THE

PHILOSOPH
QUARTERLY
VOL. 10 No. 39 APRIL 1960

GOD AND EVIL

A. THE PROBLEM STATED:

Evil is a problem for the theist in that a contradiction is involved in
the fact of evil on the one hand, and the belief in the omnipotence
and perfection of God on the other. God cannot be both all-powerful and
perfectly good if evil is real. This contradiction is well set out in its detail
by Mackie in his discussion of the problem.l In his discussion Mackie seeks
to show that this contradiction cannot be resolved in terms of man's free
will. In arguing in this way Mackie neglects a large number of important
points, and concedes far too much to the theist. He implicitly allows that
whilst physical evil creates a problem, this problem is reducible to the
problem of moral evil and that therefore the satisfactoriness of solutions
of the problem of evil turns on the compatibility of free will and absolute
goodness. In fact physical evils create a number of distinct problems which
are not reducible to the problem of moral evil. Further, the proposed solu-
tion of the problem of moral evil in terms of free will renders the attempt
to account for physical evil in terms of moral good, and the attempt thereby
to reduce the problem of evil to the problem of moral evil, completely un-
tenable. Moreover, the account of moral evil in terms of free will breaks
down on more obvious and less disputable grounds than those indicated
by Mackie. Moral evil can be shown to remain a problem whether or not
free will is compatible with absolute goodness. I therefore propose in this
paper to reopen the discussion of "the problem of evil", by approaching
it from a more general standpoint, examining a wider variety of solutions
than those considered by Mackie and his critics.
1" Evil and Omnipotence ", Mind, 1955.
98 H. J. MCOLOSKEY

The fact of evil creates a problem for the theist; but there are a number
of simple solutions available to a theist who is content seriously to modify
his theism. He can either admit a limit to God's power, or he can deny
God's moral perfection. He can assert either (1) that God is not powerful
enough to make a world that does not contain evil, or (2) that God created
only the good in the universe and that some other power created the evil,
or (3) that God is all-powerful but morally imperfect, and chose to create
an imperfect universe. Few Christians accept these solutions, and this is
no doubt partly because such 'solutions' ignore the real inspiration of
religious beliefs, and partly because they introduce embarrassing complica-
tions for the theist in his attempts to deal with other serious problems.
However, if any one of these 'solutions' is accepted, then the problem of
evil is avoided, and a weakened version of theism is made secure from attacks
based upon the fact of the occurrence of evil.
For more orthodox theism, according to which God is both omnipotent
and perfectly good, evil creates a real problem; and this problem is well-
stated by the Jesuit, Father G. H. Joyce. Joyce writes:
" The existence of evil in the world must at all times be the greatest
of all problems which the mind encounters when it reflects on God
and His relation to the world. If He is, indeed, all-good and all-
powerful, how has evil any place in the world which He has made ?
Whence came it ? Why is it here ? If He is all-good why did He allow
it to arise ? If all-powerful why does He not deliver us from the
burden ? Alike in the physical and moral order creation seems so
grievously marred that we find it hard to understand how it can
derive in its entirety from God ".2
The facts which give rise to the problem are of two general kinds, and
give rise to two distinct types of problem. These two general kinds of evil
are usually referred to as 'physical' and as 'moral' evil. These terms are
by no means apt-suffering for instance is not strictly physical evil-and
they conceal significant differences. However, this terminology is too widely-
accepted, and too convenient to be dispensed with here, the more especially
as the various kinds of evil, whilst important as distinct kinds, need not
for our purposes be designated by separate names.
Physical evil and moral evil then are the two general forms of evil which
independently and jointly constitute conclusive grounds for denying the
existence of God in the sense defined, namely as an all-powerful, perfect
Being. The acuteness of these two general problems is evident when we
consider the nature and extent of the evils of which account must be given.
To take physical evils, looking first at the less important of these.
(a) Physical evils : Physical evils are involved in the very constitution
of the earth and animal kingdom. There are deserts and icebound areas;
there are dangerous animals of prey, as well as creatures such as scorpions
'Joyce: Principles of Natural Theology, ch. XVII. All subsequent quotations from
Joyce in this paper are from this chapter of this work.
 GOD AND EVI 99

and snakes. There are also pests such as flies and fleas and the hosts of
other insect pests, as well as the multitude of lower parasites such as tape-
worms, hookworms and the like. Secondly, there are the various natural
calamities and the immense human suffering that follows in their wake-
fires, floods, tempests, tidal-waves, volcanoes, earthquakes, droughts and
famines. Thirdly, there are the vast numbers of diseases that torment and
ravage man. Diseases such as leprosy, cancer, poliomyelitis, appear prima
facie not to be creations which are to be expected of a benevolent Creator.
Fourthly, there are the evils with which so many are born-the various
physical deformities and defects such as misshapen limbs, blindness, deaf-
ness, dumbness, mental deficiency and insanity. Most of these evils contribute
towards increasing human pain and suffering; but not all physical evils are
reducible simply to pain. Many of these evils are evils whether or not they
result in pain. This is important, for it means that, unless there is one solution
to such diverse evils, it is both inaccurate and positively misleading to speak
of the problem of physical evil. Shortly I shall be arguing that no one ' solu-
tion' covers all these evils, so we shall have to conclude that physical evils
create not one problem but a number of distinct problems for the theist.
The nature of the various difficulties referred to by the theist as the
problem of physical evil is indicated by Joyce in a way not untypical among
the more honest, philosophical theists, as follows:
" The actual amount of suffering which the human race endures
is immense. Disease has store and to spare of torments for the body :
and disease and death are the lot to which we must all look forward.
At all times, too, great numbers of the race are pinched by want.
Nor is the world ever free for very long from the terrible sufferings
which follow in the track of war. If we concentrate our attention on
human woes, to the exclusion of the joys of life, we gain an appalling
picture of the ills to which the flesh is heir. So too if we fasten our
attention on the sterner side of nature, on the pains which men
endure from natural forces-on the storms which wreck their ships,
the cold which freezes them to death, the fire which consumes them
-if we contemplate this aspect of nature alone we may be led to
wonder how God came to deal so harshly with His Creatures as to
provide them with such a home."
Many such statements of the problem proceed by suggesting, if not by
stating, that the problem arises at least in part by concentrating one's
attention too exclusively on one aspect of the world. This is quite contrary
to the facts. The problem is not one that results from looking at only one
aspect of the universe. It may be the case that over-all pleasure predominates
over pain, and that physical goods in general predominate over physical
evils, but the opposite may equally well be the case. It is both practically
impossible and logically impossible for this question to be resolved. How-
ever, it is not an unreasonable presumption, with the large bulk of mankind
inadequately fed and housed and without adequate medical and health
100 H. J. MCCLOSKEY

services, to suppose that physical evils at present predominate over physical

goods. In the light of the facts at our disposal, this would seem to be a
much more reasonable conclusion than the conclusion hinted at by Joyce
and openly advanced by less cautious theists, namely, that physical goods
in fact outweigh physical evils in the world.
However, the question is not, Which predominates, physical good or
physical evil? The problem of physical evil remains a problem whether
the balance in the universe is on the side of physical good or not, because
the problem is that of accounting for the fact that physical evil occurs at all.
(b) Moral evil : Physical evils create one of the groups of problems
referred to by the theist as 'the problem of evil '. Moral evil creates quite
a distinct problem. Moral evil is simply immorality-evils such as selfish-
ness, envy, greed, deceit, cruelty, callousness, cowardice and the larger
scale evils such as wars and the atrocities they involve.
Moral evil is commonly regarded as constituting an even more serious
problem than physical evil. Joyce so regards it, observing:
" The man who sins thereby offends God. . . . We are called on
to explain how God came to create an order of things in which rebel-
lion and even final rejection have such a place. Since a choice from
among an infinite number of possible worlds lay open to God, how
came He to choose one in which these occur ? Is not such a choice
in flagrant opposition to the Divine Goodness ? "
Some theists seek a solution by denying the reality of evil or by describing
it as a 'privation' or absence of good. They hope thereby to explain it
away as not needing a solution. This, in the case of most of the evils which
require explanation, seems to amount to little more than an attempt to
sidestep the problem simply by changing the name of that which has to
be explained. It can be exposed for what it is simply by describing some of
the evils which have to be explained. That is why a survey of the data to
be accounted for is a most important part of the discussion of the problem
of evil.
In The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoievsky introduces a discussion of
the problem of evil by reference to some then recently committed atrocities.
Ivan states the problem:
"'By the way, a Bulgarian I met lately in Moscow', Ivan went
on . . . 'told me about the crimes committed by Turks in all parts
of Bulgaria through fear of a general rising of the Slavs. They burn
villages, murder, outrage women and children, and nail their prisoners
by the ears to the fences, leave them till morning, and in the morning
hang them-all sorts of things you can't imagine. People talk some-
times of bestial cruelty, but that's a great injustice and insult to
the beasts; a beast can never be so cruel as a man, so artistically
cruel. The tiger only tears and gnaws and that's all he can do. He
would never think of nailing people by the ears, even if he were able
to do it. These Turks took a pleasure in torturing children too;
 GOD AND EVIL 101

cutting the unborn child from the mother's womb, and tossing
babies up in the air and catching them on the points of their bayonets
before their mothers' eyes. Doing it before the mother's eyes was what
gave zest to the amusement. Here is another scene that I thought
very interesting. Imagine a trembling mother with her baby in her
arms, a circle of invading Turks around her. They've planned a
diversion: they pet the baby to make it laugh. They succeed; the
baby laughs. At that moment, a Turk points a pistol four inches
from the baby's face. The baby laughs with glee, holds out its little
hands to the pistol, and he pulls the trigger in the baby's face and
blows out its brains. Artistic, wasn't it? ' ".3
Ivan's statement of the problem was based on historical events. Such
happenings did not cease in the nineteenth century. The Scourge of the
Swastika by Lord Russell of Liverpool contains little else than descriptions
of such atrocities; and it is simply one of a host of writings giving documented
lists of instances of evils, both physical and moral.
Thus the problem of evil is both real and acute. There is a clear prima
facie case that evil and God are incompatible-both cannot exist. Most
theists admit this, and that the onus is on them to show that the conflict
is not fatal to theism; but a consequence is that a host of proposed solutions
are advanced.
The mere fact of such a multiplicity of proposed solutions, and the
widespread repudiation of each other's solutions by theists, in itself suggests
that the fact of evil is an insuperable obstacle to theism as defined here. It
also makes it impossible to treat of all proposed solutions, and all that can
be attempted here is an examination of those proposed solutions which are
most commonly invoked and most generally thought to be important by
theists.
Some theists admit the reality of the problem of evil, and then seek to
sidestep it, declaring it to be a great mystery which we poor humans cannot
hope to comprehend. Other theists adopt a rational approach and advance
rational arguments to show that evil, properly understood, is compatible
with, and even a consequence of God's goodness. The arguments to be
advanced in this paper are directed against the arguments of the latter
theists; but in so far as these arguments are successful against the rational
theists, to that extent they are also effective in showing that the non-rational
approach in terms of great mysteries is positively irrational.
B. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF PHYSICAL EVIL:
Of the large variety of arguments advanced by theists as solutions to
the problem of physical evil, five popularly used and philosophically sig-
nificant solutions will be examined. They are, in brief: (i) Physical good
(pleasure) requires physical evil (pain) to exist at all; (ii) Physical evil is
God's punishment of sinners; (iii) Physical evil is God's warning and re-
3P. 244, Garnett translation, Heinemann.
102 H. J. MCCLOSKEY

minder to man; (iv) Physical evil is the result of the natural laws, the opera-
tions of which are on the whole good; (v) Physical evil increases the total
good.
(i) Physical Goodis Impossible without Physical Evil : Pleasure is possible
only by way of contrast with pain. Here the analogy of colour is used. If
everything were blue we should, it is argued, understand neither what
colour is nor what blue is. So with pleasure and pain.
The most obvious defect of such an argument is that it does not cover
all physical goods and evils. It is an argument commonly invoked by those
who think of physical evil as creating only one problem, namely the problem
of human pain. However, the problems of physical evils are not reducible
to the one problem, the problem of pain; hence the argument is simply
irrelevant to much physical evil. Disease and insanity are evils, but health
and sanity are possible in the total absence of disease and insanity. Further,
if the argument were in any way valid even in respect of pain, it would
imply the existence of only a speck of pain, and not the immense amount
of pain in the universe. A speck of yellow is all that is needed for an ap-
preciation of blueness and of colour generally. The argument is therefore
seen to be seriously defective on two counts even if its underlying principle
is left unquestioned. If its underlying principle is questioned, the argument
is seen to be essentially invalid. Can it seriously be maintained that if an
individual were born crippled and deformed and never in his life experienced
pleasure, that he could not experience pain, not even if he were severely
injured ? It is clear that pain is possible in the absence of pleasure. It is
true that it might not be distinguished by a special name and called 'pain ',
but the state we now describe as a painful state would nonetheless be pos-
sible in the total absence of pleasure. So too the converse would seem to
apply. Plato brings this out very clearly in Book 9 of the Republic in respect
of the pleasures of taste and smell. These pleasures seem not to depend for
their existence on any prior experience of pain. Thus the argument is un-
sound in respect of its main contention; and in being unsound in this respect,
it is at the same time ascribing a serious limitation to God's power. It main-
tains that God cannot create pleasure without creating pain, although as
we have seen, pleasure and pain are not correlatives.
(ii) Physical Evil is God's Punishment for Sin: This kind of explanation
was advanced to explain the terrible Lisbon earthquake in the 18th century,
in which 40,000 people were killed. There are many replies to this argument,
for instance Voltaire's. Voltaire asked : " Did God in this earthquake select
the 40,000 least virtuous of the Portuguese citizens ? " The distribution
of disease and pain is in no obvious way related to the virtue of the persons
afflicted, and popular saying has it that the distribution is slanted in the
opposite direction. The only way of meeting the fact that evils are not
distributed proportionately to the evil of the sufferer is by suggesting that
all human beings, including children, are such miserable sinners, that our
offences are of such enormity, that God would be justified in punishing all
 GOD AND EVL 103

of us as severely as it is possible for humans to be punished; but even then,

God's apparent caprice in the selection of His victims requires explanation.
In any case it is by no means clear that young children who very often suffer
severely are guilty of sin of such an enormity as would be necessary to
justify their sufferings as punishment.
Further, many physical evils are simultaneous with birth-insanity,
mental defectiveness, blindness, deformities, as well as much disease. No
crime or sin of the child can explain and justify these physical evils as punish-
ment; and, for a parent's sin to be punished in the child is injustice or evil
of another kind.
Similarly, the sufferings of animals cannot be accounted for as punish-
ment. For these various reasons, therefore, this argument must be rejected.
In fact it has dropped out of favour in philosophical and theological circles,
but it continues to be invoked at the popular level.
(iii) Physical Evil is God's Warning to Men: It is argued, for instance
of physical calamities, that " they serve a moral end which compensates
the physical evil which they cause. The awful nature of these phenomena,
the overwhelming power of the forces at work, and man's utter helplessness
before them, rouse him from the religious indifference to which he is so
prone. They inspire a reverential awe of the Creator who made them, and
controls them, and a salutary fear of violating the laws which He has im-
posed ". (Joyce). This is where immortality is often alluded to as justifying
evil.
This argument proceeds from a proposition that is plainly false; and
that the proposition from which it proceeds is false is conceded implicitly
by most theologians. Natural calamities do not necessarily turn people to
God, but rather present the problem of evil in an acute form; and the prob-
lem of evil is said to account for more defections from religion than any
other cause. Thus if God's object in bringing about natural calamities is to
inspire reverence and awe, He is a bungler. There are many more reliable
methods of achieving this end. Equally important, the use of physical evil
to achieve this object is hardly the course one would expect a benevolent
God to adopt when other, more effective, less evil methods are available
to Him. for example, miracles, special revelation, etc.
(iv) Evils are the Results of the Operationof Laws of Nature : This fourth
argument relates to most physical evil, but it is more usually used to account
for animal suffering and physical calamities. These evils are said to result
from the operation of the natural laws which govern these objects, the
relevant natural laws being the various causal laws, the law of pleasure-pain
as a law governing sentient beings, etc. The theist argues that the non-
occurrence of these evils would involve either the constant intervention
by God in a miraculous way, and contrary to his own natural laws, or else
the construction of a universe with different components subject to different
laws of nature; for God, in creating a certain kind of being, must create it
subject to its appropriate law; He cannot create it and subject it to any law
104 H. J. MCCLOSKEY

of His own choosing. Hence He creates a world which has components and
laws good in their total effect, although calamitous in some particular effects.
Against this argument three objections are to be urged. First, it does
not cover all physical evil. Clearly not all disease can be accounted for along
these lines. Secondly, it is not to give a reason against God's miraculous
intervention simply to assert that it would be unreasonable for Him con-
stantly to intervene in the operation of His own laws. Yet this is the only
reason that theists seem to offer here. If, by intervening in respect to the
operation of His laws, God could thereby eliminate an evil, it would seem
to be unreasonable and evil of Him not to do so. Some theists seek a way
out of this difficulty by denying that God has the power miraculously to
intervene; but this is to ascribe a severe limitation to His power. It amounts
to asserting that when His Creation has been effected, God can do nothing
else except contemplate it. The third objection is related to this, and is to
the effect that it is already to ascribe a serious limitation to God's omni-
potence to suggest that He could not make sentient beings which did not
experience pain, nor sentient beings without deformities and deficiencies,
nor natural phenomena with different laws of nature governing them. There
is no reason why better laws of nature governing the existing objects are
not possible on the divine hypothesis. Surely, if God is all-powerful, He
could have made a better universe in the first place, or one with better laws
of nature governing it, so that the operation of its laws did not produce
calamities and pain. To maintain this is not to suggest that an omnipotent
God should be capable of achieving what is logically impossible. All that
has been indicated here is logically possible, and therefore not beyond the
powers of a being Who is really omnipotent.
This fourth argument seeks to exonerate God by explaining that He
created a universe sound on the whole, but such that He had no direct
control over the laws governing His creations, and had control only in His
selection of His creations. The previous two arguments attribute the detailed
results of the operations of these laws directly to God's will. Theists com-
monly use all three arguments. It is not without significance that they
betray such uncertainty as to whether God is to be commendedor exonerated.
(v) The Universeis Betterwith Evil in it: This is the important argument.
One version of it runs :
" Just as the human artist has in view the beauty of his com-
position as a whole, not making it his aim to give to each several
part the highest degree of brilliancy, but that measure of adornment
which most contributes to the combined effect, so it is with God"
(Joyce).
Another version of this general type of argument explains evil not so
much as a component of a good whole, seen out of its context as a mere
component, but rather as a means to a greater good. Different as these
versions are, they may be treated here as one general type of argument,
for the same criticisms are fatal to both versions.
 GOD AND EVIL 105

This kind of argument if valid simply shows that some evil may enrich
the Universe; it tells us nothing about how much evil will enrich this par-
ticular universe, and how much will be too much. So, even if valid in prin-
ciple-and shortly I shall argue that it is not valid-such an argument
does not in itself provide a justification for the evil in the universe. It shows
simply that the evil which occurs might have a justification. In view of
the immense amount of evil the probabilities are against it.
This is the main point made by Wisdom in his discussion of this argument.
Wisdom sums up his criticism as follows :
" It remains to add that, unless there are independent arguments
in favour of this world's being the best logically possible world, it is
probable that some of the evils in it are not logically necessary to a
compensating good; it is probable because there are so many evils ".4
Wisdom's reply brings out that the person who relies upon this argu-
ment as a conclusive and complete argument is seriously mistaken. The
argument, if valid, justifies only some evil. A belief that it justifies all the
evil that occurs in the world is mistaken, for a second argument, by way
of a supplement to it, is needed. This supplementary argument would
take the form of a proof that all the evil that occurs is in fact valuable and
necessary as a means to greater good. Such a supplementary proof is in
principle impossible; so, at best, this fifth argument can be taken to show
only that some evil may be necessary for the production of good, and that
the evil in the world may perhaps have a justification on this account. This
is not to justify a physical evil, but simply to suggest that physical evil
might nonetheless have a justification, although we may never come to
know this justification.
Thus the argument even if it is valid as a general form of reasoning is
unsatisfactory because inconclusive. It is, however, also unsatisfactory in
that it follows on the principle of the argument that, just as it is possible
that evil in the total context contributes to increasing the total ultimate
good, so equally, it will hold that good in the total context may increase
the ultimate evil. Thus if the principle of the argument were sound, we
could never know whether evil is really evil, or good really good. (Aesthetic
analogies may be used to illustrate this point.) By implication it follows
that it would be dangerous to eliminate evil because we may thereby intro-
duce a discordant element into the divine symphony of the universe; and,
conversely, it may be wrong to condemn the elimination of what is good,
because the latter may result in the production of more, higher goods.
So it follows that, even if the general principle of the argument is not
questioned, it is still seen to be a defective argument. On the one hand, it
proves too little-it justifies only some evil and not necessarily all the evil
in the universe; on the other hand it proves too much because it creates
doubts about the goodness of apparent goods. These criticisms in them-
selves are fatal to the argument as a solution to the problem of physical
'Mind, 1931.
106 H. J. MCCLOSKEY

evil. However, because this is one of the most popular and plausible ac-
counts of physical evil, it is worthwhile considering whether it can properly
be claimed to establish even the very weak conclusion indicated above.
Why, and in what way, is it supposed that physical evils such as pain
and misery, disease and deformity, will heighten the total effect and add
to the value of the moral whole ? The answer given is that physical evil
enriches the whole by giving rise to moral goodness. Disease, insanity,
physical suffering and the like are said to bring into being the noble moral
virtues-courage, endurance, benevolence, sympathy and the like. This is
what the talk about the enriched whole comes to. W. D. Niven makes this
explicit in his version of the argument:
" Physical evil has been the goad which has impelled men to
most of those achievements which made the history of man so wonder-
ful. Hardship is a stern but fecund parent of invention. Where life
is easy because physical ills are at a minimum we find man degener-
ating in body, mind, and character ".
And Niven concludes by asking:
" Which is preferable-a grim fight with the possibility of splendid
triumph; or no battle at all? "5
The argument is: Physical evil brings moral good into being, and in
fact is an essential precondition for the existence of some moral goods.
Further, it is sometimes argued in this context that those moral goods
which are possible in the total absence of physical evils are more valuable
in themselves if they are achieved as a result of a struggle. Hence physical
evil is said to be justified on the grounds that moral good plus physical evil
is better than the absence of physical evil.
A common reply, and an obvious one, is that urged by Mackie.6 Mackie
argues that whilst it is true that moral good plus physical evil together are
6W. D. Niven, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics.
Joyce's corresponding argument runs:
" Pain is the great stimulant to action. Man no less than animals is impelled to
work by the sense of hunger. Experience shows that, were it not for this motive the
majority of men would be content to live in indolent ease. Man must earn his bread.
" One reason plainly why God permits suffering is that man may rise to a height
of heroism which would otherwise have been beyond his scope. Nor are these the only
benefits which it confers. That sympathy for others which is one of the most precious
parts of our experience, and one of the most fruitful sources of well-doing, has its origin
in the fellow-feeling engendered by endurance of similar trials. Furthermore, were it
not for these trials, man would think little enough of a future existence, and of the
need of striving after his last end. He would be perfectly content with his existence,
and would reck little of any higher good. These considerations here briefly advanced
suffice at least to show how important is the office filled by pain in human life, and
with what little reason it is asserted that the existence of so much suffering is irreconcil-
able with the wisdom of the Creator ".
And:
" It may be asked whether the Creator could not have brought man to perfection
without the use of suffering. Most certainly He could have conferred upon him a similar
degree of virtue without requiring any effort on his part. Yet it is easy to see that
there is a special value attaching to a conquest of difficulties such as man's actual
demands, and that in God's eyes this may well be an adequate reason for assigning
this life to us in preference to another. . . . Pain has value in respect to the next life,
but also in respect to this. The advance of scientific discovery, the gradual improve-
ment of the organization of the community, the growth of material civilization are due
in no small degree to the stimulus afforded by pain ".
"Mackie, " Evil and Omnipotence ", Mind, 1955.
 GOD AND EVIL 107

better than physical good alone, the issue is not as simple as that, for physical
evil also gives rise to and makes possible many moral evils that would not
or could not occur in the absence of physical evil. It is then urged that it
is not clear that physical evils (for example, disease and pain) plus some
moral goods (for example courage) plus some moral evil (for example, brutal-
ity) are better than physical good and those moral goods which are possible
and which would occur in the absence of physical evil.
This sort of reply, however, is not completely satisfactory. The objection
it raises is a sound one, but it proceeds by conceding too much to the theist,
and by overlooking two more basic defects of the argument. It allows
implicitly that the problem of physical evil may be reduced to the problem
of moral evil; and it neglects the two objections which show that the problem
of physical evil cannot be so reduced.
The theist therefore happily accepts this kind of reply, and argues that,
if he can give a satisfactory account of moral evil he will then have accounted
for both physical and moral evil. He then goes on to account for moral evil
in terms of the value of free will and/or its goods. This general argument
is deceptively plausible. It breaks down for the two reasons indicated here,
but it breaks down at another point as well. If free will alone is used to
justify moral evil, then even if no moral good occurred, moral evil would
still be said to be justified; but physical evil would have no justification.
Physical evil is not essential to free will; it is only justified if moral good
actually occurs, and if the moral good which results from physical evils
outweighs the moral evils. This means that the argument from free will
cannot alone justify physical evil along these lines; and it means that the
argument from free will and its goods does not justify physical evil, because
such an argument is incomplete, and necessarily incomplete. It needs to
be supplemented by factual evidence that it is logically and practically
impossible to obtain.
The correct reply, therefore, is first that the argument is irrelevant to
many instances of physical evil, and secondly that it is not true that physical
evil plus the moral good it produces is better than physical good and its
moral goods. Much pain and suffering, in fact much physical evil generally,
for example in children who die in infancy, animals and the insane passes
unnoticed; it therefore has no morally uplifting effects upon others, and
cannot by virtue of the examples chosen have such effects on the sufferers.
Further, there are physical evils such as insanity and much disease to which
the argument is inapplicable. So there is a large group of significant cases
not covered by the argument. And where the argument is relevant, its
premiss is plainly false. It can be shown to be false by exposing its implica-
tions in the following way.
We either have obligations to lessen physical evil or we have not. If
we have obligations to lessen physical evil then we are thereby reducing
the total good in the universe. If, on the other hand, our obligation is to
increase the total good in the universe it is our duty to prevent the reduction
of physical evil and possibly even to increase the total amount of physical
evil. Theists usually hold that we are obliged to reduce the physical evil
 108 H. J. MCCLOSKEY

in the universe ; but in maintaining this, the theist is, in terms of this account
of physical evil, maintaining that it is his duty to reduce the total amount
of real good in the universe, and thereby to make the universe worse. Con-
versely, if by eliminating the physical evil he is not making the universe
worse, then that amount of evil which he eliminates was unnecessary and
in need of justification. It is relevant to notice here that evil is not always
eliminated for morally praiseworthy reasons. Some discoveries have been
due to positively unworthy motives, and many other discoveries which have
resulted in a lessening of the sufferings of mankind have been due to no
higher a motive than a scientist's desire to earn a reasonable living wage.
This reply to the theist's argument brings out its untenability. The
theist's argument is seen to imply that war plus courage plus the many
other moral virtues war brings into play are better than peace and its virtues;
that famine and its moral virtues are better than plenty; that disease and
its moral virtues are better than health. Some Christians in the past, in
consistency with this mode of reasoning, opposed the use of anaesthetics to
leave scope for the virtues of endurance and courage, and they opposed
state aid to the sick and needy to leave scope for the virtues of charity and
sympathy. Some have even contended that war is a good in disguise, again
in consistency with this argument. Similarly the theist should, in terms of
this fifth argument, in his heart if not aloud regret the discovery of the
Salk polio vaccine because Dr. Salk has in one blow destroyed infinite possi-
bilities of moral good.
There are three important points that need to be made concerning this
kind of account of physical evil. (a) We are told, as by Niven, Joyce and
others, that pain is a goad to action and that part of its justification lies in
this fact. This claim is empirically false as a generalization about all people
and all pain. Much pain frustrates action and wrecks people and personal-
ities. On the other hand many men work and work well without being goaded
by pain or discomfort. Further, to assert that men need goading is to ascribe
another evil to God, for it is to claim that God made men naturally lazy.
There is no reason why God should not have made men naturally industrious;
the one is no more incompatible with free will than the other. Thus the
argument from physical evil being a goad to man breaks down on three
distinct counts. Pain often frustrates human endeavour, pain is not essential
as a goad with many men, and where pain is a goad to higher endeavours,
it is clear that less evil means to this same end are available to an omni-
potent God. (b) The real fallacy in the argument is in the assumption that
all or the highest moral excellence results from physical evil. As we have
already seen, this assumption is completely false. Neither all moral goodness
nor the highest moral goodness is triumph in the face of adversity or bene-
volence towards others in suffering. Christ Himself stressed this when He
observed that the two great commandments were commandments to love.
Love does not depend for its possibility on the existence and conquest of
evil. (c) The 'negative' moral virtues which are brought into play by the
various evils-courage, endurance, charity, sympathy and the like-besides
 GOD AND EVIL 109

not representing the highest forms of moral virtue, are in fact commonly
supposed by the theist and atheist alike not to have the value this fifth
argument ascribes to them. We-theists and atheists alike-reveal our
comparative valuations of these virtues and of physical evil when we insist
on state aid for the needy; when we strive for peace, for plenty, and for
harmony within the state.
In brief, the good man, the morally admirable man, is he who loves
what is good knowing that it is good and preferring it because it is good.
He does not need to be torn by suffering or by the spectacle of another's
sufferings to be morally admirable. Fortitude in his own sufferings, and
sympathetic kindness in others' may reveal to us his goodness; but his
goodness is not necessarily increased by such things.
Five arguments concerning physical evil have now been examined. We
have seen that the problem of physical evil is a problem in its own right,
and one that cannot be reduced to the problem of moral evil; and further,
we have seen that physical evil creates not one but a number of problems
to which no one nor any combination of the arguments examined offers a
solution.

C. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF MORAL EVIL:

The problem of moral evil is commonly regarded as being the greater
of the problems concerning evil. As we shall see, it does create what appears
to be insuperable difficulties for the theist; but so too, apparently, do physical
evils.
For the theist moral evil must be interpreted as a breach of God's law
and as a rejection of God Himself. It may involve the eternal damnation
of the sinner, and in many of its forms it involves the infliction of suffering
on other persons. Thus it aggravates the problem of physical evil, but its
own peculiar character consists in the fact of sin. How could a morally
perfect, all-powerful God create a universe in which occur such moral evils
as cruelty, cowardice and hatred, the more especially as these evils constitute
a rejection of God Himself by His creations, and as such involve them in
eternal damnation ?
The two main solutions advanced relate to free will and to the fact
that moral evil is a consequence of free will. There is a third kind of solution
more often invoked implicitly than as an explicit and serious argument,
which need not be examined here as its weaknesses are plainly evident.
This third solution is to the effect that moral evils and even the most brutal
atrocities have their justification in the moral goodness they make possible
or bring into being.
(i) Free will alone provides a justification for moraI evil: This is perhaps
the more popular of the serious attempts to explain moral evil. The argu-
ment in brief runs : men have free will; moral evil is a consequence of free
will; a universe in which men exercise free will even with lapses into moral
evil is better than a universe in which men become automata doing good
always because predestined to do so. Thus on this argument it is the mere
110 H. J. MCCLOSKEY

fact of the supreme value of free will itself that is taken to provide a justifi-
cation for its corollary moral evil.
(ii) The goods made possible by free will provide a basis for accounting
for moral evil: According to this second argument, it is not the mere fact
of free will that is claimed to be of such value as to provide a justification
of moral evil, but the fact that free will makes certain goods possible. Some
indicate the various moral virtues as the goods that free will makes possible,
whilst others point to beatitude, and others again to beatitude achieved by
man's own efforts or the virtues achieved as a result of one's own efforts.
What all these have in common is the claim that the good consequences of
free will provide a justification of the bad consequences of free will, namely
moral evil.
Each of these two proposed solutions encounters two specific criticisms,
which are fatal to their claims to be real solutions.
(i) To consider first the difficulties to which the former proposed solu-
tion is exposed. (a) A difficulty for the first argument-that it is free will
alone that provides a justification for moral evil-lies in the fact that the
theist who argues in this way has to allow that it is logically possible on
the free will hypothesis that all men should always will what is evil, and
that even so, a universe of completely evil men possessing free will is better
than one in which men are predestined to virtuous living. It has to be
contended that the value of free will itself is so immense that it more than
outweighs the total moral evil, the eternal punishment of the wicked, and
the sufferings inflicted on others by the sinners in their evilness. It is this
paradox that leads to the formulation of the second argument; and it is
to be noted that the explanation of moral evil switches to the second argu-
ment or to a combination of the first and second argument, immediately
the theist refuses to face the logical possibility of complete wickedness,
and insists instead that in fact men do not always choose what is evil.
(b) The second difficulty encountered by the first argument relates to
the possibility that free will is compatible with less evil, and even with no
evil, that is, with absolute goodness. If it could be shown that free will is
compatible with absolute goodness, or even with less moral evil than actually
occurs, then all or at least some evil will be left unexplained by free will
alone.
Mackie, in his recent paper, and Joyce, in his discussion of this argu-
ment, both contend that free will is compatible with absolute goodness.
Mackie argues that if it is not possible for God to confer free-will on men
and at the same time ensure that no moral evil is committed He cannot
really be omnipotent. Joyce directs his argument rather to fellow-theists,
and it is more of an ad hominem argument addressed to them. He writes:
" Free will need not (as is often assumed) involve the power to
choose wrong. Our ability to misuse the gift is due to the conditions
under which it is exercised here. In our present state we are able to
reject what is truly good, and exercise our power of preference in
favour of some baser attraction. Yet it is not necessary that it should
 GOD AND EVIL 111

be so. And all who accept Christian revelation admit that those who
attain their final beatitude exercise freedom of will, and yet cannot
choose aught but what is truly good. They possess the knowledge of
Essential Goodness; and to it, not simply to good in general, they refer
every choice. Moreover, even in our present condition it is open to
omnipotence so to order our circumstances and to confer on the will
such instinctive impulses that we should in every election adopt the
right course and not the wrong one ".
To this objection, that free will is compatible with absolute goodness
and that therefore a benevolent, omnipotent God would have given man free
will and ensured his absolute virtue, it is replied that God is being required
to perform what is logically impossible. It is logically impossible, so it is
argued, for free will and absolute goodness to be combined, and hence, if
God lacks omnipotence only in this respect, He cannot be claimed to lack
omnipotence in any sense in which serious theists have ascribed it to Him.
Quite clearly, if free will and absolute goodness are logically incompatible,
then God, in not being able to confer both on man does not lack omni-
potence in any important sense of the term. However, it is not clear that
free will and absolute goodness are logically opposed; and Joyce does point
to considerations which suggest that they are not logical incompatibles.
For my own part I am uncertain on this point; but my uncertainty is not
a factual one but one concerning a point of usage. It is clear that an omni-
potent God could create rational agents predestined always to make virtu-
ous ' decisions '; what is not clear is whether we should describe such agents
as having free will. The considerations to which Joyce points have something
of the status of test cases, and they would suggest that we should describe
such agents as having free will. However, no matter how we resolve the
linguistic point, the question remains-Which is more desirable, free will
and moral evil and the physical evil to which free will gives rise, or this
special free will or pseudo-free will which goes with absolute goodness ? I
suggest that the latter is clearly preferable. Later I shall endeavour to
defend this conclusion; for the moment I am content to indicate the nature
of the value judgement on which the question turns at this point.
The second objection to the proposed solution of the problem of moral
evil in terms of free will alone, related to the contention that free will is
compatible with less moral evil than occurs, and possibly with no moral
evil. We have seen what is involved in the latter contention. We may now
consider what is involved in the former. It may be argued that free will is
compatible with less moral evil than in fact occurs on various grounds.
1. God, if He were all-powerful, could miraculously intervene to prevent
some or perhaps all moral evil; and He is said to do so on occasions in answer
to prayers, (for example, to prevent wars) or of His own initiative (for
instance, by producing calamities which serve as warnings, or by working
miracles, etc.).
2. God has made man with a certain nature. This nature is often inter-
preted by theologians as having a bias to evil. Clearly God could have
112 H. J. MCCLOSKEY

created man with a strong bias to good, whilst still leaving scope for a decision
to act evilly. Such a bias to good would be compatible with freedom of
the will. 3. An omnipotent God could so have ordered the world that it
was less conducive to the practice of evil.
These are all considerations advanced by Joyce, and separately and
jointly, they establish that God could have conferred free will upon us, and
at least very considerably reduced the amount of moral evil that would
have resulted from the exercise of free will. This is sufficient to show that
not all the moral evil that exists can be justified by reference to free will
alone. This conclusion is fatal to the account of moral evil in terms of free
will alone. The more extreme conclusion that Mackie seeks to establish-
that absolute goodness is compatible with free will-is not essential as a
basis for refuting the free will argument. The difficulty is as fatal to the
claims of theism whether all moral evil or only some moral evil is unaccount-
able. However, whether Mackie's contentions are sound is still a matter of
logical interest, although not of any real moment in the context of the case
against theism, once the fact that less moral evil is compatible with free will
has been established.
(ii) The second free will argument arises out of an attempt to circumvent
these objections. It is not free will, but the value of the goods achieved
through free will that is said to be so great as to provide a justification for
moral evil.
(a) This second argument meets a difficulty in that it is now necessary
for it to be supplemented by a proof that the number of people who practise
moral virtue or who attain beatitude or who attain beatitude and/or virtue
after a struggle is sufficient to outweigh the evilness of moral evil, the
evilness of their eternal damnation and the physical evil they cause to
others. This is a serious defect in the argument, because it means that the
argument can at best show that moral evil may have a justification, and not
that it has a justification. It is both logically and practically impossible
to supplement and complete the argument. It is necessarily incomplete
and inconclusive even if its general principle is sound.
(b) This second argument is designed also to avoid the other difficulty
of the first argument-that free will may be compatible with no evil and
certainly with less evil. It is argued that even if free will is compatible
with absolute goodness it is still better that virtue and beatitude be attained
after a genuine personal struggle; and this, it is said, would not occur if
God in conferring free will nonetheless prevented moral evil or reduced
the risk of it. Joyce argues in this way:
"To receive our final beatitude as the fruit of our labours, and
as the recompense of a hard-worn victory, is an incomparably higher
destiny than to receive it without any effort on our part. And since
God in His wisdom has seen fit to give us such a lot as this, it was
inevitable that man should have the power to choose wrong. We
could not be called to merit the reward due to victory without being
exposed to the possibility of defeat ".
 GOD AND EVIL 113

There are various objections which may be urged here. First, this
argument implies that the more intense the struggle, the greater is the tri-
umph and resultant good, and the better the world; hence we should appar-
ently, on this argument, court temptation and moral struggles to attain
greater virtue and to be more worthy of our reward. Secondly, it may be
urged that God is being said to be demanding too high a price for the goods
produced. He is omniscient. He knows that many will sin and not attain
the goods or the Good free will is said to make possible. He creates men
with free will, with the natures men have, in the world as it is constituted,
knowing that in His doing so He is committing many to moral evil and
eternal damnation. He could avoid all this evil by creating men with rational
wills predestined to virtue, or He could eliminate much of it by making
men's natures and the conditions in the world more conducive to the prac-
tice of virtue. He is said not to choose to do this. Instead, at the cost of
the sacrifice of the many, He is said to have ordered things so as to allow
fewer men to attain this higher virtue and higher beatitude that result
from the more intense struggle.
In attributing such behaviour to God, and in attempting to account for
moral evil along these lines, theists are, I suggest, attributing to God im-
moral behaviour of a serious kind-of a kind we should all unhesitatingly
condemn in a fellow human being.
We do not commend people for putting temptation in the way of others.
On the contrary, anyone who today advocated, or even allowed where he
could prevent it, the occurrence of evil and the sacrifice of the many-even
as a result of their own freely chosen actions-for the sake of the higher
virtue of the few, would be condemned as an immoralist. To put severe
temptation in the way of the many, knowing that many and perhaps even
most will succumb to the temptation, for the sake of the higher virtue of
the few, would be blatant immorality; and it would be immoral whether or
not those who yielded to the temptation possessed free will. This point
can be brought out by considering how a conscientious moral agent would
answer the question : Which should I choose for other people, a world in
which there are intense moral struggles and the possibility of magnificent
triumphs and the certainty of many defeats, or a world in which there are
less intense struggles, less magnificent triumphs but more triumphs and
fewer defeats, or a world in which there are no struggles, no triumphs and
no defeats ? We are constantly answering less easy questions than this in
a way that conflicts with the theist's contentions. If by modifying our own
behaviour we can save someone else from an intense moral struggle and
almost certain moral evil, for example if by refraining from gambling or
excessive drinking ourselves we can help a weaker person not to become
a confirmed gambler or an alcoholic, or if by locking our car and not leaving
it unlocked and with the key in it we can prevent people yielding to the
temptation to become car thieves, we feel obliged to act accordingly, even
though the persons concerned would freely choose the evil course of conduct.
How much clearer is the decision with which God is said to be faced-the
choice between the higher virtue of some and the evil of others, or the higher
but less high virtue of many more, and the evil of many fewer. Neither
114 H. J. MCCLOSKEY

alternative denies free will to men.

These various difficulties dispose of each of the main arguments relating
to moral evil. There are in addition to these difficulties two other objections
that might be urged.
If it could be shown that man has not free will both arguments collapse;
and even if it could be shown that God's omniscience is incompatible with
free will they would still break down. The issues raised here are too great
to be pursued in this paper; and they can simply be noted as possible addi-
tional grounds from which criticisms of the main proposed solutions of the
problem of moral evil may be advanced.
The other general objection is by way of a follow-up to points made in
objections (b) to both arguments (i) and (ii). It concerns the relative value
of free will and its goods and evils and the value of the best of the alternatives
to free will and its goods. Are free will and its goods so much more valuable
than the next best alternatives that their superior value can really justify
the immense amount of evil that is introduced into the world by free will ?
Theologians who discuss this issue ask, Which is better-men with
free will striving to work out their own destinies, or automata-machine-
like creatures, who never make mistakes because they never make decisions ?
When put in this form we naturally doubt whether free will plus moral evil
plus the possibility of the eternal damnation of the many and the physical
evil of untold billions are quite so unjustified after all; but the fact of the
matter is that the question has not been fairly put. The real alternative
is, on the one hand, rational agents with free wills making many bad and
some good decisions on rational and non-rational grounds, and 'rational'
agents predestined always 'to choose ' the right things for the right reasons
-that is, if the language of automata must be used, rational automata. Pre-
destination does not imply the absence of rationality in all senses of that
term. God, were He omnipotent, could preordain the decisions and the
reasons upon which they were based; and such a mode of existence would
seem to be in itself a worthy mode of existence, and one preferable to an
existence with free will, irrationality and evil.

D. CONCLUSION
In this paper it has been maintained that God, were He all-powerful
and perfectly good, would have created a world in which there was no un-
necessary evil. It has not been argued that God ought to have created a
perfect world, nor that He should have made one that is in any way logically
impossible. It has simply been argued that a benevolent God could, and
would, have created a world devoid of superfluous evil. It has been contended
that there is evil in this world-unnecessary evil-and that the more popular
and philosophically more significant of the many attempts to explain this
evil are completely unsatisfactory. Hence we must conclude from the
existence of evil that there cannot be an omnipotent, benevolent God.
H. J. MCCLOSKEY
University of Melbourne.