Why Your Mind Is Not A Computer, Or:: Notes From The Underground

Conception of the mind Computation Information Conclusion
Why your Mind is not a Computer, or:

Notes from the underground
Michael Maitland
Complexity / MathSys Annual Retreat

Wilderhope Manor
May 13, 2015

The Mind in history

The Mind in history

The Mind in history

Modern Mind
So, how do we think about the mind now?

Modern Mind
So, how do we think about the mind now?
“. . . the modern unconscious is a place of super-fast data

processing, useful survival mechanisms and rules of thumb about
the world that have been honed by millions of years of evolution.
[. . . ] It is the unconscious, for instance, that stitches together data
on colour, shape, movement. . . ”
—The Economist, review of Leonard Mlodinow Subliminal: How Your
Unconscious Mind Rules Your Behaviour 2012
Modern Mind in Philosophy
“nervous systems are information processing systems”

— Patricia Churchland, Neurophilosophy 1986, p36

“the key concept [of cognitive science] is computation [. . . ]

Cognitive science tries to elucidate the workings of the mind by
treating them as computations. [. . . ] mental processes are the
computations of the brain”
— Philip Johnson-Laird, Computer and the Mind, 1988, p9 & p391

“the key concept [of cognitive science] is computation [. . . ]

Cognitive science tries to elucidate the workings of the mind by
treating them as computations. [. . . ] mental processes are the
computations of the brain”
— Philip Johnson-Laird, Computer and the Mind, 1988, p9 & p391
“all the phenomena of human consciousness are explicable as ‘just’

the activities of a virtual machine realised in the astronomically
adjustable connections of the human brain”
— Daniel Dennett, Consciousness explained 1991, p410
So the mind is a computer?

Questions
With regards to the computationalist theories, two questions might

be asked:
Questions

be asked:
a) Is the mind essentially a calculator?

Questions

be asked:
b) Do computers actually calculate?


2+3=5
b) Do Computers actually calculate?
What is meant by ‘computer’ ?

loosely a system that receives

input, processes data and produces
output

output
‘input’, ‘data’ and ‘output’ are not

intrinsic properties; require
subjective definition

output
‘input’, ‘data’ and ‘output’ are not

intrinsic properties; require
subjective definition
Therefore calling the mind

intrinsically ‘computational’ seems
flawed
Information
Information
Churchlands both, Toffoli, Fodor, Chalmers, Wheeler, Fredkin,

Blakemore, Tipler, Johnson-Laird, to some extent Searle and
perhaps most famously Dawkins and Dennett all use and abuse the
term
Information
There are two main senses in which it is used:

Information
Knowledge communicated concerning some particular fact, subject,

or event; that of which one is apprised or told
—Oxford English Dictionary 2015 entry
Information

X
I (X ) = − P(xi ) ln P(xi )
i
—Shannon Entropy definition

Information

X
I (X ) = − P(xi ) ln P(xi )
i
—Shannon Entropy definition
Attempts to reconcile the two usages are problematic

Alice and Bob
Alice asks Bob “Do you love me?”, to which Bob gives answer X
(modeled as a random variable)
Alice and Bob
If the answer is in binary (Yes/No), Alice obtains 1 ‘bit’ of

information. I (X ) = −2( 12 ln2 21 ) = 1
Alice and Bob
If the answer is a single roman character, Alice obtains between 4

1 1
and 5 ‘bits’ of information. I (X ) = −26( 26 ln2 26 ) = 4.7
Alice and Bob
Only two of those outcomes can be construed meaningfully (‘y’ or

‘n’), the rest are meaningless
Information
Changing Alice’s priors actually makes things worse

Information
Presumably Alice is expecting something anodyne like ‘y’ or ‘n0

more than ‘f’, i.e. P(X = y) ≥ P(X = f).
Information

So − ln2 P(X = y) ≤ − ln2 P(X = f)...

Information

So − ln2 P(X = y) ≤ − ln2 P(X = f)...
Alice gains more information from the meaningless ‘f’ than the
more meaningful ‘y’...
Intentionality
Information as we know it always refers to something other than

itself.
Intentionality
Information as we know it always refers to something other than

itself.
information about apples is about

<<apples>>
Thoughts about apples are about

<<apples>>, and not purely about
<<thoughts about apples>>.
This intentionality of information is

what separates it from information
in the engineering sense.
“the semantic aspects of information are irrelevant to the

engineering aspects”
— Claude Shannon, The Mathematical Theory of Communication, 1949
Unqualified vacillation between the two senses allows

neuro-philosophers to imagine they have crossed the huge gulf of
the mind/body divide in recasting perception and consciousness as
the processing and possession of a physicalised ‘information’.

“possession of information can be understood as the possession of

some internal physical order”
— Paul Churchland, Matter and Consciousness, 2nd edition, 1988

“possession of information can be understood as the possession of

some internal physical order”
— Paul Churchland, Matter and Consciousness, 2nd edition, 1988
If we take this claim

seriously, then these are
the most well-informed →
objects on Earth!
Summary
Point 1
Machines cannot perform computations by themselves; if the brain
is a machine it cannot compute/calculate without a pre-existing
external consciousness to transform its activity into ‘computational
activity’.
Summary
Point 1
activity’.
Point 2
The brain cannot be regarded as an ‘information processing device’
without a mind/consciousness to whom the ‘information’ is
‘informative’. To claim otherwise is to beg the question.
Summary
Point 1
activity’.
Point 2
The brain cannot be regarded as an ‘information processing device’
without a mind/consciousness to whom the ‘information’ is
‘informative’. To claim otherwise is to beg the question.
Point 3
The scientific usage of ‘information’ is clearly inadequate to explain
even basic aspects of the mind/consciousness such as
‘intentionality’, ‘indexicality’ and unity of consciousness.
References and Further Reading
Colin Cherry Philip Johnson-Laird

On Human Communication 2nd The Computer and the Mind
edition 1988 Fontana
1966 MIT Press John Searle
David Chalmers Intentionality
The Conscious Mind 1983 Cambridge University Press
1996 Oxford University Press
Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver
Patricia Churchland Mathematical Theory of
Neurophilosophy Communication
1986 MIT Press 1949 University of Illinois Press
Paul Churchland Raymond Tallis
Matter and Consciousness, 2nd Brains and Minds
edition 2000 Journal of Royal College of
1988 MIT Press Physicians
Daniel Dennett Tzvetan Todorov
Consciousness Explained Hope and Memory
1991 Little, Brown 2004 Atlantic Books
“A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it
lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us
inexorably.”
— Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1953, p115
Thanks for listening

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Conception of the mind Computation Information Conclusion

Why your Mind is not a Computer, or:

Complexity / MathSys Annual Retreat

May 13, 2015

The Mind in history

The Mind in history

The Mind in history

So, how do we think about the mind now?

So, how do we think about the mind now?

“. . . the modern unconscious is a place of super-fast data

Modern Mind in Philosophy

“nervous systems are information processing systems”

Modern Mind in Philosophy

“nervous systems are information processing systems”

“the key concept [of cognitive science] is computation [. . . ]

Modern Mind in Philosophy

“nervous systems are information processing systems”

“the key concept [of cognitive science] is computation [. . . ]

“all the phenomena of human consciousness are explicable as ‘just’

So the mind is a computer?

With regards to the computationalist theories, two questions might

With regards to the computationalist theories, two questions might

a) Is the mind essentially a calculator?

With regards to the computationalist theories, two questions might

a) Is the mind essentially a calculator?

b) Do computers actually calculate?

a) Is the mind essentially a calculator?

a) Is the mind essentially a calculator?

b) Do Computers actually calculate?

What is meant by ‘computer’ ?

b) Do Computers actually calculate?

What is meant by ‘computer’ ?

loosely a system that receives

b) Do Computers actually calculate?

What is meant by ‘computer’ ?

loosely a system that receives

‘input’, ‘data’ and ‘output’ are not

b) Do Computers actually calculate?

What is meant by ‘computer’ ?

loosely a system that receives

‘input’, ‘data’ and ‘output’ are not

Therefore calling the mind

Churchlands both, Toffoli, Fodor, Chalmers, Wheeler, Fredkin,

There are two main senses in which it is used:

There are two main senses in which it is used:

Knowledge communicated concerning some particular fact, subject,

There are two main senses in which it is used:

Knowledge communicated concerning some particular fact, subject,

—Shannon Entropy definition

There are two main senses in which it is used:

Knowledge communicated concerning some particular fact, subject,

—Shannon Entropy definition

Attempts to reconcile the two usages are problematic

Alice and Bob

Alice and Bob

If the answer is in binary (Yes/No), Alice obtains 1 ‘bit’ of

Alice and Bob

If the answer is a single roman character, Alice obtains between 4

Alice and Bob