of the people time and accumulated and kept in the Philippines foreign
in the administration of justice. Courts of exchange (of very substantial amounts in cash and checks in
Justice are guided only by the rule of various foreign currency denominations) for the purpose of
evidence. investing in business even before they knew and had come to an
agreement as to the specific business venture in which they were
going to invest. These and other circumstances which make the
The respondent-judge has shown gross incompetence or gross
story concocted by the accused so palpably unbelievable as to
ignorance of the law in holding that to convict the accused for
render the findings of the respondent judge obviously contrived
violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution must
to favor the acquittal of the accused, thereby clearly negating his
establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the
claim that he rendered the decision "in good faith." His
law. The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or
actuations in this case amount to grave misconduct prejudicial
deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses punished
to the interest of sound and fair administration of justice.
by special laws, which are mala prohibita. In requiring proof of
malice, the respondent has by his gross ignorance allowed the
accused to go scot free. The accused at the time of his He not only acquitted the accused Lo Chi Fai, but directed in his
apprehension at the Manila International Airport had in his decision the release to the accused of at least the amount of
possession the amount of US$355,349.57 in assorted foreign US$3,000.00, allowed, according to respondent, under Central
currencies and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces), Bank Circular No. 960. This, in spite of the fact that forfeiture
without any specific authority from the Central Bank as proceedings had already been instituted by the Bureau of
required by law. At the time of his apprehension, he was able to Customs over the currency listed in the information, which
exhibit only two foreign currency declarations in his possession. according to the respondent should be respected since the
These were old declarations made by him on the occasion of his Bureau of Customs "has the exclusive jurisdiction in the matter
previous trips to the Philippines. of seizure and forfeiture of the property involved in the alleged
infringements of the aforesaid Central Bank Circular." In
invoking the provisions of CB Circular No. 960 to justify the
Although lack of malice or wilfull intent is not a valid defense
release of US$ 3,000.00 to the accused, the respondent judge
in a case for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the
again displayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the
respondent nonetheless chose to exonerate the accused based on
law. There is nothing in the said CB Circular which could be
his defense that the foreign currency he was bringing out of the
taken as authority for the trial court to release the said amount
country at the time he was apprehended by the customs
of U.S. Currency to the accused. According to the above-cited
authorities were brought into the Philippines by him and his
CB Circular, tourists may take out or send out from the
alleged business associates on several previous occasions when
Philippines foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such
they came to the Philippines, supposedly to be used for the
amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them; for the
purpose of investing in some unspecified or undetermined
purpose of establishing such amount, tourists or non-resident
business ventures; that this money was kept in the Philippines
temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00
and he precisely came to the Philippines to take the money out
or its equivalent in other foreign currencies must declare their
foreign exchange at points of entries upon arrival in the
Philippines. In other words, CB Circular No. 960 merely
provides that for the purpose of establishing the amount of
foreign currency brought in or out of the Philippines, a tourist
upon arrival is required to declare any foreign exchange he is
bringing in at the time of his arrival, if the same exceeds the
amount of US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign
currencies. There is nothing in said circular that would justify
returning to him the amount of at least US$3,000.00, if he is
caught attempting to bring out foreign exchange in excess of
said amount without specific authority from the Central Bank.

Accordingly, the Court finds the respondent Regional Trial

Court Judge, Baltazar R. Dizon, guilty of gross incompetence,
gross ignorance of the law and grave and serious misconduct
affecting his integrity and efficiency, and consistent with the
responsibility of this Court for the just and proper
administration of justice and for the attainment of the objective
of maintaining the people's faith in the judiciary (People vs.
Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712), it is hereby ordered that the
Respondent Judge be DISMISSED from the service. All leave
and retirement benefits and privileges to which he may be
entitled are hereby forfeited with prejudice to his being
reinstated in any branch of government service, including
government-owned and/or controlled agencies or corporations.

This resolution is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943 fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was
not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The
vs. Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO scene and when he asked as to who killed the deceased. Galanta,
GALANTA, defendants-appellants. referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The
corpse was thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and
upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta. wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney Torres for on Tecson's body which caused his death.
appellee.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully
MORAN, J.: supported by the evidence, particularly by the testimony of
Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different version
of the tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta, when he and
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the
chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked
accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police
Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and
of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary,
upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo
respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by the lower
Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room.
court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were
Oanis went to the room thus indicated and upon opening the
sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year
curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand
and six months to two years and two months of prison
up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as
correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of
the former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him.
the deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed
Wounded, Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded
separately from this judgment.
and shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.

In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo

On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the
Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan,
curtain covering the door and after having said, "if you are
Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the
Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the
following tenor: "Information received escaped convict
supposed Balagtas, while the latter was still lying on bed, and
Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get
continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was
him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his
only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing
first sergeant and asked that he be given four men. Defendant
the supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and
corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo,
picking up something from the floor, he fired at him.
Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant,
reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they
were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and a The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their
newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were testimonies are certainly incredible not only because they are
instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime,
instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction was but also because they are materially contradictory. Oasis
given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently
Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked watching somebody in an attitudes of picking up something
whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta testified that Oasis
knew one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit up in bed
Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate some of immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified
his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining that he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter
Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot
volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent from these
divided the party into two groups with defendants Oanis and contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to
Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at once belied by
leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living. When the other; but their mutual incriminating averments dovetail
this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one with and corroborate substantially, the testimony of Irene
Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks, and Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to Requinea,
asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by
and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is confirmed by both
her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations.
own room which was very near that occupied by Irene and her According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was
paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room still in bed about to sit up just after he was awakened by a noise.
of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter
door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering that
him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the the trial court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on
gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and the stand, we believe and so hold that no error was committed
looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the in accepting her testimony and in rejecting the exculpatory
defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene pretensions of the two appellants. Furthermore, a careful
examination of Irene's testimony will show not only that her Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using
version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the
indicia of veracity. In her cross-examination, even misleading offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture
questions had been put which were unsuccessful, the witness him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm
having stuck to the truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using
these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in
disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial court. resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected
otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force
sleeping in his room with his back towards the door, Oanis and shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall
Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his
believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but without having made detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot
previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary
question is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753;
responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is contended U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo
that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from
performance of their official duties, both of them believing that justice and a menace to the peace of the community, but these
Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability. Sustaining facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in
this theory in part, the lower court held and so declared them effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance
guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the
We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances principle laid down, although upon different facts, in
of the case, the crime committed by appellants is murder U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
through specially mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned
below. It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be
taken by storm" without regard to his right to life which he has
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this
mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, standard of official conduct where the criminal offers resistance
15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this or does something which places his captors in danger of
applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the
carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a
having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law.
the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but received no Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness
answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of
his bed and called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the
you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no
had been placed against the door and believing that he was then circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in
being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally the mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation — not
wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A condonation — should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a
common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.
man who was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road
held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal
demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend under negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In
the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and property unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the
instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia
without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna
no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being de dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho
pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la
but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como
justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado,
the accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate
whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the
person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232;
and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is
themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim
reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was cannot be considered as reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona,
unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.
legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the
victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is
Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is,
only if resistance or aggression is offered by him. however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the
incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5,
of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a
person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment
of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are
two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a
justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of
a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury
or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or
office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present —
appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second
requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is not the
necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their
duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if
resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But
through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no
chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by
killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without
any resistance from him and without making any previous
inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.

For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants

are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating
circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision
correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the
accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased
Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000,
with costs.
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910 the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it
afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately
vs. wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant. immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that
Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in
the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long

CARSON, J.:
prior to the date of the incident just described, one of which took
place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook;
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated
case is limited to the testimony of the accused himself, because robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal
from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances protection.
surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no
other evidence as to these facts was available either to the
prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who
the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the appear to have on friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal
evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there incident, had an understanding that when either returned at
can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion
material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening
substantially correct: and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and
Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28,
the nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at
quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A
same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a few moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano
house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found
house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the
August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called
No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid
occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of the wounded man.
of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side
of the building, by which communication was had with the
other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his
growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that
room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their
sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook
or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of
reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the
by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a
window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate,
the door and window, there were no other openings of any kind and sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the room,
in the room. refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make
Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the
defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was
awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from the effects
He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard of the wound on the following day.
no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it
was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination,
into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide,
of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and
that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that
moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he
chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he
and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in
inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is
probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room
by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow,
 The following are not delinquent and are therefore negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1
exempt from criminal liability: of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act
xxx xxx xxx committed by him, even though it be different from that which
he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and
cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited;
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights,
Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met.,
provided there are the following attendant
596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213;
circumstances:
Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)

(1) Illegal aggression.

The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion,
and the only question worthy of consideration is whether malice
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the
prevent or repel it. crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized
in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions there
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the given of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein
person defending himself. defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts
constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held
defendant would be entitle to complete exception from criminal criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the
liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described
intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability
a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the
be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that
the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in the
having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in
thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring
kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the
questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the
with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some
despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein
justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the
such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from
the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow. acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by
one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the
act committed is different from that which he intended to
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a
commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are
thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his property
more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in
nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at
degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference
the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such
whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and
"unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as
within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal
defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that
intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again,
there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend
"There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great
his person or his property or the property under his charge.
harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them may very
well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since,
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do
jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and since this
reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is
would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime
supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the
homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C.
of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done,
question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same
under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.
always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due
to negligence or bad faith.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and
or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent
ommissions punished by law.
which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense
charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in
crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an Acts and omissions punished by law are always
acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall
a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal appear.
 An person voluntarily committing a crime or to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial
misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even court.
though the wrongful act committed be different from
that which he had intended to commit. That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or
malice to be an essential element of the various crimes and
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an
of the word "voluntary" as used in this article, say that a examination of the provisions of article 568, which are as
voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly follows:
asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal
intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" He who shall execute through reckless negligence an
implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were act that, if done with malice, would constitute a grave
expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto
of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in
insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave
implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo crime.
Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit crime through simple imprudence or negligence shall
the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be maximum degrees.
done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence
or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his
In the application of these penalties the courts shall
discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in
proceed according to their discretion, without being
general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1,
subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted
upon by Viada are more apparent than real.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if
the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or less
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in
which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, in the degree which they may consider proper.
which declared that where there is no intention there
is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially
mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if
equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct
there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere
inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts
of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal
contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent),
Law, folio 169.)
negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal
liability on the actor.
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme
court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code
which it made use of the following language:
would seem to approximate in meaning the word "willful" as
used in English and American statute to designate a form of
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful"
crime, involve all the malice which is supposed from sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly,
the operation of the will and an intent to cause the yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and
injury which may be the object of the crime. approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is,
it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation,
"considering that, whatever may be the civil effects of the "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable
inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said
registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime that ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but
because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and
intention, which characterizes every action or ommission the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious,"
punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence." "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words indicating
intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not
made use of the following language: often being understood to require general malevolence toward
a particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from our
legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime,
and 429, and cases cited.)
that is, intent or malice or their absence in the
commission of an act defined and punished by law as
criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out
a condition in the definition of a crime that it be committed
"voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the
aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines,
construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning because first in nature from which the law itself
from general principles it will always be found that with the rare proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal
exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal
intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
position with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus
forcely present this doctrine: Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an
apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract justice result
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non
more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which
controversies between private parties the quo justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and
animo with which a thing was done is sometimes compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts
important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a
criminal mind. So that — limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their
commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer.
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is
mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence of sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that
wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of
in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is
sentiment would any people in any age allow that a clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed
man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule
It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to
probably it is of every other, that the essence of an be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that
offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil
exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by — purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is
simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's
New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law,
equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It
consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt
make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of
me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia
against my will is not my act;" and others of the like facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases
sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max.,
from civil. So also — 2d ed., 190.)

Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every
"By reference to the intention, we inculpate or crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to
exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily
the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there
result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron
simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the
ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den.
mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342;
of excitement, when vengeance takes the place of Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625;
justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209;
But with the return of reason comes the public voice Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to
that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or
his neighbors does not offend. And — negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the
circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the
mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the
circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his
nature given by God to man, no one deems another to
mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which
deserve punishment for what he did from an upright
he acted.
mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a
person is made to suffer a punishment which the
community deems not his due, so far from its placing If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one
an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts
martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely
want of bad intent in justification of what has the in accord with the principles on which the rule is
appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that founded, if without fault or carelessness he does
the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as believe them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide;
good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an
 innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that
other words, and with reference to the right of self- a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant,
defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a
the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in doctrine which would entirely take away the essential
adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the
apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self- jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to
defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension,
appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle.
misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the
law will not punish him though they are in truth To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of
otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here set out in full
extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at
305, and large array of cases there cited.) bar.

The common illustration in the American and English textbooks QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was
of the application of this rule is the case where a man, masked sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only of his
and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds wife, without other light than reflected from the fire,
up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol and that the man with his back to the door was
demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person
the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or
leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder,
in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will because of which he turned, seized the person and took
doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been
be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and struck, and gave the unknown person a blow,
wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him
real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying
undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the
Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he
facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity,
and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of and who died in about six days in consequence of
the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The
overcomes at the same time the presumption established in accused, who confessed the facts, had always
article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law,
"voluntarily." whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating
great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said: free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in
self-defense, with all the circumstances related in
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal
believing that the person slain had a felonious design branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was
against him, and under that supposition killed him, an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation,
although it should afterwards appear that there was no and that there did not exists rational necessity for the
such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either employment of the force used, and in accordance with
manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him
degree of caution used and the probable grounds of to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory
such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was
case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, acquitted by the supreme court, under the following
p.7.) sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the
sentence to have been proven, that the accused was
surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the
wife who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck,
doctrine as follows:
and beaten, without being able to distinguish with
which they might have executed their criminal intent,
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing because of the there was no other than fire light in the
rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms and a room, and considering that in such a situation and
pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against when the acts executed demonstrated that they might
his life as he advances. Having approached near endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife
enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his and child, more especially because his assailant was
hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant unknown, he should have defended himself, and in
the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It doing so with the same stick with which he was
turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense,
that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any nor did he use means which were not rationally
reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he necessary, particularly because the instrument with
would have been if there had been a bullet in the
which he killed was the one which he took from his exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that
assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and
the darkness of the house and the consteration which condemned the accused to twelve months of prision
naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal,
not given him to known or distinguish whether there the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding
was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who
might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening
considering that the lower court did not find from the robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-
accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence
the means employed, and that it did not apply of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc."
(Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28, A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar
1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) . convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow
alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from
house, which was situated in a retired part of the city, whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of
upon arriving at a point where there was no light, his property and of the property committed to his charge; that
heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented
saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith,
which, and almost at the same money, he fired two without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing
shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that
voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been
different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and
hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or
upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to
God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from
the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person
observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from and his property and the property under his charge.
the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from
responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the
acted in just self-defense under the circumstances trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of
defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond
criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the
requisites of said article, but not that of the
reasonableness of the means employed to repel the
attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight
years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme
court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this
sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a
justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the
identity of the person calling to him, and that under the
circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the
means employed were rational and the shooting
justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.)
(Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)

QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a

remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone
thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head
out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is
answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise
his house would be burned" — because of which, and
observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four
individuals, one of whom addressed him with
blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on
the next morning was found dead on the same spot.
Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal
responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with
all of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the
requisites of law? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in
favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to
G.R. No. L-16486 March 22, 1921 that it might come to the surface and could thus be recovered.
Though his friendly vigil lasted three days nothing came of it.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appelle,
vs. It may be added that Venancio has not returned to his lodging
CALIXTO VALDEZ Y QUIRI, defendant-appellant. in Manila, where he lived as a bachelor in the house of an
acquaintance; and his personal belongings have been delivered
Angel Roco for appellant. to a representative of his mother who lives in the Province of
Acting Attorney-General Feria for appellee. Iloilo. His friends and relatives, it is needless to say, take it for
granted that he is dead.
STREET, J.:
The circumstances narrated above are such in our opinion as to
The rather singular circumstances attending the commission of exclude all reasonable possibility that Venancio Gargantel may
the offense of homicide which is under discussion in the present have survived; and we think that the trial judge did not err in
appeal are these: holding that he is dead and that he came to his death by
drowning under the circumstances stated. The proof is direct
that he never rose to the surface after jumping into the river, so
At about noon, on November 29, 1919, while the interisland far as the observers could see; and this circumstance, coupled
steamer Vigan was anchored in the Pasig River a short distance with the known fact that human life must inevitably be
from the lighthouse and not far from where the river debouches extinguished by asphyxiation under water, is conclusive of his
into the Manila Bay, a small boat was sent out to raise the death. The possibility that he might have swum ashore, after
anchor. The crew of this boat consisted of the accused, Calixto rising in a spot hidden from the view of his companions, we
Valdez y Quiri, and six others among whom was the deceased, consider too remote to be entertained for a moment.
Venancio Gargantel. The accused was in charge of the men and
stood at the stern of the boat, acting as helmsman, while
Venancio Gargantel was at the bow. As to the criminal responsibility of the accused for the death
thus occasioned the likewise can be no doubt; for it is obvious
that the deceased, in throwing himself in the river, acted solely
The work raising the anchor seems to have proceeded too in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation and was in no
slowly to satisfy the accused, and he accordingly began to abuse sense legally responsible for his own death. As to him it was but
the men with offensive epithets. Upon this Venancio Gargantel the exercise of a choice between two evils, and any reasonable
remonstrated, saying that it would be better, and they would person under the same circumstances might have done the
work better, if he would not insult them. The accused took this same. As was once said by a British court, "If a man creates in
remonstrance as a display of insubordination; and rising in rage another man's mind an immediate sense of dander which causes
he moved towards Venancio, with a big knife in hand, such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injuries himself,
threatening to stab him. At the instant when the accused had the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for
attained to within a few feet of Venancio, the latter, evidently the injuries which result." (Reg. vs. Halliday, 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.],
believing himself in great and immediate peril, threw himself 701.
into the water and disappeared beneath its surface to be seen no
more.
In this connection a pertinent decision from the Supreme Court
of Spain, of July 13, 1882, is cited in the brief of The Attorney-
The boat in which this incident took place was at the time General, as follows: It appeared that upon a certain occasion an
possibly 30 or 40 yards from shore and was distant, say, 10 paces individual, after having inflicted sundry injuries upon another
from the Vigan. Two scows were moored to the shore, but with a cutting weapon, pointed a shotgun at the injured person
between these and the boat intervened a space which may be and to escape the discharge the latter had to jump into a river
estimated at 18 or 20 yards. At it was full midday, and there was where he perished by drowning. The medical authorities
nothing to obstruct the view of persons upon the scene, the charged with conducting the autopsy found that only one of the
failure of Venancio Gargantel to rise to the surface conclusively wounds caused by a cut could have resulted in the death of the
shows that, owing to his possible inability to swim or the injured person, supposing that he had received no succour, and
strength of the current, he was borne down into the water and that by throwing himself in the river he in fact died of asphyxia
was drowned. from submersion. Having been convicted as the author of the
homicide, the accused alleged upon appeal that he was only
Two witnesses who were on the boat state that, immediately guilty of the offense of inflicting serious physical injuries, or at
after Venancio leaped into the water, the accused told the most of frustrated homicide. The Supreme Court, disallowing
remaining members of the crew to keep quiet or he would kill the appeal, enunciated the following doctrine: "That even
them. For this reason they made no movement looking to though the death of the injured person should not be considered
rescue; but inasmuch as there witnesses are sure that Venancio as the exclusive and necessary effect of the very grave wound
did not again come to the surface, efforts at rescue would have which almost completely severed his axillary artery,
been fruitless. The fact that the accused at his juncture occasioning a hemorrhage impossible to stanch under the
threatened the crew with violence is, therefore, of no moment circumstances in which that person was placed, nevertheless as
except tho show the temporary excitement under which he was the persistence of the aggression of the accused compelled his
laboring. adversary, in order to escape the attack, to leap into the river, an
act which the accused forcibly compelled the injured person to
On the next day one of the friends of Venancio Gargantel posted do after having inflicted, among others, a mortal wound upon
himself near the lighthouse to watch for the body, in the hope him and as the aggressor by said attack manifested a
determined resolution to cause the death of the deceased, by
depriving him of all possible help and putting him in the very
serious situation narrated in the decision appealed from, the
trial court, in qualifying the act prosecuted as consummated
homicide, did not commit any error of law, as the death of the
injured person was due to the act of the accused." (II Hidalgo,
Codigo Penal, p. 183.)

The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible

author of the death of Venancio Gargantel, and he was properly
convicted of the offense of homicide. The trial judge appreciated
as an attenuating circumstance the fact that the offender had no
intention to commit so great a wrong as that committed. (Par. 3,
art. 9 Penal Code.) In accordance with this finding the judge
sentenced the accused to undergo imprisonment for twelve
years and one day, reclusion temporal, to suffer the corresponding
accessories, to indemnify the family of the deceased in the sum
of P500, and to pay the costs. Said sentenced is in accordance
with law; and it being understood that the accessories
appropriate to the case are those specified in article 59 of the
Penal Code, the same is affirmed, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. 35006 September 7, 1931 blade sticking in her victim's abdomen, and, taking the first bus
that chanced to pass, finally went home. The injured man was
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff- at once taken to the provincial hospital where he was given first
appellee, aid treatment, and Doctor Ortega performed a slight operation
vs. upon him, cleaning and sewing up his wound. It was not
PURIFICACION ALMONTE, defendant- appellant. serious, according to the doctor, and might be healed in a week;
but on the sixth day the patient succumbed to complications
which we shall treat of later on. The relatives of the deceased
Teodosio R. Diño for appellant.
paid a little over P200 for the hospital treatment and the
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
expenses of his last illness.

IMPERIAL, J.:
In this instance the defense assigns the following alleged errors
as committed by the trial court in its judgment:
Purificacion Almonte is charged with the crime of homicide, the
information reading as follows:
I. The trial court erred in holding that the unnecessary
movements of the deceased while in the provincial
The undersigned provincial fiscal charges Purificacion Almonte hospital of Sorsogon for medical treatment were
with the crime of homicide, committed as follows: caused by the pain of the wound inflicted by the
accused.
That on or about October 1, 1930, in the municipality
of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, Philippine Islands, II. The trial court erred in holding the accused
and within the jurisdiction of this court, the criminally responsible for the secondary hemorrhage
aforementioned accused did willfully, unlawfully, and which caused the death of the deceased.
feloniously beat, attack, and assault one Felix Te Sue
with a knife, which she carried, producing a wound in
the abdomen which was the immediate cause of the III. The trial court erred in holding the accused
death of the said Felix Te Sue. responsible for the death of the offended party as the
direct and immediate consequence of the wound
inflicted by the accused.
Contrary to law.

IV. The trial court erred in holding the accused of the

Sorsogon, Sorsogon, November 7, 1930. crime of homicide as charged in the information
instead of lesiones leves as supported by the evidence in
(Sgd.) JACINTO YAMZON this case.
Provincial Fiscal
The first three assignments of error raise questions of fact and
what really caused the death of the deceased. It is strongly
The accused pleaded not guilty, and after the trial, at which she argued that the judgment appealed from is erroneous in finding
was represented by counsel, she was convicted of the said crime that the deceased's movements, which Doctor Ortega declares
of homicide, and sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and were the cause of the secondary hemorrhage that produced his
one day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the death, were due to the pain felt after the operation and during
deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The his illness. It is contended that according to the record, the real
defendant appealed. cause of the movements was, so the deceased himself declared,
the excessive warmth of the bed and the fact that he was
The facts which have been proved beyond question are as unaccustomed to such a bed. To ascertain this important point
follows: requires a careful examination of the evidence upon this
particular.
Until a week before the crime, the accused lived maritally with
the Chinaman Felix Te Sue who was a married man. Because Doctor Eduardo Ortega, in charge of the Sorsogon Provincial
one Miguela Dawal, with whom he had also lived maritally, Hospital, a physician of admitted ability and skill, speaking of
threatened to bring suit against him unless he rejoined her, the the patient's physical condition when he entered the hospital,
Chinaman and the accused voluntarily agreed to separate. From testified as follows:
that time on Te Sue lived in the barrio of Guinlajon, municipality
of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, together with the said Q. What was the result of your examination? —
Miguela Dawal. On the morning of October 1, 1930, the accused
visited her former paramour and on entering the house, found
A. I found a wound in the abdomen, on the left
him with Miguela. When Te Sue saw her, he approached and
side near the umbilical region; it was not deep and did
told her to go away at once because her new paramour might
not penetrate very far, but it passed through the muscle
get jealous and do her harm. The accused insisted upon
tissue.
remaining, and on being pushed by Te Sue and Miguela, feeling
that she was being unjustly treated, took hold of a small
penknife she carried and stabbed the man in the abdomen. Q. What caused the death of Felix Te Sue? —
Horrified, perhaps, at her deed, she fled to the street, leaving the
A. He died of a secondary internal hemmorhage. A. If the patient had lain in bed quietly, in order
to avoid increasing the congestion of the internal veins,
Q. How? — there would have been no secondary hemorrhage.

A. The wound was caused by a certain blow, Q. But the wound you treated could have been
because the penknife was not very sharp; the force of healed? —
the blow which introduced the knife into the flesh
produced a secondary congestion of the internal organ A. Yes, sir; it could have been.
so that any unnecessary movement on the patient's
part would cause congestion of the veins, or would Q. In how many days could it have been healed?
make them more congested and cause them to bleed. —

Q. And in the case of Felix Te Sue, did they bleed? A. That wound, if there had been no secondary
— infection, would have healed up in a week.

A. He began to bleed after he had been twenty- Q. You said that Felix Te Sue had been asked
four hours in the hospital. why he moved about contrary to the physician's
instructions; what instructions did you give him? —
Q. Why do you call it a secondary hemorrhage?
— A. As soon as he had been admitted into the
hospital, he was examined, and then made to lie in bed.
A. There are many kinds of hemorrhages: Medical treatment was then administered, and he was
Primary, in this particular case, if the wound had given to understand that he should remain in bed, for
reached the internal organs and severed the veins of any unnecessary movement might aggravate his
those organs it would be called a primary hemorrhage condition, and that what he needed was complete rest.
because it was directly caused by the wound; but there
was no immediate hemorrhage after the wound was Q. If he had not made those movements, do you
inflicted, but twenty-four hours later; in other words, think death would have ensued? —
there was what is called a secondary hemorrhage.
A. I am very sure he would not have had that
Q. You also said that Felix Te Sue had made an secondary hemorrhage, because as a matter of fact,
unnecessary movement? — during the first twenty-four hours he had no
symptoms of having an internal hemorrhage.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that internal congestion of the veins,
Q. Can you tell the court what were those although those veins contained more blood than usual,
unnecessary movements? — would not have caused the hemorrhage? That is to say,
the veins would not have burst, if the patient Felix Te
A. Those movements were the following: The Sue had not moved about, as you have said? —
patient began by moving from side to side; then he
would sit up at night, and perhaps jump out of bed, A. Yes, sir; that internal congestion would have
and begin walking about; when asked why he did that, not burst if the patient had not moved about.
contrary to medical instructions, he explained that he
could not lie down because the bed was to warm, and Q. Can you tell us, doctor, why strangers who
that he was not used to lying to bed. know nothing about the care of the sick are placed in
charge of a patient so delicate that his moving may
Q. Do you mean to say that the patient's cause his death, as indeed it did, in this case? —
movements brought on the secondary internal
hemorrhage? — A. The patient was not placed in the care of
strangers; we have nurses to attend and see to the
A. Yes, sir, they produced the secondary internal patient as often as it is needed, besides the physician's
hemorrhage. visits to him; but even in the presence of the doctor and
the hospital attendants, and after we had put the
Q. And he died because of that secondary internal patient to bed, he continued to struggle with us.
hemmorhage? —
Q. Do you mean to say, then, that Felix Te Sue
A. Yes, sir. was fastened in his bed, and in spite of that he was able
to leave it a walk about? —
Q. Was the wound alone, as treated by you,
sufficient to cause the death of Felix Te Sue? —
 A. He left his bed the first day after the operation, purely nervous temperament, his irritability and other
and immediately after it, when he was not fastened in causes, all of which depend upon his physical constitution:
because he did not seem to be violent. (Pages 16-22, — should such a death be qualified as HOMICIDE? The
transcript of the stenographic notes.) Supreme Court has ruled affirmatively: "Inasmuch as
a man is responsible for the consequences of his act —
From the foregoing testimony it may be inferred: That the and in this case the physical condition and
deceased was stabbed on the left side of the abdominal region, temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the
near the navel; that the wound did not involve any internal evil, the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the
organ; that upon arriving at the hospital, he was submitted to a violence of the means employed, but by the result
minor operation which consisted in cleaning, medicating, and actually produced and as the wound which the
suturing the wound; that upon his arrival, the patient was in a appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause
nervous state; that during the operation they tied down the which determined his death, without his being able to
patient; that immediately after the operation Doctor Ortega counteract its effects, it is evident that the act in
admonished him to keep quiet because any movement he might question should be qualified as homicide, etc."
make would change his pathological state for the worse and (Decision of April 3, 1879, published in the Gazette on
bring about dangerous complication; that in spite of this the 16th of June.)
admonition the deceased moved about, sitting up in bed, getting
up and pacing about the room; that because of this, the internal In the case cited the doctors were of the opinion that death was
vessels, already congested because of the wound, bled, and the not an immediate consequence of the wound received, but was
hemorrhage thus produced caused his death. rather due to the victim's purely nervous temperament, his
irritability and other causes, peculiar to his physical
The defense contends, with which the Attorney-General agrees, constitution. In the case in question, it is sought to attribute the
that according to Doctor Ortega's testimony the determining internal hemorrhage that directly caused death, not to the
cause of Te Sue's death was not he wound inflicted by the wound or injury, but the patient's movements, overlooking the
accused, but his own carelessness in moving about against the fact that they were due to his nervous condition, and that this
doctor's orders, which produced the internal hemorrhage. We state of nervousness could only be the result of the wound
agree with both parties that according to Doctor Ortega, the inflicted by the appellant. We hold, therefore, that the real cause
immediate and determining cause of the death was none other of death in this case was not the bodily movements referred to,
than the internal hemmorhage produced by the rupture of the but the congestion of the internal veins produced beforehand by
abdominal blood vessels; but we cannot agree, in view of the the force of the blow which caused the wound and the nervous
evidence, that the real cause of said death was not the wound condition of the deceased.
inflicted upon the victim. Carefully analyzing Doctor Ortega's
testimony, we reach the inevitable conclusion that the internal In United States vs. Sornito (4 Phil., 357), we held that "In crimes
veins were congested from the beginning because of the force of against the life of a human being the results and effects of the
the blow which produced the wound, for that is what the doctor criminal acts must necessarily be taken into consideration in
means when he says that "the wound was caused by a certain order to establish the seriousness and extent of the evil or injury
blow, because the penknife was not very sharp, the force of the produced and to define the crime in accordance with the law. It
blow which introduced the knife into the flesh produced a must also be taken into consideration that the guilty parties are
secondary congestion of the internal organ so that an responsible under the law for all the unlawful acts executed by
unnecessary movement on the patient's part would cause them in violation of its principles and for all the consequences
congestion of the veins, or would make them more congested, of those acts."
causing them to bleed"; and that what really impelled the
patient to violate the doctor's orders, by sitting up in bed and In United States vs. Montes (6 Phil., 443), we also held that
pacing about the room, was not, as the defense insinuates, a "Where a person voluntarily and with intent of injuring another
desire to aggravate the criminal liability of the accused, but commits an act which is notoriously unlawful, he shall be held
simply his nervous condition, which was noted from the responsible for the consequences of his criminal action, even
moment he entered the provincial hospital. It was not the though when such wrongful act constitutes the crime of
warmth of the bed or his not being used to it that made the homicide it appears that he had no intention of killing the
patient act as he did, but the pathological state created by the deceased."
illness brought on by the wound from which he was suffering.
We are convinced that under normal conditions, if the patient
In United States vs. Navarro (7 Phil., 713), we reaffirmed the
had not been ill, he would not have violated the doctor's orders,
same principle holding that "`the firm and unalterable
knowing, as he did, that the slightest movement might occasion
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court (interpreting the Penal
a complication or internal hemorrhage capable of causing death.
Code now in force and effect) is that the crime of homicide is
committed when death ensues or follows, as the result of a
The point raised by Viada in volume 3 of his work, pages 41 and wound inflicted by another, whether the death be the precise
42, involves facts similar to those established in this case, and and necessary consequence of the injuries or wounds, or
we believe the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain is whether death resulted from accidents caused or brought on by
perfectly applicable to this case: reason of such wounds or injuries received by the patient.'
(Judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain, May 8, 1890.) `It is the
Even when the doctors say that the death was due not so firm and unalterable doctrine, and so held by the Court of
much to the wound, which in a better constituted person Cassation, that the aggressor is responsible for all the natural
would have healed in thirty or forty days, as to the patient's consequences of the aggression when these consequences do not
owe their origin to acts or malicious omissions imputable to the P500, to suffer the accessory penalties of article 61 of the Penal
assaulted party.' (Judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain, May Code, and to pay the costs of both instances. So ordered.
30, 1892.)"

The same doctrine was laid down in United States vs.

Monasterial (14 Phil., 391). Here it was held among other things,
"persons who are responsible for an act constituting a crime are
also liable for all the consequences arising therefrom and
inherent therein, other than those due to incidents entirely
foreign to the act executed, or which originate through the fault
or carelessness of the injured person, which are exceptions to the
rule not arising in the present case."

At this juncture it is well to remember that, as we stated in the

beginning, the patient's nervous condition when the
complication or internal hemorrhage which caused death set in,
was an inherent physiological condition produced by the
wound in the abdomen. It goes without saying that if he had not
been wounded he would not have undergone that
extraordinary state and condition, nor have had to leave his bed
during the critical stage of his illness.

Lastly, in United States vs. Zamora (32 Phil., 218), we held that
"One who performs a criminal act should be held to liability for
the act and for all of its consequences, although both were
inflicted upon a person other than the one whom the felon
intended to injure."

The cases which the Attorney-General cites in his brief are not
applicable, for the reason that in them all the deaths were due to
alien acts, malicious and imprudent, performed by the injured
persons themselves. We have shown that in the case at bar the
real and actual cause of death of the deceased was the
hemorrhage of the internal veins, which had already been
congested by the wound produced and the patient's nervous
condition, rather than the so-called bodily movements, and that
these, if they were the immediate cause of his death, were the
direct consequence of the patient's pathological condition or
nervousness. At any rate, they are both traceable to the wound
inflicted by the accused.

The last assignment of error is but a corollary to the first three,

which have just been refuted, and it is contended that the
accused can only be convicted of slight physical injuries, instead
of the serious crime of homicide. If the appellant must answer
for all the consequences of her acts voluntarily performed, as we
have shown, it necessarily and logically follows that she must
be convicted of the graver offense.

The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstances of not

having intended to commit so serious a crime as that committed,
and of having acted with passion and obfuscation. The first is
shown by the fact that she made use of a small penknife, and the
second, by the fact that before the attack she had been pushed
out of the room where the victim was, and that she considered
such treatment as an offense or abuse. The penalty must
therefore be reduced one degree or to prision mayor.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified and the

appellant is sentenced to eight years and one day of prision
mayor, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
G.R. No. L-27097 January 17, 1975 thirty pesos. Antonio placed the eighty pesos in the right pocket
of his pants. It was then noontime.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. Jose was not able to find any of his children in the city. The twins
ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE TOLING y returned to the agency where they ate their lunch at Juan's
ROVERO, defendants-appellants. expense. From the agency, Juan took the twins to the Tutuban
railroad station that same day, January 8th, for their homeward
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor trip.
Dominador L. Quiroz for plaintiff-appellee.
After buying their tickets, they boarded the night Bicol express
Santiago F. Alidio as counsel de oficio for defendants-appellants. train at about five o'clock in the afternoon. The train left at six
o'clock that evening.

The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the third from the rear
of the dining car. The coach had one row of two-passenger seats
AQUINO, J.:
and another row of three- passenger seats. Each seat faced an
opposite seat. An aisle separated the two rows. The brothers
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, brothers, appealed from the were seated side by side on the fourth three-passenger seat from
decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, finding them the rear, facing the back door. Jose was seated between Antonio,
guilty of multiple murder and attempted murder, sentencing who was near the window, and a three-year old boy. Beside the
them to death and ordering them to indemnify each set of heirs boy was a woman breast-feeding her baby who was near the
of (1) Teresita B. Escanan, (2) Antonio B. Mabisa, (3) Isabelo S. aisle. That woman was Corazon Bernal. There were more than
Dando, (4) Elena B. Erminio (5) Modesta R. Brondial (6) Isabel one hundred twenty passengers in the coach. Some passengers
Felices and (7) Teodoro F. Bautista in the sum of P6,000 and to were standing on the aisle.
pay Amanda Mapa the sum of P500 (Criminal Case No. SC-966).
The judgment of conviction was based on the following facts:
Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were two men
and an old woman who was sleeping with her head resting on
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both married, are natives the back of the seat (Exh. 2). on the two-passenger seat across
of Barrio Nenita which is about eighteen (or nine) kilometers the aisle in line with the seat where the brothers were sitting,
away from Mondragon, Northern Samar. They are illiterate there were seated a fat woman, who was near the window, and
farmers tilling their own lands. They were forty-eight years old one Cipriano Reganet who was on her left. On the opposite seat
in 1966. Antonio is one hour older than Jose. Being twins, they were seated a woman, her daughter and Amanda Mapa with an
look alike very much. However, Antonio has a distinguishing eight-month old baby. They were in front of Reganet.
cut in his ear (44 tsn Jan. 14, 1966).
Two chico vendors entered the coach when the train stopped at
Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila as a Cabuyao, Laguna. The brothers bought some chicos which they
laundrywoman since September, 1964. Jose's three children one put aside. The vendors alighted when the train started moving.
girl and two boys, had stayed in Manila also since 1964. It was around eight o'clock in the evening.

Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter from Not long after the train had resumed its regular speed, Antonio
Leonora telling him that she would give him money. To have stood up and with a pair of scissors (Exh. B) stabbed the man
money for his expenses, Antonio killed a pig and sold the meat sitting directly in front of him. The victim stood up but soon
to Jose's wife for sixty pesos. Jose decided to go with Antonio in collapsed on his seat.
order to see his children. He was able to raise eighty-five pesos
for his expenses.
For his part, Jose stabbed with a knife (Exh. A) the sleeping old
woman who was seated opposite him. She was not able to get
On January 6, 1965, with a bayong containing their pants and up anymore.1
shirts, the twins left Barrio Nenita and took a bus to Allen. From
there, they took a launch to Matnog, Sorsogon. From Matnog,
Upon seeing what was happening, Amanda Mapa, with her
they went to Daraga, Albay on board an Alatco bus, and from
baby, attempted to leave her seat, but before she could escape
Daraga, they rode on the train, arriving at the Paco railroad
Jose stabbed her, hitting her on her right hand with which she
station in Manila at about seven o'clock in the morning of
was supporting her child (Exh. D-2). The blade entered the
January 8th. It was their first trip to the big city.
dorsal side and passed through the palm. Fortunately, the child
was not injured. Most of the passengers scurried away for safety
At the Paco station, the twins took a jeepney which brought but the twins, who had run amuck, stabbed everyone whom
them to Tondo. By means of a letter which Aniano Espenola a they encountered inside the coach.2
labor-recruiter, had given them, they were able to locate an
employment agency where they learned the address of the Eng
Among the passengers in the third coach was Constabulary
Heng Glassware. Antonio's daughter was working in that store.
Sergeant Vicente Z. Rayel, a train escort who, on that occasion,
Accompanied by Juan, an employee of the agency, they
was not on duty. He was taking his wife and children to
proceeded to her employer's establishment. Leonora gave her
Calauag, Quezon. He was going to the dining car to drink coffee
father fifty pesos. Sencio Rubis Antonio's grandson, gave him
when someone informed him that there was a stabbing inside
the coach where he had come from. He immediately proceeded (2) Antonio B. Mabisa, 28, married, laborer, Guinayangan,
to return to coach No. 9. Upon reaching coach 8, he saw a dead Quezon.
man sprawled on the floor near the toilet. At a distance of
around nine meters, he saw a man on the platform separating (3) Isabelo S. Dando, 45, married, Paracale, Camarines Norte.
coaches Nos. 8 and 9, holding a knife between the thumb and
index finger of his right hand, with its blade pointed outward.
(4) Susana C. Hernandez, 46, married, housekeeper, Jose
He shouted to the man that he (Rayel) was a Constabularyman
Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
and a person in authority and Rayel ordered him to lay down
his knife (Exh. A) upon the count of three, or he would be shot.
(5) Teodoro F. Bautista, 72, married, Nawasa employee, San
Juan, Rizal.
Instead of obeying, the man changed his hold on the knife by
clutching it between his palm and little finger (with the blade
pointed inward) and, in a suicidal impulse, stabbed himself on (6) Modesta R. Brondial 58, married, housekeeper, Legaspi City.
his left breast. He slowly sank to the floor and was prostrate
thereon. Near the platform where he had fallen, Rayel saw (7) Elena B. Erminio 10, student, 12 Liberty Avenue, Cubao,
another man holding a pair of scissors (Exh. B). He retreated to Quezon City and
the steps near the platform when he saw Rayel armed with a
pistol. (8) Teresita B. Escanan, 25, housemaid, 66 Menlo Street, Pasay
City (Exh. C to C-3, C-7, C-8, C-9, C-11, L to L-2, N to N-2, 0 to
Rayel learned from his wife that the man sitting opposite her 0-2, P to P-2, Q to Q-2, R to R-2 and T to T-2)
was stabbed to death.
Four dead persons were found near the railroad tracks.
Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Aldea was also in the train. He Apparently, they jumped from the moving train to avoid being
was in the dining car when he received the information that killed. They were:
there were killings in the third coach. He immediately went
there and, while at the rear of the coach, he met Mrs. Mapa who (1) Timoteo U. Dimaano, 53 married, carpenter, Miguelin,
was wounded. He saw Antonio stabbing with his scissors two Sampaloc, Manila. .
women and a small girl and a woman who was later identified
as Teresita B. Escanan (Exh. I to I-3). Antonio was not wounded.
(2) Miguel C. Oriarte, 45, married, Dalagan, Lopez, Quezon.
Those victims were prostrate on the seats of the coach and on
the aisle.
(3) Salvador A. Maqueda 52, married, farmer, Lopez, Quezon
and
Aldea shouted at Antonio to surrender but the latter made a
thrust at him with the scissors. When Antonio was about to stab
another person, Aldea stood on a seat and repeatedly struck (4) Shirley A. Valenciano, 27, married, housekeeper, 657-D Jorge
Antonio on the head with the butt of his pistol, knocking him Street, Pasay City (Exh. C-4. C-5, C-6, C-10, J, J-1, J-2, K to K-2,
down. Aldea then jumped and stepped on Antonio's buttocks M to M-3 and S to S-2).
and wrested the scissors away from him. Antonio offered
resistance despite the blows administered to him. Among the injured were Lucila Pantoja, Baby X, Mrs. X, Mrs.
Armanda Mapa-Dizon, Brigida Sarmiento-Palma, Cipriano
When the train arrived at the Calamba station, four Reganet and Corazon Bernal-Astrolavio (Exh. D to D-5). Mrs.
Constabulary soldiers escorted the twins from the train and Astrolavio supposedly died later (43 tsn January 14, 1966).
turned them over to the custody of the Calamba police. Sergeant
Rayel took down their names. The bloodstained scissors and Mrs. Mapa declared that because of the stab wound inflicted
knife were turned over to the Constabulary Criminal upon her right hand by Jose Toling, she was first brought to the
Investigation Service (CIS). Calamba Emergency Hospital. Later, she was transferred to the
hospital of the Philippine National Railways at Caloocan City
Some of the victims were found dead in the coach while others where she was confined for thirteen days free of charge. As a
were picked up along the railroad tracks between Cabuyao and result of her injury, she was not able to engage in her occupation
Calamba. Those who were still alive were brought to different of selling fish for one month, thereby losing an expected earning
hospitals for first-aid treatment. The dead numbering twelve in of one hundred fifty pesos. When she ran for safety with her
all were brought to Funeraria Quiogue, the official morgue of child, she lost clothing materials valued at three hundred pesos
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, where aside from two hundred pesos cash in a paper bag which was
their cadavers were autopsied (Exh. C to C-11). A Constabulary lost.
photographer took some pictures of the victims (Exh. G to I-2, J-
1 and J-2). The case was investigated by the Criminal Investigation Service
of the Second Constabulary Zone headquarters at Camp Vicente
Of the twelve persons who perished, eight, whose bodies were Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. On January 9, 1965 Constabulary
found in the train, died from stab wounds, namely: investigators took down the statements of Mrs. Mapa-Dizon,
Cipriano Reganet, Corazon Bernal, Brigida de Sarmiento and
Sergeant Aldea. On that date, the statements of the Toling
(1) Isabel Felices, 60, housewife, Ginlajon, Sorsogon.
brothers were taken at the North General Hospital. Sergeant them, whispering among themselves and making signs. The
Rayel also gave a statement. twins suspected that the four men harbored evil intentions
towards them.
Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in the train he
was stabbed by a person "from the station" who wanted to get When the twins boarded the train, the four men followed them.
his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant. He said that They were facing the twins. They were talking in a low voice.
he stabbed somebody "who might have died and others that The twins sat on a two passenger seat facing the front door of
might not". He clarified that in the train four persons were the coach, the window being on the right of Antonio and Jose
asking money from him. He stabbed one of them. "It was a hold- being to his left. Two of the four men, whom they were
up". suspecting of having evil intentions towards them, sat on the
seat facing them, while the other two seated themselves behind
He revealed that after stabbing the person who wanted to rob them. Some old women were near them. When the train was
him, he stabbed other persons because, inasmuch as he "was already running, the man sitting near the aisle allegedly stood
already bound to die", he wanted "to kill everybody" (Exh. X or 8, 49 up, approached Antonio and pointed a balisong knife at his
tsn Sept. 3, 1965). throat while the other man who was sitting near the window
and who was holding also a balisong knife attempted to pick
Antonio's right pocket, threatening him with death if he would
Jose Toling, in his statement, said that he was wounded because
not hand over the money. Antonio answered that he would give
he was stabbed by a person "from Camarines" who was taking
only one-half of his money provided the man would not hurt
his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant with the
him, adding that his (Antonio's) place was still very far.
scissors. He said that he stabbed two persons who were
demanding money from him and who were armed with knives
and iron bars. When Antonio felt some pain in his throat, he suddenly drew
out his hunting knife or small bolo (eight inches long including
the handle) from the back pocket of his pants and stabbed the
When Jose Toling was informed that several persons died due
man with it, causing him to fall to the floor with his balisong. He
to the stabbing, he commented that everybody was trying "to
also stabbed the man who was picking his pocket. Antonio
kill each other" (Exh. I-A).
identified the two men whom he had stabbed as those shown in
the photographs of Antonio B. Mabisa (Exh. L-1 and L-2 or 5-A
According to Jose Toling, two persons grabbed the scissors in and
his pocket and stabbed him in the back with the scissors and 5-B) and Isabelo S. Dando (Exh. N-1 and N-2 or 7-A and 7-B).
then escaped. Antonio allegedly pulled out the scissors from his While Antonio was stabbing the second man, another person
back, gave them to him and told him to avenge himself with the from behind allegedly stabbed him on the forehead, causing
scissors. him to lose consciousness and to fall on the floor (Antonio has
two scars on his forehead and a scar on his chest and left
On January 20, 1965 a Constabulary sergeant filed against the forearm, 85, 87 tsn). He regained consciousness when two
Toling brothers in the municipal court of Cabuyao, Laguna a Constabulary soldiers raised him. His money was gone.
criminal complaint for multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder. Through counsel, the accused waived the second stage Seeing his brother in a serious condition, Jose stabbed with the
of the preliminary investigation. The case was elevated to the scissors the man who had wounded his brother. Jose hit the man
Court of First Instance of Laguna where the Provincial Fiscal on in the abdomen. Jose was stabbed in the back by somebody. Jose
March 10, 1965 filed against the Toling brothers an information stabbed also that assailant in the middle part of the abdomen,
for multiple murder (nine victims), multiple frustrated murder inflicting a deep wound.
(six victims) and triple homicide (as to three persons who died
after jumping from the running train to avoid being stabbed).
However, Jose did not see what happened to the two men whom
he had stabbed because he was already weak. He fell down and
At the arraignment, the accused, assisted by their counsel de became unconscious. He identified Exhibit A as the knife used
oficio pleaded not guilty. After trial, Judge Arsenio Nañawa by Antonio and Exhibit B as the scissors which he himself had
rendered the judgment of conviction already mentioned. The used. He recovered consciousness when a Constabulary soldier
Toling brothers appealed. brought him out of the train.

In this appeal, appellants' counsel de oficio assails the credibility The brothers presented Doctor Leonardo del Rosario, a
of the prosecution witnesses, argues that the appellants acted in physician of the North General Hospital who treated them
self-defense and contends, in the alternative, that their criminal during the early hours of January 9, 1965 and who testified that
liability was only for two homicides and for physical injuries. he found the following injuries on Antonio Toling:

According to the evidence for the defense (as distinguished Wound, incised, 1-1/4 inches (sutured),
from appellants' statements, Exhibits 1 and 8), when the Toling frontal, right; 3-1/2 inches each, mid-frontal
twins were at the Tutuban Railroad Station in the afternoon of (wound on the forehead) and
January 8, 1965, Antonio went to the ticket counter to buy tickets
for himself and Jose. To pay for the tickets, he took out his
Wound, stabbed, 3/4 inch, 1 inch medial to
money from the right pocket of his pants and later put back the
anterior axillary line level of 3rd ICS right,
remainder in the same pocket. The two brothers noticed that
four men at some distance from them were allegedly observing
 penetrating thoracic cavity (chest wound confounded one twin for the other. Such a confusion was
(Exh. 11). unavoidable because the twins, according to a Constabulary
investigator, are "very identical". Thus, on the witness stand CIS
and on Jose Toling a stab wound, one inch long on the Sergeants Alfredo C. Orbase and Liberato Tamundong after
paravertebral level of the fifth rib on the left, penetrating the pointing to the twins, refused to take the risk of identifying who
thoracic cavity (Exh. 10). The wound was on the spinal column was Antonio and who was Jose. They confessed that they might
in line with the armpit or "about one inch from the midline to be mistaken in making such a specific identification (28 tsn
the left" (113 tsn). The twins were discharged from the hospital September 3, 1965; 32 tsn November 5, 1965).
on January 17th.
In our opinion, to ascertain who is Antonio and who is Jose, the
The trial court, in its endeavor to ascertain the motive for the reliable guides would be their sworn statements (Exh. 1 and 8),
twins' rampageous behavior, which resulted in the macabre executed one day after the killing, their own testimonies and the
deaths of several innocent persons, made the following medical certificates (Exh. 10 and 11). Those parts of the evidence
observations: reveal that the one who was armed with the knife was Antonio
and the one who was armed with the scissors was Jose. The
prosecution witnesses and the trial court assumed that Antonio
What could be the reason or motive that
was armed with the scissors (Exh. B) and Jose was armed with
actuated the accused to run amuck? It
the knife (Exh. A). That assumption is erroneous.
appears that the accused travelled long over
land and sea spending their hard earned
money and suffering privations, even to the In his statement and testimony, Antonio declared that he was
extent of foregoing their breakfast, only to armed with a knife, while Jose declared that he was armed with
receive as recompense with respect to the scissors which Antonio had purchased at the Tutuban
Antonio the meager sum of P50 from his station, before he boarded the train and which he gave to Jose
daughter and P30 from his grandson and because the latter is a barber whose old pair of scissors was
with respect to Jose to receive nothing at all already rusty. As thus clarified, the person whom Sergeant
from any of his three children whom he could Rayel espied as having attempted to commit suicide on the
not locate in Manila. platform of the train by stabbing himself on the chest would be
Antonio (not Jose). That conclusion is confirmed by the medical
certificate, Exhibit 11, wherein it is attested that Antonio had a
It also appears that the accused, who are
wound in the chest. And the person whom Sergeant Aldea
twins, are queerly alike, a fact which could
subdued after the former had stabbed several persons with a
easily invite some people to stare or gaze at
pair of scissors (not with a knife) was Jose and not Antonio. That
them and wonder at their very close
fact is contained in his statement of January 9, 1965 (p. 9,
resemblance. Like some persons who easily
Record).
get angry when stared at, however, the
accused, when stared at by the persons in
front of them, immediately suspected them as The mistake of the prosecution witnesses in taking Antonio for
having evil intention towards them (accused). Jose and vice-versa does not detract from their credibility. The
controlling fact is that those witnesses confirmed the admission
of the twins that they stabbed several passengers.
To the mind of the Court, therefore, it is
despondency on the part of the accused
coupled with their unfounded suspicion of Appellants' counsel based his arguments on the summaries of
evil intention on the part of those who the evidence found in the trial court's decision. He argues that
happened to stare at them that broke the limit the testimonies of Sergeants Rayel and Aldea are contradictory
of their self-control and actuated them to run but he does not particularize on the supposed contradictions.
amuck.
The testimonies of the two witnesses do not cancel each other.
We surmise that to the captive spectators in coach No. 9 the The main point of Rayel's testimony is that he saw one of the
spectacle of middle-aged rustic twins, whom, in the limited twins stabbing himself in the chest and apparently trying to
space of the coach, their co-passengers had no choice but to commit suicide. Aldea's testimony is that he knocked down the
notice and gaze at, was a novelty. Through some telepathic or other twin, disabled him and prevented him from committing
extra-sensory perception the twins must have sensed that their other killings.
co-passengers were talking about them in whispers and making
depreciatory remarks or jokes about their humble persons. In It may be admitted that Rayel's testimony that Aldea took the
their parochial minds, they might have entertained the notion knife of Jose Toling was not corroborated by Aldea. Neither did
or suspicion that their male companions, taking advantage of Aldea testify that Antonio was near Jose on the platform of the
their ignorance and naivete, might victimize them by stealing train. Those discrepancies do not render Rayel and Aldea
their little money. Hence, they became hostile to their co- unworthy of belief. They signify that Aldea and Rayel did not
passengers. Their pent-up hostility erupted into violence and give rehearsed testimonies or did not compare notes.
murderous fury.
Where, as in this case, the events transpired in rapid succession
A painstaking examination of the evidence leads to the in the coach of the train and it was nighttime, it is not surprising
conclusion that the trial court and the prosecution witnesses that Rayel and Aldea would not give identical testimonies (See
6 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. 139-140; contusions, lacerations and fractures on the head, body and
People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1963, 54 SCRA 350). extremities (Exh. J to J-2, K to K-2, M to M-2 and S to S-2).
There is no doubt that Aldea and Rayel witnessed some of the
acts of the twins but they did not observe the same events and The conjecture is that they jumped from the moving tracing to
their powers of perception and recollection are not the same. avoid being killed but in so doing they met their untimely and
horrible deaths. The trial court did not adjudge them as victims
Appellants' counsel assails the testimony of Mrs. Mapa. He whose heirs should be indemnified. As to three of them, the
contends that no one corroborated her testimony that one of the information charges that the accused committed homicide. The
twins stabbed a man and a sleeping woman sitting on the seat trial court dismissed that charge for lack of evidence.
opposite the seat occupied by the twins. The truth is that Mrs.
Mapa's testimony was confirmed by the necropsy reports and No one testified that those four victims jumped from the train.
by the twins themselves who admitted that they stabbed some Had the necropsy reports been reinforced by testimony showing
persons. that the proximate cause of their deaths was the violent and
murderous conduct of the twins, then the latter would be
On the other hand, the defense failed to prove that persons, criminally responsible for their deaths.
other than the twins, could have inflicted the stab wounds.
There is no doubt as to the corpus delicti. And there can be no Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "criminal
doubt that the twins, from their own admissions (Exh. 1 and 8) liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
and their testimonies, not to mention the testimonies of Rayel, (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
Aldea, Mrs. Mapa and the CIS investigators, were the authors of which he intended". The presumption is that "a person intends
the killings. the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule
131, Rules of Court).
Apparently, because there was no doubt on the twins'
culpability, since they were caught in flagrante delicto the CIS The rule is that "if a man creates in another man's mind an
investigators did not bother to get the statements of the other immediate sense of danger which causes such person to try to
passengers in Coach No. 9. It is probable that no one actually escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the person who
saw the acts of the twins from beginning to end because creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which
everyone in Coach No. 9 was trying to leave it in order to save result" (Reg. vs. Halliday 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.] 701, cited in U.S.
his life. The ensuing commotion and confusion prevented the vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 4911, 500).
passengers from having a full personal knowledge of how the
twins consummated all the killings.
Following that rule, is was held that "if a person against whom
a criminal assault is directed reasonably believes himself to be
On the other hand, the twins' theory of self-defense is highly in danger of death or great bodily harm and in order to escape
incredible. In that crowded coach No. 9, which was lighted, it jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct of self-
was improbable that two or more persons could have held up preservation, the assailant is responsible for homicide in case
the twins without being readily perceived by the other death results by drowning" (Syllabus, U.S. vs. Valdez, supra, See
passengers. The twins would have made an outcry had there People vs. Buhay, 79 Phil. 371).
really been an attempt to rob them. The injuries, which they
sustained, could be attributed to the blows which the other
The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the jumping from the
passengers inflicted on them to stop their murderous rampage.
train of the four victims already named precludes the
imputation of criminal responsibility to the appellants for the
Appellants' view is that they should be held liable only for two ghastly deaths of the said victims.
homicides, because they admittedly killed Antonio B. Mabisa
and Isabelo S. Dando, and for physical injuries because they did
The same observation applies to the injuries suffered by the
not deny that Jose Toling stabbed Mrs. Mapa. We have to reject
other victims. The charge of multiple frustrated murder based
that view. Confronted as we are with the grave task of passing
on the injuries suffered by Cipriano Pantoja, Dinna Nosal,
judgment on the aberrant behavior of two yokels from the
Corazon Bernal and Brigida Sarmiento (Exh. D, D-3 to D-5) was
Samar hinterland who reached manhood without coming into
dismissed by the trial court for lack of evidence. Unlike Mrs.
contact with the mainstream of civilization in urban areas, we
Mapa, the offended parties involved did not testify on the
exercised utmost care and solicitude in reviewing the evidence.
injuries inflicted on them.
We are convinced that the record conclusively establishes
appellants' responsibility for the eight killings.
The eight killings and the attempted killing should be treated as
separate crimes of murder and attempted murder qualified be
To the seven dead persons whose heirs should be indemnified,
treachery (alevosia) (Art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). The
according to the trial court, because they died due to stab
unexpected, surprise assaults perpetrated by the twins upon
wounds, should be added the name of Susana C. Hernandez
their co-passengers, who did not anticipate that the twins would
(Exh. P, P-1 and P-2). The omission of her name in judgment was
act like juramentados and who were unable to defend themselves
probably due to inadvertence. According to the necropsy
(even if some of them might have had weapons on their persons)
reports, four persons, namely, Shirley A. Valenciano, Salvador
was a mode of execution that insured the consummation of the
A. Maqueda, Miguel C. Oriarte and Timoteo U. Dimaano, died
twins' diabolical objective to butcher their co-passengers. The
due to multiple traumatic injuries consisting of abrasions,
conduct of the twins evinced conspiracy and community of
design.
The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated indemnity of P96,000, and an indemnity of P500 to Amanda
by means of different acts. Hence, they cannot be regarded as Mapa. In the service of the penalties, the forty-year limit fixed in
constituting a complex crime under article 48 of the Revised the penultimate paragraph of article 70 of the Revised Penal
Penal Code which refers to cases where "a single act constitutes Code should be observed. Costs against the appellants.
two or more grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other". SO ORDERED.

As noted by Cuello Calon, the so-called "concurso formal o

ideal de delitos reviste dos formas: (a) cuando un solo hecho
constituye dos o mas delitos (el llamado delito compuesto); (b)
cuando uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer otro (el
llamado delito complejo)." (1 Derecho Penal, 12th Ed. 650).

On the other hand, "en al concurso real de delitos", the rule,

when there is "acumulacion material de las penas", is that "si son
varios los resultados, si son varias las acciones, esta conforme
con la logica y con la justicia que el agente soporte la carga de
cada uno de los delitos" (Ibid, p. 652, People vs. Mori, L-23511,
January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 403).

The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one attempted
murder. (See People vs. Salazar, 105 Phil. 1058 where the
accused Moro, who ran amuck, killed sixteen persons and
wounded others, was convicted of sixteen separate murders,
one frustrated murder and two attempted murders; People vs.
Mortero, 108 Phil. 31, the Panampunan massacre case, where six
defendants were convicted of fourteen separate murders;
People vs. Remollino, 109 Phil. 607, where a person who fired
successively at six victims was convicted of six separate
homicides; U. S. Beecham, 15 Phil. 272, involving four murders;
People vs. Macaso, 85 Phil. 819, 828, involving eleven murders;
U.S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305; U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil. 260,
271. Contra: People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 82, 102-103; People vs.
Floresca, 99 Phil. 1044; People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil. 27; People vs.
Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Manantan, 94 Phil. 831; People
vs. Umali, 96 Phil. 185; People vs. Cu Unjiengi, 61 Phil. 236;
People vs. Penas, 66 Phil. 682; People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437,
where the crimes committed by means of separate acts were
held to be complex on the theory that they were the product of
a single criminal impulse or intent).

As no generic mitigating and aggravating circumstances were

proven in this case, the penalty for murder should be imposed
in its medium period or reclusion perpetua (Arts. 64[l] and 248,
Revised Penal Code. The death penalty imposed by the trial
court was not warranted.

A separate penalty for attempted murder should be imposed on

the appellants. No modifying circumstances can be appreciated
in the attempted murder case.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified by setting

aside the death sentence. Defendants-appellants Antonio Toling
and Jose Toling are found guilty, as co-principals, of eight (8)
separate murders and one attempted murder. Each one of them
is sentenced to eight (8) reclusion perpetuas for the eight murders
and to an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year of prision
correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum for the attempted murder and to pay
solidarily an indemnity of P12,000 to each set of heirs of the
seven victims named in the dispositive part of the trial court's
decision and of the eight victim, Susana C. Hernandez, or a total
G.R. No. 116736 July 24, 1997 WHEREFORE, finding accused Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. y Conje and Manuel Garcia y
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Rivera [g]uilty beyond reasonable doubt of
vs. the crime charged, the Court hereby
BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR. y CONJE, MANUEL GARCIA y sentenced (sic) them to suffer the penalty
RIVERA and JOHN DOE, accused, of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the
costs of suit.
BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR. y CONJE and MANUEL GARCIA
y RIVERA, accused-appellants. Accused are hereby ordered to pay the
offended party the sum of P35,000.00 for
funeral expenses of deceased Andre Mar
Masangkay and death indemnity of
P50,000.00.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Notice of Appeal, dated March 9, 1994, was thus filed by
A person who commits a felony is liable for the direct, natural Atty. Evaristo P. Velicaria8 who took over from the Public
and logical consequences of his wrongful act even where the Attorney's Office as counsel for the accused.
resulting crime is more serious than that intended. Hence, an
accused who originally intended to conceal and to bury what he
The Facts
thought was the lifeless body of the victim can be held liable as
a principal, not simply as an accessory, where it is proven that
the said victim was actually alive but subsequently died as a Evidence for the Prosecution
direct result of such concealment and burial. Nonetheless, in the
present case, Appellant Garcia cannot be held liable as a The trial court summarized the testimonies of the prosecution
principal because the prosecution failed to allege such death witnesses as follows:9
through drowning in the Information. Neither may said
appellant be held liable as an accessory due to his relationship Diosdado Quitlong substantially testified that
with the principal killer, Appellant Ortega, who is his brother- on October 15, 1992 at about 5:30 in the
in-law. afternoon, he, the victim Andre Mar
Masangkay, Ariel Caranto, Romeo Ortega,
Statement of the Case Roberto San Andres were having a drinking
spree in the compound near the house of
This case springs from the joint appeal interposed by Appellants Benjamin Ortega, Jr. at Daangbakal,
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia from the Dalandanan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. That
Decision,1 dated February 9, 1994 written by Judge Adriano R. while they were drinking, accused Benjamin
Osorio,2 finding them guilty of murder. Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia who were
[already] drunk arrived and joined them.
That victim Andre Mar Masangkay answered
Appellants were charged by State Prosecutor Bernardo S. Razon
the call of nature and went to the back portion
in an Information3 dated October 19, 1992, as follows:
of the house. That accused Benjamin Ortega,
Jr. followed him and later they [referring to
That on or about October 17, 1992 in the participants in the drinking session] heard
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines and the victim Andre Mar shouted, "Don't, help
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable me!" (Huwag, tulungan ninyo ako!) That he
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and Ariel Caranto ran towards the back
together and mutually helping one another, portion of the house and [they] saw accused
without any justifiable cause, with treachery Benjamin Ortega, Jr., on top of Andre Mar
and evident premeditation and with abuse of Masangkay who was lying down in a canal
superior strenght (sic) and with deliberate with his face up and stabbing the latter with a
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, long bladed weapon. That Ariel Caranto ran
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and fetched Benjamin Ortega, Sr., the father
and stab repeatedly with a pointed weapon of accused Benjamin, Jr. That he [Quitlong]
on the different parts of the body one ANDRE went to Romeo Ortega in the place where
MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA, thereby they were having the drinking session [for the
inflicting upon the latter serious physical latter] to pacify his brother Benjamin, Jr. That
injuries which directly caused his death. Romeo Ortega went to the place of the
stabbing and together with Benjamin Ortega,
During arraignment, Appellants Ortega and Garcia, assisted by Jr. and Manuel Garcia lifted Andre Mar
counsel de oficio,4 pleaded not guilty to the charge.5Accused Masangkay from the canal and brought
"John Doe" was then at large.6 After trial in due course, the Andre Mar to the well and dropped the latter
court a quo promulgated the questioned Decision. The inside the well. That Romeo Ortega, Benjamin
dispositive portion reads:7 Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia then dropped
stones measuring 11 to 12 inches high, 2 feet
in length and 11 to 12 inches in weight to the Masangkay was courting Raquel Ortega. That
body of Andre Mar Masangkay inside the Raquel Ortega asked permission from Andre
well. That Romeo Ortega warned him Mar Masangkay when she left between 8:00
[Quitlong] not to tell anybody of what he saw. and 9:00 p.m. That there was no trouble that
That he answered in the affirmative and he occurred during the drinking session.
was allowed to go home. That his house is
about 200 meters from Romeo Ortega's house. PNP Superintendent Leonardo Orig
That upon reaching home, his conscience substantially testified that Diosdado Quitlong
bothered him and he told his mother what he is his neighbor for about 9 years. That on
witnessed. That he went to the residence of October 16, 1992 at 5:00 in the morning, he
Col. Leonardo Orig and reported the matter. was summoned by Diosdado Quitlong and
That Col. Orig accompanied him to the reported to him the stabbing incident that
Valenzuela Police Station and some police occurred at Daangbakal near the subdivision
officers went with them to the crime scene. he is living. That he relayed the information
That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and to the Valenzuela Police Station and a police
Manuel Garcia were apprehended and were team under police officer Param accompanied
brought to the police station. them to the place. That he asked the police
officers to verify if there is a body of person
On cross-examination, he said that he did not inside the well. That the well was covered
talk to the lawyer before he was presented as with stones and he asked the police officers to
witness in this case. That he narrated the seek the help of theneighbors (sic) to remove
incident to his mother on the night he the stones inside the well. That after the
witnessed the killing on October 15, 1992. stones were removed, the body of the victim
That on October 15, 1992 at 5:30 in the was found inside the well. That the lifeless
afternoon when he arrived, victim Andre Mar body was pulled out from the well. That the
Masangkay, Romeo Ortega, Serafin and one body has several stab wounds. That he came
Boyet were already having [a] drinking spree to know the victim as Andre Mar Masangkay.
and he joined them. That accused Benjamin That two men were arrested by the police
Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia were not yet in officers.
the place. That the stabbing happened
between 12:00 midnight and 12:30 a.m. That On cross-examination, he said that he saw the
they drank gin with finger foods such as pork body when taken out of the well with several
and shell fish. That he met the victim Andre stab wounds. That Diosdado Quitlong told
Mar Masangkay only on that occasion. That him that he was drinking with the victim and
accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel the assailants at the time of the incident. That
Garcia joined them at about 11:00 p.m. That Benjamin Ortega, Jr. stabbed the victim while
there was no altercation between Benjamin the latter was answering the call of nature.
Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia in one hand
and Andre Mar Masangkay, during the
NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ludivico J.
drinking session. That at about 12:30 a.m.
Lagat substantially testified that he
Andre Mar Masangkay answered the call of
conducted [an] autopsy on the cadaver of
nature and went to the back portion of the
Andre Mar Masangkay on October 16, 1992 at
house. That he cannot see Andre Mar
the Valenzuela Memorial Homes located at
Masangkay from the place they were having
Macarthur Highway. That he prepared the
the drinking session. That he did not see what
autopsy report and the sketch of human head
happened to Andre Mar Masangkay. That he
and body indicating the location of the stab
only heard Masangkay asking for help. That
wounds. That the cause of death is multiple
accused Manuel Garcia was still in the
stab wounds, contributory, [a]sphyxia by
drinking session when he heard Masangkay
submersion in water. That there were 13 stab
was asking for help. That Benjamin Ortega, Jr.
wounds, 8 of which were on the frontal part
and Manuel Garcia are his friends and
of the body, 2 at the back and there were
neighbors. That when he heard Andre Mar
contused abrasions around the neck and on
Masangkay was asking for help, he and Ariel
the left arm. There was stab wound at the left
Caranto ran to the back portion of the house
side of the neck. That the contused abrasion
and saw Benjamin Ortega, Jr. on top of Andre
could be produced by cord or wire or rope.
Mar Masangkay and stabbing the latter. That
That there is (an) incised wound on the left
Andre Mar Masangkay was lying down with
forearm. That the stab wounds which were
his back in the canal and Benjamin Ortega, Jr.
backward downward of the body involved
on top stabbing the former. That he did not
the lungs. That the victim was in front of the
see any injuries on Benjamin Ortega, Jr. That
assailant. That the stab wound on the upper
he called Romeo Ortega to pacify his brother
left shoulder was caused when the assailant
Benjamin, Jr. That he did not do anything to
was in front of the victim. That the assailant
separate Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and
was in front of the victim when the stab
Masangkay. That he knows that Andre Mar
 wound near the upper left armpit was urinating. 14 After he was through, Masangkay approached him
inflicted as well as the stab wound on the left and asked where his sister was. He answered that he did not
chest wall. That the stab wound on the back know. Without warning, Masangkay allegedly boxed him in the
left side of the body and the stab wound on mouth, an attack that induced bleeding and caused him to fall
the back right portion of the body may be on his back. When he was about to stand up, Masangkay drew
produced when the assailant was at the back a knife and stabbed him, hitting him on the left arm, thereby
of the victim. That the assailant was in front immobilizing him. Masangkay then gripped his neck with his
of the victim when the stab wound[s] on the left arm and threatened to kill him. Unable to move, Ortega
left elbow and left arm were inflicted. That the shouted for help. Quitlong came and, to avoid being stabbed,
large airway is filled with muddy particles grabbed Masangkay's right hand which was holding the knife.
indicating that the victim was alive when the Quitlong was able to wrest the knife from Masangkay and, with
victim inhaled the muddy particles. The heart it, he stabbed Masangkay ten (10) times successively, in the left
is filled with multiple hemorrhage, loss of chest and in the middle of the stomach. When
blood or decreased of blood. The lungs is the stabbing started, Ortega moved to the left side of Masangkay
filled with water or muddy particles. The to avoid being hit.15 Quitlong chased Masangkay who ran
brain is pale due to loss of blood. The stomach towards the direction of the well. Thereafter, Ortega went home
is one half filled with muddy particles which and treated his injured left armpit and lips. Then, he slept.
could [have been] taken in when submerged
in water. When he woke up at six o'clock the following morning, he saw
police officers in front of his house. Taking him with them, the
On cross-examination, he said that he found lawmen proceeded to the well. From the railroad tracks where
13 stab wounds on the body of the victim. he was asked to sit, he saw the police officers lift the body of a
That he cannot tell if the assailant or the dead person from the well. He came to know the identity of the
victim were standing. That it is possible that dead person only after the body was taken to the police
the stab wounds was (sic) inflicted when both headquarters. 16
[referring to participants] were standing or
the victim was lying down and the assailant The Trial Court's Discussion
was on top. That he cannot tell the number of
the assailants.
The trial court explained its basis for appellants' conviction as
follows: 17
Evidence for the Appellants
The Court is convinced that the concerted acts
Appellant Manuel Garcia testified that in the early morning of of accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel
October 15, 1992, he and his wife, Maritess Garcia, brought their Garcia, Jr. and one Romeo Ortega in lifting,
feverish daughter, Marjorie, to the Polo Emergency Hospital. He carrying and dumping the victim Andre Mar
left the hospital at seven o'clock in the morning, went home, Masangkay who was still alive and breathing
changed his clothes and went to work. 10 After office hours, he inside the deep well filled with water, head
and Benjamin Ortega, Jr. passed by the canteen at their place of first and threw big stones/rocks inside the
work. After drinking beer, they left at eight o'clock in the well to cover the victim is a clear indication of
evening and headed home. En route, they chanced on Diosdado the community of design to finish/kill victim
Quitlong alias Mac-mac and Andre Mar Masangkay, who Andre Mar Masangkay. Wounded and
invited them to join their own drinking spree. Thereupon, unarmed victim Andre Mar Masangkay was
Appellant Garcia's wife came and asked him to go home in no position to flee and/or defend himself
because their daughter was still sick. To alleviate his daughter's against the three malefactors. Conspiracy and
illness, he fetched his mother-in-law who performed a ritual the taking advantage of superior strength
called "tawas." After the ritual, he remained at home and were in attendance. The crime committed by
attended to his sick daughter. He then fell asleep but was the accused is Murder.
awakened by police officers at six o'clock in the morning of the
following day.
Concert of action at the moment of
consummating the crime and the form and
Maritess Garcia substantially corroborated the testimony of her manner in which assistance is rendered to the
husband. She however added two other participants in the person inflicting the fatal wound may
drinking session aside from Diosdado Quitlong alias Mac-mac determine complicity where it would not
and Andre Mar Masangkay, namely, a MangSerafin and Boyet otherwise be evidence (People vs. Yu, 80
Santos. 11 SCRA 382 (1977)).

Benjamin Ortega, Jr. likewise substantially corroborated the Every person criminally liable for a felony is
testimony of Appellant Manuel Garcia. 12 According to him, also civilly liable. Accused (m)ust reimburse
between eleven and twelve o'clock in the evening, Masangkay the heirs of victim Andre Mar Masangkay the
left the drinking session. Thirty (30) minutes after Masangkay amount of P35,000.00 for the funeral expenses
left, he also left the drinking place to urinate. 13 He went behind of the deceased.
the house where he saw Masangkay peeping through the room
of his sister Raquel. He ignored Masangkay and continued
 The Issues The Court has listened intently to the
narration of the accused and their witnesses
In their ten-page brief, appellants fault the trial court with the and the prosecution witnesses and has keenly
following: 18 observed their behavior and demeanor on the
witness stand and is convinced that the story
of the prosecution is the more believable
I. The trial court erred in
version. Prosecution eyewitness Diosdado
holding that there is
Quitlong appeared and sounded credible and
conspiracy on the basis of
his credibility is reinforced by the fact that he
the prosecution's evidence
has no reason to testify falsely against the
that at the time both
accused. It was Diosdado Quitlong who
accused and one Romeo
reported the stabbing incident to the police
Ortega lifted the body of
authorities. If Quitlong stabbed and killed the
Andrew Masangkay from
victim Masangkay, he will keep away from
where he succumbed due
the police authorities and will go in hiding. . .
to stab wounds and
.
brought and drop said
body of Andrew
Masangkay to the well to Because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the
commit murder; witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the stand as they
rendered their testimonies, its evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses is entitled to the highest respect. Therefore, unless the
II. The trial court erred in
trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and
finding and holding that
value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, his
Andrew Masangkay was
assessment of credibility must be respected. 20
still alive at the time his
body was dropped in the
well; In the instant case, we have meticulously scoured the records
and found no reason to reverse the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies 21 insofar as
III. The trial court erred in
Appellant Ortega is concerned. The narration of Eyewitness
convicting Manuel Garcia
Diosdado Quitlong appears to be spontaneous and consistent. It
and in not acquitting the
is straightforward, detailed, vivid and logical. Thus, it clearly
latter of the crime charged;
deserves full credence.
and

On the other hand, in asserting alibi and denial, the defense

IV. The trial court erred in
bordered on the unbelievable. Appellant Ortega claimed that
not finding that if at all
after he was able to free himself from Masangkay's grip, he went
Benjamin Ortega Jr. is
home, treated his injuries and slept. 22This is not the ordinary
guilty only of homicide
reaction of a person assaulted. If Ortega's version of the assault
alone.
was true, he should have immediately reported the matter to the
police authorities, if only out of gratitude to Quitlong who came
On the basis of the records and the arguments raised by the to his rescue. Likewise, it is difficult to believe that a man would
appellants and the People, we believe that the question to be just sleep after someone was stabbed in his own backyard.
resolved could be simplified thus: What are the criminal Further, we deem it incredible that Diosdado Quitlong would
liabilities, if any, of Appellants Ortega and Garcia? stab Masangkay ten (10) times successively, completely
ignoring Benjamin Ortega, Jr. who was grappling with
The Court's Ruling Masangkay. Also inconsistent with human experience is his
narration that Masangkay persisted in choking him instead of
We find the appeal partly meritorious. Appellant Ortega is defending himself from the alleged successive stabbing of
guilty only of homicide. Appellant Garcia deserves acquittal. Quitlong.23 The natural tendency of a person under attack is to
defend himself and not to persist in choking a defenseless third
person.
First Issue: Liability of Appellant Ortega

Murder or Homicide?
The witnesses for the prosecution and defense presented
conflicting narrations. The prosecution witnesses described the
commission of the crime and positively identified appellants as Although treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of
the perpetrators. The witnesses for the defense, on the other superior strength were alleged in the information, the trial court
hand, attempted to prove denial and alibi. As to which of the found the presence only of abuse of superior strength.
two contending versions speaks the truth primarily rests on a
critical evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses and their We disagree with the trial court's finding. Abuse of superior
stories. In this regard, the trial court held: 19 strength requires deliberate intent on the part of the accused to
take advantage of such superiority. It must be shown that the
accused purposely used excessive force that was manifestly out
of proportion to the means available to the victim's defense. 24 In Q What happened next?
this light, it is necessary to evaluate not only the physical
condition and weapon of the protagonists but also the various A While we were there
incidents of the event. 25 together and we were
drinking ... (interrupted by
In his testimony, Witness Dominador Quitlong mentioned Atty. Altuna)
nothing about Appellant Ortega's availment of force excessively
out of proportion to the means of defense available to the victim Q Who is that "we"?
to defend himself. Quitlong described the assault made by
Appellant Ortega as follows: 26
A Referring to Benjamin
Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia,
ATTY. ALTUNA: Ariel Caranto, Romeo
Ortega, Roberto San
Q Will you please tell me Andres, myself and
the place and date wherein Andrew Masangkay.
you have a drinking spree Andrew Masangkay
with Andrew Masangkay answer to a call of nature
and where you witnessed a and went to the back
stabbing incident? portion of the house, and
Benjamin Ortega, Jr.
A It was on October 15, followed him where he
1992, sir, at about 5:30 in was.
the afternoon we were
drinking in the house of Q What happened next?
Mr. Benjamin Ortega, Sr.,
because the house of A And afterwards we
Benjamin Ortega Sr. and heard a shout and the
the house of his son shout said "Huwag,
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. are tulungan n'yo ako".
near each other.
Q From whom did you
xxx xxx xxx hear this utterance?

Q Mr. Witness, who were A The shout came from

the companions of said Andrew Masangkay.
persons, Benjamin Ortega,
Jr., Manuel Garcia, you (sic)
Q After Benjamin Ortega,
in drinking in said place?
Jr. followed Andrew
Masangkay to answer a call
A The other companions in of nature and after you
the drinking session were heard "huwag, tulungan
Ariel Caranto y Ducay, n'yo ako" coming from the
Roberto San Andres and mouth of the late Andrew
Romeo Ortega. Masangkay, what
happened next?
Q What about this victim,
Andrew Masangkay, A Ariel Caranto and I ran
where was he at that time? towards the back portion of
the house.
A Also the victim, Andrew
Masangkay, he was also Q And what did you see?
there.
A And I saw that Benjamin
Q You said that the two Ortega, Jr. was on top of
accused, Manuel Garcia Andrew Masangkay and
and Benjamin Ortega, Jr. he was stabbing
arrived drunk and joined Masangkay.
the group?
Q Will you please
A Yes, sir. demonstrate to the
Honorable Court how the
 stabbing was done telling We do not agree with the above contention. Article 4, par. 1, of
us the particular position of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be
the late Andrew incurred by "any person committing a felony (delito) although
Masangkay and how the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended."
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. The essential requisites for the application of this provision are
proceeded with the that (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is
stabbing against the late likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong
victim, Andrew was primarily caused by the actor's wrongful acts. In assisting
Masangkay? Appellant Ortega, Jr. carry the body of Masangkay to the well,
Appellant Garcia was committing a felony. The offense was that
INTERPRETER: of concealing the body of the crime to prevent its discovery, i.e.
that of being an accessory in the crime of homicide. 30 Although
Appellant Garcia may have been unaware that the victim was
(At this juncture, the
still alive when he assisted Ortega in throwing the body into the
witness demonstrating.)
well, he is still liable for the direct and natural consequence of
his felonious act, even if the resulting offense is worse than that
Andrew Masangkay was intended.
lying down on a canal with
his face up, then Benjamin
True, Appellant Garcia merely assisted in concealing the body
Ortega, Jr. was
of the victim. But the autopsy conducted by the NBI medico-
"nakakabayo" and with his
legal officer showed that the victim at that time was still alive,
right hand with closed fist
and that he died subsequently of drowning.31That drowning
holding the weapon, he
was the immediate cause of death was medically demonstrated
was thrusting this weapon
by the muddy particles found in the victim's airway, lungs and
on the body of the victim,
stomach. 32 This is evident from the expert testimony given by
he was making downward
the medico-legal officer, quoted below: 33
and upward motion thrust.

ATTY. ALTUNA:
ATTY. ALTUNA: (To the
witness)
Q Will you please explain
this in simple language the
Q How many times did
last portion of Exhibit N,
Benjamin Ortega, Jr.
beginning with "tracheo-
stabbed Andrew
bronchial tree", that is
Masangkay?
sentence immediately after
paragraph 10, 2.5 cms. Will
A I cannot count the you please explain this?
number of times.
A The trancheo-bronchial
It should be noted that Victim Masangkay was a six-footer, tree is filled with muddy
whereas Appellant Ortega, Jr. was only five feet and five inches particles.
tall. 27 There was no testimony as to how the attack was initiated.
The accused and the victim were already grappling when
Q I ask you a question on
Quitlong arrived. Nothing in the foregoing testimony and
this. Could the victim have
circumstances can be interpreted as abuse of superior strength.
possibly get this particular
Hence, Ortega is liable only for homicide, not murder.
material?

Second Issue: Liability of Appellant Manuel Garcia

A No, sir.

Appellants argue that the finding of conspiracy by the trial court

Q What do you mean by
"is based on mere assumption and conjecture . . ." 28 Allegedly,
no?
the medico-legal finding that the large airway was "filled with
muddy particles indicating that the victim was alive when the
victim inhaled the muddy particles" did not necessarily mean A A person should be alive so
that such muddy particles entered the body of the victim while that the muddy particles could
he was still alive. The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Quitlong stated, be inhaled.
"Nilubayan lang nang saksak nang mapatay na si Andrew ni
Benjamin Ortega, Jr." Thus, the prosecution evidence shows Q So, in short, you are
Masangkay was already "dead" when he was lifted and dumped telling or saying to us that
into the well. Hence, Garcia could be held liable only as an if there is no inhaling or the
accessory. 29 taking or receiving of
muddy particles at that
time, the person is still Q And, of course, loss of
alive? blood could be attributed
to the stab wound which is
A Yes, sir. number 13?

Q Second point? A Yes, sir.

A The heart is pale with Q And the last one, under

some multiple petechial the particular point
hemorrhages at the "hemothorax"?
anterior surface.
A It indicates at the right
Q And this may [be] due to side. There are around
stab wounds or asphyxia? 1,400 cc of blood that
accumulate at the thoraxic
cavity and this was
A These are the effects or
admixed with granular
due to asphyxia or
materials?
decreased amount of blood
going to the heart.
Q And what cause the
admixing with granular
Q This asphyxia are you
materials on said particular
referring to is the
portion of the body?
drowning?

A Could be muddy
A Yes, sir.
particles.

Q Next point is the lungs?

Q Due to the taking of
maddy (sic) materials as
A The lungs is also filled affected by asphyxia? Am I
with multiple petechial correct?
hemorrhages.
A It's due to stab wounds
Q What could have caused those muddy particles
this injury of the lungs? which set-in thru the stab
wounds.
A This is due to asphyxia or
the loss of blood. Q So, because of the
opening of the stab
Q Are you saying that the wounds, the muddy
lungs have been filled with particles now came in, in
water or muddy particles? that particular portion of
the body and caused
A Yes, sir. admixing of granular
materials?
Q And, precisely, you are
now testifying that due to A Yes, sir.
stab wounds or asphyxia,
the lungs have been Q Continuing with your
damaged per your Report? report, particularly, the last
two portions, will you
A Yes, sir. please explain the same?

Q Continuing this brain A The hemoperitoneum

and other visceral organs, there are 900 cc of blood
pale. What is this? that accumulated inside
the abdomen.
A The paleness of the brain
and other visceral organs is Q And what could have
due to loss of blood. cause the same?
 A [T]he stab wound of the testimony of the medico-legal officer that all these
abdomen. muddy particles were ingested when the victim was
still alive proved that the victim died of drowning
Q The last one, stomach inside the well.
1/2 filled with muddy
particles. Please explain the The drowning was the direct, natural and logical consequence
same? of the felony that. Appellant Garcia had intended to commit; it
exemplifies praeter intentionem covered by Article 4, par. 1, of the
A The victim could have Revised Penal Code. Under this paragraph, a person may be
taken these when he was convicted of homicide although he had no original intent to
submerged in water. kill. 35

Q What is the take in? In spite of the evidence showing that Appellant Garcia could be
held liable as principal in the crime of homicide, there are,
however, two legal obstacles barring his conviction, even as an
A Muddy particles.
accessory — as prayed for by appellants' counsel himself.

Q And he was still alive at

First. The Information accused Appellant Garcia (and Appellant
that time?
Ortega) of "attack[ing], assault[ing], and stab[bing] repeatedly
with a pointed weapon on the different parts of the body one
A Yes, sir. (Emphasis ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA." The prosecution's
supplied) evidence itself shows that Garcia had nothing to do with the
stabbing which was solely perpetrated by Appellant Ortega. His
A Filipino authority on forensic medicine opines that any of the responsibility relates only to the attempted concealment of the
following medical findings may show that drowning is the crime and the resulting drowning of Victim Masangkay. The
cause of death: 34 hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an accused cannot
be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the
1. The presence of materials complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be
or foreign bodies in the informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
hands of the victim. The To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the
clenching of the hands is a complaint or information would be a violation of this
manifestation of cadaveric constitutional right. 36 Section 14, par. 2, of the 1987 Constitution
spasm in the effort of the explicitly guarantees the following:
victim to save himself from
drowning. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
2. Increase in volume is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
(emphysema aquosum) heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
and edema of the lungs the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
(edema aquosum). to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance
3. Presence of water and
of witnesses and the production of evidence
fluid in the stomach
in his behalf. However, after arraignment,
contents corresponding to
trial may proceed notwithstanding the
the medium where the
absence of the accused provided that he has
body was recovered.
been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable. (Emphasis supplied)
4. Presence of froth, foam
or foreign bodies in the air
In People vs. Pailano, 37 this Court ruled that there can be no
passage found in the
conviction for rape on a woman "deprived of reason or
medium where the victim
otherwise unconscious" where the information charged the
was found.
accused of sexual assault "by using force or intimidation," thus:

5. Presence of water in the

The criminal complaint in this case alleged
middle ear.
the commission of the crime through the first
method although the prosecution sought to
The third and fourth findings were present in the case establish at the trial that the complainant was
of Victim Masangkay. It was proven that his a mental retardate. Its purpose in doing so is
airpassage, or specifically his tracheo-bronchial tree, not clear. But whatever it was, it has not
was filled with muddy particles which were residues succeeded.
at the bottom of the well. Even his stomach was half-
filled with such muddy particles. The unrebutted
 If the prosecution was seeking to convict the crime, . . . in order to prevent its discovery," he can neither be
accused-appellant on the ground that he convicted as an accessory after the fact defined under Article 19,
violated Anita while she was deprived of par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The records show that
reason or unconscious, such conviction could Appellant Garcia is a brother-in-law of Appellant Ortega, 38 the
not have been possible under the criminal latter's sister, Maritess, being his wife. 39 Such relationship
complaint as worded. This described the exempts Appellant Garcia from criminal liability as provided by
offense as having been committed by Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code:
"Antonio Pailano, being then provided with a
scythe, by means of violence and Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal
intimidation, (who) did, then and there, liability. — The penalties prescribed for
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have accessories shall not be imposed upon those
carnal knowledge of the complainant, Anita who are such with respect to their spouses,
Ibañez, 15 years of age, against her will'. No ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural,
mention was made of the second and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives
circumstance. by affinity within the same degrees with the
single exception of accessories falling within
Conviction of the accused-appellant on the the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next
finding that he had raped Anita while she was preceding article.
unconscious or otherwise deprived of reason
— and not through force and intimidation, On the other hand, "the next preceding article" provides:
which was the method alleged — would have
violated his right to be informed of the nature
Art. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having
and cause of the accusation against him.
knowledge of the commission of the crime, and
[Article IV, Sec. 19, Constitution of 1973; now
without having participated therein, either as
Article III, Sec. 14(2)] This right is
principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its
safeguarded by the Constitution to every
commission in any of the following manners:
accused so he can prepare an adequate
defense against the charge against him.
Convicting him of a ground not alleged while 1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by
he is concentrating his defense against the the effects of the crime.
ground alleged would plainly be unfair and
underhanded. This right was, of course, 2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the
available to the herein accused-appellant. effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its
discovery.
In People vs. Ramirez, [fn: 69 SCRA 144] we
held that a person charged with rape could 3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the
not be found guilty of qualified seduction, principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with
which had not been alleged in the criminal abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of
complaint against him. In the case of People the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an
vs. Montes, [fn: 122 SCRA 409] the Court did attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is
not permit the conviction for homicide of a known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
person held responsible for the suicide of the
woman he was supposed to have raped, as Appellant Garcia, being a covered relative by affinity of the
the crime he was accused of — and acquitted principal accused, Benjamin Ortega, Jr., is legally entitled to the
— was not homicide but rape. More to the aforequoted exempting provision of the Revised Penal Code.
point is Tubb v. People of the Philippines, [fn: 101 This Court is thus mandated by law to acquit him.
Phil. 114] where the accused was charged
with the misappropriation of funds held by
Penalty and Damages
him in trust with the obligation to return the
same under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the
Revised Penal Code, but was convicted of The award of actual damages should be reduced to P31,790.00
swindling by means of false pretenses, under from P35,000.00. The former amount was proven both by
paragraph 2(b) of the said Article, which was documentary evidence and by the testimony of Melba Lozano,
not alleged in the information. The Court said a sister of the victim. 38 Of the expenses alleged to have been
such conviction would violate the Bill of incurred, the Court can give credence only to those that are
Rights. supported by receipts and appear to have been genuinely
incurred in connection with the death of the victim. 39 However,
in line with current jurisprudence, 40 Appellant Ortega shall also
By parity of reasoning, Appellant Garcia cannot be convicted of
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P50,000.00.
homicide through drowning in an information that charges
Indemnity requires no proof other than the fact of death and
murder by means of stabbing.
appellant's responsibility therefor. 43

Second. Although the prosecution was able to prove that

Appellant Garcia assisted in "concealing . . . the body of the
The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal under Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code, which is imposable in its medium
period, absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, as in
the case of Appellant Ortega. Because he is entitled to the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term
shall be one degree lower, that is, prision mayor.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the joint appeal is PARTLY

GRANTED. Appellant Benjamin Ortega, Jr. is found GUILTY of
homicide and sentenced to ten (10) years of prision
mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum. Appellant Ortega, Jr. is also ORDERED to pay the
heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity and P31,790.00 as
actual damages. Appellant Manuel Garcia is ACQUITTED. His
immediate release from confinement is ORDERED unless he is
detained for some other valid cause.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988 married, residing at Barangay Anonang, San
Fabian, Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner, found the following:
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE 1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. upper portion of the lesser palmar
prominence, right.

As to my observation the incapacitation is

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: from (7-9) days period. This wound was
presented to me only for medico-legal
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate examination, as it was already treated by the
other doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)
Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the then Circuit
Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno
Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier
agreed to settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay
The records disclose the following facts of the case. P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October
27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San
Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, Torio recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:
petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay
Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters
xxx xxx xxx
from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place
where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the
irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr
the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there 592 on page 257 both parties appeared before
he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked this Station accompanied by brgy.
them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case
and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry amicably, for they are neighbors and close
and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier
between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet accepted and granted forgiveness to
long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier Filomeno Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the
hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in expenses in his medical treatment, and
parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away promising to him and to this Office that this
from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him will never be repeated anymore and not to
again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said harbour any grudge against each other. (p. 87,
bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack Original Records.)
and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented
him from hacking Javier. Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On
November 3, 1980, the additional P300.00 was given to Javier at
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Urbano's house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven.
Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50 meters away from
where the incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to
Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition.
Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was
the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went to the having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally
police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was
by Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing
went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by
Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that tetanus.
they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available
medicine. On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the
hospital. The medical findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions
returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico- Date Diagnosis
legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate
(Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

adm. at DX TETANUS

This is to certify that I have examined the

1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-
wound of Marcelo Javier, 20 years of age,
#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile o
u
11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa- n
c
e
tion of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.
d
d
02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscita- e
a
tion and cardiac massage done but to no avail. d
b
Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M. y
D
r
PMC done and cadaver brought home by rela-
a
.
tives. (p. 100, Original Records) C
a
b
u
t g
i a
o o
n a
a t
n 4
d :
c 1
a 8
r P
d .
i M
a .
c
m P
a M
s C
s d
a o
g n
e e
d a
o n
n d
e c
b a
u d
t a
t v
o e
n r
o b
a r
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a u
i g
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. t
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P o
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o e
n b
y
 New
r Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the
decision,
e in view of the nature of his penalty.
l
a then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction
The
- Urbano on appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the
of
heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the
appellant.
t
i
v appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new
The
e
trial. The motion for new trial was based on an affidavit of
s
Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:
.
(
That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio
p
Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to
.
the present having been re-elected to such
1
position in the last barangay elections on May
0
17, 1982;

That sometime in the first week of November,

1980, there was a typhoon that swept
Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon
including San Fabian, a town of said
province;

That during the typhoon, the sluice or control

gates of the Bued irrigation dam which
irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were
closed and/or controlled so much so that
water and its flow to the canals and ditches
were regulated and reduced;

That due to the locking of the sluice or control

gates of the dam leading to the canals and
ditches which will bring water to the
ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches
became shallow which was suitable for
catching mudfishes;

That after the storm, I conducted a personal

survey in the area affected, with my secretary
Perfecto Jaravata;

That on November 5, 1980, while I was

conducting survey, I saw the late Marcelo
0
Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation
,
canals with some companions;
O
)
That few days there after,or on November l5,
l980, I came to know that said Marcelo Javier
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was
died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)
charged with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit
Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the
trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the
suffer an indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) petition.
YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised
maximum, together with the accessories of the law, to Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be
indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito)
of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was ordered confined at the intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally
responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus
for all the natural and logical consequences resulting germs.
therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the
petitioner who used a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the
2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on November 14, wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered
1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with
rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition and that on the tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not
following day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus. clear from the record.

Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted
death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's the following definition of proximate cause:
unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's
death. Thus, the appellate court said: xxx xxx xxx

The claim of appellant that there was an ... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause
efficient cause which supervened from the is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of
time the deceased was wounded to the time American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-
of his death, which covers a period of 23 days appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
does not deserve serious consideration. True,
that the deceased did not die right away from
... "that cause, which, in natural and
his wound, but the cause of his death was due
continuous sequence, unbroken by any
to said wound which was inflicted by the
efficient intervening cause, produces the
appellant. Said wound which was in the
injury, and without which the result would
process of healing got infected with tetanus
not have occurred."And more
which ultimately caused his death.
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause
is that acting first and producing the injury,
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth either immediately or by setting other events
General Hospital testified that the victim in motion, all constituting a natural and
suffered lockjaw because of the infection of continuous chain of events, each having a
the wound with tetanus. And there is no other close causal connection with its immediate
way by which he could be infected with predecessor, the final event in the chain
tetanus except through the wound in his palm immediately effecting the injury as a natural
(tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the and probable result of the cause which first
proximate cause of the victim's death was the acted, under such circumstances that the
wound which got infected with tetanus. And person responsible for the first event should,
the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent
accused is liable for all the consequences of person, have reasonable ground to expect at
his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. the moment of his act or default that an injury
People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v. to some person might probably result
Cornel 78 Phil. 418). therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)

Appellant's allegation that the proximate The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an
cause of the victim's death was due to his own efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded
negligence in going back to work without his until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability
wound being properly healed, and lately, that for Javier's death.
he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals
in the first week of November, 1980, is an
We look into the nature of tetanus-
afterthought, and a desperate attempt by
appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he
found himself in. If the wound had not yet The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time
healed, it is impossible to conceive that the between injury and the appearance of
deceased would be reckless enough to work unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days.
with a disabled hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo) However, over 80 percent of patients become
symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation
period indicates severe disease, and when
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the
the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that
Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he
Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as
returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare
restlessness, irritability, and headache are
encountered occasionally, but the commonest
 presenting complaints are pain and stiffness In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his
in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in
swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After
way to rigidity, and patients often complain 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of
of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day,
trismus in the commonest manifestation of November 15, 1980, he died.
tetanus and is responsible for the familiar
descriptive name of lockjaw. As more If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was
muscles are involved, rigidity becomes already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more
generalized, and sustained contractions medically probable that Javier should have been infected with
called risus sardonicus. The intensity and only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus
sequence of muscle involvement is quite appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than
variable. In a small proportion of patients, 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time
only local signs and symptoms develop in the should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the
region of the injury. In the vast majority, second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is
however, most muscles are involved to some that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant,
degree, and the signs and symptoms the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
encountered depend upon the major muscle Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with
groups affected. tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
of the first symptom, an interval referred to as the
onset time. As in the case of the incubation The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural,
period, a short onset time is associated with a and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing
sudden intensification of afferent stimuli with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the
arising in the periphery, which increases victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable
rigidity and causes simultaneous and doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
excessive contraction of muscles and their possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an
antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
dangerous. As the disease progresses, wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
intense and longer lasting spasms with
increasing frequency. Respiration may be
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was
impaired by laryngospasm or tonic
but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to
contraction of respiratory muscles which
take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been
prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may
the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner
then lead to irreversible central nervous
had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v.
system damage and death.
Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).

Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the
period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more
be of an action if such remote cause did
than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but
dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms nothing more than furnish the condition or
give rise to the occasion by which the injury
are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus
was made possible, if there intervened
has a somewhat shorter incubation period
between such prior or remote cause and the
and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia
injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
and generalized rigidity are present, but
ventilation remains adequate even during efficient cause of the injury, even though such
injury would not have happened but for such
spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in
include a short incubation time, and an onset
the condition except because of the
time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus,
independent cause, such condition was not
dysphagia and rigidity and frequent
prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets into
(Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine,
operation the instances which result in injury
1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis
supplied) because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate
cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found
inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the
disease. It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot
free of criminal liability. At the very least, the records show he
is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the
petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by
the victim's own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and deplorable consequences.
Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a Such reasoning fails to
compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while draw a clear line of
Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement demarcation between
of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of criminal liability and civil
Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People responsibility, and to
v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16). determine the logical result
of the distinction. The two
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate liabilities are separate and
cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this distinct from each other.
rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the One affects the social order
petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine and the other, private
is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly rights. One is for the
liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et punishment or correction
al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said: of the offender while the
other is for reparation of
damages suffered by the
xxx xxx xxx
aggrieved party. The two
responsibilities are so
... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal different from each other
prosecution must be established beyond that article 1813 of the
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of present (Spanish) Civil
evidence is required in a civil action for Code reads thus: "There
damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The may be a compromise
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil upon the civil action
liability of the accused only when it includes arising from a crime; but
a declaration that the facts from which the the public action for the
civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla imposition of the legal
v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559). penalty shall not thereby be
extinguished." It is just and
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of proper that, for the
the Civil Code, which provides that the purposes of the
acquittal of the accused on the ground that his imprisonment of or fine
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable upon the accused, the
doubt does not necessarily exempt him from offense should be proved
civil liability for the same act or omission, has beyond reasonable doubt.
been explained by the Code Commission as But for the purpose of
follows: indemnity the complaining
party, why should the
The old rule that the offense also be proved
acquittal of the accused in a beyond reasonable doubt?
criminal case also releases Is not the invasion or
him from civil liability is violation of every private
one of the most serious right to be proved only by
flaws in the Philippine a preponderance of
legal system. It has given evidence? Is the right of the
use to numberless aggrieved person any less
instances of miscarriage of private because the
justice, where the acquittal wrongful act is also
was due to a reasonable punishable by the criminal
doubt in the mind of the law?
court as to the guilt of the
accused. The reasoning "For these reasons, the
followed is that inasmuch Commission recommends
as the civil responsibility is the adoption of the reform
derived from the criminal under discussion. It will
offense, when the latter is correct a serious defect in
not proved, civil liability our law. It will close up an
cannot be demanded. inexhaustible source of
injustice-a cause for
This is one of those causes disillusionment on the part
where confused thinking of the innumerable persons
leads to unfortunate and injured or wronged."
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification
imposed by the trial court to P30,000.00. However, since the
indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the
petitioner was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case
calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so
minded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The

questioned decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court,
now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de
oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987 xxx xxx xxx

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, On arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The
vs. Solicitor General states accurately the facts as follows:
FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant.
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused
Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had illicit
relationship. The illicit relationship
SARMIENTO, J.: apparently began while the accused was in
Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar
examinations. His wife was left behind in
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court
their residence in Tacloban, Leyte (pp. 45-47,
of Palo, Leyte, sentencing the accused-appellant Francisco
65, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984).
Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder with double
frustrated murder.
On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his
residence in Tacloban, Leyte. On the morning
The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence
of that date he went to the bus station to go to
imposed. With the approval of the new Constitution, abolishing
Dolores, Eastern Samar, to fetch his daughter.
the penalty of death and commuting all existing death sentences
However, he was not able to catch the first
to life imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to
trip (in the morning). He went back to the
inform us whether or not he wished to pursue the case as an
station in the afternoon to take the 2:00 o'clock
appealed case. In compliance therewith, he filed a statement
trip but the bus had engine trouble and could
informing us that he wished to continue with the case by way of
not leave (pp. 5-8, tsn, Nov. 28, 1985). The
an appeal.
accused, then proceeded to the residence of
his father after which he went home. He
The information (amended) in this case reads as follows: arrived at his residence at the V & G
Subdivision in Tacloban City at around 6:00
xxx xxx xxx o'clock in the afternoon (pp. 8-9, tsn, Id.).

The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Upon reaching home, the accused found his
Tacloban accuses Francisco Abarca of the wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of
crime of Murder with Double Frustrated sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh
Murder, committed as follows: noticed the accused, the wife pushed her
paramour who got his revolver. The accused
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1984, in who was then peeping above the built-in
the City of Tacloban, Philippines and within cabinet in their room jumped and ran away
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the (pp. 9-13, tsn, Id.).
above-named accused, with deliberate intent
to kill and with evident premeditation, and The accused went to look for a firearm at
with treachery, armed with an unlicensed Tacloban City. He went to the house of a PC
firearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, did then and soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving there at
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously around 6:30 p.m. He got Talbo's firearm, an
attack and shot several times KHINGSLEY M-16 rifle, and went back to his house at V &
PAUL KOH on the different parts of his body, G Subdivision. He was not able to find his
thereby inflicting upon said KHINGSLEY wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the
PAUL KOH gunshot wounds which caused "mahjong session" as it was the "hangout" of
his instantaneous death and as a consequence Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh
of which also caused gunshot wounds to playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh
LINA AMPARADO and ARNOLD three times with his rifle (pp. 13-19, tsn, Id.).
AMPARADO on the different parts of their Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado who
bodies thereby inflicting gunshot wounds were occupying a room adjacent to the room
which otherwise would have caused the where Koh was playing mahjong were also
death of said Lina Amparado and Arnold hit by the shots fired by the accused (pp. 34-
Amparado, thus performing all the acts of 49, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984). Kingsley Koh died
execution which should have produced the instantaneously of cardiorespiratory arrest
crimes of murders as a consequence, but due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of multiple gunshot wounds on the head, trunk
causes independent of his will, that is by the and abdomen (pp. 28-29, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984;
timely and able medical assistance rendered see also exh. A): Arnold Amparado was
to Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado hospitalized and operated on in the kidney to
which prevented their death. 1 remove a bullet (pp. 17-23, tsn, Oct. 17, 1984;
see also exh. C). His wife, Lina Amparado,
was also treated in the hospital as she was hit
 by bullet fragments (p. 23, tsn, Id.). Arnold CONVICTION UNDER ARTICLE 247 OF THE REVISED
Amparado who received a salary of nearly PENAL CODE;
P1,000.00 a month was not able to work for 1-
1/2 months because of his wounds. He spent II.
P15,000.00 for medical expenses while his
wife spent Pl,000.00 for the same purpose (pp.
IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS AMENDED BY THE
24-25, tsn, Id. ). 2
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY. 4

On March 17, 1986, the trial court rendered the appealed

The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of
judgment, the dispositive portion whereof reads as follows:
the Revised Penal Code defining death inflicted under
exceptional circumstances, complexed with double frustrated
xxx xxx xxx murder. Article 247 reads in full:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Francisco ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted
Abarca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the under exceptional circumstances. — Any legally
complex crime of murder with double married person who, having surprised his
frustrated murder as charged in the amended spouse in the act of committing sexual
information, and pursuant to Art. 63 of the intercourse with another person, shall kill any
Revised Penal Code which does not consider of them or both of them in the act or
the effect of mitigating or aggravating immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon
circumstances when the law prescribes a them any serious physical injury, shall suffer
single indivisible penalty in relation to Art. the penalty of destierro.
48, he is hereby sentenced to death, to
indemnify the heirs of Khingsley Paul Koh in
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries
the sum of P30,000, complainant spouses
of any other kind, he shall be exempt from
Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of
punishment.
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00),
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. These rules shall be applicable, under the
same circumstances, to parents with respect
to their daughters under eighteen years of
It appears from the evidence that the
age, and their seducers, while the daughters
deceased Khingsley Paul Koh and
are living with their parents.
defendant's wife had illicit relationship while
he was away in Manila; that the accused had
been deceived, betrayed, disgraced and Any person who shall promote or facilitate
ruined by his wife's infidelity which prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall
disturbed his reasoning faculties and otherwise have consented to the infidelity of
deprived him of the capacity to reflect upon the other spouse shall not be entitled to the
his acts. Considering all these circumstances benefits of this article.
this court believes the accused Francisco
Abarca is deserving of executive clemency, We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted
not of full pardon but of a substantial if not a provision applies in the instant case. There is no question that
radical reduction or commutation of his death the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in
sentence. this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he
went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished her Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally
Excellency, the President of the Philippines, married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
thru the Ministry of Justice, Manila. sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any
of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter.
These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in
SO ORDERED. 3
convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.

xxx xxx xxx

Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed
between the time the accused-appellant discovered his wife
The accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter
by the court a quo: was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the
continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-
I. appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused
"shall kill any of them or both of them . . . immediately" after
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that
CHARGED INSTEAD OF ENTERING A JUDGMENT OF he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only
requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the
outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his
spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have That the article in question defines no crime is
been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must made more manifest when we consider that
not have been influenced by external factors. The killing must its counterpart in the old Penal Code (Article
be the direct by-product of the accused's rage. 423) was found under the General Provisions
(Chapter VIII) of Title VIII covering crimes
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not against persons. There can, we think, hardly
define an offense. 5 In People v. Araque, 6 we said: be any dispute that as part of the general
provisions, it could not have possibly
provided for a distinct and separate crime.
xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

As may readily be seen from its provisions
and its place in the Code, the above-quoted
article, far from defining a felony, merely We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the
provides or grants a privilege or benefit — Revised Penal Code does not define and
amounting practically to an exemption from provide for a specific crime, but grants a
an adequate punishment — to a legally privilege or benefit to the accused for the
married person or parent who shall surprise killing of another or the infliction of serious
his spouse or daughter in the act of physical injuries under the circumstances
committing sexual intercourse with another, therein mentioned. ... 7
and shall kill any or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon xxx xxx xxx
them any serious physical injury. Thus, in
case of death or serious physical injuries, Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He
considering the enormous provocation and is banished, but that is intended for his protection. 8
his righteous indignation, the accused — who
would otherwise be criminally liable for the
It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional
crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or
circumstances, not being a punishable act, cannot be qualified
serious physical injury, as the case may be —
by either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying
is punished only with destierro. This penalty is
circumstances, We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in
mere banishment and, as held in a case, is
this case.
intended more for the protection of the
accused than a punishment. (People vs.
Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) And where physical The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant
injuries other than serious are inflicted, the for the physical injuries suffered by Lina Amparado and Arnold
offender is exempted from punishment. In Amparado who were caught in the crossfire as the accused-
effect, therefore, Article 247, or the appellant shot the victim. The Solicitor General recommends a
exceptional circumstances mentioned therein, finding of double frustrated murder against the accused-
amount to an exempting circumstance, for appellant, and being the more severe offense, proposes the
even where death or serious physical injuries imposition of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. This is where
as to result to no punishment at all. A we disagree. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to
different interpretation, i.e., that it defines kill the Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one committing
and penalizes a distinct crime, would make an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule
the exceptional circumstances which presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony. 9
practically exempt the accused from criminal
liability integral elements of the offense, and But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-
thereby compel the prosecuting officer to appellant was not committing murder when he discharged his
plead, and, incidentally, admit them, in the rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional
information. Such an interpretation would be circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold the
illogical if not absurd, since a mitigating and appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered
much less an exempting circumstance cannot by the Amparados.
be an integral element of the crime charged.
Only "acts or omissons . . . constituting the This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is
offense" should be pleaded in a complaint or totally free from any responsibility. Granting the fact that he was
information, and a circumstance which not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim,
mitigates criminal liability or exempts the he cannot be said to be entirely without fault. While it appears
accused therefrom, not being an essential that before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words ("an
element of the offense charged-but a matter of waray labot kagawas,") 10 that is not enough a precaution to
defense that must be proved to the absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. We
satisfaction of the court-need not be pleaded. nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold
(Sec. 5, Rule 106, Rules of Court; U.S. vs. him liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365,
Campo, 23 Phil., 368.) that is, less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence
or negligence. (The records show that Arnold Amparado was
incapacitated for one and one-half months; 11 there is no
showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to the extent of her
injuries. We presume that she was placed in confinement for
only ten to fourteen days based on the medical certificate
estimating her recovery period.) 12

For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we

therefore impose upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor (in
its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum
period, arresto to being the graver penalty (than destierro). 13

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby

MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to four months
and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within
which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the service
of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify
Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for
hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for
Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special
pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132547 September 20, 2000 to the ground, SPO1 Ulep came closer and pumped another
bullet into his head and literally blew his brains out.6
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. The post mortem examination of the body conducted by Dr.
SPO1 ERNESTO ULEP, accused-appellant. Roberto A. Omandac, Municipal Health Officer of Kidapawan,
showed that Wapili sustained five (5) gunshot wounds: one (1)
DECISION on the right portion of the head, one (1) on the right cheek, one
(1) on the abdomen and two (2) on the right thigh: SHEENT -
gunshot wound on the right parietal area with fractures of the
BELLOSILLO, J.:
right temporoparietal bones with evisceration of brain tissues,
right zygomatic bone and right mandible, lateral aspect; CHEST
In the aftermath of an incident where a certain Buenaventura AND BACK - with powder burns on the right posterior chest;
Wapili1 went berserk at Mundog Subdivision, Poblacion ABDOMEN - gunshot wound on the right upper quadrant
Kidapawan, Cotabato, in the early morning of 22 December measuring 0.5 cm. in diameter (point of entry) with multiple
1995, Police Officer Ernesto Ulep was found guilty of murder powder burns around the wound and on the right lumbar area
and sentenced to death by the trial court for killing Wapili. Ulep (point of exit). Gunshot wound on the suprapubic area (point of
was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the entry); EXTREMETIES - with gunshot wounds on the right
amount of ₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs.2 thigh, upper third, anterior aspect measuring 0.5 cm. in
diameter with powder burns (point of entry) and right buttocks
The evidence shows that at around two o' clock in the morning measuring 0.5 cm. in diameter (point of exit); gunshot wound
of 22 December 1995 Buenaventura Wapili was having a high on the right thigh, upper third, posterolateral aspect; CAUSE OF
fever and was heard talking insensibly to himself in his room. DEATH - multiple gunshot wounds.7
His brother-in-law, Dario Leydan, convinced him to come out
of his room and talk to him, but Wapili told Leydan that he Dr. Omandac concluded that the shots were fired at close range,
could not really understand himself. After a while, Wapili went perhaps within twenty-four (24) inches, judging from the
back to his room and turned off the lights. Moments later, the powder burns found around some of the wounds in the body of
lights went on again and Leydan heard a disturbance inside the the victim,8 and that the wound in the head, which caused the
room, as if Wapili was smashing the furniture.3 Unable to pacify victim's instantaneous death, was inflicted while "the victim
Wapili, Leydan called Pastor Bonid of the Alliance Church of was in a lying position."9
Kidapawan to help him "pray over" Wapili, but they could not
enter the latter's room as he became wild and violent. Suddenly,
The Office of the Ombudsman for the Military filed an
Wapili bolted out of his room naked and chased Leydan.
Information for murder against SPO1 Ulep.1âwphi1 The accused
Thereafter, Leydan with the aid of two (2) of his neighbors
pleaded not guilty to the charge on arraignment, and insisted
attempted to tie Wapili with a rope but was unsuccessful as
during the trial that he acted in self-defense. However, on 28
Wapili was much bigger in built and stronger than anyone of
October 1997, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the
them.4 Wapili, who appeared to have completely gone crazy,
accused of murder and sentencing him to death -
kept on running without any particular direction.

The means employed by the accused to prevent or repel the

Thus, Leydan went to the house of policewoman Norma Plando,
alleged aggression is not reasonable because the victim,
a neighbor, and asked for assistance. As Wapili passed by the
Buenaventura Wapili, was already on the ground, therefore,
house of Plando, he banged Plando's vehicle parked outside.
there was no necessity for the accused to pump another shot on
Using a hand-held radio, Plando then contacted SPO1 Ernesto
the back portion of the victim's head. Clearly the gravity of the
Ulep, SPO1 Edilberto Espadera and SPO2 Crispin Pillo, all
wounds sustained by the victim belies the pretension of the
members of the PNP assigned to secure the premises of the
accused that he acted in self-defense. It indicates his determined
nearby Roman Catholic Church of Kidapawan.5
effort to kill the victim. It is established that accused (sic) was
already in the ground that would no longer imperil the
At around four o'clock in the morning of the same day, SPO1 accused's life. The most logical option open to the accused was
Ulep together with SPO1 Espadera and SPO2 Pillo arrived at the to inflict on the victim such injury that would prevent the victim
scene on board an Anfra police service jeep. The three (3) police from further harming him. The court is not persuaded by the
officers, all armed with M-16 rifles, alighted from the jeep when accused's version because if it is true that the victim attacked
they saw the naked Wapili approaching them. The kind of him and his life was endangered - yet his two (2) companions
weapon Wapili was armed with is disputed. The police claimed SPO1 Espadera and SPO2 Pillo did not do anything to help him
that he was armed with a bolo and a rattan stool, while Wapili's but just witness the incident - which is unbelievable and
relatives and neighbors said he had no bolo, but only a rattan unnatural behavior of police officers x x x x
stool.
WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, judgment is
SPO1 Ulep fired a warning shot in the air and told Wapili to put hereby rendered finding the accused Ernesto Ulep guilty
down his weapons or they would shoot him. But Wapili retorted beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, the accused is
"pusila!" ("fire!") and continued advancing towards the police hereby sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of Death, to
officers. When Wapili was only about two (2) to three (3) meters indemnify the heirs of Buenaventura Wapili the amount of
away from them, SPO1 Ulep shot the victim with his M-16 rifle, ₱50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
hitting him in various parts of his body. As the victim slumped insolvency and to pay the costs.
Death penalty having been imposed by the trial court, the case victim again hitting the back portion of the victim's head
is now before us on automatic review. Accused-appellant prays causing the brain to scatter on the ground x x x x the victim,
for his acquittal mainly on the basis of his claim that the killing Buenaventura Wapili, was already on the ground. Therefore,
of the victim was in the course of the performance of his official there was no necessity for the accused to pump another shot on
duty as a police officer, and in self-defense. the back portion of the victim's head.

Preliminarily, having admitted the killing of Wapili, accused- It cannot therefore be said that the fatal wound in the head of
appellant assumed the burden of proving legal justification the victim was a necessary consequence of accused-appellant's
therefor. He must establish clearly and convincingly how he due performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or
acted in fulfillment of his official duty and/or in complete self- office.
defense, as claimed by him; otherwise, he must suffer all the
consequences of his malefaction. He has to rely on the Likewise, the evidence at hand does not favor his claim of self-
quantitative and qualitative strength of his own evidence, not defense. The elements in order for self-defense to be appreciated
on the weakness of the prosecution; for even if it were weak it are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the person injured or
could not be disbelieved after he had admitted the killing.10 killed by the accused; (b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and, (c) lack of sufficient
Before the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 12
Art. 11, par. 5, of The Revised Penal Code may be successfully
invoked, the accused must prove the presence of two (2) The presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non.
requisites, namely, that he acted in the performance of a duty or There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the
in the lawful exercise of a right or an office, and that the injury victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the
caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence person defending himself.13 In the present case, the records
of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such show that the victim was lying in a prone position on the ground
right or office. The second requisite is lacking in the instant case. - bleeding from the bullet wounds he sustained, and possibly
unconscious - when accused-appellant shot him in the head. The
Accused-appellant and the other police officers involved aggression that was initially begun by the victim already ceased
originally set out to perform a legal duty: to render police when accused-appellant attacked him. From that moment, there
assistance, and restore peace and order at Mundog Subdivision was no longer any danger to his life.
where the victim was then running amuck. There were two (2)
stages of the incident at Mundog Subdivision. During the first This Court disagrees with the conclusion of the court a quo that
stage, the victim threatened the safety of the police officers by the killing of Wapili by accused-appellant was attended by
menacingly advancing towards them, notwithstanding treachery, thus qualifying the offense to murder. We discern
accused-appellant's previous warning shot and verbal nothing from the evidence that the assault was so sudden and
admonition to the victim to lay down his weapon or he would unexpected and that accused-appellant deliberately adopted a
be shot. As a police officer, it is to be expected that accused- mode of attack intended to insure the killing of Wapili, without
appellant would stand his ground. Up to that point, his decision the victim having the opportunity to defend himself.
to respond with a barrage of gunfire to halt the victim's further
advance was justified under the circumstances. After all, a
On the contrary, the victim could not have been taken by
police officer is not required to afford the victim the opportunity
surprise as he was given more than sufficient warning by
to fight back. Neither is he expected - when hard pressed and in
accused-appellant before he was shot, i.e., accused-appellant
the heat of such an encounter at close quarters - to pause for a
fired a warning shot in the air, and specifically ordered him to
long moment and reflect coolly at his peril, or to wait after each
lower his weapons or he would be shot. The killing of Wapili
blow to determine the effects thereof.
was not sought on purpose. Accused-appellant went to the
scene in pursuance of his official duty as a police officer after
However, while accused-appellant is to be commended for having been summoned for assistance. The situation that the
promptly responding to the call of duty when he stopped the victim, at the time accused-appellant shot him in the head, was
victim from his potentially violent conduct and aggressive prostrate on the ground is of no moment when considering the
behavior, he cannot be exonerated from overdoing his duty presence of treachery. The decision to kill was made in an
during the second stage of the incident - when he fatally shot the instant and the victim's helpless position was merely incidental
victim in the head, perhaps in his desire to take no chances, even to his having been previously shot by accused-appellant in the
after the latter slumped to the ground due to multiple gunshot performance of his official duty.
wounds sustained while charging at the police officers. Sound
discretion and restraint dictated that accused-appellant, a
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
veteran policeman,11 should have ceased firing at the victim the
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
moment he saw the latter fall to the ground. The victim at that
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
point no longer posed a threat and was already incapable of
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
mounting an aggression against the police officers. Shooting
which the offended party might make.14 Considering the rule
him in the head was obviously unnecessary. As succinctly
that treachery cannot be inferred but must be proved as fully
observed by the trial court -
and convincingly as the crime itself, any doubt as to its existence
must be resolved in favor of accused-appellant. Accordingly, for
Once he saw the victim he fired a warning shot then shot the failure of the prosecution to prove treachery to qualify the
victim hitting him on the different parts of the body causing him
to fall to the ground and in that position the accused shot the
killing to murder, accused-appellant may only be convicted of circumstance to offset this mitigating circumstance. Applying
homicide. the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty
shall be taken from the minimum period of prision mayor, the
Indeed, to hold him criminally liable for murder and sentence range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years,
him to death under the circumstances would certainly have the while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower
effect of demoralizing other police officers who may be called in degree which is prision correccional, in any of its periods, the
upon to discharge official functions under similar or identical range of which is six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
conditions. We would then have a dispirited police force who
may be half-hearted, if not totally unwilling, to perform their The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used
assigned duties for fear that they would suffer the same fate as only as a last resort, and under circumstances indicating that the
that of accused-appellant. offender cannot otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law
does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge
This brings us to the imposition of the proper penalty. the necessity to kill.18 It may be true that police officers
sometimes find themselves in a dilemma when pressured by a
situation where an immediate and decisive, but legal, action is
We find in favor of accused-appellant the incomplete justifying
needed. However, it must be stressed that the judgment and
circumstance of fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right.
discretion of police officers in the performance of their duties
Under Art. 69 of The Revised Penal Code, "a penalty lower by one
must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but
or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if
within reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear and legal
the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some
provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the
of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from
dictates of a sound discretion, and within the spirit and purpose
criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Arts. 11 and
of the law.19 We cannot countenance trigger-happy law
12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The
enforcement officers who indiscriminately employ force and
courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be
violence upon the persons they are apprehending. They must
deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the
always bear in mind that although they are dealing with
conditions of exemption present or lacking."
criminal elements against whom society must be protected,
these criminals are also human beings with human rights.
Incomplete justification is a special or privileged mitigating
circumstance, which, not only cannot be offset by aggravating
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment is MODIFIED. Accused-
circumstances but also reduces the penalty by one or two
appellant SPO1 ERNESTO ULEP is found guilty of HOMICIDE,
degrees than that prescribed by law.15Undoubtedly, the instant
instead of Murder, and is sentenced to an indeterminate prison
case would have fallen under Art. 11, par. 5 of The Revised Penal
term of four (4) years, two (2) months and ten (10) days of prision
Code had the two (2) conditions therefor concurred which, to
correccional medium as minimum, to six (6) years, four (4)
reiterate: first, that the accused acted in the performance of a
months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor minimum as
duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office; and second, that
maximum. He is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of
the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of
Buenaventura Wapili in the amount of ₱50,000.00, and to pay
the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such
the costs.
right or office. But here, only the first condition was fulfilled.
Hence, Art. 69 is applicable, although its "that the majority of
such conditions be present," is immaterial since there are only SO ORDERED.
two (2) conditions that may be taken into account under Art. 11,
par. 5. Article 69 is obviously in favor of the accused as it
provides for a penalty lower than that prescribed by law when
the crime committed is not wholly justifiable. The intention of
the legislature, obviously, is to mitigate the penalty by reason of
the diminution of either freedom of action, intelligence, or
intent, or of the lesser perversity of the offender. 16

We likewise credit in favor of accused-appellant the mitigating

circumstance of voluntary surrender. The police blotter of
Kidapawan Municipal Police Station shows that immediately
after killing Wapili, accused-appellant reported to the police
headquarters and voluntarily surrendered himself.17

Article 249 of The Revised Penal Code prescribes for the crime of
homicide the penalty of reclusion temporal, the range of which is
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. There
being an incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a
duty, the penalty should be one (1) degree lower, i.e.,
from reclusion temporal to prision mayor, pursuant to Art. 69, in
relation to Art. 61, par. 2, and Art. 71, of the Code, to be imposed
in its minimum period since accused-appellant voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities and there was no aggravating
G.R. No. L-34665 August 28, 1931 wounding him, he hit Omamdam; he was only defending his
possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench away
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff- from him, and his conduct was perfectly lawful.
appellee,
vs. The wound which Omamdam received in the chest, judging by
DONATO BINDOY, defendant-appellant. the description given by the sanitary inspector who attended
him as he lay dying, tallies with the size of the point of Bindoy's
Florentino Saguin for appellant. bolo.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound which
VILLAMOR, J.: produced Emigdio Omamdam's death, but the defendant
alleges that it was caused accidentally and without malicious
intent.
The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Misamis to the penalty of twelve years and one day
of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify Pacas and the widow of the deceased, Carmen Angot, testified
the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the having seen the accused stab Omamdam with his bolo. Such
costs. The crime charged against the accused is homicide, testimony is not incompatible with that of the accused, to the
according to the following information: effect that he wounded Omamdam by accident. The widow
testified that she knew of her husband's wound being caused by
Bindoy from his statement to her before his death.
That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of
Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of
Occidental Misamis, the accused Donato Bindoy The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked and show that the accused stabbed Omamdam in the chest with his
with his bolo wounded Emigdio Omamdam, inflicting bolo on that occasion. The defendant, indeed, in his effort to free
upon the latter a serious wound in the chest which himself of Pacas, who was endeavoring to wrench his bolo from
caused his instant death, in violation of article 404 of him, hit Omamdam in the chest; but, as we have stated, there is
the Penal Code. no evidence to show that he did so deliberately and with the
intention of committing a crime. If, in his struggle with Pacas,
The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and
his counsel in this instance contends that the court erred in instead of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would have
finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and in convicting had to answer for his act, since whoever willfully commits a
him of the crime of homicide. felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
(Art. 1 of the Penal Code.) But, as we have said, this is not the
The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a case.
disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop in the barrio market of
Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental
Misamis, started by some of the tuba drinkers. There were The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the
Faustino Pacas (alias Agaton), and his wife called Tibay. One defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually
Donato Bindoy, who was also there, offered some tuba to Pacas' struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the
wife; and as she refused to drink having already done so, Bindoy latter let go, the former had pulled so violently that it flew
threatened to injure her if she did not accept. There ensued an towards his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio
interchange of words between Tibay and Bindoy, and Pacas Omamdam came up, who was therefore hit in the chest, without
stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away from Donato's seeing him, because Emigdio had passed behind him.
Bindoy the bolo he carried. This occasioned a disturbance which The same witness adds that he went to see Omamdam at his
attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam, who, with his home later, and asked him about his wound when he replied: "I
family, lived near the market. Emigdio left his house to see what think I shall die of this wound." And then continued: "Please
was happening, while Bindoy and Pacas were struggling for the look after my wife when I die: See that she doesn't starve,"
bolo. In the course of this struggle, Bindoy succeeded in adding further: "This wound was an accident. Donato did not
disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the aim at me, nor I at him: It was a mishap." The testimony of this
latter's hand towards the left behind the accused, with such witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced
by the fiscal.
violence that the point of the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's
chest, who was then behind Bindoy.
We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind,
There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the fight between which, had it existed, would have greatly facilitated the solution
Bindoy and Pacas. Neither is there any indication that the of this case. And we deem it well to repeat what this court said
in United States vs. Carlos (15 Phil., 47), to wit:
accused was aware of Emigdio Omamdam's presence in the
place, for, according to the testimony of the witnesses, the latter
passed behind the combatants when he left his house to satisfy The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of
his curiosity. There was no disagreement or ill feeling between provincial fiscals, directed to the importance of
Bindoy and Omamdam, on the contrary, it appears they were definitely ascertaining and proving, when possible, the
nephew and uncle, respectively, and were on good terms with motives which actuated the commission of a crime
each other. Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas, and instead of under investigation.
 In many criminal cases one of the most important aids
in completing the proof of the commission of the crime
by the accused is the introduction of evidence
disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of the
guilty person to indulge the criminal act.

In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold,

that the appellant is entitled to acquittal according to article 8,
No. 8, Penal Code. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is
reversed, and the accused Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted
with costs de oficio. So ordered.
G.R. No. 181052 November 14, 2012 8, 1998, SPO1 Lerma Bataller of the Philippine National Police-
Tiwi went to the hospital to secure Jose's ante-mortem
RODOLFO BELBIS, JR. y COMPETENTE and ALBERTO statement. Later, in the afternoon of the same day, Jose was
BRUCALES, Petitioners, brought to the clinic of Dr. Marilou Compuesto upon the advice
vs. of Dr. Corral where he underwent ultrasound scanning. It was
PEOLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. found that Jose's kidney had acute inflammation due to
infection. He was returned to St. Claire Medical Clinic and was
advised to go to Manila. However, Jose died at 10:00 p.m. of the
DECISION
same day.

PERALTA, J.:
Dr. Corral issued a Death Certificate which shows the following:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45, dated

a) Immediate cause – Uremia, secondary to renal
February 22, 2008, of Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. and Alberto Brucales
shutdown
that seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated August 17, 2007, and its Resolution dated
January 4, 2008, at1irrning with modification the b) Antecedent cause – Septicemia, renal inflammatory
Decision3 dated December 23, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court disease.
(RTC), Tabaco City, AI bay, Branch 17, finding petitioners guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime off Homicide. Dr. Wilson Moll Lee, Medical Officer III of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) of Naga City, Region V, conducted an
The factual antecedents follow. autopsy on the victim's cadaver on January 14, 1998 and issued
Autopsy Report No. BRO No. 98-02, which indicated multiple
organ failure as the cause of the victim's death. Thus, petitioners
Jose Bahillo (Jose), the victim, was a Barangay Tanod of Sitio
were charged with the crime of homicide. The Information
Bano, Barangay Naga, Tiwi, Albay. Around 9:00 p.m. of
reads:
December 9, 1997, Jose left his house and proceeded to the area
assigned to him. Later on, around 10:00 p.m., Veronica Dacir
(Veronica), Jose's live-in partner, heard Jose shouting and That on or about the 9th day of December 1997, at about 10:30
calling her name and went to where Jose was and saw blood at o'clock in the evening, more or less, at Barangay Naga,
his back and shorts. It was there that Jose told Veronica that he Municipality of Tiwi, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within
was held by Boboy (petitioner Alberto Brucales), while Paul the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
(petitioner Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.) stabbed him. Jose was taken to St. accused, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and
Claire Medical Clinic at Tiwi, Albay, about four kilometers from helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
Barangay Naga where he was initially attended by Dr. Bernardo and feloniously assault, attack, and stab JOSE BAHILLO,
Corral (Dr. Corral). Jose was later referred to Ziga Memorial thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds which caused his
District Hospital at Tabaco, Albay and, thereafter, was referred death on January 8, 1998, to the damage and prejudice of the
to Albay Provincial Hospital on December 10, 1997 at 2:00 a.m. latter's heirs.
He was confined therein for six (6) days. Dr. Sancho Reduta (Dr.
Reduta), his attending physician, issued a medical certificate, CONTRARY TO LAW.
which stated the following wounds found on Jose's body: (1)
stab wound, 3 cm., lumbar area, right; (2) stab wound, 3 cm., On February 17, 1999, petitioners entered a plea of not guilty.
lumbar area, left; (3) stab wound, 3 cm., left buttock, medial Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
aspect; and (4) stab wound, 3 cm., left buttock, lateral aspect. He
was also found positive for alcoholic breath, his blood level was
The prosecution presented documentary evidence as well as the
monitored and was given I.V. (intravenous) fluids and
testimonies of Dr. Marilou Compuesto, Dr. Sancho Reduta, Dr.
antibiotics. He was finally discharged on December 15 1997. Dr.
Bernardo Corral, Dr. Wilson Moll Lee, SPO1 Lerma Bataller and
Reduta issued Jose prescriptions and instructed the latter to go
Calixto Dacullo.
back to the hospital after the medicines prescribed are
consumed. Jose remained bedridden and should have returned
to the hospital on December 22, 1997, but failed to do so due to Petitioners claimed that they are entitled to the justifying
financial constraints. During that time, the wounds of Jose were circumstance of self-defense. Through the testimonies of
not yet fully healed. petitioners, Dr. Olga Bausa and Dr. Edwin Lino Romano, their
version of the incident is as follows:
Veronica brought Jose back to St. Claire Medical Clinic on
January 1, 1998, because the latter was complaining of urinary Around 10:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997, petitioners were outside
retention and pains in his left and right lumbar regions. Dr. a store in Naga, Tiwi, Albay, engaged in a conversation with
Corral suspected that Jose had septicemia; thus, he was given other people when Jose went to them and told them to go home.
I.V. fluids, antibiotics and diuretics, and a catheter was used to While on their way home, they heard Jose's whistle go off as the
relieve Jose of urinary retention. Upon Jose's request, he was latter was following them. Petitioner Rodolfo asked Jose what is
discharged on January 3, 1998. He was brought back to the same the matter and the latter replied, "What about?" Suddenly, Jose
hospital on January 7, 1998 and was diagnosed by Dr. Corral as thrust a nightstick on petitioner Rodolfo, but the latter was able
having advanced Pyelonephritis, his kidney was inflamed and to evade it. Afterwards, Jose held the nightstick horizontally
with pus formation and scarring. Around 10:30 a.m. on January with both hands and tried to hit petitioner Rodolfo's forehead.
Petitioner Rodolfo held the nightstick which was in reality, a years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen
bolo sheathed on a scabbard. Jose pulled the bolo inside and the (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
wooden scabbard was detached from it, thus, the blade thereof temporal as maximum.
injured his left hand. Petitioner Rodolfo kept holding the
wooden scabbard and when Jose thrust the bolo to petitioner Costs de oficio.
Rodolfo, the latter parried it with the wooden scabbard he was
holding. Petitioner Rodolfo managed to take the bolo away from
SO ORDERED.5
Jose and, thereafter, the latter embraced petitioner Rodolfo
while trying to get the bolo back. Petitioner Rodolfo held the
bolo with his right hand and swung it away from Jose. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the
Thereafter, Jose pushed petitioner Rodolfo causing the bolo to present petition.
slip from the latter's hand. Jose tried to pick the bolo up, but
petitioner Rodolfo was able to hold it first, thus, Jose stepped Raised are the following issues:
back. During that commotion, petitioner Alberto was only
watching and told Jose and petitioner Rodolfo to stop fighting. I

Thereafter, petitioner Alberto accompanied petitioner Rodolfo WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
to the latter's house because he suffered a hand injury. Petitioner ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE STATEMENTS
Rodolfo was then brought to Tabaco General Hospital before he MADE BY THE VICTIM TO VERONICA DACIR, ONE
was referred to Albay Provincial Hospital. Dr. Reduta sutured MONTH PRIOR TO THE VICTIM'S DEATH.
the top layer of his wound and the following day, he went back CONSTITUTES A DYING DECLARATION WITHIN
to Tabaco General Hospital where he was operated on his left THE CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 37, RULE 130
hand injury by Dr. Romano. OF THE RULES OF COURT?

Petitioner Rodolfo brought the bolo used in the incident with II

him in his house and reported the matter to the police station of
Tiwi and surrendered the same bolo to the police authorities.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS-
The RTC convicted the petitioners of the crime charged against APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE
them, but appreciated the mitigating circumstance of JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE
incomplete self-defense. The dispositive portion of the decision AND THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
follows: INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE?

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Rodolfo III

Belbis, Jr. and Alberto Brucales are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the death of Jose Bahillo. Considering the
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense in
ERRED IN RULING THAT THE STAB WOUNDS
their favor, and applying the Indeterminate
WERE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE VICTIM'S
DEATH?
Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
IV
prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay the heirs of Jose
Bahillo the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
P50,000.00 as moral damages. ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER IS
NOT PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR?6
Costs against the accused.

The petition lacks merit.

SO ORDERED.4

In a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are generally

After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the
accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when
petitioners elevated the case to the CA. However, the latter
such findings are supported by substantial evidence on
denied their appeal and affirmed the RTC decision with
record.7 This rule, however, is not without exceptions, one of
modification that there was no mitigating circumstance of
which is when there is a conflict between the factual findings of
incomplete self-defense. The decretal portion of the decision
the Court of Appeals and the trial court which necessitates a
reads:
review of such factual findings.8

WHEREFORE, the decision dated 23 December 2004 of the

Petitioners claim that there is discrepancy in the findings of the
Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City, Albay, Branch 17 is hereby
RTC and the CA. According to them, the RTC never mentioned
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed.
about a dying declaration which the CA discussed in its
Accused-appellants Rodolfo C. Belbis, Jr. and Alberto Brucales
decision. They then argue that the CA erred in ruling that the
are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of six (6)
statements made by the victim in the presence of witnesses res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were
Veronica Dacir right after being stabbed, and SPO1 Lerma made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a
Bataller before he died, are dying declarations within the falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the
contemplation of the law as the victim still lived for one month occurrence in question and its immediate attending
after the said dying declaration was made. circumstances.12

A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of It goes without saying that the element of spontaneity is critical.
homicide, referring to the material facts which concern the cause The following factors are then considered in determining
and circumstances of the killing and which is uttered under a whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae
fixed belief that death is impending and is certain to follow have been made spontaneously, viz., (1) the time that lapsed
immediately, or in a very short time, without an opportunity of between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making
retraction and in the absence of all hopes of recovery. In other of the statement; (2) the place where the statement was made;
words, it is a statement made by a person after a mortal wound (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement;
has been inflicted, under a belief that death is certain, stating the (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the
facts concerning the cause and circumstances surrounding occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature
his/her death.9 and circumstances of the statement itself.13

As an exception to the hearsay rule, the requisites for its Clearly, the statement made by the victim identifying his
admissibility are as follows: (1) the declaration is made by the assailants was made immediately after a startling occurrence
deceased under the consciousness of his impending death; (2) which is his being stabbed, precluding any chance to concoct a
the deceased was at the time competent as a witness; (3) the lie. As shown in the testimony of Veronica:
declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances
of the declarant’s death; and (4) the declaration is offered in a Q What time did you sleep that night?
criminal case wherein the declarant’s death is the subject of
inquiry.10
xxxx

The fact that the victim was stabbed on December 9, 1997 and
A I was not able to sleep that night because I already heard my
died only on January 8, 1998 does not prove that the victim
husband.
made the statement or declaration under the consciousness of
an impending death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying
declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent Q What did you hear?
death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in
impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point A He was shouting.
of fact that renders the dying declaration admissible. It is not
necessary that the approaching death be presaged by the Q What was he shouting?
personal feelings of the deceased. The test is whether the
declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on
A He was calling my name, "Bonic."
death as certainly impending.11 As such, the CA incorrectly
ruled that there were dying declarations.
Q How did you come to know that it was the voice of your live-
in partner?
The CA should have admitted the statement made by the victim
to Veronica Dacir right after he was stabbed as part of the res
gestae and not a dying declaration. Section 42 of Rule 130 of the A Because upon hearing his call "Bonic," I went to the side of the
Rules of Court, reads as follows: road and I saw him on the road walking towards our house.

Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person Q More or less what time was that?
while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior
or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, A 10:00 p.m.
may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, Q What did you do?
and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the
res gestae.
A I approached him.

All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as

Q What particular place did you approach him?
part of the res gestae, is that it be made under the influence of a
startling event witnessed by the person who made the
declaration before he had time to think and make up a story, or A Near the store of Susan Galica.
to concoct or contrive a falsehood, or to fabricate an account, and
without any undue influence in obtaining it, aside from Q What happened when you approached him?
referring to the event in question or its immediate attending
circumstances. In sum, there are three requisites to admit A I asked him what happened.
evidence as part of the res gestae: (1) that the principal act, the
Q What was the answer? Q: Then what happened after Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. was able to get
hold of this stick?
A He said that he was stabbed by Paul.
A: The piece of wood was detached. The one Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.
Q What else? was holding was the scabbard, while the one with the sharp
instrument was held by Jose Bahillo.
A: He was held by Boboy.
Q: Then what happened after this?
xxxx
A: Jose Bahillo embraced Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.
Q What did you observe from Jose Bahillo your live-in partner
before you brought him to the hospital? Q: Then?

A He was bloody and he was weak. A: Wanting to get hold of that sharp instrument.

Q Could you tell us where did you see the blood? Q: Then what did Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. do when Jose Bahillo
embraced him and tried to wrest the sharp instrument from
him?
A At his back and on his shorts.14

A: While this Jose Bahillo was embracing this Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.,
Be that as it may, the CA need have discussed in its decision the
Rodolfo Belbis. Jr. was moving his hands while holding the
presence of a dying declaration or a statement as part of the res
sharp instrument, holding it away and thrusting it towards the
gestae, because petitioner Rodolfo admitted stabbing the victim
back of Jose Bahillo, near the waistline at the back.
but insists that he had done the deed to defend himself. It is
settled that when an accused admits killing the victim but
invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the accused Q: Then what happened when you saw this?
assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and
convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from A: When Jose Bahillo was not able to get hold of that sharp
his admission that he killed the victim.15 Self-defense cannot be instrument, this Jose Bahillo pushed the body of Rodolfo Belbis,
justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent Jr. away from him and Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. fell down.
and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by
itself.16 Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence Q: Then what happened to the sharp instrument which Rodolfo
is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the Belbis, Jr. was holding when Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. fell down?
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution.17
A: That sharp instrument got loose from his hand but it was
situated just near him.
The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable
Q: Who are you referring as "him?"
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person resorting to self-defense.18 Verily, to invoke self- A: Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.
defense successfully, there must have been an unlawful and
unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who Q: Then after this sharp instrument was loosened from the hand
was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by of Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. after he fell down, would you kindly
employing reasonable means to resist the attack.19 inform this Court what happened next?

Petitioners argue that the unlawful aggression that was started A: At that point, this Jose Bahillo again tried to get the sharp
by the victim continued even if petitioner Rodolfo was already instrument but Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. was faster and he got hold of
in possession of the bladed weapon used in the victim's that instrument and thrust it towards Jose Bahillo.20
stabbing. Petitioner Alberto narrated the event as follows:
From the above testimony, it is apparent that the unlawful
Q: What happened? aggression on the part of the victim ceased when petitioner
Rodolfo was able to get hold of the bladed weapon. Although
A: Rodolfo Belbis Jr. was able to fend off or parry the blow. there was still some struggle involved between the victim and
petitioner Rodolfo, there is no doubt that the latter, who was in
possession of the same weapon, already became the unlawful
Q: Then what happened again?
aggressor. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In
retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party
A: The next action of Jose Bahillo was to hold the wood already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-
horizontally and push it towards Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. and Rodolfo defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was
Belbis, Jr. was able to get hold of it. injured by the accused.21 Such an aggression can also be
surmised on the four stab wounds sustained by the victim on
his back. It is hard to believe based on the location of the stab by Bahillo are not the cause of his death because he lived for
wounds, all at the back portion of the body (right lumbar area, quite sometime and that there was no direct injury on his vital
left lumbar area, left buttock, medial aspect and left buttock, organs. There was, however, a qualification to Dr. Lee's
lateral aspect), that petitioner Rodolfo was defending himself. It statement on cross-examination. He opines that he could only
would have been different if the wounds inflicted were located connect the stab wounds with the infection and death of Bahillo
in the front portion of the victim's body. The CA is, therefore, if he has knowledge of the past medical records of the patient.
correct in agreeing with the observation of the RTC when it Petitioners-appellants' reliance of the said statement of Dr. Lee
found that: is misplaced because the doctor only examined the cadaver of
Bahillo. This explains why he has no direct knowledge of
x x x The Court is not convinced on how Bahillo sustained the Bahillo's medical records. The opinions of the other doctors who
four stab wounds as narrated by Belbis.1âwphi1 If it is true that testified for the prosecution and who examined Bahillo while he
Bahillo embraced him when he was able to wrest possession of was still alive are more conclusive than those of Dr. Lee. They
the bolo, trying to get it back; that he held it away from his reach had direct knowledge of the causal relation between the stab
and swung it at Bahillo's back; that he felt the blade touch the wounds, the kidney failure and the death of Bahillo.27
body, the nature of the wounds inflicted would be different. It
would be a laceration, slash or abrasion since it was the sharp Thus, it can be concluded that without the stab wounds, the
blade that hit the back and not the pointed end of the bolo. The victim could not have been afflicted with an infection which
location and nature of the injuries which were stab wounds later on caused multiple organ failure that caused his death. The
clearly showed that they were not caused by swinging thrust. offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his
They were caused by direct thrust. It was the pointed end of the delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of
bolo that caused the injuries which hit the same spot – the the victim.28
lumbar area and the buttock.22
As to the claim of petitioners that they are entitled to the
The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the same does
commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought not deserve merit. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated,
to be averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or the following requisites should be present: (1) the offender has
repel an unlawful aggression.23 In the present case, four stab not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself
wounds that are the product of direct thrusting of the bladed to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the
weapon are not necessary to prevent what the petitioners claim surrender was voluntary.29 The essence of voluntary surrender
to be the continuous unlawful aggression from the victim as the is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up
latter was already without any weapon. In connection and submit himself to the authorities either because he
therewith, having established that there was no unlawful acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the
aggression on the part of the victim when he was stabbed, trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and
petitioners cannot avail of the mitigating circumstance of capture.30Without these elements, and where the clear reasons
incomplete self-defense. for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest and the
need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and,
Anent the contention of petitioners that the CA failed to therefore, cannot be characterized as "voluntary surrender" to
consider the testimony of the doctor who performed the autopsy serve as a mitigating circumstance.31 In the present case, when
in its entirety, the same is without any merit. What really needs the petitioners reported the incident and allegedly surrendered
to be proven in a case when the victim dies is the proximate the bladed weapon used in the stabbing, such cannot be
cause of his death. Proximate cause has been defined as "that considered as voluntary surrender within the contemplation of
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by the law. Besides, there was no spontaneity, because they only
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and surrendered after a warrant of their arrest had already been
without which the result would not have occurred."24 The issued.
autopsy report indicated that the cause of the victim's death is
multiple organ failure. According to Dr. Wilson Moll Lee, the WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
doctor who conducted the autopsy, the kidneys suffered the 45, dated February 22, 2008, of Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. and Alberto
most serious damage. Although he admitted that autopsy alone Brucales, is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision of the
cannot show the real culprit, he stated that by having a long Court of Appeals, dated August 17, 2007, and its Resolution
standing infection caused by an open wound, it can be surmised dated January 4, 2008, affirming with modification the Decision
that multiple organ failure was secondary to a long standing dated December 23, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Tabaco
infection secondary to stab wound which the victim allegedly City, Albay, Branch 17, finding petitioners guilty beyond
sustained.25 What is important is that the other doctors who reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide are hereby
attended to the wounds sustained by the victim, specially those AFFIRMED.
on the left and right lumbar area, opined that they affected the
kidneys and that the wounds were deep enough to have caused SO ORDERED.
trauma on both kidneys. On that point, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), in its Comment,26 is correct in stating the
following:

9.3.1 Petitioners-appellants contend that the Court of Appeals

failed to consider the testimony of Dr. Lee for the defense. Dr.
Lee opines on cross-examination that the stab wounds sustained
[G.R. No. 32066. March 15, 1930.] Mendieta (34 Phil., 242), the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff- "Even admitting that the defendant intended to injure Hilario
Appellee, v. GONA (Mansaca), Defendant-Appellant. Lauigan instead of Pedro Acierto, even that, in view of the
mortal wound which he inflicted upon the latter, in no way
Jose Ma. Capili, for Appellant. could be considered as a relief from his criminal act. That he
made a mistake in killing one man instead of another, when it is
Attorney-General Jaranilla, for Appellee. proved that he acted maliciously and willfully, cannot relieve
him from criminal responsibility. Neither do we believe that the
SYLLABUS fact that he made a mistake in killing the wrong man should be
considered as a mitigating circumstance."cralaw virtua1aw
1. HOMICIDE; MISTAKE AS TO VICTIM. — As a result of a library
quarrel, the defendant endeavored to kill D, but by mistake,
killed M. Held, that his mistake in killing one man instead of The appealed sentence is affirmed with the costs against the
another did not relieve him from criminal responsibility and defendant. So ordered.
could not even be considered a mitigating circumstance.

DECISION

OSTRAND, J.:

The defendant was charged before the Court of First Instance of

the Province of Davao with the crime of homicide, the
information reading as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about October 26, 1928, in the municipal district of

Pantukan, Province of Davao, Philippine Islands, and within the
jurisdiction of the court, the said accused voluntarily, illegally,
and criminally and with a bolo which he then carried, assaulted
the Mansaca Mapudul, causing him a mortal wound on the left
side of the neck and that, as a consequence of said wound, the
said Mapudul died."cralaw virtua1aw library

Upon trial the court below found the defendant guilty as

charged in the information and taking into consideration the
extenuating circumstance of non-habitual intoxication,
sentenced him to suffer twelve years and one day of reclusion
temporal with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to
pay the costs. From this sentence the defendant appealed.

It appears from the evidence that on the evening of October 26,

1928, a number of Mansacas celebrated a reunion in the house
of the Mansaca Gabriel. There seems to have been a liberal
supply of alcoholic drinks and some of the men present became
intoxicated, with the result that a quarrel took place between the
Mansaca Dunca and the defendant. Dunca and his son Aguipo
eventually left the house and were followed by Mapudul and
one Awad. The defendant left the house about the same time
with intention of assaulting Dunca, but in the darkness of the
evening and in the intoxicated condition of the defendant, he
mistook Mapudul for Dunca and inflicted on him a mortal
wound with a bolo.

There can be no doubt that the defendant killed Mapudul and

that he is guilty of the crime charged, but his attorney argues
that in view of the fact that said defendant had no intention to
kill the deceased and committed the crime by mistake, he should
have been found guilty of homicide through negligence under
paragraph 1 of article 568 of the Penal Code and not of the
graver crime of intentional homicide. This contention is contrary
to earlier decisions of this court. In the case of United States v.
[ GR No. 25459, Aug 10, 1926 ] permit of no other conclusion than that, in firing the shot, it was
the accused's intention to kill.
PEOPLE v. RAMON MABUG-AT
In the decision of this court in the case of United States vs.
Montenegro (15 Phil., 1), it was held:
DECISION
"We do not doubt that there may be cases wherein the discharge
ROMUALDEZ, J.: of a firearm at another is not in itself sufficient to sustain a
finding of the intention to kill, and there are many cases in the
The Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros impojed upon books wherein the attendant circumstances conclusively
Ramon Mabug-at the penalty of twelve years and one day cadena establish that on discharging a firearm at another the actor was
temporal, with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the not in fact animated by the intent to kill. But, in seeking to
offended party in the sum of P700 and to pay the costs, for the ascertain the intention with which a specific act is committed, it
crime of frustrated murder. is always proper and necessary to look not merely to the act
itself but to all the attendant circumstances so far as they are
The appellant appealed from this judgment, making two developed by the evidence; and where, as in the case at bar, a
assignments of error as committed by the trial court, to wit: revolver is twice discharged point-blank at the body of another,
and the shots directed at the most vital parts of the body, it
1. In holding that the crime committed is frustrated murder, needs but little additional evidence to establish the intent to kill
and beyond a reasonable doubt."
2. In not giving any credit to the evidence presented by the
defense, finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable The fact that a person received the shot which was in-tended for
doubt. another, does not alter his criminal liability. (Art. 1, par. 3, Penal
Code.)
The evidence of the prosecution shows that the accused and
Juana Buralo were sweethearts. Juana had been jealous of the The circumstances qualifying the murder alleged in the
accused on account of the latter having frequently visited the complaint are evident premeditation and treachery. Even when
house of one Carmen. Their relations were such that the accused there is sufficient proof of premeditation (which we do not
invited Juana to take a walk on the afternoon of August 9, 1925, believe has been sufficiently established), yet, it cannot be
Juana refused him, later sending him a note of excuse. On the considered as a qualifying circumstance in the present case,
third day, or the night of August 11th, the accused went to the because the person whom the accused intended to kill was not
threshold of Cirilo Banyan's house where Juana Buralo had Perfecta Buralo, who was hit by the bullet, but her aunt Juana
gone to take part in some devotion. There the accused, revolver Buralo. Had evident premeditation been proven, and there
in hand, requested Francisco Abellon to ask Juana to come being no other qualifying circumstance of frustrated murder
downstairs and as Abellon refused to do so, the accused said: "If present in this case, the acts should be held to be frustrated
you do not want to go upstairs, I will get Juana and if anyone homicide and punished with the maximum degree of the
tries to defend her I will kill him." penalty prescribed by law. (Question 2, p. 28, 1890 ed., Viada's
Penal Code.) But, the 'fact is that treachery was proven and must
The accused waited until Juana and her niece Perfecta Buralo be taken into consideration in this case, because the accused
came downstairs, when they went in the direction of their fired at Perfecta Buralo, employing means which tended to
house. The accused, who was seen by the two girls, followed insure the execution of the crime without running any risk
them without saying a word. It is only a short distance from the himself from anyone who might attempt to defend the said
house where the devotion took place to that of the offended offended party. The treachery which, according to the evidence,
party, the houses being adjacent. As the two girls were going would have attended the crime had the bullet hit Juana Buralo
upstairs, the accused, while standing at the foot of the stairway, was present in this case because the offended party Perfecta
fired a shot from his revolver which wounded Perfecta Buralo, Buralo and Juana were going upstairs with their backs towards
the bullet passing through a part of her neck, having entered the the accused when he fired his revolver. The Supreme Court of
posterior region thereof and coming out through the left eye, Spain, in a decision of May 7, 1885 (Viada, do., pp. 29, 30), in
which was completely destroyed. Due to proper medical holding a crime to be murder and not homicide, stated the
attention, Perfecta Buralo did not die and is one of the witnesses following:
who testified at the trial of this case.
"Considering that, according to the concept of treachery as it is
The defense, without abandoning its allegation that the accused explained in article 10 of the Civil Code dealing with said
is not responsible for the crime, contends that the crime proven circumstance, it is evident that in firing the gun which Alejandro
is not frustrated murder but the discharge of a firearm, with Sola was carrying which caused the death of Nazario Inigo, he
injuries, it not having been proven that it was the accused's employed means which tended to insure the commission of the
intention to kill. crime without any risk to himself arising from any defense that
might be made by the offended party, for neither the wounded
The relations existing between the accused and Juana Buralo, his party Bartolome Lobejano, at whom the shot was aimed in order
disappointment at her not accepting his invitation to take a to kill him so that he might not testify as to the assault
walk, the fact that the accused, revolver in hand, went to look committed upon him shortly before, as held by the trial court,
for Juana Buralo at the house where the devotion was being was not in a position to defend himself in any way, nor could
held, later following her to her house, and especially having Nazario Inigo become aware of any attack so unjustified, rapid
aimed at her person the head are facts which, in our opinion, and unforeseen; considering, further, that the purely accidental
circumstance that as a result of the shot a person other than the
one intended was killed, does not modify, in the instant case, the
elements constituting the crime of murder qualified by the
treachery with which Alejandro Sola acted, whether with
respect to the wounded Bartolome Lobejano or to the deceased
Nazario Inigo, for which reason the rules of article 65 are not
applicable herein, the culprit not having, in fact, committed a
crime different from that which he intended, taking into
consideration the substantial and intrinsical meaning thereof,
etc."

Although the case just cited refers to the crime of consummated

murder, the doctrine sustained therein is applicable to the case
at bar so far as the concurrence of treachery as a qualifying
circumstance is concerned.

The crime now before us is frustrated murder, the accused

having intended to kill and performed all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of murder but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his Will. (Art. 3, Penal Code.)

We find no merit in the first assignment of error. In regard to the

second, it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts
enumerated above constitute the crime of frustrated murder.
With the exception of the qualifying circumstance of treachery,
we find no other aggravating circumstance. The judgment
appealed from being in accordance with the law and the facts
proven, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, with the costs
against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-38511 October 6, 1933 established.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-
Appellee, vs. FRANCISCO CAGOCO Y RAMONES 5. Assuming that the four preceding errors assigned are without
( alias FRANCISCO CAGURO, aliasFRANCISCO merit, the trial court erred in convicting the appellant of the
ADMONES, alias BUCOY, alias FRISCO GUY), Defendant- crime of murder, under article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
Appellant. instead of convicting him of the crime of maltreatment, under
article 266 of the said Code.
W.A. Caldwell and Sotto and Astilla for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Bengzon for appellee. It appears from the evidence that about 8:30 on the night of July
24, 1932 Yu Lon and Yu Yee, father and son, stopped to talk on
VICKERS, J.: the sidewalk at the corner of Mestizos and San Fernando Streets
in the District of San Nicolas Yu Lon was standing near the outer
The accused was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila edge of the sidewalk, with his back to the street. While they were
with the crime of asesinato, committed as follows: talking, a man passed back and forth behind Yu Lon once or
twice, and when Yu Yee was about to take leave of his father,
the man that had been passing back the forth behind Yu Lon
That on or about the 24th day of July, 1932, in the City of Manila, approached him from behind and suddenly and without
Philippine Islands, the said accused did then and there willfully, warning struck him with his fist on the back part of the head. Yu
unlawfully and feloniously, without any just cause therefor and Lon tottered and fell backwards. His head struck the asphalt
with intent to kill and treachery, assault and attack one Yu Lon pavement; the lower part of his body fell on the sidewalk. His
by suddenly giving him a fist blow on the back part of the head, assailants immediately ran away. Yu Yee pursued him through
under conditions which intended directly and especially to San Fernando, Camba, and Jaboneros Streets, and then lost sight
insure, the accomplishment of his purpose without risk to of him. Two other Chinese, Chin Sam and Yee Fung, who were
himself arising from any defense the victim Yu Lon might make, walking along Calle Mestizos, saw the incident and joined him
thus causing him to fall on the ground as a consequence of in the pursuit of Yu Lon's assailant. The wounded man was
which he suffered a lacerated wound on the scalp and a fissured taken to the Philippine General Hospital, were he died about
fracture on the left occipital region, which were necessarily midnight. A post-mortem examination was made the next day
mortal and which caused the immediate death of the said Yu by Dr. Anastacia Villegas, who found that the deceased had
Lon. sustained a lacerated wound and fracture of the skull in the
occipital region, and that he had died from cerebral hemorrhage;
After hearing the evidence, Judge Luis P. Torres found the that he had tuberculosis, though not in an advanced stage, and
defendant guilty as charged, and sentenced him to a tumor in the left
suffer reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law, kidney.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Yu Lon in the sum of library
P1,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles Yu Yee promptly reported the incident to the police, and about
virtual law library 3 o'clock the next morning Sergeant Sol Cruz and other
detectives, accompanied by Yu Yee, went to the scene of the
Appellant's attorney de oficio makes the following assignments crime and found blood stains in the street. Yu Yee said that he
of error: could recognize his father's assailant, and described him as
being about five feet in height, 25 or 30 years old, with long hair
1. The trial court erred in finding that the appellant the person and wearing a suit of dark clothes. After Sergeant Sol Cruz had
who committed the assault on Yu Lon, the victim to the crime been working on the case for three or four days he received
charged in the information that the accused might be the person that had
information.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law assaulted Yu Lon, and on August 4th the accused was arrested
library by detectives Manrique and Bustamante. He was wearing a dark
wool suit. Yu Yee was immediately called to the police station.
2. Assuming that the appellant is the person who committed the The accused was placed near the middle of a line of some eleven
assault on Yu Lon (a fact which we specifically deny), the trial persons that had been detained for investigation. They were
court erred in finding that the appellant struck his supposed wearing different kinds of clothes. Yu Yee without hesitation
victim.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law pointed out the defendant as the person that had assaulted Yu
library Lon. He identified him not only by his long hair combed
towards the back and worn long on the sides in the form of side-
whiskers (patillas), but also by his high cheek-bones and the fact
3. Assuming that the appellant is the person who committed the that his ears have no lobes. The defendant was identified at the
assault on Yu Lon, and that the appellant did strike his trial not only by Yu Yee, but also by Chin Sam and Yee
supposed victim (facts which we specifically deny) the trial Fung.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
court erred in finding that the blow was dealt from the victim's
rear.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
With respect to the first four assignment of error, which raise
questions of fact as to the identification of the accused, and
4. The trial court erred in finding that the identity of the whether or not be struck the deceased, and if he did assault the
appellant was fully deceased, whether he did so in a treacherous manner, we see no
sufficient reason, after considering the evidence and arguments following requisites be present, to wit: ( a) That a felony was
of counsel, to doubt the correctness of the findings of the trial committed; and ( b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person
judge. The accused was identified by Yu Yee and two other be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the
Chinese, and although Yu Yee may have overstated at the trial offender. U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil., 310; U.S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil.,
some of the facial peculiarities in the defendant that he claimed 14 U.S. vs. Diana, 32 Phil., 344.)chanrobles virtual law library
to have observed at the time of the incident, it must be
remembered that Yu Yee without hesitation picked the In the Brobst case, supra, it was held that death may result from
defendant out of a group of eleven persons as his father's a blow over or near the heart or in the abdominal region,
assailant, and that he had exceptional opportunities for notwithstanding the fact that the blow leaves no outward mark
observing his father's assailant, because while that person was of violence; that where death result as the direct consequence of
walking back and forth behind Yu Lon, Yu Yee was facing the the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or
assailant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his
library death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal
responsibility; that one is not relieved, under the law in these
We find the testimony of the defendant and his witnesses as to Islands, from criminal liability for the natural consequences of
the whereabouts of the defendant on the night in question one's illegal acts, merely because one does not intend to produce
unworthy of credit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles such consequences; but that in such cases, the lack of intention,
virtual law library while it does not exempt from criminal liability, is taken into
consideration as an extenuating circumstance. (U.S. vs. Luciano,
The testimony of the three Chinese that a man struck the 2 Phil., 96.)chanrobles virtual law library
deceased and then ran away is corroborated by the testimony of
a 15-year old boy, Dominador The reasoning of the decisions cited is applicable to the case at
Sales.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library bar. There can be no reasonable doubt as to the cause of the
death of Yu Lon. There is nothing to indicate that it was due to
As to the contention that the deceased would have fallen on his some extraneous case. It was clearly the direct consequence of
face if he had been struck on the back of the head, the expert defendants felonious act, and the fact that the defendant did not
testimony shows that in such a case a person instinctively makes intend to cause so great an injury does not relieve him from the
an effort to preserve or regain his balance, and that as result consequence of his unlawful act, but is merely a mitigating
thereof the deceased may have fallen backwards. Another circumstance (U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 23 Phil.,
consideration is that sidewalks almost invariably slope towards 22).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
the pavement, and this being true, when the deceased
straightened up, he naturally tended to fall backwards. The The next question is whether the crime committed by the
evidence leaves no room for doubt that the accused struck the defendant should be classified as homicide or murder. Can the
deceased on the back of the head, because when the deceased defendant be convicted of murder when he did not intend to kill
was assaulted he and Yu Yee were standing on the sidewalk, the deceased?chanrobles virtual law library
facing each other, and if the accused had not struck the deceased
on the back of the head, it would have been necessary for him to We have seen that under the circumstances of this case the
go between the deceased and Yu Yee. Since the accused struck defendant is liable for the killing of Yu Lon, because his death
the deceased from behind and without warning, he acted with was the direct consequence of defendant's felonious act of
treachery. "There is treachery when the offender commits any of striking him on the head. If the defendant had not committed
the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or the assault in a treacherous manner. he would nevertheless have
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and been guilty of homicide, although he did not intend to kill the
especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising deceased; and since the defendant did commit the crime with
from the defense which the offended party might make." treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the presence of the
(Article 14, No. 16, of the Revised Penal Code.)chanrobles qualifying circumstance of
virtual law library treachery.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The fourth assignment of error is a repetition of the
first.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Supreme Court of Spain has held that there is no
incompatibility, moral or legal, between alevosia and the
In the fifth assignment of error it is contended that the appellant mitigating circumstance of not having intended to cause so great
if guilty at all, should be punished in accordance with article 266 an injury:
of the Revised Penal Code, or for slight physical injuries instead
of murder.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law Considering that there is no moral or legal incompatibility
library between treachery and the mitigating circumstance No. 3 of
article 9 of the Penal Code, because the former depends upon
Paragraph No. 1 of article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provide the manner of execution of the crime and the latter upon the
that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person tendency of the will towards a definite purpose, and therefore
committing a felony ( delito) although the wrongful act done be there is no obstacle, in case treacherous means, modes or forms
different from that which he intended; but in order that a person are employed, to the appreciation of the first of said
may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which circumstances and simultaneously of the second if the injury
he proposed to commit, it is indispensable that the two produced exceeds the limits intended by the accused; and for
that reason it cannot be held in the instant case that this
mitigating circumstances excludes treachery, or that the
accused, being chargeable with the death of the offended party,
should not be liable due to the voluntary presence of treachery
in the act perpetrated, although with mitigation corresponding
to the disparity between the act intended and the act
consummated, etc. (Decision of May 10, 1905, Gazette of April
20, 906; Viada: 5th edition, Vol. 2, p. 156.)

In the case of the United States vs. Candelaria (2 Phil., 104), this
court speaking through Chief Justice Arellano said:

In trying Jacinto to a tree the three defendants acted

treacherously ( alevosamente). Whether it was to prevent him
from making resistance, whether it was to torture him for the
purpose of making him give information, or whether it was for
the purpose of inflicting further punishment, the fact is that by
this means the defendants secured themselves against any risk
which might have arisen from an attempt at self-defense on the
part of the victim. We are of opinion that they had no intention
to cause so great an evil as that which resulted, but this does not
neutralize that other qualifying circumstance of the resulting
death, because if there was no alevosia for the purpose of killing
there was alevosia for the purpose of the illtreating. The means
employed were not made use of for the precise purpose of
making certain the death of Jacinto de Jesus but as a safe means
of illtreating him without risk to the persons who were doing so.
If by this means the ill treatment was aggravated, it follows that
it is a qualifying circumstances in the death which resulted. It
was not a condition of the purpose, but it was a condition of the
criminal act itself, in whatever sense this be taken.

The penalty of murder (article 248 of the Revised Penal Code)

is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, and there
being present in this case one mitigating and no aggravating
circumstance the prison sentence of the appellant is reduced to
seventeen years, four months, and one day of reclusion temporal.
As thus modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with
the costs against the
appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
G.R. No. L-34665 August 28, 1931 wounding him, he hit Omamdam; he was only defending his
possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench away
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff- from him, and his conduct was perfectly lawful.
appellee,
vs. The wound which Omamdam received in the chest, judging by
DONATO BINDOY, defendant-appellant. the description given by the sanitary inspector who attended
him as he lay dying, tallies with the size of the point of Bindoy's
Florentino Saguin for appellant. bolo.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound which
VILLAMOR, J.: produced Emigdio Omamdam's death, but the defendant
alleges that it was caused accidentally and without malicious
intent.
The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Misamis to the penalty of twelve years and one day
of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify Pacas and the widow of the deceased, Carmen Angot, testified
the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the having seen the accused stab Omamdam with his bolo. Such
costs. The crime charged against the accused is homicide, testimony is not incompatible with that of the accused, to the
according to the following information: effect that he wounded Omamdam by accident. The widow
testified that she knew of her husband's wound being caused by
Bindoy from his statement to her before his death.
That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of
Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of
Occidental Misamis, the accused Donato Bindoy The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked and show that the accused stabbed Omamdam in the chest with his
with his bolo wounded Emigdio Omamdam, inflicting bolo on that occasion. The defendant, indeed, in his effort to free
upon the latter a serious wound in the chest which himself of Pacas, who was endeavoring to wrench his bolo from
caused his instant death, in violation of article 404 of him, hit Omamdam in the chest; but, as we have stated, there is
the Penal Code. no evidence to show that he did so deliberately and with the
intention of committing a crime. If, in his struggle with Pacas,
The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and
his counsel in this instance contends that the court erred in instead of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would have
finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and in convicting had to answer for his act, since whoever willfully commits a
him of the crime of homicide. felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
(Art. 1 of the Penal Code.) But, as we have said, this is not the
The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a case.
disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop in the barrio market of
Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental
Misamis, started by some of the tuba drinkers. There were The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the
Faustino Pacas (alias Agaton), and his wife called Tibay. One defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually
Donato Bindoy, who was also there, offered some tuba to Pacas' struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the
wife; and as she refused to drink having already done so, Bindoy latter let go, the former had pulled so violently that it flew
threatened to injure her if she did not accept. There ensued an towards his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio
interchange of words between Tibay and Bindoy, and Pacas Omamdam came up, who was therefore hit in the chest, without
stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away from Donato's seeing him, because Emigdio had passed behind him.
Bindoy the bolo he carried. This occasioned a disturbance which The same witness adds that he went to see Omamdam at his
attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam, who, with his home later, and asked him about his wound when he replied: "I
family, lived near the market. Emigdio left his house to see what think I shall die of this wound." And then continued: "Please
was happening, while Bindoy and Pacas were struggling for the look after my wife when I die: See that she doesn't starve,"
bolo. In the course of this struggle, Bindoy succeeded in adding further: "This wound was an accident. Donato did not
disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the aim at me, nor I at him: It was a mishap." The testimony of this
latter's hand towards the left behind the accused, with such witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced
by the fiscal.
violence that the point of the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's
chest, who was then behind Bindoy.
We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind,
There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the fight between which, had it existed, would have greatly facilitated the solution
Bindoy and Pacas. Neither is there any indication that the of this case. And we deem it well to repeat what this court said
in United States vs. Carlos (15 Phil., 47), to wit:
accused was aware of Emigdio Omamdam's presence in the
place, for, according to the testimony of the witnesses, the latter
passed behind the combatants when he left his house to satisfy The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of
his curiosity. There was no disagreement or ill feeling between provincial fiscals, directed to the importance of
Bindoy and Omamdam, on the contrary, it appears they were definitely ascertaining and proving, when possible, the
nephew and uncle, respectively, and were on good terms with motives which actuated the commission of a crime
each other. Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas, and instead of under investigation.
 In many criminal cases one of the most important aids
in completing the proof of the commission of the crime
by the accused is the introduction of evidence
disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of the
guilty person to indulge the criminal act.

In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold,

that the appellant is entitled to acquittal according to article 8,
No. 8, Penal Code. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is
reversed, and the accused Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted
with costs de oficio. So ordered.
[G.R. No. 103119. October 21, 1992.]
3. ID.; DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PHILIPPINE AND
SULPICIO INTOD, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF AMERICAN LAWS REGARDING CONCEPT AND
APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE APPRECIATION OF IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES; CASE AT BAR. —
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. There is a difference between the Philippine and the American
laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible
Public Attorney’s Office for Petitioner. crimes. In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article
4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and made them
punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes
SYLLABUS and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it
provided for were attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said
Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of
1. CRIMINAL LAW; REVISED PENAL CODE; ARTICLE 4, committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge.
PARAGRAPH 2 THEREOF AN INNOVATION; PURPOSE; In this regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the
RATIONALE. — Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation of the impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual
Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old impossibility. . . To restate, in the United States, where the
Penal Code where: . . . it was necessary that the execution of the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible of
act has been commenced, that the person conceiving the idea accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal liability.
should have set about doing the deed, employing appropriate He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive
means in order that his intent might become a reality, and crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears,
finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime,
physically possible. So long as these conditions were not but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where
present, the law and the courts did not hold him criminally the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor
liable. This legal doctrine left social interests entirely cannot be held liable for any crime — neither for an attempt nor
unprotected. The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist for an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in
School, recognizes in the offender his formidability, and now American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime.
penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime
impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate, charge — that is, attempt. This is not true in the Philippines. In
would constitute a felony against person or against property. our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The
The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely
tendencies. a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase
"inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY; EXPLAINED; Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or
FACTUAL IMPOSSIBILITY; EXPLAINED; CASE AT BAR. — physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. The factual situation in
produce an offense against persons or property because: (1) the the case at bar presents physical impossibility which rendered
commission of the offense is inherently impossible of the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under
accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is
inadequate or (b) ineffectual. That the offense cannot be sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. To uphold the
produced because the commission of the offense is inherently contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a
impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender supervening cause independent of the actor’s will, will render
must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person
must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against
impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of
qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility its accomplishment . . ." In that case, all circumstances which
occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an
amount to a crime. Thus: Legal impossibility would apply to accident independent of the actor’s will which is an element of
those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and attempted and frustrated felonies.
expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there
is intention to perform the physical act, (3) there is a
performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the DECISION
consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to
a crime. The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls
in this category. On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs CAMPOS, JR., J.:
when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended
crime. One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the
pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter’s wallet decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming in toto the
and finds the pocket empty. The case at bar belongs to this judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta
category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his City, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted
victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present murder.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his
end. From the records, we gathered the following facts.
 . . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. 4(2),
Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Revised Penal Code), but due to a cause or accident other than
Mandaya’s house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis petitioner’s and his co-accused’s own spontaneous desistance
Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of (Art. 3., ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that
Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto impossible. 3
Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to
be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal
Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code
would also be killed. where:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

At about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of the game day, Petitioner, . . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been
Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with commenced, that the person conceiving the idea should have set
firearms, arrived at Palangpangan’s house in Katugasan, Lopez about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in order
Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, that his intent might become a reality, and finally, that the result
Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan’s bedroom. or end contemplated shall have been physically possible. So
Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at long as these conditions were not present, the law and the courts
said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in did not hold him criminally liable. 5
another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law
and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6
the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire. The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School,
recognizes in the offender his formidability, 7 and now
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite
witnesses. One witness testified that before the five men left the impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate,
premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and would constitute a felony against person or against property. 8
especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal
(sic) you were not injured." 2 tendencies. 9

After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot
attempted murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the produce an offense against persons or property because: (1) the
trial court’s decision. Hence this petition.chanrobles.com.ph : commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
virtual law library accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a)
inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10
This petition questions the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of
Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the
from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act
liable only for an impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible
Revised Penal Code which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw of accomplishment. 11 There must be either (1) legal
library impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the
intended act 12 in order to qualify the act as an impossible
ARTICLE 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. — Criminal crime.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Responsibility shall be incurred:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if
x x x completed, would not amount to a crime. 13 Thus:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. act, (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and
(4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan’s absence from her amount to a crime. 14
room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets
made the crime inherently impossible. The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this
category.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues
that the crime was not impossible. Instead, the facts were On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when
sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was intent. control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. 16
Further, in its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library another with the intention to steal the latter’s wallet and finds
the pocket empty. 17
 The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the upon by Respondent to make this Court sustain the judgment of
place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, attempted murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely
the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner upon these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a
failed to accomplish his end. difference between the Philippine and the American laws
regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.
One American case has facts almost exactly the same as this one.
In People v. Lee Kong, 18 the accused, with intent to kill, aimed In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2),
and fired at the spot where he thought the police officer would expressly provided for impossible crimes and made them
be. It turned out, however, that the latter was in a different place. punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes
The accused failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it
Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It held provided for were attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of
committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge.
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking In this regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the
party imagined where he was, and where the bullet pierced the impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual
roof, renders it no less an attempt to kill. It is well settled impossibility. 22 In U.S. v. Wilson 23 the Court held
principle of criminal law in this country that where the criminal that:cralawnad
result of an attempt is not accomplished simply because of an
obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated upon, and . . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a
these facts are unknown to the aggressor at the time, the defense. If the crime could have been committed had the
criminal attempt is committed. circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is
no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of
In the case of Stokes v. State, 19 where the accused failed to commission.
accomplish his intent to kill the victim because the latter did not
pass by the place where he was lying-in wait, the court held him Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be
liable for attempted murder. The court explained invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. In U.S. v.
that:chanrobles law library Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicted for attempting to smuggle
letters into and out of prison. The law governing the matter
It was no fault of Stokes that the crime was not committed . . . It made the act criminal if done without the knowledge and
only became impossible by reason of the extraneous consent of the warden. In this case, the offender intended to
circumstance that Lane did not go that way; and further, that he send a letter without the latter’s knowledge and consent and the
was arrested and prevented from committing the murder. This act was performed. However, unknown to him, the transmittal
rule of the law has application only where it is inherently was achieved with the warden’s knowledge and consent. The
impossible to commit the crime. It has no application to a case lower court held the accused liable for attempt but the appellate
where it becomes impossible for the crime to be committed, court reversed. It held unacceptable the contention of the state
either by outside interference or because of miscalculation as to that "elimination of impossibility as a defense to a charge of
a supposed opportunity to commit the crime which fails to criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the
materialize; in short it has no application to the case when the proposed federal legislation, is consistent with the
impossibility grows out of extraneous acts not within the control overwhelming modern view." In disposing of this contention,
of the party. the Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such
provision, and thus, following the principle of legality, no
In the case of Clark v. State, 20 The court held defendant liable person could be criminally liable for an act which was not made
for attempted robbery even if there was nothing to rob. In criminal by law. Further, it said:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
disposing of the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus
act plus conduct constitutes the offense of attempt irrespective
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment of legal impossibility until such time as such legislative changes
by reason of his criminal intent, no one can seriously doubt that in the law take place, this court will not fashion a new non-
the protection of the public requires the punishment to be statutory law of criminal attempt.
administered, equally whether in the unseen depths of the
pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was really present or To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be
not. The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. committed is factually impossible of accomplishment, the
Again: ‘Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of
what is done is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements
apprehension that the evil intention will be carried out, the of attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is
incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to
reason committed. commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally
impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable
In State v. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the for any crime — neither for an attempt nor for an impossible
window of victim’s room thinking that the latter was inside. crime. The only reason for this is that in American law, there is
However, at that moment, the victim was in another part of the no such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes
house. The court convicted the accused of attempted murder. impossibility as a defense to a crime charge — that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible
crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the
criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by
itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is
found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no
distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal
impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos.

The factual situation in the case at bar presents physical

impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of
accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an
impossible crime.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was

Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a
supervening cause independent of the actor’s will, will render
useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person
criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of
its accomplishment . . ." In that case, all circumstances which
prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an
accident independent of the actor’s will which is an element of
attempted and frustrated felonies.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby

GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby
MODIFIED. WE hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible
crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and
59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the
social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this
Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided
by the law, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 95322 March 1, 1993 At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's
return, Agra received an envelope containing a ransom note.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, The note demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico and
vs. PABLITO DOMASIAN AND DR. SAMSON warned that otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra thought
TAN, Accused-Appellant. the handwriting in the note was familiar. After comparing it
with some records in the hospital, he gave the note to the police,
which referred it to the NBI for examination. 3chanrobles virtual
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
law library

Silvestre L. Tagarao for appellant Pablito Domasian.

The test showed that it bad been written by Dr. Samson Tan. 4On
the other hand, Enrico was shown a folder of pictures in the
Lino M. Patajo for appellant Dr. Samson Tan. police station so be could identify the man who had detained
him, and he pointed to the picture of Pablito
--> Domasian.5Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with
the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention in the
CRUZ, J.: Regional Trial Court of Quezon. 6chanrobles virtual law library

The boy was detained for only about three hours and was The defense of both accused was denial and alibi. Domasian
released even before his parents received the ransom note. But claimed that at the time of the incident he was watching a
it spawned a protracted trial spanning all of 8 years and led to mahjong game in a friend's house and later went to an optical
the conviction of the two accused. 1chanrobles virtual law clinic with his wife for the refraction of his eyeglasses. 7Dr. Tan
library for his part said he was in Manila. 8chanrobles virtual law library

The victim was Enrico Paulo Agra, who was 8 years old at the After trial Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas found both accused guilty
time of the incident in question. The accused were Pablito as charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
Domasian and Samson Tan, the latter then a resident physician perpetua and all accessory penalties. They were also required to
in the hospital owned by Enrico's parents. They were pay P200,000.00 to Dr. and Mrs. Enrique Agra as actual and
represented by separate lawyers at the trial and filed separate moral damages and attorney's
briefs in this appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles fees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
virtual law library
In the present appeal, the accused-appellants reiterate their
The evidence of the prosecution showed that in the morning of denial of any participation in the incident in question. They
March 11, 1982, while Enrico was walking with a classmate belittle the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and submit
along Roque street in the poblacion of Lopez, Quezon, he was that their own witnesses are more believable. Tan specifically
approached by a man who requested his assistance in getting challenges the findings of the NBI and offers anew the opposite
his father's signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed to findings of the PC/INP showing that he was not the writer of
help and rode with the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan, where the ransom note. He maintains that in any case, the crime
he waited outside while the man went into a building to get the alleged is not kidnapping with serious illegal detention as no
certificate. Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry when, detention in an enclosure was involved. If at all, it should be
instead of taking him to the hospital, the man flagged a minibus denominated and punished only as grave coercion. Finally, both
and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the while. The Domasian and Tan insist that there is no basis for the finding of
man told him to stop crying or he would not be returned to his a conspiracy between them to make them criminally liable in
father. When they alighted at Gumaca, they took another equal degree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
tricycle, this time bound for the municipal building from where library
they walked to the market. Here the man talked to a jeepney
driver and handed him an envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique First, on the credibility of the witnesses. This is assessed in the
Agra, the boy's father. The two then boarded a tricycle headed first instance by the trial judge, whose finding in this regard is
for San Vicente, with the man still firmly holding Enrico, who received with much respect by the appellate court because of his
continued crying. This aroused the suspicion of the driver, opportunity to directly observe the demeanor of the witnesses
Alexander Grate, who asked the man about his relationship on the stand.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
with the boy. The man said he and the boy were brothers, library
making Grate doubly suspicious because of the physical
differences between the two and the wide gap between their
In the case at bar, Judge Lanzanas relied heavily on the
ages. Grate immediately reported the matter to two
testimony of the victim himself, who positively identified
barangay tanods when his passengers alighted from the tricycle.
Domasian as the person who detained him for three hours. The
Grate and the tanods went after the two and saw the man
trial court observed that the boy was "straight-forward, natural
dragging the boy. Noticing that they were being pursued, the
and consistent" in the narration of his detention. The boy's
man told Enrico to run fast as their pursuers might behead them.
naivete made him even more believable. Tirso Ferreras, Enrico's
Somehow, the man managed to escape, leaving Enrico behind.
classmate and also his age, pointed to Domasian with equal
Enrico was on his way home in a passenger jeep when he met
certainty, as the man who approached Enrico when they were
his parents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance and
walking together that morning of March 11, 1982. Grate, the
already looking for him. 2chanrobles virtual law library
tricycle driver who suspected Enrico's companion and later
chased him, was also positive in identifying Domasian. All these We have held that the value of the opinion of a handwriting
three witnesses did not know Domasian until that same expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a
morning and could have no ill motive in testifying against him. writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may
By contrast, Eugenia Agtay, who testified for the defense, can afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and
hardly be considered a disinterested witness because she discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of
admitted she had known Domasian for 3 writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from
years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library an unpracticed observer. 12The test of genuineness ought to be
the resemblance, not the formation of letters in some other
The defense asks why Domasian openly took Enrico to several specimens but to the general character of writing, which is
public places if the intention was to kidnap and detain him. That impressed on it as the involuntary and unconscious result
is for Domasian himself to answer. We do no have to probe the of constitution, habit or other permanent course, and is,
reasons for the irrational conduct of an accused. The more therefore itself permanent. 13chanrobles virtual law library
important question, as we see it, is why Domasian detained
Enrico in the first place after pretending he needed the boy's Presented with the conflicting opinions of the witnesses in the
help. That is also for Domasian to explain. As for Enrico's case at bar, the Court feels that the scales should tilt in favor of
alleged willingness to go with Domasian, this was manifested the prosecution. Significantly, the NBI opinion was bolstered by
only at the beginning, when he believed the man sincerely the testimony of Agra, who believed that the ransom note was
needed his assistance. But he was soon disabused. His initial written by Tan, with whose handwriting he was familiar
confidence gave way to fear when Domasian, after taking him because they had been working in the hospital for four years
so far away from the hospital where he was going, restrained and he had seen that handwriting every day in Tan's
and threatened him if he did not stop prescriptions and daily reports. 14
crying.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library Cesar v. Sandiganbayan 15is not applicable because that case
involved a forgery or the deliberate imitation of another person's
Domasian's alibi cannot stand against his positive identification signature. In the case before us, there was in fact an effort
by Enrico, Grate and Ferreras, let alone the contradictions made to disguise the ransom note writer's penmanship to prevent his
by his corroborating witness, Dr. Irene Argosino, regarding the discovery.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
time he was in the optical clinic and the manner of his payment library
for the refraction. 9Tan's alibi is not convincing either. The
circumstance that he may have been in Manila at the time of the As for the nature of the crime committed, Article 267 of the
incident does not prove that he could not have written the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
ransom note except at that
time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any manner
Concerning the note, Rule 132, Section 22, of the Rules of Court deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
provides as follows: perpetua to death:chanrobles virtual law library

The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who 1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five
believes it to be the handwriting of such person and has seen the days.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon
which the witness has acted or been charged and has thus
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
authority.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
library
comparison, made by the witness or the court with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of 3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon
the judge. the person kidnapped or detained; of if threats to kill him shall
have been made.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Two expert witnesses were presented in the case at bar, one
from the NBI, 10who opined that the ransom note and the
standard documents were written by one and the same person, 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female
and another from the PC/INP 11who expressed a contrary or a public officer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
conclusion. The trial court chose to believe the NBI expert law library
because his examination and analysis "was more comprehensive
than the one conducted by the PC/INP handwriting expert, The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention
who virtually limited his reliance on the perceived similarities was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
and dissimilarities in the pattern and style of the writing, victim or any other person; even if none of the circumstances
thereby disregarding the basic principle in handwriting above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
identification that it is not the form alone nor anyone feature but
rather a combination of all the qualities that identify."chanrobles Contrary to Tan's submission, this crime may consist not only in
virtual law library placing a person in an enclosure but also in detaining him or
depriving him in any manner of his liberty. 16In the case at bar,
it is noted that although the victim was not confined in an other and geared toward the attainment of the common ultimate
enclosure, he was deprived of his liberty when Domasian objective, viz., to extort the ransom of P1 million in exchange for
restrained him from going home and dragged him first into the Enrico's life.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
minibus that took them to the municipal building in Gumaca, library
thence to the market and then into the tricycle bound for San
Vicente. The detention was committed by Domasian, who was The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover. According
a private individual, and Enrico was a minor at that time. The to Agra, Tan approached him six days before the incident
crime clearly comes under Par. 4 of the above-quoted happened and requested a loan of at least P15,000.00. Agra said
article.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library he had no funds at that moment and Tan did not believe him,
angrily saying that Agra could even raise a million pesos if he
Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the really wanted to help. 19The refusal obviously triggered the plan
sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime which he to kidnap Enrico and demand P1 million for his
says is not punishable. His reason is that the second paragraph release.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal library
liability shall be incurred "by any person performing an act
which would be an offense against persons or property, were it The constitutional issues raised by Domasian do not affect the
not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on decision in this case. His claim that he was arrested without
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means." warrant and then tortured and held incommunicado to extort a
As the crime alleged is not against persons or property but confession from him does not vitiate his conviction. He never
against liberty, he argues that it is not covered by the said gave any confession. As for the allegation that the seizure of the
provision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law documents used for comparison with the ransom note was
library made without a search warrant, it suffices to say that such
documents were taken by Agra himself and not by the NBI
Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the same article, agents or other police authorities. We held in the case of People
which clearly applies to him, thus: vs. Andre Marti, 20that the Bill of Rights cannot be invoked
against acts of private individuals, being directed only against
Art. 4. Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall be the government and its law-enforcement agencies and
incurred:chanrobles virtual law library limitation on official
action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. We are satisfied that Tan and Domasian, in conspiracy with each
other, committed the crime of kidnapping as defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and so
xxx xxx xxx
deserve the penalty imposed upon them by the trial
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already been
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with costs
committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime
against the accused-
because there was no inherent improbability of its
appellants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective
library
means. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the
victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been
consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty. Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Commission on Human
The sending of the ransom note would have had the effect only Rights for investigation of the alleged violation of the
of increasing the penalty to death under the last paragraph of constitutional rights of Pablito
Article 267 although this too would not have been possible Domasian.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
under the new library
Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library SO ORDERED.

On the issue of conspiracy, we note first that it exists when two

or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it, whether they
act through physical volition of one or all, proceeding severally
or collectively. 17chanrobles virtual law library

It is settled that conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by

the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interests. 18In the instant case, the trial court correctly held that
conspiracy was proved by the act of Domasian in detaining
Enrico; the writing of the ransom note by Tan; and its delivery
by Domasian to Agra. These acts were complementary to each
[G.R. No. 102596. December 17, 1999.] Paterna did not at first recognize Yolly Armada as the man on
the other side of the ricefield, and so, she called the attention of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. her husband saying that the man was carrying a firearm.
NICASIO ENOJA @ "Nick", JOSE ENOJA @ "Moros", Recognizing the man, however, Siegfred told his wife: "never
ANTONIO GALUPAR @ "Tony", RONNIE ENOJA @ "Bud- mind, he is Yolly Armada." The spouses Insular and Yolly
oy", and YOLLY ARMADA, Accused-Appellants. Armada continued walking until they met ways in front of the
ricemill of Teodoro Salamanca near the chapel. Siegfred greeted
DECISION Armada by nodding his head to which Armada responded by
also nodding his head. Siegfred then said "We will leave" but as
he and his wife were about to proceed on their way, Armada
QUISUMBING, J.: blocked the couple and pointed his firearm to Siegfred with the
barrel of the gun touching the left side of the body of the latter.
Suddenly, Armada fired his gun and as Siegfred turned his back
This is an appeal from the decision dated October 31, 1990, of to run, Armada fired successive shots at him causing him to fall
the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, Branch 26, in Criminal Case to the ground, wounded.
No. 31550, convicting accused-appellants Nicasio Enoja @
"Nick", Jose Enoja @ "Moros", Antonio Galupar @ "Tony", Almost simultaneously, several armed men appeared and took
Ronnie Enoja @ Bud-oy", and Yolly Armada of the crime of turns in firing at Siegfred. Among these armed men were
murder, and sentencing them as follows:chanrobles virtual Nicasio Enoja alias "Nick", Jose Enoja alias "Moros", Antonio
lawlibrary Galupar alias Tony," and Ronnie Enoja alias "Bud-oy." The body
of the victim jerked as the accused took turns in shooting him.
". . . Nicasio Enoja @ Nick, Jose Enoja @ "Moros", and Antonio
Galupar alias "Tony", each to suffer the penalty of reclusion After shooting Siegfred Insular, the accused turned to his wife,
perpetua; Yolly Armada to suffer an indeterminate prison Paterna, and attempted to shoot her but Paterna Insular hugged
sentence ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision Teodoro Salamanca who was then and there present, thus
mayor as minimum to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and prompting the latter to shout to the accused: "do not include the
one (1) day reclusion temporal as maximum, and Ronnie Enoja girl." The accused heeded the plea of Teodoro Salamanca and
alias "Bud-oy" to suffer indeterminate prison sentence ranging refrained from shooting Paterna Insular.
from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum
to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as Jose Enoja then turned to his brother Antonio Enoja and fired at
maximum and all the said accused, to pay, jointly and severally, the latter hitting him on the thigh. Thereafter, Jose Enoja
the heirs of the deceased Siegfred Insular the sum of P30,000 00 approached Siegfred Insular who was then lying on the ground
for his death and P19,200.00 as actual damages representing and placed the gun he used in shooting his brother, Antonio,
expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of near the hand of Siegfred Insular. Then Jose Enoja placed some
insolvency together with all the accessory penalties provided for live bullets into the pocket of Siegfred Insular. Jose Enoja called
by law and to pay the costs." 1 for a hammock and, in no time at all, there was a hammock
brought to the place where Antonio Enoja was loaded and,
The five appellants, all farmers and residents of Barangay thereafter, brought to the hospital. The body of Siegfred Insular
Caraudan, Janiuay, Iloilo, are related to each other. Jose Enoja @ was, however, left lying on the ground at the scene of the
"Moros", Ronnie Enoja @ "Bud-oy", and Yolly Armada, are the incident.chanrobles law library : red
brother, son and first cousin, respectively, of appellant Nicasio
Enoja, while Antonio Galupar is a "kumpadre." Three other Nicasio Enoja announced that they would bring Paterna Insular
accused, Joel Enoja @ "Mike", Melvin Castor, and Antonio Enoja, and Teodoro Salamanca to the ricefield where they would be
remain at-large. made to spend the night but Paterna pleaded to Nicasio Enoja
to just bring them to the house of Patria Alcantara about five
The victim, Siegfred G. Insular, was a suspected commander of meters away from the scene of the incident. The accused granted
the "New People’s Army" (NPA). A day before the incident, the the request of Paterna and brought her and Teodoro Salamanca
house of Romulo Enoja, brother of the Enojas, was allegedly to the house of Patria Alcantara where they were told to stay
sprayed with bullets by the NPA, killing Romulo’s daughter with the warning not to get out or they would be shot. It was
and son. Before that, the house of Catelina Enoja, mother of the only the following, morning, after policemen and PC soldiers
Enojas, at Barangay Caraudan, was allegedly burned by the had arrived that Paterna and Salamanca were able to go out of
NPA. the house of Alcantara.

The facts are not in dispute. In their consolidated brief, The shooting incident reached the police station of Janiuay,
appellants adopted the factual findings of the trial court, as Iloilo upon the report of one Alfredo Galupar, and so, a joint PC-
follows: 2 INP team under P.C. Lt. Pangina and police station commander,
Sgt. Reynaldo Soroñgon went to Barangay Caraudan and
". . . [I]n the afternoon of July 2, 1987, at around 4:30 o’clock, conducted investigation of the incident. That was already
while Siegfred Insular and his wife, Paterna, were on their way around 8:00 o’clock in the morning of July 3, 1987. The
home from the market walking along the ricefield at Barangay policemen were able to recover several empty shells of different
Caraudan, Janiuay, Iloilo, they saw Yolly Armada with a long caliber of firearms from the crime scene. One short homemade
firearm in hand, walking on the other side of the field towards firearm caliber .30, with one empty shell inside the chamber was
the same direction where the couple were going. likewise found and recovered from the ground near the left arm
of the victim."cralaw virtua1aw library
 Siegfred then attempted to shoot Armada but the latter beat him
On March 11, 1988, Provincial Fiscal Vicente E. Aragona filed an to the draw. Armada fired successive shots at Insular with his
Information 3 for murder against appellants and their three M-2 automatic carbine. He did not see Paterna in the vicinity.
companions who were still at large. The Information After the shooting, Salamanca, Nicasio and Arnold came out of
alleged:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph the rice mill. Salamanca asked what happened and Armada
answered that Siegfred shot Antonio and so, he shot Siegfred.
"The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses NICASIO ENOJA Armada then left and surrendered to the PC station at Jibolo,
alias "Nick", JOSE ENOJA alias "Moros", ANTONIO GALUPAR Janiuay, Iloilo City. 8
alias "Tony", RONNIE ENOJA alias "Bud-oy" and YOLLY
ARMADA of the crime of Murder committed as The other appellants admitted being in the vicinity of the crime,
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library but categorically denied any participation in the shooting.

That on or about July 2, 1987, in the Municipality of Janiuay, Nicasio claimed that he was with his son, Arnold, and
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Salamanca inside the latter’s ricemill, milling palay when the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, shooting occurred. 9 However, Salamanca testified that at the
confederating and mutually helping one another with JOEL time of the incident, there was no palay milling going on. 10
ENOJA alias "Mike", MELVIN CASTOR and ANTONIO
ENOJA, who are still at large, armed with firearms and taking Ronnie testified that he was doing household chores in their
advantage of superior strength to better realize their purpose, house at Barangay Caraudan, where his brother Rowel and
with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to sister Annelyn were lying in state, when he heard explosions
kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously coming from the direction of the ricemill. 11 Shortly thereafter,
attack, assault and shoot one SIEGFRED INSULAR with said Arnold arrived and told them that Antonio was shot by Siegfred
weapon with which they were then provided, thereby inflicting and requested that a hammock be brought to the scene so that
upon the latter gunshot wounds on the vital parts of his body Antonio could be brought to the hospital. Ronnie, Jose, and
which caused his death thereafter. Jonathan Lazo, Ronnie’s first cousin. immediately brought the
hammock to the scene of the incident. 12 Ronnie thereafter saw
CONTRARY TO LAW."cralaw virtua1aw library Paterna arrive and cry upon seeing her slain husband. Ronnie
and his companions placed Antonio in the hammock, boarded
On August 5, 1988, appellants were arraigned and entered their him in a tricycle, and rushed him to the hospital. 13 On the way,
respective pleas of not guilty. Ronnie heard explosions and when he looked back, he saw his
uncle Joel Enoja alias "Mike" and his friend, Melvin, shooting the
During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: prostrate body of Siegfred. 14
Teodoro Salamanca, an eyewitness to the shooting; Paterna
Insular widow of Siegfred; Dr. Tito D. Doromal, medico-legal Jose testified that he was at his house, about 300 meters from the
officer who did the autopsy; Pfc. Juan O. Gañon, and Pfc. Moises scene of the crime. He was weeding in his yard when he heard
C. Reiteracion, Integrated National Police officers who gunfire. After a short while, Arnold arrived and asked him to
responded to the shooting incident. bring a hammock to the scene of the incident. 15

Dr. Doromal testified that the victim suffered five (5) gunshot Galupar related that he had just finished plowing his farm and
wounds in the head and neck area, six (6) gunshot wounds in was resting in his house in Barangay Caraudan when he heard
the thoraco-abdominal regions, and two (2) gunshot wounds in explosions. He remained at home the whole night and only
the extremities. The cause of death was maceration of the brain, learned of the death of Siegfred the following morning. He
secondary to gunshot wounds. 4 claimed that he was implicated in the case because he refused to
act as witness for the prosecution. 16
Pfc. Juan O. Gañon stated that he entered the incident in the
police blotter. 5 Pfc. Moises C. Reiteracion said he was part of On October 31, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision 17
the team which responded to the report of the shooting incident. finding appellants guilty as charged. The trial court did not give
The team found the body of the victim still lying on the same credence to Armada’s claim of self-defense inasmuch as
spot the following morning. They recovered empty shells of policemen recovered several empty bullet shells from firearms
different calibers and a homemade short firearm near the left of different calibers at the scene of the crime. The short
arm of the victim. 6 Pfc. Reiteracion and two companions homemade firearm found near the left arm of the victim could
brought the body of the victim to the funeral home. 7 not have been used by the victim since it only had one empty
shell in its chamber, not to mention that the victim was right-
For the defense, appellants presented Atty. David handed. Lastly, the trial court found it highly suspicious that
Tubongbanua, 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo, who Antonio, who was allegedly shot by the victim and who could
recommended the dismissal of the case but was overturned by have corroborated Armada’s story of self-defense, went into
the Provincial Fiscal. Appellants themselves testified and, hiding and had not surfaced up to the
except for Armada, interposed the defense of denial and alibi. present.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Appellant Armada pleaded self-defense in shooting Siegfred. In this appeal, in their joint brief, 18 appellants raise the
He claimed that while he was on his way from Barangay Quipot following errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
to Caraudan, to attend the wake of his niece and nephew, he
heard gunshots near the chapel. When he went to the place, he I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING CONSPIRACY;
saw Galupar lying wounded on the ground, shot by Siegfred.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED- brother Antonio to make it appear that the shooting was in self-
APPELLANTS GUILTY; defense. Third, Jose planted a short firearm near the body of the
victim and placed bullets in the pocket of the victim. Fourth,
III. ASSUMING THEM GUILTY, THE LOWER COURT ERRED, strangely after Antonio was brought to the hospital, he
EXCEPT FOR APPELLANT YOLLY ARMADA, IN NOT conveniently disappeared and could no longer be located by the
FINDING THAT THE OFFENSE COMMITTED WAS ONLY authorities. The aforementioned acts of the appellants clearly
AN IMPOSSIBLE CRIME. point to their common purpose, concert of action, and
community of interest. 26
The records show that appellant Antonio Galupar died pending
appeal. Pursuant to our ruling in People v. Bayotas, 236 SCRA Appellants suggest that since Paterna was crying at the time of
239, the death of appellant Galupar pending appeal the shooting, she could not have clearly witnessed the
extinguished his criminal liability as well as his civil liability ex commission of the crime. This contention is disingenuous, to say
delicto in senso strictiore. the least. Paterna’s crying does not impair her credibility.
Witnesses of startling occurrences react differently depending
Appellant Yolly Armada escaped from the New Bilibid Prison upon their situation and state of mind, and there is no standard
on September 25, 1996. 19 As a result, his appeal was dismissed form of human behavioral response when one is confronted
and the judgment against him became final and executory. with a strange, startling or frightful experience. 27 Her powers
Entry of judgment was made on .January 9, 1997. 20 of observation could even be heightened by the startling event
to imprint the details in her memory. We have gone over the
In the meantime, appellant Jose Enoja jumped bail, which also records and find her testimony clear, credible and consistent
resulted in the dismissal of his appeal. Judgment against him with the testimony of Salamanca.
became final and executory, and entry of judgment was made
on March 21, 1997. 21 An appellant who escapes or refuses to Appellants further insist that the trial court erred in finding that
surrender to the proper authorities is deemed to have treachery accompanied the killing, considering that the victim
abandoned his appeal, 22 hence, the judgment against him was already forewarned of the impending danger when he saw
becomes a final and executory. Nonetheless, the appeal appellant Armada carrying a firearm.. Appellants contend that
proceeds as to the remaining appellants, Nicasio Enoja and for treachery to exist, the offended party is completely denied of
Ronnie Enoja, who are now detained at the New Bilibid Prison, the opportunity to defend himself, but it is not so in this case.
Muntinlupa City. Our present review, therefore, concerns only
these two appellants. As the Solicitor General correctly pointed out, there was nothing
in the behavior of Armada that could have forewarned the
Appellants assail the trial court’s finding of conspiracy by victim of an impending danger. Both the victim and Armada
pointing out alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the knew each other. Armada even acknowledged the greeting of
prosecution witnesses Salamanca and Paterna. Appellants the victim. The latter was walking along the ricefield with his
contend that while Salamanca testified that it was only after wife 28 when he was suddenly gunned down by the appellants.
Armada shot the victim that the other appellants came "one after The victim gave no provocation for the attack.. The essence of
the other" and fired at the victim, Paterna testified that treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the
appellants fired successive shots at the victim, implying that all slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. 29
appellants were already in the crime scene when Armada fired Clearly, the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present in
at Siegfred. However, close perusal of the pertinent transcript of this case.
stenographic notes (TSN) shows no inconsistencies in the two
testimonies. Paterna actually testified that after Armada fired at Considering the number of the armed assailants against the lone
her husband, the other appellants arrived one after the other unarmed victim, there was also abuse of superior strength. Since
("nag-arabot abot"), 23 and continued to fire at the prostrate treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
body of her husband. The two testimonies constitute cumulative superior strength this aggravating circumstance need not be
evidence on who participated in the shooting of Siegfred. Both appreciated separated. 30
witnesses pointed to all five Accused-Appellants.
As an alternative defense, appellants present the theory that
On the matter of conspiracy, we have consistently held that even assuming they participated in the killing of Siegfred, they
conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of an agreement should only be held liable for the commission of an impossible
by the parties to commit the crime. The conduct of the crime under Article 4, Par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code,
malefactors before, during or after the commission of the crime penalized under Article 59 thereof. 31 Appellants theorize that
is sufficient to prove their conspiracy. Once proved, the act of the shots fired by Armada already resulted in the death of the
one becomes the act of all. All shall be answerable as co- victim, and hence, their subsequent shooting of the victim
principals regardless of the extent or degree of their merely constitutes the impossible crime of killing an already
participation. 24 In this case, circumstances indubitably show dead person. The proposition not only completely contradicts
that appellants acted concertedly to kill Siegfred. First, after their defense of alibi and denial, it is also speculative as to cause
appellant Armada fired at the victim incapacitating the latter, of death. The defense of impossible crime is irreconcilable with
the other accused arrived "almost simultaneously" and took alibi.
turns in shooting the victim. The successive shots riddled the
victim’s body with bullets. Several empty cartridges from guns Appellants Nicasio and Ronnie Enoja claim that they were
of different calibers found in the scene and the numerous elsewhere during the offense. For alibi to prosper as a defense,
wounds of the victim indicate plurality of assailants. 25 Second, the accused must show that he was so far away that he could
appellant Jose Enoja thereafter fired a shot at the thigh of his not have been physically present at the place of the crime, or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission 32 and that his of the crime of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
presence elsewhere renders it impossible for him to be the guilty MODIFICATION that accused-appellants are ordered to pay
party. 33 In this case, Nicasio admitted he was within the the heirs of the victim, jointly and severally, the amount of
vicinity of the crime but presented the lame excuse that he was P50,000.00 as indemnity. The award of P19,200.00 as actual
inside Salamanca’s rice mill at the time of the shooting. His son, damages is deleted. Costs against appellants.
Arnold, corroborated this testimony. But it was put in doubt by
the testimony of Salamanca, who stated that no milling of palay SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
in his ricemill was going on at the time of the shooting. Alibi,
especially when it is corroborated mainly by relatives and
friends of the accused, is held by this Court with extreme
suspicion for alibi is easy to fabricate and concoct. 34

Both Paterna and Salamanca positively identified Nicasio Enoja

as one of those who took part in the shooting incident. Paterna
categorically pointed to Ronnie Enoja as the person who shot
her husband in the right eye. 35 Appellants could not attribute
any motive against these witnesses to falsely testify against
them. In the light of positive identification by witnesses who
have no motive to falsely testify, the feeble defense of alibi
cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification of the
accused as the perpetrators of the crime. 36

At the time of the commission of the crime, on July 2, 1987, the

penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. 37

There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, with

respect to Nicasio Enoja’s culpability, the trial court correctly
imposed the penalty for murder in its medium period, 38 which
is reclusion perpetua.

With respect to appellant Ronnie Enoja, who was born on

February 21, 1970, and was below 18 at the time of the
commission of the crime, the trial court correctly appreciated the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Thus, the
penalty next lower in degree was imposed on him in its proper
period pursuant to Article 68, second paragraph of the Revised
Penal Code, which is prision mayor maximum to reclusion
temporal medium. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the maximum penalty to be imposed upon appellant Ronnie
Enoja shall be taken from the medium period of the imposable
penalty, which is reclusion temporal minimum or twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree, which is prision correccional maximum to
prision mayor medium or four (4) years and two (2) months to
ten (10) years. Consequently, the trial court correctly imposed
upon Ronnie Enoja the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the award of P30,000.00

as indemnity should be increased to P50,000.00. However, the
award of actual damages in the amount of P19,000.00 should be
deleted. Credence can only be given to claims, which are duly
supported by receipts. 39 The testimony alone of the widow,
that her sister-in-law incurred about P20,000.00 expenses in
connection with the death of the victim, is insufficient basis to
award actual damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo

City, Branch 26, in Criminal Case No. 31550, convicting accused-
appellants Nicasio Enoja @" Nick" and Ronnie Enoja @ "Bud-oy"
[G.R. NO. 162540 : July 13, 2009] to make check payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH.
Around that time, Ricablanca also received a phone call from an
GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was looking
PHILIPPINES,Respondent. for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform
Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his account had
been dishonored.
DECISION

Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former

PERALTA, J.:
employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking the latter to inform
Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorarifiled by petitioner regarding the bounced check. Ricablanca explained that she had
Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 of the to call and relay the message through Valencia, because the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23761 dated Capitles did not have a phone; but they could be reached
December 16, 2003, affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of
of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution2 dated March 5, 2004 Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby
Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to
de Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle, was charged before replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131, plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself,
with the crime of Qualified Theft, allegedly committed as Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle.
follows: Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's accountant,
reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph
That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Dyhengco.
Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was
together and mutually helping one another, being then all able to confirm that the latter indeed handed petitioner a BDO
employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., herein check for P10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment for her
represented by JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had purchases from Mega Foam.4 Baby Aquino further testified that,
free access inside the aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse sometime in July 1997, petitioner also called her on the phone to
of trust and confidence reposed upon them with intent to gain tell her that the BDO check bounced.5 Verification from
and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, company records showed that petitioner never remitted the
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that
steal and deposited in their own account, Banco De Oro Check she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash in August
No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of P10,000.00, 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.6
representing payment made by customer Baby Aquino to the
Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted
in the aforesaid stated amount of P10,000.00.
depositing the subject BDO check in his bank account, but
explained that the check came into his possession when some
CONTRARY TO LAW.3 unknown woman arrived at his house around the first week of
July 1997 to have the check rediscounted. He parted with his
The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA cash in exchange for the check without even bothering to inquire
found to be more credible, reveals the events that transpired to into the identity of the woman or her address. When he was
be as follows. informed by the bank that the check bounced, he merely
disregarded it as he didn't know where to find the woman who
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known rediscounted the check.
as Baby Aquino, handed petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check
Number 0132649 postdated July 14, 1997 in the amount Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National
of P10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment
purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then operation with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided
the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited by Dyhengco were marked and dusted with fluorescent powder
in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who
Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the was tasked to pretend that she was going along with Valencia's
former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega plan.
Foam.
On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega house. Petitioner, who was then holding the bounced BDO
Foam, received a phone call sometime in the middle of July from check, handed over said check to Ricablanca. They originally
one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer wanted intended to proceed to Baby Aquino's place to have the check
to know if she could issue checks payable to the account of Mega replaced with cash, but the plan did not push through.
Foam, instead of issuing the checks payable to CASH. Said However, they agreed to meet again on August 21, 2007.
customer had apparently been instructed by Jacqueline Capitle
On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioner's house, WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds
where she met petitioner and Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa, Anita Busog De
husband, and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia; Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle GUILTY beyond
Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go with the group because she reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFTand each
decided to go shopping. It was only petitioner, her husband, of them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FIVE (5)
Ricablanca and Valencia who then boarded petitioner's jeep and YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as
went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND
from the jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, TWENTY (20) DAYS, as maximum.
pretending that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino.
However, the cash she actually brought out from the premises SO ORDERED.7
was the P10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by
Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and upon returning
The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, 2003, a
to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner.
Decision was promulgated, the dispositive portion of which
Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents,
reads, thus:
who had been watching the whole time.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court

Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where
is MODIFIED, in that:
the Forensic Chemist found fluorescent powder on the palmar
and dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This showed that
petitioner and Valencia handled the marked money. The NBI (a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;
filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the two and one
Jane Doe who was later identified as Jacqueline Capitle, the wife (b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4
of Generoso Capitle. months arresto mayor medium.

The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject (c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.
check and presented the following scenario.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until
she resigned on June 30, 1997, but claimed that she had stopped A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA
collecting payments from Baby Aquino for quite some time Decision was filed only for petitioner Gemma Tubale Jacinto,
before her resignation from the company. She further testified but the same was denied per Resolution dated March 5, 2004.
that, on the day of the arrest, Ricablanca came to her mother's
house, where she was staying at that time, and asked that she
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's house. Since
petitioner alone, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the
petitioner was going for a pre-natal check-up at the Chinese
CA. The issues raised in the petition are as follows:
General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with the
former and her husband in their jeep going to Baby Aquino's
place in Caloocan City. She allegedly had no idea why 1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not
Ricablanca asked them to wait in their jeep, which they parked charged in the information;
outside the house of Baby Aquino, and was very surprised when
Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the NBI agents 2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft;
arrested them. and

Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega 3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt
Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997. It was never part of beyond reasonable doubt.8
her job to collect payments from customers. According to her,
on the morning of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca called her up on The petition deserves considerable thought.
the phone, asking if she (Valencia) could accompany her
(Ricablanca) to the house of Baby Aquino. Valencia claims that
The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of
she agreed to do so, despite her admission during cross-
evidence to constitute the elements of the crime of qualified theft
examination that she did not know where Baby Aquino resided,
defined under Article 308, in relation to Article 310, both of the
as she had never been to said house. They then met at the house
Revised Penal Code: (1) the taking of personal property - as
of petitioner's mother, rode the jeep of petitioner and her
shown by the fact that petitioner, as collector for Mega Foam,
husband, and proceeded to Baby Aquino's place. When they
did not remit the customer's check payment to her employer
arrived at said place, Ricablanca alighted, but requested them to
and, instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) said property
wait for her in the jeep. After ten minutes, Ricablanca came out
belonged to another − the check belonged to Baby Aquino, as it
and, to her surprise, Ricablanca gave her money and so she even
was her payment for purchases she made; (3) the taking was
asked, "What is this?" Then, the NBI agents arrested them.
done with intent to gain - this is presumed from the act of
unlawful taking and further shown by the fact that the check
The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on was deposited to the bank account of petitioner's brother-in-
October 4, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive law; (4) it was done without the owner's consent - petitioner hid
portion of which reads: the fact that she had received the check payment from her
employer's customer by not remitting the check to the company; accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means
(5) it was accomplished without the use of violence or employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. The aspect of the
intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things - the inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime
check was voluntarily handed to petitioner by the customer, as under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further
she was known to be a collector for the company; and (6) it was explained by the Court in Intod10 in this wise:
done with grave abuse of confidence - petitioner is admittedly
entrusted with the collection of payments from customers. Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot
produce an offense against persons or property because: (1) the
However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
of the Revised Penal Code, the personal property subject of the accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a)
theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
to gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article
309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of
the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen. the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the
focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible
belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility,
value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act
arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
produced.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative. completed, would not amount to a crime.

Intod v. Court of Appeals9 is highly instructive and applicable to x x x

the present case. In Intod, the accused, intending to kill a person,
peppered the latter's bedroom with bullets, but since the The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this
intended victim was not home at the time, no harm came to him. category.
The trial court and the CA held Intod guilty of attempted
murder. But upon review by this Court, he was adjudged guilty
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when
only of an impossible crimeas defined and penalized in
extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59, both of the
control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. x x x 11
Revised Penal Code, because of the factual impossibility of
producing the crime. Pertinent portions of said provisions read
as follows: In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that
involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the
coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's
Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility
wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.
shall be incurred:

Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of

x x x
factual impossibility given in Intod. In this case, petitioner
performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly
employment of inadequate to ineffectual means. (emphasis enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she
supplied) would have received the face value thereof, which was not
rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to
because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible. - When petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being
the person intending to commit an offense has already produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out
performed the acts for the execution of the same but to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually
nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace
that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible the value of said dishonored
accomplishment or because the means employed by such check.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired
by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving
degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon the P5,000.00 marked money, which she thought was the cash
him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The
pesos. Court held in Valenzuela v. People12 that under the definition of
theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, "there is only one
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the
performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) taking of personal property of another." Elucidating further, the
that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its Court held, thus:
x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under
Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in the
language of the law - that theft is already "produced" upon the
"tak[ing of] personal property of another without the latter's
consent."

x x x

x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all

but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced
when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking
by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is
immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once
having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or
unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the
deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such
acts of execution. x x x
x x x

x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or

apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no
opportunity to dispose of the same. x x x

x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one's personal

property, is the element which produces the felony in its
consummated stage. x x x 13

From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of

the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for
Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the
crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment
in this case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving
the P5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for the dishonored
check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the
crime of qualified theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby
Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check was hatched
only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank.
Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's
act of receiving the cash replacement should not be considered
as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner
was caught receiving the marked money was merely
corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.

Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the

dishonored check replaced with cash by its issuer is a different
and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said
scheme was not included or covered by the allegations in the
Information, the Court cannot pronounce judgment on the
accused; otherwise, it would violate the due process clause of
the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have
been another possible source of criminal liability.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December 16, 2003, and
its Resolution dated March 5, 2004, are MODIFIED. Petitioner
Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE
CRIME as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and
59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto
mayor, and to pay the costs.SO ORDERED.