Treasury Debt Operations—An Analysis Integrating Social Fabric Matrix and Social

Accounting Matrix Methodologies

Scott T. Fullwiler
September 2010 (edited April 2011)

Fullwiler (2009) presents an analysis of operations of the Federal Reserve (hereafter,

the Fed) using the Social Fabric Matrix (hereafter, SFM; Hayden 2006). The purpose here
is to describe a subset of operations involving the Fed—the debt operations of the U. S.
Treasury (hereafter, the Treasury) while integrating the analysis within the Social
Accounting Matrix (hereafter, SAM) framework. Figure 1 presents a simplified version of
Fullwiler’s SFM of the Fed’s operations (page 125 in Fullwiler 2009) showing only the
institutions relevant for the Treasury’s debt operations and two core technologies of the
monetary system.
The integration of the SAM approach with the SFM in Figure 1 relies substantially
on the two technologies listed there—double-entry accounting and payment clearing and
settlement. As any Institutionalist knows, the transaction was the core unit of analysis for
John R. Commons; the emphasis here on double-entry accounting (T1 in Figure 1) is
similar, since every transaction in a capitalist economy affects the financial statements of
those involved. Understanding how that transaction is represented on the financial
statements of those involved is a necessary condition for understanding the transaction
itself. Within the SFM framework, double-entry accounting is a technology of modern
capitalism—it is a tool that both influences and is influenced by actions, rules, regulations,
and requirements of social institutions. The technology of payment clearing and settlement
(T2) is similarly at the core of any analysis of the monetary system, namely clearing and
settlement of wholesale payments such as in money markets and transactions among
banks, dealers, the Federal Reserve, and the Treasury (see Fullwiler 2008, Principle 2).
Payment clearing and settlement technologies likewise influence and are influenced by
rules, regulations, requirements, and actions of institutions involved in all aspects of
clearing and settling payments. In particular with regard to Treasury debt operations, it is
important to recognize that (1) Treasury auctions settle on the book-entry system of
Fedwire, the Fed’s real-time gross settlement system, and (2) Fedwire transactions are only
settled by transfers from the senders’ reserve accounts with the Fed. For more details on
wholesale payment settlement, see Fullwiler (2006, 2009).
Figure 1 also shows the hierarchy of the institutions involved in the Treasury’s debt
operations (Hayden 2009). The U. S. Congress and the President are shown as the system’s
only higher institutional authority (IA-1) articulating major norms into rules (legislation).
The Fed is one lower institutional authority—its own existence a result of an act of
Congress and the President (i.e., the Federal Reserve Act)—that is authorized by rules to
issue regulations and requirements to processing institutions (banks and primary dealers
in particular in this case). The Treasury is also a lower institutional authority that
similarly sets out requirements for banks and primary dealers related to its own spending,
revenue, and debt issuance operations, which it is authorized to issue given the rules
provided by acts of Congress and the President.
The Treasury’s debt operations occur within the context of timing of its own
spending (as determined in budgets set by Congress and the President) and revenues. The
Federal Reserve Act currently specifies that the Fed can only purchase obligations of the
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Treasury in “the open market,” though this has not always been the case. This necessitates
that the Treasury have a positive balance in its account at the Fed (which, as set in the
Federal Reserve Act, is the fiscal agent for the Treasury and holds the Treasury’s balances
as a liability on its balance sheet). Therefore, prior to spending, the Treasury must
replenish its own account at the Fed either via balances collected from tax (and other)
revenues or debt issuance.

Figure 1: Social Fabric Matrix of the Treasury’s Debt Operations

Receiving Components

IA1-1

IA2-1

IA2-2

IP-1

IP-2

IP-3

T1

T2
Payment Clearing/Settlement
Double-Entry Accounting
Non-Bank Private Sector
Congress & President

Primary Dealers
Federal Reserve

Treasury

Banks
Delivering Components
IA1-1 Congress & President 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

IA2-1 Federal Reserve 1 1 1 1 1

IA2-2 Treasury 1 1 1 1 1 1

IP-1 Banks 1 1 1 1 1 1

IP-2 Primary Dealers

1 1 1 1 1 1
IP-3 Non-Bank Private Sector
1 1 1
T1 Double-Entry Accounting
1 1 1 1 1 1
Payment
T2
Clearing/Settlement 1 1 1 1 1 1

Given that the Treasury’s primary account is a liability for the Fed, flows to/from
this account affect the quantity of reserve balances. Consequently, the Treasury’s debt
operations are in fact inseparable from the Fed’s monetary policy operations related to
setting and maintaining its target rate. More specifically, flows to/from the Treasury’s
account must be offset by other changes to the Fed’s balance sheet if they are not consistent
with the quantity of reserve balances required for the Fed to achieve its target rate on a

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1825303

given day. As such, the Treasury uses transfers to and from thousands of private bank
deposit (both demand and time) accounts—usually called tax and loan accounts—for this
purpose (Wray 1998, Bell 2000, Garbade 2004). Prior to fall 2008, the Treasury would
attempt to maintain its end-of-day account balance at the Fed at $5 around billion on most
days, achieving this through “calls” from tax and loan accounts to its account at the Fed (if
the latter’s balance were below $5 billion) or “adds” to the tax and loan accounts from the
account at the Fed (if the latter were above $5 billion).
In other words, timeliness in the Treasury’s debt operations requires consistency
with both the Treasury’s management of its own spending/revenue time sequences and the
time sequences related to the Fed’s management of its interest rate target. As such, under
normal, “pre-Lehman” conditions for the Fed’s operations in which its target rate was set
above the remuneration rate paid on banks’ reserve balances (which had been set at zero
prior to October 2008), there were six financial transactions required for the Treasury to
engage in deficit spending. Since it is clear that current conditions for the Fed’s operations
(in which the target rate is set equal to the remuneration rate) are intended to be
temporary and at some point there is a desired (by Fed policy makers) return to the more
“normal” “pre-Lehman” conditions, these six transactions are the base case analyzed here
(though the “post-Lehman” do not significantly impact conclusions reached).
The six transactions for Treasury debt operations for the purpose of deficit spending
in the base case conditions are the following:

A. The Fed undertakes repurchase agreement operations with primary dealers (in
which the Fed purchases Treasury securities from primary dealers with a promise to
buy it back on a specific date) to ensure sufficient reserve balances are circulating
for settlement of the Treasury’s auction (which will debit reserve balances in bank
accounts as the Treasury’s account is credited) while also achieving the Fed’s target
rate. It is well-known that settlement of Treasury auctions are “high payment flow
days” that necessitate a larger quantity of balances circulating than other days
(Fullwiler 2003, 2009). The transaction is represented in Figure 1 by the “1” in IA2-
1 to IP-2.

B. The Treasury’s auction settles as Treasury securities are exchanged for reserve
balances (IP-2 to IA2-2), bank reserve accounts are debited to credit the Treasury’s
account (IP-1 to IA2-2), and dealer accounts at banks are debited (IP-1 to IP-2).

C. The Treasury adds balances credited to its account from the auction settlement to
tax and loan accounts (IA2-2 to IP-1). This credits the reserve accounts of the banks
holding the credited tax and loan accounts (IA2-1 to IP-1).

D. (Transactions D and E are interchangeable; that is, in practice, transaction E might

occur before transaction D.) The Fed’s repurchase agreement is reversed, or,
otherwise stated, the second leg of the repurchase agreement occurs in which a
primary dealer purchases Treasury securities back from the Fed. Transactions in A
above are reversed.

E. Prior to spending, the Treasury calls in balances from its tax and loan accounts at
banks. This reverses the transactions in C.

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 F. The Treasury deficit spends by debiting its account at the Fed, resulting in a credit
to bank reserve accounts at the Fed and the bank accounts of spending recipients
(IA2-2 to IP-3).

Again, it is important to recall that all of the transactions listed above settle via Fedwire
(T2). Also, the analysis is much the same in the case of a deficit created by a tax cut
instead of an increase in spending. That is, with a tax cut the Treasury’s spending is
greater than revenues just as it is with pro-active deficit spending.
Instead of using a transaction-based SAM as in the previous case, this case will
utilize the stock-flow consistent (hereafter, SFC) SAMs as developed by Wynne Godley and
seen in numerous research papers (many of which were published as working papers by
various authors the Jerome Levy Economics Institute) and in Godley and Lavoie (2006). As
such, the focus of the SAM for this case will be to demonstrate how transactions A through
F above affect the balance sheets of the respective institutions. This is more appropriate
given that—as a result of wholesale payment settlement systems (T1)—individual
transactions can affect the balance sheets of multiple institutions in Figure 1. For instance,
transaction A—the first leg of the repurchase agreement between the Fed and primary
dealers—impacts the balance sheets of the Fed, the primary dealers, and banks
simultaneously. The traditional SAM approach of simply mapping transactions—such as a
representing transaction A with a payment from the Fed to primary dealers—would miss
important details (i.e., the fact that balance sheets for three different institutions are
affected) that SFC SAMs do not. The SFC SAM is also consistent with the emphasis on the
technology of double-entry accounting in the SFM analysis of the Treasury’s debt
operations.
The SAM for transactions A through F is shown in Figure 2. Like those in the SFC
SAM literature, the relevant institutions are shown on the horizontal axis, and the
asset/liabilities that are affected are shown on the vertical axis. Given that this SAM must
show six different transactions, letters A through F within individual cells denote the
respective transaction. Also, as the SFC SAM literature does, Figure Y denotes changes
affecting the asset side of an institution’s balance sheet using minus signs (-); that is, an
increase asset X is shown as “-X” (“+X” for an increase in liability X), while a decrease in
asset X is shown as “-(-X)” (“-(+X)” for a decrease in liability X). The rationale here, which
is perfectly consistent with the statement of cash flows for a business, is that rising assets
require or “use” funds, whereas liabilities and equity are a source of funds. Therefore,
transactions A through F in Figure Y are as follows:

A. For the Fed’s repurchase agreement with dealers:

i. Increase in Treasury securities held by the Fed (-TS) and decrease them for
primary dealers (-(-TS)).
ii. Increase reserve balances (RB) in bank reserve accounts (+RB for the Fed, -
RB for banks).
iii. Increase deposits for primary dealers (-Dpd for primary dealers, +Dpd for
banks).
B. For the settlement of the Treasury’s auction:
i. Decrease deposits for primary dealers (-(-Dpd) for primary dealers, -(+Dpd)
for banks).
ii. Decrease reserve balances in bank reserve accounts (-(-RB) for banks, -(+RB)
for the Fed).

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Figure 2: Stock-Flow Consistent Social Accounting Matrix of Treasury Debt Operations

1 2 3 4 5 6
Federal Primary Spending
Reserve
Treasury Banks
Dealers Recipients ∑
A. +RB A. -RB 0
B. -(+RB) B. -(-RB) 0
C. +RB C. -RB 0
1 ∆ Bank Reserve Accounts at the Fed D. -(+RB) D. -(-RB) 0
E. -(+RB) E. -(-RB) 0
F. +RB F. -RB 0

B. +TA B. -TA 0
C. -(+TA) C. -(-TA) 0
2 ∆ Treasury Account at the Fed
E. +TA E. -TA 0
F. -(+TA) F. -(-TA) 0

A. -TS A. -(-TS) 0
3 ∆ Treasury Securities B. +TS B. -TS 0

D. -(-TS) D. -TS 0

A. +Dpd A. -Dpd 0
B. -(+Dpd) B. -(-Dpd) 0
C. -Dt C. +Dt 0
4 ∆ Deposit Accounts at Private Banks D. -(+Dpd) D. -(-Dpd) 0
E. -(-Dt) E. -(+Dt) 0
F. +Dsr F. -Dsr 0

+Dsr -TS
5 ∑ 0 +TS
-(+Dpd) -(-Dpd)
-Dsr 0

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 iii. Increase the balance in the Treasury’s account at the Fed (-TA for the
Treasury, +TA for the Fed).
iv. Increase Treasury securities held by primary dealers (-TS) and raise
outstanding debt of the Treasury (+TS).
C. For the Treasury’s transfer from its account at the Fed to its tax and loan accounts:
i. Reduce balances in the Treasury’s account at the Fed (-(-TA) for the
Treasury, -(+TA) for the Fed).
ii. Increase reserve balances in bank reserve accounts (-RB for banks, +RB for
the Fed).
iii. Increase balances in tax and loan accounts at banks (-Dt for the Treasury,
+Dt for banks).
D. For the second leg of the Fed’s repurchase agreement with primary dealers:
i. Decrease deposits for primary dealers (-(-Dpd) for primary dealers, -(+Dpd)
for banks).
ii. Decrease reserve balances in bank reserve accounts (-(+RB) for the Fed, -(-
RB) for banks).
iii. Decrease in Treasury securities held by the Fed (-(-TS) and increase them for
primary dealers (-TS).
E. For the Treasury’s call of tax and loan balances to its account at the Fed:
i. Decrease balances in tax and loan accounts at banks (-(-Dt) for the Treasury,
-(+Dt) for banks).
ii. Decrease reserve balances in bank reserve accounts (-(-RB) for banks, -(+RB)
for the Fed).
iii. Raise balances in the Treasury’s account at the Fed (-TA for the Treasury,
+TA for the Fed).
F. For the Treasury’s deficit spending:
i. Decrease balances in the Treasury’s account at the Fed (-(-TA) for the
Treasury, -(+TA) for the Fed).
ii. Increase reserve balances in bank reserve accounts (-RB for banks, +RB for
the Fed).
iii. Increase bank deposits for recipients of the government’s spending (-Dsr for
spending recipients, +Dsr for banks).

Column 6 of Figure 2 shows that transactions for each row sum to 0; that is, there are no
“black boxes” in a SFC SAM as the origin and destination of every balance sheet change is
accounted for. Row 5 of Figure 2 shows the sum for each column: the Treasury ends with
additional debt outstanding; banks end with fewer primary dealer deposits and greater
deposits for spending recipients; primary dealers replace bank deposits with Treasuries,
and spending recipients have additional bank deposits.
Overall, the SFM and SAM together enable a number of facts of the Treasury’s debt
operations to be clearly articulated that are largely in contradiction to the neoclassical
view:

1. From Figure 1, it is clear who stands at the top of the decision-making hierarchy:
Congress and the President. In other words, the rule forbidding the Treasury from
receiving overdrafts into its account at the Fed should the Congress and the
President decide to incur budget deficits is clearly self-imposed; as noted above, this
constraint has in the past been changed, and can be changed precisely because it is
self-imposed.
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2. Were the Treasury to obtain overdrafts to its Fed account when it incurred deficits
(assuming the rule prohibiting this were altered for the moment), either the Fed or
the Treasury would in fact be required to issue securities in order to achieve
timeliness in the Fed’s operations (unless the Fed is allowed to pay interest on
reserve balances and did so at its target rate). Otherwise, the deficit would leave
banks holding undesired excess balances in reserve accounts and the overnight rate
would fall below the Fed’s target rate. With the prohibition of overdrafts in its
account at the Fed, this operational requirement is obviously left to the Treasury
when a deficit is incurred.

3. In the absence of interest payment on reserve balances at the Fed’s target rate, the
Treasury’s use of tax and loan accounts in private banks aides the Fed’s ability to
achieve timeliness in its operations.

4. The SAM for the Treasury’s debt operations demonstrates that government deficits
create net financial wealth for the non-government sector (denoted by the shaded
columns of Figure 2): spending recipients have seen their financial assets grow
without adding to their liabilities; while banks and primary dealers have seen their
net financial positions remain unchanged (that is, changes to liabilities and assets
net to zero). These facts run counter to the more typical position of neoclassical
economists that Treasury security issuance “crowds out” funds available for the non-
government sector; the prevailing view is thereby that deficits accompanied by
issuing Treasury securities are less stimulative to the economy than not issuing
securities.

(Indeed, one could go further and note that the deposits of the primary dealers used
to purchase the Treasury security were themselves likely created by previous
borrowing in the repurchase agreement markets (that is, primary dealers often add
to their assets such as Treasury securities with funds borrowed by using their
existing assets as collateral), while the Treasury security will very likely serve as
collateral for further credit creation in these markets. So, far from being less
stimulative or “crowding out,” the Treasury may in fact be the catalyst for more
credit creation than would occur in its absence.)

5. That government deficits raise deposits even when Treasury securities are issued is
if anything even more obvious where banks purchase them rather than primary
dealers or other non-bank investors. Figure 3 presents a SAM for Treasury debt
operations in the case of banks purchasing the Treasuries. As seen in row 5, the
summation of the columns leaves banks holding Treasuries and the recipients of
government spending holding deposits, with obviously no exchange of primary
dealer deposits for Treasuries.

6. To achieve timeliness in the Fed’s operations, sufficient reserve balances must be

supplied to reserve accounts for settling Treasury auctions. If not, bank reserve
accounts would be in overdraft and the Fed’s ability to achieve its target rate would
be compromised (i.e., the federal funds rate would increase above its target as a
result of banks sought out scarce balances to clear overdrafts).

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 The implications of this for understanding the “self-imposed constraint” described in
point 1 above are highly significant. Recall that only reserve balances can settle
Treasury auctions via Fedwire. Note, though, that the only sources of reserve
balances over time (that is, aside from various short-term effects from autonomous
changes to the Fed’s balance sheet) are loans from the Fed or the Fed’s purchases of
financial assets either outright or in repurchase agreements. Further, the vast
majority of the time the Fed purchases Treasury securities or requires Treasury
securities as collateral for repurchase agreements. Since Treasury securities are
obviously evidence of a previous deficit, it is the case that the reserve balances
required to purchase Treasury securities are the result of a previous government
deficit or a loan from the Fed to the non-government sector. This is true even
though the Treasury must have a positive balance in its account before it can spend,
and even though the Fed is legally prohibited from providing the Treasury with
overdrafts in its account.

7. If interest is paid on reserve balances at the Fed’s target rate and substantial excess
reserve balances are left circulating, the analysis is unchanged. While the Fed
would not have to actively engage in operations specifically related to Treasury
auctions for the purpose of achieving and maintaining its target rate, the reserve
balances already circulating were created via Fed lending to the private sector (or
purchases of private sector securities) or previous deficits.

8. Overall, adding the rule that the Treasury must finance its own operations in the
open market to the need to achieve timeliness in the Fed’s operations results in the
six transactions described above for the Treasury’s debt operations. The added
complexity in the Treasury’s operations that results is unnecessary since it does not
change the facts that (1) reserve balances must be provided via previous deficits or
Fed loans to the private sector in order for Treasury auctions to settle, and (2)
deficits accompanied by Treasury security issuance does not result in fewer deposits
circulating than without such security issuance. Further, the rule itself and the
added complexity can be counter-productive if they influence policy makers’
decisions regarding options available in times of macroeconomic difficulty.

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Figure 3: Deficits with Treasury Security Sales to Banks

1 2 3 4 5 6

Federal Primary Spending

Reserve
Treasury Banks
Dealers Recipients ∑

A. +RB A. -RB 0
B. -(+RB) B. -(-RB) 0
C. +RB C. -RB 0
1 ∆ Bank Reserve Accounts at the Fed D. -(+RB) D. -(-RB) 0
E. -(+RB) E. -(-RB) 0
F. +RB F. -RB 0

B. +TA B. -TA 0
C. -(+TA) C. -(-TA) 0
2 ∆ Treasury Account at the Fed
E. +TA E. -TA 0
F. -(+TA) F. -(-TA) 0

A. -TS A. -(-TS) 0
3 ∆ Treasury Securities B. +TS B. -TS 0

D. -(-TS) D. -TS 0

A. +Dpd A. -Dpd 0
0
C. -Dt C. +Dt 0
4 ∆ Deposit Accounts at Private Banks D. -(+Dpd) D. -(-Dpd) 0
E. -(-Dt) E. -(+Dt) 0
F. +Dsr F. -Dsr 0

+Dsr
5 ∑ 0 +TS
-TS
0 -Dsr 0

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Works Cited:

Bell, Stephanie A. 2000. “Can Taxes and Bonds Finance Government Spending?” Journal
of Economic Issues, vol 34, no. 3 (September).

Commons, John R. 1955 [1924]. Legal Foundations of Capitalism. New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction Publishers.

Fullwiler, Scott T. 2003. “Timeliness and the Fed’s Daily Tactics.” Journal of Economic
Issues, vol. 37, no. 4 (December): 851-880.

__________. 2005. “Paying Interest on Reserve Balances: It’s More Significant than You
Think.” Journal of Economic Issues, vol. 39, no. 2 (June):

__________. 2006. “Setting Interest Rates in the Modern Money Era.” Journal of Post
Keynesian Economics, vol. 28, no. 3 (Spring): 495-525.

__________. 2008. “Modern Central Bank Operations: The General Principles.”

__________. 2009. “The Social Fabric Matrix Approach to Central Bank Operations: An
Application to the Federal Reserve and the Recent Financial Crisis.” In Natarajan,
Tara, Wolfram Elsner, and Scott Fullwiler, (eds.) Institutional Analysis and Praxis:
The Social Fabric Matrix Approach : 123-169. New York, NY: Springer.

Godley, Wynne and Marc Lavoie. 2007. Monetary Economics: An Integrated Approach to
Credit, Money, Income, Production, and Wealth. New York, NY: Palgrave
Macmillan.

Hayden, F. Gregory. 2006. Policymaking for a Good Society: The Social Fabric Matrix
Approach to Policy Analysis and Program Evaluation. New York, NY: Springer.

__________. 2009. “Normative Analysis of Instituted Processes.” In Natarajan, Tara,

Wolfram Elsner, and Scott Fullwiler, (eds.) Institutional Analysis and Praxis: The
Social Fabric Matrix Approach : 103-122. New York, NY: Springer.

Wray, L. Randall. 1998. Understanding Modern Money—The Key to Full Employment and
Price Stability. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

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