EN BANC

[G.R. No. 88259. August 10, 1989]

THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION and the HON. LOURDES R.

QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and Chairman, Board of Medical
Education , petitioners, vs. Hon. DANIEL P. ALFONSO, Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, Fourth Judicial region,
Antipolo, Rizal, and the PHILIPPINE MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN COLLEGE
OF MEDICINE FOUNDATION, INC. , respondents.

Carpio, Villaraza & Cruz for private respondent.

Anatolio S. Tauzon, Jr. for intervenors.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL FROM DECISIONS OR ORDERS OF

SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS TO THE SUPREME COURT OR
ANY OTHER COURT NOT SANCTIONED BY LAW. — Resort to the Courts to obtain a
reversal of the determination by the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports that the
College is un t to continue its operations is in this case clearly unavailing. There is, to
begin with, no law authorizing an appeal from decisions or orders of the secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports to this Court or any other Court. It is not the functions of
this Court or any other Court to review the decisions and orders of the Secretary on the
issue of whether or not an educational institution meets the norms and standards
required for permission to operate and to continue operating as such. On this question,
no Court has the power or prerogative to substitute its opinion for that of the Secretary.
Indeed, it is obviously not expected that any Court would have the competence to do
so.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER THE SECRETARY OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS ACTED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY;
SOLE AUTHORITY REPOSED IN THE COURTS. — The only authority reposed in the
Courts in the matter is the determination of whether or not the Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports has acted within the scope of powers granted him by law and the
Constitution. As long as it appears that he has done so, any decision rendered by him
should not will not be subject to review and reversal by any court.
3. ID.; EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES AVAILABLE IN CASE OF WHIMSICAL OR
CAPRICIOUS EXERCISE OF POWERS BY THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE
AND SPORTS. — If it should be made to appear to the Court that those powers were in a
case exercised so whimsically, capriciously, oppressively, despotically or arbitrarily as
to all call for peremptory correction or stated otherwise, that the Secretary had acted
with grave abuse of discretion, or had unlawfully neglected the performance of an act
which the law speci cally enjoins as a duty, or excluded another from the use or
enjoyment of a right or o ce to which such other is entitled — it becomes the Court's
duty to rectify such action through the extraordinary remedies of certiorari,
prohibitation, or mandamus, whichever may a properly apply.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com

 4. COURT NOT BOUND ANY COMPELLING REASON TO SUBSTITUTE ITS
JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS. —
Where a Court nds that there has been abuse of powers by the Secretary and
consequently nulli es and/or forbids such an abuse of power, or commands whatever
is needful to keep its exercise within bounds, the Court, absent any compelling reason
to do otherwise, should still leave to the Secretary the ultimate determination of the
issue of the satisfaction or ful llment by an educational institution of the standards set
down for its legitimate operation, as to which it should not ordinarily substitute its own
judgment for that of said office.
5. ID.; ORDER OF CLOSURE OF A MEDICAL COLLEGE NOT A GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION. — The recorded facts quite clearly fail to support the College's claim
of grave abuse of discretion tainting the order of closure, and on the contrary
convincingly show the challenged decision to be correct. From 1985, no less than ve
(5) surveys were conducted of respondent institution to determine its compliance with
the minimum standards established for a medical college. The ndings of all ve (5)
surveys were a rmed by the O ce of the President. Indeed, the petitioner, through the
Chairman of its Board of Trutees to all intents and purposes accepted the validity of the
ndings of those ve (5) survey groups when it proposed, in 1988, a gradual phase-out
of the school starting in 1989.
6. ID.; ISSUANCE OF INJUNCTION AGAINST ORDER OF SECRETARY OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS ORDERING CLOSURE OF A MEDICAL COLLEGE;
AN UNDUE INTERFERENCE ON PURELY ADMINISTRATIVE AND DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTIONS. — It being a matter of law that the Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports exercises the power to enjoin compliance with the requirements laid down for
medical schools and to mete out sanctions where he nds that violations thereof have
been committed, it was a grave abuse of discretion for the respondent judge to issue
the questioned injunction and thereby thwart o cial action, in the premises correctly
taken, allowing the College to operate without the requisite government permit. A single
ocular inspection, done after the College had been pre-warned thereof, did not, in the
circumstances, warrant overturning the ndings of more quali ed inspectors about the
true state of the College, its faculty, facilities, operations, ets. The members of the
evaluating team came from the different sectors in the elds of education and
medicine, and their judgment in this particular area is certainly better than that of the
respondent Judge whose sole and only visit to the school could hardly have given him
much more to go on than a brief look at the physical plant and facilities and into the
conduct of the classes and other school activities. Respondent Judge gravely abused
his discretion in substituting his judgment for theirs.
7. ID.; COURTS SUPERVISORY POWERS OVER PROCEEDINGS AND ACTIONS
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. — It is well settled
doctrine that courts of justice should not generally interfere with purely administrative
and discretionary functions; that courts have no supervisory power over the
proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government
involving the exercise of judgment and ndings of facts, because by reason of their
special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction, the latter
are in a better position to pass judgment on such matters and their ndings of facts in
that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts.
8. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PARAGRAPH C OF MBCS ORDER NO. 5, SERIES OF
1986, CONSTRUED. — Paragraph c should not be construed to prohibit absolutely the
withdrawal or cancellation of government authority to operate until after three (3) years
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 from the last evaluation conducted on the school; or, stated otherwise, it does not
unexceptionably prescribe a three-year waiting period before authority to operate may
be withdrawn. Rather, it should be read as giving the Secretary of Education the
discretion, depending on the seriousness of the discovered de ciencies, to afford an
educational institution which has failed to comply with some requirement or other, time
not exceeding three (3) years to correct the de ciencies before applying the sanction
of withdrawal or cancellation of the government authority to operate.

DECISION

NARVASA , J : p

Petitioners, the Board of Medical Education, the government agency which

supervises and regulates the country's medical colleges, and Secretary Lourdes R.
Quisumbing of the Department of Education, Culture and Sport, as Chairperson of the
Board, pray for a writ of certiorari to nullify and set aside the order issued by
respondent at Judge Daniel P. Alfonso, Regional Trial Court, Antipolo, Rizal, in Civil Case
No. 1385 restraining the enforcement of petitioner Quisumbing's order of closure of
the respondent Philippine Muslim-Christian College of Medicine Foundation, Inc.
)hereafter simply the College).
The College, a private educational institution, was founded in 1981 for the
avowed purpose of producing physicians who will "emancipate Muslim citizens from
age-old attitudes on health." The unstable peace and order situation in Mindanao led to
the establishment of the College in Antipolo, Rizal, which granted it a temporary permit
to operate in the municipality, instead of in Zamboanga City where the school was rst
proposed to be located. It has since adopted Antipolo as its permanent site and
changed its name to the Rizal College of Medicine.
In 1985, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and the Board
of Medical Education (BME) authorized the Commission on Medical Education to
conduct study of all medical schools in the Philippines. The report of the Commission
showed that the College fell very much short of the minimum standards set for medical
schools. 1 The team of inspectors, composed of Doctor Florentino Herrera, Jr., Elena
Ines Cuyegkeng, Horacio Estrada, Jose V. Silao, Jr. and Andres L. Reyes, recommended
the closure of the school 2 upon the following findings, to wit:
(a) the College was not ful lling the purpose for which it had been created
because of its inappropriate location and the absence in its curriculum of subjects
relating to Muslim culture and welfare;
(b) its lack of university a liation hindered its students from obtaining a
"balanced humanistic and scientific" education;
(c) it did not have its own base hospital for the training of its students in the
major clinical disciplines, as required by the DECS;
(d) more than 60% of the college faculty did not teach in the College full-time,
resulting in shortened and irregular class hours, subject overloading, and in general,
poor quality teaching.
The school disputed these ndings as biased and discriminatory. At its request,
the Board of Medical Education, in May 1987, sent another team of doctors 3 for a re-
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 evaluation of the college. After inspection, the team con rmed the previous ndings
and recommended the phase-out of the school. 4
The rst two reports were veri ed on June 23, 1987 by a third team of
inspectors. 5 A year thereafter, the college failed another test — what was in effect the
fourth evaluation of its tness to continue as a medical school — conducted on March
4, and 5, 1988 by a team from the Board of Medical Education determining the
eligibility of medical schools for government recognition. The College was adjudged
"inadequate" in all aspects of the survey, to wit, college, curriculum, facilities, teaching
hospital, and studentry. 6 The inspectors, Doctors Nilo Rosas, Macario Tan And Elena
Ines Cuyegkeng, accordingly recommended denial of government recognition.
Accordingly, the Board of Medical Education recommended to the DECS the
closure of the College, effective the end of the school year 1988-1989. The College
however succeed in having the Board form yet another team to review the previous
ndings. Doctors Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, Alberto Romualdez, Artemio Ordinario, Joven
Cuanang and Nilo L. Rosas conducted their inspection on June 18, 1988. Their ndings:
although there had been a "major effort to improve the physical plant for classroom
instructions and the library, serious de ciencies remain(ed) in the areas of clinical
facilities and library operations;" "faculty continu(ed) to be quite inadequate with no
prospects for satisfactory growth and development;" "student pro le. . . (was) below
par from the point of view of credentials (NMAT and transfer records) as well as level
knowledge and preparedness at various stages of medical education," and "the most
serious de ciency. . . (was) the almost total lack of serious development efforts in
academic medicine — i.e., seeming lack of philosophy of teaching, no serious effort to
study surricula, almost non-existent innovative approaches." Again, the
recommendation was to close the College with provisions for the dispersal of its
students to other medical school. 7
In her letter of June 23, 1988, Secretary Quisumbing informed the Chairman of
the College's Board of Trustees, Mr. Victor Sumulong, of the decision of the Board of
Medical Education to close the College. Mr. Sumulong proposed a gradual phase-out
starting the school year 1989-1990 in order not to dislocate the students and staff and
to minimize financial loss. 8 The Board subsequently allowed the College to continue its
operations but only until May, 1989, after which it was to be closed, this decision being
" nal and unappeasable." The College was, however, assured of assistance in the
relocation of its students and in its rehabilitation as an institution for health related and
paramedical courses. 9
The College appealed the decision to the O ce of the President, imputing grave
abuse of discretion to the Secretary. 10 On February 16, 1989, Executive Secretary
Catalino Macaraig, Jr., nding "no reason to disturb" the contested decision, a rmed it.
11

On March 2, 1989, the College went to court. It led Civil Case No. 1385 in the
court of respondent Judge Daniel P. Alfonso against Secretary Quisumbing in her
capacity as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, questioning the decision as
illegal, oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory and applied for a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain its implementation.
The writ issued as prayed for prayed for by order of the respondent Judge dated
May 10, 1989. 12 His Honor ruled that the inspection of June 18, 1988 was the principal
basis of the closure order, and on such basis sustained the claim of the College that the
inspection was done in an "arbitrary and haphazard manner" by a team of inspectors
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 who had already prejudged the school. Judge Alfonso held that there was no evidence
supporting the ndings in the report of June 18, 1977, and declared that his own ocular
inspection of the College disclosed that the de ciencies mentioned in the report were
non-existent and that on the contrary, the laboratory and library areas were "big
enough," and the operations of the proposed base hospital were "going on smoothly at
the time of the ocular inspection."
The school thereupon promptly advertised in major newspaper dailies for
enrollees in al levels of the medical college and in its pre-board review classes. 13
Hence the present petition, assailing the order of injunction dated May 10, 1989
as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, and praying of restraining order
against its enforcement as well as for the dismissal of the action instituted in the court
a quo. The Court on June 1, 1989 ordered the respondent College to desist from
advertising and admitting students, and the respondent judge to refrain from enforcing
his injunction order.
The College in its Comment would justify its entitlement to the questioned
injunction on the ground that the closure order against it was directed was issued
without factual basis and in violation of the right of the College to due process of law,
and that it violates MECS Order No. 5 ( Series of 1986) to the effect that the penalty of
closure cannot be imposed earlier than three (3) years from the last evaluation, which in
this instance was made on June 18, 1988.
Resort to the Court to obtain a reversal of the determination by the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports that the College is un t to continue its operations is in
this case clearly unavailing. There is, to begin with, no law authorizing an appeal from
decisions or orders of the secretary of Education, Culture and Sports to this Court or
any other Court. It is not the functions of this Court or any other Court to review the
decisions and orders of the Secretary on the issue of whether or not an educational
institution meets the norms and standards required for permission to operate and to
continue operating as such. On this question, no Court has the power or prerogative to
substitute its opinion for that of the Secretary. Indeed, it is obviously not expected that
any Court would have the competence to do so.
The only authority reposed in the Courts in the matter is the determination of
whether or not the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports has acted within the
scope of powers granted him by law and the Constitution. As long as it appears that he
has done so, any decision rendered by him should not will not be subject to review and
reversal by any court.
Of course, if it should be made to appear to the Court that those powers were in
a case exercised so whim sically, capriciously, oppressively, despotically or arbitrarily
as to all call for peremptory correction — or stated otherwise, that the Secretary had
acted with grave abuse of discretion, or had unlawfully neglected the performance of an
act which the law speci cally enjoins as a duty, or excluded another from the use or
enjoyment of a right or o ce to which such other is entitled — it becomes the Court's
duty to rectify such action through the extraordinary remedies of certiorari,
prohibitation, or mandamus, whichever may a Court nds that there has been abuse of
powers by the Secretary and consequently nulli es and/or forbids such an abuse of
power, or commands whatever is needful to keep its exercise within bounds, the Court,
absent any compelling reason to do otherwise, should still leave to the Secretary the
ultimate determination of the issue of the satisfaction or ful llment by an educational
institution of the standards set down for its legitimate operation, as to which it should
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 not ordinarily substitute its own judgment for that of said office.
In any case, the recorded facts quite clearly fail to support the College's claim of
grave abuse of discretion tainting the order of closure, and on the contrary convincingly
show the challenged decision to be correct. From 1985, no less than ve (5) surveys
were conducted of respondent institution to determine its compliance with the
minimum standards established for a medical college. The rst survey, that undertaken
by the Commission on Medical Education, disclosed such various and signi cant
de ciencies in the school as to constrain the inspectors to recommend its closure.
Four (4) other surveys were thereafter made by as many different committees or
teams, at the school's instance or otherwise, all of which basically confirmed the results
of the rst survey. Moreover, the ndings of all ve (5) surveys were a rmed by the
O ce of the President. Indeed, the petitioner, through the Chairman of its Board of
Trutees to all intents and purposes accepted the validity of the ndings of those ve(5)
survey groups when it proposed, in 1988, a gradual phase-out of the school starting in
1989. The respondent College knew that the recommendation for its closure was made
as early as 1986, that the recommendation was reiterated and reaffirmed four (4) times
thereafter until it was nally approved and acted upon by the Secretary, whose action
was con rmed by the O ce of the President. Said respondent was given notice in June
1988, that in consequence of all these, the time for its de nite closure had been
unalterably set at May, 1989, a notice which was accompanied by assurances of
assistance in the relocation of its students before June, 1989 and in its rehabilitation as
a school for other courses. After having resorted to the whole range of administrative
remedies available to it, without success, it sought obtain from the respondent Court
the relief it could obtain from those sources, and — in what can only be described as a
deliberate attempt to frustrate and obstruct implementation of the decision for its
closure as of June, 1989 — openly solicited, by newspaper advertisement or otherwise,
enrollment of new and old students.
Given these facts, and it being a matter of law that the Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports exercises the power to enjoin compliance with the requirements laid
down for medical schools and to mete out sanctions where he nds that violations
thereof have been committed, it was a grave abuse of discretion for the respondent
judge to issue the questioned injunction and thereby thwart o cial action, in the
premises correctly taken, allowing the College to operate without the requisite
government permit. A single ocular inspection, done after the College had been pre-
warned thereof, did not, in the circumstances, warrant overturning the ndings of more
quali ed inspectors about the true state of the College, its faculty, facilities, operations,
ets. The members of the evaluating team came from the different sectors in the elds
of education and medicine, 14 and their judgment in this particular area is certainly
better than that of the respondent Judge whose sole and only visit to the school could
hardly have given him much more to go on than a brief look at the physical plant and
facilities and into the conduct of the classes and other school activities. Respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion in substituting his judgment for theirs. It is well
settled doctrine that courts of justice should not generally interfere with purely
administrative and discretionary functions; that courts have no supervisory power over
the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government
involving the exercise of judgment and ndings of facts, because by reason of their
special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction, the latter
are in a better position to pass judgment on such matters and their ndings of facts in
that regard are generally accorded respect, if not nality, by the courts. 15 There are, to
be sure, exceptions to this general rule but none of them obtains in this case.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 The claim of denial of due process likewise holds no water, as the record clearly
shows that the College was given every opportunity to so improve itself as tos come up
to requirements, but remained sadly sub-standard after the inspections conducted by
the evaluating teams. It had, in fact, admitted its failure to live up to the desired
standards when it proposed its gradual phase-out in its letter dated June 27, 1988 to
Secretary Quisumbing. It was also precisely because of its complaints of bias and
prejudice that the Board of medical Education dispatched new teams to survey and its
performance. It had even gone all the way up to the O ce of the President to seek a
reversal of the order of closure. There is thus no reason for it to complain of a lack of
opportunity to be heard and to explain its side as well as to seek reconsideration of the
ruling complained of.
There is also no merit in respondent College's argument that the closure violated
MECS ORDER No. 5, Series of 1986, because it was sought to be effected before the
lapse of the three-years period allowed, which in this case is sought to be counted from
June 18, 1988, or the date of the last evaluation. The provision referred to reads;
"The following sanction shall be applied against any medical school, for failure to
comply with the specific requirements of the essentials, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx

c. withdrawal or cancellation of the school's government

authority to operate, for failure it fully comply with the prescribed
requirements after three (3) years the last evaluation conducted on the
school."
It must at once be obvious from a reading of the provision, paragraph c, that the
situation therein contemplated — where a school is found to have failed to "fully comply
with the prescribed requirements," i.e., has not complied with some requirements and
has failed to do so within three(3) years from the last evaluation — is quite distinct from
that obtaining in the case at bar — where respondent school was found to have
de ciencies so serious as to warrant its immediate closure. Said paragraph c should
not be construed to prohibit absolutely the withdrawal or cancellation of government
authority to operate until after three(3) years from the last evaluation conducted on the
school; or, stated otherwise, it does not unexceptionably prescribe a three-year waiting
period before authority to operate may be withdrawn. Rather, it should be read as giving
the Secretary of Education the discretion, depending on the seriousness of the
discovered de ciencies, to afford an educational institution which has failed to comply
with some requirement or other, time not exceeding three (3) years to correct the
de ciencies before applying the sanction of withdrawal or cancellation of the
government authority to operate. The circumstances in the case at bar far from normal
and, to repeat, are different from those obviously envisioned by the paragraph in
question. There had never been a recommendation that the College be granted an
opportunity to comply with certain requirements. From the outset, the proposal had
been that it be forthwith closed, its discovered de ciencies as a medical college being
of so serious a character as to be irremediable. The other four (4) surveys were
conducted, not to determine if in the course of time the petitioner school had already
fully complied with all the prescribed requisites, but rather, whether or not the original
recommendation for its closure was correct and should be sustained. And, as already
mentioned, the subsequent surveys, over as period of more than three (3) years, served
but to con rm the validity of that initial proposal for its closure. Under these
circumstances, therefore, even if it be assumed that the provision, paragraph c, applied
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 to petitioner school, it must be held that there has been substantial compliance
therewith.
Having thus disposed of the issues raised by the facts of the case, the Court
sees no useful purpose to be served by remanding the case to the Trial Court for
further proceedings. The only acceptable reason for such a remand would be so that
the Trial Court may determines whether or not petitioners have acted within the scope
of their powers or grossly abused them, a matter that this Court has already passed
upon here. Such a remand cannot be justi ed on the theory that the Trial Court will
make its own independent determination of whether or not respondent medical
institution has complied with the minimum standards laid down for its continued
operation, since, as here ruled, it has not that power.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted and the
temporary restraining order issued by the Court is made permanent. The questions writ
of preliminary injunction dated May 10, 1989 is set aside and respondents judge is
ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 1385.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., No part, Dr. F.B. Herrera, Jr., having been a member of the
first evaluation team.
Sarmiento, J., No Part; I was the legal counsel of the Board of Medical Education
before my appointment to the Court.

Footnotes
1. as embodied in DECS Order No. 5, Series of 1986 on the Essentials and Requirements for
Medical Schools.
2. Annex B, Petition.

3. to wit, Doctor Serafin J. Juliano, Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, Macario Tan, Horacio Estrada,
Andres L. Reyes, Jose J. Silao, Jr. and Adolfo A. Trinidad.
4. Annex C, Petition.

5. composed of Doctors Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, Nilo L. Rosas, Macario Tan and Artemio
Ordinario. The team gave the college very poor ratings in all five aspects of the survey
(Administration, College and Curriculum, School, Hospital and Library Facilities, Faculty
staff and Studentry).
6. Annex E, Petition.
7. Annex F, Petition.
8. Annex G, Petition.

9. Annex I, Petition.
10. Annex I, Petition.
11. Annex K, Petition.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com

 12. Annex A, Petition.
13. Annex N, Petition.
14. e.g. the Association of Philippine Medical College ion the case of Dr. Macario G. Tan
and Dr. Elena Ines Cuyegkeng; the UP College of Medicine and the Department of Health
in the case of Dr. Alberto Romualdez; the Board of Medicine of the Professional
Regulation Commission in the case of Dr. Artemio Ordinario, and the DECS, in the case
of Dr. Nilo L. Rosa.
15. Ateneo de Manila v. CA, 145 SCRA 106, Liangga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Lopez Enage,
152 SCRA 80; Alcuaz v. PSBA, G.R. No. 76353, May 2, 1988.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com