Kostov and Others v. Bulgaria
Kostov and Others v. Bulgaria
Kostov and Others v. Bulgaria
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
14 May 2020
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
KOSTOV AND OTHERS v. BULGARIA JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
The case concerns, in particular, a complaint under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 that the applicants were awarded disproportionately low
amounts of compensation when their property was expropriated by the State
for the construction of roads.
THE FACTS
1. The applicants were born in 1971, 1951 and 1944 respectively and
live in Sofia. The first applicant was represented by Ms N. Sedefova, and
the second and third applicants were represented by Mr A. Kashamov; both
lawyers practise in Sofia.
2. The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms I. Nedyalkova
of the Ministry of Justice.
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15. The second and third applicants were the owners of a plot of land on
the outskirts of Sofia, on the strength of a restitution decision of the then
Serdika land commission (later renamed “the agriculture department”) of
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21 June 1999. The plot, measuring 6,101 square metres, was described in
the decision as a fourth-category “field”. Its valuation for taxation purposes
was BGN 1,141.20 (EUR 583).
16. Between 2012 and 2015 the second and third applicants rented the
plot together with two other plots as agricultural land to a private party. In
exchange, they were to receive fifty kilograms of grain each year.
17. On 21 December 2013 the Council of Ministers issued a decision to
expropriate the second and third applicants’ plot, and other land in the area,
for the construction of a section of the ring road around Sofia. The decision
stated that the second and third applicants would receive monetary
compensation in the amount of BGN 5,116, equivalent to EUR 2,616, or
BGN 0.84 (EUR 0.43) per square metre.
18. The second and third applicants applied for a judicial review of the
expropriation decision, arguing in particular that the compensation awarded
to them was too low and bore no relationship to the fair market value of the
land.
19. The Supreme Administrative Court appointed an expert to calculate
the market value of the land. The expert submitted two reports dated
14 May and 10 September 2014. He listed a number of contracts concluded
within the period to be taken into account concerning land in the same area,
and proposed several calculations of the value of the second and third
applicants’ land, depending on which of the plots concerned were to be
considered as comparable. The valuations ranged from BGN 21.5 (EUR 11)
to BGN 104 (EUR 53) per square metre.
20. The Supreme Administrative Court gave a judgment on
14 November 2014. It found that as only one of the plots described by the
expert (sold in 2012 for a price equivalent to BGN 25 (EUR 13) per square
metre) could qualify as comparable, it was insufficient to calculate an
average market value. As to the remaining plots of land, they could not be
considered as comparable because some of them were not located in the
same zone (see paragraph 26 below) and others had been jointly mortgaged
in a single contract without an indication of their individual values. Another
plot of land had been included in the capital of a company but, according to
the Supreme Administrative Court, that was not among the types of
transaction provided for by section 1a(2) of the supplementary provisions of
the 1996 Act (see paragraph 26 below). In particular, such a transaction was
not to be entered into the property register.
21. Accordingly, since only one comparable plot had been found and it
was insufficient to establish an average market value of the expropriated
land, the amount of compensation had to be calculated in accordance with
the Regulation. As that had been the method used by the Council of
Ministers when expropriating the second and third applicants’ land and
awarding them BGN 5,116 (BGN 0.84 per square metre) in compensation,
the application for a judicial review of that decision had no merit.
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meant “the market value which the owner could receive if the property were
sold on the free market”.
36. Concerning more specifically section 32(3) of the 1996 Act, the
Constitutional Court found that it represented the “natural continuation” of
the requirement of common criteria. It pointed out, nevertheless, that the
provision concerned an “exception”, and that its application had to be
premised on the “undeniable impossibility” of applying section 32(2).
37. Four (out of twelve) judges of the Constitutional Court dissented.
They considered that the 2006 amendments to the 1996 Act described above
had been expressly aimed at reducing the compensation paid by the State, to
the detriment of the right to property. Some of the judges argued that the list
of transactions which could be used for the purpose of comparison (under
section 1a of the supplementary provisions of the 1996 Act) had been
unjustifiably shortened. Other judges contested the newly-introduced
approach in its entirety, namely the reliance on other transactions to
calculate the relevant market value. They highlighted some issues in that
regard, such as the practice by parties to immoveable property transactions
of fraudulently declaring much lower values.
38. As to section 32(3) of the 1996 Act, referring to, among other things,
the Regulation (see paragraph 25 above), the dissenting judges stated that its
application could not lead to an award of “equivalent” and just
compensation or to the establishment of fair market values. On the contrary,
it could only lead to valuations which were “evidently and dramatically
lower”. The judges considered that other means of establishing a market
value, for instance through the expertise of an estate agent, were more
appropriate. They pointed out in that regard that a property “always ha[d] a
market value”.
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THE LAW
I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS
41. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the two applications,
the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.
42. The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the
compensation awarded to them when their property was expropriated had
been disproportionately low.
43. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest
and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State
to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
1. The Government
(a) General comments
44. The Government submitted that the expropriation of the applicants’
property had been necessary for the implementation of important
infrastructure projects. Moreover, it had been lawful, as it had been based
on the respective provisions of the 1996 Act, which were clear and
accessible.
45. The Government pointed out that the State enjoyed a wide margin of
appreciation in setting the appropriate levels of compensation and in
estimating the value of a property. Parliament had acted within that margin
when adopting the methods of establishing market values under the 1996
Act, in particular under section 1a of the supplementary provisions. It was
significant in addition that domestic law itself required “equivalent”
compensation, and that the applicants had had a possibility to contest the
valuations of their land and present evidence in that regard to the Supreme
Administrative Court.
46. As to the Regulation, the Government contended that it provided
“objective standards” and that its use to calculate compensation for
expropriated properties was not per se contrary to Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1. The method provided for in the Regulation was applicable only
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reasonably related to the market value of their land, and that they had not
been made to bear an excessive individual burden.
53. Lastly, the Government argued that the amount of compensation
which the Council of Ministers had agreed to pay to the owners of
expropriated land located in the same zone as the second and third
applicants’ – BGN 20.05 (EUR 10) per square metre (see paragraph 22
above) – was not “necessarily indicative” of the fair market price of that
land. The Council of Ministers had taken a sovereign decision to settle these
cases and pay the compensation at issue, prompted by the urgent need to
unblock the construction of the ring road.
2. The applicants
(a) The first applicant
54. The first applicant argued that the criteria contained in section 1a of
the supplementary provisions of the 1996 Act were too restrictive and led to
the exclusion of some transactions, which could, in reality, provide valid
data as to the just market value of land to be expropriated. He considered
that, on the whole, this led to the award of lower compensation. He referred
to the dissenting opinions of some of the judges in the Constitutional Court,
who, in objecting to that court’s judgment of 4 July 2006, had expressed the
same views.
55. In addition, the first applicant contested the Supreme Administrative
Court’s refusal in his case to accept that one comparable property was
sufficient to establish the market value of his land, pointing out that at the
time, this had not been an express requirement of the 1996 Act. Such an
approach was wrong, and the Supreme Administrative Court had
unjustifiably refused to accept the market value of the applicant’s land as
established on the basis of that one comparable property, namely in the
amount of BGN 4,804,627 (EUR 2,457,609).
56. The first applicant submitted that the compensation actually awarded
to him – BGN 4,779 (EUR 2,445) – bore no relationship to the fair market
value of his land. He pointed out that the characteristics of the land for
farming purposes, referred to by the Government, were of no relevance for
the establishment of its market value, given that it was situated close to
Sofia and in proximity to commercial and industrial installations. He
submitted a statement by a company specialised in the valuation of
immoveable property, which was of the view that land such as the plots
expropriated from him could be of interest to investors, or could be let out,
generating a “high income”.
57. The first applicant contested the statistical data provided by the
Government on the prices of agricultural land in the region of Sofia. He
pointed out that it was the practice in Bulgaria to declare a low value when
concluding property transactions, in order to pay less tax.
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B. Admissibility
61. The Court notes that the complaints under examination are neither
manifestly ill-founded, nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in
Article 35 of the Convention. They must therefore be declared admissible.
C. Merits
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the value of the property at the date on which ownership thereof was lost
(see Vistiņš and Perepjolkins, cited above, §§ 111).
64. Where an individual’s property has been expropriated, there should
be a procedure ensuring an overall assessment of the consequences of the
expropriation, including the award of an amount of compensation in line
with the value of the expropriated property, the determination of the persons
entitled to compensation and the settlement of any other issues relating to
the expropriation. Where an issue in the general interest is at stake, it is
incumbent on the public authorities to act in good time, and in an
appropriate and consistent manner (see Vistiņš and Perepjolkins, cited
above, §§ 111 and 114).
3. Lawfulness
66. The applicants did not seem to contest the legal basis of the
expropriation of their land as such. The Court also observes that the
expropriation was carried out under the 1996 Act, which appears to have
provided a clear and foreseeable legal basis (see paragraph 24 above).
67. Under the head of lawfulness, the applicants took issue with the
manner in which the Supreme Administrative Court had determined the
compensation to be awarded to them, considering that it had not been
“subject to the conditions provided for by law”. In particular, the first
applicant argued that the Supreme Administrative Court had wrongly
concluded in his case that one comparable property was insufficient to
establish the market value of his land (see paragraph 55 above). The second
and third applicants contended that in their case the Supreme Administrative
Court’s decision had been in breach of the law in determining which plots
of land similar to theirs could validly count as comparable property (see
paragraph 58 above).
68. The Court reiterates that its power to review compliance with
domestic law is limited, and that it is in the first place for the national
authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply such law (see Former
King of Greece and Others v. Greece [GC], no. 25701/94, § 82,
ECHR 2000-XII, and Svitlana Ilchenko v. Ukraine, no. 47166/09, § 66,
4 July 2019). As to the particular issues raised, it sees no manifest
unreasonableness or arbitrariness in the Supreme Administrative Court’s
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approach. In the case of the first applicant, the position that the Supreme
Administrative Court took, namely that one comparable property was
insufficient to establish a market value, was the prevalent one, and it
subsequently became a statutory requirement (see paragraph 28 above). As
to the second and third applicants’ case, the Supreme Administrative Court
gave sufficient and relevant reasons when finding that certain types of
property – one of them subject to a mortgage and the other included in a
company’s capital – could not count as comparable property within the
meaning of the 1996 Act (see paragraph 20 above).
69. Accordingly, the manner in which the amount of compensation was
assessed, and hence the interference with the applicants’ “possessions”, was
“subject to the conditions provided for by law”, as required under Article 1
§ 1 of Protocol No. 1. Deficiencies in the applicable domestic regulatory
framework will however be addressed below in relation to the
proportionality of the impugned interference.
4. Legitimate aim
70. The applicants’ land was taken for the construction of public roads.
Thus, the interference with their “possessions” pursued a legitimate aim in
the public interest (see Papachelas, cited above, § 45).
5. Proportionality
71. The salient question, therefore, is whether the interference at issue
was proportionate, in other words whether the authorities struck a fair
balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and
the requirement to protect the applicants’ rights (see paragraph 62 above).
72. As pointed out above (see paragraph 63), Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
requires compensation which is reasonably related to the value of the
expropriated property.
73. The Court has held that in some cases legitimate objectives in the
public interest, such as those pursued in measures of economic reform or
measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may justify the award of
compensation which does not reflect the market value of the property in
question (see, for example, Jahn and Others v. Germany [GC],
nos. 46720/99 and 2 others, §§ 116-17, ECHR 2005-VI, and Velikovi and
Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 43278/98 and 8 others, § 179-80, 15 March 2007).
74. However, no objectives of an exceptional character appear to have
been pursued in the cases at hand, nor have the Government claimed so. The
Court has thus to determine whether the applicants were awarded an amount
of compensation that was reasonably related to the value of their
expropriated land at the time of the expropriation, as required under
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraph 63 above).
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75. The Bulgarian Constitution and the 1996 Act provide that the owners
of expropriated property should receive “equivalent” compensation (see
paragraphs 23-24 above). According to the national Constitutional Court,
this means “the market value which the owner could receive if the property
were sold on the free market” (see paragraph 35 above). The Court is
satisfied that the compensation required under domestic law is, in principle,
in line with that required under its case-law, as defined above.
76. Under domestic law, section 32(2) of the 1996 Act and section 1a (2)
and (4) of the supplementary provisions thereof define what the requisite
“equivalent” compensation should be, and how, in principle, it should be
assessed. Those provisions contain a number of requirements as to the types
of transactions which can be used to assess the fair market value of
expropriated property (see paragraphs 25-26 above). If a sufficient number
of plots of land that can serve as comparable property cannot be found,
section 32(3) of the 1996 Act must be applied. It provides that in respect of
land considered to be agricultural, as in the cases at hand, the relevant
compensation must be calculated in accordance with the Regulation (see
paragraph 25 above).
77. The Court reiterates that it is not its task to review the relevant
legislation in the abstract; it has to confine itself, as far as possible, to
examining the problems raised by the specific cases before it. To that end it
must examine the above-mentioned law in so far as the applicants objected
to its consequences for their property rights (see The Holy Monasteries
v. Greece, 9 December 1994, § 55, Series A no. 301-A, and Scordino
(no. 1), cited above, § 100).
78. In the applicants’ cases, the Supreme Administrative Court found
that it was unable to calculate the “equivalent” compensation due to them on
the basis of section 32(2) of the 1996 Act, which refers to “the market value
of comparable properties situated in proximity to the expropriated one”.
This was so because in each of the two cases, only one comparable
property, as defined in section 1a(2) and (4), was shown to exist, and that
was found to be insufficient (see paragraphs 14 and 20 above).
79. The first applicant criticised the restrictions on the types of land
qualifying as comparable under the 1996 Act, finding them disproportionate
(see paragraph 54 above). The Court observes that, indeed, subsections (2)
and (4) of section 1a of the supplementary provisions of that Act provide for
a number of restrictions on the transactions which can be used to calculate
the market value of a property: they have to be for valuable consideration,
such as sales, exchanges, public auctions, mortgages and others; they have
to have been entered in the property register and to have been concluded in
the year preceding the assessment for the purposes of expropriation; the
plots have to be situated “in proximity” as defined in subsection (4); at least
one of the parties has to have been a commercial entity (see paragraph 26
above).
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80. The Court has held that the national authorities are in principle better
placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions,
and that in matters of general social and economic policy, including urban
and regional planning, the domestic policy-maker should be afforded a
particularly broad margin of appreciation (see Vistiņš and Perepjolkins,
cited above, § 98). Thus, the Court is not prepared to hold that factors such
as the ones defined above, limiting the discretion of the authorities,
including the courts, are in principle in breach of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1. In particular, it has not been claimed that such an approach
could not, where there are sufficient comparable properties meeting the
relevant criteria, lead to the establishment of a fair market price, and thus
the award of “equivalent” compensation.
81. However, as mentioned above, that method was found to be
inapplicable to the applicants’ cases, because a sufficient number of
comparable properties meeting the particular requirements were not found.
Therefore, pursuant to section 32(3) of the 1996 Act, the compensation due
to them was calculated in accordance with the Regulation. The Court has
thus to assess, on the basis of the facts submitted by the parties, whether, in
practice, the rules provided for in the Regulation led to the award of
compensation that was reasonably related to the value of the applicants’
land. This question is, in fact, one of the main points of disagreement
between the parties (see paragraphs 48-49, 51-53, 56 and 59 above).
82. The Court observes in that regard that the first applicant’s land was
expropriated in 2011, and that several years earlier, in 2007, the Supreme
Administrative Court had awarded owners of land in the area appertaining
to the same village, expropriated for the same infrastructure project,
compensation ranging between BGN 55 (EUR 28) and BGN 101 (EUR 52)
per square metre (see paragraph 10 above). In the judicial-review
proceedings initiated by the first applicant, a plot of land was identified as
being comparable to his land, within the meaning of section 32(2) of the
1996 Act, and it had been sold for BGN 225 (EUR 115) per square metre
(see paragraph 13 above). As regards the latter plot, the Court takes note of
the Government’s arguments (see paragraph 50 above) that it was not
comparable to the first applicant’s land, as well as the more general
arguments about the quality of his land (see paragraph 48 above). While
such arguments might be, in principle, relevant, it is significant that in the
case at hand the Supreme Administrative Court found the plot at issue to be
comparable, complying with the requirements of domestic law, and that had
at least one other comparable plot been found, its value (BGN 225,
equivalent of EUR 115 per square metre) would have been relied on to
calculate the fair market value of the first applicant’s land. In addition,
another plot of land in the same area had been sold just outside the
time-limit under section 1a(2) of the supplementary provisions, in April
2010, for BGN 6 (EUR 3) per square metre (see paragraph 13 above).
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83. In the case of the second and third applicants, a plot that had been
sold for BGN 25 (EUR 13) per square metre was identified by the Supreme
Administrative Court as a comparable one (see paragraph 20 above). Once
again, there appears to be no doubt that that value would have been used to
establish the market price of the expropriated land, had at least one other
comparable plot meeting the relevant requirements been shown to exist. In
addition, soon after the judicial-review proceedings initiated by the second
and third applicants had ended, the Council of Ministers settled other
similar cases concerning land in the same zone, expropriated for the same
infrastructure project, agreeing to pay the owners BGN 20.05 (EUR 10) per
square metre, basing its assessment of such a value on what it considered
the market value of land in a neighbouring zone (see paragraph 22 above).
84. The Court is conscious that the values cited above were not
considered to reflect the market value of the applicants’ land, assessed in
accordance with the relevant criteria under domestic law. Nor does the
Court itself find that they establish definitively any such value.
Furthermore, it takes note of the Government’s statement (see paragraph 53
above) that the Council of Ministers’ decision to settle the remaining cases
concerning land in the same zone as the second and third applicants’ was
taken under some pressure, coming from the need to finalise a major public
project, and that the proposed compensation of BGN 20.05 (EUR 10) per
square metre may not have “necessarily” represented a fair market value.
85. Nevertheless, the Court cannot ignore the above-mentioned
valuations, which should be taken at least as indication of market prices in
the respective areas. In the case of the first applicant, four years had passed
between the first round of expropriations and the expropriation of his land,
but it has not been shown that market prices in the area fell substantially
during that period of time. As regards the second and third applicants, it is
significant that the compensation of BGN 20.05 (EUR 10) per square metre
proposed by the Council of Ministers was the one offered to and not
contested by most of the owners in a neighbouring zone (see paragraph 22
above).
86. The Court notes that, in accordance with the criteria provided for in
the Regulation, the first applicant was awarded an average of BGN 0.22
(EUR 0.11) per square metre as compensation for his land, and the second
and third applicants were awarded BGN 0.84 (EUR 0.43) per square metre
(see paragraphs 11 and 17 above). It is not the Court’s task, in principle, to
assess the manner in which the value of agricultural land is calculated under
that Regulation, which is also applicable in other situations, such as in the
process of restitution (see paragraph 30 above). As noted above (see
paragraph 77), the Court’s task is to examine the relevant domestic law in so
far as the applicants objected to its consequences for their property rights.
Still, the Court finds it important to note that the Regulation was adopted a
long time ago and was based on general information about the whole
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country and not on information specific to the market value related to the
particular plots (see paragraphs 30-32 above).
87. As observed above, in the cases at hand the market value of the
applicants’ land was not established in accordance with the criteria under
section 32(2) of the 1996 Act and section 1a(2) and (4) of the
supplementary provisions. Neither do the documents provided to it allow
the Court to determine precisely such market value. Nevertheless, the
materials submitted to it are sufficient to establish major discrepancies
between the values discussed above as being indicative of market prices,
between BGN 6 (EUR 3) and BGN 225 (EUR 115) in the case of the first
applicant and between BGN 20.05 (EUR 10) and BGN 25 (EUR 13) in the
case of the second and third applicants (see paragraphs 82-83 above), and
the compensation actually awarded – an average of BGN 0.22 (EUR 0.11)
per square metre in the case of the first applicant and BGN 0.84 (EUR 0.43)
per square metre in the case of the second and third applicants. The question
of these discrepancies was never explained by the Supreme Administrative
Court in terms of individual characteristics of the applicants’ property or
other relevant factors, as it never actually addressed it. Yet, these
discrepancies seem to justify precisely the fears expressed by the judges
who dissented in the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 4 July 2006, stating
that compensation calculated under section 32(3) of the 1996 Act, as in the
cases under examination, would be “evidently and dramatically lower” than
fair market values (see paragraph 38 above).
88. The Court turns to the Government’s additional arguments, made in
defence of their position that the applicants had received the compensation
required under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, namely those concerning the
expropriated land’s relatively low value for taxation purposes, as well as the
statistical data on the prices of agricultural land in the region of Sofia (see
paragraphs 47-48 and 51 above).
89. The Court observes in that regard that it has not been claimed that
the value for taxation purposes, calculated at the national level, corresponds
to a property’s fair market value. It is noteworthy that the rules concerning
the calculation of the “equivalent” compensation required under domestic
law (section 32 (2) of the 1996 Act and section 1a of the supplementary
provisions thereof) make no reference to that value and do not consider it
indicative of a market value. As to the statistical data provided by the
Government, it has not been explained how they were compiled, nor
whether they were based on real values in transactions with agricultural land
or on ones declared by the parties thereto. As indicated by some members of
Parliament, the dissenting judges of the Constitutional Court and the first
applicant (see paragraphs 27, 38 and 57 above), the declared value appears
often to be significantly lower.
90. Lastly, the Court also finds irrelevant two additional circumstances
relied on by the Government (see paragraphs 48 and 51 above): the
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relatively low price for which the first applicant acquired his land in 2008
and the low income which the second and third applicants had derived from
their land prior to the expropriation (see, on the first point, Vistiņš and
Perepjolkins, cited above, § 121). The Court observes once again that the
rules concerning the calculation of the “equivalent” compensation required
under domestic law did not refer to any such factors.
91. In view of the considerations above, the Court concludes that the
application of the rules provided for in the Regulation did not lead to the
award of compensation that was reasonably related to the value of the
applicants’ land, as required under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
92. It follows that the expropriation complained of by the applicants
imposed on them a disproportionate and excessive burden, upsetting the fair
balance to be struck between the protection of property and the
requirements of the general interest.
93. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1.
A. Pecuniary damage
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the notification of the present judgment, the first applicant will be entitled to
seek such a reopening. If his case is to be re-examined by the domestic
courts, they will, in principle, be obliged, on the strength of Article 5 § 4 of
the Constitution, to apply Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, as interpreted in the
Court’s case-law, where the applicable domestic rules conflict with it (see
paragraph 40 above).
105. In view of the above, reiterating that due to the deficiencies in the
domestic assessment of the value of the first applicant’s property it is unable
to make its own assessment as to pecuniary damage, the Court finds that a
reopening of the domestic proceedings, as discussed in the previous
paragraph, would constitute, in principle, an appropriate means to remedy
the violation (see Bistrović v. Croatia, no. 25774/05, § 58, 31 May 2007;
Gereksar and Others v. Turkey, no. 34764/05 and 3 others, § 75, 1 February
2011; Kravchuk v. Russia, no. 10899/12, §§ 55-56, 26 November 2019). It
thus dismisses the first applicant’s claim for pecuniary damage, in so far as
it concerns the value of his plots of land.
106. Lastly, under the head of pecuniary damage the first applicant also
claimed interest (see paragraph 98 above in fine).
107. The Court reiterates that reparation for pecuniary damage must
result in the closest possible situation to that which would have existed if
the breach in question had not occurred. In cases such as the present one,
this is limited to the payment of appropriate compensation which should
have been awarded at the time of the expropriation. By contrast, there is no
basis on which the first applicant can claim any additional compensation in
respect of the period subsequent to the expropriation (see Vistiņš and
Perepjolkins v. Latvia (just satisfaction), cited above, § 34). That part of the
first applicant’s claim should thus be rejected.
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B. Non-pecuniary damage
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possession and the above criteria, the Court awards the first applicant the
entirety of the costs for his legal representation and for translation, totalling
EUR 2,302. It dismisses the remainder of the claim, as it has not been
supported by any relevant evidence. Any tax that may be chargeable to the
applicant should be added to the award.
D. Default interest
124. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate
should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank,
to which should be added three percentage points.
5. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance
with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be
converted into Bulgarian levs at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement:
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KOSTOV AND OTHERS v. BULGARIA JUDGMENT
(i) EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) to the first applicant, and the
same amount jointly to the second and third applicants, plus any
tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 2,302 (two thousand three hundred and two euros) to the
first applicant, and EUR 2,520 (two thousand five hundred and
twenty euros) to the second and third applicants, plus any tax
that may be chargeable to the applicants, in respect of costs and
expenses; the amount awarded to the second and third applicants
is to be paid directly to their legal representative,
Mr A. Kashamov;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until
settlement, simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a
rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank
during the default period, plus three percentage points;
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