John Hall Lectureby Iwai
John Hall Lectureby Iwai
John Hall Lectureby Iwai
A Comparative Perspective
(9th John Whitney Hall Lecture at Yale University, Nov. 7, 2007)
By Katsuhito Iwai
“Japan’s social and institutional history, once simply an exotic curiosity,…” (Japan, from Prehistory
to Modern Times (1968))
“The question which the comparative historian asks is not whether it is possible to identify in Japan a
pattern of history identical with that of Western Europe. He is concerned, rather, with this
question, ‘Has Japanese society at any time in its history exemplified a pattern of social organization
which, along with that of Europe, may properly be labeled feudal?’ It is a question asked by the
historian who wishes to engage explicitly in the kind of theorizing and categorizing which arises
from the broad segments of human development which may embrace more than one culture.”
(Feudalism in Japan – A Reassessment (1962))
The first fragment is from his textbook on Japan, and the rest is from his well-known article:
“Feudalism in Japan – A Reassessment.” I do not have time to read these passages in full, but what I
gather from these passages is that Professor Hall’s approach to Japanese society and history is
“comparative and theoretical.” It is neither (1) to treat Japan as “an exotic curiosity,” nor (2) to identify in
Japan “a pattern of history identical with that of Western Europe.” Indeed, what Professor Hall tried to
show in his numerous writings on Japan is that to study Japan, from a comparative perspective, is to
broaden our understanding of human development that embraces more than one culture. It is to enlarge
what is common in human institutions, what is general in human cultures, and what is universal in human
societies.
Now, this tribute to Professor Hall leads me back to the title of this lecture. If you look at this power
point slide, you may notice that I have made a slight change to the title from the announced one. I have
placed a parenthesis around the word “Japanese”.
This is to indicate that this talk is intended to be in the spirit of Professor Hall. It is to indicate that to
study Japanese society, in particular, Japanese corporate system is neither to treat it as an exotic curiosity,
nor to identify in it a pattern identical with that of the United States and Europe. It is rather to enlarge our
understanding of what is universal in societies, or more specifically, in corporate systems, by presenting a
theory that can embrace more than one economy.
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So much for the Introduction, and let me start my lecture.
As some of you may know, I am a theoretical economist by training, but in the last 15 years I have also
been working on the Japanese economy, especially, on the history and the structure of the Japanese
corporate system. Some of my papers this lecture will be based upon are an outgrowth, indeed an
unexpected outgrowth of those studies.1 I said "unexpected" outgrowth, because somewhere in the
process of studying the history and the structure of the Japanese corporate system, I began to ask myself a
very naive question: "What is corporation?" and soon found myself working on a very unfamiliar territory
– a territory inhabited mostly by legal scholars, sociologists, historians and philosophers, as you will now
see.
The above table reports the results of a 1988 survey that asked corporate managers in America, Japan and
Europe to pick out the three most important goals of their management policies. One can see from the
entries at the first column that answers given by American corporate managers were consistent with the
traditional assumption in economics that the whole purpose of the corporate firm is to maximize the
returns to its shareholders. They ranked ROI (the rate of return on investment) at the top (78.1) and
capital gains of shareholders second (63.0). In stark contrast to American counterparts, the Japanese
corporate managers placed capital gains of shareholders at the very bottom of their ranking (2.7). True
that they did rank ROI the third, but the points it gets are not so high (35.5). Instead, they put the ratio of
new products and new operations at the top (60.8) and ranked market share second (50.6). These goals are
more or less related to the survival and growth of the corporation as a business organization. The answers
given by European corporate managers, however, were somewhat murky, due to the diversity of the
countries in this category.
This study was conducted more than 20 years ago, and the outlook of the corporate managers,
especially those in Japan, have changed since then. But, more recent studies have also shown that there
2. What is Corporation?
Suppose you are an owner of a small grocery shop around a corner. Whenever you feel hungry, you can
pick up an apple on the shelf and eat it right away. That apple is your property, and the only thing you
have to worry about is the wrath of your spouse -- your co-owner. I have chosen a grocery shop as a
real-life example of the classical firm in any textbook of economics. As Fig. 1 shows, it consists of a
single ownership relationship between an owner (or a group of owners in the case of a partnership firm),
and assets such as apples and oranges on the shelf of the grocery store. However, as soon as a firm is
“incorporated” and become a “corporation (or a joint stock company),” its ownership structure undergoes
a fundamental change.
Owner
Owner
・・・・・・・
Owner
Assets
Then, what is "corporation"? Toyota is a corporation and GM is a corporation, and both are business (or
for-profit) corporations. Yale University and University of Tokyo are also corporations, though not a
business corporation.
Suppose you are a shareholder of a business corporation, for instance, a big supermarket chain. You feel
hungry and found one of its stores on your way. If you enter the store, grab an apple from its shelf and eat
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it right away, what will happen to you? You will be arrested as a thief! Why? It is because a corporate
shareholder is not the legal owner of the corporate assets. Who, then, is the owner of those corporate
assets? The corporation as a “legal person” is. Then, what is a legal person? The law treats a corporation
as a subject of property right capable of owning real property, entering into contracts, suing and being
sued, all in its own name, separate and distinct from its shareholders. A corporation is, in other words, a
“thing” that is treated legally as a “person.” And it is the corporation as a legal person that is the owner of
the corporate assets.
Who, then, are corporate shareholders? The answer is, owners of the corporation. Corporate
shareholders are the holders of corporate share -- a bundle of the financial and participatory rights in the
corporation that can be bought and sold freely as an object of property right. Indeed, to hold a corporate
share is to own a share of the corporation as a thing (an asset) separate and distinct from the underlying
corporate assets. It is the corporation as a “thing” that the corporate shareholders own.
This observation will lead us to the most crucial characterization of the business corporation. In
contrast to a single ownership firm or a partnership firm, a corporate firm is composed of not one but
TWO ownership relations: the shareholders own the corporation, and the corporation in turn owns the
corporate assets, as is shown in Fig.2.
Indeed, in this two-tier ownership structure the person/thing duality of corporation is used in an
ingenious manner. In regard to things (corporate assets), a corporation acts legally as a person, as a
subject of property right; and in regard to persons (shareholders), a corporation is acted on legally as a
thing, as an object of property right.
Shareholder
Shareholder
Shareholder
・
・
・
・
・
・
Corporation
Corporate Assets
Fig. 2: Two-Tier Ownership Structure of a Business Corporation.
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3. The Corporate Personality Controversy and the Comparative Corporate System
For many centuries, legal scholars and legal philosophers have debated heatedly as to what constitutes
the “essence” of the corporate personality. This is called the “corporate personality controversy” – one of
the most celebrated controversies in legal theory and legal philosophy. In this age-old controversy, two
competing legal theories have emerged, each advancing opposing answers. They are “corporate
nominalism” and “corporate realism.” The corporate nominalism asserts that the corporation is a
contractual association of individuals, whose legal personality is no more than an abbreviated way of
writing their names together. The corporate realism, in opposition, claims that the corporation is a
full-fledged entity whose legal personality is no more than an external expression of its real personality in
the society. (There is a huge body of writings on this controversy. Some of the best-known works
available in English are [18, 7, 5, 25]. For a comprehensive review of various theories of corporate
personality before 1930, see [10]. In [12] I have given an extensive discussion on this controversy.)
The corporate personality controversy is not the thing in the past. The rivalry between corporate
nominalism and corporate realism has continued up until now. On the one hand, the contractual theory of
the firm, whether it is an agency-theory version or a transactions costs economics version, is a direct
descendent of corporate nominalism. (See, e.g., [4, 1, 17, 8, 30].) On the other hand, the so-called
evolutionary theory of the firm or knowledge-base view of the firm or core-competence view of the firm
can be interpreted as a modern representative of corporate realism. (See, e.g., [3, 23, 24, 25, 29].) The
former regards the "private corporations" as "simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of
contracting relationships among Individuals." ([17], p. 310.) The latter posits corporate firms as
"organizations that know how to do things, .... while individual members come and go." ([31], p. 136.)
The corporate personality controversy is far from a relic of the past.
It is not hard to see that the age-old controversy between corporate nominalism and corporate realism
and the more recent rivalry between the contractual theory of the firm and the evolutionary theory of the
firm more or less correspond to the difference between the American corporate system and the Japanese
corporate system.
What I would like to do now is to “end” this controversy once and for all. It is, however, not by
declaring victory for one side or the other. It is rather by declaring victory for both sides by means of
elucidating two legal mechanisms, through which the legal concept of the corporation is capable of
generating two seemingly contradictory corporate structures ----- one approximating corporate realism
and the other approximating corporate nominalism.
Indeed, if we only look at the downstairs of the two-tier ownership structure depicted in Fig. 2, the
corporation appears as a person owning and managing corporate assets, and we draw near to the position
of corporate realists and that of the Japanese corporate system. If we look only at the upstairs, the
corporation appears as a thing owned and controlled by shareholders, and we draw near to the position of
corporate nominalists and that of American corporate system.
We can go further. What I am going to demonstrate is that there are even ways to eliminate either
thingness or personality from the corporation, thereby turning it into a full “person” or a mere “thing”,
respectively.
Corporation Natural
Persons
One might dismiss all this as idle speculation. Some countries prohibit a corporation from repurchasing
its own outstanding shares. And, in many other countries that allow share repurchases, the repurchased
shares usually lose their voting rights in shareholders meetings. In the real economy, therefore, it appears
impossible for the corporation to become its own owner.
There is, however, an important leeway to this. Imagine a situation where two corporations, A and B,
hold a majority of each other’s shares. The corporation A as a person owns the corporation B as a thing,
and the corporation B as a person in turn owns the corporation A as a thing. As is shown in Fig. 4, even
though each corporation does not own itself directly, it does indirectly through the intermediacy of the
other corporation. One might still object to the practical possibility of this leeway by pointing out that
some countries impose legal limits on the extent of cross-shareholdings between corporations.
Corporation A
Natural
Persons
Corporation B
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Fig. 4 : Mutually Holding Corporations.
Yet, it is possible to circumvent even these limits. Suppose that twelve corporations get together and
that each holds 5 percent of each of the other’s shares. Then, simple arithmetic ((12 - 1) x5% = 55%) tells
us that a majority block of each corporation’s shares could be effectively sealed off from real
human-beings, without violating legal restrictions on cross-shareholding in any of advanced capitalistic
countries. These twelve corporations would indeed become their own owners at least as a group, as is
depicted in Fig. 5. It is therefore practically impossible to prevent corporations from becoming their own
owners, if they so wish. We have now reached the paradigm of corporate realism -- by extensive
cross-shareholdings corporations can get rid of their thingness and become self-determining subjects in
the system of law.
A
L B
K C
J D Natural
Persons
I E
H F
G
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Dominant
Shareholders
Corporation
Corporate Assets
Fig. 6: A ‘Nominalistic’ Corporation.
This is of course a common sense. But I now argue that the so-called corporate raiders are daily putting
this legal mechanism into practice in the real economy.
That a business corporation consists of two-tier ownership relations implies that it contains in it two
kinds of “things” — the corporate assets and the corporation itself. This fact immediately implies that
there are also two kinds of values residing in a business corporation. They are, respectively, the value of
corporate assets and the value of the corporation as a thing. The former can be defined as the present
discounted value of the future profit stream that would accrue from the most efficient use of these assets.
This can also be called the “fundamental” value of the corporation. The latter can be identified as the total
share price of the corporation in the stock market. And the business of corporate raiders is to exploit the
potential difference between these two values by buying corporations whose stock market values are
lower than the fundamental value of the underlying assets. In the process, they do become dominant
shareholders and turn the target corporation into a purely “nominalistic” corporation.
Corporate raiders thus help to realize the idea of corporate nominalism in this world. It is indeed
claimed that even if they are not daily raiding corporations, the mere perception that they may at any time
enter the scene works as an effective threat to incumbent managers, steering them away from
management policies that may fail to realize the corporate assets’ fundamental value. If this is indeed the
case, the stock market is said to function as the “market for corporate control.” (For the notion of the
market for corporate control, see [21].)
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to the “realistic” end and the position close to the “nominalistic” end, as their dominant corporate
structure, respectively.
One of the distinguished features of the post-WWII Japanese economy was the extensive
cross-shareholdings among large corporations. Table 2 shows cross-shareholdings among core 20
corporations of Sumitomo group in 1993. Indeed, Japan used to have six major corporate groups
(Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Daiichi-Kan-Gin, Fuji, and Sanwa), each of which was clustered around a
main bank, extended over the whole industry, and connected through mutual holdings of shares and
mutual exchanges of directors. The percentage of cross-shareholdings reached as high as 32.9% of the
total shareholdings of publicly-held corporations in 1990. In contrast, the stock market in America is
known to have served as the "market for corporate control" far more effectively than that in Japan.
I believe I have resolved the paradox I stated at the outset of this talk. Because I have now shown that
in spite of their seemingly irreconcilable differences, Japanese corporate capitalism and American
shareholder capitalism are but two extreme forms of the genus Capitalism.
Now, if you look at this column for the total, you can discern a strong trend in the nominalistic
direction in contemporary Japan. 10 year’s ago the average point was 4.7, but now it is only 3.7.The
Japanese corporations seem to become increasingly shareholder-orientated. That is exactly what
economists, both inside and outside Japan, believe is happening in Japan. Yet, what captured my attention
when I looked at these numbers was something different. Professor Tanaka divided the group into three
sub-groups. And what I noticed was the third subgroup.-- the corporations whose current average is above
4.5, that is, employee-orientated corporations. Their score remains the same. In fact, to such questions as:
should the shareholders be regarded the sole power holder of the corporation? Or are the employees mere
inputs for production of profits? Their score has increased markedly.
Despite the decade-long pressure from all around the world to move towards shareholder-orientation,
they persisted doggedly to remain employee-orientated. And the position of these employee-orientated
corporations is currently being justified by the most post-industrial corporation like Google. As you know,
when Google made its shares public in 2004, they arranged the whole thing in such a way that the class A
stocks that were sold for general public had only one tenth of the voting power of the class B stocks that
are held by the insiders, including their cofounders, Messrs. Brin and Page. It was to ensure that their
corporate decisions and their organizational identity should not be influenced too much by those
shareholders who are seeking only short-term returns.
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