0% found this document useful (0 votes)
1K views17 pages

Huntington The Hispanic Challenge-1 PDF

Uploaded by

ShatabdiDas
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
1K views17 pages

Huntington The Hispanic Challenge-1 PDF

Uploaded by

ShatabdiDas
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 17

Washingtonpost.

Newsweek Interactive, LLC

The Hispanic Challenge


Author(s): Samuel P. Huntington
Source: Foreign Policy, No. 141 (Mar. - Apr., 2004), pp. 30-45
Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4147547
Accessed: 14/10/2010 05:58

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=wpni.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Foreign Policy.

http://www.jstor.org
The
• •
span,c
n
, ge
The persistent inflow of Hispanic
immigrants threatens to divide the United
States into two peoples, two cultures, and
two languages. Unlike past immigrant
groups, Mexicans and other Latinos have
not assimilated into mainstream U.S.
culture, forming instead their own political
and linguistic enclaves-from Los Angeles
to Miami-and rejecting the Anglo-
Protestant values that built the American
dream. The United States ignores this
challenge at its peril.
By Samuel P. Huntington
merica was created by 17th- and reiterated by rare men and e pou ed by the public
18th-century eerier who were a an es ential component of U.S. identity.
overwhelmingly white, Briti h, By the latter year of the 19th century, however,
and Prore rant. Their value , the ethnic component had been broadened to include
in titution , and culture provided the foundation German , Iri h, and candinavian , and the United
for and haped the development of the United rare State ' religiou identity was being redefined more
in the following centurie . They initially defined broadly from Prore tant to Chri tian. With World
America in term of race, ethnicity, culture, and reli- War II and the a imilation of large number of
gion. Then, in the 18th century they al o had to ourhern and ea tern European immigrant and
define America ideologically to ju rify independ- their off pring into U.S. ociery ethnicity virtually
ence from their home country, which wa al o white, disappeared a a defining component of national
Briti h and Prote rant. Thoma Jeffer on et forth identity. o did race, following the achievements of
chi "creed," a obel Prize-winning economi t the civi l right movement and the Immigration and
Gunnar Myrdal called it, in the Declaration of Inde- arionality Act of 1965. American now ee and
pendence, and ever ince, it principle have b en endor e their country a mulriethnic and multiracial.
As a re ult, American identity i now defined in
amuel P. Hu11ti11gton is chairman of the Harvard Academy term of culture and creed.
for /11temational and Area Studies and cofounder of FoR- Mo t American ee the creed a the crucial ele-
EIG POLICY. opyright © 2004 by amuel P. Huntington. ment of their national identity. The creed, however,
From the forthcoming book Who Are We by amuel P. was the product of the di tinct Anglo-Prote rant cul-
Huntington to be published by imon & chuster, Inc. . Y. ture of the founding ettler . Key element of that cul-
Printed by permission. ture include the Engli h language; hri rianity; reli-
The Hispanic Challenge

gious commitment; English concepts of the rule of to black and white American natives. Americans like
law, including the responsibility of rulers and the to boast of their past success in assimilating millions
rights of individuals; and dissenting Protestant val- of immigrants into their society, culture, and politics.
ues of individualism, the work ethic, and the belief But Americans have tended to generalize about immi-
that humans have the ability and the duty to try to grants without distinguishing among them and have
create a heaven on earth, a "city on a hill." Histori- focused on the economic costs and benefits of immi-
cally, millions of immigrants were attracted to the gration, ignoring its social and cultural consequences.
United States because of this culture and the economic As a result, they have overlooked the unique charac-
opportunities and political liberties it made possible. teristics and problems posed by contemporary His-
Contributions from immigrant cultures modified panic immigration. The extent and nature of this
and enriched the Anglo-Protestant culture of the found- immigration differ fundamentally from those of pre-
ing settlers. The essentials of that founding culture vious immigration, and the assimilation successes of
remained the bedrock of U.S. identity, however, at the past are unlikely to be duplicated with the con-
least until the last decades of the 20th century. Would temporary flood of immigrants from Latin America.
the United States be the country that it has been and This reality poses a fundamental question: Will the
that it largely remains today if it had been settled in the
United States remain a country with a single national
17th and 18th centuries not by British Protestants language and a core Anglo-Protestant culture? By
but by French, Spanish, or Portuguese Catholics? The ignoring this question, Americans acquiesce to their
answer is clearly no. It would not be the United States;eventual transformation into two peoples with two
it would be Quebec, Mexico, or Brazil. cultures (Anglo and Hispanic) and two languages
In the final decades of the 20th century, however, (English and Spanish).
the United States' Anglo-Protestant culture and the The impact of Mexican immigration on the
creed that it produced came under assault by the United States becomes evident when one imagines
popularity in intellectual and political circles of the what would happen if Mexican immigration
doctrines of multiculturalism and diversity; the rise abruptly stopped. The annual flow of legal immi-
of group identities based on race, ethnicity, and gen- grants would drop by about 175,000, closer to
der over national identity; the impact of transna- the level recommended by the 1990s Commission
tional cultural diasporas; the expanding number of on Immigration Reform chaired by former U.S.
immigrants with dual nationalities and dual loyalties; Congresswoman Barbara Jordan. Illegal entries
and the growing salience for U.S. intellectual, busi- would diminish dramatically. The wages of low-
ness, and political elites of cosmopolitan and transna- income U.S. citizens would improve. Debates over
tional identities. The United States' national identity,the use of Spanish and whether English should be
made the official language of state
and national governments would
subside. Bilingual education and
The cultural division between Hispanics and Anglos the controversies it spawns would
virtually disappear, as would con-
could replace the racial division between blacks and troversies over welfare and other
benefits for immigrants. The
whites as the most serious cleavage in U.S. society. debate over whether immigrants
pose an economic burden on state
and federal governments would be
like that of other nation-states, is challenged by the decisively resolved in the negative. The average
forces of globalization as well as the needs that glob- education and skills of the immigrants continuing
alization produces among people for smaller and to arrive would reach their highest levels in U.S. his-
more meaningful "blood and belief" identities. tory. The inflow of immigrants would again become
In this new era, the single most immediate and highly diverse, creating increased incentives for all
most serious challenge to America's traditional iden- immigrants to learn English and absorb U.S. cul-
tity comes from the immense and continuing immi- ture. And most important of all, the possibility of
gration from Latin America, especially from Mexico, a de facto split between a predominantly Spanish-
and the fertility rates of these immigrants compared speaking United States and an English-speaking

32 FOREIGN POLICY
From Diversity to Dominance
Foreign-Born Population Living inthe United States

1960 2000
In 1960, the foreign-born population in the United States In 2000, the foreign-born population
(from the five principal countries of origin) was relatively from the top five countries was
diverse: distributed very differently:

Poland U.K. Canada Germany Italy Cuba India Philippines China Mexico
""" ,, u
_r...,,

United States would disappear, and with it, a major This situation is unique for the United States
potential threat to the country's cultural and polit- and the world. No other First World country has
ical integrity. such an extensive land frontier with a Third World
country. The significance of the long Mexican-U.S.
border is enhanced by the economic differences
A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE between the two countries. "The income gap
Contemporary Mexican and, more broadly, Latin between the United States and Mexico," Stanford
American immigration is without precedent in U.S. University historian David Kennedy has pointed
history. The experience and lessons of past immi- out, "is the largest between any two contiguous
gration have little relevance to understanding its countries in the world." Contiguity enables Mexican
dynamics and consequences. Mexican immigration immigrants to remain in intimate contact with their
differs from past immigration and most other con- families, friends, and home localities in Mexico as no
temporary immigration due to a combination of six other immigrants have been able to do.
factors: contiguity, scale, illegality, regional concen-
tration, persistence, and historical presence. Scale I The causes of Mexican, as well as other,
immigration are found in the demographic, eco-
Contiguity I Americans' idea of immigration is nomic, and political dynamics of the sending coun-
often symbolized by the Statue of Liberty, Ellis try and the economic, political, and social attractions
Island, and, more recently perhaps, New York's of the United States. Contiguity, however, obvious-
John F. Kennedy Airport. In other words, immi- ly encourages immigration. Mexican immigration
grants arrive in the United States after crossing sev- increased steadily after 1965. About 640,000 Mexi-
eral thousand miles of ocean. U.S. attitudes toward cans legally migrated to the United States in the
immigrants and U.S. immigration policies are 1970s; 1,656,000 in the 1980s; and 2,249,000 in the
shaped by such images. These assumptions and 1990s. In those three decades, Mexicans account-
policies, however, have little or no relevance for ed for 14 percent, 23 percent, and 25 percent of total
Mexican immigration. The United States is now legal immigration. These percentages do not equal
confronted by a massive influx of people from a the rates of immigrants who came from Ireland
poor, contiguous country with more than one third between 1820 and 1860, or from Germany in the
the population of the United States. They come 1850s and 1860s. Yet they are high compared to the
across a 2,000-mile border historically marked sim- highly dispersed sources of immigrants before World
ply by a line in the ground and a shallow river. War I, and compared to other contemporary immi-

MARCH I APRIL 2004 33


an ompo ed
more than half f the new Latin meri an
immigrant r ire re and b
2000, Hi pani ed a ne half of
all migrant enr ring the c nrinenral nir-
ed race . Hi pani ompo d 12 per-
em f the t cal .. population in 2000.
Thi group in rea ed b almo r 10 per enr
from 2000 t 2002 and ha n w b omc
larger than bla k . le i e ti d Hi -
a on cicuce up r 2 enr of
. population by 2 he e
hange ar driven nor ju t 1i ra-
tion bur al ertil' ercili-
t rate in nit e ti-
maced at J ni hire
2.1 for bla n, .
"Thi i the e e el-
ping un
menred in 20
enter peak hild-bearing ag in a de ade
r two the Latino hare f meri a'
p pulation will oar.'
In the mid-19th enrury ngli h peak-
fr m the Briti inated immi-
tion int th e pr - orld
r I immigratio · · ··
ui ti a 1 · f
Italia
rm uage. Bue
n ory half of
ch ri peak a in-
gl n

IL/egality I Illegal nrr · t


en, helming! p
henomen n. r al n-
cur aft r the ad pci n ti-
g . u t al add th hu e num- tuci n no national la re tri red or prohibited
b f o ea enter the nited immigrati n and o ew · m de t
ii the the number f limit . During the ing I immi-
f reign- r in r ha e grati n wa minimal and d. Th
panded imme with and Latin mer- 196 immigrari n law, che i ility of
i an · pean dian and rran p rtati n and the inren ified for prom ting
di e amar' wa to the n emigrati n d · ged rhi · -
d our : e hare on ppre · n b er Par e
pa immi tut d 27. .6 m th milli n in the
per enr f the total · - 1 J .9 n in t 14. milli n
2000. The ne t larg ti in the 1990 . ate
ipino am unted to onl . and 4. per- e full nr II ea
enr f the foreign-6 rn p pulacion. (a rding t ation men an

34 I,•~ I 1, " l',•t I•'


mission) to 350,000 during the 1990s (according to Latin city, so to speak. It's a sign of things to come,"
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service). with Spanish increasingly used as the language of
The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act commerce and government.
contained provisions to legalize the status of existing The biggest concentrations of Hispanics, however,
illegal immigrants and to reduce future illegal immi- are in the Southwest, particularly California. In 2000,
gration through employer sanctions and other means. nearly two thirds of Mexican immigrants lived in the
The former goal was achieved: Some 3.1 million ille- West, and nearly half in California. To be sure, the Los
gal immigrants, about 90 percent of them from Mex- Angeles area has immigrants from many countries,
ico, became legal "green oord" residents of the Unit- including Korea and Vietnam. The sources of Cali-
ed States. But the latter goal remains elusive. Estimates fornia's foreign-born population, however, differ
of the total number of illegal immigrants in the Unit- sharply from those of the rest of the country, with
ed States rose from 4 million in 1995 to 6 million in those from a single country, Mexico, exceeding totals
1998, to 7 million in 2000, and to between 8 and 10 for all of the immigrants from Europe and Asia. In Los
million by 2003. Mexicans accounted for 58 percent Angeles, Hispanics-overwhelmingly Mexican-far
of the total illegal population in the United States in outnumber other groups. In 2000, 64 percent of the
1990; by 2000, an estimated 4.8 million illegal Mex- Hispanics in Los Angeles were of Mexican origin, and
icans made up 69 percent of that
population. In 2000, illegal Mexi-
cans in the United States were 25
times as numerous as the next largest There is no "Americano dream." There is only
contingent, from El Salvador.
the American dream created by an
Regional Concentration I The U.S.
Founding Fathers considered the dis- Anglo-Protestant society.
persion of immigrants essential to
their assimilation. That has been the
pattern historically and continues to be the pattern for 46.5 percent of Los Angeles residents were Hispan-
most contemporary non-Hispanic immigrants. His- ic, while 29.7 percent were non-Hispanic whites. By
panics, however, have tended to concentrate region- 2010, it is estimated that Hispanics will make up
ally: Mexicans in Southern California, Cubans in more than half of the Los Angeles population.
Miami, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans (the last of Most immigrant groups have higher fertility rates
whom are not technically immigrants) in New York. than natives, and hence the impact of immigration is
The more concentrated immigrants become, the slow- felt heavily in schools. The highly diversified immi-
er and less complete is their assimilation. gration into New York, for example, creates the
In the 1990s, the proportions of Hispanics con- problem of teachers dealing with classes containing
tinued to grow in these regions of heaviest concen- students who may speak 20 different languages at
tration. At the same time, Mexicans and other His- home. In contrast, Hispanic children make up sub-
panics were also establishing beachheads elsewhere. stantial majorities of the students in the schools in
While the absolute numbers are often small, the many Southwestern cities. "No school system in a
states with the largest percentage increases in His- major U.S. city," political scientists Katrina Burgess
panic population between 1990 and 2000 were, in and Abraham Lowenthal said of Los Angeles in their
decreasing order: North Carolina (449 percent 1993 study of Mexico-California ties, "has ever
increase), Arkansas, Georgia, Tennessee, South Car- experienced such a large influx of students from a sin-
olina, Nevada, and Alabama (222 percent). His- gle foreign country. The schools of Los Angeles are
panics have also established concentrations in indi- becoming Mexican." By 2002, more than 70 percent
vidual cities and towns throughout the United States. of the students in the Los Angeles Unified School Dis-
For example, in 2003, more than 40 percent of the trict were Hispanic, predominantly Mexican, with the
population of Hartford, Connecticut, was Hispan- proportion increasing steadily; 10 percent of school-
ic (primarily Puerto Rican), outnumbering the city's children were non-Hispanic whites. In 2003, for the
38 percent black population. "Hartford," the city's first time since the 1850s, a majority of newborn chil-
first Hispanic mayor proclaimed, "has become a dren in California were Hispanic.

MARCH I APRIL 2004 35


The Hispanic Challenge

Persistence I Previous waves of immigrants eventual- sense of being on their own turf that is not shared by
ly subsided, the proportions coming from individual other immigrants."
countries fluctuated greatly, and, after 1924, immi- At times, scholars have suggested that the South-
gration was reduced to a trickle. In contrast, the cur- west could become the United States' Quebec. Both
rent wave shows no sign of ebbing and the conditions regions include Catholic people and were conquered
creating the large Mexican by Anglo-Protestant peo-
component of that wave are ples, but otherwise they
likely to endure, absent a have little in common. Que-
major war or recession. In bec is 3,000 miles from
the long term, Me~ican France, and each year sev-
immigration could decline eral hundred thousand
when the economic well- Frenchmen do not attempt
being of Mexico approxi- to enter Quebec legally or
mates that of the United illegally. History shows that
States. As of 2002, however, serious potential for conflict
U.S. gross domestic product exists when people in one
per capita was about four country begin referring to
times that of Mexico (in pur- territory in a neighboring
chasing power parity terms). country in proprietary terms
If that difference were cut in and to assert special rights
half, the economic incentives and claims to that territory.
for migration might also
drop substantially. To reach
that ratio in any meaningful future, however, would SPANGLISH AS A SECOND LANGUAGE
require extremely rapid economic growth in Mexico, In the past, immigrants originated overseas and often
at a rate greatly exceeding that of the United States. Yet, overcame severe obstacles and hardships to reach the
even such dramatic economic development would not United States. They came from many different coun-
necessarily reduce the impulse to emigrate. During tries, spoke different languages, and came legally.
the 19th century, when Europe was rapidly industri- Their flow fluctuated over time, with significant
alizing and per capita incomes were rising, 50 million reductions occurring as a result of the Civil War,
Europeans emigrated to the Americas, Asia, and Africa. World War I, and the restrictive legislation of 1924.
They dispersed into many enclaves in rural areas and
Historical Presence I No other immigrant group in U.S. major cities throughout the Northeast and Midwest.
history has asserted or could assert a historical claim They had no historical claim to any U.S. territory.
to U.S. territory. Mexicans and Mexican Americans On all these dimensions, Mexican immigration is
can and do make that claim. Almost all of Texas, fundamentally different. These differences combine to
New Mexico, Arizona, California, Nevada, and Utah make the assimilation of Mexicans into U.S. culture
was part of Mexico until Mexico lost them as a result and society much more difficult than it was for pre-
of the Texan War of Independence in 1835-1836 and vious immigrants. Particularly striking in contrast to
the Mexican-American War of 1846-1848. Mexico is previous immigrants is the failure of third- and fourth-
the only country that the United States has invaded, generation people of Mexican origin to approximate
occupied its capital-placing the Marines in the "halls U.S. norms in education, economic status, and inter-
of Montezuma"-and then annexed half its territory. marriage rates. [See charts on opposite page.]
Mexicans do not forget these events. Quite under- The size, persistence, and concentration of His-
standably, they feel that they have special rights in these panic immigration tends to perpetuate the use of
territories. "Unlike other immigrants," Boston College Spanish through successive generations. The evi-
political scientist Peter Skerry notes, "Mexicans arrive dence on English acquisition and Spanish retention
here from a neighboring nation that has suffered mil- among immigrants is limited and ambiguous. In
itary defeat at the hands of the United States; and 2000, however, more than 28 million people in the
they settle predominantly in a region that was once part United States spoke Spanish at home (10.5 percent
of their homeland .... Mexican Americans enjoy a of all people over age five), and almost 13.8 million

36 FOREIGN l'OLICY
Failure to Assimilate
Education Economic Status
The education of people of Mexican origin in the United Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans lag behind the
States lags well behind the U.S. norm. In 2000, 86.6 rest of the nation and other immigrant groups on a variety of
percent of native-born Americans had graduated from high economic indicators, including managerial and professional
school. The rates for the foreign-born population in the occupations, home ownership, and household income.
United States varied from 94.9 percent for Africans, 83.8
percent for Asians, 49.6 percent for Latin Americans overall, Managerial/Professional Positions as a Percentage of
Employed Members of Immigrant Groups 120001

tt
and down to 33.8 percent for Mexicans, who ranked lowest.
Education of Mexican Americans by Generation (1989-90)
Second Third Fourth All Americans* Canadians • Asians
- - First
-
Nohigh school 51 .5
degree rx.i 69.9 33.0 41.0 23.5
High school 24
degree rx.i .1 39.2 58.5 49.4 30.4 • Europeans • ·· Africans
Post high school 5.4 9.3 8.5 9.6
degree rx.i 45.1
' 1D1i1 Illa• lr-ll:r 1990 12.1%

..........
S...: llldaltlO lleil
AneOIS,l'ldlllltt.ao

i.-a1 •
P Gwas
s • Latin
Americans

6.3%
Mexicans

Intermarriage
In 1977, 31 percent of all U.S. marriages invoMng Hispanics \ Nativ~-born
crossed ethnic lines, compared to on~ 25.5 percent in 1994 and • Americans
28.3percent in 2CXXl. As the absolute number of Mexican immigrants
increases and their high birthrate produces more children, the
opportunities for them to many each other will increase. Home Ownership and Income of Mexican Americans,
by Generation 11989-90)
Percentage of Asian and Hispanic Women Married
Outside of their Ethnic Group (1994) First Second Third Fourth All Alllericans
- Homeowner rx.i 30.6 58.6 55.1 40.3 64.1·
Asian Hispanic
- -- Household
First Generation rx.i 18.6 8.4
Second Generation rx.i
-----------
29 2 26.4
Income of
$50,000 7.1 10.5 11.2 10.7 24.8-
or more rx.i
Third Generation rx.i 41.5 33.2
' 1990 ldmlloollllna - 1990 l.didll ltte,ca
5-Rt, lleioG.Dtlll 1~ ·tn,t,..._Sor,,y 1990" usr..ma.-1 . aod
.. ,..,. l'llwaalba.O.•llltl.lotlldSIM.' 19!0

of these spoke English worse than "very well," a 66 Spanish or more Spanish than English, 25.6 percent
percent increase since 1990. According to a U.S. spoke both languages equally, 32.7 percent more
Census Bureau report, in 1990 about 95 percent of English than Spanish, and 30.1 percent only English.
Mexican-born immigrants spoke Spanish at home; In the same study, more than 90 percent of the U.S.-
73 .6 percent of these did not speak English very born people of Mexican origin spoke English flu-
well; and 43 percent of the Mexican foreign-born ently. Nonetheless, in 1999, some 753,505 presum-
were "linguistically isolated." An earlier study in Los ably second-generation students in Southern
Angeles found different results for the U.S.-born California schools who spoke Spanish at home were
second generation. Just 11.6 percent spoke only not proficient in English.

MARCH I APRIL 2004 37


The Hispanic Challenge

English language use and fluency for first- and petence in Spanish. Second- or third-generation
second-generation Mexicans thus seem to follow the Mexican Americans who were brought up speak-
pattern common to past immigrants. Two questions ing only English have learned Spanish as adults and
remain, however. First, have changes occurred over are encouraging their children to become fluent in
time in the acquisition of English and the retention it. Spanish-language competence, University of
of Spanish by second-generation Mexican immi- New Mexico professor F. Chris Garcia has stated,
is "the one thing every Hispanic
takes pride in, wants to protect
and promote."
One index foretells the future: In 1998, "Jose" A persuasive case can be made
that, in a shrinking world, all Amer-
replaced "Michael" as the most popular name for icans should know at least one impor-
tant foreign language-Chinese,
newborn boys in both California and Texas. Japanese, Hindi, Russian, Arabic,
Urdu, French, German, or Spanish-
so as to understand a foreign culture
grants? One might suppose that, with the rapid and communicate with its people. It is quite different
expansion of the Mexican immigrant community, to argue that Americans should know a non-English
people of Mexican origin would have less incentive language in order to communicate with their fellow cit-
to become fluent in and to use English in 2000 than izens. Yet that is what the Spanish-language advocates
they had in 1970. Second, will the third generation have in mind. Strengthened by the growth of Hispan-
follow the classic pattern with fluency in English ic numbers and influence, Hispanic leaders are active-
and little or no knowledge of Spanish, or will it ly seeking to transform the United States into a bilin-
retain the second generation's fluency in both lan- gual society. "English is not enough," argues Osvaldo
guages? Second-generation immigrants often look Soto, president of the Spanish American League Against
down on and reject their ancestral language and are Discrimination. "We don't want a monolingual socie-
embarrassed by their parents' inability to communi- ty." Similarly, Duke University literature professor (and
cate in English. Presumably, whether second-gener- Chilean immigrant) Ariel Dorfman asks, "Will this
ation Mexicans share this attitude will help shape the country speak two languages or merely one?" And his
extent to which the third generation retains any answer, of course, is that it should speak two.
knowledge of Spanish. If the second generation does Hispanic organizations play a central role in
not reject Spanish outright, the third generation is also inducing the U.S. Congress to authorize cultural
likely to be bilingual, and fluency in both languages maintenance programs in bilingual education; as a
is likely to become institutionalized in the Mexican- result, children are slow to join mainstream classes.
American community. The continuing huge inflow of migrants makes it
Spanish retention is also bolstered by the over- increasingly possible for Spanish speakers in New
whelming majorities (between 66 percent and 85 York, Miami, and Los Angeles to live normal lives
percent) of Mexican immigrants and Hispanics without knowing English. Sixty-five percent of the
who emphasize the need for their children to be flu- children in bilingual education in New York are
ent in Spanish. These attitudes contrast with those Spanish speakers and hence have little incentive or
of other immigrant groups. The New Jersey-based need to use English in school.
Educational Testing Service finds "a cultural dif- Dual-language programs, which go one step beyond
ference between the Asian and Hispanic parents bilingual education, have become increasingly popular.
with respect to having their children maintain their In these programs, students are taught in both English
native language." In part, this difference undoubt- and Spanish on an alternating basis with a view to mak-
edly stems from the size of Hispanic communities, ing English-speakers fluent in Spanish and Spanish-
which creates incentives for fluency in the ancestral speakers fluent in English, thus making Spanish the
language. Although second- and third-generation equal of English and transforming the United States into
Mexican Americans and other Hispanics acquire a two-language country. Then U.S. Secretary of Edu-
competence in English, they also appear to deviate cation Richard Riley explicitly endorsed these pro-
from the usual pattern by maintaining their com- grams in his March 2000 speech, "Excelencia para

38 FOREIGN POLICY
Todos-Excellence for all." Civil rights organizations, they would otherwise receive because they can speak
church leaders (particularly Catholic ones), and many to their fellow citizens only in English.
politicians (Republican as well as Democrat) support In the debates over language policy, the late
the impetus toward bilingualism. California Republican Senator S.I. Hayakawa once
Perhaps equally important, business groups seek- highlighted the unique role of Hispanics in oppos-
ing to corner the Hispanic market support bilin- ing English. "Why is it that no Filipinos, no Kore-
gualism as well. Indeed, the orientation of U.S. busi- ans object to making English the official language?
nesses to Hispanic customers means they increasingly No Japanese have done so. And certainly not the
need bilingual employees; therefore, bilingualism is Vietnamese, who are so damn happy to be here.
affecting earnings. Bilingu~l police officers and fire- They're learning English as fast as they can and
fighters in southwestern cities such as Phoenix and winning spelling bees all across the country. But the
Las Vegas are paid more than those who only speak Hispanics alone have maintained there is a prob-
English. In Miami, one study found, families that lem. There [has been] considerable movement to
spoke only Spanish had average incomes of $18,000; make Spanish the second official language."
English-only families had average incomes of If the spread of Spanish as the United States'
$32,000; and bilingual families averaged more than second language continues, it could, in due course,
$50,000. For the first time in U.S. history, increasing have significant consequences in politics and gov-
numbers of Americans (particularly black Ameri- ernment. In many states, those aspiring to political
cans) will not be able to receive the jobs or the pay office might have to be fluent in both languages.

Early Warnings
T he special social and
cultural problems
posed by Mexican
Other scholars have reiter-
ated these warnings, emphasiz-
ing how the size, persistence,
ethnicity will be determined rela-
tively more by immigrants and
relatively less by later genera-
immigration to the United States and regional concentration of tions, shifting the balance of
have received little public atten- Mexican immigration obstruct ethnic identity toward the lan-
tion or meaningful discussion. assimilation. In 1997, sociolo- guage, culture, and ways of life
But many academic sociologists gists Richard Alba and Victor of the sending society."
and other scholars have warned Nee pointed out that the four- "A constant influx of new
of them for years. decade interruption of large- arrivals," demographers Barry
In 1983, the distinguished scale immigration after 1924 Edmonston and Jeffrey Passel
sociologist Morris Janowitz "virtually guaranteed that eth- contend, "especially in pre-
pointed to the "strong resist- nic communities and cultures dominantly immigrant neigh-
ance to acculturation among would be steadily weakened borhoods, keeps the language
Spanish-speaking residents" in over time." In contrast, continu- alive among immigrants and
the United States, and argued ation of the current high levels their children." Finally, Ameri-
that "Mexicans are unique as of Latin American immigration can Enterprise Institute scholar
an immigrant group in the "will create a fundamentally dif- Mark Falcoff also observes that
persistent strength of their ferent ethnic context from that because "the Spanish-speaking
communal bonds." As a faced by the descendants of population is being continually
result, "Mexicans, together European immigrants, for the replenished by newcomers
with other Spanish-speaking new ethnic communities are faster than that population is
populations, are creating a highly likely to remain large, being assimilated," the wide-
bifurcation in the social-political culturally vibrant, and institu- spread use of Spanish in the
structure of the United States tionally rich." Under current United States "is a reality that
that approximates nationali- conditions, sociologist Douglas cannot be changed, even over
ty divisions .... " Massey agrees, "the character of the longer term." -S.P.H.

MARCH I APRIL 2004 39


The Hispanic Challenge

Bilingual candidates for president and elected fed- BLOOD IS THICKER THAN BORDERS
eral positions would have an advantage over Eng- Massive Hispanic immigration affects the United States
lish-only speakers. If dual-language education in two significant ways: Important portions of the
becomes prevalent in elementary and secondary country become predominantly Hispanic in language
schools, teachers will increasingly be expected to be and culture, and the nation as a whole becomes bilin-
bilingual. Government documents and forms could gual and bicultural. The most important area where
routinely be published in both languages. The use Hispanization is proceeding rapidly is, of course, the
of both languages could become acceptable in con- Southwest. As historian Kennedy argues, Mexican
gressional hearings and debates and in the gener- Americans in the Southwest will soon have "suffi-
al conduct of govern~ent cient coherence and critical
business. Because most of mass in a defined region
those whose first lan- so that, if they choose, they
guage is Spanish will also can preserve their distinc-
probably have some flu- tive culture indefinitely.
ency in English, English They could also eventual-
speakers lacking fluency ly undertake to do what
in Spanish are likely to no previous immigrant
be and feel at a disad- group could have dreamed
vantage in the competi- of doing: challenge the
tion for jobs, promotions, existing cultural, political,
and contracts. [See side- legal, commercial, and
bar on opposite page.] educational systems to
In 1917, former U.S. change fundamentally not
President Theodore Roo- only the language but also
sevelt said: "We must the very institutions in
have but one flag. We which they do business."
must also have but one Anecdotal evidence of
language. That must be such challenges abounds.
the language of the Dec- In 1994, Mexican Ameri-
laration of Independence, cans vigorously demon-
of Washington's Farewell strated against California's
address, of Lincoln's Gettysburg speech and second Proposition 187-which limited welfare benefits to
inaugural." By contrast, in June 2000, U.S. presi- children of illegal immigrants-by marching through
dent Bill Clinton said, "I hope very much that I'm the streets of Los Angeles waving scores of Mexican
the last president in American history who can't flags and carrying U.S. flags upside down. In 1998,
speak Spanish." And in May 2001, President Bush at a Mexico-United States soccer match in Los Ange-
celebrated Mexico's Cinco de Mayo national hol- les, Mexican Americans booed the U.S. national
iday by inaugurating the practice of broadcasting anthem and assaulted U.S. players. Such dramatic
the weekly presidential radio address to the Amer- rejections of the United States and assertions of Mex-
ican people in both English and Spanish. In Sep- ican identity are not limited to an extremist minori-
tember 2003, one of the first debates among the ty in the Mexican-American community. Many Mex-
Democratic Party's presidential candidates also ican immigrants and their offspring simply do not
took place in both English and Spanish. Despite the appear to identify primarily with the United States.
opposition of large majorities of Americans, Span- Empirical evidence confirms such appearances.
ish is joining the language of Washington, Jeffer- A 1992 study of children of immigrants in Southern
son, Lincoln, the Roosevelts, and the Kennedys as California and South Florida posed the following
the language of the United States. If this trend con- question: "How do you identify, that is, what do you
tinues, the cultural division between Hispanics and call yourself?" None of the children born in Mexi-
Anglos could replace the racial division between co answered "American," compared with 1.9 per-
blacks and whites as the most serious cleavage in cent to 9.3 percent of those born elsewhere in Latin
U.S. society. America or the Caribbean. The largest percentage of

40 FOREIGN POLICY
The Threat of White Nativism.?
I n the 1993 film Falling
Down, Michael Douglas
plays a white former
foretell the replacement of white
culture by black or brown cul-
tures that are intellectually and
will react like Bosnian Serbs is
about zero. The chance that they
will not react at all is also about
defense company employee morally inferior. zero. Indeed, they already have
reacting to the humiliations that Changes in the U.S. racial reacted by approving initiatives
he sees imposed on him by a balance underlie these concerns. against benefits for illegal immi-
multicultural society. "From the Non-Hispanic whites dropped grants, affirmative action, and
get-go," wrote David Gates in from 75.6 percent of the popu- bilingual education, as well as
Newsweek, "the film pits Dou- lation in 1990 to 69.1 percent in by the movement of whites out
glas-the picture of obsolescent 2000. In California-as in of the state. As more Hispanics
rectitude with his white shirt, Hawaii, New Mexico, and the become citizens and politically
tie, specs, and astronaut hair- District of Columbia-non-His- active, white groups are likely to
cut-against a rainbow coali- panic whites are now a minor- look for other ways of protecting
tion of Angelenos. It's a cartoon ity. Demographers predict that, themselves.
vision of the beleaguered white by 2040, non-Hispanic whites Industrialization in the late
male in multicultural America." could be a minority of all Ameri- 19th century produced losses for
A plausible reaction to the cans. Moreover, for several U.S. farmers and led to agrarian
demographic changes underway decades, interest groups and protest groups, including the
in the United States could be the government elites have pro- Populist movement, the Grange,
rise of an anti-Hispanic, anti- moted racial preferences and the Nonpartisan League, and
black, and anti-immigrant move- affirmative action, which favor the American Farm Bureau Fed-
ment composed largely of white, blacks and nonwhite immi- eration. Today, white nativists
working- and middle-class males, grants. Meanwhile, pro-global- could well ask: If blacks and
protesting their job losses to ization policies have shifted jobs Hispanics organize and lobby
immigrants and foreign coun- outside the United States, aggra- for special privileges, why not
tries, the perversion of their cul- vated income inequality, and whites? If the National Associa-
ture, and the displacement of promoted declining real wages tion for the Advancement of
their language. Such a movement for working-class Americans. Colored People and the Nation-
can be labeled "white nativism." Actual and perceived losses al Council of La Raza are legit-
"Cultured, intelligent, and in power and status by any imate organizations, why not a
often possessing impressive social, ethnic, racial, or economic national organization promot-
degrees from some of America's group almost always produce ing white interests?
premier colleges and universities, efforts to reverse those losses. In White nationalism is "the
this new breed of white racial 1961, the population of Bosnia next logical stage for identity
advocate is a far cry from the and Herzegovina was 4 3 percent politics in America," argues
populist politicians and hooded Serb and 26 percent Muslim. In Swain, making the United
Klansmen of the Old South," 1991, it was 31 percent Serb and States "increasingly at risk of
writes Carol Swain in her 2002 44 percent Muslim. The Serbs large-scale racial conflict
book, The New White National- reacted with ethnic cleansing. In unprecedented in our nation's
ism in America. These new white 1990, the population of Califor- history." The most powerful
nationalists do not advocate nia was 57 percent non-Hispan- stimulus to such white nativism
white racial supremacy but ic white and 26 percent Hispan- will be the cultural and linguis-
believe in racial self-preservation ic. By 2040, it is predicted to be tic threats whites see from the
and affirm that culture is a prod- 31 percent non-Hispanic white expanding power of Hispanics
uct of race. They contend that and 48 percent Hispanic. The in U.S. society.
the shifting U.S. demographics chance that California whites -S.P.H.

MARCH I APRIL 2004 41


The Hispanic Challenge

Mexican-born children (41.2 percent) identified Miamians spoke a language other than English at
themselves as "Hispanic," and the second largest home, compared to 55.7 percent of the residents of
(36.2 percent) chose "Mexican." Among Mexican- Los Angeles and 47.6 percent of New Yorkers. (Of
American children born in the United States, less Miamians speaking a non-English language at home,
than 4 percent responded "American," compared to 87.2 percent spoke Spanish.) In 2000, 59.5 percent
28.5 percent to 50 percent of those born in the of Miami residents were foreign-born, compared to
United States with parents from elsewhere in Latin 40.9 percent in Los Angeles, 36.8 percent in San
America. Whether born in Mexico or in the United Francisco, and 35.9 percent in New York. In 2000,
States, Mexican children overwhelmingly did not only 31.1 percent of adult Miami residents said they
choose "American" as their primary identification. spoke English very well, compared to 39.0 percent
Demographically, socially, and culturally, the recon- in Los Angeles, 42.5 percent in San Francisco, and
quista (re-conquest) of the Southwest United States by 46.5 percent in New York.
Mexican immigrants is well underway. A meaningful The Cuban takeover had major consequences
move to reunite these territories with Mexico seems for Miami. The elite and entrepreneurial class flee-
unlikely, but Prof. Charles Truxillo of the University ing the regime of Cuban dictator Fidel Castro in
of New Mexico predicts that by 2080 the southwest- the 1960s started dramatic economic development
ern states of the United States and the northern states in South Florida. Unable to send money home,
of Mexico will form La Republica del Norte (The they invested in Miami. Personal income growth in
Republic of the North). Various writers have referred Miami averaged 11.5 percent a year in the 1970s
to the southwestern United States plus northern Mex- and 7. 7 percent a year in the 1980s. Payrolls in
ico as "MexAmerica" or "Amexica" or "Mexifornia." Miami-Dade County tripled between 1970 and
"We are all Mexicans in this valley," a former coun- 1995. The Cuban economic drive made Miami an
ty commissioner of El Paso, Texas, declared in 2001. international economic dynamo, with expanding
This trend could consolidate the Mexican-dominant international trade and investment. The Cubans
areas of the United States into an autonomous, cul- promoted international tourism, which, by the
turally and linguistically distinct, and economically 1990s, exceeded domestic tourism and made
self-reliant bloc within the United States. "We may be Miami a leading center of the cruise ship industry.
building toward the one thing that will choke the melt- Major U.S. corporations in manufacturing, com-
ing pot," warns former National Intelligence Council munications, and consumer products moved their
Vice Chairman Graham Fuller, "an ethnic area and Latin American headquarters to Miami from other
grouping so concentrated that it will not wish, or need, U.S. and Latin American cities. A vigorous Spanish
to undergo assimilation into the mainstream of Ameri- artistic and entertainment community emerged.
can multi-ethnic English-speaking life." Today, the Cubans can legitimately claim that, in
A prototype of such a region already exists-in the words of Prof. Damian Fernandez of Florida
Miami. International University, "We built modern
Miami," and made its economy larger than those
of many Latin American countries.
BIENVENIDO A MIAMI A key part of this development was the expan-
Miami is the most Hispanic large city in the 50 U.S. sion of Miami's economic ties with Latin America.
states. Over the course of 30 years, Spanish speak- Brazilians, Argentines, Chileans, Colombians, and
ers-overwhelmingly Cuban-established their dom- Venezuelans flooded into Miami, bringing their
inance in virtually every aspect of the city's life, fun- money with them. By 1993, some $25.6 billion in
damentally changing its ethnic composition, culture, international trade, mostly involving Latin
politics, and language. The Hispanization of Miami America, moved through the city. Throughout the
is without precedent in the history of U.S. cities. hemisphere, Latin Americans concerned with
The economic growth of Miami, led by the early investment, trade, culture, entertainment, holidays,
Cuban immigrants, made the city a magnet for and drug smuggling increasingly turned to Miami.
migrants from other Latin American and Caribbean Such eminence transformed Miami into a
countries. By 2000, two thirds of Miami's people Cuban-led, Hispanic city. The Cubans did not, in
were Hispanic, and more than half were Cuban or the traditional pattern, create an enclave immigrant
of Cuban descent. In 2000, 75 .2 percent of adult neighborhood. Instead, they created an enclave city

42 FOREIGN POLICY
with it own culture and
economy, in which a imita-
tion and mericanizarion
were unnece ary and in
ome mea ure uncle ired. By
2000, pani h wa not ju t
the language poken in mo t
home , it wa al o the prin i-
pal language of commerce,
bu ine , and politic . the
media and communication
indu try became increa ingly
Hi panic. In 1998, a pani h-
language televi ion ration
became the number-one ra-
tion watched by Miamian -
the fir t time a foreign-lan-
guage cation achieved chat
rating in a major U . . city.
"They're out ider , ' one uc-
ce fut Hi panic aid of non-
Hi panic . Here we are member of the power could leave Miami, and between 1983 and 1993,
tructure another boa red. about 140,000 did ju t that, their exodu reflect-
In Miami there i no pre ure to be American,' ed in a popular bumper ticker: "Will the la t
one Cuban-born ociologi t ob erved. "People can American to leave Miami plea e bring the flag. '
make a living perfectly well in an enclave that peak
pani h." By 1999, the head of iami' large t
bank, large t real e tare development ompany, and CO T EM PT O F CULTU R E
large t law firm were all Cuban-born or of Cuban I Miami the future for Lo Angele and the outh-
de ent. The Cuban al o e tabli hed their domi- we t United rate ? In the end the re ult could be
nance in politic . By 1999, the mayor of Miami and imilar: the creation of a large, di rinct pani h-
the mayor police chief and tate attorney of Miami- peaking community with economic and political
Dade County plu two third of Miami' U . . re ource ufficient to u rain it Hi panic identity
ongre ional delegation and nearly one half of it apart from the national identity of other American
rate legi lator were of uban origin. In the wake and al o able to influence U .. politic , government
of the lian Gonzalez affair in 2000, the non- and ociety. However the proce e by which thi
Hi panic city manager and police chief in Miami re ult might come about differ. The Hi panization of
ity were replaced by uban . Miami ha been rapid explicit and economically
The Cuban and Hi pani dominance of Miami driven . The Hi panization of the outhwe t ha
left Anglo (a well a black ) a out ide minoritie been lower, unrelenting and politically driven. The
that could often be ignored. Unable to communi- uban influx into Florida wa intermittent and
cate with government bureaucrat and di crimi- re ponded to the policie of the uban government.
nated again t by tore clerk , the Anglo came to Mexican immigration on the other hand i con-
realize, a one of them put it "My God thi i what tinuou include a large illegal component and
it like to be the minority. ' The Anglo had three how no ign of tapering. The Hi pani (that i
choice . They could accept their ubordinate and largely Me ican) population of outhern alifornia
out ider po ition . They could attempt to adopt fare ceed in number but ha yet to reach the pro-
the manner , cu tom , and language of the Hi - portion of the Hi panic population of Miami-
pani and a imitate into the Hi panic communi- though it i in rea ing rapidly.
ty-' a ulturation in re er e ' a the cholar le- The early uban immigrant in outh Florida
jandro Porte and le tepick labeled it. Or they were largely middle and upper eta . ub equent

\ \ \I, 1 1\ 1 11 • i 43
The Hispanic Challenge

immigrants were more lower class. In the South- IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES


west, overwhelming numbers of Mexican immi- The persistence of Mexican immigration into the Unit-
grants have been poor, unskilled, and poorly edu- ed States reduces the incentives for cultural assimila-
cated, and their children are likely to face similar tion. Mexican Americans no longer think of themselves
conditions. The pressures toward Hispanization as members of a small minority who must accommo-
in the Southwest thus come from below, whereas date the dominant group and adopt its culture. As their
those in South Florida came from above. In the long numbers increase, they become more committed to
run, however, numbers are power, particularly in their own ethnic identity and culture. Sustained numer-
a multicultural society,
, a political democracy, and ical expansion promotes cultural consolidation and
a consumer economy. leads Mexican Americans not to minimize but to glory
Another major difference concerns the relations in the differences between their culture and U.S. cul-
of Cubans and Mexicans with their countries of ori- ture. As the president of the National Council of La
gin. The Cuban community has been united in its Raza said in 1995: "The biggest problem we have is
hostility to the Castro regime and in its efforts to a cultural clash, a clash between our values and the val-
punish and overthrow that regime. The Cuban gov- ues in American society." He then went on to spell out
ernment has responded in kind. The Mexican com- the superiority of Hispanic values to American values.
munity in the United States has been more ambiva- In similar fashion, Lionel Sosa, a successful Mexican-
lent and nuanced in its attitudes toward the American businessman in Texas, in 1998 hailed the
Mexican government. Since the 1980s, however, emerging Hispanic middle-class professionals who
the Mexican government has sought to expand the look like Anglos, but whose "values remain quite dif-
numbers, wealth, and political power of the Mex- ferent from an Anglo's."
ican community in the U.S. Southwest and to inte- To be sure, as Harvard University political scien-
grate that population with Mexico. "The Mexican tist Jorge I. Dominguez has pointed out, Mexican
nation extends beyond the territory enclosed by its Americans are more favorably disposed toward
borders," Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo said in democracy than are Mexicans. Nonetheless, "fero-
the 1990s. His successor, Vicente Fox, called Mex- cious differences" exist between U.S. and Mexican cul-
ican emigrants "heroes" and describes himself as tural values, as Jorge Castaneda (who later served as
president of 123 million Mexicans, 100 million in Mexico's foreign minister) observed in 1995. Cas-
Mexico and 23 million in the United States. taneda cited differences in social and economic equal-
As their numbers increase, Mexican Americans ity, the unpredictability of events, concepts of time epit-
feel increasingly comfortable with their own culture omized in the maiiana syndrome, the ability to achieve
and often contemptuous of American culture. They results quickly, and attitudes toward history, expressed
demand recognition of their culture and the historic in the "cliche that Mexicans are obsessed with histo-
Mexican identity of the U.S. Southwest. They call ry, Americans with the future." Sosa identifies sever-
attention to and celebrate their Hispanic and Mex- al Hispanic traits (very different from Anglo-Protestant
ican past, as in the 1998 ceremonies and festivities ones) that "hold us Latinos back": mistrust of people
in Madrid, New Mexico, attended by the vice pres- outside the family; lack of initiative, self-reliance, and
ident of Spain, honoring the establishment 400 ambition; little use for education; and acceptance of
years earlier of the first European settlement in poverty as a virtue necessary for entrance into heav-
the Southwest, almost a decade before Jamestown. en. Author Robert Kaplan quotes Alex Villa, a third-
As the New York Times reported in September generation Mexican American in Tucson, Arizona,
1999, Hispanic growth has been able to "help as saying that he knows almost no one in the Mexi-
'Latinize' many Hispanic people who are finding it can community of South Tucson who believes in "edu-
easier to affirm their heritage .... [T]hey find cation and hard work" as the way to material pros-
strength in numbers, as younger generations grow perity and is thus willing to "buy into America."
up with more ethnic pride and as a Latin influence Profound cultural differences clearly separate Mexicans
starts permeating fields such as entertainment, and Americans, and the high level of immigration
advertising, and politics." One index foretells the from Mexico sustains and reinforces the prevalence of
future: In 1998, "Jose" replaced "Michael" as the Mexican values among Mexican Americans.
most popular name for newborn boys in both Cal- Continuation of this large immigration (without
ifornia and Texas. improved assimilation) could divide the United States

44 FOREIGN POLICY
into a country of two languages and two cultures. more than three centuries. Americans should not let
A few stable, prosperous democracies-such as that change happen unless they are convinced that
Canada and Belgium-fit this pattern. The differ- this new nation would be a better one.
ences in culture within these countries, however, do Such a transformation would not only revolu-
not approximate those between the United States and tionize the United States, but it would also have
Mexico, and even in these countries language dif- serious consequences for Hispanics, who will be in
ferences persist. Not many Anglo-Canadians are the United States but not of it. Sosa ends his book,
equally fluent in English and French, and the Cana- The Americana Dream, with encouragement for
dian government has had tq impose penalties to get aspiring Hispanic entrepreneurs. "The Americana
its top civil servants to achieve dual fluency. Much dream?" he asks. "It exists, it is realistic, and it is
the same lack of dual competence is true of Walloons there for all of us to share." Sosa is wrong. There is
and Flemings in Belgium. The transformation of no Americana dream. There is only the American
the United States into a country like these would not dream created by an Anglo-Protestant society. Mex-
necessarily be the end of the world; it would, how- ican Americans will share in that dream and in that
ever, be the end of the America we have known for society only if they dream in English. W

Want to Know More?

For an overview of U.S. immigration, see David Heer's Immigration in America's Future: Social Sci-
ence Findings and the Policy Debate (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996). Roger Daniels provides a recent
history of U.S. immigration policy in Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigrants and Immi-
gration Policy Since 1882 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2003). A sophisticated analysis of the costs and
benefits of immigration is George J. Borjas's Heaven's Door: Immigration Policy and the American Econ-
omy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

On the ability of immigrants to assimilate, consult Milton M. Gordon's Assimilation in American


Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).
Richard Alba and Victor Nee analyze developments since the 1960s in Remaking the American Main-
stream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).
See also Barry Edmonston and Jeffrey S. Passel's (eds.) Immigration and Ethnicity: The Integration of
America's Newest Arrivals (Washington: Urban Institute Press, 1994). Bill Richardson encourages U.S.
Hispanics to affect U.S. foreign policy in "Hispanic American Concerns" (FOREIGN POLICY, Fall 1985).

For an overview of Mexican immigration issues, consult the studies in Crossings: Mexican Immi-
gration in Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge: Harvard University's David Rockefeller Cen-
ter for Latin American Studies, 1998), edited by Marcelo M. Suarez-Orozco. Very different but equal-
ly important aspects of U.S.-Mexican relations are discussed in Abraham F. Lowenthal and Katrina
Burgess's (eds.) The California-Mexico Connection (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993) and
Jorge I. Dominguez and Rafael Fernandez de Castro's The United States and Mexico (New York:
Routledge, 2001 ). Excellent explorations of the U.S.-Mexican border include Robert S. Leiken's The
Melting Border: Mexico and Mexican Communities in the United States (Washington: Center for
Equal Opportunity, 2000) and Peter Andreas's Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Itha-
ca: Cornell University Press, 2000). Doris Meissner offers her perspectives and experiences on
immigration and security in the interview "On the Fence" (FOREIGN POLICY, March/April 2002).
Finally, for a superb study of the psychology, sociology, and politics of Mexican Americans, see Peter
Skerry's Mexican Americans: The Ambivalent Minority (New York: Free Press, 1993).

» For links to relevant Web sites, access to the FP Archive, and a comprehensive index of related
FOREIGN POLICY articles, go to www.foreignpolicy.com.

MARCH I APRIL 2004 45

You might also like